Inadequacy of individualistic conceptions of moral responsibility

Samuel Oluoch Imbo, Purdue University

Abstract

Individualistic theories of responsibility rely on an atomistic account of human nature. Their point of departure is the disentangled first-person-singular, the individual who is a rights-holder, autonomous, self-regarding and self-fulfilling. The world, however, has increasingly and unalterably become a global village in which the fate of the global community is shared. In this dissertation I argue for a notion of community extending beyond national boundaries as the point of departure for any adequate theory of responsibility. Further, and in opposition to liberal individualists, I argue that the global community is one we are thrust into non-voluntarily and not one we choose. To reconceptualize responsibility along these lines, I advance a communitarian view borrowing from the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel. The communitarianism however differs from the more common fore-mentioned forms because it incorporates insights from the Luo community of Kenya, Japanese society and computer-mediated communities. From these diverse sources conclusions are drawn that add new dimensions to communitarian discourses. The Luo and Japanese examples point to the social web and interrelationships from which one cannot opt out. The cyberspace metaphor points to a conception of community which transcends the usual limitations of place, time and physical attributes. Combining these insights I advance a view of community in which, to paraphrase Sartre, the members are condemned to be responsible.

Degree

Ph.D.

Advisors

McBride, Purdue University.

Subject Area

Philosophy

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