Good science / God science?: On the scientific legitimacy of design hypotheses
Abstract
In non-scientific contexts we regularly, naturally, and legitimately make inferences to design, or intelligent agency. Furthermore, there is no logically necessary reason to prohibit similar hypotheses about the possibility of intelligent agencies of a natural or supernatural order in scientific contexts. In this study, I defend the scientific legitimacy of design hypotheses (SLED) against the three objections most commonly raised against them: (i) that contemporary design hypotheses and arguments are merely disguised iterations of discredited positions in classical natural theology and more recent “Creation Science”; (ii) that arguments employing design hypotheses fail to conform to reasonable demarcation criteria for science (that is, a priori objections); and (iii) that there is no need to posit intelligent agencies because of the historic and expected success of competitor hypotheses constrained by methodological naturalism (a posteriori objections). I contend that design hypotheses surmount these objections, and retain a legitimate place in scientific reasoning. Finally, as the bulk of this project is defensive and reactive, I conclude with a short constructive proposal as to how science ought to be practiced; I describe what I coin “Virtue Science.”
Degree
Ph.D.
Advisors
Curd, Purdue University.
Subject Area
Philosophy of Science|Philosophy
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