Europe and the United States defense establishment: American military policy and strategy, 1815-1821

Michael Stuart Fitzgerald, Purdue University

Abstract

Following the defeats and frustrations of the War of 1812, the United States undertook an extensive reformation of its defense establishment and a substantial build-up of its military and naval forces. Historians have often ascribed this unprecedented interest in a stronger military to the "lessons" of the war. They have also credited it to a burgeoning postwar nationalism, buttressed by economic prosperity and a healthy United States Treasury. The demise of the military program in 1821 has been conversely ascribed to a waning of that nationalism, and the Panic of 1819 and its deleterious impact on Federal revenues. This dissertation seeks to explain this cyclical pattern in postwar American military policy through reference to the above-mentioned factors, but also through examination of the roles of domestic politics, American expansionism and the international situation. My research indicates that American expansionism and the chaotic condition of post-Revolutionary Europe and South America influenced military policy far more than any other factors. The retention of an enlarged, peacetime army in 1815 reflected an American belief that a renewal of major European wars was a strong possibility, as was also the possibility of further conflict with Great Britain over issues left unresolved by the Treaty of Ghent. American interest in military strength remained strong even after the threat of an immediate resumption of war had passed. The larger army survived Congressional scrutiny in 1816, and a major ship building program was enacted in the same year. These forces were essential diplomatic tools in the United States' efforts to take Florida from Spain and secure a favorable western boundary for the Louisiana Purchase. By the terms of the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819, Spain surrendered Florida and the western limits of the United States were defined. The Panic of 1819 provided the followers of William H. Crawford and Henry Clay with financial arguments to use in an attack on the size of the military establishment. Their ultimate goal was to inflict damage on the Presidential prospects of Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams and John C. Calhoun. Nevertheless, the military program survived because the Spanish refused to ratify the treaty. When word did reach Washington of Spain's ratification in early 1821, reduction of the army and a scaling back in naval building immediately followed.

Degree

Ph.D.

Advisors

Rothenberg, Purdue University.

Subject Area

American history|Political science

COinS