A CRITIQUE OF THE RHETORIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY RELATIONSHIP AND A REINTERPRETATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF HABERMAS' CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY
Abstract
The relation of rhetoric and knowledge, or the proposition that "rhetoric is epistemic," is central to contemporary rhetorical theory. As articulated in current rhetorical scholarship, however, the proposition exhibits neither conceptual clarity regarding what is meant by "rhetoric" nor philosophical rigor regarding what is meant by "knowledge." Such deficiencies preclude fruitful theoretical development of the proposition. Specifically, it is argued that the four major expressions of the proposition demonstrate untenable epistemological assumptions derived from either conceptual relativism, positivism, or Popperian critical rationalism. Each of the major expressions also distorts in some way traditional conceptual distinctions among communication, rhetoric and dialectic. Three major components of Habermas' critical theory are explicated. Habermas' view of the relation of theory and practice clarifies the nature and concerns of a legitimate post-positivistic epistemology. The theory of cognitive interest demonstrates man's fundamental interest in the production of three mutually irreducible forms of knowledge: technical knowledge, practical knowledge and critical knowledge. The latter of these is reflective of man's fundamental interest in reason or an emancipated form of life. The theory of communicative competence demonstrates that man's interest in reason inheres in the universal-pragmatic structure of communication, which provides the possibility of rationally motivated discourse for the achievement of knowledge. Habermas' perspective remedies deficiencies in existing views of the relation of rhetoric and knowledge. The theory of cognitive interest offers a tenable epistemology which avoids both positivism and post-positivistic relativism. The theory of communicative competence reestablishes traditional and productive conceptual parameters among communication, rhetoric and dialectic. Consequently, Habermas' perspective provides a viable reinterpretation of the epistemological significance of rhetoric. Rhetorical activity, understood as intentional persuasive activity, does not create knowledge. Rhetorical study, however, demonstrates epistemological importance in the production of critical knowledge, thus expressing man's interest in an emancipated form of life.
Degree
Ph.D.
Subject Area
Communication
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