Elites, youth and informal networks: Explaining ethnic violence in Kenya and Kosovo

Erik Thomas Cleven, Purdue University

Abstract

After elections in 2007, Kenya experienced some of the worst violence in its history leaving over 1,000 people dead and several hundred thousand displaced. Some towns experienced very high levels of violence while others suffered only low levels of violence, or none at all. In order to account for the sub-national variation in the levels of across Kenya, I introduce a framework that explains the mobilization of ethnic violence. The strategic context within which violence takes place – defined as the goals of political actors along with the institutions and policies where they are active – determines who attacks whom. The challenge of mobilizing violence determines where and how violence is organized. This depends on two factors. First, violence is more likely to occur where attackers are strong and target populations are weak. Second, deadly violence requires violence specialists, people with the skills and opportunity to commit violence. I present evidence from 8 case study locations in Kenya – four places with high levels of violence and four places with low levels of violence. In the locations with high levels of violence I carried out semi-structured interviews with youth who participated in or witnessed violence. In the towns with low levels of violence I interviewed similar youth who did not riot. I show that organized violence occurred in places where there were significant numbers of supporters of the opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and where violence specialists, either in the form of criminal gangs, or Kalenjin warriors, were present. I also show that in some cases elites, civil society associations and security forces could constrain violence. I also study the March 2004 violence in Kosovo. I present evidence from 4 case studies of towns in Kosovo. In Kosovo too the strategic context determined who attacked whom. Attacks in Kosovo occurred in the attackers' strongholds and deadly violence involved violence specialists. One main difference between the violence in Kenya and the violence in Kosovo is that in Kosovo violence specialists traveled greater distances. This means that their presence does not predict the location of violence in the same way as it does in Kenya.

Degree

Ph.D.

Advisors

Clark, Purdue University.

Subject Area

Political science

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