Descartes on time

Rebecca Lloyd, Purdue University

Abstract

Time plays various crucial roles in Descartes's metaphysical physics. Descartes's mechanism requires time for the very possibility of diversity since diversity depends on motion and motion depends on time (Principles II.39 and II.23). Likewise, time plays a central role in Descartes's metaphysics and epistemology since Descartes appeals to a “parts of time” doctrine in his Med III proof for God's existence. Despite its importance, Descartes's account of time continues to baffle commentators. This is due in part to an apparent inconsistency between the above roles and the claim at Principles I.57 that time is a mere attribute and “mode of thought.” Since it is difficult to reconcile I.57 with Descartes's other discussions on time, many commentators either ignore or marginalize this troublesome passage. Such an approach obscures Descartes's account of time and thus one's understanding of the important doctrines that rely on it. In my dissertation, I provide a new and historically sensitive interpretation of Descartes account of time, which renders I.57 consistent with Descartes's other accounts. I do this by arguing that there are two really distinct, but equally fundamental, temporal attributes for Descartes. In Chapter 1, I outline the alternative views on time that were prevalent among Descartes’s contemporaries. A basic familiarity with these views helps to clarify Descartes's account, since during the 17 th century, all accounts of time were structured around these various alternatives. I thus analyze these views in order to isolate the four most important questions to ask of Descartes's account: (1) the independence question (i.e., is time an independent or dependent entity?), (2) the dependence question (i.e., if time is a dependent entity, then is it dependent on the mind or on something extramental?) (3) the extramental question (i.e., if time is dependent on the mind, then is there any kind of time in the extramental world?) (4) the duality question (i.e., if one kind of time can be found in the mind and another in the extramental world, then is one kind more fundamental than the other?) In the following chapters, I indicate Descartes's answers to each of these questions. In Chapter 2, I address the independence question and argue that time cannot exist as an independent entity for Descartes. Insofar as independent entities are substances, I argue that time could not be a type of Cartesian substance because (i) there would be no grounds for a substantial time to be divisible into the numerically distinct parts/moments that Descartes’s account requires and because (ii) a substantial time would contradict the Med III claim that any substance can exist at one isolated moment. Since Descartes's ontology exhaustively divides between substances and attributes (i.e., that which depends on substances), I thereby conclude that time must be a type of attribute for Descartes. As this fact is explicitly stated in Principles I.57, this chapter provides the metaphysical backing for I.57's assertion. In Chapter 3, I address the dependence question and the extramental question via a close analysis of Principles I.57. By considering the relationships between motion, duration, and time, I demonstrate that Descartes's account of time includes two really distinct temporal attributes (namely, duration and mental time). These two attributes are really distinct since mental time (the mode of thought by which duration is measured) is dependent on motion but motion is not dependent on mental time. In contrast, duration (the successive enduring of any thinking or extended substance) is not dependent on motion but motion is dependent on it. From these differences, I establish that these two attributes are really distinct and also that they appear to be very similar to the “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” times found in Suarez. In Chapter 4, I address the duality question by considering the nature of mental time as separate from duration. I show that Descartes is committed to mental time's being an innate idea by first showing why it must be the idea by which one measures and then why this idea could be neither fictitious nor adventitious. In arguing that mental time is an innate idea, I establish it to be an attribute that is on an ontological par with duration. Unlike Suarez's extrinsic time, Descartes's mental time is not simply a constructed idea. Rather, it is an innate idea and thereby an idea of a true and immutable nature. As such, mental time is only weakly dependent on minds, since it is found in minds but it is not created by them. Thus, I establish that Descartes admits two different, but equally fundamental, temporal attributes – a conclusion that is both historically sensitive and that reconciles Principles I.57 with Descartes's other claims about time.

Degree

Ph.D.

Advisors

Cover, Purdue University.

Subject Area

Philosophy

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