The minimization of lost income in procurement and allocation markets for human transplant organs
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the inability to procure more cadaveric solid organs for use in solid organ transplants results from regulation of the market under the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) and to show the behavior of the participants within the market reflect their efforts to minimize the lost potential gains within the market. The original act of regulation under NOTA discouraged procurement of organs. Subject to the cost of circumventing the rules of organ procurement and allocation, the participants within the market work to minimize the lost exchanges. In this study we demonstrate the procuring agents deviate from federal law to procure more cadavers. Similarly, the evidence is consistent with physicians over-reporting their patients' sickness in an effort to receive the procured organs for their patients.
Degree
Ph.D.
Advisors
Umbeck, Purdue University.
Subject Area
Economic theory|Economics|Health care management
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