The problem of conflicting truths and Nelson Goodman's ontological pluralism

Bruce Philip Dutra, Purdue University

Abstract

In a number of his later works, Nelson Goodman defends the claim that there are many actual worlds. In this dissertation I focus on this claim and the arguments he makes in its favor. In particular, my discussion. of Goodman's pluralism is couched within an investigation of what I call ‘the problem of conflicting truths’. This problem arises from the recognition that there appear to be pairs of true statements such that each statement in the pair conflicts with the other. One example of which Goodman is particularly fond involves the statements ‘The earth revolves around the sun,’ often regarded as true when we are concerned with astronomical topics, and ‘The earth stands still,’ usually regarded as true when we discuss the movement of medium-sized objects on or near the surface of the earth. It would seem that if we take any such appearances as an indication of reality, we will be forced to concede the truth of a contradiction. Given this, the challenge is to pinpoint the source of this problem: does it lie with the supposition that there are conflicting truths, or in the steps that lead from that supposition to the untoward conclusion that there are true contradictions? Goodman responds to this challenge by denying that the acceptance of such truths forces one to countenance a true contradiction; for he argues that the only acceptable way to avoid the problem is to treat each of the statements in a conflicting pair of truths as true relative to separate but actual worlds. But this response to the problem is by no means the only one to have been offered. Accordingly, I discuss a number of alternate suggestions, based on the writings of Carnap, Davidson, and Quine; and I argue that there are drawbacks to all of the suggestions I examine, including Goodman's. I conclude by devising a somewhat original but certainly controversial way of skirting around the difficulties presented by the problem of conflicting truths, one which suggests that the many worlds of which Goodman is prone to speak can be summed into one world without conflict.

Degree

Ph.D.

Advisors

Bertolet, Purdue University.

Subject Area

Philosophy

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