Leibniz on monadic action & divine concurrence

T. Allan Hillman, Purdue University

Abstract

Leibniz insists that his metaphysical system is consistent with the orthodox doctrine of divine concurrence, i.e., the view according to which, for any individual action in nature, both God and the created individual substance jointly contribute to the production of the act. Leibniz articulates the doctrine as follows: (DC) For any effect brought about by the act of a created substance, God contributes what is perfect in the act and the created substance contributes what is imperfect or limited in the act. This doctrine has a bearing on at least two theses central to the Leibnizian system: (T1) Individual created substances are essentially active, and (T2) Occasionalism is false. As many scholars have recognized, a certain reading of (DC) would look to recommend that, in metaphysical strictness, God himself is the only genuinely active entity while created substances are sources of, at best, passivity. Such a reading entails the falsity of both (T1) and (T2). In my dissertation, I argue for a new interpretation of (DC), and conclude that Leibniz’s systematic metaphysical commitments coexist harmoniously with his doctrine of divine concurrence. My approach begins historically, in Chapter One, by setting out theses (T1) and (T2) in detail, and then by cataloguing the traditional scholastic options available to Leibniz for explaining the distinction between primary (divine) and secondary (creaturely) causes: mere conservationism, occasionalism, and divine concurrence. In the subsequent chapter (Chapter Two), I focus on the parallels between the divine nature and the natures of created individual substances, particularly as concerns the so-called perfections that are shared by God and creatures. I will show that, for Leibniz, perfections are best understood as authentic causal powers. My account pinpoints the causal relationship between God and the natural world by demonstrating that the only difference between God and creature is one of degree, not of kind. Creatures possess all of the perfections that God does, and in creatures, as in God, the perfections constitute a genuine unity. God and creatures differ only in that the former possesses the perfections in their highest manifestation, while creatures possess them in lesser manifestations. In this way, creatures are limited only relative to the perfection of God. A requirement on any Leibnizian substance is simplicity. Yet, the perfections or causal powers are a veritable many, and what’s more, constitute the very nature of a substance. In Chapter Three I address this problem concerning my interpretation: if perfections (plural) are constitutive of the natures of individual substances, then monadic simplicity is undermined. I argue that simplicity can be maintained, on two counts. First, Leibniz revives the scholastic notion of substantial form, and identifies each form with an individual substance. Traditionally, substantial forms served as the ground for the causal powers of substance, and I show that they function in the same way for Leibniz. Second, I argue that Leibniz’s theory of metaphysical predication provides a satisfactory account of monadic simplicity. In particular, it is shown that for any intrinsic predication wherein some perfection is predicated of an individual substance, the substance itself acts as the truthmaker for that proposition. So, for any perfection had by a particular substance, that substance will be identical with that perfection. I conclude the dissertation in Chapter Four by turning to Leibniz’s doctrine of divine concurrence and my new interpretation of (DC). I argue that Leibniz adopts an account of concurrence originally proposed by the scholastic philosopher, Francisco Suárez. Like Suárez, Leibniz countenances a dual principle of causality such that for any action, both God and creature are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the production of that action. To make this clear, I draw on my Chapter Two proposal, that perfections are genuine causal powers. Also, I show that recent interpreters of Leibnizian concurrence fail to take seriously Leibniz’s opposition to occasionalism on the one hand and the essential activity of substantial things on the other. In doing so, they deny that he asserts a dual principle account of concurrence. Against this, I argue that Leibniz’s metaphysical commitments can best be salvaged by positing a dual principle, and that in fact such an interpretation is consonant with Leibniz’s texts. Accordingly, Leibniz’s considered view of divine concurrence can be understood to follow closely from his theory of perfections. As a result, theses (DC), (T1) and (T2) are rendered a consistent triad.

Degree

Ph.D.

Advisors

Cover, Purdue University.

Subject Area

Philosophy

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