Subject and objects: A comparative study of Kant's and Sartre's theoretical philosophies
Abstract
This project seeks to show that a number of philosophical theses are shared by Kant and Sartre. Specifically, Kant's and Sartre's respective accounts of the ‘I’, their descriptions of possible self-knowledge and more generally self-awareness, and the ‘dualism’ espoused by each, are compared. It is shown that Sartre's many claims of his philosophy, as expressed in both The Transcendence of the Ego and Being and Nothingness, being un-Kantian are largely a result of his misunderstanding Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. In fact, becoming clear on what Kant writes on the above issues indicates that many of the philosophical underpinnings in Sartre's maturing thought are themselves Kantian. Sartre's assertion that most of his philosophical theses are distinct from those maintained by Kant has likely steered scholars away from exploring any relation between Kant and Sartre beyond the mere historical debt that Sartre has to Kant for the latter's role in the development of phenomenology. However, to ignore the similarities between Sartre's and Kant's writings on the topics of self and epistemological limitations is to do a disservice to Sartre scholarship. In light of the errors Sartre makes in his evaluation of Kant, as well as Sartre's descriptions of being-for-itself and being-in-itself, a new interpretive stance towards Sartre's philosophical system is provided.
Degree
Ph.D.
Advisors
McBride, Purdue University.
Subject Area
Philosophy
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