Practical cognition and moral motivation in the thought of Thomas Aquinas

Justin John Matchulat, Purdue University

Abstract

The work of Thomas Aquinas contains rigorous and rich reflection on the relationship between practical cognition and moral motivation. The goal of my dissertation is to elucidate and motivate Aquinas's views on this relationship, views which delve into the core of human moral psychology and are at the heart of Aquinas's ethics. Aquinas's views on these issues are especially interesting. On the one hand, he holds that there is a strong relationship between cognition and moral motivation, for he holds that the will is moved towards some good insofar as, and only insofar as, that good is cognized by the intellect. Furthermore, he holds that all wrongdoing involves some measure of ignorance, a claim which has the following corollary: if a human being were to behold the good in all its fullness, he or she would be incapable of doing evil. But Aquinas also holds that there are indeed culpable cases of human wrongdoing that are the result of weakness of will, a case that involves the influence of the emotions on moral motivation. So on the one hand, Aquinas holds that there is a strong link between practical cognition and moral motivation, since the former can give rise to the latter; but on the other hand he thinks that our desires, emotions, and appetitive habits can and often do influence our practical cognition and even render us ignorant in some way. My dissertation proposes to illuminate these contrasting strands of thought in Aquinas and show how he unifies them. I then turn in my final to consider contemporary discussions in both moral and empirical psychology and how Aquinas's views bear on these discussions.

Degree

Ph.D.

Advisors

Brower, Purdue University.

Subject Area

Ethics|Philosophy

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