Justification, truth and the philosopher's armchair

Philip Osborne, Purdue University

Abstract

The goal of this dissertation is to provide a defense of the subject-matter and methods of contemporary analytic epistemology. In particular, I aim to answer two questions: First, epistemologists spend a great deal of time developing theories concerning the concept of 'justification.' Is this a worthwhile goal? Second, epistemologists pursue this goal through methods that can be executed almost entirely from the armchair, with little appeal to the outside world. Is this method trustworthy enough to merit its continued use? Against a growing body of literature, this dissertation aims to justify a "yes" answer to both of the initial questions. The value of justification is defended on the basis of its conceptual link with knowledge, and its importance in epistemic evaluation. With respect to the second question, this dissertation aims to defuse skeptical challenges to the trustworthiness of armchair methods that have emerged from the growing field of experimental philosophy

Degree

Ph.D.

Advisors

Bergmann, Purdue University.

Subject Area

Epistemology

COinS