Proposal
This paper posits a new way of attempting to formulate theories of machine consciousness. At present, inquiry revolves around formulating criteria that could be applied to machines to determine if they possess human-like consciousness. The paper demonstrates that efforts so far have not been fruitful, instead finding that present methods of inquiry are destined to result in an impasse between those who support the notion of machine consciousness and those who oppose it. Consequently, the paper questions the assumption that human and machine consciousness must resemble each other. It explores a different approach, one that rejects the idea that the two forms of consciousness need to be defined under the same theories. The paper then posits that it may be preferable to develop separate theories for human and machine consciousness, ones that may not be comparable to each other, although it does not go so far as to posit specific theories for either “class” of consciousness. This change of methodology would open new avenues of inquiry in the philosophy of mind and allow a greater number of scientists to contribute to formulating such theories.
Recommended Citation
Freeman, Derek
(2024)
"And You Don't Seem to Understand: Disanalogies Between Artificial and Biological Consciousness,"
The Journal of Purdue Undergraduate Research:
Vol. 14, Article 4.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7771/2158-4052.1706