RECALL OF SELF-REFERENT INFORMATION AS A FUNCTION OF AFFECTIVE ASSESSMENT, SELF-ESTEEM, AND SELF-AWARENESS

MARTHA LYNN KNIGHT, Purdue University

Abstract

Logical learning theory views the self as a construct which enables the theorist to conceptualize the active contribution an individual makes to his/her conceptualization of experience (Rychlak, 1977). This view of the self was contrasted with that employed by mediation models in which the self is described as a mediating cognitive structure. These two theoretical viewpoints were contrasted and were found to differ in their approaches to five basic issues of theory constuction: (a) dialectical versus demonstrative nature of meaning, (b) the locus of meaning, (c) the role of affect in meaning, (d) the use of final cause explanation, and (e) the potential for arbitrariness in human behavior. In light of literature reviewed, the purpose of the present research was threefold. First, logical learning theory was examined as a theoretical framework within which to study the role of self in the construction and meaningful organization experience. Second, the present research empirically examined organization and recall of self-referent information as a function of affective self-premises. Third, the role of dispositional self-consciousness in construction and extension of self-premises was explored. In a free recall task, subjects attempted to recall adjective traits-words they had previously rated for self-descriptiveness (me, not me) and for reinforcement value (like, dislike). The 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design included self-esteem (high, low) and private self-consciousness (high, low) as between subject factors and reinforcement value (like, dislike) and self-description (me, not me) as within subject factors. It was hypothesized that subjects high in private self-consciousness would be most likely to extend the meaning of affective self-premises to conceptualize the free recall task. It was expected that, when high self-conscious, high self-esteem subjects would display an RV-posiitive affect, such that liked words would be learned faster than disliked words. More liked than disliked clusters were also expected for these subjects. High self-conscious, low self-esteem subjects were expected to recall disliked words as fast as, if not faster than liked words, such that they wuold display a diminution or reversal of the RV effect. Low self-conscious, low self-esteem subjects were also expected to construct at least as many disliked as liked word clusters. Only limited support for the hypothesized RV-effects were obtained. Predictions of a positive RV-effect for high self-conscious, high self-esteem subjects were supported for the measure of average number of trials to criterion, but not for amount recalled on Trial 1, average amount recalled across all trials, or clustering in free recall. Interactions of self-consciousness and self-esteem were obtained such that high self-consciousness seems to have very different consequences for high and low self-esteem subjects. Contrary to hypotheses, high self-conscious, low self-esteem subjects displayed more liked clusters in free recall than did high self-conscious, high self-esteem or low self-conscious, low self-esteem subjects. Also, unexpectedly, high self-conscious, low self-esteem subjects tended to recall more self-descriptive than not self-descriptive words, while high self-conscious, high self-esteem subjects recalled more words that did not describe them. It was suggested that perhaps high self-conscious, low self-esteem subjects are most likely to predicate a social task in terms of affective self-premises, while high self-conscious, high self-esteem subjects may be more likely to affirm and extend other, nonself premises. It was recommended that future research include more detailed assessment of potential premises and attempt to specify how multiple premises may be extended during conceptualization.

Degree

Ph.D.

Subject Area

Social psychology

COinS