A CRITIQUE OF THE BIOMEDICAL DEFINITION OF HEALTH
Abstract
The present study is a critical examination and analysis of the biomedical expression of health as the freedom from physical disease. Criticism of this definition of health culminates in an effort to reformulate health in a more comprehensive and wholistic manner, one which takes into account mental and social, as well as physical, components. Evidence is provided that the biomedical definition eliminates from consideration the experiences of emotion, embodiment, and relation to others by use of the doctrines/notions of physicalistic reductionism, mind-body dualism, and value-freedom regarding disease. The biomedical definition is argued to be unacceptable on the basis of its identification with these doctrines/notions, and it is toward these fundamental characteristics that critical analysis is directed. Physicalistic reductionism is argued to fail to adequately explain mental states. Mind-body dualism is criticized as being unable to account for the concrete, lived experience of the body as the body presents itself to the one whose body it is. Disease as a value-free phenomenon is criticized on the basis of the inability to reduce health exclusively to biology or normality and the failure to allow for the influence of social behavior.
Degree
Ph.D.
Subject Area
Physical education
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