Russia's regional executives and the strategy of confrontation: The link between institutional change and intergovernmental conflict
Abstract
The purpose of the current study is to investigate the causes of intergovernmental conflict, as manifested in threats of separatism and political brinkmanship that accompanied post-communist transition of the Russian Federation. The project is driven by the need to develop a systematic theoretical explanation for the effects of institutional change on political conflict. I propose a formal model of elite behavior that accounts for the observed outcomes. The focus of this study is on the center-periphery bargaining in Russia in 1991–2002. I argue that the ambiguity and weakness of the institutions of federalism created conducive conditions for brinkmanship strategies. Using a variety of statistical and qualitative data, I demonstrate that the ability to make credible threats was the most significant predictor of aggressive bargaining strategies.
Degree
Ph.D.
Advisors
Theen, Purdue University.
Subject Area
Political science
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