Descartes on the metaphysics of human nature

Justin James Skirry, Purdue University

Abstract

One of philosophy's most persistent problems is how minds and bodies causally interact. This problem can be traced back to Descartes' conclusion that minds (i.e. immaterial, thinking things) can exist independently of bodies (i.e. material, extended things) and vice versa. The challenge, as it confronted Descartes, can be formulated as follows: How can efficient causal interaction take place between two independently existing things that have absolutely nothing in common? My dissertation provides a detailed reconstruction of Descartes' theory of mind-body union in order to show how Descartes avoided this problem, contrary to current scholarship. This study is conducted through a critical re-examination of Descartes' fundamental ontology and his metaphysics of human nature. New light is shed on these aspects of his metaphysics by considering them within the context of his Scholastic intellectual heritage and through the various criticisms made by some of his early modern successors. I argue that the union of mind and body is not, as most scholars maintain, constituted by efficient causal interaction for Descartes, because this kind of union does not result in one, complete human nature. Descartes goes on to argue that mind-body union is constituted by the Scholastic relation of substantial union, i.e. the union that form (the mind) has with matter (the body), because only this kind of union results in a complete human nature with the capacities for modes of sensation and appetite. On this account, these modes would be explained by the activity of one, whole thing instead of by the efficient causal interaction of two things. Hence, the problem of mind-body efficient causal interaction is avoided altogether, since no efficient causal occurrences play a role in the final account of a living human being.

Degree

Ph.D.

Advisors

Cover, Purdue University.

Subject Area

Philosophy

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