Why workers reject their unions in NLRB-supervised elections: Three empirical studies

Gregory S Jelf, Purdue University

Abstract

This paper presents a literature review and critique of union decertification and deauthorization research, and develops a theory to explain workers' voting behavior in these elections. The theory incorporates theoretical viewpoints from several research traditions: the expected utility, social-political, and workplace voice perspectives. The theory was tested using samples of decertification (Study 1) and deauthorization (Study 2) elections. In the decertification tests, the expected utility and workplace voice perspectives received support, but the social-political perspective did not. In particular, the expected utility test showed the local union-nonunion wage gap and the local unemployment rate as significant determinants of decertification, presumably because workers value the economic benefits delivered by unionization. In the workplace voice test, bargaining units probabilistically having a higher proportion of female workers, and bargaining units who probabilistically perform hazardous work, were less prone to decertify, presumably because they desired union representation to safeguard their workplace rights and safety. Also, several union and management campaign effects were estimated and received support in the decertification tests; voter turnout, unfair labor practices, and the importance of the local union to an international all predicted decertification. However, no tests of any of the theoretical perspectives, or of campaign effects, received support in the deauthorization sample. Furthermore, tests of the Early Warning Signal Hypothesis in the deauthorization sample received no support. In a third study (Study 3), simulations using decertification and deauthorization elections highlight the implications of voting rule changes on union success.

Degree

Ph.D.

Advisors

Dworkin, Purdue University.

Subject Area

Management|Labor relations

COinS