EMOTION AND COGNITION: PARALLEL PROCESSES OR SEPARATE SYSTEMS (PRIMING, SCRIPTS, MEMORY, SOCIAL COGNITION)
Abstract
Existing general information processing models and convergent techniques were used in this research to compare the processes underlying emotion and cognition. The first and second experiments compared the effects of priming a specific cognitive category on cognitive judgments, with the effects of priming a discrete emotion on affective judgments. Some support for the hypothesis of parallel processes in the cognitive and affective domains was obtained. There was no support for the notion that inducing a discrete emotion systematically influences the cognitive factors that are assumed to underly that emotion, although a methodological explanation for this result is likely. Expertise in a specific emotion or cognitive domain did generally predict responses that were related to that domain, although a general affect intensity measure did not. These expertise effects were independent of the effects of temporary priming. The third experiment compared the influence of cognitive and emotional scripts on memory and inferences relevant to the specific script. Similar effects in the two cases were obtained. Script consistent and script inconsistent information was recalled better than script irrelevant information. More script consistent inferences were made, with greater certainty, when the stories subjects read contained no script inconsistencies relative to when script inconsistencies were present. Discussion centered on evidence supporting theorists who argue that the mind is a unified system. Emotion and cognition seem to be the result of similar processes; they can be activated with the same technique and they produce comparable effects on memory and inference measures.
Degree
Ph.D.
Subject Area
Social psychology
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