Insofar as this is the first issue of an occasional paper by The John Dewey Society, the lack of an established response format leaves me relieved and yet anxious. Relief is experienced in terms of feeling free of the vexing problem of format constraint, but anxiety is felt in terms of the personal judgment that the response should be such that it might be worthy of future replication. Hence, bearing these thoughts in mind, I am pleased to have the opportunity to respond to Professor Pizzillo's paper because the topic he has chosen appeals, perhaps fascinates, huge audiences, not solely because bilingualism and pluralism "are in the air" but because each offers "the glimpse behind the curtain" in terms of what it is to live a different way of life, to perceive oneself and the world in quite a different way. Each reveals aspects of American life rarely caught except in certain novels or in movies like The Goodfather and the Swedish import, The Emigrants.

In his paper, Pizzillo has set forth a description of the prevalent state of bilingual education and has proposed reasons for directing our attention and effort toward asking some hard questions and making bilingual education a much-needed and vital part of the American educational experience. His general aim, I take it, is to provoke each reader to self-inquiry; to realize that there is no single culture in the United States whose symbols, values, roles, attitudes, or general life-style, are acceptable to all. In short, Pizzillo wishes to alert us to a new ethnic consciousness, one that delights in the glory of America's recently rediscovered pluralism.

These are most provocative considerations, demanding our attention and critical judgment. I want, therefore, in the first part of my response, to offer a critical account of some of Pizzillo's basic ideas, which seem to me
intrinsically interesting and, moreover, important for education. In the second part of my response, I will formulate certain criticisms and reservations concerning the basic features of Pizzillo's descriptive account. My remarks in this section will be grouped under three headings: "Conceptual and Moral Difficulties," "Cultural Diversity and Cultural Pluralism," and "Instructional Problems."

A Critical Account

We have much to learn from Pizzillo's paper. It is readily agreed that it is perhaps impossible to exaggerate the importance of language acquisition in the education of our children. He warns us that bilingual education is not new in the United States, having its roots in America's diversity of an earlier period. The commitment to bilingual education, according to Pizzillo, was choked off by the rising tide of American nationalism that emerged along with World War I. The return or reinstatement of bilingual education came about, at least in part, by the awareness that the educational level of Mexican-Americans, revealed in the data of the 1960 national census, was considerably below the national average. After considerable effort in Congress, the Bilingual Education Act Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act was passed.

Bilingual education, according to Pizzillo, is demanded and quite fashionable today. Public interest and support continue at high levels. He gives short shrift to glorified versions of remedial reading programs or English-as-a-Second-Language programs, and proposes that increasing the student's competency in two languages, his native tongue and English, employing both as a vehicle for content instruction, is called for. But along with the instructional use of language should go an emphasis on culture. Pizzillo, following Rodriguez, informs us that "language is not just an instrument for communication and learning; it is a set of values. Bilingual education is, then, best viewed as bilingual-bicultural education."

Pizzillo's definition of bilingual education is crucial, for the entire thrust of his argument turns on the acceptance of bilingual education as bilingual-bicultural education. In such a program, there is no merit in learning a new language just for the sake of exercising certain skills. If the bilingual-bicultural education program does anything at all, it is to develop an integrated personality, enhance a positive self-concept, and promote cultural understanding. If it is eminently successful, the bicultural individual has developed a high level of proficiency in two languages, neither preferring one to the other, but using either one in the appropriate situation, and has mastered the nuances of two distinct cultures.

In a discussion of the target audience of bilingual education in three states, Pizzillo makes explicit the primary thrust of bilingual education, which is, of course, the inclusion of a second language other than English, the official language of the American school, on an equal footing. His discussion of the characteristics of existing programs is highly descriptive and too elaborate to summarize here, but he intends that the reader will come to appreciate variant forms and possibilities of the different approaches to bilingual education programs.

One irony is to be considered in connection with the above. I found myself not so much impressed by the great variations and possibilities in the existing programs but puzzled by the cumulative effect arrived at after reading Pizzillo's admittance that "there is considerable variation among the communities in which bilingual education programs exist," "bilingual programs range in grade levels from pre-school and kindergarten through twelfth grade," "the many programs differ considerably in emphasis," "there is little consensus about the methods to be used in bilingual programs," and "finding quali-
fied bilingual staff has been a problem." With regard to materials, "there is wide diversity among bilingual programs in terms of material used." Finally we are informed that "the field of bilingual education is still in a developmental state."

Yet, despite the foregoing itemization, Pizzillo tells us that "schools with bilingual programs can serve as catalysts for the integration of diverse cultures within a community." He claims that "this can be accomplished in part by the teacher, with the community's assistance." Giving the teacher this very important function, Pizzillo considers certain cultural competencies needed by teachers in bilingual settings. Finally, he proposes that:

On a national basis, generally, bilingualism fosters cultural pluralism in our international society, "through maintenance of the linguistic-cultural heritages of various groups--a concept which is consistent with the democratic principle of choice, central to the American way of life--principles now rejected in a free society, and associated with the myth of the 'melting pot' tradition."

What is wanted, according to Pizzillo, is a pluralism where not only do the members of society function successfully in one, two, or more languages and cultural styles but where individuals can abide by and function successfully adhering to different customs and languages, and to less crippling language stereotypes than those accepted today. In sum, bilingual education is offered in the hope of promoting a society where groups function without cultural bias, and are behaviorally committed to the value that no one race, culture, or language is preferred prima facie over another.

The above sketch of Pizzillo's ideas does not do justice to the detail of his treatment, but his main points are, I believe, now evident and I turn thus to the positive consideration of their import, adding further detail as the need may arise.

First, I should express by agreement with much of what Pizzillo has to say on the topic of bilingual education. Surely the state of language instruction in the United States is vulnerable to the criticisms he offers. In particular, recognition of the functional illiteracy problem of many non-English-speaking children in America should move us to some new ideas to deal with the problem. The fact that children in the United States are living in a society of persons who come from a variety of racial and cultural backgrounds, and that, if individual learning and growth are to be enhanced, each child must be helped to come to terms with the reality of his own significance, and must be able to express this sense in behavior, means we need to help children experience their worth both as individuals and as cultural beings. Only if we acknowledge and show respect for cultural differences in values, beliefs, and behaviors that exist among our children will we be able to foster positive and constructive learning.

Second, I applaud the notion that children should use their mother tongue and be able to relate it to their identities. If we accept rather generally the notion that culture is "the general method by which a group of people organizes its life from the cradle to the grave," we take into account the idea that culture is a method or tool constructed for dealing with common life problems. These problems are, of course, experienced by all groups, and yet there is no universally accepted pattern for handling any of these problems. Different cultural patterns are thus different solutions to the same human problems. Hence, difference does not entail nor imply inferiority. It is harmful and destructive for any child to
be led, either explicitly or implicitly, to believe that cultural differences are hierarchically arranged with, say, middle-class Anglo-American culture being somewhat better than other cultures in our nation, or that Anglos are better than non-Anglos.

Non-English-speaking children in America need to experience that the language they bring with them to school is valued as an asset to be used and respected. Moreover, English-speaking children need to learn that another language can be a valuable tool for learning, for conceptualizing, and for interpersonal relations. Bilingual education is therefore good because it can help many of our students understand and respect the deep meaning that language has for personal identity and worth, both for themselves and for others.

Finally, I endorse the implicit objective of bilingual education of fostering the core belief that every culture is good and intrinsically worthwhile. I presume that such an aim seeks to empower children who are receptive and flexible in facing culturally diverse values, beliefs, and lifestyles.

Having indicated a broad area of agreement, I proceed now to formulate certain criticisms and reservations concerning basic features of Pizzillo's account.

Conceptual and Moral Difficulties

What mainly is at rock-bottom in Pizzillo's paper is the concept of bilingualism. But just what is bilingualism? It is not clear from Pizzillo's account what it is. But surely its explication is basic to understanding the concept of bilingual-bicultural education put forth. We would profit from an ordinary language analysis that reveals customary uses, distinctions, relations, emphases and so on. However, because of the limitation of time, perhaps it will suffice to recognize that the concepts of bilingualism and biculturalism are related, but not identical. We commonly take note of the fact that large minority groups in the United States who are bilingual also have a culture that is different from the host or dominant Anglo-American culture. For instance, in the Southwest all the bilingual people speak Spanish or an Indian dialect. Hence, in the Southwest bilingualism always connotes biculturalism. But it takes only a moment's reflection to see that some minority group members, even though bilingual, may not be bicultural. The literature on American immigrants and their children is complete with such examples, particularly in the case of the second generation. Many of these have been portrayed as typically "marginal persons" groping aimlessly and accepting fortuitously from either culture. Or, to take another tack, we can see that a group may indeed be bicultural, as in the example of the Jew who spends part of his daily life immersed in secondary relationships involving business with gentiles, but whose home life and primary associations are spent wholly with other Jews. It is not inconceivable to think of a Jew who shares two cultures, but speaks only English.

Hence, even though interrelated and interdependent, biculturalism and bilingualism are not identical terms. Bilingualism, in its most ordinary employment, means fluency in at least two languages, including oral communication, the encoding and decoding of written symbols, and the correct inflection, pitch, etc. commonly called the superimposed structure of a language. Facility in the use of two languages may range from a minimal competency in either language to a high level of proficiency in both. Generally speaking, however, the bilingual person tends to be more proficient in one language than the other even though he may have attained a high level of proficiency in both languages. Biculturalism, on the other hand, refers to the cultural elements that may include language but go beyond language, insofar as it is a functional awareness and participation in two con-
trasting sociocultures (statuses, roles, values, etc.). Thus for the purpose of clarifying the conceptual difficulty here, if it is only the language fluency that is assessed as bilingual, it is obvious that bilingualism is not biculturalism. Hence, it is possible to attain bilingualism without dual acculturation and biculturalism can be achieved without bilingualism.

Does our briefly put description of "bilingual" offer us any warrant for asserting more than "having a fluency in two languages"? I doubt it. How, then, does Pizzillo's account move from bilingual education to bilingual-bicultural education? Bilingualism, adapted to groups by Pizzillo, gives the connotation that self-images, emotions, intellects, and different socio-economic levels of living must be connected to the point of amalgamation of languages with people. This then leads to Pizzillo's conclusion that much more than fluency in two languages is necessary. He proposes, in effect, melting two cultures through the vehicle of language, namely, bilingual-bicultural education.

My major criticism is that Pizzillo's argument for bilingual education turns on a definition of bilingual education that "wraps up" bicultural education. That is, against those interested in English-as-a-Second-Language or monolingual education, Pizzillo declares that bilingual education should increase the student's competency in both English and, say, Spanish, and both should be used concurrently as media of instruction in any portion of the curriculum except the languages themselves. Thus, for instance, science will be taught in both Spanish and English, or arithmetic in Spanish and social studies in English. But without the least acknowledgement of the radical differences in context of bilingual education and bicultural education, or the morally crucial variations of the meaning of 'bilingual' and 'bicultural,' Pizzillo's discussion glides easily and resoundingly from the notion of bilingual education to that of bilingual-bicultural education.

There is a sense in which it would be hard to find a better example of the danger of naively defining a term in educational discourse in order to win acceptance of the program offered. In brief, Pizzillo has not offered us a reportive definition of bilingual education, but has stipulated its use to include biculturalism. Moreover, something of importance is taking place in this "move." Pizzillo's definition raises much more than instructional concerns; practical and moral issues are posed. My major point is that it would be foolish to challenge the accuracy or form of Pizzillo's definition of bicultural education. Rather, as Israel Scheffler tells us, what needs to be examined and justified is the program (in its moral and practical aspects) called for by the definition.

Pizzillo's point, I take it, is that a program that is bilingual without also being bicultural restricts a child's learning as well as demeans him. Such a program denies the deep psychological and social meaning of language, and is merely a "bridge model" of bilingual education which, if successful, has the effect of phasing out the non-English language as soon as possible. Thus his programmatic definition of bilingual education rules out the teaching of a second language that stresses only skills (TESOL: Teaching of English to Speakers of Other Languages), and any other of the so-called "bridge" models.

Rather than take issue with the definition, it would be of interest to find out what evidence exists concerning the efficacy of Pizzillo's bilingual education versus the bridge models? Is one program more productive of students capable of getting and holding onto jobs, not just menial ones, but jobs with a future? What of the financial cost? The Lau vs. Nichols decision mandating bilingual education programs and their successful establishment is a wide gap to fill. It will require trained teach-
ers in bilingual education and new curriculum material. According to Pizzillo, there is a dearth of both. Which type of bilingual program can best accommodate large-scale in-service work by the universities? At what cost? Many state legislatures will be involved, since the programs require a larger percentage of school money to come from state funds. The implementation of bilingual programs by school districts and universities will, to a great extent, be dependent on how the legislators assess the cost and efficacy of the various versions of bilingual education programs. State legislators and school district officials will have to review carefully the "hard data" on this matter. In any event, a decision that has such great importance is not to be decided by a programmatic definition of bilingual education, but on the basis of accurate and reasoned judgments. Important questions of practical import require critical and careful judgment, not merely solution by definitional fiat.

However, I suspect that Pizzillo's definition of bilingual education hides another important point, namely, a value question. His definition commits us to the value that a bilingual education that fails to deal with the attitudes, theories, values, etc. of another socio-culture cannot produce a "truly" bicultural individual. If this is what Pizzillo intends, then a question needs to be asked. Clearly Pizzillo regards bilingual education as an instrument or process necessary for producing the valued bicultural individual. The question becomes: Is this valid? Is the bicultural individual best produced by a bilingual education program? It seems that we have here something akin to earlier views of pedagogy that considered mathematics to be the best means of producing someone knowledgeable about logic. In other words, we taught math in order to teach students logic. Today we know that there is something dreadfully wrong with teaching A explicitly in order to arrive at students learning B implicitly. If this analogy holds, then perhaps the claim should become that "true" bilin-

gualism is better attained when the individual becomes bicultural rather than bilingualism produces biculturalism. However, it is unclear to me what the answer is to the question just posed.

But perhaps Pizzillo's breaking down of the distinction between bilingual and bicultural into bilingual-bicultural education aims to commit us to the position that although the relationship between the two terms is not necessarily a natural, commonplace one, it should be. He may be warning us that while it is possible to be bicultural to some extent without knowing the language of the second culture, "complete" biculturalism cannot be achieved without high levels of proficiency in the languages of both cultures. The valued bicultural student envisioned by Pizzillo has a firsthand knowledge of, and acquaintance with, the roles that he is expected to play in the two sociocultures. Not only does he know how to play these roles but he is well-versed in and has some emotional commitment to the value systems of both cultures. He knows not only the spoken language of both cultures, but knows the "silent language" in playing these roles. Moreover, he neither intrinsically prefers one socioculture to the other, but rather uses either system in the appropriate situation.

No one could guess, from Pizzillo's account, that there is any problem of arguing from facts to values, since he is quite forthright in pronouncing his values, and makes little effort to avoiding giving the impression that these values are proper and thoroughly democratic. Indeed, at one point, after telling us that the curriculum and the orientation of teacher training must be reorganized so that "the English-speaking Anglo-oriented perspective is shared with other viewpoints and ideas," he declares that "bilingual education allows people to live in and be part of two cultures." Yet he never explains how the basic justification of his programmatic definition of bilingual education can yield all the value judgments he offers nor, alternatively, what their
warrant is. It is objected, in other words, that such claims as "bilingual education would seem pedagogically sound. Educators stress the importance of allowing the individual to begin and maintain his schooling in his first language" make the case for Pizzillo's bilingual education. We must not take it for granted that there is no need to differentiate between a bilingual education program that is taught as a worry-free activity in a purely academic setting and one which is taught as a survival technique for those whose survival depends on learning another language. For the non-English speaking student, the latter may obtain; for the Anglo-American student, the former may be the case. For the sake of greater clarity and moral integrity, it would have been helpful if Pizzillo had addressed himself to this problem.

Cultural Diversity and Cultural Pluralism

In this section I wish to consider Pizzillo's effort to persuade us of the importance of bilingual education because of its intimate connection to and significance for pluralism (read: cultural pluralism). Hence, he has not only offered a rationale for bilingual education that claims pedagogical soundness and the stamp of moral authority, but he has given us pluralism as its social significance. There are danger signals, however, in that this position may be either socially naive and/or logically confused.

Social naive is exhibited by Pizzillo insofar as his piece is largely historical. From a not too distant historical perspective, foreign language instruction in general and bilingual education in particular has been tied to a deep class bias in the United States. For generations the children of immigrants tried to rid themselves of the stigma of employing a second language, particularly with an accent. Speaking a second language was a mark of class, either denoting a recently arrived or nonacculturated immigrant family—thus, generally speaking, marking a lower class person—or it was a quality distinguishing the elite, the wealthy, the indolent rich or refined minority, whose survival did not depend upon learning a second language, but whose rank demanded it. This class acquired a second language as a mark of status or wealth, and it reflected leisure-time learning. But in either instance, ability to speak a second language was considered a class symbol in America, either of the class below or the class above, and in many respects the symbol was to be avoided.

There are, of course, numerous exceptions to the above generalization. Mainly the exceptions have come from religious communities where the learning of a second language—Hebrew, German, French, and the like—was considered essential in the moral training of children. But, actually, few adults have had a strong desire to become bilingual, no less bicultural. For many, it would seem, to be asked to become bilingual would be no less an affront than to be asked to become bisexual. It seems to be the case that many American parents, for one reason or another, refuse to expend the time and energy needed to acquire bilingualism, although they would like their children to develop a speaking facility in a second or even a third language, but remain Anglo-Americans who know another language or two.

My claim is that Pizzillo is socially naive insofar as he fails to take account of this cultural bias. He takes pains to argue that bilingual children are advantaged, and the entire effort of his paper stems in one way or another from an effort to give significance to the bicultural individual. If we recall that biculturalism refers to the cultural elements that may include language but go beyond language, then a program of bicultural education may be more easily accepted by parents than a program of bilingual education. Naivete is replaced by the more sophisticated judgment that bilingualism is better attained when the individual becomes bi-
Logical confusion is exhibited by Pizzillo in a common but deplorable confusion that mistakes cultural diversity for cultural pluralism, the social theory that supports cultural diversity. Pizzillo simply equates the two. Implicitly he accepts and values the notion of diverse cultures living side by side, each enhancing the other, yet each assured of its own worth and value. The two terms are indeed related, but are not the same. Let us see why this is so.

To explain how different human groups were originally distinguished is beyond the scope of this response; suffice it to say that two facts stand out. First, it is clear that "human groups do not exist in nature, or rather, the part of difference that exists because of nature is unimportant." Whenever distinctions or differentiations are made and groupings result, it is we who make them. Second, the distinctions that men make to create groups may be drawn along all sorts of lines; indeed, there seems to be no end to human ingenuity in thinking of characteristics that can set groups apart. Hence, we are all familiar with the realization that diversity may and does take different forms. But what is claimed here? What does it mean to say that some groups are diverse? At rock-bottom we would say that the decision to regard any group as diverse signifies a decision on somebody's part to single out different factors in the groupings—such as skin color, beliefs, ancestral heritage, language—and establish these as criteria for the basis of the so-called diversity.

The point is, of course, that diversity of some sort exists everywhere and is visible everywhere. Every society is diverse in some respects, but this observation can only be made from a certain point of view. It could be made only by somebody who looks at a number of people and because of some reason or other finds it important to observe that some members are different. While seeing that everybody is diverse in some respect, it should not go recognized that we make certain criteria count in establishing differences. To turn the coin over, when we say that a particular group is homogeneous, we mean simply that the ways in which the members differ are unimportant or irrelevant to any practical concerns. However, we do not suggest that there are no differences. When we say that a society is diverse, we are saying that from a particular vantage point we find something relevant, interesting, and for some reason important to mark off a group or groups as different. Thus, we may identify differences of exclusiveness along the lines of cultural difference, and group identify may be ordered along the lines of ritual, dietary habits, beliefs, folktales, and language pattern. One or a combination of these aspects generally is regarded as necessary for identifying a group as culturally diverse.

But is this sufficient for establishing cultural diversity? No analysis of cultural diversity is complete without a recognition that the selected differences between groups must be viewed as fundamental enough to be capable of producing values and dispositions that contribute to significantly different outlooks on the world. The variety or variegation of unlikeness among groups must be capable of making a difference—the difference must have reality in the minds of men, not just in the eye of the beholder. The point to be observed is that cultural diversity within society must have a concrete social reality; it must be made incarnate within the behaviors of the people. It must be expressed in a concrete situation which bears on political, economic, and social policy. Hence, the second condition that must be met for a society to be culturally diverse is that diversity go beyond being merely visible; diversity must be exhibited in the social behavior of groups who wish to embody their views in choos-
ing among the various social arrangements which determine the division of advantages for underwriting an agreement on the proper distribution of goods and services.

But even this is not sufficient. Diversity is not a matter of genetics; it is a matter of cultural transmission across generations. Hence, a third condition of cultural diversity would require that a sense of historical and participational identity and the peculiar traits which mark the identity must be transmitted from generation to generation if the group is to continue to maintain its identity. It is doubtful that any group could long maintain its peculiar features if it did not jealously guard them and limit the members' sphere of relations, particularly in the decisive period of formation, namely, childhood.

With these three conditions in mind, we may further identify what 'cultural diversity' expresses. We can start with its descriptive use. As a descriptive term, at the very least, 'cultural diversity' refers to the coexistence of unlike or variegated groups in a common social system. It makes no judgments about this situation, for it is employed simply to record the fact that different groups are able to live together in such a way that allows the society to accomplish the basic functions of producing and distributing goods, defining social arrangements and institutions which determine collective goals, and providing security.

But 'cultural diversity' may be also used normatively to express a social ideal. As a social value, the phrase goes beyond the descriptive sense to emphasize the value of freedom of association, the so-called "democratic ideal." That is, a culturally diverse society is commonly portrayed as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage—everyone profits from a plurality of groups expressing different values and interests. Thomas F. Green expressed this point most eloquently:

The view is that any society is richer if it will allow a thousand flowers to bloom. The assumption is that no man's culture or way of life is so rich that it may not be further enriched by contact with other points of view. The conviction is that diversity is enriching because no man has a monopoly on the truth about the good life. There are many ways. Diversity is further valued because it provides any society with a richer pool of leadership from which to draw in times of crisis.

Green develops this position by observing that the value of diversity entails two further assumptions.

In the first place it means that there must be contact between the divergent groups in society. A household may be richer for including persons of different aspirations, values, dispositions, and points of view. But these differences will not be enriching to any particular individual unless he talks with, eats with, or in some way has an exchange of views with those who are different. The value of diversity implies contact between persons, and not simply incidental, temporary, and casual contacts. Secondly this fundamental value implies that the diversity which is enriching is not itself endangered by the contact which is valued. The diversity must be sustained through contact.

If Green is right, then it seems that cultural diversity as a social ideal wraps up certain fundamental values or beliefs. It demands that different
groups coexist with one another, having more than mere fleeting or casual contact, and it presumes that such contact will not limit or endanger but will enrich the diversity.

Cultural diversity as a social ideal is immensely significant for public education. Our understanding of the ideal could influence the positions we take on the issue of informal or casual education versus formal education or schooling as well as determining the flexibility we allow to public education in accommodating religious and language differences. But if the ideal of cultural diversity is to have any influence in determining practical educational issues, it will do so to the extent that the ideal is embodied in and expressed through the decision-making of men in voting their various agendas of politics. In other words, the ideal of cultural diversity will or will not be expressed in no other terms than in the reality of American social structure.

From the view of social structure, American society has had difficulty in accepting cultural diversity. There is strong evidence that cultural diversity has been viewed as potentially divisive. The point is that the United States has been seen as a conglomeration of culturally diverse (and potentially divisive) groups, most with distinctive social, economic, and political concerns, who prefer living with other members of their group and take pride in efforts to sustain and build up group self-confidence and self-assertiveness. The divisive tendencies of cultural diversity have been seen as promoting a view of politics which makes of local and state governments a federation of groups, with protected and excluded turfs.

Reasons for the lack of congruence between cultural diversity as social ideal and as realized in social institutions are found in the hard core of the American experience. Since most Americans have no ethnic roots in past millennia, as do so many other peoples of the world, the Americanization process has taken on a central role in the formation of a national identity and self-concept. What is unique in the American experience is not the fact that the naturalization of immigrants has taken place, but rather that we have the example of a new nation starting from scratch, as it were. In fact, to question the wisdom of the necessity for engaging in the Americanization of immigrants has struck many as questioning the very possibility of America's continued national and cultural well-being. Both the explanation and the fact of Americanization have affected the nature and function of cultural diversity, and both have done so in a cumulative and accelerating fashion.

But what of cultural pluralism? Varying degrees of confusion surround the concept since its inception by Horace M. Kallen in the second decade of the present century. In 1915 Kallen predicted the realization of cultural pluralism in the United States as:

... a federal republic; its substance a democracy of nationalities, cooperating voluntarily and autonomously through common institutions in the enterprise of self-realization through the perfection of men according to their kind. The common language of the commonwealth, the language of its great tradition, would be English, but each nationality would have for its emotional and involuntary life its own peculiar dialect or speech, its own individual and inevitable esthetic and intellectual forms. The political and economic life of the commonwealth is a single unit and serves as the foundation and background for the realization of the distinctive individuality of each nationality that composes it and of the pooling of these in a harmony above
them all. Thus "American civilization" may come to mean the perfection of the cooperative harmonies of "European civilization"---the waste, the squalor and the distress of Europe being eliminated---a multiplicity in a unity, an orchestration of mankind.9

What is crucial in such a statement is the notion of cultural pluralism as respectful of the dominant of core culture embodied in the English language, values, and tradition. Diversity and its acceptance has been exhibited in ethnic cuisines, Columbus days, and Pulaski skyways, but the respect tended to those who diverged from the WASP ideal was minimal at best and non-existent at worst. Cultural pluralism, in effect, remained more a myth of American society than a concept which has supported its institutions and practices. The myth assumed that American society would be able to fulfill democratic goals by absorbing differences. But the fact is that American society did not tolerate cultural diversity and insisted on a pervasive sameness by all who wished to share in its resources. Moreover, even those who were willing to abandon their cultural backgrounds to gain their share of "good life" were often denied entrance into society. Thus there were those for whom the price was never too high, those for whom the price was too high, and there were those who were never allowed to know the price or pay the price.

The re-emergence of the concept of cultural pluralism in recent years is perhaps testimony that the older myth is no longer accepted today. Today's cultural pluralism, however, is decidedly different than its predecessor. What is different is the emphasis on cultural pluralism, and its fundamental posture is that individuals and groups can function successfully and democratically if they believe that no one race, culture, or language is preferred over another. In short, cultural pluralism assumes the following:

1. There must be a rejection of any position that assumes that some people are better than others, that homogeneity is better than heterogeneity, and that some culture forms (language, values, etc.) are better than others.

2. There must be a rejection of the model of the "preferred American"--the WASP--and adoption of a view which encourages and supports diversity in language, life-styles, religions, and any other cultural characteristics.

Thus there is an important difference between yesteryear's cultural pluralism and today's cultural pluralism. The former was found wanting because it was used to create an illusion of respect for cultural diversity and equality of opportunity. Non-whites and others did not receive the rewards of society and were held responsible for their failure. Today's cultural pluralism, on the other hand, demands that Native Americans, Blacks, women, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Jews, and any group feeling different or which dares to be different have access to the resources, privileges, and power of American society. A corollary of this view includes the rejection of concepts, institutions, and actions which reward individuals or groups on the basis of race, culture, sex, class, and national origin.

It would, perhaps, be helpful to suggest a kind of formula for seeing the relationship between cultural pluralism and cultural diversity. This relationship may be put in this way:

1. CP (cultural pluralism) is desirable as an end.

2. In present-day society, CD (cultural diversity) as a social ideal is the best way of
achieving CP.

3. Therefore, do whatever CD involves.

In short, the new cultural pluralism is a response to a changed situation; one that is not satisfied with a mere acknowledgement of diversity of cultures in American society. The fact is that the United States has included citizens of diverse cultures; it is also a fact that many groups have been disenfranchised or "made invisible" for generations. Cultural pluralism recognizes and celebrates America's diversity but goes further to demand a state of equal coexistence in a mutually supportive relationship within the framework of each person securing his own identity, and willing to extend to others the same respect and rights that he expects to enjoy himself.

Hence, the concept of cultural pluralism suggests a movement of affection and identify, enriched perhaps by the subtle, provocative ways in which one differs from others, and reinforced by a strong attachment to one's diversity. The concept, in other words, makes a great deal of cultural diversity and is a force for asserting claims against the institutions of society, for any oppressed group has the best chance of changing the system if it raises the communal consciousness of its individual members.

The new emphasis on cultural pluralism does not require renaming it, but it does give direction to those who, for many reasons, experienced deprivation, powerlessness, alienation, frustration, and the like. Consequently, cultural pluralism may now be seen to read: cultural socio-economic pluralism. It demands political and social policies which would result in a more equal distribution of the goods, prerogatives, and services of American society.

The major political and social policy reflective of cultural pluralism in education has been the development and implementation of bilingual-bicultural programs, both in the public schools and in teacher education programs. Implicit in the arguments of Pizzillo and others linking bilingual education with bicultural education is the belief that these programs will somehow "foster cultural pluralism in our intercultural society. . . ."

According to Pizzillo,

Ideally, bilingual education is intended to produce a balanced bilingualism-biculturalism within the learner, whereby he has the ability to function equally well in the two linguistic and cultural contexts.

Pizzillo's programmatic definition of bilingual-bicultural education makes the assumption of the transferability of bicultural skills into effective participation in society. Moreover, a bilingual education program aims to enable each student to retain and develop his cultural identity while he becomes versed in the language and values of mainstream America. Hence, for Pizzillo, the product of bilingual education is biculturalism: the ability to function competently and comfortably in the culture of the student's family as well as the culture represented by the majority of Americans.

The common assumption of cultural pluralists is that cultural pluralism is achievable through programs of bilingual-bicultural education. Non-English-speaking students, studying and interacting with English-speaking children, will somehow work this out. In effect, the assumption is that cultural pluralism is to be had through schooling that influences people's attitudes and behavior, so much so that institutions are eventually changed. But isn't this too naive a view? Doesn't our experience suggest the limitations of schooling in this and other regards? Cultural parity
among diverse groups is not likely to be achieved in public education alone. The extent to which entrenched institutions other than the school are reluctant to grant cultural parity will determine whether or not some sort of meaningful cultural pluralism can be achieved.

**Instructional Questions**

To this point, I have attempted to question broad-ranging aspects relating to bilingual education. There is, in addition, another area of practical import to consider, namely, instructional matters.

The primary thrust of bilingual education is, of course, the inclusion on equal footing of a second language other than English in the school. On the surface this would seem to be an innocent enough objective. But when the educational personnel of a school district attempts to implement this objective, it may be that there are certain problems and implications that have to be considered. For example, is it the case that teaching one in his native language is an irrelevancy? Although Pizzillo tells us that such a practice is "pedagogically sound," is what is really necessary in teaching, in whatever language, is love, compassion, understanding, dignity, respect, etc.? Although bilingual education programs do indeed attempt this, is this "good teaching" syndrome necessarily excluded from other forms of language education programs? It may be, I suspect, but I do not think Pizzillo has sufficiently made the case for it. We are left with little or no idea about such an important consideration.

More specifically, however, Pizzillo never tells us whether the second language is going to be used to move the student faster into adequate proficiency in English so as to ensure the non-English-speaking student normal progress in schooling. We are unsure whether or not the English-speaking student will be graded in terms of developing equal proficiency in both languages. Is it the case that the non-English-speaking and English-speaking student will be expected to develop equal proficiency in both languages? If so, to what levels will they be raised? These are questions that must be raised and answered if anyone is going to take bilingual education seriously.

What is perhaps even more important for the educator is the instructional question of bilingual education itself. That is, what does it mean when we say that students will be taught in two languages? If we take the Spanish communities in the United States as our example, we readily see that there are strong language clashes within the general language area, so that Puerto Ricans, in New York City, Cubans in Miami, and Texas Mexicans in El Paso find their own language differences quite exaggerated. Pizzillo, following Steiner, claims that, "chicanos are developing an authentic third language which is neither Spanish nor English, and which has developed so far as to be creating its own literature." Thus quite innocently we come to the vexing question of "what counts as two languages?" The question of what counts as a language is indeed important, but an instructional question of major concern is: Are we talking about bilingual or trilingual education? Is the Chicano's first language (Tex-Mex) to be retaught as a second language to attain literacy and to establish a base of language on which English proficiency can be developed? Or is the Chicano to become literate in Tex-Mex only? Is literacy demanded in at least two languages? If so, then the Chicano student might need to become trilingual, speaking Tex-Mex, and becoming literate in both standard Spanish and English.

Another question that has to be raised is what aspects of the bilingual education program are to be taught in which language? Are the sciences better taught in English than, say, in Spanish? Is the highly technical vocabulary of science more infused with English words
than Spanish words? If so, then is it easier for the Spanish child to read "science" because of the rather easily identified English science words or does the reverse hold true? Would the using of Spanish entail awkward and difficult translations of technical terms—for example, how to translate into Spanish the term "technology"? What of history, mathematics, etc.? What is the evidence in this regard?

This is not the place to explore all the questions facing the bilingual education teacher, but in particular it seems necessary to raise one final consideration. Consider the problem of teaching students such sophisticated concepts as "slavery," "exploitation," "colonialism," or "authority." These concepts are abstract and ordinarily young children lack the rich content derived from personal experience to grasp their meanings and use. Acceptance of Pizzillo's stance on bilingual education would impose on the teacher the moral choice of teaching the concept of authority in terms of, say, the Mexican-American who considers authority to be embedded in the paternalistic, autocratic family and the offspring's role to be that of an obedient, respectful son or daughter in an intensely cooperative family relationship. Or, on the other hand, teaching the concept of authority of America's counter-culture which views authority as suspect, contaminated, corrupt, and regards authority relationships as neo-anarchists. A teacher should not be in authority, nor even, in R.S. Peter's distinction, be an authority. At best the teacher is a friend, his job is to expose his frailties in the interests of mind-expansion, eliminating the artificial boundaries between teacher and taught imposed by wrong-headed notions of authority.

The problem is a major one. The teacher is not merely giving cognitive knowledge to his or her students, rather, teaching involves value stances. One may talk about authority, but in the second case above openness and vulnerability are dispositional traits, not cognitive beliefs, and they are the prime requirements of teaching. It seems imperative to recognize that teaching, wherever it occurs, generally has conjoined cognitive, affective, and behavioral involvements. It has basic and pervasive effects whose causes are not located merely in propositional knowledge about something like "authority." The way one teaches the concept of authority, the constraints on teaching, helps shape the way children learn and use the concept.

In any event, apart from the problem just posed, the fundamental question of practical consideration is this: What of teaching the same concept in two languages? Would not such an instructional practice double the cost in terms of energies and resources without the attainment of substantial gains? How sensible would be such a practice in terms of the student, providing, of course, that the teacher is capable of "pulling it off"? Is a double performance never or always, or just possibly, a waste?

These are the kinds of instructional questions that need extensive probing if we are to clarify our ideas about bilingual education.

**Conclusion**

What must be the general conclusion from what has been said thus far? To my mind, the inescapable one that stands out is the absolute necessity to recognize that we have been toying with the top of the iceberg; trying to avoid it and feeling assured that nothing else exists to threaten us. Bilingual education programs, of whatever stripe and purpose, merely represent the top of a problem that goes much deeper. At bottom, is the recognition by many Americans that the traditional curriculum and language training are not appropriate today. We should take more than passing notice of the fact that what is wanted by non-English-speaking Americans
is a greater share of the wealth and power of American society, an according of respect and dignity by groups historically considered to be "superior," and a social order that guarantees the end to humiliation and denial of elementary human rights. It is tragic that the United States has, in the past, offered its allegiance not to fairness and justice to all but to self-interest, prejudice, and Anglo conformism.

This is not the place to illustrate in detail, nor do I command the rhetoric to speak, of the long history of injustice suffered by America's racial minorities and women, but I am deeply aware that these groups will no longer peaceably accept the existing distribution of power, domestic or international, and the political-socio-economic realities that flow from it. Schoolmen must expect that the terminology of the social and behavioral sciences (e.g., culturally deprived) will no longer protect their actions from criticism and attack. But the long-suffering groups should be aware of the fact that schooling has little to say, in the final analysis, about the problems of man and society that really matter. Bilingual education programs, no matter how honest and well-intentioned, cannot rectify the distribution of power in favor of minorities nor can it be used to change domestic policies.

If the majority of Americans come to be preoccupied with questions of human dignity, worth, and justice for all, then the schools might have an invaluable civilizing influence on such a society. If, as is more likely, such questions are regarded with disdain, then our minorities and women will have to look elsewhere for enlightenment and help.
Footnotes

1 I am puzzled about Pizzillo's ignoring the fact that the so-called-bilingual may actually have a very low level of development in both languages, thus making the student functionally illiterate in both languages. See Guy Pryor, Evaluation of the Bilingual Project and Hardendale Independent School District, San Antonio, Texas, in the First and Second Grades of Four Elementary Schools During the 1967-68 School Year. Our Lady of the Lake College, San Antonio, Texas, 1968. Mimeo.


3 In this case, the Supreme Court upheld a class action suit filed by Kinney K. Lau, a minor, through Mrs. Kam Wai Lau, his Guardian ad Litem, to compel the San Francisco Unified School District to provide all non-English-speaking Chinese students with bilingual compensatory education in the English language. Associate Justice Douglas wrote that short opinion in which Associates Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist joined. Concurring opinions were written by Associate Justices Steward and Blackmun, with Chief Justice Berger joining with both concurring opinions.


5 It would be wrong to assume that explicit sanctions would be needed to enforce expressions of cultural diversity. Nothing more than a carefully nurtured sense of historical identity and well defined and available satisfying participational roles within the group and the larger society are needed.


7 Ibid., p. 11. (Italics in original.)


9 Ibid., p. 124.


11 A very recent exception to this is the requirement, under amendments to the Voting Rights Act, that 464 counties in 27 states, including every county in Texas, will have to protect the voting rights of non-English-speaking citizens by conducting elections in more than one language.

This requirement, according to the Justice Department, applies in Autumn 1975 and to all future elections in the affected counties, even on local matters like bond issues. This means that parts of more than half the states will now have to offer their voters special assistance--through ballots printed in languages other than English or through other means--to ensure that all have an equal chance to participate in the electoral process.
As defined by the Voting Rights Act, minority groups entitled to this assistance are American Indians, Asian Americans, Alaska natives, and persons of Spanish background. Spanish, the primary language of large groups throughout the southwest, Florida, and New York, is expected to be the language that will figure more prominently in future bilingual elections.