Abstract

I this paper, I introduce an internalist theory of justification which I call restricted internalist reliabilism. The main concern of the theory is to explain when a belief source, particularly perceptual experiences, can be a source of justification. I will discuss three alternative internalist theories: dogmatism, conservatism and internalist reliabilism and discuss objections and difficulties associated with each. I will then argue how restricted internalist reliabilism can address many of those objections. Also I present the response that each of these theories provide against the skeptic and argue for superiority of restricted internalist reliabilism’s response compared to the other three theories.

Degree Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts (MA)

Department

Philosophy

Date of Award

January 2015

First Advisor

Matthias Steup

Committee Member 1

Paul Draper

Committee Member 2

Rod Bertolet

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