The impact of competition on information aggregation in external reports
Abstract
Firms often claim that providing detailed financial data hurts their competitive interests. However, very little is understood or documented about specifically how these competitive forces shape the aggregation choices of firms. This thesis analytically examines the following questions: (1) When disclosure choices are made after observing private information, how do firms aggregate their data to protect their competitive interests? How do disclosure policies change as the typically assumed disclose-all-or-disclose-nothing disclosure options are extended to include aggregated disclosures as an option as well? (2) Are single-product firm's incentive to share information the same as those of a multiproduct firm's? (3) How does the presence of firms that produce both substitute and complementary products affect a firm's incentive to publicly reveal its cost information? and (4) Given the presence of competitors, how would a multi-segment firm group its products into segments for external reporting purposes?
Degree
Ph.D.
Advisors
Thoman, Purdue University.
Subject Area
Accounting|Economic theory
Off-Campus Purdue Users:
To access this dissertation, please log in to our
proxy server.