Introduction: Dewey's Influence on Curriculum

To educationally recover something (or somebody, as the title suggests vis-a-vis Dewey) invokes at least two assumptions: (1) that it has been covered before, thus, it can be recovered; and (2) that it somehow increases perspective, insight, or understanding, and is therefore educational. Clearly, the work of John Dewey permeates the literature of curriculum studies. On numerous occasions (Schubert, 1980, 1982a, 1982c, 1986a) I have discussed an experientialist tradition in curriculum discourse that stems from writings of Francis W. Parker, William James, and principally John Dewey. It is developed through the writings of Boyd Bode, Harold Rugg, George S. Counts, William H. Kilpatrick, John Childs, and L. Thomas Hopkins. While the years from 1940 and onward saw the deterioration of a Deweyan brand of progressive education (and the demise of The Progressive Education Association), I submit that the spirit of the experientialist critique has emerged time and again (often without the progressive banner and even without Deweyan citation), challenging conventional theory and practice in curriculum.

Zissis (1987) identifies six recurrent themes in the experientialist critique from the late nineteenth century to the present: (1) advocacy of a continuous search for the meaning of the good life as opposed to the conventional tendency to establish fixed parameters of the good life and attempt to mold students to fit within them; (2) advocacy of the person as a creator of knowledge and morality as contrasted with the person as receiver of knowledge and moral precept; (3) recognition of knowing as multi-dimensional (a variety of legitimate epistemological bases) in contrast to knowing as only a
rational/technical process; (4) acceptance of knowledge as an intersubjective creation as opposed to knowledge as an objectified entity; (5) characterization of educational growth and development as primarily a process of intrinsic rather than extrinsic motivation; and (6) acceptance of the need for curricular experience to be based on participatory democracy instead of autocratic bestowal of knowledge or autocracy disguised as representative democracy.

In addition to the identification of experientialist and progressive themes in curriculum discourse throughout this century, it is possible to study the widespread acknowledgment of Dewey as a source of curriculum studies. Kliebard (1986), for instance, in his recent interpretation of the struggle of ideas and practices that forged the American curriculum from 1893 to 1958, recognizes Dewey as sufficiently important to be set apart from the contending parties as a kind of exemplar and intelligent mediator for all of the groups and individuals involved. Sixty years earlier, the all-star team of curriculum scholars (William C. Bagley, Franklin Bobbitt, Frederick G. Bonser, Werrett W. Charters, George S. Counts, Stuart A. Courtis, Ernest Horn, Charles H. Judd, Frederick J. Kelly, William H. Kilpatrick, Harold O. Rugg, and George A. Works) who comprised the committee that authored the second volume of the Twenty-sixth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, *The Foundations of Curriculum-Making* (Rugg, 1927), saw fit to conclude their composite statement and individual rebuttal commentaries with a section of twenty-two pages of quotations selected from Dewey's published writings on curriculum. Moreover, the next twenty-one pages included quotations from Herbartian scholars on curriculum, including additional quotations from Dewey, who is Herbartian only by a stretch of the imagination.

To augment the re in the recovery of Dewey in curriculum, I conducted a brief citation analysis of synoptic or general curriculum texts in the 1980s,
texts used frequently to educate teachers, curriculum leaders, and future scholars about curriculum theory, history, research, and development. Among eleven widely used texts published from 1980 to 1986, eight referenced Dewey more than or equal to any other author listed in their index. These include: Tanner and Tanner (1980), Hass (1987), Unruh and Unruh (1984), McNeil (1985), Miller and Seller (1985), Eisner (1985), Doll (1986), and Schubert (1986a). In the other three texts surveyed, Dewey was cited third by Wiles and Bondi (1984); second by Beane, Tespfer, and Alessi (1986); and among the top ten by Saylor, Alexander, and Lewis (1981). Selecting one very prominent text from each decade stretching back to the time of the NSSE Twenty-sixth Yearbook, we find Dewey referenced fifth by Zais (1976); first by Taba (1962); first by Smith, Stanley, and Shores (1950); first by Alberty (1947); and second by Caswell and Campbell (1935), the first synoptic curriculum text. Moreover, a 1981 survey (Schubert, Posner, and Schubert, 1982) of curriculum scholars reveals that when asked to name scholars and books most influential to them and/or authors and books that they would recommend to others, curriculum scholars consistently select Dewey among the most influential. Likewise, Shane's poll of significant writings that influenced curriculum in this century reveals that Dewey's *Democracy and Education* (1916) and Tyler's *Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction* (1949) were most influential, with several of Dewey's other books also heading the list. Similarly, Fraley's (1981) list of curriculum classics, derived from a poll of professors of curriculum, finds Dewey as author of five of the twenty-nine selected.

All of this contributes evidence to support the assertion that Dewey has been perhaps the most prominent figure in the field of curriculum studies. Why, then, should it be necessary or desirable to recover his work? Clearly, Dewey is more often identified as a philosopher, a philosopher of education, and a
political activist than as a curriculum theorist. His contribution to curriculum was more indirect than direct. This, however, should not be surprising, since the curriculum field had not taken distinguishable form until after Dewey had completed most of his major works that could be considered curricular in character. Dewey's *The School and Society* (1900), *The Child and the Curriculum* (1902), *How We Think* (1910), *Interest and Effort in Education* (1913), and *Democracy in Education* (1916), as well as *Schools for Tomorrow* (1915, with Evelyn Dewey) were all written before the curriculum field is generally acknowledged to have begun. Although at least twenty-four curriculum books can be identified in this century prior to 1918, that date is generally noted as the birth date of the curriculum field (Schubert, 1980). In 1918 Bobbitt published *The Curriculum*, the Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education of the National Education Association published *Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education*, and Kilpatrick published *The Project Method*. After 1916, Dewey devoted most of his scholarly energies to philosophy, although he authored four smaller books on education that were indeed highly regarded: *The Sources of a Science of Education* (1929), *The Way Out of Educational Confusion* (1931), *Experience and Education* (1938), and a collection of previous essays on education, *Education Today* (1940), as well as subsequent editions of pre-1918 books. Despite this later writing on education, it seems fair to assert that Dewey was primarily a philosopher after 1918, and probably always was. Of course, he wrote directly about curriculum on occasion; however, most of his direct influence on the curriculum field came through the interpretation of his work by disciples.

One steeped in the Kuhnian analysis of paradigms of inquiry might see this as evidence to support Kuhn's (1962) assertion that paradigm shifts are often created by those whose field lies outside the field being influenced. It might be claimed, therefore, that Dewey did much to create the new field of curriculum
studies precisely because of his great insight into philosophy. One must temper such a claim with the realization that Dewey's philosophical work was always permeated with his educational ideas. In a large sense he saw education and philosophy as inseparable, the study of one having mutually beneficial influence on the other. Curriculum for Dewey resides at the heart of education, and deals with the most fundamental issues regarding the nature of that which is worthwhile to know and experience. Such fundamental curriculum issues, if taken seriously as Dewey advocated, invoke the need to study the deepest assumptions about metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, ethics, aesthetics, politics, logic, and religion.

This leads directly to my response to the central topic of this symposium, that of recovering Dewey's work, and the need to do so in curriculum. I want to argue that the potential for curriculum improvement embodied in the corpus of Dewey's work is far from realized in curriculum theory, and most assuredly rare in curriculum practice. Therefore, the reason for recovering Dewey is implied in the symposium title itself, "Educationally Recovering Dewey"; simply put, the reason to recover Dewey is to be educational. Despite the apparent vastness of Dewey's influence on education generally, and curriculum in particular, I submit that the consequences of his oft-cited work are sorely absent in practice. I suggest that this is due to a deep cultural aversion to the most basic values embedded in Deweyan curricular philosophy. Most profoundly, the deeply ingrained faith in democracy that pervades Dewey's educational theory is simply not accepted by the majority of today's professional educators and the public generally. The most influential school reform proposals, and most of the regional and state reform legislation, contradict the Deweyan position on almost every count. The experientialist assumptions (Zissis, 1987) noted earlier (personal search for the good life, person as creator, knowing as
multi-dimensional, knowledge as intersubjectively constituted, education as intrinsic, and participatory democracy) are negated by most of the current reform efforts. A deep-seated reason for this state of affairs is that the Deweyan position on curriculum severely contradicts dominant assumptions in everyday life (namely, that the good life is received, the person is a consumer, knowing is unidimensional and rule-bound, knowledge is objectively bestowed, education is extrinsic, and the best governance is authoritarianism disguised as representative democracy). The Deweyan position has, therefore, been expelled from school practice time and time again.

I wish to point out in the remainder of this paper that Dewey offers a largely unrealized and radical departure from conventional assumptions about curriculum. So radical is this departure from conventional curricular "wisdom" that the pessimist within me wonders if it is possible to actualize the spirit of a Deweyan orientation to curriculum on any large scale at all. The optimist within me, however, sustains a hope that says a Deweyan orientation and its experientialist relatives embody the only promise of authentic curriculum reform and the unique brand of specialized knowledge supporting that reform. I will organize my comments around the usual subdimensions of curriculum inquiry (see Schuber, 1986, pp. 43-46).

Curriculum Theory

The realm of curriculum theory and the relation between curriculum theory and practice would likely be the realm of the most profound alteration were a Deweyan orientation subscribed to a large scale. To use Dewey's language, both a logical and psychological response could be derived to the perennial question: Is there such a thing as a curriculum theory, and, if so, what would it be like? From a logical stance, one that looks first at the disciplines of knowledge, it can be argued that if curriculum inquiry genuinely addresses the question of
what is worthwhile to know and experience, it then invokes the whole array of philosophical assumptions. Attendant questions about the nature of reality, human nature, knowledge and knowing, the good life, the just society, defensible reason, the beautiful and the sublime all become problematic for the curricularist. In the larger corpus of his philosophical writing Dewey addressed all of these questions, and each of his major works could be considered a basis for developing a comprehensive curriculum theory. Consider, for example, this limited list:

**Perennial Philosophical Categories and Deweyan Sources for Curriculum Theory**

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<td>Nature of reality</td>
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<td><strong>Experience and Nature</strong> (1929a)</td>
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<td>Human nature</td>
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<td><strong>Human Nature and Conduct</strong> (1922)</td>
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<th>Epistemology:</th>
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<td>The continuous search</td>
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<td><strong>The Quest for Certainty</strong> (1929c)</td>
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<td>Dialogue, dialect, and transaction</td>
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<td><strong>Knowing and the Known</strong> (with A.F. Bentley, 1949)</td>
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<td>The knowing process</td>
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<td>Ethics and morality</td>
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<td><strong>Freedom and Culture</strong> (1939)</td>
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<td>The individual and society</td>
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<td><strong>Individualism Old and New</strong> (1930)</td>
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<td>Economics, politics, and praxis</td>
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<td><strong>The Public and Its Problems</strong> (1927)</td>
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<td>Logic, scientific method, and human problem-solving</td>
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<td><strong>Logic, The Theory of Inquiry</strong> (1938b)</td>
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<td>Religiousness of democratic faith</td>
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<td><strong>A Common Faith</strong> (1934)</td>
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This context of Deweyan literature provides philosophic assumptions that could constitute a basis for a curriculum theory, and such a theory would be logical (derived first from the disciplines of knowledge and developed for
curricularists). As Dewey might say, it is from the realm of "funded knowledge." Despite the centrality of logically organized funded knowledge in Dewey's scheme of things, the use-value of the logical (or funded knowledge) is evaluated by its consequences in the world of lived experience. Moreover, I suggest that Dewey would argue in theory building, as well as in pedagogy, beginning with the psychological and moving to the logical, rather than starting with funded knowledge and then focusing on use in application.

Dewey's use of psychological, as a counterpoint of logical, reveals his allegiance to the realm of lived experience. By psychological, he refers not only to momentary interest or whim as the starting point of pedagogy, but rather sees the momentary interest as symbolic of deeper human interests (Dewey, 1916). Such interests are shared in the deep structure of human concern. They reflect a fundamental human quest to create personal knowledge and public meaning about what Robert Ulich so aptly called "the great mysteries and events of life: birth, death, love, tradition, society and the crowd, success and failure, salvation, and anxiety" (Ulich, 1955, p. 255). Such fundamental human interests are the basis of inquiry itself as well as the key to sound pedagogy. Since these experiences are shared among people throughout history, across boundaries of race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, age, and class, they are the seedbed of dialogue.

Dialogue, with its conjoint associated living, is the basis for participatory democracy. Inquiry as the search for personal meaning in a public space is the kind of science that Dewey advocated. Democracy and science, so constituted, are the hallmarks of Dewey's philosophy and the central tenets of his theory of education. Of course, during the time of Dewey's major writing, one could hardly go wrong by promoting the labels of science and democracy. Anyone who has read much beyond the title page of any of Dewey's major works begins to
realize that Dewey argued for a kind and quality of both democracy and science that radically departed from prevailing interpretations. Today, too, Dewey's images of science (as the personal and democratic creation of meaning through daily problem-solving [Dewey, 1910, 1929b, 1938b]), expressive thought (Dewey, 1934b), and reverie (1934a), and his images of democracy (as conjoint or cooperative living built on sciences of dialogue, deliberation, and dialectic that carefully attend to the consequences of action that flow with inquiry [Dewey, 1927, 1929b, 1930, 1935, 1939]), depart radically from conventional curriculum research, theory, and practice.

Thus, it is clear that what can be educational about recovering Dewey for curriculum is that his notions of science and democracy combine to form a sharp critique of the objectified catchwords that those labels have become. This is particularly relevant in an era when the promotion of democracy is equated with economic supremacy and the conduct of educational science means deification of rule-like stands of inquiry that are deemed impervious to values and ideologies. The quest for that which is worthwhile and the search for the good life and just society implicit in that quest, according to Deweyan orientations to democracy and science, clearly situate curriculum theory, as reflective theorizing, in the lived worlds of persons and their immediate public spheres. Given this, the recovery of Dewey for curriculum would render significant changes in the conventional categories into which curriculum is often subdivided, e.g., curriculum theory, curriculum history, curriculum development, curriculum design, curriculum implementation, curriculum evaluation, curriculum change, and curriculum inquiry (Schubert, 1986a, pp. 40-43). Let us consider brief illustrations of what might happen to these categories (so much a part of curriculum discourse, especially the rhetoric of reform) if they were infused with a Deweyan spirit of inquiry.
Curriculum Theory Revisited

The foregoing section, entitled "Curriculum Theory," began with the suggestion that Deweyan philosophy, writ large, embodies all of the philosophical categories necessary to build a comprehensive curriculum theory from a range of assumptions. However, the section concluded with an admonition to heed Dewey's principle of moving from the psychological to the logical, thus, arguing for a reconstitution of curriculum theory away from an abstract guiding construct to a process of continuous reflection or theorizing about (and in) the course of action. This image of curriculum theory creates havoc with managerial curriculum administrators who envision a theory as a set of rules for action that can be plugged in for the purpose of resolving prespecified dilemmas. Even the notion of a comprehensive theory as a set of assumptions derived from Deweyan philosophy would be an anathema to the 'plug-in' interest because it requires considerable scholarly inquiry, and, in Deweyan spirit, it is open-ended, i.e., the tenets of Deweyan philosophy are indicators of direction for further inquiry which only becomes concrete through the exercise of intelligence in specific contexts with particular problems in question.

There is a real sense, then, in which the situation-based curriculum inquirer is a highly appropriate developer of curriculum theories, i.e., teachers and even students can be seen as developers of theory to guide their search for worthwhile knowledge, meaningful experiences, the good life, and the just society. In fact, the evolving perspectives of teachers and students who seriously engage this search actually may be considered to be continuously reconstructed curriculum theories. Thus, the pedagogical transaction of teachers and students that moves in Deweyan fashion from the psychological to the logical is, itself, theory development (Schubert, 1982b). The movement from the psychological to the logical, sometimes called Dewey's progressive theory of
Curriculum organization, involves inquiry that is microcosmic of the whole range of dimensions of Deweyan philosophy.

Curriculum History

In addition to the usual topics in the history of educational ideas and practice—and the history of the curriculum field itself—the situational and contextual nature of curriculum development by teachers and students invokes new images of curriculum history. Such history would focus directly on teachers, not so much on their behaviors but on the ways in which they reflect on curriculum matters, namely, on the way teachers deal with the problem of developing worthwhile experiences. Traver (1987) criticizes the corpus of extant research on teaching presented in *The Handbook of Research on Teaching* (Wittrock, 1986) for the major omission of the perspectives of teachers themselves. Traver (1987) calls for an "autobiographical" approach to study teachers using first person accounts of their work. In the curriculum literature, Berk (1980) illustrates a biographic approach to curriculum history; Pinar and Grumet (1976) and Pinar (1980 and 1981) exemplify autobiographical method; and Connelly and Elbaz (1980), Elbaz (1983), Connelly and Clandinin (1985), Munby (1982), Clandinin (1986), Butt (1986), and Oberg (1987) focus on the personal and practical reflection of teachers in the process of developing curricula. Some inquiry into teaching points in a similar direction: Connell's (1985) critical analysis of teachers' work; Stenhouse's development of teacher-as-researcher approaches (Rudduck and Hopkins, 1985); an interpretation of teachers' worlds and work in light of school improvement literature by Lieberman and Miller (1984); Goodson's (1985) collection of perspectives on teachers' lives and careers and Sikes' (1985) treatment of the same topic; a study of teachers' sense of efficacy and the difference it makes in student achievement by Ashton and Webb (1986); and first person accounts by some who have contributed to autobiographical
literature on teaching since the 1960s (e.g., Herndon, 1985; Kohl, 1984). The first-person literature to which I refer often has a counter-culture flavor, especially in opposition to the dominant culture of schooling; primary exemplars include John Holt, Herb Kohl, George Dennison, James Herndon, Sylvia Ashton-Warner, and Jonathan Kozol, among others.

The point of all this is that there is a great deal of curriculum history to be excavated within the experiential repertoires of teachers. The Deweyan emphasis on teachers and students as curriculum makers who continuously move through phases from the psychological to logical necessitates taking a much more serious look at the values, beliefs, and experientially derived principles that guide teachers' reflective efforts to enable students to engage in worthwhile endeavors. During the past year, I have begun to direct a research project in the Chicago area called The Teacher Lore Project (Schubert, 1987), which has as its purpose the accumulation of audio tapes of teachers talking about values, beliefs, and principles that guide their work. It is hoped that the interpretations and analyses that result from such study will provide the seedbed for a neglected dimension of both curriculum history and curriculum theory.

Curriculum Development

Curriculum development, as revealed in classic curriculum texts of each decade for the past fifty years (e.g., Caswell and Campbell, 1935; Stratemeyer, Forkner, Mckim, and Passow, 1947 and 1957; Smith, Stanley, and Shores, 1950 and 1957; Taba, 1962; and Tanner and Tanner, 1975 and 1980), has usually drawn heavily upon Dewey. While authors of such texts often remind readers of the centrality of teachers and students to the curriculum development process, this advice is often read by administrators as guidelines for management. In contrast to mounting guidelines and mandates from state departments, school boards,
and central office administrators, the Deweyan origins of these authors of curriculum development texts still can be seen today in their emphasis on diagnosis of situational needs and interests in the context of the classroom, and on the advocacy of scientific and democratic problem-solving as a basis of continuous reconstruction of the curriculum by those who live there, viz., teachers and students.

Despite this intent, however, as curriculum development literature grew throughout this century, teachers and students were increasingly pushed to the sidelines, more specifically to roles of receivers. Curriculum leaders in school districts were staff and line administrators whose purpose was to develop curriculum for teacher use, for teachers to follow. Curriculum development became managerial in character; note, for example, recent illustrative titles of endeavors to re-educate curriculum workers: books by Glatthorn, Curriculum Leadership (1987); English, Improving Curriculum Management in the Schools (1980); and institutes and workshops by organizations such as ASCD and private consulting firms that focus on the management and leadership aspects of curriculum development.

In contrast, a Deweyan emphasis for curriculum development would see teachers and students (those most directly involved in the teaching-learning situation) as the principal architects of curriculum. Together, they would address the fundamental curriculum question: What knowledge and experience are most worthwhile in given situations? Together, too, they would work out the human transactions necessary to pursue their continuously evolving sense of meaning and direction.

Curriculum Design

Curriculum development usually deals with the larger domain of orchestrating human and material resources to further an educational philosophy, as well
as the typical notion of curriculum design which involves specific decisions about how to realize the aims and purposes articulated. While Walker (1971) and others point out that this involves a considerable amount of political interaction, curriculum design most frequently focuses on particular characteristics of decision regarding such Tylerian (Tyler, 1949) matters as purposes, learning experiences, organization (scope, sequence, environment, instructional strategies, etc.), and evaluation. Decision about these matters is conventionally assumed to occur prior to and apart from the teaching-learning situation. Dewey (1938a) argued that this is (to invoke Abraham Lincoln's well-known image of democracy "of, by, and for the people") to have a curriculum for the students without being of or by them (Schubert and Schubert, 1981; Melnick, 1987). Dewey's democratic image of education concurs, again contending that the process of determining how to pursue one's sense of meaning and direction is as central to educational development as particular content studied. As with curriculum development, Dewey would see design as a quality of the mind and of life lived more than as characteristics of curriculum materials, texts, computer software, and other predesigned instructional packages.

Curriculum Implementation

The most prevalent notion of implementation is that of carrying out something designed beforehand. Often this invokes a treatment specification and verification model in which curriculum policy is spelled out in advance, perhaps after conducting a highly structured needs analysis. Implementation is considered successful if it can be verified by mapping on the original prespecifications or goals. In their study of implementation of political policy, Pressman and Wildavsky (1979) point out a contrasting view—one much more compatible with Dewey's position than the highly mechanistic treatment specification-verification model. They suggest that policy be conceived as
disposition and implementation of evolution which is consonant with Dewey's characterization of education as "that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to meaning of experience and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience" (Dewey, 1916, p. 76). Education is not something set out in advance to be obtained later. Rather, it is a continuous process of reconstructing one's perspective and the consequences of acting on that perspective. Clearly, the perspective provides disposition about what is worthwhile, but action (i.e., implementation) based on that disposition must be encouraged to evolve in view of the continuous monitoring of consequences.

**Curriculum Evaluation**

Evaluation, revised according to Dewey, flows directly from consideration of implementation. Formative evaluation, in the treatment specification-verification model involves periodic monitoring of implementation to determine if it is keeping on the predetermined track. If it is not on track, it is put back on track (track being defined by prespecification). In a Deweyan orientation (one that along with Pressman and Wildavsky [1979] sees policy—disposition and implementation—as evolution), formative evaluation continuously assesses the value of the initial disposition in light of circumstances that were not foreseen in advance or could not have been foreseen because situations have changed. Thus, instead of returning practice to a predetermined track, the Deweyan orientation trusts practitioners sufficiently to encourage ongoing improvement of the track itself. This trust manifests itself even in the case of summative evaluation. The individuals and groups of individuals most fully influenced by a policy, course of action, or curriculum are precisely those who are deemed most capable of assessing its impact on their lives. This, of course, does not rule out assessment by experts who possess specialized knowledge. However, it is those who live under the influence of the curriculum in
question who should decide when and whether to consult the experts rather than merely use evaluation determined and conducted by outside experts who are deemed more capable, more insightful, and more wise than those who live and create the curriculum, namely, teachers and students.

Curriculum Change

Curriculum change is not desirable unless it can be justified as improvement. Change for its own sake, or for the sake of public relations, is a long story in curriculum. In large part, it is, as Apple (1987) and others have shown, a story of de-skill ing the profession of teaching. Purposes are generated in one setting by one group of curricularists, evaluation is conceived and conducted by another set of curricularists, and teachers and students are merely expected to follow orders of the former and submit to the judgment of the latter.

The professional fulfillment of teaching that includes conception of an individual teacher's work, followed by execution and self-evaluation, is sacrificed in the interest of specialized division of labor. In the process, curriculum change loses its sense of wholeness that can only be provided by the teacher. In her analysis of what she calls the "wonderland" of educational reform, Cross (1987) declares that "teachers must be actively involved in the process of teaching. They cannot be following someone else's dicta" (p. 500). She continues, "If teaching is a profession in which it is possible to grow and develop, then teachers are learners" (p. 501). Much of the curriculum reform movement of the 1980s has apparently learned nothing from mistakes in reform efforts of the post-Sputnik era. To wit, state departments and the multitude of "blue ribbon commissions" on educational reform rarely consult teachers about what should be done, how it might be evaluated, and/or what they have learned from their experience in classrooms. Change that purports to be improvement
must be guided by continuous reflectiveness, an art that Schon has convincingly argued is well known to first-rate practitioners across professional fields (Schon, 1983). In a more recent work, Schon offers means by which the arts of reflection can be enhanced through professional education (Schon, 1987). Parallels to Dewey are legion, as his portrayal of reflective inquiry is well-known (Dewey, 1910, 1938b).

Curriculum Inquiry

A Deweyan emphasis on curriculum inquiry moves into sharp relief the role of teachers in curriculum inquiry. At the same time, it does not diminish the involvement of curriculum scholars, curriculum leaders in school districts, relevant government officials, or building principals. It simply puts all of them in perspective with teachers. Stenhouse (1975, also Rudduck and Hopkins, 1985) does this in his work on teacher-as-researcher. The work of Carr and Kemmis (1986) which extends Stenhouse-like perspectives in the tradition of action research (Miel, 1946; Corey, 1953) and adds to it an awareness that enables teachers to become critical (e.g., Bullough, Goldstein, and Holt, 1984; Connell, 1985; Giroux and McClarin, 1986; Lather, 1986; and Apple and Weis, 1983). Similarly, the educational criticism of Eisner (1985abc), Barone (1983), and McCutcheon (1981) adds to the acuteness of perception that researchers, curriculum leaders, and teachers can have when they inquire together to interpret and understand educational situations. The necessary salience of students as well as teachers in the process of curriculum inquiry is clear in Dewey's conclusion to The Sources of a Science of Education (Dewey, 1929):

The sources of an educational science are any portions of ascertained knowledge that enter into the heart, head, and hands of educators, and which, by entering in, render the performance of the educational function more enlightened, more humane, more truly educational than it was before. But there is no way to discover what is "more truly educational" except by the continuation of the educational act itself... Education is by its nature an endless circle or spiral.
It is an activity which includes science within itself. In this very process it sets more problems to be further studied, which then react into the educative process to change it still further, and thus demand more thought, more science, and so on, in everlasting sequence. [Dewey, 1929, pp. 76-77.]

Conclusion

According to Dewey's orientation, that which should be recovered for curriculum is clearly not a recipe. It is a spirit of inquiry, in the sense of Montesquieu's distinction between the spirit and the letter of the law. Thus, if Dewey may not have embraced certain issues or ideas fully enough (which he would doubtless be the first to admit), we should turn to those who continue the quest. For example, if his image of deliberation could be sharpened, we might turn to Schwab (1969, 1970, 1971, 1973, 1983) on practical curriculum inquiry; if Dewey could not have anticipated the repercussions wrought by post-industrial capitalism for democracy, we might turn to the work of Apple (1982), Aronowitz and Giroux (1985), or Shor and Freire (1987); if his image of the good life seems to stop short, we might turn to Alasdair MacIntyre (1981), Iris Murdock (1970), or Eliseo Vivas (1950); if we think that Dewey did not turn inward to the phenomenology of teaching thoroughly enough, we might turn to van Manen (1986) or Langevelt (1983); if we deem Dewey's reliance on science too confining, we could turn to claims that curriculum insight can derive from critical and interpretive philosophy as well as the empirical and analytic (Feinberg, 1983), a literary rendition (Greene, 1973 and 1978), intuition (Noddings and Shore, 1984), a feminist ethic of caring (Noddings, 1984), and a range of other epistemological bases (Eisner, 1985c; Haggerson, 1986; Phenix, 1964; Rubin, 1984; Willis, 1978); if we wish Dewey would have elaborated more on the nature of communicative competence, we could study Habermas (1984) and Bowers (1984); if we think that Dewey did not emphasize religious dimensions of curriculum and pedagogy sufficiently, we could turn to Foshay (1985) on peak spiritual
experiences, Macdonald (1981) on curriculum theorizing as an act of faith and a prayerful act, and Huebner (1984) on religious metaphors in curriculum language; if we estimate that Dewey does not give sufficient attention to the role of nonschool educative environments, we could turn to those who advocate sources that see curriculum as permeating a whole configuration of school and nonschool organizations and arrangements in students' lives (e.g., Cremin, 1976; Schubert, 1981; Fantini and Sinclair, 1985); and if we think that Dewey could not have predicted the range of contemporary social issues that bear on curriculum and education generally, we could turn to portrayals by Molnar (1987) and by Stevens and Wood (1987).

In all of the above, it is of central importance to remember the pivotal focus that Dewey gives to the exercise of intelligence by all those involved in any situation in question. This point clearly implies that students as well as teachers should continuously conduct inquiry into that which is worthwhile for their lives and for the consequences of their lives, i.e., they should engage in curriculum inquiry. This is implicit, as well, in Dewey's image of democracy sketched earlier. Those who think Dewey did not provide enough practical examples of his theory in action, beyond the University of Chicago Laboratory School, might turn to the work of the Institute for Democratic Education initiated by George Wood at Ohio University which is described in the following essay. Moreover, the notion that teachers and students can be conceived as primary curriculum inquirers is corroborated in a review of Torbert (1981) and related sources by Short (1985), who describes it as a view that "research and action are inextricably intertwined in practice" (p. 72-73), and it is supported in research by Brimfield, Roderick, and Yamamoto (1983) that portrays persons as researchers in the observations of participants. Herein, then, lies the essence of a Deweyan recovery of curriculum—a recovery of fundamental questioning about
what is worthwhile in the lives of teachers and students, who together engage in
the continuous reconstruction of their lives through the experience of democracy
in education.

My central point is that Dewey offers a specialized understanding of
curriculum that is quite different from the usual image of specialized knowledge
as the results of research in social and behavioral sciences. In fact, what
Dewey calls "a technical definition of education" (as noted earlier as "that
reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of
experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent
experience"—Dewey, 1916, p. 76) is especially telling when coupled with his
conclusion about educational science, viz., that "education . . . is an activity
which includes science within itself" (Dewey, 1929, p. 77). If educational
science (or inquiry) is within education, and if curriculum (as the progressive
organization of subject matter) pervades education, it seems reasonable that
educational science is, in fact, the moving force that enables curriculum to
proceed from the psychological to the logical (i.e., from momentary interest or
concern, to fundamental human interests through democratic transactions, and to
perceiving valuable insight that speaks to those interests through available
funded knowledge).

Thus, to educationally recover Dewey in curriculum would be to realize that
engagement in the progressive organization of curriculum is to do curriculum
inquiry. Therefore, if we search for exemplary curriculum inquiry, we should
look to teaching-learning situations where teachers and learners cooperate to
discover greater worth, meaning, and direction for their lives, and for the
consequences of their lives. There, the educational recovery of Dewey for
curriculum can be found as well, and probably not in reform mandates conceived
by persons who know little of the lives of those who are supposed to implement
them. It is only when teachers and students, themselves, address fundamental curriculum questions about worthwhile knowledge and experience, about meaning and direction in their lives, about assessing the consequences of their lives, and about how to contribute to a good and just world, that a Deweyan orientation to curriculum can be developed.*

*To borrow the title of what may be the first visually appealing new journal in education (Teaching Education, edited by Craig Kridel), Dewey can be educationally recovered in curriculum when curriculum becomes "teaching education."
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