Cost sharing for economic lot-sizing problems with remanufacturing options
Abstract
In this work we study a new class of cooperative games, associated with the economic lot-sizing problem with remanufacturing options (ELSR). In particular we study the core of the ELSR game. We present various mathematical optimization formulations of the ELSR problem and compare their relative strengths. This gives us some insights into the core of ELSR games. We study in detail two special cases of the ELSR problem: zero setup costs and initial large quantity of low cost returned products. We show that the ELSR game, under these special conditions, has a non-empty core. Further we present polynomial-time algorithms to find a cost allocation in the core under theses special conditions.
Degree
M.S.
Advisors
Uhan, Purdue University.
Subject Area
Operations research
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