The dark side of reactive attitudes: From persons to compatibilism
Abstract
This thesis contains two independent papers that both address the problems associated with the reactive attitudes. The first paper, presented in Chapter 2, discusses the negativities of the reactive attitudes in debates regarding skepticism about the moral notion of persons. The second paper, presented in Chapter 3, presents the negativities associated with the reactive attitudes in debates concerning compatibilism about moral responsibility. Neither chapter deals solely with presenting the negativities associated with the reactive attitudes. More than present these, both chapters undermine the non-realist or compatibilist philosophical arguments that attempt to save either the moral notion of persons (Chapter 2) or moral responsibility (Chapter 3) from skeptical and incompatibilist arguments, respectively, by appealing to the benefits of the reactive attitudes. Each chapter undermines these arguments by reminding readers that we are using the benefits of the reactive attitudes and ignoring their detriments in order to cling to tightly held philosophical notions.
Degree
M.A.
Advisors
Kelly, Purdue University.
Subject Area
Philosophy
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