Contemporary legal theory and philosophical hermeneutics: Originalism's failed reliance on intentionalist theories of meaning
Abstract
Hans Georg Gadamer‘s philosophical hermeneutics requires that intentionalist claims about the determination of meaning are incorrect and that these notions of meaning determination must be reconsidered if we are to understand correctly the nature of interpretation. One goal of this project is to describe Gadamer's theory of interpretation in contrast to claims made by intentionalists and to propose a novel distinction consistent with his theory that aids in understanding how his notion of interpretation works in reality. In the second half of the project, I consider originalist theories of legal interpretation and their reliance on intentionalist theories of meaning. In so far as these normative legal theories require the intentionalist thesis of meaning determination, they too are incorrect. I conclude by describing what a legal theory of interpretation must look like if it is to incorporate the correct notion of interpretation described by Gadamer.
Degree
Ph.D.
Advisors
McBride, Purdue University.
Subject Area
Law|Philosophy
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