THE EXISTENCE OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUILIBRIA AND THE POSSIBILITY OF MANIPULATION (COMMITTEE, CHAIRMAN, AGENDA)
Abstract
This dissertation explores the existence of voting equilibria in a variety of institutional settings. A model of institutional choice is developed that includes multidimensional committee choice spaces and committee chairmen who have the ability to control the agenda within their respective committees by requiring that the final outcome lie on a vector of their choosing that includes the inherited status quo as a point. It is shown that within various types of institutional settings, structure-induced equilibria always exist when this type of agenda control is used. Furthermore, although the chairman has limited power with regard to forcing his committee to approve a given point, he can effectively veto any proposal that he does not like as well as the status quo. The existence of structure-induced equilibria is also examined under different assumptions regarding the chairman's agenda setting powers. Specifically, rather than declaring a voting vector, the chariman is assumed to be able to choose and order a finite number of points from the choice space on which the committee may vote. It is shown that structure-induced equilibria also exist in this setting, and the set of points which the chairman can make the outcome is characterized in a variety of settings. A similar study is undertaken for the case when the chairman must take a finite set of proposals as given and may only determine the order in which the votes will be taken. Lastly, for the voting vector model of agenda control, a partial ordering of the distribution of committee members' preferences is developed that reveals under which distributions the chairman has the most power, with power measured by the utility he receives from the adopted proposal.
Degree
Ph.D.
Subject Area
Economic theory
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