POLITICAL REPRESSION AND MONETARIST STABILIZATION IN POST-WAR ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND MEXICO (POLITICAL VIOLENCE, LATIN AMERICA, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT)
Abstract
A variety of analysts have speculated that monetarist macro-economic stabilization policies lead to a higher incidence of political repression. The current work systematically analyzes this relationship. A theoretical model is developed which outlines the processes by which the anticipated relationship operates, particularly within the context of Latin American political and economic development. This model is tested via three parallel time-series regression analyses of postwar Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Modest though qualified support is discovered for the basic hypothesis that stabilization promotes repression. Alternative explanatory factors, however, are found to complement the role played by stabilization, and thus the work concludes with a discussion of the need for a more broadly based, synthetic model of the causative agents of political repression.
Degree
Ph.D.
Subject Area
International law|International relations
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