Animals and the value of life
This dissertation concerns the extent to which commonly held views regarding the comparative status of non-human animals to humans can be accommodated by pro-animals theories, which take an abolitionist stance on factory farming, vivisection, zoos hunting, etc. It is argued that pro-animals theories cannot unproblematically accommodate the thesis which states that ceteris paribus, human lives are worth more than animal lives. This is demonstrated by a refutation of three different arguments for the compatibility of abolitionism and this comparative value of life thesis. Key concepts include, but are not limited to, animal rights, abolitionism, value of life, disvalue of death, replaceability, consequentialism, contractualism, self-consciousness, sentience, and the moral status of animals.
Bernstein, Purdue University.
Off-Campus Purdue Users:
To access this dissertation, please log in to our