The Case against Interest-Relative Invariantism

David Andrew Coss, Purdue University

Abstract

Interest-Relative Invariantism (IRI hereafter) is the view that a person’s practical interests encroaches upon her knowledge states. Put more formally, whether S knows that p partially depends on the practical facts of S’s situation. A central thesis of my dissertation is that IRI leads to an unacceptable degree of ignorance and is therefore an inferior epistemic view when judged against its rivals. Chapter one presents the dialectic surrounding three views: classical epistemology, contextualism and IRI, discussing the virtues, and problems, with each. Since both contextualism and IRI are deviations from classical epistemology, I start out with the latter view first. I outline how epistemologists have traditionally conceived of the project of epistemology, and then examine several traditional epistemic problems, such as skepticism and the lottery paradox, and explain how each view responds to these issues. With contextualism being a rival to IRI, I outline this view next and explain how IRI differs from it and classical epistemology. I close the chapter by considering and revising an objection to IRI. Chapter two presents two diverging accounts over the nature of contexts. Context plays a pivotal role within both contextualist and IRI theorizing, but the question of what a context is has not received the attention it deserves. I first draw attention to an uncontroversial fact: contexts are either completely internal to a subject’s mind, or else involve features external to it. I argue that contextualism is best paired with internalism, while IRI is best paired with externalism. The final section explores a question concerning voluntarism: are contexts under a subject’s control? If contexts are completely internal to the mind, then one might be inclined to answer yes, at least to some degree, because much of what is mental is typically under one’s voluntary control. For example, one might argue that we can control what we imagine, or more controversially, what we believe. If contexts are external, I argue that there is less room to exercise such control. Chapter three explores the IRI conception of practical interests. I argue that the question of what constitutes practical interests is only vaguely understood, which subsequently allows for the generation of a series of indifference cases designed to show that subjective valuations play too large of a role in epistemological theorizing. I present two views one could take toward practical interests: Humeanism & Aristotelianism. According to the former, practical interests are dependent on desires, while according to the latter, practical interests are independent of such. I then present a series of indifference cases, each of which claims to show that irrational attitudes and beliefs can, by IRI’s lights, give subjects knowledge. I argue that these cases only pose a problem for IRI given a Humean framework. I proceed to argue that IRI-theorists are wise to adopt an Aristotelian framework, and I devote the remaining portion of the chapter to spelling out such a framework, anticipating objections along the way. Chapter four is a defense of the main thesis that IRI leads to unacceptable ignorance proliferation. I point out that if an epistemological view implies that the extent of knowledge is smaller than usually thought, this does not necessarily count against the theory. For example, if the JTB + (where the ‘+’ stands for a suitable de-gettierization clause) is true, the extent of knowledge is smaller than it would be if the tripartite JTB account were true. This reduction in the extent of knowledge is not a reason for preferring the JTB to the JTB+ account. However, if a theory implies a reduction in the extent of knowledge that amounts to a proliferation of ignorance approaching the threshold of skepticism, then the theory becomes untenable. I argue that IRI does indeed lead to undesirable ignorance proliferation. In support of this thesis, several practical interest cases are outlined in diverse domains, such as religious, moral, and political beliefs. Many IRI-theorists endorse a knowledge action principle whereby knowledge is necessary for rational action. When this principle is combined with the thesis that IRI leads to undesirable ignorance proliferation, rational action becomes impossible much of the time. I argue that these two results—undesirable ignorance proliferation and rational action paralysis—render IRI an inferior epistemological view when judged against its rivals.

Degree

Ph.D.

Advisors

Bertolet, Purdue University.

Subject Area

Epistemology

COinS