Essays on empirical industrial organization
Abstract
This dissertation contains two essays relating to the impact of the length of patent policy and firm's licensing behavior. This first chapter evaluates how different lengths of patent lives impact market structure and market performance. We show that there are excessively early entries in the static random access memory industry. Patent protection can serve as a mean to delay excessive entry, save entry cost and improve total welfare if the length of patent life is sufficiently long. The second chapter evaluates the impact of unilateral licensing on R&D and on product market competition. We find that firms gain both market shares and citation shares if licensing out their patents to another firm. The licensing out decisions are primarily motivated by firms' gains in market shares.
Degree
Ph.D.
Advisors
Siebert, Purdue University.
Subject Area
Economics
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