Aristotle on friendship, justice, and the human good
Abstract
According to Aristotle human beings are naturally rational and political animals, and what it is for them to flourish is to live a life of excellent rational activity in accordance with these dual aspects of their nature. Exactly what this means and how it works out Aristotle's ethical thought is not always clear. In this dissertation I attempt to demonstrate that a proper understanding of Aristotelian human flourishing will account for the rational and political aspects of our nature as complementary, rather than in conflict. For Aristotle, to flourish as a human being is to flourish as a rational-political animal. In Chapter One I argue that the political nature of human beings refers to more than their being inclined to live and dwell among others of their kind, or seeking to couple for purposes of reproduction. Their political nature extends beyond biological necessity to include the exercise of their rational capacities. Partial evidence for this is found in the role that propositional language plays in the human community, especially regarding the development of our character and our understanding of the world. In Chapter Two I focus on friendship as a unique kind of relationship that contributes to human flourishing. I argue that according to Aristotle even the good and virtuous individual needs friends. Such a need is not indicative of any defect or shortcoming, but rather naturally follows from what a human being is and the kind of life required to actualize the capacities of a human being's nature. In my final chapter I examine Aristotle's claim in EN X that the best life for a human being is one devoted to contemplation. While such a conception of the best life is compatible with our rational nature, it seems in tension with Aristotle's emphasis on our essentially political nature, and more specifically, the claim that friendship is important for human flourishing. For, if our good is such that it can be in principle realized apart from the human community, there seems little reason to suggest that we 'need' friends in the sense explained in Chapter Two. I argue that central to Aristotle's discussion of contemplation in EN X is the claim that our chief good accords with whatever is 'most divine' in us, and that, according to Aristotle, what is most divine in us is our rational nature (EN 1177b12-18). Thus, the best life for a human being will be one involving the excellent exercise of our rational capacities. I distinguish and examine two ways in which human beings exercise rationality in their flourishing. The first is in the activity of theoria. The second, I argue, can be found in the virtuous activity of complete friendship (teleia philia). I argue that Aristotle understands the truest form of friendship to be an expression of our rational nature. Such friendship is characterized not by feeding together or sharing the same pasture, but by living together, conversing, and sharing one another's thoughts (EN 1170b12-14). By appealing to Aristotle's notion of a friend as 'another self' (allos autos), I argue that through friendship human beings come to better know themselves and the world in which they live. Perfect friendship involves a (uniquely human) second-order awareness of oneself in another, and through this awareness the human being's understanding of himself and the world in which he lives is enriched, confirmed, and enjoyed through the presence of another knower. On the basis of this claim I argue that the highest form of Aristotelian friendship is an intellectual activity through which human beings attain a human analogue of divine contemplation, thereby living in accordance with what is most divine in them, but doing so in accordance with their uniquely rational-political nature.
Degree
Ph.D.
Advisors
Curd, Purdue University.
Subject Area
Ethics|Philosophy|Ancient history
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