Autonomy, second-order states, and critical reflection
Abstract
Harry Frankfurt, Gerald Dworkin and others have helped themselves to the concept of higher-order intentional states to flesh out important ethical concepts. Research in both philosophy and psychology present serious difficulties with taking this approach. In philosophy Daniel Dennett's arguments regarding competing intentional descriptions for the same behavior make specifying what behavior would count as evidence for a second-order intentional description problematic. In psychology current research indicates that subjects do not have introspective access to their mental processes which suggests that first-person reports may not solve the problem Dennett presents. It is argued that if we understand the second-order states as being the result of the process of critical reflection and insist, contrary to Dworkin, that this process be a conscious one, we can expect people to give us accurate self-reports thus solving the original problem presented.
Degree
Ph.D.
Advisors
Russow, Purdue University.
Subject Area
Philosophy|Psychology
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