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Leibniz on intra-substantial causation and change

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Entitled
Leibniz on Intra-Substantial Causation and Change

For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Is approved by the final examining committee:

Jan Cover
Chair

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Michael Jacovides

Dan Frank

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Approved by: Matthias Steup 28 June 2016
Head of the Departmental Graduate Program
LEIBNIZ ON INTRA-SUBSTANTIAL CAUSATION AND CHANGE

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty
of
Purdue University
by
Davis White Kuykendall Jr.

In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy

August 2016
Purdue University
West Lafayette, Indiana
For Lauren.
I would first of all like to thank my dissertation director Jan Cover. This dissertation would be non-actual were it not for the many dozens of hours in the summer of 2012 he spent patiently brainstorming with me in his office. I always left his office with a stack of books to read, a word of encouragement, and a spot in his calendar to meet again. I also would like to thank committee members Jeff Brower and Mike Jacovides for their guidance. During many seminars they taught, works of theirs I read, and one-on-one guidance they gave me during my graduate studies, I learned a lot about how to approach the history of philosophy. I would also like to thank my fourth reader, Dan Frank, for his encouragement and feedback during the last stages of my project.

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ABBREVIATIONS

**Leibniz**

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ABSTRACT

Kuykendall, Davis W. Ph.D. Purdue University, August 2016. Leibniz on Intra-substantial Causation and Change. Major Professor: Jan Cover.

Leibniz argued that in natural world, only \textit{intra-substantial} or \textit{immanent} causation is possible— the causation that takes place \textit{within} an individual, when an individual brings about a change in itself. In this dissertation, I address issues arising from Leibniz’s arguments against the rival view that posits a world of causally interacting substances and issues pertaining to Leibniz’s own positive metaphysics of immanent causation and change.

Chapter 1 is devoted to stage setting for the remainder of the dissertation. I first offer a historically informed overview of efficient causation and change before introducing Leibniz’s novel views, including his criticisms of competing accounts and his own positive account. After presenting a detailed roadmap of my project, I articulate the idealistic interpretation of Leibniz assumed in this dissertation, where the only genuine substances are simple monads. Finally, I articulate the methodological approaches I employ.

In Chapters 2 and 3, I reconstruct and assess Leibniz’s most frequent argument against transeunt causation (the causation that occurs when a substance produces a property in a numerically distinct substance), what I call the “Transference Argument.” Leibniz argued that a created substance’s causing an accident in a numerically distinct
substance is possible only if the agent (the cause) transfers the accident from itself to the patient (the recipient of the effect), where upon transference the agent no longer possesses the accident it transferred. Call the transeunt causal requirement that the agent transfer the accident produced from itself to the patient the “Transference Condition.”

Chapter 2 is devoted to two problems with Leibniz’s transference condition. First, Leibniz stated the transference condition throughout his career, but offered little argument for it. Second, God is a transeunt cause in Leibniz’s metaphysics yet God’s causation does not consist in transference. Thus, Leibniz needs a principled way to require transference for creaturely causation while denying that divine transeunt causation consists in transference. I shall argue that Leibniz thought that if an agent transeuntly caused an accident without transferring the accident, the agent created the accident. For the recipient substance contributed no reality to the accident and the agent lost no reality in causing the accident. However, only an omnipotent being—God—can create. Therefore, only God can transeuntly cause without transferring what is caused. Finally, I close off chapter 2 by drawing attention to an important weakness with the transference condition that has not yet been recognized by Leibniz scholars. Based on arguments Leibniz develops against occasionalism in his *Theodicy* concerning the production of *modifications*, I shall argue that Leibniz ultimately only had reasons to require transference for the transeunt production of non-modal accidents, such as real qualities.

In Chapter 3, I argue that there is nothing in Leibniz’s ontology that could be transferred from the cause to the recipient of the effect. I first argue that
Leibniz’s ontology consists of simple non-corporeal substances and their modifications. Second, I present and articulate a number of important theses Leibniz affirmed about substances and their modifications, which entail that neither could be transferred. I also show that most of these theses were not unique to Leibniz, but were in fact widely endorsed by his predecessors who defended the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation.

In chapter 4, I continue the study of the nature of Leibnizian accidents, shifting the focus from their role in Leibniz’s critique of creaturely transeunt causation to their positive role in change and as causal relata, where such accidents are the effects of immanent causation. Specifically, I reconstruct and assess Leibniz’s reasons for holding that accidents are modifications or limitations. Drawing from Leibniz’s 1688 essay “De Realitate Accidentium” and his later mereological writings, I shall argue that Leibniz’s thesis that accidents are modifications or limitations allowed him to posit mereologically simple substance that have a multitude of accidents at a time and change accidents over time.

In Chapter 5, I address an issue that has divided Leibniz scholars concerning the precise relata in Leibnizian immanent efficient causation. In many passages, Leibniz writes as if it is the substance or individual itself that efficiently causes its later properties or accidents. Call this the “Efficacious-substance” account. The efficacious-substance account is difficult to reconcile with Leibniz’s requirements that change be intelligible and deterministic. In plenty of other passages, he writes as if it is the substances earlier properties or accidents that cause its later accidents. Call this the “Efficacious-accident” account. The efficacious-accident account explains how change is intelligible and
deterministic but it faces a “plurality of agents” objection. If a substance’s accidents are the efficient causes of later accidents, then *prima facie* there is a plurality of efficient causal agents in a substance. This view is incompatible with Leibniz’s requirement that substances be simple, unified entities.

Drawing upon a Scholastic distinction made between two kinds of efficient causes—principle *quod* efficient causes (efficient causal agents) and principle *quo* efficient causes (powers by which agents cause), I shall argue that for Leibniz, substances are principle *quod* efficient causes and their appetitions (desire-like accidents that are a subset of a substance’s accidents) are principle *quo* efficient causes. This interpretation combines the strengths of the Efficacious-substance and Efficacious-accident accounts while overcoming their weaknesses. There is just one causal agent, the substance, but change is both intelligible and deterministic because as what an agent produces is explained by its appetitions.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

In the 17th century, causation took center stage as one of the most debated topics by philosophers who were increasingly forced to rethink natural philosophy given the challenges the scientific revolution posed to the Aristotelian-Scholasticism, which still dominated university curricula.\(^1\) One of the most important disputants was the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), whose views on causation and change are the subject of my dissertation.\(^2\) Leibniz argued that at the fundamental level of the natural world, only intra-substantial or immanent causation occurred— the causation that takes place within an individual, when an individual brings about a change in itself.\(^3\) Leibniz argued that his counter-intuitive theory overcame serious defects that plagued the other dominant causal theories of his time, while also providing a

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\(^3\) A classic statement of this thesis is found in Leibniz’s Monadology, where he writes, “It follows from what we have just said that the monad’s [individual’s] natural changes come from an internal principle, since no external cause can influence it internally.” See (G VI.608: AG 214). See also AG 33, (G IV.439: AG 47), (G VI.351-52: T 396), and T 400 (G V.353-54).
philosophical underpinning for the increasingly successful enlightenment physical theories.

In the first half of this dissertation, I address issues arising from Leibniz’s criticisms of what I’ll call the Traditional Causal View of his time— the view that created substances genuinely causally interact. In the second half, I address issues pertaining to his positive account of change and creaturely immanent efficient causation. In this introductory chapter, I present a historically informed overview of efficient causation and change in §1. In §2, I segue to an overview of Leibniz’s own distinctive views on causation and change before presenting a detailed roadmap of my project in §3. In §4, I articulate the idealistic interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics that I assume in this dissertation. Finally, I discuss the methodological approaches I employ in this dissertation in §5.

§1 Efficient Causation and Change

In section 1, I draw attention to some important but mostly non-controversial features of what I mean by efficient causation and change, which will come from a brief historical overview. Giving such an account might strike the reader as unnecessary, as efficient causation is the type of causation that is the most familiar to present day philosophers. In fact, since the early modern era, it has largely been the only type of causation considered. However, as will become apparent in this project, the nature of efficient causation has historically been one of the most controversial topics in metaphysics. I note that my aim in this overview is not to precisely define efficient causation. Instead, I highlight some
important features found in some of the most influential accounts of efficient causation prior to Leibniz, and which are also found in Leibniz’s own account.

While efficient causation—of some sort—played a role in metaphysics prior to Aristotle, it is appropriate to start with Aristotle’s account, as his influence will loom large in what follows.\(^4\) According to Aristotle, all causes are *principles* of change. As principles of change, causes *explain* change.\(^5\) Thus, the efficient cause of some change is also a principle and therefore explainer of that change. Specifically, in some change, the efficient cause is the *origin* or *source* of the change.\(^6\) Aristotle’s famous example is the coming-to-be of a statue.\(^7\) Take some clay that has been molded into a statue with the shape of Socrates. The clay is the statue’s *material* cause, the shape is the statue’s *formal* cause, and to-be-admired could be the statue’s *final* cause. The *efficient* cause of the statue is the sculptor, who molds the clay into Socrates shape. In this scenario, the sculptor efficiently causes the statue by giving or creating a *new form* in the clay—the shape of Socrates. The clay acquires a new property or more appropriate to the metaphysics of Leibniz’s time, an *accident*—the accident of a particular shape. What’s key here is that the effect produced by the efficient cause is, in some sense, a *new being* or *entity*—such as a new shape in the clay.\(^8\)


\(^6\) See *Physics*, II.3, 194b30-32 and *Metaphysics*, I.3, 984a27.

\(^7\) See *Physics* II.3 and *Metaphysics* V.2.

\(^8\) In just what sense it is a new being or entity which is produced was a matter of great controversy which I address in significant portions of chapters 2-4.
We can build on Aristotle’s account by turning to Aquinas, as Aquinas’s influential account is heavily informed by and influenced by Aristotle’s. According to Aquinas, the efficient cause—such as the sculptor—is the principle that acts. Another way Aquinas puts it is that the efficient cause is a cause insofar as it acts. This, according to Aquinas, distinguishes the efficient cause from the material, final, and formal cause. The efficient cause, as the cause that acts, is the causal agent.

Since the efficient cause is one of the principles and explainers of change, it’s also worth briefly discussing what I mean by change in this section. As with efficient causation, my aim is not to offer a precise definition or metaphysics of change. Instead it’s to draw attention to some important features of it that can serve as a launch pad for this project. By change, I mean an individual’s acquiring and losing properties. For example, the clay changes when it acquires the property of Socrates’ shape and loses its previous shape.

So the efficient cause is to be understood as a principle and explainer of change, specifically the cause from which the change or effect originates, as the efficient cause is the agent that acts and by acting produces a new form or property or accident in an individual, which the individual acquires. Once one probes further into these concepts and inquires into just what the new beings are that are produced, what it is precisely that does the producing, and how the new beings produced are related to the individual they

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9 See Aquinas, On the Principles of Nature 3.15, DPN 1.4, In Meta I, 12.199., V.2.775, and QDV q28, a8c.
10 Leibniz is in agreement with Aquinas, arguing that the efficient cause is the “active cause” or the “cause through action.” See C 472 and A.VI.ii.490.
12 I explore Leibniz’s precise definition of change in much greater depth in chapter 5.
are beings in, one enters into more difficult terrain— terrain that I’ll be in throughout this project.\textsuperscript{13}

Philosophers before and during Leibniz’s era further distinguished between two types of efficient causes— transeunt and immanent causes.\textsuperscript{14} An individual is a transeunt cause when it brings about a change or produces a property in a numerically distinct individual. For example, when a particle $p_1$ collides with a different particle $p_2$, $p_1$ is the transeunt cause of $p_2$’s change in velocity. In contrast, an individual is an immanent cause when it produces a property in itself. While less discussed in studies of causation, we are more intimately acquainted with this second kind, as many examples come from human action. When a person moves her hand, she is the immanent cause of her hand moving. When a person imagines a cloud, she is the immanent cause of the mental image formed.

It is with this distinction between transeunt and immanent causation that Leibniz’s views on causation and change merit attention. The central early modern philosophical debate about causation was whether (i) both immanent and transeunt \textit{creaturely} causation are possible; (ii) only one of the two is possible; or (iii) neither are possible. Aristotelian-Scholastics, such as the late medieval/renaissance philosopher Francisco Suarez and notable early modern philosophers such as Rene Descartes argued for (i), what I’ll call

\textsuperscript{13} While the focus of my study is \textit{creaturely} or \textit{secondary} efficient causation, I note that the case is different with divine efficient causation as the effect is not always simply a form or accident in some pre-existent substrata, such as prime matter or a substance, but instead the whole substance in cases of creation, a type of efficient causality exclusive to God alone, according to most classical theists.

\textsuperscript{14} The distinction traces back to Aristotle but finds more detailed expression in Medieval philosophers. For example, see Aquinas, SCG II.1 and ST 1a, q. 18, a. 3 ad 1.
the “Traditional” view. Second-generation Cartesians, such as Malebranche, La Forge, and Cordemoy, challenged (i) and argued for (iii), the view known as Occasionalism. Occasionalists argued that God is the only real cause of change and any creaturely causation so-called was merely apparent. First defended centuries earlier by the medieval Muslim philosopher Al Ghazali, the early modern occasionalists revived the theory with novel and powerful arguments.

§2 Leibniz’s on Efficient Causation and Change

Leibniz entered into this debate by defending a unique and strikingly counterintuitive option, which he rigorously defended throughout his career. On the one hand, with the Aristotelians and contra the Occasionalists, Leibniz argued that the very essence of substances consists in their being causally efficacious. With the Aristotelians and Descartes, Leibniz also affirmed the fundamentality of immanent causation, again, contra the Occasionalists.

On the other hand, Leibniz rejected the Traditional view that posited a world populated by causally interactive created substances. Instead, Leibniz defended a world of spontaneous substances. A substance is spontaneous when it is solely causally

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15 See Suarez, DM 18.1; Aquinas, SCG III.I.69, 28. Descartes’ views are more complicated, as scholars debate whether he thought one body could transeuntly cause a change in a different body. However, Descartes did argue that mental substance could transeunt cause changes in extended substance. The best resource for Descartes’ more complicated causal views is Tad M. Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).


17 In this first part of my study where I examine Leibniz’s criticisms of competing causal theories, I am primarily concerned with Leibniz’s response to the Traditional view.

18 See (G VI.608: AG 214), AG 33, (G IV.439: AG 47), (G VI.351-52: T 396), and (G V.353-54: T 400).
responsible for all of its natural changes and properties. In this world, immanent
efficient causation is fundamental while transeunt causation is merely phenomenal and
reducible in some sense to the immanent causal activity of individuals. So Leibniz
defended position (ii) against (i) and (iii). The spontaneity of substances and the
fundamentality of immanent rather than transeunt causation are foundational theses of
Leibniz’s metaphysics, which Leibniz also utilized in his philosophical theology. He also
argued that these counterintuitive causal views provided a powerful philosophical
underpinning for the increasingly successful enlightenment physics.

Leibniz’s views are challenging in at least three ways, which I take up in my
dissertation. First, Leibniz rigorously defends some aspects of his criticisms of competing
causal theories, while he passes over other crucial premises without pausing to develop
them. One explanation for this is that the reasoning would have been obvious to his 17th

19 I use the term “natural” because Leibniz allows for the possibility of miracles, such as a case where God
is solely responsible for some of a created substance’s accidents. Additionally, Leibniz was a concurrentist
who, with other concurrentists, argued that God’s causal input is required for the production of even non-
miraculous accidents. For a treatment of Leibniz’s theory of divine concurrence, see See Timothy Allan
Hillman, “Leibniz on Monadic Action & Divine Concurrence,” (PhD Diss., Purdue University, 2008).
20 The reduction of transeunt causal activity to immanent causal activity actually occurs in multiple levels
in Leibniz’s metaphysics. First, it is a crucial feature of Leibniz’s theory of pre-established harmony. On
the theory of pre-established harmony, all non-initial properties of created individuals are immanently
causally caused by such individuals. However, God created the world in such a way that all the immanently caused
properties are coordinated or harmonious. Second, corporeal individuals—such as organisms and the
particles studied by impact mechanics—are reducible to individual simple non-extended individuals or
substances (what Leibniz calls “monads”) and their accidents. Thus, any transeunt causal activity between
two bodies is reducible to the immanent causal activity of monads. Third, immanent causal activity is
prominent when focusing solely on impact mechanics and Leibniz’s science of dynamics. Leibniz argued
that when two bodies $b_1$ and $b_2$ collide, rather than $b_1$ causing $b_2$’s change in velocity, $b_2$’s change in
velocity is caused by the elastic nature of the particles composing $b_2$. The focus on my dissertation, I note,
is not the reduction of transeunt causal activity to immanent causal activity. Instead, it is the metaphysics
of immanent causation as such—what happens when an individual causes a property in itself. A coherent
account of immanent causation as such is a necessary condition of Leibniz’s reduction of transeunt
causation to immanent causation.
century peers, even though the reasoning is lost on us. I dredge out the missing support for some of the key premises that have baffled scholars.  

Second, Leibniz never stops to rigorously and systematically develop at length his own positive account of what happens when an individual produces a change in itself. This absence leaves many unanswered questions. A task confronting scholars—as yet undone—is to reconstruct his positive account from both his many scattered criticisms of alternative causal theories and his equally scattered remarks of the positive elements of causation. In the second half of my dissertation, I contribute to such an eventual positive account of a substance’s producing a change in itself by carefully examining two issues: how simple substances can have a multitude of accidents at a time and over time

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21 I describe in greater detail the missing premises and how one might fairly go about supplying them in Chapters 2-5.
22 One explanation for why Leibniz never produces a lengthy, rigorous, systematic treatise on his positive account of immanent causation is that most of his writings were letters to various philosophers, scientists, and theologians he dialogued with. Hence, his remarks on causation are scattered, written in response to specific concerns raised by disputants, usually using the technical vocabulary of his interlocutors instead of using Leibniz’s own carefully worked out terminology.
and how substances can be efficient causal agents that deterministically and immanently efficiently cause their accidents.

Finally, Leibniz’s causal views are relevant to contemporary theories of causation in at least three respects. First, Leibniz offers novel reasons both for and against persistence theories of causation.\(^{24}\) Second, and related to the first, his views also point to some consequences of persistence theories of causation, which, while not entailing their truth or falsity, are important.\(^{25}\) Mainly, persistence theories of causation are inconsistent with causal overdetermination. Third, Leibniz, I mentioned above and shall argue in greater depth, has principled reasons to wed substance causation with determinism—two metaphysical views typically viewed as at odds with each other.\(^{26}\)

§3 Dissertation Roadmap

With the broad overview of efficient causation, change, and Leibniz’s distinctive views on both, I now turn to the specific issues that arise his metaphysics of change and causation, which will be the subject of my dissertation. In Chapter 2, I address Leibniz’s criticisms of the dominant version of the Traditional view of his time that defended the


\(^{25}\) In Appendix A, I argue that one sort of persistence theory of causation which Leibniz attributes to the Traditional view of efficient causation is inconsistent with causal overdetermination.

\(^{26}\) I address this in Chapter 5 and give a more detailed summary of this issue in the dissertation roadmap below.
fundamentality of natural or creaturely transeunt causation—*Physical Influx*. Physical influx was endorsed by figures of wide-ranging views, such as the renaissance Aristotelian-Scholastic philosopher Francisco Suarez and enlightenment philosophers such as Rene Descartes. Physical influx’s central tenant was that transeunt causation consisted in the *communication* of the effect from the cause to the recipient of the effect. Physical Influx was utilized to explain a wide variety of change, including perception and impact mechanics. In perception, the perceived object communicates a likeness or representation—what Scholastics called a “species”—of itself to the percipient. In impact mechanics, one particle changes the velocity of another by communicating its motion. On Leibniz’s understanding of Physical Influx, which is strikingly similar to many contemporary persistence theories of causation, the agent substance’s (cause) communication of the effect consisted in the accident caused by the agent first detaching itself from the agent and being sent to the recipient of effect (the patient). Call this literal detachment of the accident from the agent and its being sent to the patient ‘Transference’, where upon transference, the agent no longer possesses the accident it causes.

Leibniz’s criticisms of the fundamentality of creaturely transeunt causation then consisted of two claims:

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28 See for example Suarez, DM 17.1.6. For an overview of Aristotelian-Scholastic theories of physical influx and transeunt efficient causation, with special attention given to Suarez’s theory, who in turn heavily influenced Descartes, see A.J. Freddoso’s introduction to Francisco Suarez, S.J., *On Creation, Conservation, & Concurrence: Metaphysical Disputations 20-22* (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2002), xliii-lix.

29 See for example AG 33, (G II.251: AG 176), (G VI.607-8: AG 213-14), and G IV.498f.
C1. Creaturely transeunt causation is fundamental only if the transference of accidents is possible.
C2. The transference of accidents is not possible.

C1 is confronted with two problems—interpretive and philosophical—that I address in Chapter 2. First, Leibniz stated C1 throughout his career, but offered little argument for it. The lack of defense is startling as most who affirmed the fundamentality of creaturely transeunt causation also surprisingly but nevertheless vehemently denied C1. In fact, Thomas Aquinas called the transference condition “laughable.”30 Second, God is a transeunt cause in Leibniz’s philosophy. Yet God’s transeunt causation does not consist in transference. Thus, Leibniz needs a principled way to affirm C1 and deny that divine transeunt causation consists in transference.31

I argue that Leibniz had a solution to both puzzles. While Leibniz never explicitly states it, I make the case that Leibniz thought that if an agent transeuntly caused an accident without transferring the accident, the agent created the accident. For the recipient substance contributed no reality to the accident and the agent lost no reality in causing the accident. However, only an omnipotent being—God—can create. Therefore, only God can transeuntly cause without transferring what is caused. I also argue in Chapter 2 that the argument for C1 is consistent with creaturely immanent causation.

Finally, I close off chapter 2 by drawing attention to an important weakness with C1 that has not yet been recognized by Leibniz scholars. Based on some important arguments Leibniz develops against occasionalism in his Theodicy concerning the causation of modifications, I argue that Leibniz ultimately only has reasons to hold that the

30 See Aquinas, SCG, Bk. III, Pt. 1, Ch. 69, 28.
31 Freddoso raises this problem, which to date has not been addressed. See Freddoso, Ibid., xlix.
transference condition is a condition of the production of non-modal accidents, such as real qualities.

In Chapter 3, I address Leibniz’s support for C2. Unlike C1, Leibniz provides ample support for C2 throughout his career, making C2 much easier to defend than C1. Additionally, unlike C1, C2 enjoys much support throughout the history of philosophy, especially by defenders of creaturely transeunt causation who denied C1. I argue, in two stages, that there is nothing in Leibniz’s ontology that could be transferred from the cause to the recipient of the effect. First, I articulate the thesis that Leibniz’s ontology consists of simple non-corporeal substances and their accidents.32

Second, I present and articulate a number of important theses Leibniz affirmed about substances and their accidents, which entail that neither could be transferred. I also show that most of these theses were not unique to Leibniz, but in fact were widely endorsed by his predecessors who affirmed the fundamentality of creaturely transeunt causation.33 The majority of the second half of Chapter 3 is devoted to Leibniz’s theses on accidents, specifically his claims that accidents are modifications or limitations, as these features of accidents are most relevant to why they could not be transferred. These theses also provide material which will be utilized in the next chapter when I investigate

32 A classic statement of Leibniz’s ontology can be found in a 1715 letter to Des Bosses, where Leibniz writes, “Whatever is not a modification can be called a substance.” (G II.503-4: L 614). Leibniz’s most extensive defense and articulation of his metaphysics of fundamental, simple and non-extended individuals is his Monadology. See (G VI.607-23: AG 213-25).
33 The two most important theses concern properties. First, for any property P, P exists only if P is some individual s such that P is a property of s. Second, for any property P and any individual s₁, if P is a property of s₁ then there is not some individual s₂ such that P is a property of s₂. The first thesis entails that properties must exist in an individual—they cannot float free. The second thesis entails that a property cannot exist in more than one individual (i) at the same time; (ii) at different times; (iii) or in different possible worlds. The second thesis was affirmed by nearly every medieval and early modern philosopher and has recently been revived by contemporary philosophers. Contemporary metaphysicians call it the thesis of “non-transferability”.
the nature of accidents insofar as they are the effects of immanent causation and the role
they play in change.

In chapter 4, I continue my study of the nature of Leibnizian accidents, shifting
the focus from their role in Leibniz’s critique of the Traditional view to their positive role
in change and as causal *relata*, where such accidents are the *effects* of immanent
causation. Specifically, I reconstruct and assess Leibniz’s argument that accidents are
modifications or limitations\(^34\), a thesis which was widely held by early modern
philosophers and which set them apart from their medieval predecessors and also which
played an crucially important role in Leibniz’s positive account of change and immanent
causation.\(^35\) In a key passage, in a 1703 letter to De Volder, Leibniz clarifies what it is
for an accident to be a modification or limitation:

\[
\ldots \text{a modification is a varying limitation, and modes merely limit things but do}
\]
\[
\ldots \text{not increase them and hence cannot contain any absolute perfection which is not}
\]
\[
\ldots \text{in the thing itself which they modify. Otherwise, in fact, these accidents must be}
\]
\[
\ldots \text{thought of in the manner of substances, namely, something which stands per se.}^{36}
\]

I shall argue that holding that accidents are modifications or limitations allowed Leibniz
to posit that substances are mereologically simple while synchronically and
diachronically complex— they have a multitude of accidents at a time and change
accidents over time.

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\(^{34}\) See (G VI.598: AG 207), (G VI.590: AG 265), (G II.458: L 606), and (G II.503-4: L 614).

\(^{35}\) For a helpful paper on why it was significant and controversial that early modern philosophers only

posited one type of accident—modifications—in their ontology, see Stephen Menn, “The Greatest

Stumbling Block: Descartes’ Denial of Real Qualities,” in Roger Ariew and Marjorie Grene, ed.,

*Descartes and His Contemporaries: Meditations, Objections, and Replies* (Chicago: The University of


\(^{36}\) (G II.257: L 532).
To do so, I first reconstruct Leibniz’s argument in his not yet translated 1688 “De Realitate Accidentium,” (DRA) which I also provide a translation of in Appendix B.\(^{37}\) DRA is one of the few texts in which Leibniz goes into any length in arguing that all accidents are modifications. In this lesser known essay, Leibniz draws from premises the he utilized throughout his career.

After I reconstruct the argument in DRA, I address an issue arising from his arguments in DRA. The issue is that while Leibniz’s arguments in DRA \textit{prima facie} support the conclusion that accidents are modifications, he gives a surprisingly non-committal or agnostic conclusion as to whether there are any accidents at all. I argue that Leibniz hesitates to posit even modifications because he worried that the problems he raised with non-modal accidents apply to modifications as well.\(^{38}\) Specifically, Leibniz’s arguments against non-modal accidents stem from such accidents being \textit{parts} of substances, which is inconsistent with substantial simplicity. The arguments of DRA \textit{prima facie} also entail that not only are non-modal accidents parts, but modal accidents are parts as well. Not much later, Leibniz changed his mind and posited modal accidents in his ontology, without, however, ever explicitly addressing how such accidents could be in a substance without being a part of it. Drawing from Leibniz’s later mereological and geometrical writings and his understanding of modifications as limitations, I argue that Leibniz had the resources to posit simple substances that have a multitude of modifications at a time and change such modifications over time. By doing so, I fill one scholarly void in this chapter by applying Leibniz’s developed mereological theses to not

\(^{37}\) A.VI.4A,994-996.

\(^{38}\) By “non-modal accidents,” I mean accidents that are not modifications.
only showing how substances can have a multitude of modes at a time and over time, but also showing why simple substances cannot have non-modal accidents (such as real qualities).

In Chapter 5, I address an issue that has divided Leibniz scholars concerning the precise *relata* in Leibnizian immanent efficient causation. In many passages, Leibniz writes as if it is the substance or individual itself that efficiently causes its later properties or accidents. Yet in plenty of other passages, he writes as if it is the substances earlier properties or accidents that cause its later accidents. Call the former view the Efficacious-substance interpretation, which Bobro, Clatterbaugh, and Jorati defend. Most recent scholars such as Rutherford, Carlin, Kulstad, and Bolton, who defend the latter view, argue that it isn’t just any accident in Leibniz’s ontology but rather appetitions, which strictly speaking, produce a substance’s later accidents. Call this the Efficacious-appetition interpretation.

In this chapter, I present and defend a novel version of the Efficacious-substance interpretation which incorporates the strengths of the Efficacious-appetition interpretation. I focus primarily on Donald Rutherford’s arguments for the efficacious-
appetition interpretation, as he has presented the lengthiest and strongest case for it. Rutherford argues that the Efficacious-substance interpretation is incompatible with Leibniz’s determinism and his requirement that change be intelligible— the change must explained by the substance’s own nature.\textsuperscript{44} Instead, Rutherford argues that if appetitions are what produce the later accidents of a substance, then monadic change is both deterministic and intelligible. A substance $s$ is determined to change from state $N$ to $N+1$ because the appetitions of $s$ that partially constitute $N$ are both appetitions for the accidents of state $N+1$ and what produce the accidents which make up $N+1$. The change is intelligible because it is explained by $s$’s nature— specifically $s$’s nature as modified by its appetitions. What is key in Rutherford’s argument is that what does the explaining is what does the producing— the efficient causal agent of the change.

However, the Efficacious-appetition interpretation succumbs to a serious objection originally raised by Locke and endorsed by Leibniz himself in his \textit{New Essays on Human Understanding}, what I’ll call the Multiplication of Agents objection.\textsuperscript{45} If appetitions, rather than substances, are efficient causes of a substance’s later accidents, then there is a plurality of distinct efficient causal agents in a substance, a view that Leibniz explicitly rejects, and, moreover that, runs afoul of the simplicity and unity of created substances. The Efficacious-substance interpretation avoids this objection as there is just one efficient causal agent— the substance.

\textsuperscript{44} Leibniz writes, “Whenever we find some quality in a subject, we ought to believe that if we understood the nature of both the subject and the quality we would conceive how the quality could arise from it. So within the order of nature (miracles apart) it is not at God’s arbitrary discretion to attach this or that quality haphazardly to substances. He will never give them any that are not natural to them, that is, that cannot arise from their nature as explicable modifications.” See A.VI.6.66.

\textsuperscript{45} See John Locke, \textit{An Essay Concerning Human Understanding} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 2.21.20/243-44 and (G V.159: NE 174).
I further argue that the efficacious-substance account can be reconciled with Leibniz’s determinism and strictures on explanation. Leibniz utilized a distinction found as early as Aquinas and developed at length by Suarez between two different kinds of efficient causes— the *principle quod* efficient cause or efficient causal agent and the *principle quo* efficient cause or power by which the agent acts.\(^{46}\) Scholastics such as Suarez held that in most cases, substances are efficient causal agents yet they also had principled accounts of how substances could be efficient causal agents and yet act deterministically or of necessity in some sense.\(^{47}\) I argue that Leibniz had similar reasons to consistently hold that substances are efficient causal agents—and so avoid the Multiplication of Agents objection—but also hold that such substances deterministically produce their effects in a way that satisfies Leibniz’s strictures on explanation. Mainly, appetitions are powers by which a substance efficiently causes its later accidents.

In the Appendix A, I argue that there are resources within Leibniz’s metaphysics of causation to provide the support for a premise that scholars have argued is missing but needed in a different argument Leibniz made against creaturely causal interaction. Early in his career, Leibniz denied creaturely causal interaction because of his thesis of substantial spontaneity, specifically a variant of spontaneity in which all of a substance’s states follow from its complete concept or notion.\(^{48}\) Scholars have rightly pointed out that Leibniz cannot deny causal interaction from spontaneity alone. Instead, Leibniz also needs a premise ruling out causal overetermination. Otherwise, there is no inconsistency

\(^{46}\) See, for example, Aquinas, *ST* 1a q36 a1 and Suarez, *DM* 22.1.19.

\(^{47}\) *DM* 19.1

\(^{48}\) See *AG* 33 and (G IV.439: AG 47).
in affirming both that substances are spontaneous and that some states of a substance are caused by distinct substances.

Leibniz never offers an argument against overdetermination, nor does he even deny it. However, in Appendix A, I argue that given Leibniz’s understanding of creaturely transeunt efficient causation—specifically his Transference condition, Leibniz has the resources to deny causal overdetermination. That is, if creaturely causal interaction consisted in transference, as Leibniz insists it must if it occurred—with a literal detaching of the accident caused from the agent and its being transferred to the patient, then overdetermination is not possible. If Leibniz can rule out overdetermination from his understanding of creaturely transeunt causation, then he can deny that an accident transeuntly caused is also immanently and spontaneously caused. However, if Leibniz can deny spontaneity from creaturely transeunt causation, then he can deny creaturely transeunt causation from spontaneity via contraposition.

In the Appendix B, I address early and late Leibniz’s views on Transubstantiation. While at various times in Leibniz’s career, he offered accounts of the metaphysics of transubstantiation, I argue that the mature Leibniz, ultimately, did not affirm Transubstantiation. In Appendix C, I offer a translation of Leibniz’s “De Realitate Accidentium.”

§4 The Idealistic Interpretation of Leibniz

As dissertation is a study of Leibniz’s metaphysics of intra-substantial causation and change, it’s important to get clear on what count as substances in Leibniz’s metaphysics. In this dissertation, I assume the idealistic interpretation of the mature Leibniz’s
metaphysics—the period starting around the publication of his Discourse on Metaphysics in 1686 up until his death in 1716—\(^{49}\) in which the only entities that are substances, strictly speaking, are simple substances or monads.\(^ {50}\) We find Leibniz expressing this thesis in his “Against Barbaric Physics,” written sometime between 1710 and 1716, where he claims that “only monads (among which the best are souls, and among souls, the best are minds) are substances.”\(^ {51}\) Writing to his friend Nicolas Remond, in the last year of his life, Leibniz again claims that “Absolute reality rests only in monads and their perceptions.”\(^ {52}\)

While I will draw upon texts that both clarify and support the idealistic interpretation in this section, my aim is not to offer a full-scale defense of the idealistic reading of Leibniz. Adequately defending the idealistic or non-idealistic interpretation of Leibniz is a task demanding its own dissertation. Space and time constraints wouldn’t allow me to do justice in addressing the numerous issues that must be dealt with in defending one interpretation over the other. I do note, however, that the idealist interpretation has been the dominant interpretation, both historically and presently.

To clarify the idealist interpretation in which, strictly speaking, the only entities that are substances are simple substances, it’s important to get clear on the reasons

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\(^ {49}\) I will draw upon earlier texts at various stages in this project, when relevant, but will indicate when I do so.


\(^ {51}\) AG 319.

\(^ {52}\) (G III.636: L 659).
Leibniz’s offers in favor of that thesis. To do so, I start by looking at some features of Leibnizian substances. According to Leibniz, a substance is a true unity or an \textit{unum per se}. In a letter to Arnauld, Leibniz writes, “that what is not truly one being is not truly one being either.”\textsuperscript{53} In order to be a true unity, however, a substance must be indivisible. In another letter to Arnauld, Leibniz writes, “A substantial unity requires a thoroughly indivisible and naturally indestructible being, since its notion includes everything that will happen to it, something which can be found neither in shape nor in motion (both of which involve something imaginary, as I could demonstrate) but which can be found in a soul or substantial form, on the model of what is called me.”\textsuperscript{54} Thus, according to Leibniz the only genuine substances, which have true unity, are simple substances. We find Leibniz expressing this thesis several decades later in a 1704 or 1705 letter to De Volder, writing that simple substances “alone have unity and absolute reality.”\textsuperscript{55}

Bodies, however, are divisible and therefore cannot be substances. Bodies, being shaped, are extended and therefore have parts.\textsuperscript{56} Instead, of counting as substances, bodies are divisible aggregates of substances, as Leibniz argues in his “Comments on Michel Angelo Fardella”.\textsuperscript{57} Given that bodies are beings by aggregation, they “have their unity in our mind only,” according to Leibniz.\textsuperscript{58} Bodies are “unities”, Leibniz argues, in

\textsuperscript{53} (G II.97: AG 86).
\textsuperscript{54} (G II.76: AG 79).
\textsuperscript{55} AG 181.
\textsuperscript{56} AG 207.
\textsuperscript{57} AG 103.
\textsuperscript{58} AG 86.
the sense that circle of men holding hands are a unity.\textsuperscript{59} Since bodies are aggregates, they are not substances. In a 1703 letter to De Volder, Leibinz writes, “Since only simple things are true things, what remains are only entities by aggregation.”\textsuperscript{60}

As aggregates, such as bodies, are not substances, they are instead phenomena.\textsuperscript{61} Specifically, bodies are well-founded phenomena that result from simple substances.\textsuperscript{62} Bodies, then, are not eliminated from Leibniz’s metaphysics. Instead they are reduced, in some sense, to simple substances and their accidents. Support for this understanding of bodies is found, for example, in a fictional dialogue between Philarete and Ariste written in 1712, when Philarete (speaking for Leibniz) claims, “My friend [Leibniz], whose opinion I have just related, gives enough evidence that he leans in this direction, since he reduces everything to monads, or to simple substances and their modifications. . .”.\textsuperscript{63} Earlier, in a 1704 letter to De Volder, Leibniz writes: “Considering the matter carefully, we must say that there is nothing in things but simple substances, and in them, perception and appetition.”\textsuperscript{64} Bodies, reduced in some sense to simple substances and their accidents, have a phenomenal existence. Leibniz continues, “Moreover, matter and motion are not substances or things as much as they are the phenomena of perceivers, the

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid. Leibniz also writes to Arnauld: “We can therefore say of these composites and similar things what Democritus said so well of them, namely, they depend for their being on opinion or custom. And Plato held the same opinion about everything which is purely material. Our mind notices or conceives some true substances which have certain modes; these modes involve relations to other substances, so the mind takes the occasion to join them together in thought and to make one name account for all these things together. This is useful for reasoning, but we must not allow ourselves to be misled into making substances or true being of them.” See AG 89.

\textsuperscript{60} AG 177.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{63} (G VI.590: AG 265).

\textsuperscript{64} (G II.270: AG 181).
reality of which is situated in the harmony of the perceivers with themselves (at different times) and with other perceivers).  

This is the idealistic interpretation I shall assume in this dissertation. The only substances, strictly speaking, are simple substances. Bodies are reducible in some sense to simple substances and their accidents. While bodies are not substances, but well-founded phenomena that result from, in some sense, simple substances, there is a complication. There is a distinction between plain old composite bodies (e.g., a pebble) and organisms or animals. In a letter to De Volder, Leibniz writes:

I distinguish: (1) the primitive entelechy or soul; (2) the matter, namely, the primary matter or primitive passive power; (3) the monad made up of these two things; (4) the mass or secondary matter, or the organic machine in which innumerable subordinate monads come together; and (5) the animal, that is, the corporeal substance, which the dominating monad makes into one machine.

An animal, according to Leibniz, is a corporeal substance made up of a very large number of monads or simple substances. Prima facie, an animal is a composite—made up of a large number of monads—but also a substance. Specifically, an animal consists in a dominant monad and a plurality of subordinate monads. In the Monadology, Leibniz writes, “Thus we see that each living body has a dominant entelechy, which in the animal is the soul; but the limbs of this living body are full of other living beings, plants, animals, each of which also has its entelechy, or its dominant soul.”

There are two interpretations one could take on Leibniz’s writings on organisms. First, these animals—which consist of a plurality of monads—are genuine corporeal substances, which while composite are nonetheless active true unities. The downside of

65 Ibid.
66 (G II.252: AG 177).
67 (G VI.619: AG 222).
this interpretation is that it conflicts with Leibniz’s claims about substantial simplicity. The second interpretation is that these corporeal substances are not genuine substances. Instead, they are aggregates of monads, like pebbles, only with additional special relations between the dominating monad and its subordinate monads. On this latter interpretation, composite corporeal substances or animals are reducible as well, in some sense, to simple substances and their accidents. I will assume this latter interpretation in this dissertation. However, there is still much of value in this dissertation to scholars who subscribe the non-idealist reading of Leibniz. Scholars who believe that the mature Leibniz posited corporeal substances in addition to simple substances should understand my project not as a study of intra-substantial causation and change but as a study on Leibniz’s metaphysics of intra-monadic causation and change.

§5 Methodological Approaches

As this dissertation is a work in the history of philosophy, I close off this introductory chapter by explaining the methodological approaches I’ll be utilizing in the remaining chapters. There is more than one worthwhile approach to the history of philosophy, and most worthwhile approaches have exemplars in Leibniz scholarship. Using a distinction recognized by Leibniz scholars such as Mates, Sleigh, Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne, these approaches can broadly be construed as “Exegetical” history of philosophy and “Philosophical” history of philosophy.68

I’ll start with exegetical or what can also be called “historical” history of philosophy. Mates characterizes exegetical history philosophy as “an attempt to discover and set forth, as accurately, objectively, and completely as possible the philosophical views of various historical figures”. Building on Mates’s description, Sleigh distinguishes two components of exegetical history of philosophy—a fact-finding component and an explanatory component. According to Sleigh, the fact-finding component is not simply collecting various statements by a philosophy. Instead, it involves the careful task of formulating a philosopher’s central views on a topic using sentences whose meaning is obvious in that we know what propositions the sentences express. While the outcome of mere fact-finding is—in and of itself—rarely if ever a significant contribution to the history of philosophy, it is at the very least a necessary component of work in the history of philosophy. My own project is no exception—there will be such fact-finding when appropriate in this project, which will be used in the service of what Sleigh calls the explanatory component.

Sleigh describes the explanatory component as not simply determining what a philosopher said but explaining why the philosopher said it. By explanation, Sleigh means the rational basis, as opposed to the psychological motivations for a philosopher’s views. The explanatory component is more difficult. As Sleigh writes, “Usually, many aspects of the intellectual setting that bear on philosophical theses ultimately accepted by

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69 Mates, Ibid.
70 Sleigh, 4.
71 Ibid., 5-6.
72 Ibid.
our philosopher go unstated.”\textsuperscript{73} This is especially true with some of the reasons for some of Leibniz’s most important and daring metaphysical theses, some of which are the subject of my project. I highlight this in order to note that the aims of my project are primarily explanatory. I aim to explain why Leibniz held certain theses, especially in Chapters 2-4.

Sleigh also notes that the explanatory component can benefit from what he calls philosophical history of philosophy as well, which Jonathan Bennett (whom Sleigh cites) describes as discussing some philosophical topic “in the company” of a historical figure.\textsuperscript{74} The style of philosophical history of philosophy I adopt in parts of this project can be described as follows. Leibniz may argue that some proposition $P_1$ is true because of a different proposition $P_2$. The reasoning for why $P_2$ entails $P_1$ may be lost on us. Operating on a principle of charity that is more than appropriate when studying a philosopher of Leibniz’s caliber, one should assume—initially, at least—that Leibniz had good reasons for arguing that $P_1$ follows from $P_2$. The work of figuring out how $P_2$ entails $P_1$ requires finding additional premises, usually premises that are not explicitly stated by Leibniz as linking $P_1$ and $P_2$. Finding these premises can involve: (i) searching throughout Leibniz’s thought for theses he did explicitly defend which can also link $P_1$ and $P_2$, even though Leibniz does not show that or even state that such theses link $P_1$ and $P_2$; (ii) looking broader at theses widely held by historical figures whom Leibniz was familiar with which could link $P_1$ and $P_2$ and which Leibniz would have no reason to reject; or (iii) engaging in plain old metaphysical reasoning oneself to rationally

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 3.
reconstruct a link between $P_1$ and $P_2$. Oftentimes, it involves a combination of (i) through (iii), with a high preference for (i) and (ii). With respect to (ii) and (iii), good philosophical history should start and end with the figure being studied. In parts of this dissertation, I also engage in such “philosophical” history of philosophy, with the intention of utilizing it to serve explanatory history of philosophy. In the main body of this dissertation, I try to stick with methods (i) and (ii) but I will go into the territory of (iii) in parts of the main chapters and in the entirety of Appendix A.

75 As Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne note and have done in their own work on Leibniz’s metaphysics of substance. See Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne, Ibid., 8-9.
CHAPTER 2. LEIBNIZ’S TRANSFERENCE ARGUMENT CREATURALLY TRANSEUNT CAUSATION, PART 1: THE TRANSFERENCE CONDITION

In this chapter and the next, I assess Leibniz’s criticisms of the traditional view of creaturely causation of his time—what Leibniz called “physical influx,” which defended the fundamentality of creaturely transeunt causation and posited a world of causally interacting created substances.76 A central tenant of the traditional view was that transeunt causation consisted in the giving or communication of the effect from the cause—the agent—to the recipient of the effect—the patient.77 On Leibniz’s understanding of physical influx, which is strikingly similar to many contemporary persistence theories of causation, the agent substance’s communication of the effect consisted in the accident caused by the agent first detaching itself from the agent and being sent to the patient.78 Call this literal detachment of the accident from the agent and its being sent to the patient “transference”, where upon transference, the agent no longer possesses the accident it caused. Leibniz’s criticisms of the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation then consisted of two claims. First, creaturely transeunt causation is

77 See for example Suarez, DM 17.1.6. For an overview of Aristotelian-Scholastic theories of physical influx and transeunt efficient causation, with special attention given to Suarez’s theory, which in turn was a major influence on Descartes, see A.J. Freddoso’s introduction to Francisco Suarez, S.J., On Creation, Conservation, & Concurrence: Metaphysical Disputations 20-22 (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2002), xliii-lix.
78 In the appendix to this chapter, I explore in greater depth the similarities between Leibniz’s understanding of physical influx and contemporary persistence theories of causation.
possible only if the transference of accidents is possible. Second, the transference of accidents is not possible.

In this chapter, I address two problems—interpretative and philosophical—that confront the first claim, what I’ll call the “transference condition”. First, Leibniz stated the transference condition throughout his career but offered little argument for it. This lack of any sustained defense is striking because most who affirmed the fundamentality of creaturely transeunt causation vehemently denied the transference condition. In fact, as we’ll see soon, Thomas Aquinas, a proponent of creaturely transeunt causation called the transference condition “laughable.” Second, God is a transeunt cause in Leibniz’s philosophy and yet God’s transeunt causation does not consist in transference. Thus, Leibniz needs a principled way to hold that the transference condition is a requisite of creaturely transeunt causation while denying that divine transeunt causation consists in transference.

I argue that Leibniz had a solution to both problems. While Leibniz never explicitly states it, I argue that Leibniz thought that if an agent transeuntly caused an accident without transferring the accident, the agent created the accident. For the recipient substance contributed no reality to the accident and the agent lost no reality in causing the accident. However, only an omnipotent being—God—can create. Therefore, only God can transeuntly cause without transferring what is caused.

In §1, I articulate and defend a specific interpretation of Leibniz’s transference condition, where creaturely transeunt causation consists in the effect being transferred.

79 Aquinas, SCG, Bk. III, Pt. 1, Ch. 69, 28.
80 According to Leibniz, God’s transeunt causal activity consists in creation, conservation, and concurrence. See for example (G VI.118-19: T 27) and (G IV.457-58: AG 63).
from the agent to the patient, where upon transference, the agent no longer possesses what it produces in the patient. In §2, I address the two puzzles that scholars have raised against Leibniz’s transference condition. After showing that Leibniz has principled reasons for holding that creaturely transeunt causation must consist in transference while divine causation does not, I draw attention in §3 to a weakness that has not yet been addressed with the transference condition. Based on some important arguments Leibniz develops against occasionalism in his *Theodicy* concerning the causation of *modifications*, I argue that Leibniz ultimately has reasons only to hold that the transference condition is a condition of the production of non-modal accidents, such as real qualities.81

§1 The Transference Condition

Take a non-initial accident $A$ inhering in some created substance $s$. What could be the efficient cause of $A$? Adherents of the traditional view (nearly everyone except Leibniz and the occasionalists) would say that either $s$ itself or God or a different created substance $s’$ could have caused $A$. For example, suppose Davis’s face turns red. Davis could have produced the redness in his face by holding his breath. On the assumption of Theism, God could have produced the redness in Davis’s face. But it also seems trivially true that some other created substance, such as Davis’s grandmother, could have produced the redness in Davis’s face (perhaps by slapping him). I’ll call cases where a

81 Non-modal accidents are accidents that are not modifications.
substance produces or efficiently causes an accident in a different created substance cases of transeunt causation.\textsuperscript{82}

In this chapter and the next, I address Leibniz’s (in)famous denial of the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation, specifically his requirement that some of the being of the agent substance be transferred to the patient substance in such causal interaction, which Leibniz in turn claimed is impossible. I will call Leibniz’s argument the “Transference argument”. The argument is worth focusing on for two reasons. First, some of the key metaphysical theses and constraints used in Leibniz’s transference argument also play important roles in Leibniz’s positive views on efficient causation and change, which are the subjects of chapters 4 and 5. Second, the transference argument is the argument Leibniz most frequently invokes against the possibility of creaturely causal interaction throughout his career. For example, in his 1686 “Primary Truths”, Leibniz writes:

\begin{quote}
Strictly speaking, one can say that no created substances exerts a metaphysical action or influx on any thing. For not to mention the fact that one cannot explain how something can pass from one thing into the substance of another, we have already shown that from the notion of each and every thing follows all of its future states.\textsuperscript{83}
\end{quote}

In a later 1703 letter to de Volder, expressing his more mature metaphysics, Leibniz writes, “Properly speaking, I don’t admit the action of substances on one another, since there appears to be no way for one monad to flow into another.”\textsuperscript{84} Around the same time, in his \textit{Monadology}, Leibniz continues to deny the possibility of creaturely causal

\textsuperscript{82} In this chapter, I’m primarily focused on Leibniz’s criticisms of creaturely transeunt causation, so transeunt causation should be understood as creaturely transeunt causation. I’ll call cases where God is a transeunt cause, “divine transeunt causation”.
\textsuperscript{83} AG 33.
\textsuperscript{84} (G II.251: AG 176).
interaction, writing, “There is also no way of explaining how a monad can be altered or changed internally by some other creature.” Leibniz’s reason again is that “Accidents cannot be detached, nor can they go about outside of substances, as the sensible species of the Scholastics once did. Thus, neither substance nor accident can enter a monad from without.”

All of these passages express roughly the same argument, which has the following structure: Creaturely causal interaction (or transeunt causation) is not possible because $x$ is not possible. The variable $x$ is a placeholder for statements in the passages above about some entity passing or flowing or detaching from the cause to the effect—or better put, from the agent to the patient. Call this “passing” or “flowing” or “detaching” of some entity from the agent to the patient “Transference”. Leibniz’s argument then is that creaturely transeunt causation is not possible because transference is not possible. Given that Leibniz argues that creaturely causation is not possible because transference is not possible, it is evident that Leibniz takes such transference to be a necessary condition of creaturely transeunt causation.

It is important to get a grip on how Leibniz understands transference. I argue that Leibniz thinks such transference consists in the effect moving from the agent to the patient, such that upon transference, the agent no longer possesses what was transferred to the patient. That is, when an agent produces an effect in a patient, the agent transfers some of its own being to the patient. Key passages support this understanding of transference. For example, in his 1695 *A New System of Nature*, Leibniz writes:

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85 (G VI.607-8: AG 213-14).
Further, the action of one substance upon another is not an emission or a transplanting of some entity, as is commonly supposed; and it can be understood reasonably only in the way just shown. It is true that we can easily conceive of both the emission and the reception of the parts in matter and can in this way reasonably explain all the phenomena of physics mechanically. But since material mass is not a substance, it is clear that the action of substance itself can be only what I have just described. 86

Similar support is found a year later in his 1696 “Second Explanation of the New System,” where he writes:

The way of influence is that of the common philosophy. But since it is impossible to conceive of material particles or species or immaterial qualities which can pass from one of these substances into the other, this view must be rejected. 87

Further support is found a decade later in Leibniz’s New Essays on Human Understanding:

I am not surprised that you encounter insurmountable problems when you seem to be entertaining something as inconceivable as an accident’s passing from one subject to another; but I see no reason why we have to suppose such a thing. It is almost as strange as the Scholastics’ notion of accidents which are not in any subject; though they are careful to attribute theirs solely to the miraculous workings of divine omnipotence. 88

In these passages and the previous set of passages we looked at, Leibniz is criticizing the possibility of creaturely causal interaction—specifically “the way of influence,” which he describes as some entity being detached (detacher) or emitted (emission) from the substance and being passed (passer) or transplanted (transplantation) from the agent to the patient. This detaching of the entity implies that the entity was previously attached to the subject. That the entity emitted and detached by the substance goes outside of the substance implies that the entity was previously inside. Hence, whatever it was that was

86 (G IV.486: L 459).
87 (G IV.498-99: L 460).
88 (G V.208: NE 224).
passed or transplanted or detached or emitted to the patient first belonged to the agent until its reception in the patient. Leibniz’s statement that “It is true that we can easily conceive of both the emission and the reception of the parts in matter” is especially strong evidence for this understanding of transference. For when a material part is passed from one body to another, the material part surely does not belong to the originating body upon its reception in the receiving body but was a part of the originating body prior to transference. Similar reasoning applies when the entity transferred is a material particle.

Leibniz entertains several different kinds of entities as candidates for transference, such as atoms, sensible species, accidents and monads. For three reasons, however, I’ll focus primarily on accidents in this chapter and the next. First, Leibniz has other reasons for denying the possibility of one created substance causing the existence of a different created substance. Mainly, he holds that all created substances begin to exist by divine creation and can only cease to exist via divine annihilation. Second, Leibniz is an idealist who—in his strict ontology—denies the existence of physical atoms. His idealism also leaves no place for sensible species. This leaves accidents. Exploring why accidents could not be transeuntly caused or transferred, in addition to the first two reasons, also sheds much light on his own positive account of the created substances immanently causing and changing their own accidents.

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89 Leibniz denies the possibility of created substances efficiently causing other created substance to come into existence because he argues that created substances are mereologically simple. Given that they are simple, they can only begin to exist and cease to exist via divine creation and annihilation. See (G VI.607: AG 213).

90 I articulated and to a limited extent defend the idealistic interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics in Chapter 1.
So in this chapter, I focus on Leibniz’s reasons for his claim that one substance can transeuntly cause an accident in a different substance only if the agent transfers the accident from itself to the patient, with such transference resulting in a loss of some of the being of the agent— the being of the accident gained by the patient. This is the transference condition, which I formally express thus:

**The Transference Condition:** For any created substance \(s_1\) and any created substance \(s_2\) and any accident \(A\), \(s_1\) efficiently causes \(A\) to inhere in \(s_2\) only if \(s_1\) transfers \(A\) from \(s_1\) to \(s_2\). \(^{91}\)

\(s_1\)’s transferring of \(A\) from itself to \(s_2\), as I argue Leibniz understands it, entails that \(s_1\) loses \(A\) or loses the being of \(A\) that it transfers to \(s_2\). The accident \(A\) or the being of \(A\) first belonged to \(s_1\) and then is gained by \(s_2\), upon which \(A\) no longer belongs to \(s_1\). That is how I argue that Leibniz understands it and the version of transference I shall work with throughout this chapter. While not a definition, I can at least offer some constraints to further clarify what transference consists in:

For any created substance \(s_1\) and any created substance \(s_2\) and any accident \(A\), \(s_1\) transfers \(A\) to \(s_2\) only if:

(i) \(s_1\) is not identical to \(s_2\);
(ii) \(A\) first belongs to \(s_1\), \(^{92}\)
(iii) \(A\) second belongs to \(s_2\).

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\(^{91}\) An alternative formulation, which will make sense in the third section of this chapter when I articulate the causal adequacy principle, can be expressed thus: For any created substance \(s_1\) and any created substance \(s_2\) and any accident \(A\), \(s_1\) efficiently causes \(A\) to inhere in \(s_1\) only if \(s_1\) transfers the being of \(A\) from \(s_1\) to \(s_2\). For now, I stick with the original formulation.

\(^{92}\) *Prima facie*, the use of ordinals in conditions (iv) and (v) suggest a temporal ordering, where \(A\) is a part of \(s_1\) at a time earlier than when \(A\) is a part of \(s_2\). Invoking time in elucidating transference is *prima facie* controversial then, as Leibniz defines time in terms of causality rather than vice versa. However, the use of ordinals in (iv) and (v) doesn’t necessarily mean that transference is defined partly by temporal concepts. Ordinals in a statement do not always entail a temporal ordering. For example, “B” is the second letter of the alphabet. That doesn’t mean that “B” occurs temporally later than “A”. For works addressing the relation between time and causality in Leibniz, see J.A. Cover, “Non-Basic Time and Reductive Strategies: Leibniz’s Theory of Time,” *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 28 (1997): 289-318 and Michael Futch, *Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Time and Space* (New York: Springer, 2008).
(iv) If $A$ belongs to $s_1$ then $A$ does not belong to $s_2$;
(v) If $A$ belongs to $s_2$ then $A$ does not belong to $s_1$;

I note two things about these constraints on transference. First, I am not claiming that (i) – (v) are *sufficient* for transeunt causation, as it could be the case that God moved $A$ from $s_1$ to $s_2$, in which case we would say that God, rather than $s_1$, caused $s_2$ to have $A$.\(^{93}\)

Second, the term “belong” is undefined. In the case of $s_2$, $A$’s belonging to $s_2$ just is $A$’s inhering in $s_2$. However, I’ll assume, for now, that “belonging” is broader in extension than just inherence, leaving open the possibility that $A$’s belonging to $s_1$ does not entail that $A$ inheres in $s_1$. This will be relevant in §2 when I address the causal adequacy principle.

With transference clarified, Leibniz’s transference argument against creaturely transeunt causation can be expressed thus:

(P1) Creaturally transeunt causation is possible only if the transference of accidents is possible.
(P2) The transference of accidents is not possible.
(C) So, creaturally transeunt causation is not possible.

I address each premise in turn, focusing on Leibniz’s reasons for (P1) in this chapter and (P2) in chapter 3.

§2 Leibniz’s Defense of the Transference Condition

(P1), a restatement of the transference Condition, is the most controversial premise in Leibniz’s transference argument. Appropriately, I’ll devote the rest of this chapter to

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\(^{93}\) This is in contrast to the recent persistence theory of causation defended by S.D. Rieber who claims “causation is nothing more than a property moving from one object to another.” See S.D. Reiber, “Causation as Property Acquisition,” *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* 109, no. 1 (2002): 53-74.
addressing what reasons Leibniz could and does give in support of it. The controversy concerning the transference condition is three-fold. First, most philosophers who defended the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation denied the transference condition. Second, Leibniz offers very little in defense of the transference condition himself. Instead, he oftentimes just asserts the transference condition, as noted in the passages above. Third, God is a transeunt cause in Leibniz’s metaphysics, and yet divine transeunt causation (unlike creaturely transeunt causation) does not consist in transference. Thus, Leibniz needs principled reasons for holding that creaturely transeunt causation must consist in transference while divine causation does not.

2.1 Philosophers who denied the Transference Condition

Many philosophers who not only devoted significant space to defending the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation but also developed sophisticated accounts of it vehemently denied the transference condition and therefore the truth of (P1). For example, in an often-quoted passage, where Aquinas is arguing against a medieval version of occasionalism that assumed something like the transference condition, Aquinas writes:

> Again, it is laughable to say that a body does not act because an accident does not pass from subject to subject. For a hot body is not said to give off heat in this sense, that numerically the same heat which is in the heating body passes over into the heated body.\(^{94}\)

Aquinas denies the very same thing we saw Leibniz deny above— that an accident which belonged to one subject could be detached and sent to a different subject. Instead, Aquinas argues that such creaturely transeunt causation—such as a hot body heating a different body—occurs through what Scholastics called “eduction”:

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\(^{94}\) Aquinas, SCG, Bk. III, Pt. 1, Ch. 69, 28.
Rather, by the power of the heat which is in the heating body, a numerically different heat is made actual in the heated body, a heat which was previously in it in potency. For a natural agent does not hand over its own form to another subject, but it reduces (reducens) the passive subject from potency to act.  

Roger Bacon, who defended a similar account of transeunt causation known as the “Multiplication of Species” account, also denied that creaturely transeunt causation consists in transference. Bacon writes, “Acting does not destroy and corrupt an agent, but perfects it, since . . . a thing is perfect when it is able to produce a like thing.”  

Bacon’s denial of the acting of an agent destroying or corrupting it just seems to be a denial that in acting, an agent loses any of its own being. Focusing on species, when an agent produces a species in a recipient, the agent does not transfer the species, but rather, by a “bringing forth out of the active potentiality in the recipient matter”, the species is generated.  

Bacon’s denial is noteworthy because the language Leibniz often uses in describing transference—such as the transmission of species—is heavily drawn from Bacon’s account of transeunt causation.  

Finally, Suarez—from whom Leibniz gets the term “influx”—also denied that creaturely transeunt causation consists in transference. Suarez writes:

The efficient cause . . . causes by means of a proper action that flows from it. And in this it is also included that the efficient cause does not give its own proper and formal esse to the effect, but instead gives another esse that emanates from it by means of an action . . . The efficient cause . . . is an extrinsic cause, that is, a cause that does not communicate its own proper and (as I will put it) individual esse to the effect but instead communicates to it a different esse, which really flows forth and emanates from such a cause by means of an action.  

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95 Ibid.  
96 RB 45.  
97 RB 53.  
98 DM 17.1.6. See also DM 12.2.7.
Here Suarez is explicit—the being (esse) that the cause gives to the effect is not any of the efficient causes own being. Thus, the efficient cause does not lose any of its own being in producing an effect.

2.2 Was Leibniz arguing against a strawman?

The similarities between the language Leibniz uses in his transference argument and the terminology of Aquinas’s, Bacon’s, and Suarez’s accounts of creaturely transeunt causation are not at all surprising. Aquinas’s, Bacon’s, and Suarez’s accounts were heavily influential and well known in Leibniz’s time. Prima facie, Leibniz was arguing against a straw man. He argues that creaturely transeunt causation is not possible because transference is not possible, and he often describes such transference as the transmission of species, or accidents detaching, or influx. This leads to a dilemma: Either Leibniz did not understand the dominant accounts of transeunt causation or he did understand but nonetheless argued against a caricatured account.

A passage in one of Leibniz’s earlier writings—his 1670 “Preface to an Edition of Nizolius”—calls into doubt the first horn of the dilemma. Criticizing Suarez’s account of causation, Leibniz writes:

. . . so far as we have shown that technical terms are to be avoided as far as possible. Now we must note that whether terms are popular or technical, they ought to involve either no figures of speech or few and apt ones. Of this, the Scholastics have taken little notice, for strange though this sounds, their speech abounds with figures. What else are such terms as to ‘depend’, to ‘inhere’, to ‘emanate’, and to ‘inflow’ (influere)? On the invention of this last word Suarez prides himself not a little. The Scholastics before him had been exerting themselves to find a general concept of cause, but fitting words had not occurred to them. Suarez was not cleverer than they, but bolder, and introducing ingeniously the word influx (influxus), he defined cause as what flows being into something else, a most barbarous and obscure expression. Even the construction is inept, since influere is transformed from an intransitive into a transitive verb; and this influx is metaphorical and more obscure than what it defines. I should
think it an easier task to define the term ‘cause’ than this term influx, used in such an unnatural sense.\textsuperscript{99}

In this passage, the young Leibniz indicates that he is aware that terms such as ‘influx’ and ‘inflow’ have a metaphorical meaning when used in defining efficient causation. Leibniz’s criticism of the usage of such terms is that he argues that one should not use a metaphorical term at the ground level of one’s metaphysics. This is especially the case in defining a term such as ‘cause’, for using a metaphorical term obscures, rather than clarifies causation. With the above passage as evidence, I herewith suggest that Leibniz was aware that scholastics such as Suarez do not literally mean that the agent gives a part of its being to the patient. However, if Leibniz understands that causation does not consist in transference in sophisticated and influential accounts of transeunt causation (such as Suarez’s), then Leibniz is in a worse position, leading to the second horn of the dilemma: Leibniz knowingly argued against a caricatured understanding of transeunt causation.

In response to this second horn, Eileen O’Neill—who in her own work has contributed much towards understanding Leibniz’s transference condition—draws attention to two points in Leibniz’s favor indicating that he was not arguing against a straw man but rather thought that transeunt causation was committed to transference.\textsuperscript{100}

First, in spite of all the talk about eduction and the strongly worded denials of transference from scholastics such as Bacon, Aquinas and Suarez, they use the language

\textsuperscript{99} L. 126.
of transference when describing body-to-body causation. Take the following quote by Suarez on sensible species:

It is known by many experiences that species *shoot forth* from an object. The first is, because we see ourselves in another’s pupil, which cannot be understood to happen otherwise than by some little form which represents me having been impressed on the other’s pupil.\(^1\)

Second, when describing causation between entities of a different nature, such as bodies and minds, the scholastics often use language suggesting occasionalism or pre-established harmony—further implying a denial of transeunt causation in these cases because transference between entities of a different nature is difficult to conceive. Again, Suarez writes:

The phantasm and also the intellect of man are rooted in one and the same soul. For, here it turns out that they have a wonderful order and agreement in their operation, whence . . . for the same reason that the intellect operates, the imagination also senses. Therefore, in this way, I think . . . there is spiritual force in a rational soul for bringing about, in the possible intellect, species of these things . . . , while sensible cognition itself does not at all concur efficiently to that action.\(^2\)

According to O’Neill, Leibniz takes the scholastics’ reverting to the language of transference when discussing interaction between entities of similar natures or Pre-established Harmony/occasionalism when discussing interaction between entities of different natures as evidence that Leibniz thought they ultimately have no intelligible notion of creaturely transeunt causation. Instead, transference at the phenomenal level of description—bodies—is intelligible and the only conceivable model we have. At the

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metaphysical level of description of simple substances, there is no conceivable model of creaturely transeunt causation.\textsuperscript{103}

2.3 Divine transeunt causation and transference

Suppose Leibniz’s argument is as O’Neill suggests it is— that creaturely transeunt is unintelligible if no model can be given for it and there is no way of describing it without using language suggestive of either transference (between entities of similar natures) or pre-established harmony/occasionalism (between entities of different natures). Suppose further that such unintelligibility is evidence of impossibility. Alfred Fredosso has a response: “. . . it is better to have mysteries emerge at the end of one’s investigation into an obvious starting point than to deny the obvious starting point itself – in this case, the reality of action as an observable, basic primitive.”\textsuperscript{104} If Fredosso is right, then creaturely transeunt causation ultimately bottoms out in a mystery or a primitive. While dissatisfying, especially to one like Leibniz who places a high premium on explanation, such mystery does not entail impossibility.\textsuperscript{105} Figures such as Suarez might respond that the cost of rejecting something as obvious as creaturely transeunt causation is too high of a price to pay to avoid a mystery or primitive at some level of one’s explanation.

In this chapter, I do not aim to resolve this particular issue, as doing so requires a detailed examination of Leibniz’s strictures on metaphysical explanation and its connection to possibility.\textsuperscript{106} Instead, I turn here to what I argue is a more pressing problem for Leibniz’s Transference argument: Leibniz is \textit{prima facie} guilty of having a

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\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 52.
\textsuperscript{104} Fredosso, MD 20-22., xlix.
\textsuperscript{105} At least on the strictures of explanation endorsed by figures such as Aquinas, Bacon, Suarez, and others.
\textsuperscript{106} I address in greater depth Leibniz’s strictures on explanation in chapter 5.
very similar mystery emerge in his own metaphysics of causation, specifically in cases of 
divine transeunt causation. Continuing his critique of Leibniz and others who denied 
creaturally transeunt causation, Fredosso argues that philosophers such as Leibniz who 
deny creaturally transeunt causation while affirming divine transeunt causation must 
answer the question they themselves pose to defenders of creaturally causation: “What 
does God’s transeunt action consist in?”\textsuperscript{107} This question is important for Leibniz, as 
divine transeunt causation is not just a mere possibility but a crucial element of his 
systematic metaphysics. There would not even be created substances without God’s 
creation and conservation, and these are kinds of transeunt causation. Such divine 
transeunt causation does not, because it could not, consist in transference. That would 
entail God losing some of His being— an impossibility on the classical conception of a 
simple God. Leibniz then needs a principled way to argue that creaturally transeunt 
causation must consist in transference while divine transeunt causation does not. In what 
follows, I develop a way that Leibniz could take up this challenge.

\textbf{2.4 The Argument for the Transference Condition}

Leibniz needs reasons to defend the transference condition or (P1) of his transference 
argument:

\begin{center}
(P1) Creaturally transeunt causation is possible only if the transference of accidents is possible.
\end{center}

But the reasons for (P1) must not entail that divine transeunt causation consists in 
transference or that the transference condition is a necessary condition of divine transeunt 
causation. The reasons for the transference condition instead must be consistent with

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., xlviii.
denying that divine causation consists in transference. Further, rather than *ad hoc* reasons, Leibniz needs *principled* reasons for affirming (P1) while denying that divine causation consists in transference. I argue that Leibniz has such reasons.

My argumentative strategy is as follows. I first articulate three key theses or constraints on creaturely transeunt causation that were endorsed and utilized by notable medieval and early figures in their accounts of creaturely transeunt causation. These theses are connected to one another and follow upon one another in a logical progression of sorts. From these three theses, I develop an argument for (P1) that I contend was lurking behind Leibniz’s transference condition. The argument for (P1), as I shall show, is also consistent with denying that divine transeunt causation consists in transference. In fact, the argument is an argument for why specifically *creaturely* transeunt causation must consist in transference. After developing the argument, I argue in 2.5 that it was the argument behind Leibniz’s repeated statements of the transference condition.

I note that the argument for (P1) I develop and defend as Leibniz’s is drawn from what is at most a very thin skeleton in Leibniz’s writings. In this section, then, I trudge into the terrain of *philosophical* history of philosophy. I do so with the aim, however, of serving explanatory exegetical history of philosophy. My aim is to explain why Leibniz repeatedly endorsed the transference condition. I note as well that I do not conclude that Leibniz ultimately had a successful argument for (P1). In fact, I draw attention to a significant weakness with it in §3. Instead, I aim to make sense of *why* Leibniz thought (P1) was true while denying that divine causation required transference.

The first thesis is what I’ll call the “Causal Adequacy Principle”. The causal adequacy principle was not merely endorsed by both medieval and early modern
philosophers but was central to some of their most important metaphysical views.

Expressed in various ways, the causal adequacy principle required that effects pre-exist, somehow, in their causes or that causes must, somehow, contain their effects. The principle traces back at least to Aristotle, who argued that something that is potentially $F$ can only be made actually $F$ by something that is or contains the actuality of $F$. Many centuries later, we find Descartes—known for defending a metaphysics which is largely anti-Aristotelian—putting the principle to use as a key premise in his causal argument for God’s existence in his third meditation. Descartes writes, “there must be at least as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause.”

In between Aristotle and early modern figures such as Descartes, we find the principle explicitly defended by some medieval philosophers. For example, Aquinas endorsed and utilized the principle both in his own metaphysics of causation and in other important areas of his metaphysics, including his account of the divine nature. A classic statement of the principle is found in Part I of the *Summa Theologiae*: “For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like.”

Centuries later, Suarez endorses the very same principle, writing, “It is proved that nothing of perfection is in the effect that it does not

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108 Aristotle writes, “So far as the things formed by nature or by human art are concerned, the formation of that which is potentially is brought about by that which is in actuality; so that the Form, or conformation, of B would have to be contained in A.” *On Generation and Corruption*, 734a30-32.

109 CSM II, 28.

110 ST 1, q19, a4. Commenting on Aquinas’s usage of the principle, John Wippel writes, “This [the causal adequacy principle] is to say simply that the agent has the power to produce the effect.” *Metaphysical Thought of Aquinas*, 490
have from its causes”\textsuperscript{111} and “The effect can have no perfection which does not pre-exist in some of its causes.”\textsuperscript{112}

One might suppose that the causal adequacy principle is all Leibniz needs to argue against the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation instead of the more complicated transference argument. Consider the familiar but philosophically knotty cases of transeunt causation between substances of vastly different natures, such as mind-body causation in the context of Cartesian metaphysics.\textsuperscript{113} Suppose, for example, some mind efficiently caused a body to change its shape, such as when—within the metaphysics of Cartesian substance dualism—Socrates decides to rise from sitting and changes his shape. In this case, Socrates’ mind produced a new accident in his body—a new shape. Given the causal adequacy principle, Socrates’ mind can only produce a new accident in his body—a new shape—if the accident pre-exists in his mind. However, a shape is an accident appropriate for an extended thing while the accidents of a mental substance—such as Socrates’ mind—would be accidents appropriate to non-extended mental things, such as beliefs and desires. The burden for defenders of transeunt causation between entities of very different natures—such as Descartes—was to explain how a mental substance could cause a change in a bodily substance (or vice versa) when the mental substance lacked the accidents it caused in the body. The challenge, that is, was to explain how Socrates’ mental substance—which willed the standing—produced

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\textsuperscript{111} DM XXVI.1, quoted in Tad Schmaltz, \textit{Descartes on Causation}, 52.
\textsuperscript{112} DM 4 XXVI 1.2
\textsuperscript{113} According to Descartes, there are two fundamentally different kinds of created substances: bodies and mental substances. The essence of bodily substances is extension and all changes in bodily substances are grounded in changes in their extension. The essence of mental substances, on the other hand, is thought. Descartes’ most rigorous articulation of his metaphysics is found in his \textit{Principles of Philosophy}. See CSM I, 177-292.
\end{flushleft}
the change in shape in his body when his mental substance isn’t shaped or capable of being shaped.

However, in addition to the fact that it takes us no further towards understanding Leibniz’s reasons for (P1), there are at least two reasons why the causal adequacy principle is not sufficient to argue even against the possibility of transeunt causation. Clearly, the argument against transeunt causation from the causal adequacy principle, as presented above, gains purchase only in cases of causation between entities of different natures, such as minds and bodies. It would not apply to entities of the same nature, such as cases of mind/mind or body/body causation. An extended substance would be a suitable candidate to produce an accident in a different extended substance, unlike a non-extended substance, because the agent extended substance itself possesses the types of accidents it causes in the patient. Leibniz, however, is adamant that transeunt causation is not possible between any created substances.

Second, the few brief passages and argument given above present an overly simplistic and grossly misrepresentative version of the causal adequacy principle. As initially presented, the causal adequacy principle requires that a cause have an accident of the exact same type it causes in the effect, whether it be numerically the same (as Leibniz would argue) or a different token of the same type. This is plausible in causes of what the scholastics call univocal causation, such as fire heating a pan. But it scarcely applies to cases such as fire’s heat hardening clay, where the cause does not have an

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114 See DM 17.2 for Suarez’s discussion of univocal causes.
accident as the same type as the effect. A more pressing burden for many theists would be to explain how a non-extended God could create extended corporeal substances.

Instead, the simplistic version of the causal adequacy principle that entails the impossibility of causal interaction between substances of different natures is not the version of the principle that figures such as Aquinas, Suarez, and Descartes endorsed, even though they sometimes wrote as if it were. Instead, they endorsed a more refined version of the principle that is consistent with causal interaction between substances of different natures. Thus, Aquinas writes:

> I answer that, all created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator, Metaph. v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be seen from two considerations. First, because whatever perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent—as when man reproduces man; or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal agent—thus in the sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power.¹¹⁵

From Suarez:

> An effect cannot exceed in perfection all of its causes taken together. It is proved that nothing of perfection is in the effect that it does not have from its cause; therefore the effect can have nothing of perfection that does not pre-exist in any of its causes, either formally or eminently, because causes cannot give what they in no way contain.¹¹⁶

And Descartes:

> A stone, for example, which previously did not exist, cannot begin to exist unless it is produced by something which contains, either formally or eminently, everything to be found in the stone [i.e. it will contain in itself the same things as are in the stone or other more excellent things; similarly, heat cannot begin to exist unless it is produced in an object which was not previously hot, except by

¹¹⁵ ST 1, q4, a2, emphasis added.
¹¹⁶ DM XXVI.1, quoted in Tad Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation, 52. Emphasis added.
something of at least the same order (degree or kind) of perfection as heat, and so on.\textsuperscript{117}

Aquinas, Suarez, and Descartes all argue that the cause must formally or eminently contain the effect. The requirement of causes formally containing the effect applies to cases of univocal causation and is what was assumed in the initial argument against transeunt causation from the causal adequacy principle. That requirement drove figures such as Descartes’ pupil Princess Elizabeth to question the possibility of transeunt causation between substances of different natures. In 1643, she writes to Descartes, “I admit that it would be easier for me to concede matter and extension to the mind than it would be for me to concede to an immaterial thing the capacity to move the body and be moved by one.”\textsuperscript{118} Elizabeth assumed a version of the causal adequacy principle such as the following:

\begin{align*}
\text{For any substance } s_1 \text{ and any substance } s_2 \text{ and any accident } A, \text{ } s_1 \text{ efficiently causes } A \text{ to inhere in } s_2 \text{ only if } s_1 \text{ formally contains } A.
\end{align*}

But as the texts above make clear, Aquinas, Suarez, Descartes, and many others in fact affirmed a more generous version:

\begin{align*}
\text{For any substance } s_1 \text{ and any substance } s_2 \text{ and any accident } A, \text{ } s_1 \text{ efficiently causes } A \text{ to inhere in } s_2 \text{ only if } s_1 \text{ formally contains } A \text{ or } s_1 \text{ eminently contains } A.
\end{align*}

Formal containment is fairly easy to understand in contrast to eminent containment. Fire can heat a metal pan because the fire itself is hot.\textsuperscript{119} A precise formulation of eminent containment is more difficult to offer. There is indeed much disagreement on how a

\textsuperscript{117} CSM II, 28. Emphasis Added.
\textsuperscript{118} AT iii, 661
\textsuperscript{119} Formal containment can be expressed thus: For any substance \( s \) and any accident \( A, s \) formally contains \( A \) if and only if there is an accident \( F \) such that \( F \) is the same type of accident as \( A \) and \( F \) inheres in \( s \). In this definition, \( A \) and \( F \) may be numerically distinct or identical. Many texts suggest that Leibniz thought \( A=F \).
cause can eminently contain an effect. Rather than shoulder that burden, it will suffice, for the purposes of this section, to briefly draw attention to a feature of eminent containment that most philosophers familiar to Leibniz would have recognized. When an effect is eminently contained in its cause, the effect exists in the cause, in some “higher way” than in the effect. How, though, can an effect exist in a higher way in its cause? While various answers have been posed and defended, all answers agree that it is because the cause is more perfect or the cause has more reality than the effect. For example, Suarez writes, “Nevertheless, it should be briefly said that to contain eminently is to have such a perfection of a superior ratio, which virtually contains whatever is in the lower perfection.”

Notably, at least two philosophers influenced by Descartes—Malebranche and Spinoza—rejected eminent containment because of difficulties in giving a precise

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120 Most of the discussion has centered around Descartes’ usage of the notion of eminent containment. See, for example, Kenneth Clatterbaugh, The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy and 17-46, Tad M. Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation, 49-86.

121 See, for example, Aquinas, SCG I, 30 and ST 1, q13, a4. See also Descartes, CSM II, 30. Suarez gives the lengthiest defense and articulation of eminent containment that I have found. See DM XXX.1.

122 DM XXX 1.10.

123 Consider the following passage from Malebranche (where a univocal cause formally contains the effect and an equivocal cause eminently contain the effect) in LO 277: “And if one objects against their false and incomprehensible suppositions that fire must be composed of very highly agitated particles because it produces such violent motion, and that a thing cannot communicate what it does not have (which is certainly a very clear and well founded objection), they never fail to confuse everything by some frivolous and imaginary distinction (such as that between equivocal and univocal causes) in order to appear to say something when in effect they have said nothing. For at bottom it is a common notion among attentive minds that there is no such thing in nature as a true equivocal cause (in the sense they understand it) and that only the ignorance of men has invented them.”
account of it. Spinoza’s rejection of eminent containment, and thus likely affirmation of
the stricter version of the causal adequacy principle, would suffice to secure the falsity of
transeunt causation between substances of different natures (but not suffice alone to
secure the falsity of causal interaction between substances of the same nature). Leibniz,
however, could not have appealed to that option in arguing against creaturely transeunt
causation. In addition to that version of the causal adequacy principle still not entailing
the falsity of causal interaction between substances of the same nature, Leibniz himself
assumed eminent containment, at least in cases of divine causation. In the Discourse on
Metaphysics, Leibniz wrote, “This simple primitive substance [God] must eminently
(eminemment) include the perfections contained in the derivative substances which are its
effects.”

The causal adequacy principle alone then does not provide Leibniz with sufficient
reason to deny the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation. The principle will,
however, provide Leibniz with support for the first premise of his transference argument
and it does so in a way consistent with denying that divine causation consists in
transference. To see the role the principle plays in the argument, we must see why
philosophers endorsed the causal adequacy principle.

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124 Spinoza denies transeunt causation between substances of different natures in his Ethics, writing “When
things have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the other.” See Ethics 1, Proposition 3.
Spinoza seems to give epistemological reasons for Proposition 3 in the Ethics, writing, “If things have
nothing in common, then (Ax. 5) they cannot be understood through one another, and so (Ax. 4) one cannot
be the cause of the other. (Ethics I, prop. 3.) However, Francesca di Poppa has recently argued that the
proposition in the Ethics is ultimately due to problems Spinoza found with eminent containment, leading to
a metaphysics where all modes are formally contained in God, who immanently causes them. See
Francesca di Poppa, “God Acts from the Laws of His Nature Alone: From the Nihil Ex Nihilo Axiom to
Causation as Expression in Spinoza’s Metaphysics,” (PhD Diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2006).
125 See (G VI.602: AG 210). See also (G VI.613: AG 218).
Recall the passage from Suarez where he writes, “. . . the effect can have nothing of the perfection that does not pre-exist in any of its causes, either formally or eminently, because causes cannot give what they in no way contain.” The causal adequacy principle is the constraint expressed before the word ‘because’. Granted, Suarez expresses the principle somewhat differently that I have, requiring that the perfection of the effect pre-exist or be contained in the cause, while I my formulation of the principle requires the accident to pre-exist in the cause. I’ll continue to use the term accident. I do so, however, while noting that scholastics such as Aquinas and Suarez tended to use the term ‘perfection’ (perfectiones) in expressing the causal adequacy principle while Descartes tended to use the terms ‘reality’ and ‘perfection’ interchangeably.\(^{126}\) However, my usage of the term ‘accident’ will not impact the argument, thus I’ll assume the following bi-conditional:

For any substance $s$ and any accident $A$, $s$ formally contains $A$ or $s$ eminently contains $A$ if and only if $s$ contains the perfection of $A$.

If $s$ contains $A$, surely $s$ contains the perfection of $A$. For similar reasons, I’ll also assume the bi-conditional:

For any substance $s$ and any accident $A$, $s$ formally contains $A$ or $s$ eminently contains $A$ if and only if $s$ contains the reality of $A$.

Notice then that in the passage from Suarez, whatever is written after the word ‘because’ is a reason for the causal adequacy principle. The phrase Suarez uses is “causes cannot give (dare) what they in no way contain”, expressing what I’ll call the “Causing-as-

\(^{126}\) The term “reality” has a nuanced technical meaning in Leibniz’s metaphysics, which I soon address in §3 in this chapter and in much greater depth in chapter 4.
Giving” principle, the second thesis.\textsuperscript{127} The causing-as-giving principle is a reason for the causal adequacy principle and the causal adequacy principle is a necessary condition of the causing-as-giving principle. This relation between the two principles is expressed in other ways, most notably as “\textit{nihil dat quod non habet}.” If some pan heats some water—i.e., the pan gives heat to the water, then the pan must itself contain heat. To put it slightly differently: what reason might one offer for the causal adequacy principle? The answer is the causing-as-giving principle. If \(x\) gives \(F\) to \(y\), \(x\) must possess \(F\). I can’t give my sister fifty dollars for her birthday unless I have fifty dollars. The same restriction applies to causal transactions.\textsuperscript{128}

Leibniz can agree with Suarez and others that the causing-as-giving principle is a reason for the causal adequacy principle and that the causal adequacy principle is a necessary condition of the causing-as-giving principle. That is, Leibniz can agree that:

For any substance \(s_1\) and any substance \(s_2\) and any accident \(A\), \(s_1\) gives the reality of \(A\) to \(s_2\) only if \(s_1\) formally contains \(A\) or \(s_1\) eminently contains \(A\).

But Leibniz holds further that once you give what you have, you longer possess it yourself. While Leibniz doesn’t explicitly make the following claim, there are plausible reasons to suppose that it is lurking behind his repeated assertions of the transference condition:

For any created substance \(s_1\) and any created substance \(s_2\) and any accident \(A\), \(s_1\) gives the reality of \(A\) to \(s_2\) only if \(s_1\) transfers \(A\) from \(s_1\) to \(s_2\).

\textsuperscript{127} Aquinas writes, “In De divinis nominibus Dionysii 4.5: “For these three things seem to belong to the notion of an efficient cause: to give being, to move, and to conserve.” Quoted in Michael Rota, “Causation,” in \textit{The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas}, edited by Brian Davies & Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 104-114.

\textsuperscript{128} In DM 12.2.3, Suarez argues that a cause’s “pouring being into another” is synonymous with the cause “giving or communicating being to another thing.” Quoted in Stephan Schmidt, “Efficient Causality: The Metaphysics of Production,” 85.
An objection immediately comes to mind with respect to arguing that the causing-as-giving principle entails the transference condition. It’s not necessarily the case that if you give something, you no longer possesses what you gave. For example, Paul’s giving Timothy advice does not entail that Paul no longer possesses that advice. Yet Paul can’t give Timothy advice unless Paul possesses, in some sense, the advice he gives. Thus, Paul’s giving advice must satisfy a constraint similar to the causal adequacy principle while at the same time not satisfying a constraint such as the transference condition. So giving what one has doesn’t entail that one loses what they give.

Leibniz would have to respond that there is an equivocal meaning to ‘give’ between ‘giving’ advice and ‘giving’ money, where the giving in causation is like the latter rather than the former. An immediate objection is that this move is *ad hoc*. Leibniz could respond, however, that it is not *ad hoc*, as the crucial difference between giving advice and the notion of giving in the causing-as-giving principle lies crucially in what is given. In cases of causing-as-giving, what is given are accidents—genuine beings that the patient substance gains.¹²⁹

One might further object that God can give an accident to a patient without God losing the reality of that accident. Moreover, God’s giving an accident is not necessarily equivocal in meaning to a created substance’s giving an accident, unlike Paul’s giving Timothy advice. This returns us to Fredosso’s objection: If God can give the reality of an accident to a patient substance without God losing what he gives, why can’t a created substance do the same?

¹²⁹ I address in greater depth how to understand that accidents are beings in the third part of this chapter and throughout chapters 3 and 4.
There are reasons available to Leibniz—which I shall argue were his reasons in 2.5—that address both objections: The reason causing-as-giving in transeunt causation is more like the giving of money when the giver is a created substance while God’s giving is more like the giving of advice is that only God can create. In support of this claim, I turn to the third thesis—in addition to the causal adequacy principle and the causing-as-giving principle—that applies to transeunt causation, what I’ll call the “No-Reality-from-Patient” principle. The No-reality-from-patient principle is the common sense principle that the patient does not contribute reality to the effect in transeunt causation, where the reality of the effect is the perfection of the effect or more simply put, the accident produced. While this principle needs little defense, it’s helpful to look at least one example of a philosopher who affirmed it. In Aquinas’s account of an agent substance’s educating an effect in a patient, the agent contributes actuality to the effect, while the patient does not. Instead, the patient supplies the potency for the effect, which is reduced to act by the agent. A pan must actually be hot if it is to produce heat in water that is only hot in potency. In the following passage, Aquinas defends the no-reality-from-patient principle:

Now it is plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause: and although to pre-exist in the potentially of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way.\[^{130}\]

While Aquinas is contrasting the perfection contributed by the efficient cause with the perfection contributed by the material cause, and while he does not use the term

\[^{130}\] ST 1, q4, a2
“patient”, his claims supports the no-reality-from-patient principle. The efficient cause is the agent and the agent contributes a form that inheres in matter—in this case either in prime matter (if the agent contributes a substantial form) or in the patient substance (if the agent contributes an accidental form). If the effect exists in a more imperfect way in the patient or material cause, the patient or material cause surely cannot be what contributes the perfection—or in other words the reality—of the accident. I note further that while Descartes does not avail himself of the act/potency distinction, his description of the causal adequacy principle conveys basically the same idea. That is, in transeunt causation, the substance acted on is not the source of the reality of the effect.

Further support for the no-reality-from-patient principle can be found in how the causal-adequacy principle is often expressed. For example, Suarez writes, “An effect cannot exceed in perfection all of its causes together. It is proved that nothing of perfection is in the effect that it does not have from its cause.”

Suarez’s statement is consistent with the effect exceeding in perfection the patient substance of a transeuntly caused accident. The reason is that the patient does not contribute perfection to the effect. If perfection is co-extensive with reality, then the patient does not contribute reality to the effect. The no-reality-from-patient principle can then be stated thus:

For any substance $s_1$ and any substance $s_2$ and any accident $A$, if $s_1$ efficiently causes $A$ to inhere in $s_2$ and it is not the case that $s_2$ efficiently causes $A$ to inhere in $s_2$, then it is not the case that $s_2$ gives the reality of $A$ to $s_2$.

It is from these three principles that Leibniz has an argument for (P1) that is consistent with denying that divine transeunt causation must consist in transference. Leibniz would

\[^{131}\text{DM XXVI.1}\]
argue that those who defend the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation could not endorse the causal adequacy principle, causing-as-giving principle, and no-reality-from-patient principle while at the same time rejecting the transference condition. While he never supplies it, his reasoning could be as follows: If the patient contributes no reality to the effect and the agent does not lose the reality it contains when it gives the reality of the effect to the patient, then the reality of the accident caused to inhere in the patient must have been created. However, only God can create, as only an omnipotent being can create and only God is omnipotent. So one of these must be rejected by defenders of creaturely transeunt causation: the causal adequacy principle, the causing-as-giving principle, the no-reality-from-patient principle, or the denial of the transference condition. If you give up the denial of the transference condition and instead affirm (P1), then the production of an accident in a patient is not a case of creation. So the denial of (P1)—the denial of the transference condition for created substances—is the culprit. Affirm, rather than deny, the transference condition and you no longer have created substances themselves creating. Leibniz thus has an argument for the transference condition and (P1) of the transference argument that is not only consistent with holding that divine causation does not consist in transference but also makes sense of it.

132 I note that Thomas Pinkston, in his dissertation on Suarez’s account of efficient causation, claims that efficient causation for Suarez—even when the cause is a created substance—is a type of creation. Pinkston writes: “Moreover, inasmuch as the efficient cause makes to be something that was not, and, inasmuch as the esse of the cause is strictly separated from that of its effect, one might reasonably speak of a cause “creating” its effect. Obviously, such a use of ‘create’ excludes any connotation of supernatural ex nihilo creation. Nevertheless, use of the term, suitably qualified, underscores the radical nature of efficient causality as understood by most scholastics, including Suarez.” As will be obvious in the following pages, the argument I give on behalf of Leibniz can be understood to press Pinkston (or Pinkston’s reading of Suarez) on just how the transeunt causation of accidents can satisfy the causal adequacy principle, causing-as-giving, and the no-reality-from-patient principle while also denying the transference condition, and not being the type of creation traditionally understood to require omnipotence. See Pinkston, 56.
2.5 *The argument for the Transference Condition is a Leibnizian Argument*

While it cannot be stated with certainty, two broad reasons point in favor of the argument developed in 2.4 being Leibniz’s reasons for (P1). First, the argument for (P1) makes sense of why Leibniz thinks *creaturely immanent* causation is possible even though *creaturely transeunt* causation is not, something which to date has not been dealt with in the scholarly literature. Specifically, the argument makes sense of how the causal adequacy principle can be a constraint on immanent causation without immanent causation requiring the transference or creation of accidents. Take a created substance $s$ immanently producing an accident $A$, so that $A$ inheres in $s$. On the causal adequacy principle, $s$ must have contained or possessed the reality of $A$ prior to causing $A$ to inhere in itself. The reality of $A$ did not move from $s$ to another substance when $s$ produced $A$. The reality of $A$ also didn’t just pop into being from another substance, nor did it just pop into being it itself. Instead, the reality of $A$ was already in $s$. So the production of $A$ resulted in no net gain of reality in $s$.

Using a crude but appropriate metaphor given our discussion of the causal adequacy principle, $s$ is a container, and the reality of $A$ never left the container, nor did new reality appear in the container when $A$ was produced, in addition to the reality already present in $s$. Instead, the reality was “moved around” but within the same substance.\(^{133}\) Were $s$ to efficiently cause $A$ to inhere in a different substance $s’$, and were

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\(^{133}\) In the *Theodicy*, Leibniz claims as much, writing, “...substances produce accidents by the changes of their limits.” The nature of accidental reality, how accidents are connected to their substances, and how substances immanently produce their accidents will occupy a significant portion of this dissertation, including the next section, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4. See (G VI.351: T 395). For similar claims by Leibniz, see (G II.257: L 532) and (G II.270: AG 180).
this case of transeunt causation to satisfy the causal adequacy principle, causing-as-giving principle, no-reality-from-patient principle, and the denial of transference, then Leibniz would call that creation. There would be a net gain in reality in the patient substance—the reality of the accident produced by the agent—with no loss of the agent’s being. Hence, Leibniz can say that creaturely immanent causation is possible because it requires neither creation nor transmission, unlike transeunt causation.¹³⁴

Second, the argument for the transference condition has historical precedent in philosophers not merely familiar to Leibniz but whom he claimed to have influenced important areas of his thought. Notably, the argument for the transference condition makes sense of two important areas of agreement between Leibniz and the occasionalists: (i) creaturely transeunt causation is impossible while (ii) divine transeunt causation is possible. With respect to (i), Malebranche—the most well known occasionalist and one who corresponded with Leibniz—also argued that one influential account of creaturely transeunt causation was inconceivable without transference. Arguing against the

¹³⁴ In conversation, Jeffrey Brower has raised an important objection to this account of immanent causation. Brower argues that Leibniz faces a dilemma with respect to the causal adequacy principle, the possibility of immanent causation, and the defense of the transference condition. Take again a created substance \( s \) immanently causing an accident \( A \) to inhere in itself. If \( s \) contains \( A \), as the causal adequacy principle requires, then \( s \) either formally contains \( A \) or eminently contains \( A \). If \( s \) formally contains \( A \), then \( s \) didn’t really change, as what it is for a substance to formally contain an accident just is for the accident (or an accident of the same type) to inhere in and be an accident of that substance. If \( s \) eminently contains \( A \), on the other hand, then \( s \) created \( A \).

I concede the first horn: If \( s \) formally contained \( A \), then in immanently producing \( A \), \( s \) didn’t really change. The next section of this chapter and the next two chapters do deal with topics relevant to the second horn of the dilemma raised by Brower, including what kind of reality accidents have, what kind of reality substances have, how they are related, and how a substance changes its accidents. In the next section of this chapter, I draw attention to a similar problem: Leibniz’s argument for the transference condition ultimately only applies to non-modal accidents, such as real qualities. It does not, I argue, apply to modifications—the only kind of accidents Leibniz posits in his ontology, as I argue in Chapter 3. Were Leibniz to hold that monads produce non-modal accidents, such as real qualities, then the dilemma applies: Either the accident would be created or the monad would not change. Modifications, Leibniz argues, have no reality of their own but instead are limitations on the positive reality of a monad, thus the immanent causation of a modification by a monad would not result in a net gain in reality.
multiplication of species model of causation developed at length by Roger Bacon, Malebranche wrote in *The Search After Truth* III.2.2, “Finally, it is inconceivable how a body that does not sensibly diminish could continually emit species in all directions, or how it could continually fill the vast spaces around it with them—and all this with inconceivable speed.” Malebranche finds it puzzling that a body (the causal agent) could emit species—the first effect of a natural cause in Bacon’s account—without the body diminishing. In other words, Malebranche finds it inconceivable how a body could produce a species distinct from it without losing some of its own being. So Malebranche argued that a major account of transeunt causation was inconceivable without transference. We find here Malebranche endorsing a premise very similar to (P1) of Leibniz’s transference argument. Malebranche, of course, also agreed with the conclusion of the Transference argument—that creaturely transeunt causation is impossible.136

For a different but related line of evidence that the argument for (P1) expresses Leibniz’s reasons for the transference condition, and one again based on Leibniz’s agreement with Malebranche, I turn to a key passage in Leibniz’s 1695 “A New System of the Nature and Communication of Substances, and of the Union of the Soul and Body.” This work expresses some of Leibniz’s most mature metaphysics. In it, Leibniz not only agrees with the occasionalists on (i) and (ii), but also explicitly states that he

135 LO 220-21.
136 I leave open the question of whether or not Malebranche would have agreed with (P2) of the transference argument—substances can’t diminish in being in the way required for transference. Malebranche in fact develops different reasons for the conclusion of the transference argument, which I soon present.
agrees —to some extent—with the their reasons for (i) and (ii). I present the passage in full:

For I could not find any way of explaining how the body makes anything happen in the soul, or vice versa, or how one substance can communicate with another created substance. Descartes had given up the game at this point, as far as we can determine from his writings. But his disciples, seeing that the common opinion is inconceivable, judged that we sense the qualities of bodies because God causes thoughts to arise in the soul on the occasion of motions of matter, and that when our soul, in turn, wishes to move the body, it is God who moves the body for it. And since the communications of motions also seemed inconceivable to them, they believed that God imparts motion to a body on the occasion of the motion of another body. That is what they call the system of occasional causes, which has been made very fashionable by the beautiful reflections of the author [Malebranche] of The Search after Truth.

I must admit that they have penetrated the difficulty by articulating what could not possibly be the case, but their explanation of what actually happens does not appear to eliminate the difficulty. It is quite true that, speaking with metaphysical rigor, there is no real influence of one created substance on another, and that all things, with all their reality, are continually produced by the power of God. . . .

Therefore, since I was forced to agree that it is not possible for the soul or any other true substance to receive something from without, except by divine omnipotence, I was led, little by little, to a view that surprised me, but which seems inevitable, and which, in fact, has very great advantages and rather considerable beauty. . . .”

Leibniz agrees with the occasionalists’ denial of the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation. Further, Leibniz admits that the occasionalists “penetrated the difficulty”, suggesting that Leibniz agrees to some extent with their reasoning against the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation. Finally, Leibniz agrees with the occasionalists that divine transeunt causation is the only possible kind of transeunt causation, and the reasons have something to do with God’s omnipotence. According to both Leibniz and the occasionalists, only an omnipotent being can produce an accident in a different

137 (G IV.482-83: AG 142-43).
substance. So the reason Leibniz and the occasionalists deny creaturely transeunt causation but affirm divine transeunt causation is because they are convinced that only God is powerful enough or has the right kind of power to produce accidents in other substances, while created substances do not.

It is important to note a reason why Leibniz did not agree with the occasionalists that only an omnipotent being can be a transeunt cause. Malebranche famously argued that one reason that only an omnipotent being can produce an accident in another substance is because there must be a necessary connection between a cause and an effect, something that obtains only when the cause is God’s will. Malebranche’s reasoning can be expressed thus:

(M1) Transeunt causation is possible only if there is a necessary connection between the cause and the effect.
(M2) There is a necessary connection between a cause and an effect only when the cause is an omnipotent being.
(M3) So, Transeunt causation is possible only when the cause is an omnipotent being.

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138 Malebranche writes, “A true cause as I understand it is one such that the mind perceives a necessary connection between it and its effect.” See LO 450.
139 Actually, Malebranche defends an even stronger conditional: (M1’) Efficient causation is possible only if there is a necessary connection between the cause and the effect, where even immanent efficient causes require a necessary connection between cause and effect. Thus, Malebranche also affirms the stronger conclusion (M3’). So, efficient causation is possible only when the cause is an omnipotent being. For the purposes of this section, the weaker M1 and M3 suffice.
140 Malebranche continues, “Now the mind perceives a necessary connection only between the will of an infinitely perfect being and its effects. Therefore, it is only God who is the true cause and who truly has the power to move bodies. I say further that it is inconceivable that God could communicate his power to move bodies to men or angels, and that those who claim that our power to move our arms is a true power should admit that God can also give to minds the power to create, annihilate, and do all possible things; in short, that He can render them omnipotent, as I shall show.” See Ibid.
Leibniz denied that a necessary connection is the link between transeunt causation and omnipotence. But he agreed with the conclusion: something related to power is the reason why divine transeunt causation is possible while creaturely transeunt causation is not. The reason, I propose, is that creaturely transeunt causation without transference is creation. But once again, only an omnipotent being can create—a conclusion that theists of all stripes have generally agreed upon. They just have not agreed that creaturely transeunt causation involves creation, a point I take Leibniz and the occasionalists to be pressing them on. Recall Fredosso’s challenge: If divine transeunt causation doesn’t consist in transference, why must creaturely transeunt causation consist in it? Leibniz and the occasionalists would both say that it is because created substances are not powerful enough. With respect to Leibniz, the reason is that if you deny the transference condition while affirming the familiar causal adequacy principle, the causing-as-giving principle, and the no-reality-from-patient principle, then the accident is created—something that only God can do.

The argument for the transference condition also bears a strong resemblance to an argument Aquinas attributed to Avicenna concerning the production of substantial forms in Aquinas’s *Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei*. Aquinas characterizes Avicenna’s argument thus:

142 Leibniz writes, “Malebranche’s strongest argument for why God alone acts reduces to this in this end—a true cause is that which the effect follows from necessarily, but an effect follows necessarily from the will of God alone. However, it should be noted that if the state of any entity is known perfectly, then the state of any other entity can be inferred infallibly (although not, I grant, necessarily, i.e., not in such a way that it could ever be demonstrated that the contrary implies a contradiction, since analysis goes on ad infinitum.” Quoted in Robert C. Sleigh, Jr., “Leibniz on Malebranche on Causality,” in J.A. Cover and Mark Kulstad, ed., *Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy: Essays Presented to Jonathan Bennett* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1990), 171.

143 Kara Richardson has recently argued that the argument Aquinas attributes to Avicenna is partly
That which has no matter as a constituent part cannot be made of matter. Now forms have no matter as a constituent part: because form is contradistinguished both from matter and from composite things. Since, then, forms are made since they have a beginning of existence, it would seem that they are not made out of matter; and consequently are made out of nothing and therefore are created.  

The argument Aquinas attributes to Avicenna specifically concerns the production of substantial forms. However, Aquinas later argues that if the argument applies to substantial forms, it also applies to accidental forms. In keeping with the focus on the production of accidents in this chapter, the argument can be reconstructed to apply to both substantial and accidental forms:

(1) Forms have a beginning of existence.
(2) So, forms are made.
(3) Whatever is made is made out of something or made out of nothing.
(4) Something can be made out of matter only if that something has matter as a constituent part.
(5) Forms do not have matter as a constituent part.
(6) So, forms cannot be made out of matter.
(7) So, forms are made out of nothing.
(8) Whatever is made out of nothing is created.
(9) So, forms are created.

With the emphasis on accidental forms, let’s take (1) to mean that an accident caused to inhere in a patient substance has a beginning of existence simpliciter. This is certainly true if the accident was not transferred from the agent in the way transference is characterized, where once the agent transfers an accident, the agent no longer possesses misleading. Her reasons are complicated but can be summarized thus: First, Aquinas’s interpretation of Avicenna renders Avicenna an Occasionalist, which Avicenna is not. Second, Aquinas’s reading of Avicenna conceals many important areas of agreement he has with Avicenna, especially ideas Aquinas adopts for his eduction model of generation. See Kara Richardson, “Avicenna and Aquinas on Form and Generation,” in Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci, ed., The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Metaphysics (Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co., 2011), 251-74.

144 Aquinas, QDP, q3, a8, objection 6.
145 Aquinas writes, “Moreover, just as matter is not a part of the substantial form so neither is it a part of the accidental form. Hence, if the reason why substantial forms must be produced by creation is because they have no matter, the same argument will apply to accidental forms.” See QDP, q3, a8, sed contra.
it. While the text makes no mention of transference, it is also fair to say that the argument assumes the denial of transference. Were the accident transferred, it would not have a beginning of existence simpliciter in that causal transaction. Instead, it would only begin to exist in the patient. The denial that an accident can be made out of matter can be taken to be a variant of the no-reality-from-patient principle. The accident gets no reality from the matter, i.e., the accident produced in the patient gets no reality from the patient. Hence, Avicenna is arguing (on Aquinas’s gloss) that because the accident does not come from the agent in the sense that the agent loses the accident (the denial of the transference) and because the patient doesn’t contribute the accident (the affirmation of the no-reality-from-patient thesis), the accident is created.

Aquinas rejects Avicenna’s conclusion in (9) in part because while Aquinas agrees that only God can create, he also argues that created substances can produce substantial and accidental forms. Therefore, the created substances that produce the forms do not create them. Leibniz would agree with Aquinas that only God could create. But Leibniz would also agree with Avicenna that the denial of transference and the affirmation of no-reality-from-patient thesis commit to an accident’s being created when produced.

Of course, the argument differs in important details from the argument I’m attributing to Leibniz. For example, Leibniz did not utilize a form/matter distinction in the way many Aristotelian scholastics did. However, for the purposes of this chapter, I need not develop the argument further. I draw attention to it only to note that the reasons

\[146\] Aquinas writes, “Moreover, God alone can create. Hence, if forms are created, they will be the work of God alone, so that all nature’s work, the purposes of which is the form, will be useless.” Ibid.
I argue are lurking behind Leibniz’s repeated statements of the transference condition have a notable historical precedent in an influential medieval Aristotelian. Further, there is textual evidence that Leibniz was aware of Avicenna’s argument. In a section of the *Theodicy* where he criticizes eduction, Leibniz writes, “Some have thought that forms were sent from heaven, and even created expressly, when bodies were produced.”\(^{147}\)

While Leibniz doesn’t specify who thought forms were created as opposed to educated, the most likely candidate is Avicenna, as the view is distinctive to Avicenna as an alternative to eduction with respect to the production of substantial forms.\(^{148}\)

### §3 A Weakened Transference Condition

Having developed an argument for (P1) in §2 that is consistent with denying that divine transeunt causation requires transference, and having argued as well why the argument is plausibly given to Leibniz, I now draw attention to two weaknesses with the argument. The first problem is that the argument for (P1) does not take into account the Aristotelian act/potency distinction operative in most scholastic accounts of causation, such as the eduction account and Bacon’s multiplication of species account. Such scholastics would argue that Leibniz’s transference condition is the absurd implication of any metaphysic that did not take into account the act/potency distinction. A key passage in the *Theodicy* will show that Leibniz was in fact aware of the role the act/potency distinction played in scholastic accounts of causation, and sheds light on why he rejected the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation.

\(^{147}\) (G VI.150-51: T 88).

\(^{148}\) I address in more depth Leibniz’s criticisms of eduction in §3.
However, the first problem leads to a second. In several passages in the *Theodicy* where Leibniz criticized both the act/potency distinction central to scholastic accounts of causation, and in a passage criticizing one of Bayle’s arguments for occasionalism, Leibniz himself gives reasons that in turn weaken the transference condition. For reasons that will soon be apparent, I conclude in this final part of the chapter that Leibniz only has reasons for the transference condition to be a condition of creaturely transeunt causation when the accident produced is a non-modal accident.

### 3.1 The act/potency Distinction and the transference condition

The argument for the transference condition would not have persuaded Aristotelian scholastics who utilized the Aristotelian distinction between act and potency. Such philosophers argued that efficient causal agents transeuntly produce accidents in patients not by handing over their own being or actuality, nor by creating the accident. Rather, the agent produces the accident in the patient by reducing the potency for the accident in the patient to act or by educing the accident from the potentiality of the patient. For example, in a passage we’ve already seen, Aquinas writes:

> Rather, by the power of the heat which is in the heating body, a numerically different heat is made actual in the heated body, a heat which was previously in it in potency. For a natural agent does not hand over its own form to another subject, but it reduces the passive subject from potency to act.\(^{149}\)

In *On the Multiplication of Species*, Bacon addresses the question of how species—the first effects of natural agents in his metaphysics—are produced. He immediately rejects a transference account (in which the agent emits species) on the grounds that it would

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\(^{149}\) SCG IIIa, 69
entail the corruption of the agent. He also rejects an account where the species are created *ex nihilo*. Instead:

Since the generation of a species occurs in none of the aforementioned ways, it is apparent that it must occur in a fifth way, namely, by true alteration and bringing forth out of the active potentiality of the recipient matter.

Leibniz’s transference condition *prima facie* does not take into account the act/potency distinction and its role in causation, where the agent is said to draw out the effect produced from the potentiality of the matter. Instead, rather than by being educed from the patient’s potentiality, the underlying assumptions of the transference condition entail that the accident produced was already actual and its being produced in the patient consisted simply in its being transferred from the agent to the patient.

In the *Theodicy*, Leibniz shows that he is aware but critical of the act/potency distinction’s role in scholastic causal accounts, especially the eduction model. In a section discussing the causal origin of substantial forms, Leibniz writes, “Now philosophers have troubled themselves exceedingly on the question of the origin of substantial forms. For to say that the compound of form and matter is produced and that the form is only *comproduced* means nothing.” Aquinas, amongst many other scholastics, is a likely target in this passage as Aquinas responded to Averroes’s argument against the possibility of creatures producing substantial forms with a very similar line of reasoning:

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150 Bacon writes, “Acting does not destroy and corrupt an agent, but perfects it, since . . . a thing is perfect when it is able to produce a like thing.” See RB 45.

151 Bacon also writes, “But a species is the effect of a natural agent and is naturally produced; therefore, the species must be generated out of the potentiality of matter.” See RB 47.

152 (G VI.150-51: T 88).
Now that which is made is said to become according to the way in which it is because its being is the term of its making: so that properly speaking it is the composite that is made per se. Whereas the form properly speaking is not made but is that whereby a thing is made, that is to say it is by acquiring the form that a thing is said to be made.\textsuperscript{153}

Aquinas’s claim that substantial forms are not made (or as Leibniz writes, produced) is a crucial component of his eduction model of causation. Aware of this, Leibniz has equally harsh words for eduction, writing, “The common opinion was that forms were derived from the potency of matter, this being called \textit{Eduction}. That also meant in fact nothing . . .”\textsuperscript{154} Instead of an \textit{explanation} of causation, Leibniz claims that transeunt causal accounts that rely on some notion of the effect being derived from potency is a pseudo-explanation. However, Leibniz finds one exception:

\begin{quote}
\ldots [B]ut it was explained in a sense by a comparison with shapes: for that of a statue is produced only by removal of the superfluous marble. This comparison might be valid if form consisted in a mere limitation, as in the case of shape.\textsuperscript{155}
\end{quote}

The only way Leibniz can make sense of a form being educed from the potentiality of matter is in the way a statue is chipped away from a block of marble. However, this is restricted to a very narrow class of effects and a far cry from the scope of what scholastics thought were produced by creatures. Scholastics such as Aquinas argued that substantial forms of living beings are educed from the potentiality of matter as well as many different kinds of accidents such as real qualities. Further, the ‘eduction’ of the shape of a statue from a block of marble is in one sense a removal of the being of the

\textsuperscript{153} QDP III, 8, \textit{respondo}. Aquinas also writes, “\ldots that which is made is not the form but the composite, which is made from matter and not out of nothing. See Ibid.
\textsuperscript{154} (G VI.150-51: T 88).
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
excess marble rather than an addition of being found in many scholastic accounts, such as when the substantial form of a living organism is educed in some secondary matter.

3.2 The transference condition and modifications

Although Leibniz’s scathing remarks would not have persuaded scholastics such as Aquinas and Bacon, they at least shed light on what he thought about the role of the act/potency distinction in explaining creaturely transeunt causation. In short, Leibniz thought that the act/potency distinction did not explain such causation. This highlights a deep tension between Leibniz’s approach to metaphysics, on the one hand, and the scholastics’, on the other.

In this final section of the chapter, however, I draw attention to a more troubling tension that lies not between Leibniz’s account and others but within his own account. This problem, I shall argue, weakens the transference condition, ultimately entailing that it only applies to non-modal accidents. That is, Leibniz himself gives reasons that count against the original transference condition. The original transference condition applied to the transeunt production of any kind of accident, which was formulated thus:

For any created substance $s_1$ and any created substance $s_2$ and any accident $A$, $s_1$ efficiently causes $A$ to inhere in $s_2$ only if $s_1$ transfers $A$ from $s_1$ to $s_2$.

I shall argue that Leibniz only has the resources to defend a more restrictive version of the transference condition, one that applies only to the production of non-modal accidents (e.g., real qualities):

For any created substance $s_1$ and any created substance $s_2$ and any non-modal accident $A$, $s_1$ efficiently causes $A$ to inhere in $s_2$ only if $s_1$ transfers $A$ from $s_1$ to $s_2$. 
In the same passage where Leibniz argued that the act/potency distinction ultimately explained nothing in accounts of creaturely causation, Leibniz writes: “Eduction is not inexplicable with accidental forms, since they are only modifications of the substance, and their origin may be explained by eduction, that is, by variation of limitations, in the same way as the origin of shapes.” While Leibniz dismisses the eduction account of substantial forms (as explaining nothing), he allows that the production of accidents may be explained by eduction. However, he does so with two important caveats. First, the accidents are modifications. Second, the eduction of those modifications is really just the variation of limitations, where the varying of limitations is importantly analogous to a change of shape (such as the shape of a statue carved out of some marble).

In a later chapter in the *Theodicy*, Leibniz makes a similar claim that seems to challenge the very conclusion of the transference argument. Responding to Bayle, who argued that if created substances could produce accidents, they would create them, Leibniz writes:

As for the so-called creation of the accidents, who does not see that one needs no creative power in order to change place or shape, to form a square or a column, or some other parade-ground figure, by the movement of the soldiers who are drilling; or again to fashion a statue by removing a few pieces from a block of marble; or to make some figure in relief, by changing, decreasing or increasing a piece of wax? The production of modifications has never been called creation, and it is an abuse of terms to scare the world thus. God produces substances from nothing, and the substances produce accidents by the changes of their limits.

*Prima facie*, this passage challenges the argument for the transference condition: Leibniz seemingly denies that the production of accidents in other substances—such as blocks of

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156 (G VI.151-52: T 89).
157 (G VI.351: T 395).
marble, wax and statues—is creation. Of course, the argument for the transference condition is not only consistent with but further clarifies why Leibniz thought the immanent causation of accidents does not require transference or the power to create. But all the examples in the passage are examples of transeunt causation. So Leibniz himself challenges the argument for his transference condition: he denies that the transeunt causation of accidents is creation.

However, there is reason to deny that the passage challenges the argument for the transference condition. Leibniz’s *Theodicy* was a book written for a popular audience. Depending on his audience, Leibniz often concealed or at least omitted aspects of his deeper metaphysical views. His deeper metaphysics, expressed more in works such as the *Monadology*, held that bodies are only phenomenally real and also denied the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation. What we would call a corporeal substance, such as a block of marble, would only be phenomenally real in the idealistic interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics, being reducible in some sense to an aggregates of a monads and their perceptions. When a body $b_1$ produces an accident in a

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158 John Whipple points to two important distinctions Leibniz draws concerning the communication of his philosophical views: exoteric versus esoteric form and exoteric versus esoteric content. Roughly, doing philosophy in an esoteric form is, according to Leibniz, the proper way to do strict philosophy and follows the geometric manner of demonstration. This is in contrast to an exoteric form, which is philosophy written in a less rigorous and formal style but more accessible and popular level instead. Philosophical writings with esoteric content express Leibniz’s deep metaphysical views, which may conflict strongly with either the general views of the population of the particular philosophical persuasions of Leibniz’s interlocutors. Leibniz’s writings that contain exoteric content are written either with a popular audience in mind; hence concealing in some manner Leibniz’s deeper views or the writings are tailored to the philosophical persuasions of Leibniz’s interlocutor. For example, when dialoguing with Cartesians, Leibniz uses Cartesian technical terms even though at root, Leibniz’s philosophy is not Cartesian. John Whipple, "Leibniz's Exoteric Philosophy", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/leibniz-exoteric/>. 
numerically distinct body $b_2$, strictly speaking, immaterial monads are immanently causing changes in their perceptions. For example, at $t_1$ a monad $s_1$ produces perceptions of a block of marble and at $t_2$ the same monad produces perceptions of the marble with a chip of the top.\footnote{160}

Given that the examples in the \textit{Theodicy} are examples of the transeunt causation of accidents in bodies and facts about bodies are reducible in some sense to facts about immaterial monads and their perceptions, at least on the idealistic interpretation held in this dissertation, this passage does not challenge the argument for the transference condition. For the passage, ultimately, does not establish that one created substance can produce an accident in a different created substance without requiring transference or creative power. Instead, when understood against the background of Leibniz’s monadological metaphysics, the passage can be taken to establish that the immanent production of accidents does not require creative power. That is consistent with the argument for (P1).

While the above argument would not persuade scholars who endorse the non-idealistic interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics, there is a different problem arising from that passage and others that plagues both the non-idealistic and idealistic interpretations. This problem will lead me ultimately to conclude that Leibniz had

\footnote{159} Of course, I’m taking a stance on an important debate in the recent scholarly literature on the ontological status of bodies in Leibniz’s metaphysics. Specifically, I’m assuming the idealistic interpretation, in which there are no corporeal or bodily substances. For those who disagree with the idealistic reading of Leibniz, my argument can be understood as the conditional with the antecedent “If Leibniz is an idealist” and the consequent being the argument I’ve just given. For an overview of the arguments pro and con for whether or not Leibniz was an idealist, see Brandon C. Look, “Leibniz’s Metaphysics and Metametaphysics: Idealism, Realism, and the Nature of Substance,” \textit{Philosophy Compass} 5, No. 11 (2010): 871-79.

\footnote{160} Thus, Leibniz’s argument in the passage from the \textit{Theodicy} has what John Whipple calls \textit{exoteric content}.}
reasons to hold only that the creaturely transeunt causation of accidents requires either transference or creative power only when the accidents are not modifications but instead are non-modal accidents such as real qualities.

Before denying that the production of accidents requires creative power, Leibniz quotes Bayle in full:

'One of the absurdities', says M. Bayle (p. 779), 'that arise from the so-called distinction which is alleged to exist between substances and their accidents is that creatures, if they produce the accidents, would possess a power of creation and annihilation. Accordingly one could not perform the slightest action without creating an innumerable number of real beings (d’estres reels), and without reducing to nothingness an endless multitude of them. Merely by moving the tongue to cry out or to eat, one creates as many accidents as there are movements of the parts of the tongue, and one destroys as many accidents as there are parts of that which one eats, which lose their form, which become chyle, blood, etc.'

Bayle argues that the production of accidents requires the power to create and annihilate, a power only available to an omnipotent being—God. Leibniz, on the other hand, denies that the production of accidents requires omnipotence. Note that Bayle writes,

“Accordingly one could not perform the slightest action without creating an innumerable number of real beings”. Here, Bayle assumes that accidents are real beings (d’estres reels), an assumption that is important, as I soon show. Bayle’s argument, focusing on creation and bracketing annihilation, can be reconstructed as follows:

1. Accidents are real beings.
2. The production of real beings requires creative power.
3. So, the production of accidents requires creative power.

Leibniz denies (3), as we have seen, and thus might reject either (1) or (2). The evidence points strongly towards Leibniz’s denying (1). In Leibniz’s response to the argument, he never explicitly denies (2). In fact, an important thesis of his monadological metaphysics is that created substances can only begin to exist via creation by God and cease to exist
via annihilation by God. If any entities in Leibniz’s metaphysics count as real beings, substances do. So Leibniz partially agrees with (2).

Yet in Leibniz’s response to Bayle’s argument, Leibniz does not identify accidents with real beings. Instead Leibniz identifies accidents with modifications and denies that the production of modifications requires creative power. Leibniz writes, “The production of modifications has never been called creation”. So Bayle can be understood as arguing that the production of accidents is creation because accidents are real beings. Leibniz responds by arguing that a created substance’s producing accidents is not creation because accidents are modifications, not real beings.

It’s important to get a grip on what philosophers meant in Leibniz’s time in claiming that modifications are not real beings. This in turn will shed light on the significance of Leibniz’s response to Bayle’s argument. Many notable philosophers during Leibniz’s era distinguished between two types of beings—res and modifications. \footnote{For a lengthy overview of how late medieval and early modern philosophers understood res and modifications, see Robert Pasnau, 

\textit{Metaphysical Themes: 1274-1671} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 179-199 and 244-278.} Substances counted amongst the res. Importantly, a subset of accidents—real qualities—counted amongst the res as well. According to Suarez, a sign that an accident is a res rather than a modification was the supernatural possibility of the accident existing without inhering in a substance. For example, the accidents of the bread and wine of the Eucharist could exist—miraculously—without inhering in the bread and wine. Accidents that were not real qualities were modifications of a substance. A modification is an accident that cannot even supernaturally exist without inhering in a
substance. Leibniz’s response to Bayle’s argument can then be understood as follows. Bayle claims that the production of accidents—which are res—is creation. Leibniz
denies that the production of accidents is creation because accidents are not res. Instead,
accidents are modifications.

In summary so far, Leibniz denies (3) by denying (1). Leibniz does not deny (2),
at least in responding to Bayle’s argument. Further, Leibniz’s denial of (1) is consistent
with affirming (2). What does this imply for the argument for the transference condition?
While Leibniz has reasons to affirm that the transeunt causation of res requires
transference or creative power, Leibniz lacks similar reasons to affirm that the transeunt
causation of modifications or limitations requires transference or creative power. Shortly
before responding to Bayle’s argument, Leibniz writes in the Theodicy:

God is the one principal cause of pure and absolute realities, or of perfections. Causae secundae agunt in virtute primae. But when one comprises limitations
and privations under the term realities one may say that the second causes co-
operate in the production of that which is limited; otherwise God would be the
cause of sin, and even the sole cause.

Leibniz argues that the term “realities” has not only pure and absolute realities or
perfections (which are the same thing) in its extension, but also limitations and
privations. Recall that the transference argument frequently invokes the term “reality.” It

162 For an excellent overview on the theological significance of early modern philosophers’ rejection of real
qualities, see Stephen Menn, “The Greatest Stumbling Block: Descartes’ Denial of Real Qualites,” in Roger
Ariew and Marjorie Grene, ed., Descartes and his Contemporaries: Meditations, Objections, and Replies
163 (G VI.349-50: T 392). Tad Schmaltz has recently argued that Leibniz’s specific claim in this passage in the
Theodicy, that God is the principle (presumably efficient) cause of pure and absolute
realities/perfections, is consistent with holding that creatures are secondary efficient causes of pure and
absolute realities/perfections. As I argue in Chapters 3 and 4, there are plenty of reasons to deny that
Leibniz thought that created substances produce pure and absolute realities/perfections. Instead, the effects
of secondary causation are limitations. See Tad M. Schmaltz, “Moral Evil and Divine Concurrence in the
Theodicy,” in Larry M. Jorgenson and Samuel Newlands, ed. New Essays on Leibniz’s Theodicy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014), 135-152.
is important to see how well the transference argument succeeds given what falls under the extension of “realities” in Leibniz’s metaphysics. I will argue that the transference argument succeeds only when the accident produced is a non-modal accident such as a real quality, which would count as pure or absolute realities in Leibniz’s metaphysics. The argument does not succeed, however, when the effect is a modification, which we shall soon see is a limitation. This points to an important weakness in Leibniz’s argument, as Leibniz denies the existence of non-modal accidents in his ontology and instead argues that all accidents are modifications. This means that Leibniz’s transference argument, I shall argue, does not succeed in establishing that the creaturely transeunt causation of modifications—the only type of accident in Leibniz’s ontology—requires transference. Instead, it only succeeds in establishing that the transeunt causation of non-modal accidents that Leibniz does not even posit in his ontology—such as real qualities—requires transference.

Let’s first look at why the transference argument does not succeed when the effect produced is not an absolute reality but instead a limitation or privation. Here, we enter into a topic that is still generating a lot of scholarship, as many of Leibniz’s comments about limitations and privations are usually made in the context of discussions about Divine concurrence and whether evil is traceable to God. *Prima facie,* if $A$ is a limitation or a privation, then it is far from obvious why $s_1$’s transeuntly causing $A$ to inhere in $s_2$ requires that $s_1$ transfer $A$ from itself. It’s also far from obvious why $s_1$’s transeuntly causing $A$ without transferring $A$ would require that $s_1$ create $A$ where $s_1$’s creating $A$ requires omnipotence. The reason is that $s_2$’s gaining $A$ is not a net gain in absolute or positive reality.
To see why, let’s first look at why the transference argument does not apply to modifications or limitations. In a 1703 letter to De Volder, Leibniz claims that modifications are limitations and clarifies what he means by that:

. . . a modification is a varying limitation, and modes merely limit things but do not increase them and hence cannot contain any absolute perfection which is not in the thing itself which they modify. Otherwise, in fact, these accidents must be thought of in the manner of substances, namely, something which stands per se.\(^{164}\)

Leibniz here claims that modifications are limitations. As Leibniz also argues elsewhere that all accidents are modifications, all accidents are also limitations.\(^{165}\) A limitation has no absolute perfection or reality of its own, so a modification has no absolute perfection or reality of its own. The passage also indicates that substances are absolute or positive realities in Leibniz’s metaphysics. Leibniz argues that if modifications were not limitations, but instead contained absolute perfection that was not the absolute perfection of the substance being modified, then modifications, like substances, would be things per se.

In chapter 3, I address in much greater depth why modifications could not be transferred as that is ultimately relevant to Leibniz’s positive account of causation. Here, however, I argue that Leibniz has no reasons to argue that the production of modifications requires omnipotence if the modification is not transferred. For the production of a modification is not the production of new absolute or positive reality. There is no net gain in positive reality when a new modification comes into being in a substance. Instead, the production of a modification is a re-arrangement of previously

\(^{164}\) (G II.257: L 532).

\(^{165}\) In a 1715 letter to Des Bosses, Leibniz wrote, “Whatever is not a modification can be called a substance.” See (G II.503-4: L 614). I address in at length in Chapter 4 Leibniz’s reasons for arguing that all accidents are modifications.
existing absolute or positive reality. As we saw earlier, Leibniz claimed that substances produce accidents by the changes of their limits. Leibniz also claims, as we’ve seen, that a substance’s changing its limits is analogous to a body changing shape. Further, Leibniz claims in his letter to De Volder that a modification is not an increase in a substance or that a modification does not increase the absolute reality of a substance. Given this understanding of accidents as modifications or limitations, where such modifications are analogous to re-arrangements of the absolute reality of their substances, I’m hard-pressed to see why a substance would need to be omnipotent to produce such an accident in a distinct substance. That is, I’m hard-pressed to see why a substance would have to be omnipotent to re-arrange the reality of some numerically distinct substance.

Perhaps one could offer a similar argument to the transference argument when it comes to privations—that the transeunt causation of privation requires omnipotence. If \( s_1 \) produces a privation in \( s_2 \), then \( s_1 \) has caused \( s_2 \) to lack a reality that \( s_2 \) previously had. Leibniz could respond (in agreement with Bayle) that \( s_1 \)’s production of the privation was ultimately an annihilation of a previously existing reality. But this argument also cuts against the immanent causation of privations. For if a substance immanently causes \( A \) to inhere in itself and \( A \) is a privation—that is, \( A \) is a lack of a reality that \( s_1 \) previously possessed—then the substance is the cause of an annihilation of some of its reality, which is again a power only available to God.

There is a way to make sense of the immanent causation of privations without requiring the omnipotence of the created substance. If the privation immanently caused is a privation of absolute or positive reality, then Leibniz would argue that such causation is a case of annihilation requiring omnipotence. But if the privation is a privation of a
limitation or modification, such causation would not require omnipotence. However, if a substance’s immanently causing the privation of a modification or limitation does not require omnipotence, I’m again hard pressed to find a reason why the transeunt causation of a limitation or modification would require omnipotence.

The argument for the transference condition does succeed, at least, if the accident produced is non-modal accident or *res*, such as a real quality. First, non-modal accidents such as real qualities, which Leibniz denies exist, would count as absolute realities in Leibniz’s metaphysics rather than limitations, if such accidents existed. The reason is that such non-modal accidents or real qualities were widely held to be able to exist, at least supernaturally, without inhering in a substance. This was important for the Catholic belief in transubstantiation, where the accidents of the bread and wine exist without inhering in a substance when the bread and wine is transubstantiated into the body and blood of Christ.\(^\text{166}\) This leads to a plausible inference: If an accident can exist (even supernaturally) without inhering in a substance, then the accident has some absolute perfection of its own, rather than the absolute perfection of the substance the accident inheres in. As we’ll see in Chapter 3, one reason modifications—which are not *res*—could not be transferred is because they cannot exist without inhering in a substance—unlike such non-modal accidents or real qualities.

Given that non-modal accidents are *res* and so are absolute realities, Leibniz can argue that they would have to be transferred or created (requiring omnipotence) if

\(^{166}\) I address Leibniz’s views on Transubstantiation in Appendix B.
transeuntly caused.\textsuperscript{167} That is, the transference argument does apply to non-modal accidents and the transference condition is a condition of the production of non-modal accidents. The reason is that an accident that is a \textit{res} or real quality is an accident that can exist—at least supernaturally—without inhering in a substance. If a created substance \( s_1 \) transeuntly causes a real quality \( A \) in a different created substance \( s_2 \), then \( s_1 \) has produced an entity that inheres in \( s_2 \) but can exist apart from \( s_2 \), apart from \( s_1 \), and any other created substance. An accident that can exist apart from any created substance is surely more than a mere re-arrangement of the absolute perfection of a substance the accident inheres in. So there is a net gain in the absolute reality of a substance when the substance gains an accident that is a \textit{res}.

From here, the argument for the transference condition runs through as it did in §2. If \( s_1 \) transeuntly causes an accident \( A \) which is a \textit{res} to inhere in a different substance \( s_2 \) and \( s_1 \) does not transfer \( A \) to \( s_2 \), then if \( s_1 \)’s transeunt causing of \( A \) in \( s_2 \) satisfies the no-reality-from-patient-principle, once again there is a net gain in absolute reality rather than a mere re-arrangement of \( s_2 \)’s reality (if \( A \) were a modification). Therefore, \( A \) would have to be created. To avoid that implication, one would have to invoke the transference condition and hold that \( A \) originally belonged to \( s_1 \) but no longer belongs to \( s_1 \) upon its inhering in \( s_2 \). But again, Leibniz does not posit the existence of accidents which are \textit{res}. Instead, all accidents are modifications. So the argument for the transference condition doesn’t succeed in establishing that the transeunt causation of modifications—the only type of accident Leibniz posits—requires that they be transferred or created by a

\footnote{167 The success of the argument also hinges on Leibniz’s rejection of the act/potency distinction as being explanatory.}
substance with omnipotence. This is a significant weakness with Leibniz’s transference condition.

The argument, while weakened, is not a failure. Plenty of philosophers during Leibniz’s time did posit non-modal accidents so Leibniz can be seen as presenting a challenge to the transeunt causation of such accidents. Perhaps these are the accidents Leibniz had in mind in his repeated statements of the transference condition. Further, textual evidence suggests that Leibniz thought that creaturely transeunt causation would have to consist in the transference of real beings. Recall some of the various candidates Leibniz suggests for transference, such as material particles and monads (substances). Leibniz—as I’ve just argued—is likely correct that real beings—in the sense of beings that are pure or absolute or positive realities--are the only types of things that could be transferred. But given that many (if not all) accidents are limitations, which of course cannot be transferred (reasons which I explore in greater depth in Chapter 3), why could not one created substance produce a limitation in another? To put the question slightly differently: why must the effect of creaturely transeunt causation be a res? To my knowledge, Leibniz never answers that question. So I conclude that Leibniz has good reasons to hold that the transeunt causation of res requires transference, or else the res would be created. But Leibniz lacks similar good reasons to hold that such causation of limitations or modifications requires transference or omnipotence.
CHAPTER 3. LEIBNIZ’S TRANSFEERENCE ARGUMENT, PART 2: AGAINST TRANSFERENCE

In this chapter, I evaluate Leibniz’s support for the second premise of the Transference argument, which I expressed thus:

(P1) Creaturely transeunt causation is possible only if the transference of accidents is possible.
(P2) The transference of accidents is not possible.
(C) So, creaturely transeunt causation is not possible.

As will be evident throughout this chapter, Leibniz provides ample support for (P2) throughout his career, making (P2) much easier to defend than (P1). Additionally, the second premise enjoys much support throughout the history of philosophy, especially by defenders of creaturely transeunt causation who vehemently denied the transference condition.

There are two parts to this chapter. In §1, I present an overview of the idealistic interpretation of Leibniz’s ontology that I assume in this dissertation, in which what exists, strictly speaking, are simple substances and their accidents. In §2, I argue that nothing in Leibniz’s ontology could be transferred from agent to patient. I devote the bulk of this chapter to addressing why accidents could not be transferred. I first draw
attention to several constraints Leibniz places on accidents that forbid them from being transferred. I then argue that accidents have those constraints because, according to Leibniz, all accidents are *modifications* and all modifications are *limitations*. Finally, I look at reasons why substances could not be transferred from agents to patients.

§1 Leibniz’s Substance-Accident Ontology

While I am primarily concerned with Leibniz’s transference argument insofar as it concerns the production and transference of accidents, I will argue in this chapter for the stronger thesis that nothing in Leibniz’s ontology could be transferred from agent to patient in creaturely transeunt causation. On the idealistic interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics assumed in this dissertation, strictly speaking there are only simple substances and their accidents. Everything else is reducible in some sense to these simple substances and accidents. Many facts or statements about bodies, while true, are reduced to facts or statements about monads and their accidents.\(^{168}\)

We can find the mature Leibniz stating this ontology in various passages. For example, in a 1715 letter to Des Bosses, Leibniz wrote, “Whatever is not a modification can be called a substance.”\(^{169}\) Here, Leibniz seems to state that the world consists in two and only two types of entities—substances and modifications. I write “seems” because one might argue that Leibniz is merely making a semantic claim: If x is not a modification then x can be *called* a substance. However, Leibniz’s argument in the

\(^{168}\) The specifics of the reduction of bodies to monads and their accidents goes well beyond the scope of this dissertation. For a more detailed treatment of Leibnizian reduction, see J.A. Cover, “Non-Basic Time and Reductive Strategies,” *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science* 28 (1997): 289-318.

\(^{169}\) (G II.503-4: L 614).
remainder of the passage strongly indicates that Leibniz is not merely making a semantic claim, instead he is making a metaphysical claim. Leibniz considers whether there could be a third kind of entity that is neither a modification nor a substance, and rejects that there could be such a third entity.\textsuperscript{170} I take this to show that Leibniz’s ontology is an ontology of substances and accidents, where accidents are modifications. That is, what exists are substances and their modifications. As I argue later, all accidents are modifications for Leibniz, so an ontology of substances and accidents amounts to the same thing.

Other texts support my contention that Leibniz’s ontology is an ontology of substances and their modifications. For example, in the fictional dialogue between Philarete and Ariste, speaking for Leibniz, Philarete claims, “My friend [Leibniz], whose opinion I have just related, gives enough evidence that he leans in this direction, since he reduces everything to monads, or to simple substances and their modifications. . .”.\textsuperscript{171} Similarly, Leibniz writes:

As a result, a monad, in itself and at a moment, can be distinguished from another only by its [a] internal qualities and [b] actions, which can be nothing but its [a’] perceptions (that is, the representation of the composite, or what is external, in the simple) and its [b’] appetitions (that is, its tendencies to go from one perception to another) which are the principles of change. For the simplicity of substance does not prevent a [a’’ and b’’] multiplicity of modifications.\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{170} Leibniz writes: “We may ask whether there can be a thing which is neither a modification nor a source of modifications – such as the Scholastics think of as accidents, which, they say, are in a subject naturally but not essentially, since they can be without a subject by the absolute power of God. But I do not yet see how such a thing can be explained if it is different from my substantial chain, which is truly in the subject, though not as an accident but as what the Scholastics call a substantial form, or as a source of modifications – if you like, after the manner of an echo.” Ibid.
\textsuperscript{171} (G VI.590: AG 265).
\textsuperscript{172} (G VI.598: AG 207).
Here, Leibniz identifies [a] with [a’], [b] with [b’], but then identifies [a], [a’], [b], and [b’] with a multiplicity of modifications [a” and b”]. Given the prior text where Leibniz claims that everything is reducible to simple substances (monads) and their modifications and that [a] and [b] exhaust the modifications of simple substances, I once again conclude that Leibniz’s ontology is an ontology of substances and their modifications.

I’ve used the terms “modification” and “accident” interchangeably in describing Leibniz’s ontology. I do so because according to Leibniz, all accidents are modifications. In several places in Leibniz’s corpus, Leibniz argues that there are no accidents that are not modifications, such as real qualities—accidents that can exist without inhering in a substance. For example, in an earlier 1712 letter to Des Bosses, Leibniz writes:

Let us come now to the real accidents which are in this unifying thing as their subject. You will agree, I believe, that some of them are only modifications, which disappear when it is removed. But you ask whether there are not certain accidents which are more than modifications. Such accidents seem, however, to be entirely superfluous, and whatever is in such a substance other than a modification seems to pertain to the substantial thing itself.\(^{173}\)

Leibniz in this passage is addressing a question Des Bosses asked, mainly, whether there are accidents that are more than modifications. In other words, are there accidents that are not modifications, such as real qualities? Leibniz’s gives a negative answer. According to Leibniz, anything that is not a modification pertains to the substantial thing itself—in other words, is itself a substance.\(^{174}\) In the remainder of the first 1705 letter to Des Bosses I quoted at the beginning of this section, Leibniz makes a similar claim:

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\(^{173}\) (G II.458: L 606).

\(^{174}\) In this particular passage, the substantial thing is the *vinculum substantiale*, a special type of substance Leibniz proposed in his correspondence with Des Bosses as a way to show what would be needed for metaphysics to be compatible with transubstantiation. The *vinculum substantiale* is a substance-like entity that bonds other substances, such as the monads which makeup the bread and wine during the Eucharist.
. . . we may ask whether there can be a thing which is neither a modification nor a source of modifications—such as the Scholastics think of as accidents, which, they say, are in a subject naturally but not essentially, since they can be without a subject by the absolute power of God. But I do not yet see how such a thing can be explained if it is different from my substantial chain, which is truly in the subject, though not as an accident but as what the Scholastics call a substantial form, or as a source of modifications—if you like, after the manner of an echo.  

Once again, Leibniz denies that there is anything not a modification or a substance.

Anything that is not a modification is a substantial form. That is tantamount to claiming that it is a substance. Therefore, all accidents, for Leibniz, are modifications.

§2 Why nothing in Leibniz’s Ontology can be Transferred

2.1 Why accidents cannot be transferred.

I turn now to two different but related reasons why accidents/modifications in Leibniz’s metaphysics could not be transferred from an efficient causal agent to patient. As a starting point, both reasons can be found in Leibniz’s 1692 “Critical Thoughts on the General Part of the Principles of Descartes”:

I do not know whether the definition of substance as that which needs for its existence only the concurrence of God fits any created substance known to us, unless we interpret it in some unusual sense. For not only do we need other substances; we need our own accidents even much more. Therefore, since substance and accident depend on each other, other marks are necessary for distinguishing a substance from an accident. Among them may be this one: That a substance needs some accident but often does not need a determinate one but is content, when this accident is removed, with the substitution of another. An argue in Appendix B that Leibniz in fact did not seriously posit the vinculum substantiale in the final analysis.

Ibid. Elsewhere Leibniz denies that substances are composed of substantial forms and prime matter, thus I assume, in this dissertation, that substantial forms just are substances. For an extended discussion of this thesis, see Cover & Hawthorne, Substance & Individuation in Leibniz, 214-226

In Chapter 4, I reconstruct and assess Leibniz’s argument for the thesis that all accidents are modifications.
accident, however, needs not only some substance in general but that very one in which it inheres, so that it cannot change it.\textsuperscript{178}

In this passage, Leibniz claims that while substances and accidents depend on each other, the dependence is not of the same type. Substances need some accident or other while accidents need the very substance they inhere in. The former claim was a common view among many scholastics and modern philosophers. For example, Peter John Olivi argued that “. . .subjects cannot, without contradiction, be put into existence with some such accident, although they could without this or that one.”\textsuperscript{179} More pertinent to this section of the chapter are two constraints Leibniz places on accidents in the passage. The first constraint I express thus:

**Dependence of Accidents on Substances:** Necessarily, for any accident $A$, $A$ exists only if there is some substance $s$ such that $A$ inheres in $s$.

Most philosophers would have agreed that dependence of accidents on substances is a constraint on accidents with certain qualifications.\textsuperscript{180} With respect to real qualities, many Catholic philosophers were committed to a less restrictive constraint:

**Natural Dependence of Accidents on Substances:** For any accident $A$, $A$ naturally exists only if there is some substance $s$ such that $A$ inheres in $s$.

Catholics needing to explain transubstantiation would have been committed to the natural dependence of accidents on substances and in fact committed to denying the Dependency of Accidents on Substances. In transubstantiation, the real qualities of the bread and wine can supernaturally exist without inhering in a substance. So the natural dependence of

\textsuperscript{178}(G IV.364: L 389-90).
\textsuperscript{180}The constraint traces back at least as far as Aristotle, where in chapter 2 of his *Categories*, Aristotle wrote, “Some [things] are in a subject but are not said of any subject. (By ‘in a subject’ I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.)” See Aristotle, *Categories*, 1a20-25.
accidents on substances is a constraint on what is naturally or physically possible while allowing for the supernatural or logical possibility of an accident existing without inhering in a substance.\textsuperscript{181} Leibniz, being Lutheran, was not burdened with the need to accommodate transubstantiation in his metaphysics of accidents.\textsuperscript{182} Hence, Leibniz could affirm the dependence of accidents on substances, a much stronger constraint on what is logically possible.

The second constraint found in the passage can be expressed thus:

**The Ownership Thesis of Accidents:** Necessarily, for any accident $A$ and any substance $s$, if $A$ inheres in $s$ then there is not some substance $s'$ such that $s'$ is not identical to $s$ and $A$ inheres in $s'$.\textsuperscript{183}

The ownership thesis of accidents, as formulated, has an important *diachronic* implication: An accident $A$ cannot inhere in a substance $s$ at a time $t$ and a different substance $s'$ at a different time $t'$. Leibniz primarily utilizes the diachronic implication against the possibility of accidents being transferred from agent to patient. There are numerous passages in support of the diachronic implication of the ownership thesis of accidents, many of which we saw in Chapter 2, including this passage in the *Monadology*:

Accidents cannot be detached, nor can they go about outside of substances, as the sensible species of the Scholastics once did. Thus, neither substance nor accident can enter a monad from without.\textsuperscript{184}


\textsuperscript{182} I defend this claim at length in Appendix B.

\textsuperscript{183} I note that the Ownership Thesis of Accidents does not entail that a substance $s$ is essentially related to its accident $A$ in such a way that $A$ cannot cease to inhere in $s$. Instead, when $A$ ceases to inhere in $s$, $A$ ceases to exist (which is entailed by the Dependency of Accidents on Substances), while $s$ can still exist.

\textsuperscript{184} (G VI.607-8: AG 214).
Leibniz is clear: an accident cannot be detached from one substance and then enter a
different substance. Leibniz also writes in a letter to Clarke:

If space is the property or affection of the substance which is in space, the same
space will be sometimes the affection of one body, sometimes of another body,
sometimes of an immaterial substance, and sometimes perhaps of God himself,
when it is void of all other substance, material, or immaterial. But this is a
strange property or affection, which passes from one subject to another. Thus
subjects will leave off their accidents like clothes, that other subjects may put
them on. At this rate how shall we distinguish accidents and substances?

Again, Leibniz dismisses the notion that an accident could switch substances. He also
 hints at a reason via a rhetorical question: If accidents could change substances—contra
the ownership thesis of accidents—then what would distinguish accidents from
substances? The answer to the rhetorical question is “Nothing”. One distinction then
between substances and accidents is that substances can change accidents over time while
accidents cannot change substances over time.

The diachronic implication of ownership thesis of accidents enjoys wide support
in the history of philosophy, as we saw in Chapter 2, especially by defenders of
creaturally transeunt causation. Even when transubstantiation complicates matters, the
diachronic implication of ownership thesis of accidents is still a constraint on accidents.
For example, according to Aquinas, when the bread is transubstantiated into the body of
Christ, the accident of the bread’s quantity continues to exist without inhering in a
substance, thus violating the dependency of accidents on substances. The remaining

185 (G VII.398: L 702).
186 I explore later in this chapter and in Chapter 4 what features of accidents and substances make it the
case that accidents cannot switch substances while substances can change accidents.
187 For example, Aquinas writes, “Accidents are not transferred from subject to subject, so that numerically
one and the same accident inheres first in one subject and later in another. For an accident is individuated
by its subject. Hence, it impossible for numerically one and the same accident to inhere in one subject at
one time and in another subject at another time.” See ST 1.77.1
bready accidents inhere in the quantity. While it seems that the accidents have switched substances—first inhereing in the bread and later inhering in the quantity, in fact they have not. Rather, the remaining accidents switch from inhering in the bread (a substance) to inhering in the quantity (an accident), thus not violating the ownership thesis of accidents. So transubstantiation is just a further violation of the dependency of accidents on substances, as the all the bread’s accidents exist while not inhering in a substance.

The diachronic implication of the ownership thesis of accidents is all that is needed to argue that accidents could not be transferred from an agent substance to a patient substance. If a created substance \( s_1 \) transeuntly causes \( A \) to inhere in a different created substance \( s_2 \), then presumably \( A \) first inhere in \( s_1 \) and later inhere in \( s_2 \), violating the ownership thesis. Further, if there is a temporal gap in which \( A \) exists without inhereing in \( s_1 \) or \( s_2 \), then \( s_1 \)’s causing \( A \) to inhere in \( s_2 \) violates the dependency of accidents on substances.

The diachronic implication of ownership thesis of accidents suffices to show that accidents cannot be transferred from one substance to another. There is a second and third implication of the ownership thesis of accidents — a synchronic and an inter-worldly implication. In what follows, I present these two further implications, which in turn provide an opportunity to explore Leibniz’s reasons for endorsing the dependency of accidents on substances and the ownership thesis of accidents. Going into further depth

188 Aquinas writes, “It is necessary to say that the other accidents that remain in this sacrament inhere, as in a subject, in the dimensive quantities of the bread and wine that remain. One reason for this is the following: it seems clear to the senses that something exists having size and color and which is affected by the other accidents. Nor are the senses deceived in this regard.” See ST 3.77.2
189 See Brower, Ibid.
with respect to Leibniz’s reasons for both the dependency thesis and the ownership thesis will pay dividends in later chapters, as the dependency and ownership theses are constraints on accidents—which are always the effects of Leibnizian creaturely immanent causation. Gaining a greater understanding of why the dependency and ownership theses are constraints on accidents then yields a better understanding of Leibnizian accidents. This will assist us in the chapters ahead as I address Leibniz’s positive account of creaturely immanent causation and change.

The second implication of the ownership thesis is that it rules out an accident inhering in more than one substance at the same time. This is the synchronic implication of the ownership thesis of accidents: If $A$ inheres in $s$ at $t$ then there is not some substance $s'$ such that $s'$ is not identical to $s$ and $A$ inheres in $s'$ at $t$. Leibniz affirms the synchronic implication of the ownership thesis as well. For example:

> It cannot be said that both of them [substances], $L$ and $M$ together, are the subject of such an accident; for if so, we should have an accident in two subjects, with one leg in one and the other in the other, which is contrary to the notion of accidents.\(^{190}\)

Thus, unlike substances—which can have more than one accident at the same time, accidents can only ever inhere in one substance at some time. As with the diachronic implication, many of Leibniz’s predecessors agreed with the synchronic implication of ownership thesis. For example, Aquinas writes, “One should reply to the second argument that some people said, as Avicenna notes, that numerically the same relation is

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\(^{190}\) (G VII.401: L 704). Elsewhere, Leibniz writes, “If someone maintains that the same wisdom in number or the same heat in number is in two subjects at once, the fact that one says that the wisdom of one fails, whereas the wisdom of the other still subsists, can refute this.” See A.VI.4a, 991.
in both extremes. But that cannot be, since one accident is not in two subjects.”

In many passages Leibniz affirms both the synchronic and diachronic implications of the ownership thesis of accidents, suggesting that he regards them as implications of the same constraint. For example, Leibniz writes, “For two different subjects, as A and B, cannot have precisely the same individual affection, it being impossible that the same individual accident should be in two subjects or pass from one subject to another.”

Both the synchronic and diachronic implications of the ownership thesis of accidents, at least as I have presented them, are intra-worldly. The implications restrict an accident from inhering in more than one substance at the same time in the same world or in different substances at different times in the same world. It’s worth addressing whether Leibniz thought there was an inter-worldly constraint on accidents. That is, if A inheres in s in world W, could A inhere in a different substance s’ in a different world W’?

There are strong reasons to believe that Leibniz gave a negative answer to the question. Further, Leibniz’s reasons for denying that A could inhere in s in W and that A could inhere in s’ in W’ also shed light on why Leibniz affirmed the dependency of accidents on substances and the diachronic and synchronic versions of the ownership thesis of accidents. The reason Leibniz affirmed an inter-worldly ownership thesis is because, as argued above, is related to the fact that for Leibniz, all accidents are modifications. In a letter to Des Bosses, Leibniz writes, “But a modification is connected

191 Sent I, d. 27, q. 1, art. 1, ad 2
192 (G VII.401: L 704).
193 Of course, the question assumes transworld identity between accidents.
essentially to that whose modification it is.”\textsuperscript{194} If a modification $M$ is essentially connected to the substance $s$ that $M$ modifies, then it is plausible to hold that there are no worlds where $M$ modifies a different substance $s'$. Leibniz’s claims that modifications are essentially connected to their substances and thus his affirmation of inter-worldly implications of the ownership thesis, like the diachronic and synchronic implications, had historical precedent. Suarez frequently characterized modes as accidents that are essentially connected to their substances— a feature of modes that distinguished them from non-modal accidents. For example, Suarez writes:

\begin{quote}
\ldots this mode so necessarily includes conjunction with the thing of which it is a mode that it is unable by any power whatsoever to exist apart from that thing.\textsuperscript{195}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\ldots for the very essence of a mode demands that it cannot exist unless actually united to the thing it modifies.\textsuperscript{196}
\end{quote}

So Leibniz was assuming a standard position on modes tracing back at least to Suarez, with the difference being that Leibniz held that all accidents are modes, contra Suarez.

What is it about the nature of modifications that entails the dependency of accidents on substances and the ownership thesis of accidents? Leibniz offers some guidance. Immediately after stating that modifications are essentially connected their substances, Leibniz clarifies with an example, “So there can be no modification without a subject; for example, no sitting without a sitter.” It is absurd to posit the existence of a token accident of sitting without the sitter. However, all accidents, for Leibniz, are like the Socrates’ shape when sitting— modifications whose nature it is to modify their

\textsuperscript{194} (G II.503-4: L 614)


\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., 46-7.
subjects in some way. Leibniz’s example of sitting to support his contention that modifications are essentially connected to their substances also had precedent in Suarez. Again Suarez writes:

For what is purely a mode not only cannot be separated from anything of which it is the mode, but this individual mode cannot be separated from this individual thing; for example, this position of sitting cannot be separated from this sitter.¹⁹⁷

Socrates’ shape when sitting, for Suarez, not only needs to modify some substance, it needs to modify the very substance it modifies. I note that Suarez and Leibniz both use the example of sitting as if it were sufficient to establish that modes are essentially connected to what they modify. Given that they usually did not elaborate further, they likely assumed that it would be obvious to anyone else that modifications such as sitting and other figures are essentially connected to what they modify.

Given that, in the case of Leibniz, all accidents are like figure in their being essentially connected to what they modify, it’s worth exploring what feature(s) of modifications support their essential connection to their substances. In what follows, I shall argue that there is a feature of a shape modifying a substance that Leibniz believes entails that the modification is essentially connected to what it modifies. This feature, Leibniz argues, is found in all modifications and therefore all accidents. I do not offer on Leibniz’s behalf a tight deductive proof for the claim that modifications are essentially connected to what they modify, from the feature. As noted above, Leibniz would have assumed that his audience would take the fact that accidents are modifications as being sufficient for their essential connection to their substances. However, the feature of

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 46.
modifications—as Leibniz understands them—will shed further light on that thesis as well as the dependency of accidents on substances.

The feature, I argue, is that modifications are limitations. Leibniz writes, “. . . a modification is a varying limitation, and modes merely limit things but do not increase them and hence cannot contain any absolute perfection which is not in the thing itself which they modify.” Leibniz claimed throughout his corpus that modifications are limitations. Very early in his career, in his 1676 “Two Notations for Discussion with Spinoza,” Leibniz wrote, “Indeed there can be no active modifications of that which is merely passive in essence, since modifications limit rather than increase or add.” As we saw in Chapter 2, Leibniz claims that a created substance changes its accidents by changing its limits.

Leibniz’s frequent example of shapes as modifications can clarify, somewhat, how modifications are limitations. One example, especially, is found in the Theodicy. Leibniz claims that shapes are mere limitations, using the example of a sculptor. When a sculptor sculpts a statue from a block marble, the sculptor “adds” a shape to the marble. However, the sculptor “adds” a shape to the marble by removing chunks from the block of marble. The “addition” of the shape, then, is added by limiting the block of marble.

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198 (G II.257: L 532).
199 L 169.
200 Leibniz writes, “The common opinion was that forms were derived from the potency of matter, this being called Eduction. That also meant in fact nothing, but it was explained in a sense by a comparison with shapes: for that of a statue is produced only by removal of the superfluous marble. This comparison might be valid if form consisted in a mere limitation, as in the case of shape.” He also writes, “But traduction and eduction are equally inexplicable when it is a question of finding the origin of the soul. It is not the same with accidental forms, since they are only modifications of the substance, and their origin may be explained by eduction, that is, by variation of limitations, in the same way as the origin of shapes. But it is quite another matter when we are concerned with the origin of a substance, whose beginning and destruction are equally difficult to explain.” See (G V I.150-2: T 88-89).
The shape is then a limitation on the block of marble— a terminus or boundary on the marble’s extension.

A limitation—such as shape—cannot exist without limiting something. Thus, that modifications are limitations entails the dependency of accidents on substances. Further, Leibniz has plausible reasons to hold that a token limitation—such as the token shape of a block of marble—could only be a limitation of the thing it limits. While two blocks of marble could have two distinct token shapes of the same type, they could not switch the same shape tokens. Plato could switch from standing to sitting while Socrates switches from sitting to standing. Plato, however, could not acquire Socrates’ token accident of sitting.201

2.2 Why substances cannot be transferred.

As we saw in chapter 2, Leibniz denied that several different kinds of entities could be transferred— e.g., physical atoms, sensible species, substances, and accidents.202 We’ve seen why accidents could not be transferred and can also rule out physical atoms and sensible species being transferred, given Leibniz’s idealistic ontology. This leaves substances. I note that while the focus of this dissertation is largely on the creaturely causation of accidents, which I’ve dealt with at length up until this point and will continue to address in later chapters, it’s worth briefly seeing why substances could not be transferred, as they are one of the only two types of entities that strictly speaking, exist

201 Of course, the thesis that all accidents are modifications and all modifications are limitations raises a number of puzzles. For example, on the idealistic reading of Leibniz that I assume in this dissertation holds that all accidents inhering in substances are perceptions. Perceptions, however, have content. It’s not obvious how to explain how a perception with content is a mere limitation, unlike a modification such as shape. I do not address these topics in this dissertation.

202 See (G IV.498-9: L 460), (G II.251: AG 176), and (G VI.607: AG 213-14).
in Leibniz’s idealistic ontology. This argument will require much less space to develop. To address this, it’s helpful to briefly consider an amended version of the initial characterization of transference I offered in chapter 2 which is not restricted to only accidents being transferred but entities of any type:

For any created substance $s_1$ and any created substance $s_2$ and any entity $E$, $s_1$ transfers $E$ to $s_2$ only if:

1. $s_1$ is not identical to $s_2$;
2. If $A$ belongs to $s_1$ then $E$ does not belong to $s_2$;
3. If $A$ belongs to $s_2$ then $E$ does not belong to $s_1$;
4. $E$ first belongs to $s_1$;
5. $E$ second belongs to $s_2$.

Assuming that $E$ is a substance, $E$ could not belong to $s_1$ by inhering in it. Thus, we need some other way of understanding how $E$—a substance—could belong to $s_1$. The most likely candidate is $E$’s being a part of $s_1$. Leibniz would of course reject this second way as well, for he argued that created substances are simple and therefore lack parts.

Yet if $s_1$ were to transfer a substance to $s_2$, so that the substance transferred to $s_2$ belongs to $s_2$ after belonging to $s_1$, then if the substance transferred did not inhere in $s_1$, prima facie the only other way for the substance to belong to $s_1$ would be for that substance to be a part of $s_1$.

203 Leibniz writes, “Whatever is not a modification can be called a substance.” See (G II.503-4: L 614).
204 Leibniz would argue that it’s a category mistake to hold that a substance can inhere in another substance, as substances are what are inhere in, rather than what inhere. Evidence for why Leibniz would claim this can be found in his numerous passages dismissing the existence of real qualities—accidents that can exist without inhering in a substance, for Leibniz claims that such accidents would in fact be substances instead. See, for example, (G VII.398: L 702).
205 A classic statement of this doctrine can be found in Leibniz’s Monadology, where he writes, “The monad, which we shall discuss here, is nothing but a simple substance that enters into composites—simple, that is, without parts.” See (G VI.607: AG 213). I address in great depth Leibniz’s mereology and his metaphysics of simple substances in chapter 4.
However, let us bracket the issue, for now, of whether or not a created substance could have parts. If Leibniz could argue that even if substances had parts, substances could not be transferred from agent to patient in transeunt causation, he would have an even stronger case against transference. Suppose that $s_1$ causes an accident $A$ to inhere in $s_2$ by transferring some entity $E$ to $s_2$, where $E$ is a third substance $s_3$. How could $s_1$’s transference of $s_3$ to $s_2$ cause $A$ to inhere in $s_2$? Perhaps $s_3$ just is $A$. In this case, when $s_2$ receives $s_3$, $s_3$ itself changes from being the substance $s_3$ to the accident $A$ inhering in $s_2$. Leibniz has strong reasons to reject this option. In addition to puzzles about how a substance could become an accident, this option blurs the distinction between substances and accidents. For example, rather than $s_3$ being an accident inhering in $s_2$, given that $s_3$ was a substance prior to its reception by $s_2$, why couldn’t $s_2$ be $s_3$’s accident instead where $s_3$ remains a substance?  

Perhaps instead, when $s_1$ transfers $s_3$ to $s_2$, $s_3$ itself produces $A$ in $s_2$. However, if that were the case, then $s_3$’s producing $A$ in $s_2$ would just be another case of creaturely transeunt causation, in which case $s_3$ must transfer something to $s_2$. Then the question reemerges: how does what $s_3$ transfers to $s_2$ cause $A$ to inhere in $s_2$? This option then leads to a vicious infinite regress. For if what $s_3$ transfers to $s_2$ causes $A$ to inhere in $s_2$, then whatever it is that $s_3$ transferred to $s_2$ and caused $A$ to inhere in $s_2$ must itself transfer something from itself to $s_2$, and so on ad infinitum.

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206 While Leibniz, to my knowledge, never gives this exact objection, it is consistent with a number of criticisms Leibniz has against accidents, which while inhering in substances, can exist apart from substances. If such accidents existed, Leibniz argued that there would be no way in principle to distinguish them from substances. This objection takes that criticism a step further and argues that there would also be no way to distinguish a substance from an accident.
Another option is that $E = s_1$. When $s_1$ produces $A$ in $s_2$, $s_1$ does so by transferring itself to $s_2$.\(^{207}\) This option has at least one advantage. There are no worries about $s_1$ being composed of other substances (e.g., $s_3$) or having parts. This option is still not plausible. For it faces the problems of explaining how a substance can become an accident and once again explaining the distinction between substances and accidents. That is, why is it that $s_1$ becomes an accident inhering in $s_2$ rather than $s_2$ becoming an accident that inheres in $s_1$?

That’s the least of the difficulties. No longer bracketing Leibniz’s mereological views, Leibniz would argue that if $s_1$ were truly a substance and $s_2$ were truly a substance, then $s_1$’s causing $A$ to belong to $s_2$ by $s_1$ transferring itself would result in $s_1$ and $s_2$ being an *unum per aggregrans*, rather than $s_1$ or $s_2$ being an *unum per se* with $s_1$ or $s_2$ modifying it.\(^{208}\) For Leibniz not only denies that substances could have other substances as parts, he also denies that substances have any parts.\(^{209}\) If substances had parts, then they would not be substances. Instead they would be aggregates. If substances cannot have parts, *a fortiori*, substances cannot have other substances as parts.

With these considerations in mind, I conclude that substances cannot play the role of $E$ in transference. Given that in Leibniz’s ontology, what exists are either substances

\(^{207}\) For example, take a piece of wood acquiring the property of being white from some white paint that was applied to it. The board gets the property of whiteness from the paint but the paint does not lose the whiteness the board gained. In cases then where $E = s_1$, $s_1$ does not lose the accident it gives to the patient substance. This example comes from Rieber, “Causation as Property Acquisition,” 56.

\(^{208}\) According to Leibniz, an aggregate of substances has unity only in the mind and is not a genuine substance. He writes, “I therefore believed that I would be allowed to distinguish beings by aggregation from substances, since these beings have their unity in our mind only, a unity founded on the relations or modes of true substances. If a machine is one substance, a circle of men holding hands will also be one substance, and so will an army, and finally, so will every multitude of substances.” See (G II.96-7: AG 86). See also AG 167.

\(^{209}\) I explore this in great depth in chapter 4.
or accidents, nothing in Leibniz’s ontology could play the role of $E$. Therefore, transference cannot occur. Thus we have Leibniz’s support for the second premise of the transference argument.
CHAPTER 4. LEIBNIZIAN SIMPLE SUBSTANCES AND THE REALITY OF ACCIDENTS

As we saw in Chapter 3, Leibniz maintained throughout his career that all accidents are modifications, a thesis which played a crucial role in his defense of the second premise of the Transference argument. Equally, if not more important, the thesis that all accidents are modifications also plays a crucial role in Leibniz’s positive account of creaturely intra-substantial or immanent causation, as accidents are the effects of such causation.210

In this Chapter, I examine in greater depth Leibniz’s reasons for holding that accidents are modifications, reasoning that sheds light on the nature of modifications, their substances, and change. To accomplish this, I do three tasks, with a section of this chapter devoted to each of the three tasks. In §1, I reconstruct Leibniz’s argument in his short 1688 essay “De Realitate Accidentium” (DRA), the writing where Leibniz goes to his greatest lengths to argue against the existence of non-modal accidents.211 While less well known than his other writings, Leibniz draws upon principles that he defended throughout his career for the argument in DRA. Further, as I show, Leibniz’s reasoning in DRA impacted his later metaphysical views.

After reconstructing the argument in DRA, I address an important issue with it in §2. While Leibniz’s arguments in DRA prima facie support the conclusion that accidents

210 In Chapter 5, I argue that substances are the efficient causal agents in creaturely immanent causation.
211 A VI, 4A, 994-996.
are modifications, he gives a surprisingly non-committal or agnostic answer as to whether there are any accidents at all at the end of the essay. I argue that Leibniz hesitated to posit even modal accidents because he worried that the problems he raised with non-modal accidents apply to modifications as well. Specifically, Leibniz’s arguments against non-modal accidents hinge on the assumption that such accidents are parts of substances, which is inconsistent with Leibniz’s views on the simplicity of substances.\textsuperscript{212} However, Leibniz also worried that the arguments of DRA entail that modifications, if they existed, would be parts of substances. Not much later, Leibniz changed his mind and posited modal accidents in his ontology, without, however, ever explicitly addressing how such accidents could be in a substance without being a part of it. Drawing from Leibniz’s later mereological and geometrical writings and his understanding of modifications as limitations, I argue that Leibniz had the resources to posit simple substances, which have a multitude of modifications at a time and change such modifications over time. I also show that non-modal accidents, such as real qualities, would have to be parts of their substances, if they existed, given Leibniz’s mereological theses. In arguing for this, I fill one scholarly void in this chapter by applying Leibniz’s developed mereological theses to not only showing how substances can have a multitude

\textsuperscript{212} Evidence that Leibniz thought that substances must be simple can be found earlier than his “De Realitate Accidentium”, which if dated accurately was written in 1688. For example, in a 1686 letter to Arnauld, Leibniz argued that substances must be thoroughly indivisible and naturally indestructible. Earlier, in his chapter 9 of his Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz writes, “It also follows that a substance cannot begin except by creation, nor come to an end except by annihilation; and because one substance can’t be destroyed by being split up, or brought into existence by the assembling of parts, in the natural course of events the number of substances remains the same, although substances are often transformed.” See AG 42 and (G II.76: AG 79).
of modes at a time and over time, but why simple substances cannot have non-modal accidents, such as real qualities.

§1 Leibniz’s “De Realitate Accidentium”

Leibniz begins “De Realitate Accidentium” (DRA) with the statement, “It is worth considering whether accidents have a reality that is more than modal, and in what that [reality] consists.” The statement proposes two questions:

(Q1) Do accidents have a reality that is more than modal?
(Q2) If Q1 has an affirmative answer, in what does that reality consist?

Q1 can be understood to simply ask if there are non-modal accidents. What Leibniz means in asking Q2 will become obvious as I reconstruct his argument. In the remainder of the essay, Leibniz considers the consequences of an affirmative answer to Q1 by exploring the possible answers to Q2.

Call the thesis that accidents have a reality that is simply modal the “Merely-Modal-Reality” thesis. Leibniz’s argument in DRA is an indirect proof for the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis. He begins the argument by assuming the falsity of the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis and thereby assuming an affirmative answer to Q1, which supplies us with the first premise:

(1) Suppose that the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis is false.

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213 Consideratu dignum est, utrum accidentia realitatem aliquam plus quam modalem, habeant, et in qua illa consistat. A VI, 4A, 994.
214 I note that a negative answer to Q1, the way it is worded, is consistent with both accidents having a merely modal reality and also with a variant of nominalism in which accidents have no reality at all. However, given that Leibniz asks “Do accidents have a reality that is more than modal?” rather than “Do accidents have any reality at all?”, I argue that it is fair to interpret Leibniz as intending Q1 to have only two answers: Either accidents have a reality that is more than modal or accidents have a merely modal reality. That Leibniz intended Q1 to have only these two answers will become evident as I reconstruct Leibniz’s argument. I am grateful to Michael Jacovides for pressing me on this.
If one denies the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis, Leibniz argues there are two options:

Either the accidental reality is part of the reality of the substance or the accidental reality is not part of the reality of the substance. With respect to the second option, the accidental reality is instead a new reality added to the substance. The second premise can then be expressed thus:

\[(2) \text{ If the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis is false, then (A) the accidental reality is part of the reality of the substance or (B) the accidental reality is not part of the reality of the substance but something additional to it.}\]

Leibniz first considers (A) and argues against it. If the accidental reality is a part of the reality of the substance, then when a substance changes accidents, the substance thereby loses and gains different parts (accidental realities). However, if the substance loses and gains parts, Leibniz argues that the whole substance perishes. Leibniz here assumes a variant of mereological essentialism, arguing that if some whole \(W\) which has part \(p\) at \(t\) loses \(p\) and gains a different part \(p'\) at \(t'\), \(W\) at \(t\) is identical in name only to \(W\) at \(t'\).

Leibniz writes:

If it is part of the reality of the substance, it follows that the substance itself perishes in accidental change, or it becomes a new thing, and myself yesterday exists not yet, but another although very similar to me, so that the ship which is repaired, or the republic, or the river, are the same in name, are not really [the same]. (Emphasis added)\(^{216}\)

Leibniz supports this variant of mereological essentialism by appeal to the absurdities raised by the Ship of Theseus problem:

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\(^{215}\) Leibniz writes, “And at least if we posit the accidental reality, whether their reality is part of the reality of the substance, or if it adds to the substance a new reality (Et quidem si accidentia ponimus realia, aut realitas earum pars est realitatis substantiae, aut addit substantiae realitatem novam).” Ibid.

\(^{216}\) Si pars est realitatis substantiae, sequitur substantiam ipsam in mutationibus accidentalibus interire, seu rem aliam fieri, et me heri nondum fuisse, sed alium mihi licet valde similem, uti navis quae reparatur, aut respublica, aut fluvius, nomine idem sunt, revera non sunt. Ibid.
For with a part destroyed, truly the same thing does not remain, even if thus far it is denominated the same thing by a more important surviving part, otherwise it is able to take place, so that with all of the parts little by little destroyed, which now belong to, yet it is finally said to be the same thing, just as the ship of Theseus.  

If the mere change of accidents causes a substance to perish—which would be entailed by Leibniz’s mereological essentialism and (A), then as all created substances continually change accidents, Leibniz argues that there would be no created substances:

If, however it is admitted that the substance perishes and comes into existence by change (Which is the thought of the duke of Buckingham in the ingenious writing about true religion the Schediasmate\(^2\)) they in reality remove all changeable substance.

Leibniz gets to this further conclusion rather quickly, writing:

For since the changes of things are perpetual, so that nothing remains in the same state through the smallest intervals of time, it follows that no changeable substance ever exists and actually endures a minimum time, for any moment whatever it is born and perishes, neither is it said to properly exist, nor to act, neither is it able to produce anything or to endure since nothing is brought about unless enduring for some time.

I understand Leibniz’s reasoning thus: First, substances can cease to exist—as they would if they lost one of their parts given Leibniz’s mereological essentialism—only if the substances first existed. Substances can exist, however, only if they exist for some

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\(^{217}\) Nam parte sublata res vere eadem res non manet, etsi a potiore parte superstite adhuc eadem denominetur, alioqui fieri posset, ut sublatis paulatim partibus omnibus, quae nunc insunt, tamen aliando res eadem dicatur, ut navis Thesei. Ibid.

\(^{218}\) Here, Leibniz makes reference to the book *A short Discourse upon the Reasonableness of Men’s having a Religion or Worship of God*, by George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham. For more information, see Mugnai, 515.

\(^{219}\) Si qui autem substantiam fatentur interire et nasci mutationibus (quae fuit sententia ducis Buckinghamii in Schediasmate ingenioso pro religionis veritate scripto) revera tollunt omnem substantiam mutabilem.

\(^{220}\) Cum enim perpetuae sint rerum mutationes, ut nihil per minimum temporis spatium in eodem statu permaneat, sequitur nullam unquam substantiam mutabilem existere et vel minimum durare, quod enim quovis momento nascitur et perit, nec existere proprie dicendum est, nec agere, aut efficere aliquid aut pati potest cum nihil nisi aliquo tempore durante efficiatur.
duration of time. I take Leibniz to rule out the possibility of a substance existing for only an instant, instead affirming what I’ll call the No-Momentary-Substance thesis:

For any created substance $s$ and any time $t$, if $s$ exists at $t$ then there is at least one time $t'$ such that $t'$ is not identical to $t$ and for any time $t^*$ between $t$ and $t'$, $s$ exists at $t^*$.\(^{221}\)

Additionally, Leibniz draws upon the thesis that created substances continually change—that no created substance ever remains in the same state.\(^{222}\) We’ll call this the Perpetual-Change thesis:

For any created substance $s$ and any time $t$ and any time $t'$, if $s$ exists at $t$ and $s$ exists at $t'$ and $t$ is not identical to $t'$, then for any state of a substance $C$, if $C$ is a state of $s$ at $t$ then it is not the case that $C$ is a state of $s$ at $t'$.\(^{223}\)

Now Leibniz has all he needs to argue against (A). Recall that on (A), the reality of accidents is part of the reality of created substances. Given (A) and Leibniz’s mereological essentialism, any time a substance changes accidents, the substance ceases to exist. But on Perpetual-Change thesis, substances continually change accidents. So no substance exists for more than an instant from (A), Leibniz’s mereological essentialism, and the Perpetual-Change thesis. Any created substance $s$ that exists at a time $t$ with accidents $A_1, A_2, A_3, \ldots, A_n$ must change its state by changing at least one of its accidents,

\(^{221}\) I find Leibniz endorsing a very similar constraint, if not the same constraint, later in his career. In the *Theodicy*, Leibniz writes, “If the created substance is a successive being, like movement; if it does not endure beyond a moment, and does not remain the same (during some stated portion of time) any more than its accidents; if it does not operate any more than a mathematical figure or a number: why shall one not say, with Spinoza, that God is the only substance, and that creatures are only accidents or modifications?” See (G VI.350-51: T 393).

\(^{222}\) That created substances continually change is a non-negotiable metaphysical thesis that Leibniz defends throughout his career. For example, in the Monadology, Leibniz writes, “I also take it for granted that every created being, and consequently the created monad as well, is subject to change, and even that this change is continual in each thing.” See (G VI.608: AG 214)

\(^{223}\) I note that while the Perpetual-Change thesis is a thesis about the states of a substance, it entails that the accidents of a substance continually change. States consist—in some manner—of a substance’s accidents. In fact, a state of a substance just is the sum total of that substance’s accidents at a time. Supposing a mereological essentialism about states, when a substance $s$ in state $C_1$ loses an accident $A_1$ and gains an accident $A_2$, $s$ changes from state $C_1$ to state $C_2$. 
as the Perpetual-Change thesis requires. But when a substance $s$ loses at least one of its accidents, $s$ ceases to exist. However, recall that on No-Momentary-Substance thesis, a substance cannot exist for only an instant. As (A), Leibniz’s mereological essentialism, and Perpetual-Change thesis entail that no substance exists for more than an instant but the No-Momentary-Substance thesis requires that substances exist for more than an instant, no created substances would exist. With the added premise that created substances do exist, Leibniz has all he needs for the third premise of his argument for the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis:

(3) It is not the case that (A) the accidental reality is part of the reality of the substance.

A Spinozist might agree with Leibniz’s reasoning up until the point that affirms the existence of created substances. The Spinozist instead might take the argument as an argument against the existence of created substances and offer substance monism as a solution instead. What we think are created substances are instead accidents of the one divine substance. Leibniz anticipates such a response but argues that such a substance monist solution only pushes the problem back a step:

Truly, nor do they thus avoid [the problem], so that in this way the changes which created substances undergo (naturally enduring) are forced to be brought over into God, and thus neither shall God himself endure, but shall continuously perish and be born. 224

The Spinozist then has the same difficulty of explaining how accidents are related to God, in which case the substance monist solution is not a solution.

224 Verum nec sic [effugiunt], quin hoc modo mutationes quas ademere substantii creatiis (quippe sublatis), in deum transferre cogantur, atque ita nec deus ipse durabit, sed continue interibit et nascetur.
Someone might further object that there is a different way to understand (A): Substances consist in a substantial permanent part that persists through change and an accidental part that perishes with change. On this understanding, all that is required for a substance to persist through change is the persistence of substance’s permanent part. This alternative understanding of (A) has to reject Leibniz’s mereological essentialism which holds that all the parts of a whole are necessary for the existence of the whole. Instead, only the essential parts are necessary. When a substance changes accidents, it only loses an accidental part. With no change to the essential permanent part, the substance persists.

Leibniz claims that this alternative understanding of (A) is tantamount to arguing (B): The accidental reality is not part of the reality of the substance. He writes, “Therefore, if someone wants a permanent part of the reality and a changeable part, they happen in their opinion, those who prefer to add to the substantial reality something from accidents.”225 So Leibniz next considers (B), offering at least three reasons to reject it as well.

Leibniz gives the first two reasons when he writes, “For it will be able to be asked why those added realities are said to belong to the substance as it were in a subject, and why it is not considered as a thing per se, even though not enduring.”226 Here, I take Leibniz to argue that if (B), then it is difficult to explain how an accident could be an accident of the substance that the accident allegedly belongs to and also difficult to

225 Itaque si qui partem realitatis permanentem, partem mutabilem volunt, incidunt in eorum opinionem, qui substantiali realitati addi aliquid ab accidentibus volunt.
226 Quaeri enim poterit cur illa realitas superaddita dicatur inesse substantiae tanquam subiecto, et cur non consideretur ut res per se, licet non-permanens.
explain how the accident is an accident at all. I’ll start with the first difficulty. On (B), a substantial permanent part is one part $P_S$ of a whole $W$ and an accidental part is a different part $P_A$ of $W$. Leibniz doesn’t elaborate but I think some sense can be made of his objection. What we have are two distinct parts, $P_S$ and $P_A$, of a greater whole $W$. But then it doesn’t make sense to say that $P_A$ inheres in or is an accident of $P_S$ any more than one spatial part of an object, such as the left half of a sphere, is an accident that inheres in a distinct non-overlapping spatial part of the same object, such as the right half of a sphere.

Second, it is difficult to explain how such an accident is an accident at all, rather than a thing per se—a substance. The second difficulty entails the first. If the accident is not an accident, then surely the accident cannot be the accident of a substance. Rather than there being an accident that belongs to a substance, there are two substances. It’s worth noting that the “accident” would be, according to Leibniz, a non-enduring thing per se. If the thing per se is a substance, then Leibniz has all the more reason to reject (B), as (B) also entails non-enduring substances, which Leibniz adamantly denied in his argument against (A).

The third difficulty with (B) is expressed in the following passage: But if that inherence seems to really affect the reality of the substance, so that it exists somehow in close union by some real it exists, it is not apparent, how the accidental [reality] is able to perish, without change in the substantial reality it [the accidental reality] originates from. Therefore, it itself will be divided again into a perishing and permanent part, contrary to hypothesis.\(^{227}\)

\(^{227}\) Quodsi inhaesio illa videtur realiter afficere realitatem substantialem, ut in connexione aliquam realitate consistat, non apparat, quomodo accidentalis posit interire, quin oriatur mutatio in realitate substantiali, ergo rursus ipsa dividenda erit in partem pereuntem, et permanentem, contra hypothesis.
I understand Leibniz to reason as follows: The accident is related, using the term “related” loosely, to the substance via inherence. On (B), this inherence would be what relates the accidental part with the substantial permanent part. But by inhering in the substantial permanent part, the accident’s union with the substance would have to somehow affect the reality of the substantial permanent part. Otherwise, the accident would not be the substance’s accident. However, according to Leibniz, the substantial permanent part would then have to perish when the accident ceases to exist. Thus (B) doesn’t avoid the problem raised by (A). If the substance is to avoid perishing, something would have to persist. Given that something has to persist, the substantial part would itself have to be divided into a substantial and accidental part, call them $\text{substantial}_2$ and $\text{accidental}_2$. $\text{Accidental}_2$ would be what is affected by the first accidental part while $\text{accidental}_2$ inheres in $\text{substantial}_2$. While Leibniz doesn’t state it, the argument suggests an infinite regress. The same problem would apply to $\text{substantial}_2$ and $\text{accidental}_2$, requiring that $\text{substantial}_2$ be divided into a substantial and accidental part, call them $\text{substantial}_3$ and $\text{accidental}_3$, *ad infinitum*.

With these three difficulties with (B), Leibniz argues:

(4) It is not the case that (B) the accidental reality is not part of the reality of the substance.

And now Leibniz has all he needs to conclude:

(5) Therefore, the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis is true.

However, Leibniz doesn’t conclude DRA with the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis and therefore a negative answer to Q1— the position that accidental reality is merely modal.
In fact, Leibniz never actually gets to the conclusion (5). Instead, Leibniz surprisingly concludes DRA with a non-committal or agnostic answer to Q1:

\[\text{I say therefore that substances change, or at diverse times their attributes are unlike; for this has no doubt, whether however in change there is something real that perishes and is born; and whether there are diverse realities in a substance, which are the foundations of diverse predicates, it is not necessary to ask, and if asked, it is difficult to decide.}\]

Notice that in the above passage, Leibniz denies that two questions need to be answered:

(Q3) Is there something real in substances that perishes and is born when a substance changes?
(Q4) Are there diverse realities in a substance, which are the foundations of diverse predicates?

Leibniz ends the passage claiming that it is difficult to decide the answer to these questions. The reason it is difficult to decide is understandable, given the complications that Leibniz raised throughout DRA, as we’ve seen. What’s surprising, however, is Leibniz’s response. It’s fair to wonder why Leibniz does not instead give a negative response to Q3 and Q4 given difficulties he raised in DRA. Speculating about Leibniz’s motivations is not the main goal of this Chapter, but perhaps Leibniz held out hope that he could eventually arrive at an account of accidental change that avoided the difficulties he raised in DRA.\(^{229}\) In fact, the later Leibniz did think he had an account or a skeleton of an account of accidental reality, as I shall argue soon.

\(^{228}\) Dicam igitur substantiam mutari, seu diversis temporibus diversa eius esse attributa; hoc enim dubitationem non habet, an autem mutatione aliqua realitas intereat, et oriatur; et an diversae sint realitates in substantia, quae sint fundamenta diversorum praedicatorum, quae necesse non est, et, si quaeratur difficile est diiudicatu.

\(^{229}\) Some scholars might interpret Leibniz as concluding the argument with a variant of nominalism, in which accidents have no reality or there are no accidents. However, I argue that Leibniz concludes the argument instead with an agnosticism about the reality of accidents. Leibniz never claims in DRA that accidents have no reality. Instead, Leibniz claims that it not necessary to answer that question and difficult to decide if one attempts to answer the question. This agnosticism is consistent with the variant of nominalism that denies that accidents have any reality, but Leibniz’s agnostic conclusion does not entail it.
Before I present that account, it’s worth clarifying Q3 and Q4 some more, and relating them back to Q1 and Q2. I suspect that an affirmative answer to Q3 entails an affirmative answer to Q4 and vice versa. That is, if there is something real that perishes and is born when a substance changes, then there are different realities in substances that are the foundations of diverse predicates.\(^{230}\) If there are different realities in substances that are the foundations of diverse predicates, then given that substances continually change, there is something real, which is born and perishes when a substance changes. Further, once one gives an affirmative answer to Q3 and Q4, then it would be mighty helpful to address Q2: Just what are those diverse realities that perish and are born and are the foundations of diverse predicates? In other words, what is the nature of those realities?

§2 Leibniz’s Changing Stance on the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis

Leibniz’s arguments in DRA strongly suggest that a negative answer to (Q1) “Do accidents have a reality that is more than modal?” entails a negative answer to (Q3) “Is there something real in substances that perishes and is born when a substance changes?” and (Q4) “Are there diverse realities in a substance, which are the foundations of diverse predicates?” Negative answers to Q1, Q3, and Q4 further entail that one can’t address what kind of reality accidents have (Q2).

The not much later Leibniz disagreed. In his 1692 “Critical Thoughts on the General Part of the Principles of Descartes”, Leibniz writes:

\(^{230}\) Presumably Leibniz is talking about diverse predicates over time in the same subject.
To deny a real distinction between modes is an unnecessary change in the accepted use of words. For until now modes have been considered as things [original language] and have been held to different in reality, as a spherical figure of wax differs from a square one. Certainly, the transformation of one figure into the other is a true change, and it has therefore a real foundation.\textsuperscript{231}

While Leibniz is writing about modes as opposed to non-modal accidents, he claims that a change of modes has a real foundation. Thus, Leibniz here doesn’t assume that a negative answer to Q1—the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis—entails a negative answer to Q4. If a body changes shape from $F$ to $G$, Leibniz claims that that is a true change with a real foundation. If there is a real foundation to changing modes, then as I argued above, there is also a real foundation to diverse predications. Take the following two statements, where $t'$ and $t$ are different times:

(S1) The body $B$ is cube-shaped at $t$.
(S2) The body $B$ is sphere-shaped at $t'$.

S1 and S2 have the same grammatical subject—“$B$” designating a body $B$—but contrary predicates. The Leibniz of DRA, as we saw, denied that one needs to address whether or not there are different realities in $B$ that are the foundations of the diverse predicates of statements such as S1 and S2. However, the not much later Leibniz now affirms that $B$’s changing shape has a real foundation. As I argued above, Leibniz is then committed to the different predicates of S1 and S2 having a real foundation. If Q3 and Q4 are inter-entailing, as I argued above, then Leibniz is further committed to there being different realities in $B$ that perish and are born. So Leibniz once again must address all the complications raised in DRA.

\textsuperscript{231} (G IV.365: L 390). Emphasis added.
2.1 Different Types of Realities

I argue that Leibniz did have a solution in mind. Several years later, in his *Theodicy*,

Leibniz makes a three-fold distinction between different types of realities:

> God is the one principal cause of pure and absolute realities, or of perfections. *Causae secundae agunt in virtute primae*. But when one comprises limitations and privations under the term realities one may say that the second causes co-operate in the production of that which is limited; otherwise God would be the cause of sin, and even the sole cause.\textsuperscript{232}

Leibniz claims above that there are three types of realities: (i) pure and absolute realities, or perfections; (ii) limitations; and (iii) privations. For the purposes of this chapter, I’ll focus on absolute realities and limitations, bracketing discussion of privations.\textsuperscript{233} For the sake of the discussion at hand, I’ll also call the realities picked out in (i) “Absolute-Realities” and the realities picked out in (ii) “Limitations” or “Limited-Realities”. In what follows, it’s worth briefly working through Q1-Q4 given this three-fold distinction Leibniz has introduced in his *Theodicy*.

For review, Q1 asks, “Do accidents have a reality that is more than modal?” As I argued in Chapters 2 and 3, all accidents for Leibniz are modifications. So the answer to Q1 is still “No”. Thus, Leibniz maintains, throughout his career, that the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis is true. However, as we’ve seen, this doesn’t prevent Leibniz from answering Q3 and Q4 positively later in his career, contra his conclusion in DRA. One reason is that, as we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, modifications are limitations. Given that

\textsuperscript{232} (G VI.347-48: T 392).

\textsuperscript{233} I will focus on limitations in what follows, noting that recent scholars argue that privations are a type of limitation for Leibniz. For example, see Samuel Newlands, “Leibniz on Privations, Limitations, and the Metaphysics of Evil,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 52, No. 2 (2014): 281-308.
limitations are realities, for Leibniz, Leibniz can answer Q3 and Q4, which provide him the workings of an answer to Q2.

Recall that Q3 asks, “Is there something real in substances that perishes and is born when a substance changes?” Leibniz’s answer to Q3 is “Yes”. What perishes and are born, however, are not absolute-realities. Instead, what perishes and are born are limited-realities. Accidents, which are modifications, which are limitations, are realities that come into and go out of existence. So when a substance changes accidents, limitations are what come into and go out of existence.

Q4 asks, “Are there diverse realities in a substance, which are the foundations of diverse predicates?” Leibniz’s answer again is “Yes”. However, the foundations of diverse predicates are not absolute-realities. Instead they are limited-realities. Diverse limited-realities—different modifications/limitations—are the foundations of diverse predicates.

Recall that Q2 asks “What is the nature of accidental realities?” Leibniz has the beginnings of an answer: Accidental realities are not absolute-realities. Instead they are limited-realities—accidents are limitations on their substances. This, however, still doesn’t provide much information as to the nature of accidents. An example Leibniz often gives of a limitation is shape.234 A shape limits what is shaped. Yet, as we saw above, when something changes shape, that is a true change according to Leibniz.

234 For example, Leibniz writes, “I have often said, and I do not remember having deviated from the view, that unless there is some active principle in us, there cannot be derivative forces and actions in us, since everything accidental or changeable ought to be a modification of something essential or perpetual, nor can it contain anything more positive than that which it modifies, since every modification is only a limitation, shape a limitation of that which is varied, and derivative force a limitation of that which brings about the variation.” See (G II.270: AG 180).
According to Leibniz, the distinction between shape $s_1$ a body $B$ has at $t_1$ and shape $s_2$ $B$ has at $t_2$ is neither a mere distinction of reason nor a modal distinction. I note, however, that this still does not provide much by way of answer to the nature of accidental reality. For example, while it easy to grasp how an accident such as shape is a limitation of its substance, what about an accident such as a perception—with content—of an immaterial monad?

2.2 The Arguments of DRA, Absolute-Realities and Limited-Realities

For now, I shall set aside this issue and address, to my mind, the more pressing question I raised above as it directly relevant to the arguments Leibniz makes in DRA: Does Leibniz’s distinction between absolute-realities and limitations allow him to avoid the problems he raised in his argument for the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis, specifically the problems with affirming either (A) the accidental reality is part of the reality of the substance or (B) the accidental reality is not part of the reality of the substance? In what follows, I shall argue that Leibniz has a way to argue that the problems he raised with (A) and (B) are only problems if accidents are absolute-realities. I shall do so by turning to Leibniz’s mereology.

In what follows, I argue that the problems Leibniz found in DRA both with accidents that have a more than modal reality and accidents that have a merely modal reality stemmed from Leibniz worrying that either type of accident—as a reality that is born and perishes in change and serves as the foundations of diverse predicates—is a part of its substance. I then argue that given Leibniz’s technical mereological views, the later Leibniz had a way to hold that accidents—as modifications and limitations—could be realities that born and perish in change and serve as the foundations of diverse predicates
without beings parts of their substances. I argue that such modifications cannot be homogenous with their substances, where homogeneity is a necessary condition of parthood in Leibniz’s mereology. To argue this, I examine Leibniz’s notion of homogeneity—a technical notion that has frequently been misunderstood by scholars, as I show. After reconstructing Leibniz’s notion of homogeneity, I argue that modifications or limitations cannot be homogenous with what they modify. I further argue that accidents that have more than modal reality (which would count as absolute-realities in Leibniz’s metaphysics) could be homogenous with their substances, and so parts of their substances.

Before presenting my argument, it’s worth addressing just why I should even bother to offer an argument on Leibniz’s behalf. Mainly, Leibniz assumed in DRA that the problematic disjunction (A) or (B) is entailed by the denial of the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis. Yet holding that accidents are absolute-realities is just to affirm the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis, which does not, according to Leibniz, entail (A) or (B).

In response to the objection, Leibniz claimed that a substance’s changing accidents, even when the accidents are limited-realities, is a true change with a real foundation. As I argued above, a true change’s having a real foundation entails that there are diverse realities in a substance that come to and cease to exist when the substance changes—Q3 entails Q4 and vice versa. The fact that Leibniz gave a non-committal answer to Q3 and Q4 at the end of DRA strongly suggests that he thought that any answer lead to difficult to solve puzzles. The further fact that Leibniz claims this immediately after working out the implications of (A) and (B) is strong evidence that the problems Leibniz had in mind were the problems with (A) and (B). So it’s worth
exploring whether or not Leibniz—in claiming that the realities that perish and are born and which are the real foundation of true changes are R2 realities—can avoid the problems he raised with (A) and (B).

2.3 Leibniz’s Mereology and Accidents

Leibniz’s mereological writings are the best place to address this challenge. I’ll specifically focus on the account of parts and wholes Leibniz developed in his 1714 “The Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics.” Both (A) the accidental reality is part of the reality of the substance and (B) the accidental reality is not part of the reality of the substance assume that accidents are parts. Option (A) holds that accidental reality is part of the reality of the substance.

So, on option (A), substances are wholes that have accidents as parts. Option (B), as Leibniz developed it in DRA, is the thesis that accidental realities are also a part of the substance, only the accidental part not identical to an essential substantial part that persists through change. So, on (B), a substance is whole with at least two parts—the essential substantial part and the accidental part. What’s important for my argument is that on both (A) and (B), the accidental reality is a part. I’ll call the thesis that accidents are part of the substances they inhere in the thesis of Substantial-Composition: For any accident $A$ and any substance $s$, if $A$ inheres in $s$ then $A$ is a part of $s$. This leads to a premise:

(P1) If (A) or (B) then the Substantial-Composition thesis is true.

The first premise of Leibniz’s argument in DRA held that the denial of the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis entailed the disjunction (A) or (B). However, as I’ve argued above, Leibniz now needs a reason to also argue that the affirmation of Merely-Modal-Reality
thesis does not entail the disjunction (A) or (B), where the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis is understood now as the thesis that accidents are limited-realities. That is, Leibniz needs to argue that it is not the case that the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis entails (A) or (B). P1 presents a necessary condition for the disjunction (A) or (B). So if the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis entails (A) or (B), then the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis entails Substantial-Composition. A reason to deny that the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis entails Substantial-Composition would then be a handy way to deny that the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis entails (A) or (B). In what follows, I argue that Leibniz actually has the resources to argue that if the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis is true, then it is not the case that accidents are parts of substances. That is, Leibniz can argue the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis entails that Substantial-Composition is false, which is a much stronger claim. For the former claim is consistent with the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis being the case and Substantial-Composition being the case. It only denies that the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis is sufficient for Substantial-Composition. But if Leibniz can argue that the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis entails the falsity of Substantial-Composition, which I shall argue he can, then a fortiori he can argue for weaker claim.

How might one address whether or not the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis entails Substantial-Composition or its negation? That is how might one address whether or not a modification of a substance is a part of that substance? Thankfully, Leibniz has precise criteria for when any \( x \) counts as a part of any \( y \): “An entity which is in something and is also homogeneous to it is called a part, and that which it is in is called a whole; or a part
is a homogenous ingredient of a whole.\textsuperscript{235} Formalized, Leibniz’s criteria of part-hood can be expressed thus:

For any \( x \) and any \( y \), \( x \) is a part of \( y \) if and only if:

(i) \( x \) is an ingredient of \( y \); and
(ii) \( x \) is homogeneous with \( y \).\textsuperscript{236}

To argue that the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis entails the falsity of Substantial-Composition, I must establish that modes of a substance are either \textit{not ingredients} of a substance or \textit{not homogeneous} with their substance. However, to establish that, I need a definition of “ingredient” and “homogeneous”, which Leibniz also supplies. I’ll start with ingredient. Leibniz writes:

We say that an entity is in \textit{inesse} some locus, or is an ingredient of something, if, when we posit the latter, we must also be understood, by this very fact and immediately, without the necessity of any inference, to have posited the entity as well. Thus when we posit any finite line, we also posit its end points as belonging to it.\textsuperscript{237}

Leibniz’s definition of an ingredient can then be expressed thus:

For any \( x \) and any \( y \), \( x \) is an ingredient of \( y \) if and only if for any person \( P \), if \( P \) posits \( y \), \( P \) immediately posits \( x \).

Leibniz’s example is the endpoints that are ingredients of a finite line. One cannot posit a finite line without positing the endpoints. While Leibniz’s examples are geometric, there is a sense in which a modification could be understood as ingredients of its substance. In

\textsuperscript{235} L 668.
\textsuperscript{236} I should note that two further conditions could be added: (iii) \( x \) is not identical to \( y \) and (iv) \( y \) is a whole. Condition (iii) implies that the definition of a part is in fact a definition of a proper part. I don’t encounter Leibniz ever developing the notion of an improper part in his mereological writings, so I’ll leave condition (iii) aside. Condition (iv) I take to be entailed by (i), (ii), and (iii), given Leibniz’s mereological views. That is, if \( x \) is a homogeneous ingredient of \( y \) and not identical with \( y \), then \( y \) is a whole of which \( x \) is a part.
\textsuperscript{237} L 667.
Chapter 3, we saw that Leibniz claims that a created substance must have some accident or other. On that understanding, the positing of a created substance requires the positing of some accident or other. However, there are two complications with addressing whether or not accidents could be ingredients in addressing whether or not accidents are parts. First, it is not clear if Leibniz’s criteria of ingredient-hood requires the positing of the very individual thing posited, or just some entity of the right type. The latter option leads to a further complication. Leibniz—as we saw in Chapter 3—also argues that accidents require substances. Thus, substances—in the sense suggested by the latter option—would be ingredients of accidents. But surely substances could not be parts of accidents. So it is not clear if accidents are ingredients of their substances and it is also not clear if accidents are not ingredients of their substances.

In what follows I’ll assume that accidents are ingredients. However, I also argue that a more fruitful avenue for addressing whether or not accidents could be parts of substances lies in the second necessary condition of parthood—homogeneity. Recall that the second necessary condition of parthood is that \( x \) be homogenous with \( y \). Homogeneity is also a technical term for Leibniz. Prima facie, one might take Leibniz to be adopting the notion of homogeneous parts and wholes that Aristotle articulated in the

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238 Leibniz writes, “I do not know whether the definition of substance as that which needs for its existence only the concurrence of God fits any created substance known to us, unless we interpret it in some unusual sense. For not only do we need other substances; we need our own accidents even much more. Therefore, since substance and accident depend on each other, other marks are necessary for distinguishing a substance from an accident. Among them may be this one: That a substance needs some accident but often does not need a determinate one but is content, when this accident is removed, with the substitution of another. An accident, however, needs not only some substance in general but that very one in which it inheres, so that it cannot change it.” (G IV.365: L 390).

239 Ibid.

240 I note that I am not arguing that accidents are ingredients of their substances. Instead, I’m assuming they are for the sake of argument so I can explore whether or not accidents are homogeneous with their substances.
Aristotle gives the example of blood, flesh, and bone as homogeneous wholes. Any part of an animal’s blood is also blood, any part of an animal’s bone is bone, and any part of an animal’s flesh is also flesh, according to Aristotle. This leads to the question of what feature of the part and whole make the part and whole homogeneous for Aristotle? It can’t simply be any predicate. For example, Socrates (a whole) and Socrates’ left hand (a part) could both have the predicate “exists in Athens before the birth of Christ” truly predicated of them, yet that doesn’t mean that Socrates’ left hand is homogeneous with Socrates in Aristotle’s usage of the term. Instead, the predicate must be a kind-term that indicates what kind of thing or stuff the part and wholes are. For example, a gold brick and the left-half of a gold brick can both have the kind-term “gold” truly predicated of them.

Is this the conception of homogeneity that Leibniz has in mind? In places, Leibniz makes claims that suggest he is adopting Aristotle’s usage. For example, in his 1690 “Comments on Michael Angelo Fardella,” Leibniz writes, “Further, although the aggregate of these substances constitutes body, they do not constitute it as parts, just as points are not parts of lines, since a part is always of the same sort as the whole.”

Leibniz here uses the term “sort”, which might be taken to mean what contemporary metaphysicists mean by the term “sortal”. However, contemporary sortal predicates are count-nouns, such as horse, unicorn, book, etc. But a proper part of a unicorn is not a unicorn. Philosophers further deny that any sortal predicate that applies to some entity $x$

\[\text{See Aristotle, } \textit{Parts of Animals}, \text{ Book 1, Part 1, 640b18-22.}\]
\[\text{See AG 105. Emphasis added.}\]
applies must also apply to a part of x. Instead, Leibniz’s usage of “sort” suggests something closer to Aristotle’s usage. A part of a body is a body, a part of a line segment is a line segment, and so on.

This has lead many scholars to take Leibniz to be adopting Aristotle’s usage of homogeneity, or at least write as if they take Leibniz to be adopting such usage. For example, Robert Adams writes:

A part of a line, on this view, must be homogeneous with the line, and therefore must be a line segment, and not a point. See Aristotle Physics Book VI, CH. 1. Similarly, I suppose, a part of a phenomenon must be a phenomenon, and a part of an aggregate must be a subaggregate. Specifically, a part of a body must be a body. If a body is an aggregate of substances which are not aggregates, those substances will not be parts of the body, and the body will not be composed of them if being ‘composed of’ means having as parts.

Pauline Phemister, commenting on Leibniz’s “Comments on Michael Angelo Fardella,” writes:

To support this conclusion [points not parts of lines, souls not parts of matter, bodies are parts of matter], Leibniz appeals to the principle of the homogeneity of parts and wholes. For anything to count as a part of a larger whole, it has to be of the same nature as the whole. The converse, that those things which do not possess the same nature cannot stand in relation of part to whole, allows Leibniz to assert that those substances which are aggregated together as a body are not parts of those bodies.

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244 See Robert Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, 244. Adams also writes, “The meaning of this passage turns on Leibniz’s conception of the parts of bodies. The statement that ‘a part is always homogeneous with the whole’ is a key to this. A body, according to the memo, is an aggregate. Its homogeneous parts, therefore, are subaggregates (and thus still bodies) rather than the indivisible nonaggregates ‘of’ which it is an aggregate. The latter we might call ‘elements’ as distinct from ‘parts’ of the corporeal aggregate (as I have suggested in Chapter 9, section 3.1), and I think nothing is said here to preclude their being (concrete) souls or, as I put it, ‘qualified monads.” See Ibid, 276.
245 See Pauline Phemester, Leibniz and the Natural World: Activity, Passivity and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz’s Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 98. Phemester also writes, “Since mere aggregate bodies and corporeal substances are of essentially different natures, the homogeneity principle rules out corporeal substances as parts of bodies as effectively as it eliminated souls.” See Ibid, 98-99.
And Benson Mates, commenting on whether or not component concepts are parts of complex concepts, writes:

Thus, he [Leibniz] says, the parts of lines are not points, but other lines, although, in his use, points are ‘in’ lines. On this definition it would appear that the component concepts of a complex concept are parts of it, assuming that all concepts are to be considered ‘homogeneous’.  

There are, however, two problems with understanding Leibniz’s usage of homogeneity exactly in this Aristotelian way. First, in other places Leibniz denies that there are homogeneous parts in Aristotle’s sense. Instead, such homogeneous parts in fact turn out to be heterogeneous:

The point is that people mistakenly take these bodies to be homogeneous or uniform, whereas really they are more mixed than they are thought to be. When dealing with heterogeneous bodies, one is not surprised to find differences between individual samples: physicians know only too well how much human bodies differ in their balance and their constitution. In short, as I have remarked earlier, we shall never be able to find species which are logically the lowest; and two real, i.e., complete, individuals belonging to a single species will never be perfectly alike.

I take Leibniz to argue for the claim that any apparent homogeneous whole $W$, upon closer inspection, would turn out to be a heterogeneous whole. There are two reasons Leibniz argues this, both found in the above passage. First, Leibniz’s reason stems in part from his denial that no two things are ever of the exact same species, a thesis Leibniz maintained throughout his career. Granted, Leibniz usually applies the reasoning to


\[247\] See (G V.284: NE 305). Leibniz also writes, “I believe, however, that the four bodies they call elements, which they believe to be simple, as well as the salts, metals, and other bodies which they believe to be perfectly mixed, with their ingredients in fixed proportions, are not unum per se either – particularly since we should regard them as only apparently uniform and homogeneous, and even a homogeneous body would still be an aggregation.” See (G.V.308: NE 328).
created substances. No two monads are of the same species. Instead, they are like Thomistic angels. Perhaps Leibniz also applies this to corporeal substances as well (even if, on the idealistic interpretation I assume in this dissertation, Leibniz denies that there are corporeal substances): No two bricks of gold are really of the same exact species or kind. Second, Leibniz perhaps is advancing an assumption based on advances of the science of his time. To appearances, every part of some portion of blood is also blood. So a portion of blood only has homogeneous parts. Yet if one zooms in with a microscope, one will instead find heterogeneous parts. So a portion of blood appears to be a homogeneous whole, but instead is a heterogeneous whole.

Second, and more importantly, as is the case with many terms Leibniz uses, “homogeneity” is also a technical term with a precise meaning that differs in some respects from the Aristotelian notion of homogeneity. Leibniz writes:

Two entities are homogeneous to which two other entities can be assigned which are equal to them and similar to each other. Given A and B; if L is taken equal to A, and M equal to B, and L and M are similar, we call A and B homogeneous. Hence I usually also say that homogeneous entities are those which can be made similar to each other by means of transformations, like curves and straight lines. That is, if A is transformed into its equal L, it can be made similar to B, or to its equal M into which B is assumed to have been transformed.²⁴⁸

Leibniz seems to offer two definitions of homogeneity. I’ll use the terms “homogeneous₁” and “homogeneous₂”, respectively.

²⁴⁸ L 667.
The first definition can be expressed thus, using the same variables Leibniz used:

For any $A$ and any $B$, $A$ is homogeneous$_1$ with $B$ if and only if: There is at least one $L$ and at least one $M$, such that:

(i) $L$ is similar to $M$;  
(ii) $L$ is equal to $A$; and  
(iii) $M$ is equal to $B$.

The second definition Leibniz presents in the same passage defines two entities $x$ and $y$ as homogeneous$_2$ when they can be made similar to each other by means of transformations. Rather than offering two unrelated definitions, the text suggests that the two definitions are inter-entailing. That is, if $x$ is homogeneous$_1$ with $y$ if and only if $x$ is homogeneous$_2$ with $y$. If two entities satisfy conditions (i) - (iii) of homogeneity$_1$, then those two entities can be made similar to each other by means of transformations. Of course, stating the definitions and that they inter-entail is not the same thing as explaining why they do, so I now attempt to do just that.

First, to unmuddy what are some still murky waters, it’s helpful to also see how Leibniz defines the terms “similar” and “equal” in the definition of homogeneous$_1$, as they are also technical notions for him. I’ll start with “equal”, which Leibniz defines when he writes, “Equals are things having the same quantity.” Leibniz elaborates what he means by “quantity” when he writes, “Quantity or magnitude is that in things which can be known only through their simultaneous compresence – or by their simultaneous perception. Thus it is impossible for us to know what a foot or a yard is unless we

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249 For reasons that will become apparent soon, similarity is symmetric relation. If $x$ is similar to $y$, then $y$ is similar to $x$. Hence, I see no need to add the condition (iv) $M$ is similar to $L$.

250 Roy T. Cook finds a third definition in this very passage, only to argue that the third definition is consistent with and entailed by the first. I’ll draw upon the first definition primarily. See Roy T. Cook, “Monads and Mathematics: The Logic of Leibniz’s Mereology,” *Studia Leibnitiana* (2000): 9-12.

251 L 667.
actually have something to serve as a measure which can be applied to successive objects after each other.”

What’s not clear from this passage is whether Leibniz thinks he is offering (i) simply a handy way to know whether some property $F$ is a quantitative property or (ii) the definition of a quantitative property or (iii) a way to know the particular quantity—i.e., the measure—of something. The first sentence suggests (i) or (ii). However, in the second sentence, Leibniz seems to assume (iii): To know if some $x$ is a foot long, one must have some other entity $y$ that is a foot long that can be compared to $x$. Fortunately, one doesn’t have to decide on which of (i) – (iii) applies to understand how quantity pertains to equality. According to commentators, two objects are equal in quantity if and only if they are equal in size. This understanding of equality will suffice for now.

Now onto Leibniz’s definition of “similarity”. Leibniz writes, “Similar are things having the same quality.” Two objects $o_1$ and $o_2$ are similar if there is some quality token $F_1$ of quality type $F$ inhering in $o_1$ and some quality token $F_2$ of quality type $F$ inhering in $o_2$. Leibniz also elaborates on what he means by “quality”, “Quality, on the other hand, is what can be known in things when they are observed singly, without requiring any compresence. Such are the attributes which can be explained by a definition or through the various modes which they involve.”

Leibniz’s elaboration on what he means by “quality”, at least with respect to his definition of homogeneity, can be contrasted with what he means by “quantity”, shedding

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252 Ibid.
254 L 667.
255 Ibid. Leibniz used this definition of similarity as far back as 1679. See, for example, L 254-55.
light on both. One can know that an object $o_1$ has a particular quality $F_1$ without requiring some other object $o_2$ to compare with $o_1$. This is unlike knowing whether or not an object has a particular quantity, such as length. While it’s not clear if Leibniz is offering this as a strict definition, once again for the purposes of my argument, it suffices. I note that some scholars argue that the quality of an object, in Leibniz’s developed mereological views, is the shape of the object—two objects are similar when they are the same shape. However, I shall also consider a broader conception of qualitative similarity not limited to shape in what follows.

To recap, given Leibniz’s definition of a part, a modification can be a part of a substance only if the modification is homogeneous with its substance. A modification is homogeneous with its substance only if the modification can be transformed in such a way that it is similar to its substance. To avoid both (A) the accidental reality is part of the reality of the substance and (B) the accidental reality is not part of the reality of the substance, Leibniz needs to a way to argue that a modification is not a part of its substance. To do so, I shall argue that a modification cannot be homogeneous with its substance. Once I have established that, I will have provided all Leibniz needs to defend the premise (P2) If the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis is true, then Substantial-Composition is false.

In what follows, I shall argue that modifications cannot be parts of their substances on both the idealistic and non-idealistic interpretations of Leibniz, where by non-idealistic I mean the interpretation that holds that there are bodies and/or corporeal

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substances in Leibniz’s ontology. I’ll start with the non-idealistic interpretation and argue that modes cannot be homogeneous with the bodies they modify. While I assume the falsity of the non-idealistic interpretation of Leibniz’s ontology in this project, starting with the non-idealistic is still beneficial for the following reason: Leibniz’s stock example of a limitation, as we’ve seen, is the shape of a body. If the shape of a body cannot be homogeneous with the body shaped and the reason the shape cannot be homogeneous is due to its being a limitation of that body, then *ipso facto* a modification of a substance—be it corporeal or non-corporeal—cannot be homogeneous with the substance modified. For modifications, according to Leibniz, are limitations.

One might still object to my even bothering to address whether modes could be homogeneous with bodies. On the idealistic ontology I assume in this project, there are no corporeal substances or bodies. Instead there are only immaterial monads and their accidents. According to some scholars, Leibniz’s definition of homogeneity in his definition of parts is a geometrical definition applying to shaped entities of varying dimensions such as lines and spheres. But monads are dimension-less. So it’s a category mistake to claim that an accident of a monad is a part of a monad. Nothing more needs to be argued.

This objection is correct as far as it goes but it is still fruitful to run the argument through in greater depth as it sheds light on an important related issue. Monads, according to Leibniz, are simple even though they are both synchronically and diachronically *complex*—monads have a multitude of accidents at a time and they change accidents over time. Many of Leibniz’s predecessors would have claimed that
such synchronic complexity is inconsistent with monadic simplicity. If monads have accidents, then they are composite and therefore not simple.²⁵⁷

Contemporary scholars have responded to this issue in one of two ways. First, some scholars have resorted to arguing that Leibniz is ultimately committed to the position that monads are not really synchronically and diachronically complex. That is, monads do not have a multitude of accidents at a time and they do not endure through change of accidents over time.²⁵⁸ This position, however, is in tension with Leibniz’s numerous arguments defending the reality of monadic change.²⁵⁹ Additionally, Leibniz argues in the *Monadology* that there can only be a plurality of monads if they differ in quality from each other.²⁶⁰

Other scholars who have not been willing to jettison diachronic and synchronic complexity, have proposed a more promising solution. Accidents are not parts of monads. Instead, monads are simple entities that serve as parts of composite wholes consisting in the monad and accident.²⁶¹ However, this solution runs into problems that Leibniz

²⁵⁷ For example, Aquinas famously argued that God couldn’t have accidents because that would entail that God is not simple. See SCG 1.23.3.
²⁵⁹ Such as Leibniz’s Perpetual-Change thesis he appealed to in DRA that we saw earlier in this chapter.
²⁶⁰ In the *Monadology*, Leibniz writes, “However, monads must have some qualities, otherwise, they would not even be beings. And if simple substances did not differ at all in their qualities, there would be no way of perceiving any change in things, since what there is in a composite can only come from its simple ingredients; and if the monads had no qualities, they would be indiscernible from one another, since they also do not differ in quantity.” See (G VI.608: AG 214).
²⁶¹ For example, Timothy Allan Hillman, in his own work on this topic, writes, “Now, accidents all by themselves need not compromise substantial simplicity. After all, Aquinas and other Medieval philosophers had maintained that immaterial substances—for example, angels—were singular entities which, nonetheless, had accidents. Whenever some accident inheres in an angel, the angel’s simplicity is not corrupted; instead, the simple substance is said to enter into a larger substantial composite of which it and the accident are constituent parts. So, Leibniz need not fear that a monad’s possession of some mode
himself drew attention to in DRA above. Mainly, if monads are simple parts of composite wholes, of which accidents are the other part, then Leibniz argues that it is difficult to explain how the accidents are accidents of the monad that inhere in the monad instead of entities that exist per se. In what follows, I show how Leibniz can maintain that accidents are accidents of simple monads without being parts of monads or parts of a greater whole composed by the accident and monad.

A final reason to show that limitations/modifications are not parts of what they limit even in the case of immaterial monads is that some scholars interpret qualitative similarity in Leibniz’s definition of homogeneity to not be limited to shape. If these scholars are right then Leibniz’s definition of homogeneity may not be limited to applying to bodies are corporeal substances, for Leibniz argues that the accidents of monads are qualities. In what follows, I shall also offer reasons to hold that even if qualities are not limited to shapes, qualities could not be homogeneous with what the qualities are qualities of.

2.3.1 Shapes not Homogenous with what they Shape

I first argue that the shape of a body—a modification—is not homogeneous with its body, and therefore cannot be a part of its body. Leibniz suggests one route to this thesis in his “Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics” when he writes, “It is clear from this that a boundary is not homogeneous with what it bounds, nor a section with


For example, in his own work on Leibniz’s technical definition of homogeneity found in Leibniz’s “Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics,” Hartz writes, “Whatever is homogeneous must be of a certain kind K, ‘all the way down’ in its decomposition or ‘all the way up’ in its composition.” See Glenn A. Hartz, *Leibniz’s Final System: Monads, Matter and Animals* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 69.

See (G VI.608: AG 214). Recall as well in Chapter 3 that qualities are modifications.
what it cuts."²⁶⁴ Earlier in Leibniz’s career, Leibniz identified the boundary of a thing with its figure or shape. In a 1669 letter to Jacob Thomasius, Leibniz wrote, “Here too everything agrees remarkably if we assume that form is nothing but figure. For since figure is the boundary of a body, a boundary is needed to introduce figure into bodies.”²⁶⁵ From these two passages, we have an argument: Shape is what bounds a body, but a boundary cannot be homogeneous with what it bounds. So a shape cannot be homogeneous with what it shapes. Therefore, a shape cannot be a part of what it shapes. Given that shape is Leibniz’s stock example of a modification, at least one type of modification cannot be a part of what it modifies.

There are two problems, however, with this argument. First, immediately preceding the passage above in his “Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics,” Leibniz writes, “A common boundary of two things is an entity which is in them when they do not have a part in common. Insofar as these two things are understood to be parts of a single whole, their common boundary is called a section of the whole.”²⁶⁶ This passage leads to a tension with Leibniz’s Ownership Thesis of Accidents (OTA) that we saw in Chapter 3, if the shape of a body—a modification— is to be identified with the boundary of a body.²⁶⁷ Leibniz claims that two entities can have a common boundary. However, recall that on OTA, no modification can modify more than one substance at the same

²⁶⁴ L 668.
²⁶⁵ (G I.18: L 95).
²⁶⁶ L 668.
²⁶⁷ The Ownership Thesis of Accidents can be expressed thus: For any accident A and any substance s, if A inheres in s then there is not some substance s’ such that s’ is not identical to s and A inheres in s’. See (G IV.365: L 390).
time—the synchronic implication of OTA.\textsuperscript{268} If a shape is a modification and a modification is a boundary, then Leibniz here is committed to holding that a modification can modify more than one entity at the same time.

There’s a second problem. Leibniz gives the example of the endpoint of a line segment being an ingredient of the line segment but not homogeneous with it.\textsuperscript{269} Instead, a smaller line segment within the original line segment would be homogeneous. Commentators have point out that Leibniz generalizes this point, and further argues that a one-dimensional line that is an ingredient of a two-dimensional polygon is not homogeneous the two-dimensional polygon and that a two dimensional surface is an ingredient of but not homogeneous with the three dimensional object the surface is the surface of, and so on.\textsuperscript{270} For an entity to be homogeneous with another entity, however, both entities must have the same number of dimensions—a smaller line segment in a line segment is homogeneous with the larger line segment unlike the endpoint. This leads to a necessary condition of homogeneity: for any $x$ and any $y$, $x$ is homogeneous with $y$ only if the number of $x$’s dimensions = the number of $y$’s dimensions. However, the number of dimensions of the \textit{shape} of a body \textit{is} identical to the number of dimensions of the \textit{body}.

A sphere is three-dimensional and the shape of a sphere is three-dimensional. So the shape of a body—which is mode of its body—satisfies an important condition of

\textsuperscript{268} See Chapter 3, section 2.2.
\textsuperscript{269} L 667.
\textsuperscript{270} See Hartz, \textit{Leibniz's Final System: Monads, Matter and Animals}, 69.
\textsuperscript{271} Assuming that the later Leibniz did not identify shape with boundary. If Leibniz did identify shape with boundary, then there are plausible reasons to suppose that the number of dimensions of a shape is equal to the number of dimensions of what is shaped minus one. For discussion, see Achille Varzi, "Boundary", \textit{The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy} (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = \texttt{<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/boundary/>}. 
homogeneity. Given that the shape of a body is also an ingredient of its body (on one understanding of ingredient I presented above), we’re not far from concluding that the shape is a part of its body.

This second problem seems also to apply to immaterial substances—monads. Monads are zero-dimensional entities. The modifications of monads—which on one understanding of ingredient are also ingredients of monads—are also zero-dimensional. So again we’re not far from concluding—contra Leibniz’s claims—that the modification of a monad is homogeneous ingredient of a monad, and therefore a part of a monad.

However, this second problem rests on a confusion. In fact, addressing the confusion paves the path to establishing that the shape of a body could not be homogeneous with its body, and further that the modification of a monad could not be homogeneous with its monad. I’ll start with shapes. If a shape were homogeneous with its body, then the shape would be similar (or could be transformed to be similar) to its body. But what would it be for a shape to be similar to its body? It would be for the shape to have the same shape as its body. But that’s absurd. We would be treating the shape as if it were a substance with a shape modifying or inhering in it, which we then compare to the shaped body. Instead, the body has the shape it has because the shape modifies it and the shape only exists as modifying its body.

A slightly different way to clarify the confusion of the second problem is as follows. Homogeneity is symmetric. If $x$ is homogeneous with $y$ then $y$ is homogeneous with $x$. So if a shape is homogeneous with its body then a body is homogeneous with its

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272 Monads, being non-extended, are zero-dimensional. See (G VI.607: AG 213).
shape. If a body is homogeneous with its shape, then the body is similar to its shape or could be made similar to the shape via transformations. Yet once again this is absurd for the same reason. What would it be for a body to be similar to its shape? It would be for the body to have the same shape as its shape. But once again we are treating the shaped body as a distinct entity from the shape shaping the body, which we then compare. The confusion then lies in supposing that two entities are being compared and then judged similar—the body and the body’s shape, as if one glances at the body and then glances at the body’s shape, and then judges the body to have the same shape as its shape.273

Instead, while the shape of a body is an ingredient of its body (on one understanding of ingredienthood), it is not homogeneous with the body. What would be both an ingredient of and homogeneous with a body B is a smaller body B’, such as B’s left half. B’ could be transformed so that it is similar in shape to B. The transformation would involve B’ changing from having one shape M modifying B’ to a different shape M’ similar to B’s shape. Thus, commentators have correctly claimed that only a body could be a part of another body in Leibniz’s metaphysics, even if the route they took to the conclusion was not the route Leibniz takes.

2.3.2 Limitations are not Homogenous with what they Limit

Further, in addition to a shape not being homogeneous with what it shapes, Leibniz has grounds to argue that no modification can be homogeneous with what it modifies. In fact, I shall argue that claiming that a limitation’s being homogeneous with what it limits leads to a regress. Recall that modifications are limited-realities—

273 Of course if they are really distinct they are two entities, but not two entities have the same shape in the same respect that would be needed for them both to be homogeneous with each other.
modifications are limitations. This especially includes shape, Leibniz’s frequent example of a limitation. A shape is a limitation of its body. The confusion that lies then in claiming that a shape is homogeneous with its body lies can be made clearer when one takes into consideration that a shape is a limitation. To claim a shape is homogeneous with its body would be to claim that the shape is limited in the same way that its body is limited. The problem is, what limits the body is the body’s shape.

Generalized, a limitation $L$ is homogeneous with an entity $x$ that $L$ limits only if $L$ is limited in the same way that $x$ is limited. But $x$ is limited by $L$. Assuming that $L$ cannot be limited by $L$, if $L$ were to be limited in the same way that $x$ is limited, then $L$ would have to be itself limited by a different limitation $L’$ that is similar to $L$ (which limits $M$). But then if $L’$ is similar to $L$, then $L’$ in turn would have to be limited by $L’’$, and so on *ad infinitum*. To avoid the regress, one must deny that a limitation could be homogeneous with what it limits. Given that modifications are limitations, no modification can be homogeneous with what it modifies. Thus, no modification could be a part of what it modifies. Leibniz now has the second premise of his argument he needed above:

(P2) If the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis is true then Substantial-Composition is false.

In which case, Leibniz can conclude:

(C) If the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis is true then it is not the case that (A) the accidental reality is part of the reality of the substance and it is not the case that (B) the accidental reality is not part of the reality of the substance.

Thus, affirming the Merely-Modal-Reality thesis does avoid the problems Leibniz raised with (A) and (B). Leibniz in fact did have good reasons to avoid the non-committal
answers he originally gave to Q3 and Q4. Further, Leibniz can give answers to Q3 and Q4 while also giving an affirmative answer to Q1.

2.3.3 Absolute-Realities and Homogeneity

One important issue remains to be addressed: What reasons could Leibniz have for holding that an accident must be a part of its substance if the accident is an absolute-reality? Recall that Leibniz’s arguments against accidents being absolute-realities stem from the consequences of the disjunction (A) or (B). Both (A) and (B) assume that accidents—if absolute-realities—are parts of their substances. What Leibniz needs, then, is a reason to hold that if accidents are absolute-realities, then accidents are parts of their substances. As we’ve seen, the two necessary conditions of Leibnizian part-hood are ingredient-hood and homogeneity. So Leibniz needs a reason then to argue that if accidents are absolute-realities, then accidents are ingredients of and homogeneous with their substance. As I just argued, on at least one understanding of ingredient-hood, modifications are ingredients of their substance. However, as modifications are not homogeneous with their substance—as I also argued above, modifications are not parts of their substance. What needs to be established, then, is that if accidents are absolute-realities, then accidents are homogeneous with their substances.

Recall that if an accident that is an absolute-reality is to be homogeneous with its substance, then the accident must be similar to its substance or able to be transformed so that it would be similar to its substance. As I noted above, there are two different conceptions of similarity—the strictly geometrical conception and a broader conception. On the strictly geometrical conception, $x$ is similar to $y$ only if $x$ has the same
shape/figure as $y$. On the broader conception of similarity, $x$ is similar to $y$ if $x$ has the same type of quality as $y$.

I’ll start with the geometrical conception. On the geometrical conception of homogeneity, the accident $A$—if it is to be homogeneous with its substance $s$—would have to be similarly shaped or capable of being similarly shaped to $s$. Hence, $A$ would have to be a smaller body in $s$. So Leibniz now needs reasons to argue that if accidents are absolute-realities, then both the accidents and their substances are bodies. I can’t find one. Leibniz can argue that if $A$ is a smaller body within $s$ then $A$ is a part of $s$. Leibniz can also argue that if $A$ is smaller body in $s$, then $A$ is an absolute-reality. But I find no reason why Leibniz could argue that if $A$ is an absolute-reality then $A$ is a body and $s$ is a body.

Fortunately, there’s a different route Leibniz can take with a broader understanding of similarity. On the broader understanding of similarity, $x$ is similar to $y$ if and only if either (i) $x$ has the same quality (type) as $y$ or (ii) $x$ is transformable so that it has the same quality (type) as $y$. Take the following two passages conveying the same claim. The first passage was written the same year as DRA:

“It seems that something inheres in a subject, if and only if, its reality belongs to the reality of the subject. That is to say, . . . A is in B, if all that is immediately required by A, is also immediately required by B.”

Leibniz claims here that if $x$ inheres in $y$, then $x$’s reality belongs to $y$’s reality. The second passage was written several decades later:

... a modification is a varying limitation, and modes merely limit things but do not increase them and hence cannot contain any absolute perfection which is not

274 A VI.iv.990.
in the thing itself which they modify. Otherwise, in fact, these accidents must be thought of in the manner of substances, namely, something which stands per se.\footnote{(G II.257: L 532).}

The second passage utilizes Leibniz’s distinction between absolute and limited realities while the first does not. However, the first passage but can be taken to apply to absolute-realities. That is, if $x$ inheres in $y$, then $x$’s absolute reality belongs to $y$’s absolute reality.

I note also that Leibniz makes a point at the end of the second passage strikingly similar to a point he makes in DRA: If an accident contains absolute perfection not found in the substance the accident inheres in, then the accident is a substance—something which stands per se, and therefore not an accident.

On the broader understanding of similarity, for an accident, which is an absolute-reality to be homogeneous with its substance, it would have to be something that can have qualities rather than what simply is a quality. Here, the case is easy to make then. An entity that is an absolute-reality is something that has absolute perfection or positive reality of its own. This is in contrast with a modification or limitation, which has no absolute perfection of positive reality of its own but instead is merely a limitation on an absolute reality. So absolute-realities can have limitations. Further, there are reasons to believe that Leibniz would require any created absolute-reality to have some limitations, otherwise the absolute-reality would be unlimited—something privy only to God. On this broader understanding of similarity then, an accident that is an absolute-reality could be homogeneous with its substance by having similar limitations or capable of being transformed so that it has similar limitations. Conjoined with the fact that the accidents are also ingredients (on one understanding of ingredient-hood), the accidents being

\footnote{(G II.257: L 532).}
absolute-realities entails they are parts after all. Hence, accidents being absolute-realities entails either (A) the accidental reality is part of the reality of the substance or (B) the accidental reality is not part of the reality of the substance, which is what Leibniz needed.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I argued that in his “De Realitate Accidentium,” Leibniz hesitated to argue that accidents have even a modal reality because he worried that if accidents had any kind of reality, such accidents would be parts of their substances. Thus, positing of any kind of reality to accidents then ran afoul of Leibniz’s views on the simplicity of substances. However, the not later Leibniz argued that accidents have a modal reality. I argued that the later Leibniz could affirm that accidents have a modal reality given his tri-fold distinction between absolute-realities, limited-realities, and privations, where modifications are limited realities and his developed mereological views. According to Leibniz, some x is a part of some whole y only if x is *homogenous* with y. After a reconstruction of Leibniz’s technical notion of homogeneity, I argued that given that modifications are limitations, modifications cannot be homogenous with their substances. If accidents were absolute-realities such as real qualities, however, such accidents could be homogenous with their substances and therefore could be parts of their substances. Therefore, a major reason Leibniz argued all accidents are modifications and no accidents have a more than modal reality were his views on the simplicity of substances.
CHAPTER 5. DETERMINISTIC AND INTELLIGIBLE LEIBNIZIAN SUBSTANCE CAUSATION

In Chapter 3, I argued that Leibniz’s views on the nature of accidents—specifically that accidents are modifications or limitations—led him to argue against the possibility of creaturely inter-substantial causation or creaturely causal interaction. In Chapter 4, I argued that Leibniz held that accidents are modifications or limitations because of his views that created substances are mereologically simple while possessing a plurality of modifications, which they change over time. In this chapter, I more closely examine the role accidents play in intra-substantial or immanent causation, by addressing an interpretative controversy concerning the causal relata in such causation. Specifically, the controversy is over what, strictly speaking, causes a substance’s accidents—the substance itself or its accidents.

A hallmark of Leibniz’s metaphysics is his thesis of creaturely spontaneity—the thesis that created substances are causally responsible for their accidents. Given


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276 Leibniz writes, “For why should God be unable to give substance, from the beginning, a nature or an internal force that can produce in it, in an orderly way (as would happen in a spiritual or formal automaton, but free in the case where it has a share of reason), everything that will happen to it, that is, all the appearances or expressions it will have, without the help of any created being?” (G IV.483-4: AG 143-44). See also (G VI.295-6: T 300).
creaturely spontaneity, Leibniz denies that created substances ever causally interact, as we’ve seen. Any apparent causal interaction is then reducible—in some sense—to the immanent causal activity of created substances. Furthermore, Leibniz argues that creaturely spontaneity entails the falsity of Occasionalism—the theory that only God is causally responsible for change.

While this much is clear, the details are murkier the closer one looks at Leibniz’s thesis of spontaneity, as Leibniz makes several conflicting claims about what, precisely, causes a substance’s accidents: Either the substance itself causes its accidents or the substance’s earlier accidents or states cause its later accidents. Leibniz’s differing answers have understandably divided scholars. Several notable scholars endorse the view that strictly speaking, it is the substance itself that produces its accidents, a view I’ll call the “Efficacious-substance” interpretation. Most scholars, however, take Leibniz’s claims that earlier accidents or states are the causes of later accidents or states to be his genuine account of spontaneity.

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277 I address in depth Leibniz’s reasons for denying creaturely causal interaction in chapters 2 and 3 and why the thesis of spontaneity rules out causal interaction in Appendix A.

278 In “On Nature Itself,” Leibniz writes, “For who would call into doubt that the mind thinks and wills, that we elicit in ourselves many thoughts and volitions, and that there is spontaneity that belongs to us? If this were called into doubt, then not only would human liberty be denied and the cause of evil things be thrust into God, but it would also fly in the face of the testimony of our innermost experience and consciousness, testimony by which we ourselves sense that the things my opponents have transferred to God, without even a pretense of reason, are ours. But if we were to attribute an inherent force to our mind, a force for producing immanent actions, or to put it another way, a force for acting immanently, then nothing forbids, in fact, it is reasonable to suppose that the same force would be found in other souls or forms, or, if you prefer, in the natures of substances—unless someone were to think that, in the natural world accessible to us, our minds alone are active, or that all power for acting immanently, and further, as I put it, all power for acting vitally is joined to an intellect, assertions that are neither confirmed by any rational arguments, nor can they be defended except by distorting the truth.” See (G IV.510: AG 161).
Moreover, recent scholars argue that a specific type of accident—appetitions—is the genuine productive cause of a substance’s later accidents. I call this the “Efficacious-appetition” interpretation. Appetitions in Leibniz’s metaphysics are principles of change, specifically tendencies or strivings for future perceptions. So appetitions just seem to be the right kind of entity to produce later accidents. Unlike the efficacious-substance interpretation, the efficacious-appetition interpretation is also compatible with Leibniz’s determinism and meets his strictures on explaining change—specifically his principles of intelligibility and sufficient reason.

In this chapter, however, I argue that the efficacious-appetition succumbs to a serious objection originally raised by Locke and endorsed by Leibniz in his New Essays on Human Understanding—what I’ll call the “Multiplication of Agents” objection. If appetitions are the efficient causes of a substance’s later accidents, then there a plurality of distinct efficient causal agents in created substances, a consequence that Leibniz rejects because it runs afoul of his views on substantial simplicity and unity. The efficacious-substance interpretation overcomes this objection as it only posits one efficient causal agent—the substance.

I further argue that the efficacious-substance account can be reconciled with Leibniz’s determinism and strictures on explanation. Leibniz utilized a distinction found as early as Aquinas and developed at length by Suarez between two different kinds of efficient causes—the principle quod efficient cause/efficient causal agent and the principle quo efficient cause/power by which the agent acts. Scholastics such as Suarez held that in most cases, substances are efficient causal agents yet they also had principled accounts of how substances could be efficient causal agents and yet act deterministically
or of necessity in some sense. I argue that Leibniz had similar reasons to consistently affirm that substances are efficient causal agents—and so avoid the Multiplication of Agents objection—but also affirm that such substances deterministically produce their effects in a way that satisfies Leibniz’s strictures on explanation. I do so by arguing that while substances are the principle *quod* efficient causes of their accidents, appetitions are the principle *quo* efficient causes or the powers by which substances produce their accidents. Appetitions can then explain the changes substances deterministically undergo without requiring Leibniz to posit a multiplicity of distinct efficient causal agents in each created substance.

§1 Leibniz’s Prima Facie Inconsistent Views on the Efficient Cause of Accidents

1.1 Creaturely Spontaneity

Leibniz summarizes his thesis of spontaneity in his 1695 “A New System of Nature”:

> For why should God be unable to give substance, from the beginning, a nature or internal force that can produce in it, in an orderly way (as would happen in a spiritual or formal automaton, but free in the case where it has a share of reason), everything that will happen to it, that is, all the appearances or expressions it will have, without the help of any created being?²⁷⁹

Similarly, in the *Theodicy*, Leibniz writes:

> But to say that the soul does not produce its thoughts, its sensations, its feelings of pain and of pleasure, that is something for which I see no reason. In my system every simple substance (that is, every true substance) must be the true immediate cause of all its internal actions and passions; and, speaking with metaphysical rigor, it has none other than those which it produces.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁹ (G IV.485: AG 144).
²⁸⁰ (G VI.353-4: T 400).
Given the thesis of creaturely spontaneity, any accident of a created substance is produced by the substance as opposed to a distinct created substance or God alone (except, of course, in the case of miracles). This much is clear, as we’ve seen in previous chapters and in the passages above. Unfortunately, when one zooms in further and aims to understand in greater depth how accidents are produced by their substances, Leibniz gives several seemingly conflicting answers: Sometimes he writes as if the substance itself is, strictly speaking, the cause of its accidents while in other passages he writes as if the substance’s earlier accidents or states produce its later accidents.

1.2 The Efficacious-Substance Interpretation

Let’s look at the former view first, in which substances themselves are what, strictly speaking, cause their accidents. Support for this view—what I’ll call the “Efficacious-Substance” account—is found in many passages throughout Leibniz’s career. For example, in his New Essays on Human Understanding, Leibniz writes:

As I have already said, anything which occurs in what is strictly a substance must be a case of ‘action’ in the metaphysically rigorous sense of something which occurs in the substance spontaneously, arising out of its own depths; for no created substance can have an influence upon any other, so that everything comes to a substance from itself (though ultimately from God).

In his Theodicy, Leibniz writes:

Bayle asserts, for instance, that by purely philosophical meditations one can never attain to an established certainty that we are the efficient cause [la cause efficiente] of our volitions. But this is a point which I do not concede to him: for the establishment of this system demonstrates beyond a doubt that in the course of nature each substance is the sole cause of all its actions, and that it is free of all physical influence from every other substance, save the customary cooperation of God.

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281 (G V.195: NE 210).
282 (G VI.295-6: T 300). See also (G V.58: NE 65), PM 100, (G IV.483-4: AG 144), and (G IV.504-5: AG 156).
And in *On Nature Itself*, Leibniz writes:

To the extent that I have made the notion of action clear to myself, I believe that the widely received doctrine of philosophy, that actions pertain to supposita, follows from the notion and is grounded in it. Furthermore, I believe that we must grasp the fact that this also holds reciprocally, so that not only is it the case that everything that acts is an individual substance, but also that every individual substance acts without interruption, including even body itself, in which one never finds absolute rest.  

Passages like the ones above have lead many scholars, such as Bobro, Clatterbaugh, and Jorati to defend the efficacious-substance account.  

1.3 The Efficacious-Accident Interpretation

Yet in quite a few passages throughout his career, Leibniz writes as if the earlier accidents or states of a substance produce its later accidents or states. Call this the “Efficacious-Accident” interpretation. Notable scholars such as Robert Sleigh have endorsed this view and for understandable reasons, as in numerous passages, Leibniz does just seem to claim that earlier accidents or states of substances cause their later accidents or states. In a 1698 letter to Arnauld, Leibniz writes, “Every present state of a substance occurs to it spontaneously and is only a consequence of [une suite de] its preceding state.” In a later letter written to Arnauld, Leibniz restates the same thesis.

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283 (G IV.509-10: AG 160).
285 Sleigh writes, “Every non-initial, non-miraculous state of every created substance has as a real cause some preceding state of that very substance.” See Robert C. Sleigh, Jr., “Leibniz on Malebranche on Causality,” p. 162. Additionally, Kulstad endorsed this view in earlier works but as will become apparent, he has since endorsed a more nuanced interpretation of monadic-causation. Kulstad writes, “I mean the view that created substances can be real causes, or, more specifically, that each state of a created substance arises causally from its preceding state.” See Mark Kulstad, “Causation and Pre-established Harmony in the Early Development of Leibniz’s Philosophy,” in *Causation and Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. Steven Nadler (University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), p. 96.
286 G II.47.
writing, “Everything occurs in each substance in consequence of [en conséquence du] the first state that God gave it in creating it.”\textsuperscript{287} In his 1695 “Clarification of the difficulties that Mr. Bayle found in the New System of the Union of the Soul and the Body,” Leibniz continues to affirm the same thesis, writing that “the present state of each substance is a natural result of its preceding state.”\textsuperscript{288}

However, Leibniz divided accidents into two kinds: perceptions and appetitions. Therefore, it’s worth further examining which of the two kinds of Leibnizian accidents are efficient causes on the efficacious-accident interpretation: the substance’s perceptions, appetitions, or both? In many passages, Leibniz writes as if perceptions are efficacious: \textsuperscript{289}

> In fact, nothing can happen to us except thoughts and perceptions, and all our future thoughts and perceptions are merely consequences, though contingent, of our preceding thoughts and perceptions, in such a way that, if I were capable of considering distinctly everything that happens or appears to me at this time, I could see in it everything that will ever happen or appear to me.\textsuperscript{290}

> every present perception leads to [que la suite de] a new perception.\textsuperscript{291}

> subsequent [perceptions] are derived [derivantur] from preceding ones.\textsuperscript{292}

In an article arguing against the efficacious-perception interpretation, Bobro and Clatterbaugh have rightly pointed out that in the above passages, Leibniz does not use the language of efficient causation when describing how future states come from a

\textsuperscript{287} G II.91.
\textsuperscript{288} G IV.521.
\textsuperscript{289} Nicolas Jolley endorses the view that perceptions are efficacious. He writes, “Although Leibniz may say that it is substances which produce their states, this is only a loose way of speaking; in strictness, it is perceptual states which causally produce other perceptual states of the same substance.” See Nicholas Jolley, “Causality and Creation in Leibniz,” \textit{The Monist} (1998) 81, no. 4, 605.
\textsuperscript{290} Leibniz writes this in chapter 14 of his \textit{Discourse on Metaphysics}. See (G IV.439-40: AG 47).
\textsuperscript{291} (G VI.356-7: T 403).
\textsuperscript{292} A 1709 letter to Des Bosses. See G II.372
Instead, Leibniz uses logical terms, such as “consequences” and “derived”. However, in other passages, Leibniz does use causal language:

But this expression which the soul has of the future in advance, although obscure and confused, is the true cause (cause veritable) of what will happen to it and of the clearer perception it will have afterwards, when the obscurity is lifted, since the future state is a result of the preceding one.\(^\text{294}\) (Emphasis added)

Notice that Leibniz claims that a soul’s expression—which just is a perception—is the true cause of its later perception. In other passages, Leibniz uses not only causal language but efficient causal language:

The representation of the present state of the universe in the soul … will produce (produira) in it the representation of the following state of the same universe, just as the objects in the preceding state actually produce (produit) the following state of the world. In the soul the representations of these causes are the causes of the representations of these effects.\(^\text{295}\) (Emphasis added)

The present state of body is born from the preceding state through the laws of efficient causes; the present state of the soul is born from its preceding state through the laws of final causes. The one is the place of the series of motion, the other of the series of appetites; the one is passed from cause to effect, the other from end to means. And in fact, it may be said that the representation of the end in the soul is the efficient cause of the representation in the same soul of the means.\(^\text{296}\)

Recently, however, scholars such as Rutherford, Carlin, and Bolton have argued that a substance’s appetitions are the efficient causes of a substance’s later accidents.\(^\text{297}\) Their reasons, which I soon present in greater depth, are that appetitions—being more akin to

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\(^{293}\) See Bobro and Clatterbaugh, “Unpacking the Monad, Leibniz’s Theory of Causality,” 415.

\(^{294}\) (G II.91: AG 82).

\(^{295}\) G IV.532-3.

\(^{296}\) Quoted in Carlin, 226

causal powers—are better suited to cause accidents than perceptions. This interpretation, which I’ll call the “Efficacious-appetition” interpretation, finds support in the following passages from Leibniz’s “Principles of Nature and Grace Based on Reason” and *Monadology*:

As a result, a monad, in itself and at a moment, can be distinguished from another only by its internal qualities and actions, which can be nothing but its perceptions (that is, the representation of the composite, or what is external, in the simple) and its appetitions (that is, its tendencies to go from one perception to another), which are the principles of change.²⁹⁸

The action of the internal principle which brings about the change or passage from one perception to another can be called appetition; it is true that the appetite cannot always completely reach the whole perception toward which it tends, but it always obtains something of it, and reaches new perceptions.²⁹⁹

As this brief survey should have made obvious by now, appealing to texts alone won’t settle this debate, as there is ample textual support for all three interpretations: the efficacious-perception, efficacious-appetition, and efficacious-substance view. Other considerations are needed if this debate is to be resolved. While I defend a variant of the efficacious-substance interpretation in this paper, I defend one that incorporates the specific strengths of the efficacious-appetition view, so it’s worth seeing just what those strengths are. Before I do so, however, I need to address two preliminary issues.

1.4 *Why not both Efficacious-substance and Efficacious-Accidents?*

Someone might respond that if Leibniz claims that both substances and their accidents are efficacious, then Leibniz must have meant that both are efficacious. That is, it is true that created substances are efficient causes and it is also true that accidents are efficient

²⁹⁸ (G VI.598: AG 207).
²⁹⁹ (G VI.609: AG 215).
causes. In fact, such a view had historical precedent, for many scholastics held that both substances and accidents are efficacious. For example, on Suarez’ s metaphysics, it is not just substances that are efficacious, but res, which are efficacious.\textsuperscript{300} The category of res, however, is not limited to substances but also includes certain kinds of accidents such as real qualities.\textsuperscript{301}

However, two reasons count against appealing to scholastic affirmations of the efficacy of both substances and accidents in attempting to make sense of Leibniz’s own claims. First, Scholastics were pushed to affirm the causal efficacy of accidents because of their commitment to transubstantiation, where the wine and bread at a Eucharistic mass undergo a substantial change into the blood and body of Christ. When the wine and bread become the blood and body of Christ, the accidents of the wine and bread continue to exist without inhering in the substance of the wine and bread (as it no longer exists) and also without inhering in Christ’s body and blood. Such accidents are efficacious because they can be seen, felt, and tasted by the recipients of communion.\textsuperscript{302} Leibniz, however, was a Lutheran who ultimately did not affirm transubstantiation, and so would not have that as a reason for affirming the efficacy of both substances and accidents.\textsuperscript{303}

Second, the accidents, at least on Suarez’s view, which are efficacious are real qualities. A sign of an accident’s being a real quality is its separability from its substance—such as the accident of redness in wine, which can exist apart from the wine

\textsuperscript{300} See DM 18.4.3 and 18.4.7. Stephan Schmid points this out in his recent work on Suarez on efficient causality. See Stephan Schmid, “Efficient Causality: The Metaphysics of Production,” in Jakob Leth Fink ed. \textit{Suarez on Aristotelian Causality} (Brill, 2015), 104-105.

\textsuperscript{301} I explore at length Leibniz’ s own views on whether accidents are real qualities in Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{302} See DM 18.3.13

\textsuperscript{303} I address Leibniz’ s views on transubstantiation in the appendix to chapter 3.
in which it originally inhered upon transubstantiation. Leibniz, however, is adamant that such real qualities do not exist. Instead, all accidents, for Leibniz, are modes that are inseparable from their substances. Leibniz argued that if real qualities did exist, they would not be accidents at all but rather substances (and so not accidents).

A second issue concerning the response that both substances and accidents are efficacious concerns the precise contribution each would make in the production of a new accident. From the get go, one can rule out both the substance and accident being sufficient for the newly produced accident, as this would result in the future substances of accidents being causally overdetermined. While Leibniz never explicitly rules out the possibility of causal overdetermination, surely he would reject widespread and systematic overdetermination, where every non-initial accident of a substance has more than one sufficient cause— substances and their earlier accidents.

Perhaps Leibniz meant that substances and accidents are each partial causes of the future accidents of substances. This account avoids the problems with holding that


305 Leibniz writes, “Let us come now to the real accidents which are in this unifying thing as their subject. You will agree, I believe, that some of them are only modifications, which disappear when it is removed. But you ask whether there are not certain accidents which are more than modifications. Such accidents seem, however, to be entirely superfluous, and whatever is in such a substance other than a modification seems to pertain to the substantial thing itself.” See (G II.458: L 606)

306 Concerning the inseparability of accidents from their substances, Leibniz writes, “An accident, however, needs not only some substance in general but that very one in which it inheres, so that it cannot change it. See (G IV.364: L 390).

307 Leibniz writes, “...we may ask whether there can be a thing which is neither a modification nor a source of modifications—such as the Scholastics think of as accidents, which, they say, are in a subject naturally but not essentially, since they can be without a subject by the absolute power of God. But I do not yet see how such a thing can be explained if it is different from my substantial chain, which is truly in the subject, though not as an accident but as what the Scholastics call a substantial form, or as a source of modifications—if you like, after the manner of an echo.” See (G II.504: L 614).

308 In the Appendix A, I argue that Leibniz has reasons to reject even non-widespread and non-systematic overdetermination.
substances and accidents are each sufficient causes, but has its own difficulties. Mainly, if substances and accidents are partial causes, what do substances and accidents contribute in the production of new accidents? Unfortunately, looking to Leibniz yields very little by way of an answer. For now, I shall assume that it is not the case that both substances and accidents are efficient causes of a substance’s later accidents in a *univocal* sense of efficient cause. Later, however, I argue for a nuanced interpretation of the efficacious-substance interpretation in which appetitions are efficacious, but not in the same sense in which substances are efficacious.

1.5 Against the Efficacious-Perception Interpretation

While I ultimately argue for a nuanced interpretation of the efficacious-substance interpretation of Leibniz that incorporates elements of the efficacious-appetition view, it’s worth briefly addressing why, in spite of numerous passages where Leibniz seems to claim that perceptions are efficacious, it is *not* the case that perceptions are genuinely efficacious. As we’ve seen, Leibniz posits two types of accidents in his ontology—perceptions and appetitions.\(^{309}\) These two types of accidents could, with some caveats, be understood in contemporary parlance as categorical properties and dispositional properties where perceptions are categorical properties and appetitions are dispositional

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\(^{309}\) Leibniz writes, “As a result, a monad, in itself and at a moment, can be distinguished from another only by its internal qualities and actions, which can be nothing but its perceptions (that is, the representation of the composite, or what is external, in the simple) and its appetitions (that is, its tendencies to go from one perception to another) which are the principles of change. For the simplicity of substance does not prevent a multiplicity of modifications.” See (G VI.598: AG 207).
properties. If perceptions, however, are the genuine efficient cause of later accidents, then Leibniz has categorical properties serving as genuine efficient causes.

I find two problems with such a view, however. First, as mentioned above and what I develop in much greater depth soon, there are plausible reasons to hold that appetitions—which are a lot like causal powers—are efficacious. If both appetitions and perceptions are efficacious in the same sense, then we are lead back to the difficulties we faced in supposing that both substances and accidents are efficacious in the same sense. If both appetitions and perceptions are efficacious in the same sense, then they are either both sufficient causes or partial causes of a substance’s later accidents. If they are both sufficient causes, then the same difficulties with overdetermination arise—mainly that such a picture results in systematic and widespread overdetermination. If they are both partial causes, then a detailed account—which is lacking in Leibniz’s corpus—is needed as to what each distinctly contribute.

Second, let’s assume for the moment that only perceptions are efficacious. According to Leibniz, appetitions are “tendencies from one perception to another” and perceptions are representational entities. Thus, with some caveats that I address later in this paper, perceptions are akin to categorical properties while appetitions are more like dispositional properties. However, if perceptions are solely efficacious, Leibniz has a scenario where categorical properties—perceptions—do all the causal work. Earlier

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310 I address the differences between appetitions and normal Aristotelian powers or dispositions later in this chapter.
311 (G VI.598: AG 207).
312 In the 14th chapter of his Monadology, Leibniz writes, “The passing state, which involves and represents a multitude in the unity or in the simple substance is nothing other than what one calls perception…” (G VI.608: AG 214). See also (G VI.598: AG 207), G II.311, G III.622, G VII.529, and 566.
perceptions produce later perceptions. I find two problems with this scenario. First, the efficacious-perception view leaves little work for appetitions. If perceptions are solely efficacious, then it is not clear what role appetitions play in Leibniz’s metaphysics. The appetitions would be superfluous. Second, this picture is at odds with Leibniz’s causal views at large, as Leibniz is a full-fledged realist about causal powers.\(^{313}\) However, on the efficacious-perception interpretation, categorical properties—perceptions—do all the causal work, including producing appetitions—which are akin to dispositional properties or powers. Such a picture—which would turn Leibniz into a Humean—is further at odds with texts where Leibniz claims that appetitions produce perceptions. Hence, I’ll assume for the remainder of this paper that while perceptions count amongst the causal relata as effects, they do so as effects, not causes. Instead, I shall focus on the efficacious-substance and efficacious-appetition view.

\(^{313}\) Indeed, the essence of substance consists in an active force or entelechia, which is responsible for change. See, for example (G IV.478-9: AG 139), and (G IV.504-16: AG 155-67).

§2 The Argument for the Efficacious-Appetition Interpretation

This leaves the efficacious-substance interpretation and the efficacious-appetition interpretation. While I defend the efficacious-substance interpretation, I present the motivations for the efficacious-appetition interpretation first, as the efficacious-substance account I defend is one that incorporates the strengths of efficacious-appetition interpretation. Donald Rutherford gives the strongest and lengthiest argument for the efficacious-appetition interpretation against the efficacious-substance interpretation, which I turn to now. Rutherford’s argument consists in two moves. First, Rutherford
argues that the efficacious-substance interpretation cannot be reconciled with Leibniz’s determinism and his strictures on the explanation of monadic change—Leibniz’s requirement that change be intelligible. Second, Rutherford argues that the efficacious-appetition interpretation does meet Leibniz’s strictures for explaining monadic change, and thus is the true interpretation.

2.1 Rutherford on the Efficacious-substance Interpretation, Determinism and Intelligibility

Recall that on the efficacious-substance interpretation, substances—not their earlier accidents—are the efficient causes of their later accidents. A substance $s$ changes from being in state $N$ to state $N+1$ because $s$—the efficient causal agent—produced the accidents which makeup $N$ and then produced the accidents which makeup $N+1$.

However, Leibniz is also determinist who held that a substance $s$ is determined to be in state $N+1$ given its immediate predecessor state $N$. For example, in his Monadology, Leibniz states that “every present state of a simple substance is naturally a consequence of its preceding state.”$^{314}$

Additionally, Leibniz has strict requirements for the intelligibility of monadic change.$^{315}$ There has to be an intelligible reason why a monad changes from $N$ at $t$ to $N+1$ at $t+1$ where by “intelligible”, Leibniz means that the explanation for the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{314} (G VI.610: AG 216).}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{315} Leibniz writes, “Whenever we find some quality in a subject, we ought to believe that if we understood the nature of both the subject and the quality we would conceive how the quality could arise from it. So within the order of nature (miracles apart) it is not at God’s arbitrary discretion to attach this or that quality haphazardly to substances. He will never give them any that are not natural to them, that is, that cannot arise from their nature as explicable modifications.” A.VI.vi.66.}\]
substance’s change from \(N\) to \(N+1\) is found within the substance’s own nature and is understandable by finite substances.\(^{316}\)

While Rutherford doesn’t bring it up, a further stricture on explanation can be drawn from Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). While Leibniz gives several formulations of PSR throughout his career, I have in mind the version in which any explanation must involve contrastive reasons. For example, Leibniz writes:

And that of sufficient reason, by virtue of which we consider that we can find no true or existent fact, no true assertion, without there being a sufficient reason why it is thus and not otherwise, although most of the time these reasons cannot be known to us.”\(^ {317}\)

According to Leibniz, for any state \(N\) of a substance \(s\), there is a sufficient reason why \(s\) is in state \(N\) as opposed to a different state \(N’\). Further, if \(s\) changes from \(N\) to \(N+1\), there is a sufficient reason why \(N+1\) rather than \(N’+1\) is a consequence of \(N\). In what follows, I will focus primarily on Leibniz’s determinism and principle of intelligibility, since that is what Rutherford focuses on in his argument.\(^ {318}\) Later, however, I will argue that my nuanced interpretation of the efficacious-substance account can be reconciled with PSR.

According to Rutherford, the efficacious-substance interpretation cannot be reconciled with Leibniz’s determinism nor his requirements for intelligibility. Claiming

\(^{316}\) The principle of intelligibility is wielded by Leibniz against a number of targets. For example, Leibniz argues that the principle of intelligibility rules out occult qualities such as mental properties in material substances and Newtonian gravitation, as such qualities are not explainable by their substance’s nature. Leibniz also utilizes it against occasional accounts of creaturely change. If God is the sole efficient cause of any accident that comes to inhere in a created substance, then the explanation for the accident is not found in the creature but rather in God’s will. Thus, if Occasionalism is true, then no change is intelligible—a consequence Leibniz insists is false, in which case Occasionalism is also false.\(^ {317}\) (G VI.612: AG 217). See also (G VI.602: AG 209-10) and (G VI.127: T 44).

\(^{318}\) In an earlier paper, Rutherford distinguishes between the principle of intelligibility and PSR. However, the version of PSR that Rutherford distinguishes from the principle of intelligibility is not the contrastive version I address above. Instead, it’s the axiom that “nothing happens without a reason.” See Donald P. Rutherford, “Leibniz’s Principle of Intelligibility,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 9, no. 1 (1992): 35.
that a substance $s$ is in state $N$ at $t$ because $s$ produced all the accidents that makeup $N$ does not explain why $s$ produced the accidents that make up $N$. Claiming that $s$ changes from $N$ to $N+1$ because $s$ efficiently caused all the accidents that makeup $N$ and later produced all the accidents that makeup $N+1$ also does not explain why $s$ first produced the accidents that make up $N$ and then produced the accidents that make up $N+1$.

Rutherford draws attention to an unpublished passage in support of his argument, where Leibniz writes, “Saying that the soul’s God-given force is the only source [principe] of its particular actions is not sufficient to give the explanation for those actions.”\(^{319}\) The force referred to in this passage is the substance’s primary active force, which just is the substance’s nature or substance itself.\(^{320}\) Thus, the efficacious-substance interpretation, it seems, runs afoul of Leibniz’s principle of intelligibility. As Rutherford writes:

> The concern is that there is nothing in the concept of an ‘active power,’ or even one that is more entelechia than dunamis, that would allow us to understand why that power should give rise to one succession of states rather than another. Arguably, we have here the same sort of violation of the principle of intelligibility that Leibniz elsewhere inveighs against it.\(^{321}\)

### 2.2 Why the Law-of-the-Series does not help the Efficacious-Substance Interpretation

Defenders of the efficacious-substance interpretation might appeal to the substance’s law-of-the-series as providing an explanation of monadic change that meets Leibniz’s own strictures on explanation and is consistent with Leibniz’s determinism. The substance’s law of the series is tantamount to the substance’s essence or substantial form.\(^{322}\)

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\(^{319}\) G IV. 542. See also WF 100. Quoted in Rutherford, “Laws and Powers in Leibniz,” 162.

\(^{320}\) See Rutherford, “Leibniz on Spontaneity,” 163.


\(^{322}\) As Rutherford notes, the law of the series is identified with the individual nature of the substance. See
Rutherford writes, “Here, what is important about the law of the series is that it involves, in some unspecified sense, a complete history of a substance’s states.”

Given that the law-of-the-series involves somehow a complete history of a substance’s states, we might then have an explanation for why a substance changes from state \( N \) to state \( N+1 \)— it is because \( N+1 \) follows \( N \) in the substance’s law of the series. This also provides an explanation for \( s \) changes from \( N \) to \( N+1 \) rather than \( N'+1 \)—it is because \( N+1 \) follows \( N \) in the substance \( s \)’s law of the series. Further, given that the law-of-the-series is identified with the nature of a substance, which involves active power, one might be further tempted to give the law-of-the-series a causal role. A substance \( s \) just is its law of the series, and \( s \) changes from \( N \) to \( N+1 \) because \( s \) produces all the accidents that makeup \( N+1 \). The reason \( s \) changes from \( N \) to \( N+1 \) instead of from \( N \) to \( N'+1 \) is because \( N+1 \) follows \( N \) in \( s \)’s law of the series. Thus, the law-of-the-series plays both the efficient causal role and the role of explainer or determiner with respect to monadic change.

Rutherford writes:

> There is no doubt that Leibniz invests the law of the series with a causal aspect. Insofar as this law is identified with the individual nature of a substance, and that nature involves an active power that is the spontaneous source of all of a substance’s states, the law of the series can be seen as ‘determining’ the succession of those states.

However, according to Rutherford, this just pushes the problem back a step. For we still do not have an explanation for why \( N+1 \) must follow from \( N \) in a substance’s law of the series instead of \( N'+1 \) following from \( N \). Rutherford writes:

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Ibid., 164. Rutherford is not recognizing that Leibniz identifies the law of the series with the individual nature of the substance or the substance itself. See Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne, *Substance and Individuation in Leibniz*, 219-226.


324 Ibid., 163-64.
The law of the series is said to contain this information, but it provides (so far as we can understand it) no explanation of that order. It encapsulates a complete history of all that a substance will do, but it does not render intelligible, as an instance of natural change, the transition from one state of the substance to another.\textsuperscript{325}

Rutherford continues:

Knowing a substance’s law of the series (which only God can know), one would know all the states of the substance, in the order in which they occur. What one wouldn’t know, however, is why if a given substance is in state $S_n$, it will thereafter, as a matter of natural necessity, be in state $S_{n+1}$. Such an explanation requires a generality that is missing in the law of the series, each example of which pertains uniquely to a single substance. It must explain why if any substance is in a state $S_n$, characterized in suitable theoretical terms, it will thereafter, given the laws of nature, be determined to be in state $S_{n+1}$.\textsuperscript{326}

2.3 Rutherford on the Efficacious-Appetitions, Determinism, and Intelligibility

Rutherford’s second move is to argue that in explaining monadic change, the efficacious-appetition account succeeds where the efficacious-substance account fails. In support of both appetitions being explainers of monadic change and their efficacy, Rutherford first draws attention to some key passages such as the following in Leibniz’s “Principles of Nature and Grace” which we’ve seen already but is worth repeating:

A monad, in itself and at a moment, can be distinguished from another only by its internal qualities and actions, which can be nothing but its perceptions (that is, the representation of the composite, or what is external, in the simple) and its appetitions (that is, its tendencies to go from one perception to another) which are the principles of change.\textsuperscript{327}

That appetitions are tendencies and principles of change is strong evidence in favor of the efficacious-appetition interpretation, according to Rutherford. Additionally support comes from passages where Leibniz claims that appetitions are forces—specifically

\textsuperscript{325} Ibid., 165.
\textsuperscript{326} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{327} (G VI.598: AG 207).
derivative forces which modify the monad’s primitive force. More importantly, however, especially considering that there are also many passages in support of the efficacious-substance account, the efficacious-appetition account avoids the issues that plagued the efficacious-substance account. Specifically, Rutherford argues the efficacious-appetition account makes sense of how monadic change can be deterministic and also meets Leibniz’s strictures on explanation.

Rutherford first draws attention to a definition of change that Leibniz offered throughout his career, where change is defined as “nothing but a complex of two states which are immediate and opposite to each other, together with a force or reason for the change, which reason itself is a quality.” It’s worth unpacking this definition. A monad’s change involves two states— $N$ and $N+1$. $N$ and $N+1$ are ordered as prior and posterior and the reason for $N$’s being prior to $N+1$ and $N+1$ following $N$ is due to a quality of $N$ which is a force or reason for $N+1$. That force, Rutherford points out, just is the appetitions in $N$. Such appetitions are forces or reasons for change— specifically appetitions for future states, namely, perceptions. Thus, the ordering is not arbitrary.

$N+1$ does not follow $N$ merely because $N+1$ follows $N$ in the monad’s law of the series. Instead, $N+1$ follows from $N$ because $N$ has appetitions for the accidents that make up $N+1$. This explanation also explains why $N+1$ follows $N$ in the monad’s law of the series rather than $N’+1$— it is because the appetitions which makeup $N$ are appetitions for the accidents of $N+1$ rather than $N’+1$.

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328 Rutherford, “Laws and Powers in Leibniz,” 166. See also (G II.562: L 533), (G II.270: L 537), and (G II.200-1: NE 216).
329 Ibid., 167, quoting C 9/MP 134.
330 Ibid., 167.
So, according to Rutherford, the efficacious-appetition account meets Leibniz’s intelligibility requirements. When a substance \( s \) changes from \( N \) to \( N+1 \), the explanation for the change from \( N \) to \( N+1 \) comes from \( s \)’s own nature. Specifically, \( s \)’s nature as modified.\(^{331}\) The substance in state \( N \) has the appetitions—which are modifications or accidents of itself—for the accidents of \( N+1 \) and those accidents produce \( N+1 \). Therefore, the reason for the substance’s change from \( N \) to \( N+1 \) is the substance’s nature rather than some other created substance or merely God’s will. That the substance’s state \( N \) has appetitions for \( N+1 \) and so produce the accidents of \( N+1 \) rather than \( N'+1 \) also makes sense of how such change is deterministic and in line with Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason.

According to Rutherford, \( s \) changes from \( N \) to \( N+1 \) because the appetitions in \( N \) are appetitions for the accidents of \( N+1 \) and so efficiently cause the accidents which makeup \( N+1 \).\(^{332}\) Therefore, it is the appetititions, rather than the substance, which are genuinely efficacious. Rutherford has provided a powerful argument for the efficacious-appetition interpretation that incorporates the strengths of the efficacious-substance account while also presenting a strong case against the efficacious-substance interpretation.

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\(^{331}\) Rutherford writes, “Changes in the states of a monad are explained in terms of its own nature—however, crucially, it is that nature as modified. While all the states of a substance depend ontologically on the primitive active force produced by God, since they exist only as modifications of primitive force, changes in the substance are explained by appeal to prior states that determine the existence of new states.” See Ibid., 166-67.

\(^{332}\) Rutherford writes, “Monadic states themselves (or the appetitive forces associated with those states) are causally efficacious in the production of new states, which in turn are productive of new states, and so on.” Ibid.
§3 Leibnizian Substance Causation

However, I argue that the efficacious-substance interpretation can be formulated in a way that incorporates the strengths of the efficacious-appetition interpretation. In fact, such an understanding will prove to be necessary for Leibniz himself, I soon show, raises a fatal objection to the efficacious-appetition account— at least as it has been developed by recent defenders such as Rutherford, et al. I shall argue that substances are the efficient causal agents but the substances appetitions still explain why a substance changes from $N$ to $N+1$. I do so by drawing upon a widely held scholastic distinction that is found as early as Aquinas and developed at length by Suarez between the principle *quod* efficient cause and a principle *quo* efficient cause. The principle *quod* cause is the efficient causal agent and the principle *quo* cause is the efficient causal power by which the efficient causal agent acts. I shall argue that substances, for Leibniz, are the principal *quod* cause and their appetitions are the principle *quo* causes. This will make sense of texts where Leibniz says substances—specifically their primary active forces— are principles of change and other texts where Leibniz says that their appetitions are principles of change.

On this formulation of the Efficacious-substance account, if one asks “Is it the substance or the appetite that efficiently causes a substance’s later accidents?” the answer is “Yes”. If one asks “Is it the substance or the appetite which is a principle of change?” the answer is also yes. One would have to further specify whether they mean the principle *quod* or principle *quo* cause to get an answer of only the substance or only its accidents. A lot of the debate in the secondary literature has hinged on the assumption that any time Leibniz says that substances, perceptions, states, or appetitions cause later
states, Leibniz always means that they are efficient causes in the same sense— the
principal *quod* or efficient causal agent.

**3.1 Suarez on the Efficient Principle Cause Quod and Quo**

Scholastics often distinguished between the agent in efficient causation and the power by
which the agent acts when efficiently causing some effect. This distinction traces back at
least as far as Aquinas, who in the *Summa Theologica* writes, “In every action two things
are to be considered, the ‘suppositum’ acting, and the power whereby it acts; as, for
instance, fire heats through heat.”

Suarez utilized this distinction throughout his *Disputation Metaphysica*, especially disputations 17-22 on efficient causation.

According to Suarez, both the agent which efficiently causes some effect and the power
by which the agent causes the effect are efficient causal principles. The agent is the
principle *quod* or suppositum of the act and the power by which the agent acts is the
principle *quo*. Suarez writes that, “. . . a suppositum is said to act immediately as a
principle quod when it acts through a power inherent in itself in such a way that the
action proceeds immediately from that power as a principle quo.”

As notable Suarez scholars have pointed out, both the agent and the power by
which the agent acts are efficient causal principles for Suarez. Freddoso writes, “Suarez
distinguishes an efficient principle ut *quod*, that is, the substance which exercises a power

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333 ST 1a q36 a1. This distinction appears throughout the *Summa*. For example, Aquinas writes, “Now
actions belong to suppositis and wholes and, properly speaking, not to parts and forms or powers, for we do
not say properly that the hand strikes, but a man with his hand, nor that heat makes a thing hot, but fire by
heat, although such expressions may be employed metaphorically.” For example, see ST 2a2ae, q58, a2c.
334 DM 22.1.19. Suarez also writes, “. . . there is one sort of principal cause which operates and another
sort which is a principal principal of operating—they are commonly called, respectively, a principal cause
quod and a principal cause quo.” See DM 17.2.7. Suarez also writes, “For the principle quod is the
suppositum, just as in other actions.” See DM 18.2.1.
and to which the resulting acting is ultimately attributed, from an efficient principle *ut quo*, that is, the power or faculty by which such a substance operates.” In a recent article on Suarez’s account of efficient causation, Schmid explains the implications of this distinction in even greater depth:

But what sorts of things are causes if they are not events? In treating this question, we have to be careful since asking ‘what are efficient causes?’ is ambiguous. Taken in one way, Suarez explains, this question addresses the principle-quod (or ‘the principle cause which operates’), that is, the thing or suppositum from which a certain action arises. Taken in another way, the question refers to the principle-quo (or the principal principle of the operation’), that is, the principle by virtue of which a certain agent performs its action.

This distinction can help clear much confusion that may arise in a first time reader of Suarez’s disputations on efficient causation, where in quite a few sections Suarez develops accounts of how various non-substances—such as the substantial form or a substance’s powers—are efficient causal principles. As Freddoso writes, “I mention this [the distinction] in part because several of the questions concerning efficient causality that Suarez deals with in Disputations 17-19 center around the principle *ut quo*, and it is important to understand from the beginning that Suarez takes the principle *ut quo* to fall under his general characterization of an efficient causal principle.”

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3.2 Why the distinction applies to Leibniz

I argue that the distinction applies to Leibniz. That is, substances are the agent or principle *quod* efficient cause of accidents for Leibniz and powers are the principle *quo* efficient cause of accidents. Specifically, appetitions are the principle *quo* efficient causes or powers by which the substance acts.

3.2.1 Appetitions are powers

As scholars who defend the efficacious appetition account, such as Kulstad, Carlin, Bolton, and Rutherford, have argued, appetitions just are powers. Leibniz claims several times in his mature writings that appetitions are tendencies. For example, Leibniz writes to Samuel Masson in 1716:

> But the tendency of which I speak is of another nature; it is internal to the soul, which is not a point. It is the progress of one thought to another, and since thoughts (though in a soul not composed of parts) represent things composed of parts, it is only in this sense that these perceptions are called composite, as are their tendencies or appetites—that is, they contain a multitude of modifications and relations all at once.”

Earlier, in his “Principles of Nature and Grace”, Leibniz claims as well that appetitions are tendencies from one perception to another.

Leibniz identifies also appetitions as derivative forces, which entails that appetitions are powers. In the *New Essays*, Leibniz writes, “There are other efforts, arising from insensible perceptions, which we are not aware of; I prefer to call these ‘appetitions, rather than volitions, for one describes as ‘voluntary’ only actions one can be aware of and can reflect upon when they arise from some consideration of good and

339 (G VI.627: AG 228).
340 (G VI.598: L 636).
bad; though there are also appetitions of which one can be aware.”

So appetitions are efforts. Not much earlier in the New Essays, Leibniz identifies efforts with derivative force, writing, “Force would divide into ‘entelechy’ and ‘effort’; for although Aristotle takes ‘entelechy’ to generally that it comprises all action and effort, it seems to me more suitable to apply it to primary acting forces, and ‘effort’ to derivative ones.” In Leibniz’s 1695 “A Specimen of Dynamics,” however, Leibniz claims that derivative forces are powers. Specifically, Leibniz argues that there are two types of active force, primitive and derivative active forces. Both kinds of active forces, however, “might not inappropriately be called power”, as Leibniz claims.

3.2.2 Substances and Appetitions are Principles of Change

Leibniz also claims that both substances and their appetitions are principles of change. The second thesis is explicitly stated in a famous passage in his “Principles of Nature and Grace” that we’ve already seen but is worth repeating:

> It follows that one monad by itself and at a single moment cannot be distinguished from another except by its internal qualities and actions, and these can only be its perceptions—that is to say, the representations of the compound, or of that which is without, in the simple — and its appetitions—that is to say, its tendencies from one perception to another — which are the principles of change. (Emphasis added)

The first thesis requires a bit more work to develop but is still well supported. In the Theodicy, Leibniz identifies the soul with Entelechy and he identifies the Entelechy as the active principle, writing, “Moreover, it is true that the soul is the Entelechy or the active principle, whereas the corporeal alone or the mere material contains only the passive.

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341 (G V.158-9: NE 173).
342 (G V.155-6: NE 169-70).
343 AG 219.
344 (G VI.598: L 636).
Consequently the principle of action is in the soul, as I have explained more than once in the Leipzig Journal.\textsuperscript{345} Leibniz also identifies the entelechy with the monad.\textsuperscript{346} So the monad or created substance just is the entelechy or active principle. Which just is to say that the created substance is a principle of change.

It’s worth noting that Leibniz uses the term “principle” roughly in the same way that Suarez and Aquinas use it, a usage which traces back to Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, where a principle plays a metaphysical role as a beginning or origin rather than the contemporary usage as rule or axiom. Aquinas writes that “the word ‘principle’ signifies only that whence another proceeds: since anything whence proceeds in any way we call a principle; and conversely.”\textsuperscript{347} While Suarez has a broad notion of principle that designates the first element in any ordering, he has a narrower usage that is closer to Aquinas’s in which the principle is not merely the first element in an ordering but also is a thing from which another follows via some sort of connection.\textsuperscript{348} Given that the principle under discussion is an active principle or principle of change, I submit that Leibniz’s usage here closely follows Aquinas’s and Suarez’s.\textsuperscript{349}

\textsuperscript{345} (G VI.89-90: T 69).
\textsuperscript{346} (G II.193-4: L 521-22).
\textsuperscript{347} ST 1 q33 a1
\textsuperscript{348} Suarez writes, “Therefore, ‘principle’ of the thing’ can be used either only on account of an order and whatever connection or on account of some intrinsic disposition towards.” (DM 12.1.4) Freddoso, commenting on Suarez’s account of principle, writes, “The term ‘principle’, he tells us, can be used in a wide sense to designate the first element in any sort of ordering, real or merely conceptual, and in this sense it is obviously more inclusive than the term ‘cause’. However, ‘principle’ is used most properly in a narrower metaphysical sense to designate ‘that which truly and directly communicates (influens) some sort of being (esse) to that of which it is the principle,’ or, in other words, that on which a real entity depends in some way for its existence.” (Freddoso, xxv-xxvi)
\textsuperscript{349} A principe may either be a source, foundation, or rule of acting. Petit Robert; *dictionnaire de la langue francaise*, ed. A. Rey and J. Rey-Debove, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Ed, (Paris: Dictionnaires Le Robert 2003).
3.2.3 Substances are Principle Quod Causes and the Appetitions are Principle Quo

Causes

So as we’ve seen, Leibniz claims that substances are efficient causes in numerous passages but in other passages Leibniz claims that appetitions—which are modifications of substances—are also efficient causes. We’ve also seen that both substances and appetitions are principles of change. However, given that appetitions are powers, appetitions are best understood as principle quo efficient causes and substances are the principle quod efficient causes. In other words, substances are the efficient causal agents that produce their accidents by means of their powers or appetitions.

Support for substances being the principle quod or agent or suppositum which acts can be found in several important passages. For example, in “On Nature Itself”, Leibniz writes, “To the extent that I have made the notion of action clear to myself, I believe that the widely received doctrine of philosophy, that actions pertain to supposita, follows from the notion and is grounded in it.” Here, Leibniz explicitly endorses the thesis we’ve seen Aquinas and Suarez defend as above, that substances or supposita act. Relatedly, in Leibniz’s fifth letter to Clarke, Leibniz writes, “Properly speaking, motives do not act on the mind as weights do on a balance, but it is rather the mind that acts by virtue of the motives, which are its dispositions to act.” The mind acts in virtue of its motives, where such motives are a species of appetitions. Here, Leibniz is again using the language of principle quo efficient causes.

350 (G IV.509: AG 160).
351 (G VII.392: L 698).
The strongest support for this thesis that substances are principle *quod* causes and appetitions are principle *quo* causes, however, is found in a telling section of the *New Essays on Human Understanding*. As Theophilus, Leibniz writes, “Faculties or qualities do not act; rather, substances act through faculties.” The context of this passage is key, for Leibniz is responding—as the character of Theophilus—to an argument in Locke’s *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* against the thesis that powers are efficient causal agents. I’ll call this the Multiplication of Agents Objection. Locke writes:

But the fault has been, that Faculties have been spoken of, and represented, as so many distinct agents. For it being asked, what is was that digested the meat in our stomachs? It was a ready, and very satisfactory answer, to say, that it was the digestive faculty. What was it that made any thing come out of the body? The explosive faculty. What moved? The motive faculty: and so in the mind, the intellectual faculty, or the understanding, understood; and the elective faculty, or the will, willed or commanded: which is in short to say, that the ability to digest, digested; and the ability to move, moved; and the ability to understand, understood. For faculty, ability, and power, I think are but different names of the same things: which ways of speaking, when put into more intelligible words, will, I think, amount to thus much; that digestion is performed by something that is able to digest, motion by something able to move; and understanding by something able to understand….”

In what follows, I’ll focus on Philalethes’s version, as Philalethes is Leibniz’s voice for Locke in Leibniz’s *New Essays on Human Understanding*:

The ordinary way of speaking is, that the understanding and will are two faculties of the same soul; a word proper enough, if it be used as all words should be, not to breed any confusion in men’s thoughts,’ as I suspect has happened in this matter of the soul. And when we are told that ‘the will is superior faculty of the soul; that it is, or is not free; that it determines the inferior faculties; that it follows the dictates of the understanding, may be understood in a clear and distinct sense’, yet

352 Ce ne sont pas les facultes ou qualites, qui agissent, mais les Substances par les facultes. (G V.160: NE 174).
I am afraid that they have misled many people into a confused idea of so many agents acting separately in us.\textsuperscript{354}

Leibniz, writing as Theophilus, responds:

The question of whether there is a real distinction between the soul and its faculties, and whether one faculty is really distinct from another, has long exercised the Scholastics. The realists have said Yes, the nominalists No; and the same question has been debated concerning the reality of various other abstract beings which must stand or fall with faculties. But I do not think that we need here plunge into the brambles in an attempt to settle this question, despite the fact that Episcopius, I remember, attached such importance to it that he thought that if the faculties of the soul were real beings then human freedom would be untenable. However, even if they were real, distinct beings, it would still be extravagant to speak of them as real agents. Faculties or qualities do not act; rather, substances act through faculties.\textsuperscript{355}

From Leibniz’s response, Leibniz can be taken to understanding Locke as arguing for the following conditional, which I’ll call the “Multiplication of Agents” Objection:

If (A) there is a real distinction between the soul and its faculties (powers), then (B) there would be a plurality of agents acting separately in us.\textsuperscript{356}

Leibniz denies the consequent (B), as evinced by his last sentence in which he claims that faculties do not act. His strategy, however, is not to deny (A). While he takes no stance on the truth of (A) in this passage, in fact he argues for (A) elsewhere— Leibniz claims that a substance is really distinct from its accidents.\textsuperscript{357} Given that appetitions count

\textsuperscript{354} (G V.160: NE 174).
\textsuperscript{355} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{356} Leibniz identifies faculties with powers in several passages in his \textit{New Essays}. At NE 379, Leibniz offers a line of reasoning that supports the thesis that appetitions are faculties, writing, “Primary powers are what make up the substances themselves; derivative powers, or ‘faculties’ if you like, are merely ‘ways of being’ – and they must be derived from substances. . .” As appetitions are derivative forces and derivative forces are powers, appetitions can be called ‘faculties’. At NE 169-70, Leibniz argues that “The active power can be called ‘faculty’ . . .” As I argued earlier, appetitions are derivative active powers.
\textsuperscript{357} In his \textit{Theodicy}, Leibniz writes, “It is true that God is the only one whose action is pure and without admixture of what is termed ‘to suffer’: but that does not preclude the creature’s participation in actions, since the action of the creature is a modification of the substance, flowing naturally from it and containing a variation not only in the perfections that God has communicated to the creature, but also in the limitations that the creature, being what it is, brings with it. Thus we see that there is an actual (\textit{distinction réelle})
amongst a substance’s accidents, Leibniz is committed to a substance being really distinct from its appetitions, and so a substance is really distinct from its derivative powers. So Leibniz needs instead to deny that (A) entails (B), which is just what he does. It doesn’t follow, Leibniz argues, that if a soul (or substance) is really distinct from its powers, then those powers are agents. Instead, substances are the agents which act or cause through their powers. Here, Leibniz just is utilizing the principle quod/quo distinction, or the distinction between agents and the powers by which agents act, in arguing that (A) does not entail (B).

Leibniz’s response to the Multiplication of Agents Objection spells trouble for the efficacious-appetition account, if appetitions are efficient causal agents on that account. For if individual appetitions are efficient causal agents, then given that there is a plurality of appetitions inhering in a substance in any state the substance is in, there is a multiplication of agents in a substance in any state it is in. It is no surprise why Leibniz would deny (B), for the simplicity and unity of created substances is a crucial aspect of his monadological metaphysics. Holding that there are in fact a plurality of efficient causal agents that are responsible for monadic change would seriously threaten such simplicity and unity.

Those who endorse the efficacious-appetition account, however, can avoid the Multiplication of Agents Objection if appetitions are understood as principle quo efficient causes rather than principle quod efficient causes. However, the efficacious-substance

358 Ibid.
359 I address mereological issues that arise in Leibniz affirming a plurality of accidents in simple substances in Chapter 4.
account—where substances are the principle *quod* efficient causes or the efficient causal agents—is consistent with the efficacious-appetition account once appetitions are understood as principle *quo* efficient causes.

### 3.3 The Efficacious-Substance Interpretation and Determinism, Intelligibility, and PSR

The principle *quod/quo* distinction helps the efficacious-appetition account avoid the Multiplication of Agents objection and also shows that in fact the efficacious-substance account is consistent with the efficacious-appetition account, when understood in a certain way—substances are principle *quod* efficient causes and appetitions are principle *quo* efficient causes. It still remains to be seen whether affirming that substances are principle *quod* efficient causes and appetitions are principle *quo* efficient causes is consistent with Leibniz’s determinism and able to meet his strictures on explanation—Leibniz’s principle of intelligibility and his principle of sufficient reason. I argue that it is consistent and that it can meet his strictures.

Recall that Leibniz defines change as “nothing but a complex of two states which are immediate and opposite to each other, together with a force or reason for the change, which reason itself is a quality.” There is nothing in this definition that requires the force or reason for the change—the appetition in the case of monadic change—to be the efficient causal agent. Instead, this definition is consistent with the monad being the agent. A substance $S$ in state $N$ is the efficient causal agent that produces state $N+1$ and does so through its appetitions in $N$, which constitute its force or reason for $N+1$. In other words, the powers by which the substance produces $N+1$. 
This account is consistent with Leibniz’s determinism as well. A substance in state \( N \) can only act through the powers it has in state \( N \), where such powers are its appetitions for future perceptions. A substance in state \( N \) will not produce the perceptions which make up \( N+1 \) unless it has appetitions for the perceptions which make up \( N+1 \). This is so because appetitions are appetitions for particular, specific perceptions, rather than random perceptions. It’s worth noting a similarity between scholastic powers and Leibnizian appetitions. Fire produces heat in its patients through fires active powers, rather than coldness or wetness, because fire’s powers are powers for heat. That is, fire is determined to certain kinds of effects because of its powers.

This account is also consistent with Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason. The reason \( s \) changes from \( N \) to \( N+1 \) instead of \( N'+1 \) is because \( s \) had the appetitions for the perceptions of \( N+1 \) instead of \( N'+1 \). That is, \( s \) at \( N \) had the powers to produce the accidents which makeup \( N+1 \), as opposed to \( N'+1 \). Finally, this account also is consistent with Leibniz’s requirement that change be intelligible. A substance’s changing from \( N \) to \( N+1 \) is still explained by the substance’s nature. Further, in agreement with Rutherford, it’s the substance’s nature as modified. For a substance \( s \)’s appetitions when \( s \) is in state \( N \) are modifications of \( s \). This does not require that such appetitions are the efficient causal agents that produce the accidents which makeup \( N+1 \), however. Instead, it’s worth repeating that the appetitions are the powers by which \( s \) causes \( N+1 \).

### 3.3.1 Scholastic Substance Causation and Determinism

In further support of my argument that Leibnizian substances, rather than their accidents, can be principle quod efficient causes while deterministically producing their effects, scholastics such as Suarez also held that—with the exception of the free actions of
intelligent substances—substances which were principle *quod* efficient causes acted necessarily in some sense. For a digression, I take a closer look at scholastic accounts of how effects could be necessitated by their causes when their principle *quod* causes are substances. I’ll focus primarily on Suarez’s account but note that his account was just a more developed version of a broadly scholastic-Aristotelian account.

Before I do so, however, there are five caveats. First, as mentioned earlier, Suarez is not strictly a substance-causal theorist but rather a *res* causal theorist. That is, any *res*—be it a substance or a real quality—could be a principle *quod* efficient cause. Given that Leibniz denied real qualities, I’ll focus only cases where the substance rather than a real quality is a principle quod efficient cause. The second caveat is that when the effect is due to a free action of an intelligent substance, the cause does not act necessarily. However, in all other natural efficient causation, such as fire heating water, the causes act necessarily. Thus, I’ll further restrict my focus to cases where the substances are non-intelligent. A third caveat, related to the second, is that Scholastics such as Suarez restricted causes that always act necessarily to corporeal substances—substances which do not exist, speaking strictly, in Leibniz’s ontology.

A fourth caveat is that the standard scholastic cases of efficient causes that act necessarily are cases of transeunt efficient causation between distinct created substances. Leibniz, of course, denies any transeunt efficient causation between

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360 Suarez writes, “For the present, we are asserting merely that every faculty which altogether lacks the use of reason exercises its operations by natural necessity.” DM 19.1.12

361 Jeff Brower has argued that according to scholastics, any deterministic immanent causation would in fact be formal causation and they would thus argue that all monadic change is also due to formal causation. This might be troublesome for my account if a substance *s*’s formally causing some accident *A* entailed that *s* did not efficiently cause *A*. However, as Robert Pasnau has shown, many scholastics also held that formal
created substances and instead holds that all creaturely efficient causation is immanent causation within a substance. The fourth caveat points to a fifth. The principle *quod* causes—substances—which act of necessity in scholastic cases have powers which often need an external excitation for the substance to act. Leibnizian powers, in contrast, act unless impeded. In spite of these five caveats, the scholastic account of principle *quod* efficient causes that act necessarily and are also substances provides Leibniz with ample reasons to also affirm deterministic substance causation. The reasons hinge mainly on the principle *quod/quod* distinction and God’s concurrence. I’ll first explain the scholastic account and then show it sheds light on how, with some important revisions, Leibnizian substance causation can also be deterministic.

Suarez’s DM 19.1 is dedicated to efficient causes that act necessarily. Suarez writes, “among created causes there are many that operate necessarily once all the things they require for operating are present.” For much of DM 19.1, Suarez articulates just what he takes those requirements to be, ultimately concluding that there are nine:

For any agent substance $s_A$ and any accident $A$, $s_A$ efficiently causes $A$ if and only if:

(i) $s_A$ has the full and sufficient power to act;

(ii) There is a patient substance $s_P$ such that $s_P$ is susceptible and sufficient close to $s_A$;

(iii) Any medium between $s_A$ and $s_P$ is suitable for and susceptible to $s_A$’s action;

causes efficiently cause accidents. See Robert Pasnau, “Form, Substance, and Mechanism,” *Philosophical Review* 113, no. 1 (2004): 31-88. On this understanding, Leibnizian immanent efficient causes are also formal causes, but their being formal causes does not entail that they are not efficient causes. For a recent paper arguing that all secondary causation is formal but not efficient causation, see Sukjai Lee, “Leibniz on Divine Concurrence,” *Philosophical Review* 113, no. 2 (2004): 203-48.

362 I clarify this difference shortly.

363 DM 19.1.1

364 DM 19.1.2

365 Ibid.

366 Ibid.
(iv) There is nothing impeding the action with an equal power to resist it;\textsuperscript{367}
(v) The patient $s_P$ does not already have the accident that $s_A$ would cause;\textsuperscript{368}
(vi) Any action required beforehand which is presupposed for $s_A$’s causing $A$ in $s_P$ is already completed;\textsuperscript{369}
(vii) $s_A$ is not a free cause;\textsuperscript{370}
(viii) God concurs with $s_A$’s causing $A$;\textsuperscript{371}
(ix) $s_A$ is not indifferent with respect to more than one effect;\textsuperscript{372}

It’s important to address the relation between conditions (i) through (ix) and some agent substance $s_A$ efficiently causing an accident $A$ in a patient substance $s_P$. Conditions (i) through (ix), according to Suarez, constitute the \textit{total cause}. Further, there is a \textit{necessary} relation between the total cause and $s_A$’s efficiently causing $A$ in $s_P$. The total cause necessitates the effect.\textsuperscript{373} Whatever the type of necessity is involved, it is quite strong.\textsuperscript{374} As Suarez writes, “Still, if the matter is considered carefully, even God himself does not seem to be able to bring it about in the composed sense (as they call it) that a cause which

\textsuperscript{367} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{368} This fifth condition rules out causal overdetermination.
\textsuperscript{369} DM 19.1.3
\textsuperscript{370} DM 19.1.4
\textsuperscript{371} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{372} DM 19.1.5. Suarez argues that the ninth condition is in fact entailed by or equivalent to one of the previous conditions. While Suarez doesn’t specify which condition, precisely, entails or is equivalent, textual evidence points in favor of it being the seventh condition. He writes, “Nonetheless, one should, it seems, reply that this [ninth] condition has rather to be traced back to one of the conditions posited above; that is, to the absence of one of those conditions. For the condition of indifference, taken just by itself, is in some sense incompatible with the proper determination of natural agents, since it is proper for them to be determined to one effect. How, then, can they have this indifference of themselves.” See DM 19.1.6
\textsuperscript{373} I’m less concerned with the exact type of necessity involved and more concerned with establishing that there is some sort of necessity involved between requirements (i) – (ix) and $s_A$’s efficiently causing $A$ in $s_P$. Given that what is at issue is the particular effects of particular substances, natural necessity is the most likely candidate. However, Walter Ott has recently argued that the necessity is in fact logical necessity. That is, the effect is logically necessitated by the Total cause because it is a contradiction to posit the Total cause and deny the effect. Ott writes, “Now, once the requisite active an passive powers are in place, ‘natural causes cannot prevent the action of a necessary agent, since they do not have the power to change the nature of things or to remove wholly intrinsic properties.’ Note what it would take for a natural cause to prevent the action of such an agent, i.e., to change the course of events: one would have to alter its intrinsic properties. In other words, one would have to bring it about that fire was not fire.” See Walter Ott, “Causations, Intentionality, and the Case for Occasionalism,” \textit{Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philosophie}, 90 (2008): 175.
\textsuperscript{374} Assuming a difference between logical and physical or natural necessity, where the former is stronger than the latter.
by its nature acts necessarily should fail to act once all the things required for acting have

been posited.”\textsuperscript{375} So the only way for \( s_A \) to not efficiently cause \( A \) in \( s_P \) would be for one

of (i) – (ix) is not the case. Not even God could bring prevent \( s_A \)’s efficiently causing \( A \)
in \( s_P \) if (i) – (ix) are in place.\textsuperscript{376} God would have to remove one of (i) – (ix).\textsuperscript{377}

For an example of Suarezian substance causation where the substance acts of

necessity, take the example of fire burning some wood.\textsuperscript{378} Fire—the agent substance—

has the power to burn some wood—the patient substance. Fire burns the wood via its

heat—a causal power of fire. When the fire is appropriately situated near some wood,
either through direct contact or with the right kind of medium between the fire and the

wood—such as air, the fire will burn the wood as long as God concurs and no other

substances impedes the fires burning the wood, such as a bucket of water spilled on the

fire. So in this case, the fire—a substance—produces an effect—burnt wood—of

necessity. While Suarez does not use the exact term, if conditions (i) through (ix) obtain,
the fire is \textit{determined} to burn the wood.

It’s again important to stress the principle \textit{quod} efficient cause—the efficient

causal agent—is the fire, a substance in Suarez’s metaphysics. Yet a power of the

substance—specifically, the fire’s heat—plays a crucial part in \textit{explaining} the substance’s

efficiently causing the wood’s being burnt. The fire’s powers also play a crucial part of

the explanation for why the fire’s efficiently burning the wood is \textit{necessitated}. The fire’s

\textsuperscript{375} DM 19.1.14.
\textsuperscript{376} Suarez writes, “Still, if the matter is considered carefully, even God himself does not seem to be able to
bring it about in the composed sense (as they call it) that a cause which by its nature acts necessarily should fail to act once all the things required for acting have been posited.” (DM 19.1.14)
\textsuperscript{377} Suarez continues, “Therefore, it is not the case that God brought it about that the fire did not act even
though all the required things had been posited; instead, he removed one of those things.” (DM 19.1.14)
\textsuperscript{378} I use fire because it is a frequent example of Suarez’s.
powers are one of the necessary ingredients in the total cause. It’s just that the fire’s powers are not efficient causal agents. Instead, they are the agent’s powers.

3.3.2 Deterministic Leibnizian Substance Causation

I argue that if the scholastics can consistently hold that substances rather than their powers are the efficient causal agents that act of necessity, then Leibniz can consistently hold that monads are efficient causal agents which deterministically cause their effects. There are, of course, important differences between the deterministic efficient causal activity of Leibnizian and scholastic substances. In Leibniz’s metaphysics, the efficient causal agents are immaterial monads, which immanently efficiently cause their accidents—perceptions and appetitions—by means of their derivative powers—appetitions. So the Leibnizian model is going to differ in some important ways from the scholastic model. For a start, Suarezian conditions (ii) and (iii) will not apply to Leibniz’s model.

Another important difference that calls for further elaboration concerns how a Leibnizian power would be impeded. It’s easy to imagine cases of corporeal scholastic substances being impeded from exercising their causal powers. Fire would be impeded from burning some wood if a different substance—such as some cold water—were splashed onto the wood. However, Leibniz’s account is burdened with answering how an immaterial monad would be impeded from exercising its powers since it doesn’t causally interact with other created substances and is instead causally responsible for all its miraculous accidents. Of course, God could impede such a power, say by withholding

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I address soon the type of necessity involved in deterministic monadic efficient causation as Leibniz is adamant throughout his writings that such deterministic monadic efficient causation is contingent in some sense.
his concurrence, in which case the impediment would be miraculous. But more pertinent here are natural impediments.

To address this question, it’s worth first noting that according to Leibniz, a key difference between monadic powers and the powers of scholastic substances is that monadic powers *always* act *unless* impeded, rather than needing a stimulus of some sort:

Active force differs from the mere power familiar to the schools, for the active power or faculty of the scholastics is nothing but a proximate principle of acting, which needs an external excitation or a stimulus, as it were, to be transferred into action. Active force, in contrast, contains a certain act or entelechy and is thus midway between the faculty of acting and the act itself and involves a conatus. It is thus carried into action by itself and needs no help but only the removal of an impediment.\(^{380}\)

So a monad’s powers will always be exercised unless impeded. But again, what impedes a monad’s powers? Following Mark Kulstad, let’s draw a distinction between the overall derivative force of a substance \(s\) in state \(N\) and the individual derivative forces which makeup \(s\)’s state \(N\).\(^{381}\) The individual derivative force which make up state \(N\) are \(s\)’s appetitions \(A_{N1}, A_{N2}, A_{N3}, \ldots, A_{Nx}\). Recall that appetitions are always appetitions *for* various accidents. As causal powers, appetitions are powers for \(s\) to produce such accidents.

Yet these appetitions frequently conflict.\(^{382}\) The perception \(P_{N1}\) which appetition \(A_{N1}\) is an appetition for will conflict with the perception \(P_{N2}\) which appetition \(A_{N2}\) is an appetition for. How such appetitions conflict takes us into Leibniz’s metaphysics of final

\(^{380}\) L 433.


\(^{382}\) Leibniz writes, “Various perceptions and inclinations combine to produce a complete volition: it is the result of the conflict amongst them.” (G.V.178: NE 192).
causation, a subject of much recent scholarly debate.\(^{383}\) As I do not need to take a stand in this paper, I will only canvas the options found in Leibniz’s writings and the secondary literature. \(A_{N1}\) conflicts with \(A_{N2}\) if (i) the goodness of \(P_{N1}\) is greater or lesser than the goodness of \(P_{N2}\) or (ii) the apparent goodness of \(P_{N1}\) is greater or lesser than the apparent goodness of \(P_{N2}.\(^{384}\) The goodness (or apparent goodness) of \(P_{N1}\) which is greater or lesser than the goodness (or apparent goodness) of \(P_{N2}\) is either (ia/iia) the goodness of \(s\) or (ib/iib) the goodness of the whole universe.\(^{385}\) So two or more appetitions conflict when they differ with respect to (i) or (ii) and one appetition will impede another when it is stronger than the other in terms of either (i) or (ii). So what impedes an individual appetition is either God or a different appetition.

The total derivative force of \(s\) in state \(N\) is the result of the outcome of the various conflicting appetitions which makeup \(N.\) In a sense, the total force could be understood as an appetition or tendency for the next complete state \(N+1.\) But the total force is made up of the individual appetitions and the result of the conflict between them, it would not be impeded by an individual appetition. Rather, I suggest that the only thing that could impede the total derivative force of a monad—its tendency for the complete next state \(N+1—\)is God.\(^{386}\)


\(^{384}\) Following Rutherford, call (i) the “natural” teleology view and (ii) the “desire” teleology view.

\(^{385}\) Rutherford explains both of these views in greater depth in “Laws and Powers in Leibniz,” 170.

\(^{386}\) With Kulstad, I think there is a strong and intended analogy in Leibniz’s metaphysics between the conflicting appetitions of a monad and the conflicting forces of a physical body. See Kulstad, 139.
3.3.3 The necessity involved in Leibnizian Deterministic Substance Causation

There is one last issue that needs to be addressed— the necessity involved in Leibnizian deterministic substance causation. I address this because in the account of scholastic causal necessitation I presented above, some scholars, such as Walter Ott, have argued that there is a logically necessary connection between the total cause and its effect, even in the many cases where the principle quod efficient cause is a substance. Leibniz, however, argues throughout his career that created substances deterministically but contingently produce their effects.

I address this with some irony, since as we’ve seen throughout this paper, the efficacious-substance interpretation has been challenged for being incompatible with whatever sort of necessity is required for deterministic causation. Yet if the account of scholastic substances acting of necessity that I presented above is accurate and if the scholastic account sheds light on how Leibnizian substance causation can be deterministic, then prima facie it saddles Leibnizian substance causation with a type of necessity that he would deem too strong for deterministic substance causation— logical necessity.

This worry is misplaced, however, once one takes into account the distinction between the total cause and the principle quod efficient cause. Recall that Suarez writes, “Still, if the matter is considered carefully, even God himself does not seem to be able to bring it about in the composed sense (as they call it) that a cause which by its nature acts necessarily should fail to act once all the things required for acting have been posited.” According to Suarez, a substance will act necessarily or produce an effect when all the
things required for acting have been posited, where all the things required for acting are all of the elements of the total cause, instead of just the principle quod efficient cause.

Leibniz’s distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity is important here, for what Leibniz specifically denies is that what is determined is absolutely necessary. Some truth is absolutely necessary when its denial entails a contradiction. A created substance $s$ being in state $N$ would not be absolutely necessary on Leibniz’s account, as the denial of the proposition “$s$ is in state $N$” does not entail a contradiction. The claim “$s$’s being in state $N$ efficiently causes the accidents which makeup state $N+1$” is also not absolutely necessary, as it’s denial would not entail a contradiction. However, Leibniz would likely agree with Suarez, however, that there is a contradiction in any conjunction affirming a total cause but denying the effect of the total cause. For the total cause is not limited to the created principle quod efficient cause modified in some way but also God or God’s concurrence and the laws of monadic change.

So Leibniz’s account of deterministic causation differs in some important ways from the scholastics’ accounts. Yet, none of these differences entail that Leibniz can’t consistently hold that substances deterministically produce their effects while scholastics can hold that substances deterministically produce their effects. Any objection to Leibniz’s account would affect scholastic accounts as well. However, even if there are serious reasons to doubt the plausibility of deterministic substance causation, it’s valuable to at least document the historical precedent to the interpretation I’m defending.

387 See (G IV.436-7: AG 45-6), (G III.400-1: AG 194), (G V.161: NE 176), (G VI.163-4: NE 178-9), (G VI.123-4: T 37), (G VI.131-2: T 53), (G VI.341-2: T 381), and (G VI.351: T 395).

388 But the necessity involved when the effect follows from the Total Cause is hypothetical, rather than absolute necessity. I note further that my account of contingent but deterministic causation differs little from Rutherford’s own account. See Rutherford, “Laws and Powers in Leibniz,” 165-66.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued for a nuanced interpretation of the Efficacious-Substance Interpretation—account of the causal relata in creaturely causation in Leibniz’s metaphysics. This interpretation has the advantage of having historical precedent in many Scholastic accounts of efficient causation. It is also supported by numerous passages in Leibniz’s writings. More importantly, the interpretation I defended overcomes a serious challenge to the efficacious-appetition interpretation—Locke’s “Multiplication of Agents” objection. Finally, the interpretation I defended showed how appetitions play an important explanatory role in monadic change and is consistent with appetitions determining monadic change even though such appetitions are not efficient causal agents.
Appendix A. Leibniz’s Missing Overdetermination Premise

In at least two passages written early in his career, Leibniz argues that created substances are not transeunt causes because everything that happens to a created substance is the result of its own notion or complete concept. In “Primary Truths”, Leibniz writes:

Strictly speaking, one can say that no created substance exerts a metaphysical action or influx on any other thing. For, not to mention the fact that one cannot explain how something can pass from one thing into the substance of another, we have already shown that from the notion of each and every thing follows all of its future states. 389 (Emphasis added)

In chapter 14 of his Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz also writes:

We could therefore say in some way and properly speaking, though not in accordance with common usage, that one particular substance never acts upon another particular substance nor is acted upon by it, if we consider that what happens to each is solely a consequence of its complete idea or notion alone, since this idea already contains all its predicates or events and expresses the whole universe. 390 (Emphasis added)

Leibniz gives same argument against creaturely transeunt causation in both passages.

Using the wording from the first passage, a first-pass of the argument can be expressed thus:

(P) From the notion of each and every thing follows all of its future states.
(C) So, no created substance exerts a metaphysical action or influx on any other thing.

Scholars have rightfully pointed out that (P) alone is not sufficient for (C). Even if all of a substance’s future states follow from its complete concept— if the substance’s

389 AG 33.
390 (G IV.439: AG 47)
complete concept is the sufficient cause of all the substance’s future states, it is still possible that some states are also caused by different substances.\footnote{See Donovan Cox, “Leibniz on Divine Causation: Creation, Miracles, and the Continual Fulgurations,” \textit{Studia Leibnitiana}, (2002): 189; Mark Kulstad and Laurence Carlin, "Leibniz's Philosophy of Mind", \textit{The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy} (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/leibniz-mind/; Nicholas Jolley, “Leibniz: Truth, Knowledge, and Metaphysics,” in G.H.R. Parkinson edited, \textit{Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume IV, The Renaissance and Seventeenth-Century Rationalism}, 382; Christia Mercer, \textit{Leibniz's Metaphysics: It's Origins and Development} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 227-230; and R.C. Sleigh, Jr., \textit{Leibniz & Arnauld: A commentary on their Correspondence} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 144.} To make the move from (P) to (C), Leibniz needs a further premise (P2) ruling out causal overdetermination.\footnote{Kulstad and Carlin write, “Even if conceptual considerations about substances were sufficient to explain their apparent causal activity, it does not seem to follow that substances do not interact—unless one is assuming that causal overdetermination is not a genuine possibility. Leibniz seems to be assuming just that, but without argument.” See Ibid.} Unfortunately, Leibniz never supplies an argument for (P2) in the vicinity of the above passages, nor does he even state (P2). Worse, an argument for (P2) in Leibniz’s corpus seems to be lacking.\footnote{Sleigh draws attention to one potential statement against causal overdetermination. In a letter to Arnauld, Leibniz wrote, “Anything capable of having many causes is never a complete entity.” (G II.72) However, in the context, Leibniz is discussing the causation of substances. A substance—being a complete being—could not have multiple causes. Yet that doesn’t allow Leibniz to make the further move that accidents can’t have multiple causes. In his \textit{Discourse on Metaphysics}, Leibniz writes, “Since this is so, we can say that the nature of an individual substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed. An accident, on the other hand, is a being whose notion does not include everything that can be attributed to the subject to which the notion is attributed.” See (G IV.432-3: AG 41) and Sleigh, 144.} In this appendix, I shall argue that given Leibniz’s transference condition, Leibniz does have reasons to rule out causal overdetermination of the sort needed to allow him to make the move from (P) to (C).

Before I present the argument, some justification is needed for why one should even bother with Leibniz’s argument from (P) to (C), as several objections can be raised. It is doubtful that Leibniz ever held the view that the complete concept does any efficient
causal work.\textsuperscript{394} Even if the early Leibniz did hold such a view, the mature Leibniz did not. Instead, the law-of-the-series—an active entity—is responsible for a substance’s states, as opposed to the complete concept or notion—a static entity.\textsuperscript{395} Further, the law-of-the-series just is the substance.\textsuperscript{396} So the mature Leibniz held that the substance is responsible for all of its states, a thesis I soon unpack and which I’ll call the Spontaneity Thesis (ST). Finally, the mature Leibniz didn’t conclude that created substances are not transeunt causes because of the Spontaneity Thesis. Instead, the mature Leibniz reasoned to the Spontaneity Thesis in part because he argued that created substances cannot be transeunt causes, as addressed in chapters 2 and 3.\textsuperscript{397}

However, I argue that there are two reasons why it’s worth addressing whether Leibniz had reasons to deny causal overdetermination, allowing him to infer (C) from (P). First, while the later Leibniz didn’t infer (C) from (P), he also never explicitly denied that you could make the inference. Second, whether or not Leibniz had reasons to

\textsuperscript{394} Rather than the complete concept being the \textit{efficient} cause of the substance’s states, J.A. Cover argues that Leibniz is merely expressing in the formal mode something intimately tied to what Leibniz expresses in the material mode. Cover writes, “What Leibniz expresses in the formal mode, as the thesis that every predicate true of a substance has a reason or foundation in its individual concept, is intimately tied to what he expresses in the material mode, as the thesis that each state of a substance has its causal origin in preceding states.” A better understanding, then, is that the substance is the cause of its states, rather than the concept. See J.A. Cover, “Non-Basic Time and Reductive Strategies: Leibniz’s Theory of Time,” \textit{Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci.}, 28, No. 2 (1997): 308.

\textsuperscript{395} Donald Rutherford addresses the progression of Leibniz’s thought away from the complete concept as expressive of the substance’s nature towards the law of the series. See Donald Rutherford, \textit{Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 138-154.

\textsuperscript{396} In this section, I rely on J.A. Cover and John O’Leary Hawthorne’s argument that the law of the series is the substance, rather than a \textit{component} of the substance. See J.A. Cover and John O’Leary-Hawthorne, \textit{Substance & Individuation in Leibniz} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 214-226.

\textsuperscript{397} For example, in his 1695 “A New System of Nature,” Leibniz writes, “Therefore, since I was forced to agree that it is not possible for the soul or any other true substance to receive something from without, except by divine omnipotence, I was led, little by little, to a view that surprised me, but which seems inevitable, and which in fact has very great advantages and rather considerable beauty. That is, we must say that God originally created the soul (and any other real unity) in such a way that everything must arise for it from its own depths, through a perfect spontaneity relative to itself, and yet with a perfect conformity relative to external things.” See (G IV.484: AG 143).
affirm or deny the possibility of causal overdetermination is a question worth pursuing on its own in a project whose central focus is Leibniz’s metaphysics of causation.

Before laying out the argument, I should also remark about the methodological approach I adopt in this appendix. In this appendix, more than any other part of the dissertation, I utilize “philosophical” history of philosophy. As in other parts, my usage of “philosophical” history of philosophy is in the service of “exegetical” or “explanatory” history of philosophy. I’m interested in whether or not Leibniz is justified in making an inference that he made in important writings of his early and mid-career—whether or not Leibniz can infer (C) from (P). In Chapter 1, I distinguished three ways the historian of philosophy can see look for connections between premises in an argument by a historical figure such as Leibniz when Leibniz doesn’t explicitly offer the justification: (i) by searching through Leibniz’s writings for theses he did explicitly defend which can link (P) to (C), even though Leibniz does not himself show that or even state that such theses link (P) and (C); (ii) by looking broader at theses widely held by historical figures whom Leibniz was familiar with that could link (P) and (C) and which Leibniz would have no reason to reject; or (iii) by engaging in metaphysical reasoning oneself to rationally reconstruct a link between (P) and (C). In this appendix, I help myself to (i) and (iii) in addressing if Leibniz has reasons to reject causal overdetermination, therefore providing him the missing premise that allows him to infer (C) from (P). Since this rational reconstruction will go significantly beyond the text, I’ve dealt with this topic in an appendix to the chapter instead of the main body.

Thus, I’m going to proceed with the argument. Further, I’m going to do so by actually offering an argument that allows Leibniz to get the denial of creaturely transeunt
causation from either the Spontaneity thesis (that I soon present) or \( P \). In keeping with the overall focus on this dissertation, I’ll start with the Spontaneity thesis. By assuming the Spontaneity Thesis, I will show that Leibniz has an argument he can give from his mature metaphysics to the denial of creaturely transeunt causation via reasons Leibniz had to deny overdetermination. The argument, once given, can then be re-applied to the older argument that assumes (on some interpretations) that the complete concept is doing real causal work— the view that the complete concept is the genuine cause of all of a substance’s states. So Leibniz has the resources to deny that creatures are transeunt causes from \( P \), even if the mature Leibniz believes \( P \) is false.

I now turn to the argument. First, as indicated above, given that the mature Leibniz likely did not hold that the complete concept of a created substance did any efficient causal work. Instead, the created substance itself is the natural cause of all of its accidents. Leibniz maintains this throughout his later writings. For example, in his 1695 “A New System of Nature,” he writes, “That is, we must say that God originally created the soul (and any other real unity) in such a way that everything must arise for it from its own depths, through a perfect spontaneity relative to itself, and yet with a perfect conformity relative to external things.”\(^{398}\) A few lines further, he elaborates, writing:

For why should God be unable to give substance, from the beginning, a nature or an internal force that can produce in it, in an orderly way (as would happen in a spiritual or formal automaton, but free in the case where it has a share of reason), everything that will happen to it, that is, all the appearances or expressions it will have, without the help of any created being?\(^{399}\)

\(^{398}\) Ibid.

\(^{399}\) (G IV.485: AG 144).
In his *New Essays on Human Understanding*, Leibniz continues to affirm the spontaneity of created substances, writing, “Anything which occurs in what is strictly a substance must be a case of action in the metaphysically rigorous sense of something which occurs in the substance spontaneously arising out [arrive] of its own depths.” (*New Essays* A vi, 6, 210) In his *Theodicy*, Leibniz also defends the thesis of creaturely spontaneity against the occasionalists and skeptics of the efficacy of creatures such as Bayle:

Bayle asserts, for instance, that by purely philosophical meditations one can never attain to an established certainty that we are the efficient cause [la cause efficiante] of our volitions. But this is a point which I do not concede to him: for the establishment of this system demonstrates beyond a doubt that in the course of nature each substance is the sole cause of all its actions, and that it is free of all physical influence from every other substance, save the customary cooperation of God.

Therefore, it’s worth replacing (P) with a different premise stating what I’ll call Leibniz’s “Spontaneity Thesis” (ST):

For any created substance \( s \) and any accident \( A \), if \( A \) naturally inheres in \( s \) and it is not the case that \( A \) initially inhered in \( s \) then \( s \) is the natural sufficient efficient cause of \( A \)’s inhering in \( s \).

I draw attention to five features of the Spontaneity Thesis. First, the Spontaneity Thesis applies—as indicated—only to non-initial accidents. I formulate the Spontaneity Thesis that way in order to leave open the possibility that either God is the efficient cause of initial accidents (upon the first moment of the creation of a substance). I note,

\[400\] (G VI.295-6: T 300).
however, that the Spontaneity Thesis is consistent with the created substance efficiently causing initial accidents (on some accounts where substantial forms are like functions, where God created the function and supplies the first argument but the substance/function is what outputs the state and thus efficiently causes the first state). Second, and relatedly, I include the term “natural” in the antecedent to focus on non-miraculous accidents. For the purposes of this appendix, I understand a natural accident as a non-initial accident that inheres in a substance and is not solely caused by God.

Third, note the term “sufficient” in the Spontaneity Thesis, where \( s \) is a sufficient efficient cause of \( A \)’s inhering in \( s \). By sufficient, I mean what many early moderns and Scholastics meant by a “total” cause, something that is contrasted with a “partial” cause. Take two persons pulling a boat by rope, where each person is individually too weak but together the two are jointly strong enough to pull the boat. Each person individually is then a partial cause of the boat’s motion. The two persons taken together are a sufficient cause of the boat’s motion. This notion of “sufficient” is what contemporary

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401 However, ST conjoined with other theses from Leibniz’s metaphysics is inconsistent with a different created substance causing a non-initial accident in \( s \). The two other considerations are that first, Leibniz holds that created substances can only come into existence through creation by God. Second, we saw Leibniz’s claims in chapter 2 that created substances must have some accident or other. So God cannot create a substance without that substance having some accident or other. If God cannot create a substance without that substance having some accident or other, then we must address what caused the accident. There are three options: God, \( s \), or a different created substance \( s’ \). The most obvious answer is God but the second option, \( s \), also has merit. God could create \( s \) and \( s \) cause \( A \). This would not be a temporal progression. Instead, \( s \) is prior in nature to \( A \). So it is not the case that \( s \) exist at some time without having an accident inhere in it.

But suppose that \( s’ \) cause \( A \) to inhere in \( s \), where \( A \) is \( s’ \) first accident. Given the thesis that a substance must have some accident or other, \( s’ \) cannot cause \( A \) to inhere in \( s \) at a time \( t’ \) later than the first moment of \( s’ \)’s existence. So we have God creating a substance \( s \) and a different substance \( s’ \) causing \( A \) to inhere in \( s \) at the moment of \( s’ \)’s creation. I don’t think this picture works. \( S’ \) has to have something to work with to cause \( A \) to inhere in \( s \), but that presupposes that \( s’ \) exist prior to \( s’ \) causing \( A \) to inhere in \( s \). That is, if \( s’ \) can cause \( A \) to exist in \( s \) only if \( s’ \) exists. But prior to the creation of \( s \), \( s \) does not exist.

402 Therefore, this option is consistent with a model of the substance proposed and defended at length by J.A. Cover and John-O’Leary Hawthorne. See Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne, *Substance & Individuation in Leibniz*, 214-252.
philosophers have in mind when discussing overdetermination. Overdetermination occurs when there are two causes sufficient for some effect. I’ll specify more precisely the sort of overdetermination at play soon.

Fourth, I use the term “naturally” in the consequent in order to make the Spontaneity Thesis consistent with divine concurrence. Divine concurrentists such as Leibniz hold that God is also an efficient cause of accidents inhering in created substances. Thus, the Spontaneity Thesis as expressed is the thesis that the created substance is the only created cause needed for an accident to inhere in itself.

Fifth and finally, I note that the Spontaneity Thesis itself is in fact consistent with a different created substance $s_2$ also efficiently causing $A$ to inhere in $s_1$. That is, while ST holds that a substance causes all its natural non-initial accidents, those accidents could also be caused by a different created substance as well. Thus, the Spontaneity Thesis needs a premise against overdetermination, seemingly lacking in Leibniz’s corpus, if it’s to get (C) – just as the first formulation of (P) needs a premise against overdetermination as well.

I’ll replace (P) with the Spontaneity Thesis then as the first premise of the argument. In keeping with the theme of my dissertation, I’ll replace or revise (C) with a conclusion denying creaturely transeunt causation. The denial of creaturely transeunt causation can be expressed as follows:

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403 The details are complicated and go beyond the topic of this appendix, so I shall bracket the topic for now. I note that in this appendix, I am concerned primarily with the possibility of creaturely causal overdetermination, where two or more created substances are sufficient causes of the same effect.

404 ST is in fact consistent with a different created substance causing an initial or non-initial accident. I’ve presented problems with a created substance causing an initial created accident in another substance in a footnote above.
For any created substance \( s \) and any accident \( A \), if \( A \) inheres in \( s \) then it is not the case that there is some created substance \( s' \) such that \( s \) is not identical to \( s' \) and \( s' \) is an efficient cause of \( A \)’s inhering in \( s \).405

As expressed above, Leibniz could only get the denial of creaturely transeunt causation from the Spontaneity Thesis if there were an additional premise against overdetermination. Before I get to the main argument, I need to specify exactly what kind of overdetermination Leibniz would have to rule out, as there are several kinds of overdetermination. Specifically, Leibniz needs a premise against what Eric Funkhouser calls independent causal overdetermination or what other philosophers call coincident overdetermination.406 As an example of independent causal overdetermination, take two assassins who both shoot the same person at the same time in the heart, where each bullet individually is sufficient for the person’s death. The person’s death, event \( E \), is then overdetermined. Three features of \( E \) make \( E \) an effect that is independently overdetermined. First, both assassins or assassins’ shootings are sufficient for \( E \). Both bullets struck the heart in such a way that the person would have died instantly without the other bullet. This is in contrast to a scenario in which the assassins or assassins’ shootings are jointly sufficient and individually necessary but not individually sufficient, where, say, each assassin individually would seriously harm but not kill the person.

Second, both causes of \( E \) are distinct from each other. This needs little elaboration. Assassin \( A_1 \) is not numerically identical to Assassin \( A_2 \). Third, both causes of \( E \) are independent of each other. I don’t mean that the assassins have different

405 I note that this denial of creaturely transeunt efficient causation applies to both initial and non-initial accidents.
employers. Instead, neither assassin or assassin’s shooting—as a cause—was necessary for the existence of the other cause. This is best understood in contrast with certain types of non-independent and non-coincident overdetermination entailed by certain views on mental causation where two sufficient causes are distinct but dependent on each other.\(^4\) Take a multiply realizable mental state \(M_2\) that has as a sufficient cause the previous mental state \(M_1\). On some understandings of the relation between the mental and the physical, \(M_2\) also has as a sufficient cause the brain state \(B_1\), where \(B_1\) is distinct from \(M_1\). However, while \(M_1\) and \(B_1\) are distinct, \(M_1\) is dependent on \(B_1\). That is, the token mental state \(M_1\) cannot exist without the token brain state \(B_1\). Thus, in contrast to the assassins, \(M_1\) and \(B_1\) are non-coincident/non-independent overdeterminers of \(M_2\).

Given that what is at issue in the argument from the Spontaneity Thesis to the denial of creaturely transeunt causation is whether one created substance could be the efficient cause of an accident in another, the type of overdetermination ruled out then needs to be independent causal overdetermination, where there cannot be two sufficient, distinct, and independent causes (in this case created substances) of an accident inhering in a created substance. So what reason(s) would Leibniz have to rule out overdetermination of that sort? *Prima facie*, Leibniz has no good reasons, nor does anyone else. *Non*-independent/*non*-coincident overdetermination is at least initially problematic, given that it would be widespread and systematic. Appealing to one understanding of Ockham’s razor, if there is a theory requiring lawful overdetermination of event type \(E\) and a theory that doesn’t require lawful overdetermination of event type

\(^4\) This is a view of mental causation criticized by Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument. Kim gives this argument in several publications, including Jaegwon Kim, “Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Confusion,” *Philosophical Perspectives* 3(1989): 77-108.
to the extent that it posits less sufficient causes of the same effect. But coincident/independent overdetermination is not systematic and widespread in that way. Why couldn’t two assassins overdetermine $E$ where $E$ is the person’s death? Ted Sider brings up a reason to rule out such independent overdetermination:

Metaphysical objection: overdetermination is metaphysically incoherent. Here is a picture. Causation is a kind of fluid divided among the potential causes of an effect. If one potential cause acts to produce an effect, that fluid is used up, and no other potential cause can act. Atoms causing the shattering of a window would use up the available causal fluid, leaving none of the baseball composed of those atoms.\(^{408}\)

But Sider rightly dismisses such a reason, writing, “This, of course, is a bad picture. It takes seriously a view of causation that no one accepts.”\(^{409}\) I agree with Sider that the picture above is a picture of a theory no one accepts. However, with some revisions, a similar picture can be developed that does capture how Leibniz understood creaturely transeunt causation.\(^{410}\) I grant that it is a mistake to think that when one cause $C_1$ causes an effect $E$ in a patient substance $P$, $C_1$ drains or uses up all the causal fluid so that the other causes $C_2$, $C_3$, \ldots, $C_N$ no longer have any causal fluid to give. However, keeping the fluid analogy, I argue that one should think of $P$ as a container.\(^{411}\) When $C_1$ causes $E$ in $P$, if $C_1$ is a sufficient cause of $E$ in $P$, then $P$ is filled. So while $C_2$, $C_3$, \ldots, $C_N$ may have fluid to give, they can’t give it to $P$ because $P$ is already full.

\(^{409}\) Ibid.
\(^{410}\) Additionally, the picture I develop captures how many contemporary metaphysicians understand causation, as I show in the final section of this appendix.
The above picture fits in with Leibniz’s understanding of creaturely transeunt causation given his transference condition for such causation. As I argued in chapter 2, in spite of strongly worded denials from scholastics, Leibniz thought that if it were possible for a created agent substance to transeuntly produce an accident in a distinct patient substance, such causation would have to consist in the transference of the accident from the agent to the patient.\textsuperscript{412} Leibniz, using the language of figures such as Suarez, thought such causation—if possible—would have to consist in a literal “flow” or “influx” from the agent to the patient. In other places, he describes it as an accident “passing”\textsuperscript{413} from one subject to another or “detaching” from the agent.\textsuperscript{414} The patient substance receives the effect—the accident—that the agent transfers.\textsuperscript{415} This gives Leibniz a reason to rule out causal overdetermination at least in cases where a created substance produces an accident in a patient, where such production consists in transference. If a created substance $s_1$ produces the token accident $A$ in $s_2$ and $s_1$ is a sufficient cause of $A$’s

\textsuperscript{412} See, for example, (G IV.498-500: L 459-60).
\textsuperscript{413} Leibniz of course dismisses the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation because he thinks such passing is not possible, but the argument reveals that he thinks such passing is necessary if creaturely transeunt causation is possible, as I argue in Chapter 2. Leibniz writes, “I am not surprised that you encounter insurmountable problems when you seem to be entertaining something as inconceivable as an accident’s passing from one subject to another; but I see no reason why we have to suppose such a thing. It is almost as strange as the Scholastics’ notion of accidents which are not in any subject; though they are careful to attribute theirs solely to the miraculous workings of divine omnipotence.” See (G V. 208: NE 224). See also L 269.
\textsuperscript{414} Leibniz writes, “Monads have no windows, through which anything could come in or go out. And accidents cannot detach themselves and stroll about outside of substances, as the Scholastics' sensible species used to; so neither substance nor accident can come into a monad from outside” See (G VI.607-8: AG 214).
\textsuperscript{415} Leibniz does not think created substances can be acted on because, in part, he doesn’t think such created substances can “receive” accidents from other created substances. But this shows that Leibniz thinks such “receiving” is a necessary condition for creaturely transeunt causation. Leibniz writes, “Further, the action of one substance upon another is not an emission or a transplanting of some entity, as is commonly supposed; and it can be understood reasonably only in the way just shown. It is true that we can easily conceive of both the emission and the reception of the parts in matter and can in this way reasonably explain all the phenomena of physics mechanically. But since material mass is not a substance, it is clear that the action of substance itself can be only what I have just described.” See (G IV.498-9: L 459). See also (G IV.432-3: AG 58).
inhering in $s_2$, then while $s_3, s_4, \ldots, s_n$ may have accidents of the same type as $A$ to give to $s_2$, $s_2$ already has $A$ and so there is no “room” left.

A related analogy is to compare causation to work, a view defended by Ned Hall, amongst others.\textsuperscript{416} Jonathan Jacobs presents reasons to hold that the work view of causation doesn’t allow overdetermination as described above:

On the causal work analogy, if I did the full amount of work required to get something done, there’s simply no work left for you to do. And if you contribute work, either I did less than I otherwise would have, or we finished the task more quickly, or we produced something better than I would have if you hadn’t contributed your work.\textsuperscript{417}

It’s fair to attribute such an understanding of efficient causation in general to Leibniz. Recall, as we saw in Chapter 1, that the efficient cause, for Leibniz, is the “active cause”\textsuperscript{418} and is the cause which produces.\textsuperscript{419} Take two created substances $s_1$ and $s_2$ which are hot rods and a third created substance $s_3$ which is a pan of water to be heated. On the transference understanding of creaturely transeunt causation, if $s_1$ causes a change in $s_3$, say by heating $s_3$ to 200F, $s_1$ does so by transferring a number of accidents to $s_3$. If $s_1$ is the sufficient cause of $s_3$’s being 200F, then there’s nothing left for $s_2$ to do. If $s_2$ were also a cause, then, as Jacobs argues, either $s_1$ transmits less, or if $s_1$ transmits the same amount, then $s_3$ heats up to 200F quicker or $s_3$ heats up to a hotter temperature.

The above arguments give Leibniz reasons to argue that an effect which is transeuntly caused by a creature could not be causally overdetermined, whereby causally

\textsuperscript{418} This is how Leibniz defines the efficient cause in his Table of Definitions, as we saw in Chapter 1. Leibniz writes, “efficiens est causa activa.” C 472. See also A.VI.2.490.
\textsuperscript{419} (G V.211: NE 228).
overdetermined, I mean independently causally overdetermined. Let “CTEC” stand for “Creaturely Transeunt Efficient Causation” and “COD” stand for “Causal Overdetermination”:

(1) If CTEC then Transference.
(2) If Transference then ¬COD.
(3) So, if CTEC then ¬COD.

With the argument above, Leibniz now has the resources to get the denial of Creaturely Transeunt Efficient Causation from the Spontaneity Thesis. Suppose that the Spontaneity Thesis is the case. If the Spontaneity Thesis is true, then for any created substance $s_1$, $s_1$ is the sufficient efficient cause of all of $s_1$’s non-initial natural accidents. So if $A$ inheres in $s_1$ and $A$ is a non-initial natural accident of $s_1$, then $s_1$ is the sufficient natural efficient cause of $A$. But if the Spontaneity Thesis is true, and so $s_1$ is the sufficient natural efficient cause of all of it’s non-initial naturally inhering accidents, then it cannot also be the case that some created substance $s_2$, not identical to $s_1$, is also the sufficient efficient cause of at least some of $s_1$’s non-initial naturally inhering accidents. For if $s_2$ were to sufficiently efficiently cause some of $s_1$’s non-initial naturally inhering accidents, then that is a case of creaturely transeunt causation and the effect of such causation — given transference — could not be overdetermined, $s_1$ could not also be the cause of the accident’s that $s_2$ causes to inhere in $s_1$. That is, if $s_1$ were to also to sufficiently efficiently cause the accidents that $s_2$ causes, then that would be independent causal overdetermination, which can’t happen given creaturely transeunt causation, as I argue. So for any case of the creaturely transeunt causation of an accident, where the cause is a sufficient cause, that accident cannot also be efficiently caused by the patient substance. Leibniz now has reasons to argue from Creaturely Transeunt Efficient Causation to the
denial of the Spontaneity Thesis. But if Leibniz can argue from creaturely transeunt causation to the denial of the Spontaneity Thesis, then Leibniz can also argue from the Spontaneity Thesis to the denial of creaturely transeunt causation via contraposition. Thus, Leibniz has a way to argue from the Spontaneity Thesis to the denial of creaturely transeunt causation, with a premise against overdetermination as the link.420

Further, on the Spontaneity Thesis— in which case for any created substance $s_1$, $s_1$ is the sufficient cause of all of its non-initial natural accidents, then $s_2$ could not even be a partial cause of $A$’s inhering in $s_1$. Recall the work analogy: If $s_1$ does all the work needed, then there is no work left for $s_2$ to do. Suppose $s_1$ is a pan of water. If $s_1$ sufficiently causes itself to heat up to 200F, $s_2$— a hot rod— could not also be an cause of $s_1$’s heating up. Given transference, $s_2$ would heat $s_1$ by transferring heat from itself to $s_1$. But if $s_2$ were to partially cause $s_1$ to heat up by $s_2$’s transmitting heat from itself to $s_1$, then either: (i) $s_2$ caused $s_1$ to heat up quicker than it would have in the absence of $s_2$; (ii) in the absence of $s_2$, $s_1$ would have reached a lower temperature. With respect to (ii), $s_1$

420 It’s worth presenting the argument in a more formal manner. Below is one way the argument could be developed:

(1) CTEC $\rightarrow$ ¬COD. [Premise]
(2) If ¬COD, then not (CTEC and ST) [Implication of ¬COD]
(3) So, if CTEC then not CTEC and ST. [HS 1 and 2]
(4) Suppose CTEC.
   a. So, ¬COD. [MP 1 and 4]
   b. So, not CTEC and ST. [MP 4a and 2]
   c. So, not CTEC or not ST. [DeMorgans 4b]
   d. Not not CTEC. [DN 4]
   e. So, not ST. [DS 4d and 4c]
(5) So, if CTEC then not ST. [CP 4 and 4e]
(6) So, if ST then not CTEC. [Contraposition 5]
would arguably have a different accident other than being-200F. So I argue that if \( s_1 \) is a sufficient cause of its being 200F, \( s_2 \) could not even be a partial cause.\(^{421}\)

Given the above reasoning-- that an immanently and sufficiently produced accident cannot also be transeuntly caused, Leibniz can also argue from (P) to the denial of the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation. For if the complete concept/notion of a created substance is sufficient for all the substance’s future states and so in some sense is the cause of those states, then a different created substance producing a state in the patient substance would overdetermine those states. However, a different created substance producing a state in a patient substance is creaturely transeunt causation, but such the effects of such causation cannot be overdetermined. So, for very similar reasons, Leibniz can argue that (P) entails the denial of creaturely transeunt causation, even though the mature Leibniz thought the antecedent—or at least some construal’s of (P) in which the complete concept actually efficiently causes a substance’s states—is false.

\(^{421}\) With respect to (i), there is a potential complication that needs to be addressed. One could object that (i) counts against \( s_2 \)’s being a partial cause of \( s_1 \)’s being 200F when \( s_1 \) is a sufficient cause of \( s_1 \)’s being 200F only if the relatum on the effect side of the causal relation is fine-grained rather than coarse-grained. With respect to the example I’ve used, a coarse-grained relatum would be \( s_1 \)’s being hot while the fine-grained relatum would be \( s_1 \)’s being 200F. One could argue that while the same coarse-grained relatum could be caused by \( s_1 \) alone or \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \), a different fine-grained relatum would be caused depending on whether \( s_1 \) alone or \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \) causes \( s_1 \) to be 200F. Again-- \( s_1 \) alone would take a longer amount of time. However, all one needs to do is reject that the relata are fine-grained and then they could reject (i).\(^{421}\)

The best way to respond is to argue that for Leibniz, the relata would have to be fine-grained. On the effect side, the relatum is an accident: the accident A produced. Accidents—such as being 200F, however, are fine-grained. If the effect was an event, such as the event of \( s_1 \)’s increasing in temperature, then it could be coarse-grained. But as I’ve argued throughout this project, the effects of efficient causation in Leibniz’s metaphysics are accidents (when the cause is a created substances) or substances (when the cause is God). Jonathan Schaffer canvasses the various implications of holding that the relata in causation are coarse-grained or fine-grained in Jonathan Schaffer, "The Metaphysics of Causation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/causation-metaphysics/>. 
In summary, I’ve argued that Leibniz can make the move from the Spontaneity Thesis to the denial of creaturely transeunt causation, and the way in which he can do so is via a premise denying causal overdetermination. The reason is that Leibniz’s views on creaturely transeunt causation provide reasons to deny causal overdetermination. The same reason also gives Leibniz the resources to move from (P) to (C), as he did several times in his early career.
Appendix B. Leibniz on Transubstantiation.

According to the Catholic view of the Eucharist, codified in the Council of Trent (1545-1563) and developed at length earlier by influential Catholic philosophers such as Aquinas, during the Eucharistic mass, when the priest recites Christ’s words of the institution, the bread and wine are converted or transubstantiated into the body and blood of Christ. While the bread and wine are transubstantiated into the body and blood of Christ, the accidents of the bread and wine continue to exist. That the accidents continue to exist is evident to the senses, for the there is something that looks, feels, and tastes like bread. However, the accidents no longer inhere in the bread and the wine because it has been converted into Christ’s body and blood. The accidents do not inhere in Christ’s body and blood, because of Christ’s impassibility. Further, the accidents do not inhere in a third type of substance, such as the surrounding atmosphere.

According to Aquinas’s influential account of transubstantiation, the reason the accidents do not swap substances, say from the bread and wine to the atmosphere is

422 The words of the institution, according to Christian tradition, are “This is my body, which is for you, do this in remembrance of me” and “This cup is the new covenant in my blood; do this, as often as you drink it, in remembrance of Me.” See 1 Corinthians 11.
423 According to the Council of Trent, the accidents “which present themselves to the eyes or other senses exist in a wonderful and ineffable manner without a subject. All the accidents of bread and wine we can see, but they inhere in no substance, and exist independently of any; for the substance of the bread and wine is so changed into the body and blood of our Lord that they altogether cease to be the substance of bread and wine.” Catechism of the Council of Trent for Paris, Priests, trans. John McHugh and Charles Callan (New York: Joseph Wagner, 1962), 228-9, quoted in Daniel Fouke, “Dynamics and Transubstantiation in Leibniz’s Systema Theologicum,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 32, No. 1 (1994): 49
because he, like many Catholic philosophers, affirmed a variant of the Ownership Thesis of Accidents:

Accidents are not transferred from subject to subject, so that numerically one and the same accident inheres first in one subject and later in another. For an accident is individuated by its subject. Hence, it is impossible for numerically one and the same accident to inhere in one subject at one time and in another subject at another time.\(^{425}\)

Instead, the accidents of the bread and wine exist but without inhereing in any substance.

Later Scholastics such as Suarez distinguished between two kinds of accidents—modifications and real qualities—to explain transubstantiation. Real qualities were accidents that could exist—at least with the miraculous help of God—without inhereing in a substance.\(^{426}\) The accidents of the bread and wine that continued to exist during transubstantiation were among the real qualities. Modifications, on the other hand, could not exist even miraculously without a substance. That is, not even God could hold a modification existence without that modification inhereing in a substance.

Three of Leibniz’s metaphysical theses that I have argued in this dissertation are crucial for his metaphysics of causation are in tension with the Trenton understanding of transubstantiation— the dependency of accidents on substances, the ownership thesis of accidents, and the thesis that all accidents are modifications. The dependency of accidents on substances, recall, is thesis that accidents only exist when inhereing in substance. The ownership thesis of accidents is the thesis that an accident can only ever inhere in its original substance. The accident cannot swap substances or inhere in two or more substances at the same time. The reason for both the dependency and ownership

\(^{425}\) ST 1 q77 a1

\(^{426}\) See Suarez, DM 7.
theses is that Leibniz believed that all accidents are modifications and all modifications are limitations, as I argued in Chapter 3.

Given these theses, Leibniz could not consistently affirm the Trenton understanding of transubstantiation where the accidents of the bread and wine continue to exist without inhering in a substance. As Leibniz was a Lutheran, one might think that he did not have to explain transubstantiation or be committed to the Trenton view that accidents can exist—at least supernaturally—without a substance. However, at several stages in his career, Leibniz developed accounts of the metaphysics of transubstantiation, leading to a tension with the dependency and ownership theses and the thesis that all accidents are modifications.

Early in Leibniz’s career, during the 1660s and 70s, Leibniz in fact affirmed transubstantiation and argued that the Lutheran view of the Real Presence was the same as the Catholic Trenton view of transubstantiation. His understanding of transubstantiation in these earlier writings was importantly different from Scholastic understandings, but nonetheless, in several works, Leibniz explicitly argued that his own (earlier) metaphysical views were not only consistent with but explained transubstantiation.427

For example, in his 1668 (?) De Transsubstantiatione, Leibniz argued that bodies, such as the bread and wine, were substances only when united with a mind.428 A human body was a substance only because it is united with a human mind.429 Substances of

428 L 116.
429 Ibid.
bodies that lack reason, such as the bread and wine in the Eucharist, are substances when united with God. When considered apart from their union with a mind (Divine or human), bodies are merely accidents or appearances. When the bread and wine are transubstantiated into the body and blood of Christ, the accidents are united with Christ’s mind rather than the general concourse, which God’s mind has with all bodies (which are not united with human minds).\(^{430}\) This account developed by the young Leibniz is in tension with Leibniz’s Ownership Thesis of Accidents. For the bread and wine on this account, considered apart from their union with a mind, are accidents that swap substances. However, Leibniz abandoned this defense of Transubstantiation by 1690.\(^{431}\)

More pertinent to my project, however, are accounts of transubstantiation Leibniz developed in his later writings. Specifically, during his multiple-years spanning correspondence with Des Bosses, Leibniz expended a great deal of ink describing what would have to be the case in order for his metaphysics to be compatible with transubstantiation. If the mature Leibniz genuinely believed in transubstantiation and such transubstantiation involves accidents existing without a substance or swapping substances, then this results in a deep tension within his mature metaphysics. As I argued in chapters 3 and 4, the dependency thesis, ownership thesis, and theses that accidents are modifications play crucially important roles both in his positive account of causation and change and his criticisms of competing accounts.

Early on in their correspondence, Des Bosses wanted to know how Leibniz reconciled transubstantiation with his metaphysics of non-corporeal non-causally

\(^{430}\) Ibid.
\(^{431}\) Fouke, Ibid., 159
interacting substances, writing “But principally it would have been helpful to have known how you would defend by your principles the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, a matter which I believe you have discussed to some extent in your anti-Bayle work.” Throughout the remaining letters, Leibniz went to great lengths to sketch out what would have to be the case for the possibility of transubstantiation within his metaphysics by introducing an entity, the vinculum substantiale. According to Leibniz, bread—being corporeal—is not a substance but an aggregate of simple substances or monads. To unite the collection of monads so that the aggregate is an unum per se or genuine substance, however, an additional entity would have to be added—the vinculum substantiale. The substantiality of the bread would then consist of this uniting entity. During the Eucharist, a different bond, substituted by God, would replace the original vinculum substantiale—uniting the monads into the bread. While the bond is substituted, however, the situation would be phenomenally equivalent to the previous union of monads. Thus, the phenomena remains constant, as do the monads themselves, but the substantiality of the bread is changed given that the substantial bond has changed.

However, two reasons count against concluding Leibniz meant for his account of the vinculum substantiale—which he developed to explain transubstantiation—to be a part of his strict metaphysics. These reasons also point towards the mature Leibniz denying transubstantiation. First, early in his correspondence with Des Bosses, after

\[\text{References:}\]

\text{432} G II.388. \text{433} G II.399. \text{434} Ibid. \text{435} (G II.461: L 607). \text{436} G II.399.
initially presenting the notion of a *vinculum substantiale* in response to Des Bosses’s question about how Leibniz would explain transubstantiation, Leibniz wrote, “But we who reject transubstantiation do not need such a thing [*vinculum substantiale*].”\(^{437}\) Hence, even after introducing the idea of the *vinculum substantiale*, Leibniz explicitly denies transubstantiation.

Second, as Brandon Look has shown in his own work on the topic\(^{438}\), the *vinculum substantiale* is a (i) a principle of action\(^{439}\) insofar as it is a source of modifications\(^{440}\); (ii) which unites monads\(^{441}\); but (iii) which can exist independently of the monads it unites.\(^{442}\) Thus, the *vinculum substantiale* ought to count as a substance in Leibniz’s metaphysics.\(^{443}\) The only difference between the *vinculum substantiale* and other substance is that the former doesn’t have perceptions.\(^{444}\)

What’s especially key here is the role of the *vinculum substantiale* as unifying what would otherwise be a mere aggregate of monads into an *unum per se*. Leibniz is

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\(^{437}\) G II.399.


\(^{439}\) Leibniz writes, “This vinculum will be the principle of action of the composite substance.” L 613 (G II 503: L 613).

\(^{440}\) Leibniz argues that the vinculum substantiale is a source of modifications. (G II 503-4).

\(^{441}\) See, for example, (G II.516: AG 202).

\(^{442}\) Leibniz writes, “A vinculum substantiale superadded to the monads is in my opinion something absolute, such that although it corresponds accurately, in the course of nature, to the affections of the monads, that is, to their perceptions and appetites, and can therefore be taken to be within the monad in whose body its body is, it can nevertheless be independent of the monads in a supernatural sense and can be removed and adapted to other monads while its former monads remain.” (G II.474: L 608).

\(^{443}\) As opposed to just a relation between the monads it unites, which Leibniz rules out. Leibniz writes, “For orders, or relations which join two monads, are not in one monad or the other, but equally well in both at the same time, that is, really in neither, but in the mind alone. You will not understand this relation unless you add a real vinculum, that is, something substantial which is the subject of the predicates and modifications joining them together.” See (G II.517: AG 203)

\(^{444}\) Look, 220.
adamant that without the *vinculum substantiale*, the monads would be a mere aggregate and bodies (such as the bread and wine) would have merely phenomenal reality:

If that substantial bond [the *vinculum substantiale*] of monads did not exist, all bodies together with all of their qualities, would be nothing but well-founded phenomena, like a rainbow or an image in a mirror, in a word, continual dreams perfectly in agreement with one another, if a body is a substance, it is a making real of the phenomena over and above their agreement.\(^\text{445}\)

However, in order to unify the various monads into a genuine substance or *unum per se*, it must be capable of exercising causal powers on those monads.\(^\text{446}\) For the *vinculum substantiale* is not a mere relation between the various monads of the bread and wine. Instead the *vinculum substantiale* is a bond and a unifying reality that makes the monads, which would otherwise be an aggregate, into an *unum per se*.\(^\text{447}\) Given that Leibniz is adamant that no created substance (such as the *vinculum substantiale* uniting the monads prior to transubstantiation) can causally affect other substances, as we saw in Chapter 2, I argue that Leibniz should not have posited the *vinculum substantiale* in his metaphysics.

Given Leibniz’s claim that those who reject transubstantiation (a group he counts himself in) do not need the *vinculum substantiale*, I further conclude that Leibniz in fact did not posit it in his metaphysics. Instead, I argue that Leibniz’s accounts of the *vinculum substantiale* in his letters to Des Bosses should be viewed as a conditional with both an antecedent and consequent that Leibniz in fact rejected: Transubstantiation is

\[^{445}\text{G II.435-6: AG 198-99.}\]
\[^{446}\text{Look, 219-20.}\]
\[^{447}\text{Leibniz writes: “... either bodies are mere phenomena and so extension will also be only a phenomenon and the monads alone will be real, the union will be provided by the operation of the perceiving mind on the phenomena, or, if faith compels us to accept corporeal substances, we must say that the substance consists in that unifying reality that adds something complete (and therefore substantial), though in flux, to those things that are to be united.” (G II.435: AG 198).}\]

explainable in Leibniz’s monadological metaphysics only if there is a *vinculum substantialie*. 
Appendix C. Leibniz’s “De Realitate Accidentium”\textsuperscript{448}

It is worth considering, whether accidents have a reality that is something more than modal, and in what that [reality] consists. And at least if we posit the accidental reality, whether their reality is part of the reality of the substance, or if it adds to the substance a new reality. If it is part of the reality of the substance, it follows that the substance itself perishes in accidental change, or it becomes a new thing, and myself yesterday exists not yet, but another although very similar to me, so that the ship which is repaired, or the republic, or the river, are the same in name, are not really [the same]. For with a part destroyed, truly the same thing does not remain, even if thus far it is denominated the same thing by a more important surviving part, otherwise it is able to take place, so that with all of the parts little by little destroyed, which now belong to, yet it is finally said to be the same thing, just as the ship of Theseus. If a true part is understood to always remain, it at least will be the same, whereas the whole arrangement itself will not be. Therefore, if someone wants permanent part of the reality and a changeable part, they fall into their opinion, those who prefer to add to the substantial reality something from accidents. If however it is admitted that the substance perishes and comes into existence by change (Which is the thought of the duke of Buckingham in the ingenious writing about true religion the Schediasmate) they in reality remove all changeable substance. For since the changes of things are perpetual, so that nothing remains in the same state

\textsuperscript{448} A.VI.iv 994-996.
through the smallest intervals of time, it follows that no changeable substance ever exist
and actually endures a minimum time, for any moment whatever it is born and perishes,
neither is it said to properly exist, nor to act, neither is it able to produce anything or to
endure since nothing is brought about unless enduring for some time.\textsuperscript{449} It follows
therefore that all enduring things are by nature changeable substances, which by reason
we fall into the doctrine of Spinoza and of the Averroists, and the certain long established
tradition, which considers God alone or nature as a substance, creatures otherwise have
no reality other than as a mode of God.\textsuperscript{450} Truly, nor do they thus avoid [the problem], so
that in this way the changes which created substances undergo (naturally enduring) are
forced to be brought over into God, and thus neither shall God himself endure, but shall
continuously perish and be born. Whence it follows that in the end nothing exists
altogether, for if each thing perishes once, so that from here it follows, nothing will be
because nothing revives it; for out of nothing comes nothing, and nothing is produced
freely from itself. Therefore, it is necessary that something in things persist through
change. But if now a part of the divine reality remains, and a part perishes, we return
back to those who add accidental realities to the substances, and why do they not admit it
in creatures, because now we say [it is] in God, and indeed we relinquish created
substance?

\textsuperscript{449} Mugnai’s Translation: Given that things change perpetually so that nothing remains in the same state for
even the smallest amount of time, it follows that there is not a changeable substance and that it [i.e. the
substance] does not endure even a minimal amount of time. What in any moment is born and then perishes,
one cannot say it exists in a proper sense, for it does not act or undergo anything, because everything needs
time to exist. (A VI, 4A, 995)

\textsuperscript{450} Mugnai’s Translation: [ . . . ] they [Spinoza and the Averroists] consider only God as substances or as
nature, and regard creatures as the modes of God. (A VI, 4A, 995)
We now come to those who think that substances have a two-fold reality, one substantial and the other accidental. These [views] do not themselves also lack their own difficulties. For it will be able to be asked why those added realities are said to belong to the substance as it were in a subject, and why it is not considered as a thing per se, even though not enduring.\textsuperscript{451} But if that inherence seems to really affect the reality of the substance, so that it exists somehow in close union by some real it exists, it is not apparent, how the accidental [reality] is able to perish, without change in the substantial reality it [the accidental reality] originates from. Therefore, it itself will be divided again into a perishing and permanent part, contrary to hypothesis.\textsuperscript{452}

Nor thus far do I see another way to avoid these obstacles, how if abstracta are considered as things, but as shorthands of speaking, as when I call heat, it is not useful in order that I bring about naming of any wandering subject; or if in order that I say that something is hot, and so far I am a nominalist, at least through caution.\textsuperscript{453} I say therefore that substances change, or at diverse times their attributes are unlike; for this has no doubt, whether however in change there is something real that perishes and is born; and whether there are diverse realities in a substance, which are the foundations of diverse predicates, it is not necessary to ask, and, if asked it is difficult to decide.\textsuperscript{454} It’s enough

\textsuperscript{451} Mugnai’s Translation: Why does one believe that the added reality inheres in the substances, as in a subject, and why does one not consider it to be a thing in itself, even though it does not persist?
\textsuperscript{452} Mugnai’s Translation: If this inherence, being some kind of real connection, affects the substantial reality, it is not clear how the accidental reality may perish without causing any change in the substantial one. The entire substance would, therefore, divide again into perishing and persisting parts, contrary to the hypothesis.
\textsuperscript{453} Mugnai: It seems to me that, till now, the only way to avoid these obstacles was to consider the abstract terms not as [corresponding to] things, but as a kind of shorthand for discourse [. . .] and it is exactly on this point that I am a nominalist, even though it is only to be precautious.
\textsuperscript{454} Mugnai: I will therefore say that the substance changes, meaning that, in different times, its attributes are different, since this is beyond any doubt. It is not necessary, however, to ask whether there is
for substances alone to be posited as things, and to say truths about them. Geometers don’t actually use abstract definitions, but they reduce them to the concrete; thus, Euclid doesn’t use the definition of ratio which he has, but he explains those things in the ratio, which are said to have equal, greater, or smaller ratios.

something real that perishes and is born, which corresponds to a given change, nor whether there are different realities in a substance that are the foundations of different predicates. If someone were to pose these questions, it would be very difficult to answer them. Mugnai: “It suffices alone to consider the [individual] substances as things and to state truths about them” (A VI, 4A 996)
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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