Physicalism and qualia

Thomas Allen Gardner, Purdue University

Abstract

Most philosophers agree that some form of physicalism is the solution to the mind-body problem. It is also generally accepted that accommodating the existence of qualia—i.e., the properties of phenomenally conscious mental states in virtue of which there is something it is like to occupy those states—is the biggest stumbling block in the way of physicalist theories of mind. Thomas Nagel's central argument in “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” captures and codifies the basic intuition that qualia are a problem for physicalism, and consequently it has received much critical attention from physicalists. I show that Nagel's argument cannot be dismissed as easily as many physicalists contend and that the cost of defeating it is, in the end, too high for the physicalist to pay. More specifically, I show that the physicalist can answer Nagel's challenge only by retreating to non-reductionism, and I argue that the two mainstream forms of non-reductive physicalism are unacceptable. Some maintain that the physicalist need not take Nagel's argument seriously because qualia do not exist. So, after giving a characterization of qualia and explaining the relationship between qualia and consciousness, I respond to a variety of eliminativist strategies. I argue that qualia do exist and that the physicalist must account for them. Then, after explicating and clarifying Nagel's central argument, I defend it against all the significant objections that have been raised against it that do not require abandoning reductionism. Given the failure of these objections, I maintain that the physicalist's only recourse is non-reductionism. After briefly characterizing non-reductive physicalism, I argue that neither of its mainstream forms—viz., realization physicalism and supervenience physicalism—is a tenable position. I show that realization physicalism succumbs to Nagel's argument just as reductive physicalism does. Then, I exploit the shortcomings of a variety of specific supervenience theses to show that the relation of supervenience is incapable of grounding an acceptable form of non-reductive physicalism. I conclude that the physicalist faces a dilemma: the qualia problem—in the form of Nagel's argument—defeats reductive physicalism, and non-reductive forms of physicalism are not viable alternatives.

Degree

Ph.D.

Advisors

Russow, Purdue University.

Subject Area

Philosophy

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