Cultural Discourse in Taiwan

Edited by
Chin-Chuan Cheng, I-Chun Wang, and
Steven Tötösy de Zepetnek

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## Contents

Introduction to *Cultural Discourse in Taiwan*  
I-Chun Wang and Steven Tötösy de Zepetnek  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contexts of Taiwan Studies in the U.S. Academe</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sung-Sheng Yvonne Chang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese Identity Shift and the Struggle for Cultural Hegemony in the 1990s</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-Yu Chang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nativist Rhetoric in Contemporary Taiwan</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pei-Yin Lin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poetry, Politics, and the Reception of Yu Guangzhong's &quot;Nostalgia&quot;</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weiliang Huang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan, China, and Yang Mu's Alternative to National Narratives</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisa L.M. Wong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Position of Sinophone Malaysian Literature within the Polysystem of Taiwan Literature</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tee Kim Tong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fashioning Identity in Taiwan Vernacular Poetry</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-Chun Wang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic Flows, Subjectivity in Cross-Writing, and Language Experiments in Modern Taiwan Literature</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yu-Lin Lee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant Brides and Language Problems in Taiwan</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chin-Chuan Cheng</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyzing East/West Power Politics in Comparative Cultural Studies</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William H. Thornton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander C.Y. Huang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography for the Study of Cultural Discourse in Taiwan</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yu-Chun Chang, I-Chun Wang, and Steven Tötösy de Zepetnek</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Index  
Yu-Chun Chang, I-Chun Wang, and Steven Tötösy de Zepetnek  

236
Introduction to Cultural Discourse in Taiwan
I-Chun Wang and Steven Tötösy de Zepetnek

The collected volume Cultural Discourse in Taiwan is intended as an addition to scholarship in the field of Taiwan Studies. The articles in the volume are in many aspects comparative and the topics discussed are in the context of literary and culture scholarship. At the same time, the volume is interdisciplinary as the articles cover historical perspectives, analyses of texts by Taiwan authors, and cultural discourse as related to Taiwan consciousness, language, and linguistic issues. Over the past fifty years, Taiwan has constructed itself by virtue of its development in self-recognition as a democratic society and its location and position within the controversial situation with regard to the "One China Policy." In particular, the efforts and policies by various levels of government towards inclusion, recognition, and dialogue with the Indigenous population of the island represent a sign of interculturalism in a democratic and inclusive society. This is, in particular, of importance with regard to culture and literature, as well as scholarship. The position of Taiwan on the landscapes of Asian and Chinese culture, society, and history is — as many scholars in a number of fields argue(d) — that the island's culture is unique and it should not be regarded simply as an appendage of Mainland China. Taiwan exemplifies the process of cultural formation and formulation, and it represents the dynamics of cultural processes where the East and West meet in a specific and extraordinary locus. Taiwan society and culture developed during the past thirty years following a dictatorship under the looming presence of the "other" dictatorship across the straits and its claims on Taiwan: the difference between the two systems with regard to the observation of human rights and political turmoil remains relevant. Taiwan's democratic test continues and China has by now stepped into the age of globalization. Scholarships on the political position of and cultural development in Taiwan attract attentions from scholars in the fields of linguistics, national literature, comparative literature and cultural policies. A significant part of scholarships paid attention to the local aspects of Taiwan culture as well as its relationship to Chinese culture. Taiwan tries hard to embrace the world and promotes its visibility, and its democracy is recognized by most part of the world. David Der-wei Wang and Carlos Rojas refer in their edited volume Writing Taiwan: A New Literary History to Taiwan literature as one of the most contested zones in the mapping of modernity and modernization in Chinese culture. As they write, Taiwan was regarded traditionally as being located on the margins of Chinese politics, society, and including scholarship; however, because of its colonial experiences, Taiwan literature and culture embody a diversity of cultural heritage and creativity because of its conflicting legacies, impulses, and ideological forces. During the past ten years, Taiwan consciousness and Taiwan cultural politics have been the primary concerns of scholars in various disciplines and Taiwan cultural policy and cultural processes remain at the core of debates about issues related to Taiwan cultural identity.

Taiwan remains at the crossroad of changes in culture and society. During the last decades Taiwan cultural policy, the impact of globalization, and Taiwan consciousness help(ed) the development of Taiwan as a multicultural society while issues remaining to be discussed include cultural aspects represented in media, literature, the matter of language(s) in the context of the construction and re-construction of culture in Taiwan society.

Fangming Chen writes that "literary history must always be considered in the context of the societal conditions that gave rise both to the literary works and to the authors" (Hou zhi min Taiwan [Postcolonial Taiwan], Mai Tien, 2002. 26). By examining the context of Taiwan literary history, cultural background, and cultural discourses, the volume's readers might be able to know the trends of Taiwan cultural discourse and detect the phenomenon that culminates the flourishing of Taiwan literature. Until now, Taiwan literature has not been easily accessible to the reading public on the international landscape. In English in the context of an international and global readership and scholarship, with the publication of such seminal texts as Chang Hsi-kuo's and John
Introduction to Cultural Discourse in Taiwan

Balcom's *City Trilogy: Modern Chinese Literature from Taiwan* (Columbia University Press, 1997), Wang Der-wei's and Carlos Rojas's collected volume *Writing Taiwan: A New Literary History* (Duke University Press 2007), Jonathan Mantorpe's *Forbidden Nation* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), Melissa J. Brown's *Is Taiwan Chinese?: The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities* (University of California Press, 2004), Bruce Herschensohn's *Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy* (World Ahead Publishing, 2007), and John Copper's *Taiwan: Nation-state or Province* (Westview Press, 2008), Taiwan's cultural, literary, and social identity and its problematics are established. However, owing to Taiwan's political, social, cultural, and literary history, its processes, and its current developments, Taiwan's cultural discourse as presented in the articles of the volume would prove useful for the advancement of Taiwan Studies within literary and (comparative) cultural studies (on the developing field of comparative cultural studies, see Steven Tötösy de Zepetnek, ed., *Comparative Literature and Comparative Cultural Studies* (Purdue University Press, 2003; see also the Purdue monograph series of Books in Comparative Cultural Studies, as well as the peer-reviewed, full-text, and open-access humanities and social sciences quarterly *CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture* [ISSN 1481-4373] <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb>).

The articles in the volume are as follows (the abstracts of the articles are quoted from the articles in the volume):

Sung-Sheng Yvonne Chang opens the volume with her article entitled "Contexts of Taiwan Studies in the U.S. Academe" Chang discusses the paradigm shift in Taiwan with regard to the proliferation of the "China discourse" since the late 1980s. Chang begins with a review of the subordinate status of Taiwan Studies in the US-American academy prior to the 1990s followed by reflection on her personal journey in pursuing the study of literary modernism in postwar Taiwan. Importantly, Chang suggests the relevance of inquiry in Taiwan Studies with East Asian comparative literature and culture. Thus, her article is an exposé on the how of the study of literature and culture within the current trend of cultural globalization, a trend accelerated by the twin forces of the industrialized West's neoliberalist capitalism and the digital turn since the late twentieth century — which Taiwan is a significant part of. In sum, Chang argues that attention ought to be paid to the contexts and driving forces of the said impact of globalization by scholars of Taiwan literature and culture.

Bi-yu Chang discusses in her article "The Cultural Turn and Taiwan Identity in the 1990s". Taiwan identity formation in the context of political conflicts and the emergence of Taiwan awareness with the postulate that changes in Taiwan identity formation were primarily a result of democratization. Further, Chang argues that changes in identity formation are the result cultural, as well as political processes. Recognizing the impossibility of searching for a "true" Taiwanese identity, Chang maps the struggles between contested discourses and follows the construction of a Taiwan-centric identity in the 1990s. She pays particular attention to the role that Taiwan cultural policy played in the formation of a new hegemonic discourse where this includes an examination of how cultural policy produced new meanings in the 1990s turning the discourse of "Taiwanese subjectivity" into "common sense."

Pei-Yin Lin, in her article "Nativist Rhetoric in Contemporary Taiwan," discusses the nativist discourse as related to Taiwan's sociopolitical environment. Nativist rhetoric in Taiwan emerged from the 1930s with theorists advocating writing about the island's cultural particulars and in Indigenous languages to facilitate the popularization of literature, its production and reading. Lin describes the nativization process as a result of 1970s disillusionment with the rule of the Kuomintang. Since then, nativization remained one of the most prevalent cultural discourses in Taiwan. Based on interpretative readings and close textual analysis, Lin examines how the nativist discourse has evolved along Taiwan's changing sociopolitical environment; in particular, she looks at how the concept of native soil has turned into politicized literary nativization combined with intellectuals' construction of a postcolonial historiography. To underline her
Weiliang Huang explores in his article "Poetry, Politics, and the Reception of Yu Guangzhong 'Nostalgia'" Yu's concern about Taiwan cultural discourse in poetry and politics. Yu's poem enjoyed tremendous popularity in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other overseas Chinese communities, and then extending to Mainland China. Expressing the grief of separation from the Mainland longing for the motherland/fatherland, the poem's popularity and fame reached its peak in December 2003 when Premier Wen Jiabao of the People's Republic of China quoted a line from "Nostalgia" in his speech addressed to an overseas Chinese audience in the United States, stressing the political reunification between China Mainland and Taiwan. Huang demonstrates in his analysis that the criticism of Yu in Taiwan is with factual errors and political biases and points out that the poem was written in 1972 and not in more recent times when reunification was pronounced as a national policy of the People's Republic of China. Yu has penned a great number of poems and essays showing his love of and concern for Taiwan, its land, and people.

Lisa L.M. Wong examines in her article "Taiwan, China, and Yang's Alternative to National Narratives" the ways Yang's poetry acts as an echo and a dissent to the mainstream national narratives in Taiwan between the late 1970s and early 1980s. During this decade, identity discourse has developed from othering Westernism to preserve Chinese cultural-national integrity to espousing a native Taiwanese identity against the Chinese one. Each of Yang's poems in Wong's analysis is a field of contention, peopled by different subjects such as the colonizers, the native Taiwanese, the female, and the diasporant, who articulate contested stories of a historical event or a historical site. The "lived" experiences of the texts' participants rupture the orthodox narratives, whether it is the Dutch imperialist conquest, the Ming glory of national recovery, or the place-based cultural imaginary of Chang-an. If, as John Berger says, fear of the present leads to mystification of the past and the present, Yang's poems are attempts of demystification as well as political critique, they are history plays in which disparate histories play against each other, letting open a myriad of alternatives for addressing national-cultural narratives in post-colonial Taiwan and in contemporary China.

Tee Kim Tong explores in his article "The Position of Sinophone Malaysian Literature within the Polysystem of Taiwan Literature" Taiwan's multi-faceted phenomena with regard to literature and culture. According to Tong, Sinophone Malaysian Literature, as a border literature in Taiwan, exemplifies the mobility and transnationality of the emerging new literatures in Chinese of the Pacific Rim. While Taiwan serves as a flexible and resourceful literary environment for the transnational diasporic producers of Sinophone literature, the position of Sinophone Malaysian Literature in Taiwan is ambiguous. On the one hand, critics of Taiwan literature complain that Sinophone Malaysian writers in Taiwan tend to write more about their tropical homelands than the place where they are living. On the other hand, they are accused by some Malaysian critics in the Sinophone literary scholarship of misrepresenting their country of birth. Sinophone Malaysian literature in Taiwan thus becomes a border literature in both the Malaysian and Taiwan literary polysystems. Such a double (dis)position of the border literature thus provokes reflections on Taiwan's cultural identity and transnationality.

I-Chun Wang discusses in her article "Cultural Discourse and Fashioning Identity in Taiwan Vernacular Poetry" the formation of Taiwan cultural identity in vernacular poetry. The relationship between dialectal cultural identity as existing in vernacular language is related to the dialect formation of literary language. The function of a language or a dialect is the expression of concepts; however, owing to growing literacy and the popularity of mass-media, official languages throughout the world tend to be the dominant language while dialect tends to remain as a characteristic of certain regions. The vernacular usually provides for and preserves the wealth, beauty, and the strength of folk tradition.
The power and tenderness of the vernacular is found in poetic traditions in both national and popular literature. Although the vernacular carries beauty and essence of a certain culture, it is a difficult path to use it in literature. In the imperialist, that is, essentialist mode the local language or dialect is to be eliminated. Taiwan has a colonial history and the dialect used by the common people was discouraged in the period of Japanese colonization. And the Kuomintang discouraged the use of Taiwan dialects for at least forty years or more. However, with the Taiwan cultural movement since the 1980s the vernacular — especially the Minnan dialect — has become a part of Taiwan cultural consciousness. Wang traces in her article the value of the vernacular in the Western literary history and analyzes the use of the Hakkien dialect in Taiwan poetry.

Yu-Lin Lee analyses in his article "Linguistic Flows, Subjectivity in Cross-Writing, and Language Experiments in Modern Taiwan Literature" the translingual practice in modern Taiwan literature, a literary production that inscribes the problematic of locality in a mixed, heterogeneous cultural context. Lee argues that translingual practice in writing connects and traverses boundaries of languages and cultures, and accordingly, informs a process of deformation, transformation, and becoming. Concurrently, translingual practice involves an opening process of creation that provokes the production of a new literature. Translingual writing has played a vital part in Taiwan’s literary production and Lee highlights the crossing of linguistic boundaries as well as the condition of the subject in the writing space of liminality. The translingual practice in Taiwan’s literary production not only depicts an alternative history that emphasizes hybridity and multiplicity as evidenced by literary texts, it also signifies a transformative force that induces literary creation in the local context.

Chin-Chuan Cheng’s article “Immigrant Brides and Language Problems in Taiwan” is an analysis of the selected aspects of language acquisition by immigrants to Taiwan. It was reported in the media in 2006 that in the entire year of 2005 one-fifth of the newly-wed couples in Taiwan had a foreign spouse. Most of the foreign spouses were female. The international marriages thus created the terms "foreign brides" and "immigrant brides". These women had to face language identity problems as their native languages were not used at home, and their children would not acquire their mother tongues. They also had to manage to retain their dignity when their children were falsely labeled as slow learners at school. There were also over 300,000 foreign laborers mostly from Southeast Asia speaking Cambodian, Indonesian, Thai, and Vietnamese. As Taiwan has Mandarin, Southern Min, Hakka, and a dozen Austronesian languages, the diversity of the foreign laborers and immigrant brides made Taiwan overtly multicultural and multilingual. The society had to take measures to deal with the challenges of language equality and linguistic rights.

William H. Thornton argues in his article "Analyzing East/West Power Politics in Comparative Cultural Studies" that culture represents a central force on the geopolitical map. Although Huntington and Fukuyama are taken seriously on the question of East/West power politics, Thornton develops a world view by grounding balance of power politics in national and local (not just civilizational) social reality. Further, Thornton argues against external democratic teleologies both Huntington and Fukuyama have imposed on the cultural Other. The thrust of Thornton’s argumentation goes beyond the monolithic fallacies of political modernism, namely, political realism on the one hand and today’s "reverse domino" globalization on the other. Once political realism takes this postmodern turn, it confronts the agonistic realities that killed the New World Order in its infancy. Although Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations also confronted these grim realities, he did so in terms of a negative and retreatist realism. For Thornton, in the post-Cold War world that Huntington well describes but declines to fully engage, any effective realism must temper cultural agonistics with Bakhtinian cultural dialogics.

The volume includes a review article by Alexander C.Y. Huang of seminal books published recently, namely June Yip’s Envisioning Taiwan: Fiction, Cinema, and the Nation in the Cultural Imaginary and Leo T.S. Ching’s Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and
Introduction to Cultural Discourse in Taiwan

the Politics of Identity Formation and a selected bibliography of studies on the topic of the volume, "Bibliography for the Study of Cultural Discourse in Taiwan" compiled by Yu-Chun Chang, I-Chun Wang, and Steven Tötösy de Zepetnek.

Author’s profile: I-Chun Wang is professor of English at National Sun Yat-sen University where she teaches Renaissance and twentieth-century drama. Her interests in scholarship include comparative literature, Chinese and Taiwan drama, and English Renaissance drama. Among her recent publications are Gendered Memories (Studies in Comparative Literature 28), Xing Bie yu Jiang Jieh (Gender and Boundary), East Asian Cultural and Historical Perspectives, and Identity Politics: Early Modern Culture. She is currently working on Renaissance travel literature.

Author’s profile: Steven Tötösy de Zepetnek is professor of media and communication studies at the University of Halle-Wittenberg and research professor of literature at National Sun Yat-sen University. His single-authored books include Comparative Cultural Studies and Sustainable Humanities (forthcoming), Comparative Literature: Theory, Method, Application, and Wen hsüe yen chiu ti ho fa hua (Legitimizing the Study of Literature), and his edited volumes include Comparative Central European Holocaust Studies, The New Central and East European Culture, Comparative Cultural Studies and Michael Ondaatje’s Writing, and Imre Kertész and Holocaust Literature.

Contexts of Taiwan Studies in the U.S. Academe

Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang

Introduction: Contexts of Taiwan Studies in the U.S. Academe

At a conference in 1998 held at Columbia University, I made an attempt at observing several prevalent paradigms in the field of Taiwan Studies (the paper’s revised version is included in my book Literary Culture in Taiwan: Martial Law to Market Law). A key point I tried to convey was that, for many decades after World War II, the study of Taiwan was shrouded in the field’s predominant interest in the larger entity, Mainland China. Abundant evidence indicates that Taiwan was more often than not studied as "part of China," perpetuating the old geocultural mapping; as "the Other China," following the logic of the cold-war dichotomy of the "Red" versus "Free" China; or, as a substitute for China for researchers (in particular anthropologists) denied access to Mainland China to conduct their fieldwork. Only the case-study model, adopted by some social scientists that treated Taiwan as a member of the global community, treated Taiwan more fairly for its own sake, without touching implicitly on its dubious "Chinese" identity.

Beginning in the last decade of the twentieth century, the growing prominence of the People’s Republic of China in the international arena has made the focus on the unresolved dispute over Taiwan as an independent nation-state relevant. In the meantime, scholarly discourses about Taiwan in the field of China Studies have also quietly metamorphosed and a telling sign is the shifting status of Taiwan Studies within academic structures. In a sense, once divest of the awkward role as "surrogate China," Taiwan seems to be further marginalized as a subject of scholarly inquiry. Murray Rubinstein, who once called himself deprecatingly a "Taiwan hand," used a sensational title to highlight this reality at the 2006 convention of the Association for Asian Studies in San Francisco: "Are Taiwan Studies Dead"? His apprehension might be justified; arriving at the seminar room a few minutes late, I was
greeted by a single-digit number of audience. And yet, this bleak picture is contradicted by the greater esteem researchers have accorded to particular cultural products from Taiwan. Films by the Oscar winner Ang Lee and the celebrated auteur directors of Taiwan New Cinema, Hou Hsiao-hsien, Edward Yang, and Tsai Ming-liang are good examples. Furthermore, as the US-American academe makes advances in its inclusion of non-Western cultures — a tardy response to criticism of Eurocentrism — such distinctive features of the society and history of Taiwan as its unique colonial experience (especially in the Dutch and Japanese periods), migration patterns, economic and political "miracles," folk religion, consumption of popular culture in the globalizing age (the dynamic roles it plays in the reception of Japanese and Korean TV dramas and the innovative adaptations of Asian pop) have attracted interest increasingly from researchers in the disciplines of history, anthropology, sociology, political science, and literary and cultural studies. Therefore, the impression of the decline of Taiwan Studies may be true only if one perceives it from within the institutional frame of Area Studies, in which it has been located traditionally. While the US is known to be strong in its academic institutions, it is occurring, interestingly, in Europe where "independent" Taiwan Studies programs, centers, and exchange programs have been established recently, for example in Germany at the universities of Bochum and Heidelberg, in the United Kingdom at the University of London, or in France at University Lyon III. Thus, it appears that Taiwan Studies may be able to gain legitimacy as a research subject for the accomplishments of its cultural producers and for its potential to enrich our knowledge in different areas of specialization, often by challenging the established norms.

Proliferating China Discourses

The changes Taiwan Studies have undergone parallels — and may have benefited indirectly from — new transformations of the "China discourse." Since around the late 1980s, a number of discourses that foreground the plastic and pluralistic nature of Chinese identity have arisen. Paying special attention to Chinese ethnic communities beyond the territorially defined nation-state, these discourses have opened up new spaces for the discursive construction of Taiwan's cultural identity. To some extent, they have also eased or diffused the pressure felt perpetually by scholars of Taiwan to be either assimilated or excluded from mainstream China Studies. The complex network of forces behind this new phenomenon deserve our special attention as they are immediately relevant to our understanding of the context within which new ways of positioning Taiwan Studies may be conceived.

In a sense, the dynamics of China discourse come from a palpable tension — as well as a complex interplay — between the seemingly opposing yet mutually implicating drives to de-center and to re-center "China." At one end of the spectrum, the notion of "cultural China," proposed in the early 1990s by the intellectual historian Tu Wei-ming, exhibits the strongest centripetal force, as it calls for a revival of Confucianism as a core value of global ethics. At the other end, in a more centrifugal mode, are vehement denouncements of the outdated, normative, and monolithic definitions of "Chinese" that have been voiced since the mid-1990s in such works as Ien Ang's *On Not Speaking Chinese: Living Between Asia and the West* and Allen Chun's "Fuck Chineseness: on the Ambiguities of Ethnicity as Culture as Identity."

The presence in the US-American academe of scholars from former Western colonies in South Asia and the Middle-East — for example Edward Said, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, and Homi Bhabha — have contributed significantly to the rise and popularity of postcolonial studies and discourse in the 1980s and 1990s. In retrospect, this was part of the globalization phenomenon described by Arjun Appardurai, himself a migrant from India: the transnational flow of people on a larger scale, especially between what were regarded as the First and the Third worlds in the cold war era. The same forces have driven the rise of the particular types of China discourse: whereas scholars like Wei-ming Tu
belong to the postwar "brain-drain" generation of Third World intellectuals who have settled in US-American academe, and who share to a large extent the nostalgic nationalism of postwar Chinese expatriates, positions taken by Ang and Chun reflect on the coming of age of descendants of Chinese immigrants or Chinese born and raised in former Western colonies, or whose identities are forged primarily in diasporic communities. The background of Shu-mei Shih, who coined the currently popular term "Sinophone sphere" speaks further to the possible multiplicity of such experiences as she has an even more complex background: born and raised in South Korea, Shih went to Taiwan to attend university before coming to the U.S. In addition to the increased volume of the flow of people, the enormous, greatly accelerated flow of capital facilitated by the neo-liberalist economy in the late twentieth century, what Appadurai calls the new "financescape" (33), is also behind some of the China discourses, that accelerated phase of globalization in the late twentieth century. Aihwa Ong, for instance, another scholar in the Chinese diaspora who has introduced such useful notion as "flexible citizenship" and "Chinese transnationalism," grounding her theories on observations of Chinese-operated business networks in Southeast Asia. And the extremely popular term "Greater China" first entered wider circulation in the late 1980s, among Western observers impressed by overseas Chinese investment that contributed significantly to Mainland China's fledgling capitalist development. With their ostensible stress on the cultural aspect of traditional China, advocates of Cultural China subscribe to the idea that Confucian teachings are conducive to modern capitalist developments, because of the emphasis on diligence and education, which, in turn, form an important basis for "Asian values" propagated by Singapore's Lee Kwan Yeu.

In terms of theoretical thrusts, the differences in intellectual orientations between scholars endorsing different types of China discourses clearly bear generational, as well as institutional marks. For instance, the evangelical undertone of the quasi-religious symbol found in the title of an edited volume by Wei-ming Tu, *The

*Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today,* bespeaks a hidden lineage to the missionary elements that were present from the beginning of the Western Sinology. Although secularized, Sinologists envision a holistic "China" in civilizational terms, and such venerable views of pre-modern China dominated the academic studies of Chinese philosophical and ethical traditions until recent decades — and certainly during the period when Tu's generation received graduate training. By contrast, younger scholars such as Ang, Chun, Shih, and Ong have been trained in such newer disciplines as media studies, cultural anthropology, or cultural studies, and their endeavors to deconstruct the notion of Chineseness reflect the anti-essentialist intellectual climate of recent decades. Equally important is the postmodern-progressivist impulse that informs the said discourse to overturn the "center" by those from the "margin." In all these cases, re-conceptualizing "China" lends rich symbolic capital to these scholars' inter-positional competition in scholarship and ideas. Taking advantage of the moral high ground of multiculturalism, the advocacy of minority discourses (within the US-American context) also allows one to play the identity card, thus gaining visibility in mainstream academic circles.

At the same time, like any newly emerging intellectual discourse, these China discourses tend to possess a quality of indeterminacy and are easily appropriated by people of different agendas. Most noteworthy is the way academic China discourses converge and intermingle with politics in the real world, especially politics that might be categorized as instances of "long-distance nationalism." Some scholars of Mainland China origin such as Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu, for instance, stress the transnational character of Chinese identity partly as a way to challenge the repressive, state-monopolized nationalist discourse back home. Scholars in/of Taiwan, then, find in these discourses powerful resonances with the dominant neo-traditionalist nationalist culture on the one hand and the post-martial law boom of postmodern-progressivist intellectual trends on the other. The former provided fertile soil for breeding New Confucianism in the 1960s and 1970s and the latter
was a consequence of the radical turn of the intellectual sphere in the wake of the lifting of the martial law in the late 1980s. And it is particularly interesting to note that, in recent years, Taiwanese politicians from both pan-green and pan-blue camps have employed deliberately such labels as zhonghua minzu (which refers to the "Chinese nation" in contradistinction to Zhongguo [China] as a nation-state) and the huaren (people of the broadly defined "Chinese nation"), which share the same spirit as the aforementioned discourses. Their intent is easily discernible: to reject the Mainland China's claim that Taiwan is a renegade province — and thus a "sacred, inseparable part of the Chinese territory" — without completely foregoing their ethnic Chinese identity.

As someone born and raised in Taiwan and whose research in the last two decades focuses primarily on Taiwan literature, I cannot but be keenly aware of this ambience of ambivalence that has shrouded the "sub-field" of Taiwan Studies and in its complex relationship with "China." At the same time, I may also enjoy the advantage of being an outsider and insider simultaneously, a position that allows me to think beyond the box. Viewed in a larger context, the Chinese ethnic-linguistic-cultural sphere that exists across national borders parallels that of the Arabs and Indians, who have also become active on the global stage in the age of globalization. But there are also other types of alliances and coalitions that have emerged. Many scholars have called attention to the new consciousness of the East Asian cultural geography, heightened by the boom of East Asian cultural markets since the 1990s, a consciousness that has reconnected its member countries separated since the Second World War. The current restructuration of the global cultural system, to be sure, bear unmistakable legacies of the immediately preceding, cold war period, in which East Asian countries occupied different positions in either the free or the communist worlds and whose relationship with the West, in particular the U.S. and the Soviet Union were much stronger than those with their neighbors. It took all of us some time to readjust our mindset.

A Personal Journey in Studying Modernist Literature from Taiwan

About twenty years ago, when I had just started working on the manuscript of Modernism and the Nativist Resistance: Contemporary Chinese Fiction from Taiwan, I submitted an outline of the book to the 1988 München congress of the ICLA/AILC: International Comparative Literature Association / Association Internationale de Littérature Comparée. It was a time when modernism caught a great deal of attention on the post-Mao literary scene and a number of Mainland China scholars were also planning to attend the meeting. Without thinking, I took for granted that our papers would be placed on the same panel and was excited about opportunity for dialogues between us on the different situation of "Chinese literary modernism." But I was very wrong. I ended up presenting my paper along with scholars working on "minor" literatures from East Europe, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle-East to an audience who was just as uninterested in my topic as I was ignorant of the other papers on the same panel. When I rushed out of the conference room right after the session, a soft-spoken Japanese gentleman caught up with me and told me how impressed he was by the striking similarities between the polemics engendered by the modernist aesthetics in the literary circles in Taiwan and in his own country. It did not dawn on me until a while later, however, that he was referring to events in Japan's prewar period, some twenty or thirty years before the modernist literary movement hit Taiwan. In the following year, 1989, Hou Hsiao-hsien's City of Sadness won the top prize (the Golden Lion Award) at the Venice Film Festival, which, as we later learned, was the debut of the much celebrated Taiwan New Cinema on the world stage. As I phoned a friend to share my excitement, she cool-headedly reminded me that Rashomon (1950), the Japanese classic by Akira Kurosawa, had won the same award in 1953 — so the same honor was bestowed upon a Japanese modernist director more than three decades
earlier. I then recalled that, a few years earlier, in a conversation with an Egyptian writer who attended the Writers of the World lecture series in my department, I was greatly intrigued by the discovery that the time table of the modernist trend in Egypt was strikingly similar to that in postwar Taiwan.

These incidents, coupled with my observations of how the modernist trend unfolded in Mainland China in those years resulted in a major re-orientation of my research. In a nutshell, I became increasingly aware of the limitations of the model of "influence study," a time-honored approach in comparative literature which privileges the binary relationship between the "source of influence" and the "recipient" and placed its primary focus on direct lineages between the two. I felt that greater attention ought to be given to complex power networks in both the global and the local contexts within which the actual literary influences took place. The late 1980s and early 1990s were a time when the post-colonialist discourse, which probed deep into this dimension, began to attract larger numbers of followers. Although I do not necessarily count myself as one of such, yet, having been exposed to critical theories in the 1980s, I was also developing a keener sensitivity toward the inseparability between culture and power: to the essential place culture occupied in political hegemonies and to the role power played in cultural transmissions. The reason why the trajectories of aesthetic modernism traveled in different non-Western societies bear such a high degree of similarities thus becomes easy to explain: they are part of the same global spread of the North Atlantic cultures of the twentieth-century, driven essentially by the same sets of historical forces. Thus, in my book *Modernism and the Nativist Resistance*, I borrowed from Raymond Williams the tripartite structure of dominant, alternative, and oppositional cultural formations to explore the case in Taiwan's post-1949 era. Aesthetic modernism, I argue, played a role beyond the narrowly conceived literary sphere and embodied ideologically potent "alternative cultural visions" that undermined nationalist hegemonic culture.

**New Complications**

With the new awareness that Taiwan was not unique in its assimilation and resistance of literary modernism, I then became intrigued by another thorny issue. That is, suppose similar dynamics underlie incidences of modernist aesthetic movement in the non-West, what can we say about these movements’ correlations with the advancement of modernity, which in turn is tied to the temporal progression of societal modernization in different places? This question lends itself easily to a particular neo-Marxist interpretive scheme as propagated by Fredric Jameson, one that links the aesthetic forms of realism, modernism, and postmodernism to three consecutive stages of the capitalist development: bourgeois capitalism, high capitalism, and postindustrial capitalism. Although by now people have been well alerted to its troubling deterministic overtone and underlying Eurocentric point of view, at the time this theory was widely cited by Chinese scholars of literature. The rise of the globalization discourse since the 1990s has compelled us to revisit the same issues these propositions purported to deal with. In his 1988 lectures, Anthony Giddens suggested that, while initially originated in Europe, modernity had an inherent globalizing tendency that might take several hundred years to run its course. Evidently, the last couple of decades saw such a dramatic acceleration of this process that the need to re-examine the relationship between the modernist literary trends in the non-West and their modernities, variously labeled as "derivative," "belated," "translated," and "alternative," is presenting itself with renewed urgency.

To get a rough idea about how literary scholars of modernism in Anglophone America are dealing with this issue, I have done a quick survey of publications by members of the Modernist Studies Association. To my surprise there appeared a strong tendency to dissociate modernism from the concept of modernity. In a large number of works, "modernism" is either understood as free-floating aesthetic doctrines (such as autonomous art) or refers to a set of artistic conventions of technical and formal devices.
(experimentalism, defamiliarization, stream-of-consciousness, appeal to senses, shock effect, etc.). The assumptions appear to be that these were once rooted in, or motivated by, a budding "modern condition," but are no longer bound to it as we have long passed that historical stage. At the same time, without being identified explicitly as modernist studies, new research is now with focus on the sensory dimensions of literary expressions, visual and acoustic in particular. Personally, I take this sudden flourish of studies of sensorial qualities in the arts a direct consequence of the impact of digital technology and globalizing economy, which has caused exponential growths in the consumption of visual and audio cultural products, thus changing fundamentally the channels of production and transmission.

The digital revolution and globalizing economy are quickly making the West/non-West dichotomy meaningless. And we are, therefore, faced with the daunting task of having to comprehend today’s synthesis without forgetting about yesterday's separation. I then tried to take a close look at how the Chinese scholars were dealing with the latter, when "modernism" was clearly an alien importation to Chinese society and served to mediate people's reactions to a fledgling modernity. A few researchers, like Leo Lee, demonstrated proper caution in dealing with this subject. In his *Shanghai Modern*, for example, Lee argues that Chinese modernist writers in Shanghai in the 1920s and 1930s were too infatuated by the newly emerging modern condition, in particular its material dimension, to be critically distanced from it, which accounts for the fundamental difference between them and Baudelaire’s flâneur in Paris of the mid-nineteenth century. Many Chinese scholars, however, have employed the term "literary modernity" (wenxue de xiandai xing) without much discretion: some refer to the more narrowly defined notion of "literary modernism" while others mean a broad range of qualities of works that are either produced in the modern period or reflect specific aspects of modern history and/or society.

There are certainly advantages to such attempts of definition and categorization: designating a "Chinese literary modernity" or "Taiwanese literary modernity" in a more or less arbitrary manner frees one's hand to dealing with the subject "for its own sake." And yet, as we are all painfully aware, the encounter with the modern West has deeply transformed Chinese and Taiwanese literature in their institutional dimensions, their generic conventions, and aesthetic criteria, as well as conceptions of their role and function in society. That is to say, the impact from Western literary concepts cannot be wished away and the process of transmission is messy and complex. Here I want to highlight one of such complexities in relation to the narrowly defined notion of "literary modernism" by evoking a concept described by Giddens as "self-reflexivity," which he perceives as a distinctive characteristic of modernity. The gist of the idea is this: modern people's reflections of specific human activities produce related discourses, which, after being circulated, would come back to exert impact on the way people carry out those same activities in the future. Studies in sociology of existing social behaviors, for instance, end up typically with modifying those very behaviors after the results of the studies acquire the status of scientific knowledge and circulate in society in the form of discourses. It seems to me that the same reflexive process also occurs in the transmission of knowledge and attitudes toward the modern condition through the late-comers' assimilation of discourses produced in advanced modern societies. Modernist literary works in non-Western cultures, for instance, often contain preconceived views on/of modernity that are either assimilated from the their Western literary models or disseminated through high-profile public debates (one salient example of the former is the motif of urban alienation, which is set in physical environments far from a fully urbanized one). Precisely in what ways the views toward the modern condition have affected attitudes and behaviors in non-Western societies as they themselves undergo the modernizing process, whether they facilitate or prevent the entrenchment of certain modern institutions, is something to be further explored. But the fact that modernist literary movements more often than not occur at the onset of a period of rapid societal modernization — as was the case in all four waves of modernist
trend in Taiwan and Mainland China — shows that, again, a shared pattern may be discernible.

If we could re-connect modernism to modernity in a non-reflectionist fashion, taking advantage of such insights as provided by Giddens's notion of reflexivity, we should be able to move closer to making sense of modernism's chronology in different East Asian cultures. This effort could then shed light on many parallel phenomena that have occurred within the cultural field of different East Asian societies, including the polemics that pit modernist aesthetics against traditional-indigenous ones, and the shifting of genre hierarchies as a result of the reversal of values attributed to modern/ Western and Indigenous/traditional systems of knowledge. Postcolonialist theories have made compelling arguments about the complicated power play in the collective psyche in former colonies of the West and scholars have applied some of them to examine East Asian cultures' encounter with the West. What is conspicuously lacking, however, is a more nuanced analysis of how the structure of the cultural fields in these societies have mediated the impact of socio-historical changes on literary production — changes that are not only consequences of the global spread of modernity, but also reflect global-scale geopolitical maneuvers that typifies the modern times.

Structural Affinities of East Asian Societies during the Cold War

The question of structural affinity turned my attention to the ubiquitous presence of the menace of the cold war in East Asia, as well as opportunities it offered. Indeed, the influence of the cold war penetrated the region in such a comprehensive manner that it sometimes became "invisible." It is only after we have entered the new millennium, when consequences of accelerated economic globalization become so manifest in people's lifestyles and in the new types of geocultural struggles, that many of us begin to contemplate the extraordinary implications of the influences of the cold war. As Pierre Bourdieu observes, external (political, economic, social, or technological) forces produce effects in cultural production only in a refractive manner, through the impact they exert on the structure of the cultural field and on its internal governing laws. The shared geopolitical positions in different contemporary societies of East Asia, therefore, could not but have resulted in comparable cultural phenomena. However, because of our obsession with the East versus West relationship, few have thought this would be something worth our scholarly attention.

Around the mid-to-late 1990s, I chanced upon a number of conference presentations on South Korean film and literature. To my own embarrassment, it was the first time for me to realize the striking parallelism between South Korean and Taiwanese postwar histories. The proximity in the dates of critical political events reveals a similar trajectory in both countries' process of democratization. The stable growth under the US-American-backed authoritarian regime led by postwar strongmen Chiang Kai-shek and Park Chung-hee ended in the 1970s; Taiwan's Kaohsiung Incident in 1979 and South Korea's Gwangju popular uprising in 1980 marked the rise of a period of political opposition and democratization movements in both countries; the lift of martial law in Taiwan in 1987 and the establishment of civilian government in South Korea in 1987-88 as a result of the Olympic Games were among the most prominent examples. Taiwan and South Korea were both stellar examples of newly industrialized countries in the 1980s, dubbed as "little dragons of the East Asia." As former colonies of Japan and still suffering from the fate of divided nations, both societies harbor profoundly ambivalent feelings toward Japan and the United States. As a student of literature, I am of course most interested in how people's reactions to such momentous historical events crystallize in their production and reception experiences of cultural products. It was eye-opening, to say the least, for me to observe how Sandglass, the astronomically popular 1995 South Korean television mini-series that deals with the political turbulence of the country's recent past, and City of Sadness, Hou Hsiao-hsien's 1989 film about the traumatic Kaohsiung Incident, performed very similar therapeutic functions
for people in their respective societies. Both provided an opportunity for the public to express their political discontent of a recently defunct military/authoritarian government while sentimentally reliving a bygone era.

It then dawned on me that the underdeveloped sub-field of "East Asian comparative literature" could prove to be a gold mine, precisely for its promise to illuminate the relationship between these countries' geopolitical positions and the nature and function of their cultural products, given the structural affinities of their respective cultural fields in the cold war era. Cultural productions in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan all seemed to be constrained by a politically instituted, neo-traditionalist, conservative, and conformist dominant culture, and thus the mainstream artistic position tended to circumscribe any potentially subversive aesthetic form like literary modernism. These views were confirmed to some degree by observations found in Margret Hillenbrand's recent book, *Literature, Modernity, and the Practice of Resistance. Japanese and Taiwanese Fiction, 1960-1990*, which compares Japanese and Taiwanese fiction in the latter half of the cold war era (the book takes primarily a thematic approach and compares the literary manifestations of such sociological syndromes as the experience living under the shadow of U.S. hegemony, modernity's disintegrative power on traditional family, and the city and sexuality as privileged tropes to represent such traumatic experiences). It is particularly noteworthy that, given the great disparity between Taiwan and Japan in their statures, aesthetic orientations, international visibilities, and stages of modernization, this comparative study is meaningful because of the two countries' shared socio-cultural experiences within larger historical frames: the structural affinities of their respective cultural fields conditioned by their similar geopolitical positions in the cold war; the presence in both of a soft-authoritarian government's state-sponsored, economically centered dominant discourse on modernity; and the remnants of Confucianist tradition of remonstrance that still defines the self-positioning of modern intellectuals and writers. And it is unsurprising that commonalities exist on the other side of the cold war division among the communist East Asian countries of the People's Republic of China and North Korea. Another West-based scholar, Xiaomei Chen, takes pains to point out in *Occidentialism: A Theory of Counter-discourse in Post-Mao China* that the special type of cultural logic discussed in this book may only be found in one other place, namely North Korea.

In sum, geopolitical factors have certainly contributed to creating structural affinities in the cultural fields of different East Asian countries and we need to achieve a better understanding of the governing laws of these fields and their distinctive characteristics. As I have argued elsewhere that, if Bourdieu sees in the cultural field in modern Western capitalist society two competing legitimating principles — the "heteronomous" and the "autonomous" principles represented by market-authorized best-sellers and "pure art," respectively — then the struggle between the principles of "political legitimacy" and the principles of "cultural legitimacy" could be said to have constituted the central dynamics of twentieth-century Chinese culture (see my "Twentieth-century Chinese Modernism"). The comparative framework I am suggesting allows us to explore the subtler dimensions of the complex workings of these principles and it is reasonable to believe that such sustaining structural features could be traced back to the earlier phase of East Asian modernity when literature was first established as a modern institution. It is encouraging that some scholars have begun to treat Republican Chinese literature from the institutional perspective such as journals and literary societies or how the publishing and educational institutions have legitimized particular vernacular writing styles. It would be fruitful to explore such issues with reference to other East Asian countries that encountered modernity in comparable ways in the early part of the twentieth century.

**Taiwan Studies and the Globalization of Culture**

Néstor García Canclini calls attention to the new cultural landscape developed in recent decades: "above all in the second half of the
20th century, the industrialization of material goods went hand in hand with the industrialization of culture, so generating new concepts of development... The final stage of this restructuring of cultural processes and of their links with social and economic development can be summarized in two formulae: integration of the mass media into information superhighways and integration of the national cultural circuits into globalized systems" <http://www.unesco.org/culture_and_development/discussion/cancli.html> [inactive]. We are, of course, still caught in the middle of this process, which has been even further accelerated in the post-cold-war years by the twin forces of neoliberalist expansion of global capitalism and the digital revolution of communication technology. Nowadays, it is increasingly difficult to separate cultural activities from economic activities and as culture plays an important part in the national economy, it becomes susceptible to ever more blatant political manipulations.

In a sense, this direction of development has its roots in the very nature of literature as a modern social institution consisting of two dimensions: it refers simultaneously to the more abstract dimension of aesthetic conceptions (such as genre conventions, evaluative criteria, etc.), and the more concrete one of organizations that facilitates the production, dissemination, and consumption of literature (literary journals and societies, publishing industry, literary contests, etc.; on literature as an institution, see, e.g., Dubois; Hohendahl). The mutual implication of these two dimensions dictates that the development of the institution of literature is inevitably tied to the conditions of other modern institutions that Giddens identifies: surveillance, capitalism, industry, and state-monopolized use of violence. The fact that modern East Asian literatures have been instituted in East Asian societies within a relatively short period of time of little more than a century — and in many cases the processes are not complete yet — explains why they are so closely connected to social phenomena motivated by the entrenchment of different kinds of modern institutions. For instance, the vernacular movement was aimed at building a modern nation; the rise of entertainment culture was associated with both the spread of print capitalism and mass literacy; the collectivist ideology of literature and culture was engendered in war mobilization and different kinds of revolution; and state surveillance of citizens took the familiar form of literary censorship. In other words, culture has always been intricately entangled in national politics and economics in modern times, but the current global restructuring of cultural systems has transformed the very nature of the literary institutions, thus generating new ways in which they relate to each other.

"Soft Power"

Taiwan is not alone in its self-conscious endeavors to promote itself through culture. The 1998 conference at Columbia University I referred to earlier was tellingly titled Representing Taiwan: Strategies and Aesthetics — and sure enough, it was sponsored by the Council of Cultural Affairs of the Executive Yuan of the Republic of China. Governments nowadays are more publicly and unapologetically engaged in exploring the potential of culture to achieve diplomatic goals. From a rational point of view, this is of course a more desirable approach than the use of military force. Joseph S. Nye Jr., who has coined the now-popular term "soft power," wrote in The International Herald Tribune in 2003: "Soft power is the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals. It differs from hard power, the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will. Both hard and soft powers are important in the war on terrorism, but attraction is much cheaper than coercion, and an asset that needs to be nourished" (4). Nye's remark was clearly directed at criticizing the Iraqi war launched by the Bush government. But the increasingly popular term "soft power" has served at once to rationalize what used to be known pejoratively as "propaganda" and to shed lights on the innovative ways in which geocultural wars are waged. More and more governments are actively exploring the new possibilities offered by the globalization of culture for diplomatic and economic purposes. The so-called "Korean Wave" in the last decade offers an
excellent example of how the government and big corporations collaborate in enhancing the image of the country, while producing considerable financial gains through a cluster of cultural products including television drama, pop music, and cultural tourism. In 2006, the government of Mainland China began to establish "Confucian Institutes" as an agent to teach Chinese language and to disseminate Chinese cultural knowledge throughout the world (although it may appear ironic, given the anti-traditionalist slant of the Chinese Communist Party's founding ideology). Critical voices, of course, are heard, and what progressive scholars find especially unsavory is the self-conscious, unabashed ways in which culture is exploited by the state to achieve political goals. At an international conference entitled Japan and the Soft Power held in my Department in the Spring of 2006, Japanese historian Nancy Stalker remarked that earlier in the postwar period Japanese government used to brandish traditional Japanese arts to forge its international image, but suddenly decided to promote Japanese popular culture in more recently year for that same purpose. This came apparently from a recognition of the tremendous success enjoyed by Japanese manga, anime, the "cute" (kawai) products, Pokemon, Nintendo, and so on, across broad regions in both the East and the West.

Faced with the new ways cultural wars are waged in the age of globalization, I submit that my own elitist, primarily humanistic orientation to the study of literature in the Department of Foreign Languages and Literature in the early 1970s, which regarded literature as a refined form of culture, and thus an effective counter force to the pervasive encroachment of political and economic powers in modern life, requires modification. While I am not yet entirely clear how exactly to modify the old views, I am hoping that the attempts at describing the new reality in the present article would help me to come to terms with it one way or another.

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The Cultural Turn and Taiwanese Identity in the 1990s

Bi-yu Chang

**Introduction**

Shifting between continuity and rupture, sameness and difference, identity is constantly shaping and reshaping by various factors in the process of identity formation and the factors are of course significant in the process of winning hegemony. The discourse of "Taiwanese subjectivity" has been created and has become a "regime of the truth" within only a few years, not just relying on establishing a broad bloc of social forces through the intermediary of ideology, but more importantly, depending on a vigorous process of otherings.

The radical political changes and social turmoil following the lift of martial law in 1987 had a profound effect on the complicated issue of Taiwanese identity. The topic of "Taiwanese identity" was for the first time widely debated and became an issue affecting every aspect of Taiwanese life. After the upheaval and uncertainty of the 1990s, Taiwan’s society now seems to have finally entered a more stable phase. In the new millennium, it appears that "Taiwanese subjectivity" has become a less contentious topic. The slogan "I love Taiwan" is now a popular phrase, proposed and supported by both the ruling party and the opposition. The importance of Taiwanese subjectivity has been widely accepted and the principle of *Taiwan youxian* ("prioritising Taiwan") is also widely recognised. However, just two decades ago, this would have been unthinkable of. How did this change in Taiwan cultural discourse come about?

Most research on the crisis of Taiwanese identity focuses on the impact of political conflicts and the emergence of Taiwanese awareness. The assumption underpinning most accounts of the period is that changes in Taiwanese identity were primarily a result of democratisation. However, I argue that the reasons for the rapid shift from the previous China-centric identity to a Taiwan-centric
The Cultural Turn and Taiwanese Identity in the 1990s

Bi-yu Chang

one were not merely political, but also cultural. The identity shift that occurred in the 1990s demonstrates how a new identity can be constructed and exemplifies the contest between different narratives interpreting Taiwan's past. This search for a "true" Taiwanese identity triggered the overturn of old values and reversed the previous China-centric cultural hegemony. In contrast to the general belief that this change was achieved by political and social movements, I see the change to be fundamentally cultural in nature. In recent decades, the social sciences and the humanities have taken a cultural turn, emphasising the importance of the production of meaning. I believe that Taiwan's identity crisis in the mid-1990s was a competition between various discourses fighting to dominate the said production of meaning.

In this article, I present an overview of the cultural environment at the beginning of the 1990s, examine the crucial change in the mid-90s, and then explore how a new discourse was won and strengthened. As Antonio Gramsci suggests, every crisis is a chance for reconstruction, and even if a dominant group has hegemony firmly in its grasp, "it must continue to 'lead' as well" (68). In other words, changes take place whenever crises arise, but hegemony can only be truly successful and secured if it is constantly maintained. In the 1990s, under pressure from the public, the Kuomintang (KMT) government adopted a Taiwan-centric rhetoric to keep itself in power. The state's cultural policy was a primary agent in the repetition and reinforcement of this new discourse, and, ironically, caused the KMT's downfall in 2000. This process of identity change proves that the seizure of cultural hegemony leads to political leadership. I believe that cultural policy was the crucial factor in sustaining the hegemonic change and creating a general acceptance of Taiwan-centric discourse at the end of the 1990s.

Cultural policy is not arts policy, as many perceive it to be. I see cultural policy as a set of official mechanisms that provides contracts, grants, and fellowships to individuals and distributes funds to organisations. However, what is involved in these mechanisms is a series of decisions to select, exclude, and reward.

This process of encouraging and discouraging, including and excluding, rewarding and ignoring through cultural policy can easily determine which art forms will be supported, what kinds of art works will be put on display, what cultural heritage will be preserved and promoted, who will be funded, and what kind of values and knowledge are to be encouraged and reproduced. Hence, I regard cultural policy to be actions taken by the state to create meanings purposefully. Any official statement, policy and deliberate action/inaction with the intent to produce meanings, formulate identity, and construct ideologies can be seen as a form of "cultural policy" and the official indicator of the state's cultural blueprint. However, what I am looking at here is not cultural policy itself, but the meanings that are produced by it and focus on the role that cultural policy played in the formation of a new hegemonic discourse in Taiwan. This includes an examination of how cultural policy produced new meanings at the time turning the discourse of "Taiwanese subjectivity" into "common sense" and an exploration of how cultural mechanisms functioned to maintain this newly acquired hegemony.

Short-lived China Fever

Following the lift of martial law in 1987 and an increase in cross-Strait contacts, Taiwan was immersed in "China Fever" (Li 72). Between 1987 and 1994, 7.25 million non-governmental activities took place, including tourism, trading, and cultural exchanges. There were approximately 600,000 Taiwanese travelling to Mainland China in the first year alone (Siew 3). Among these activities, cultural exchange was situated as the focal point for the improvement of the cross-Strait relationships (CCA, White Paper 263). In 1992, as this interest in Chinese culture reached its height, the KMT government further opened the door to artists and exhibitions from Mainland China. The welcome given and admiration shown towards Chinese culture in the early 1990s demonstrated how the Taiwanese felt closely associated with Chinese culture. This was the result of several decades of KMT rule.
that had constructed a China-centric ideology in Taiwan and created a sentiment taking China as the "cultural homeland."

According to anthropologist Li Yih-yuan, the cause of "China Fever" was curiosity in, and a longing for, the homeland and traditional culture (72). However, alongside curiosity and longing, a realisation was also emerging. Because of the intensified contacts between two sides, it gradually dawned on people in Taiwan that they were really very different from their mainland counterparts. A sense of uniqueness in being "Taiwanese" had been awoken when cross-Strait communications increased. The Taiwanese noticed there were huge differences between them: "The values are so different ... We feel somehow very familiar with Chinese culture ... but we're a new kind of person" (Elliott 16). Although the KMT government had always encouraged people to see themselves as Chinese, they had gradually become aware that there were huge gaps between themselves and the people of the Mainland. Even the older generation of mainlanders who had lived in Taiwan for over fifty years eventually found it difficult to feel "at home" after they returned to visit the Mainland. They often said, "I no longer know anybody there. We have little in common" (Elliott, 16).

The shock they experienced was similar to what Stuart Hall described as "the 'doubleness' of similarity and difference" ("Cultural Identity" 227). The Taiwanese and Chinese were both same and different. When the ambiguous doubleness became increasingly apparent and uncomfortable, the previous dominant China-centric identity was cast into doubt. Although many Taiwanese were awed by the sudden influx of Chinese culture and artists, Taiwanese consciousness grew because of a growing awareness of difference. Little wonder, then, that when the People's Republic of China (PRC) threatened Taiwan with missiles in 1995 and 1996 and worked to obscure its international profile, people in Taiwan felt disillusioned and disappointed with their former homeland. The sense of "difference" surfaced and the feeling of sameness subsided. As a result, Taiwanese awareness which had gradually been awakening since the 1970s now gathered momentum and arose with a vengeance in the mid-1990s.

Taiwanese Identity in the 1990s

From the late 1980s to 2000, there were 62 surveys on "how the Taiwanese identified themselves" (MAC). As these surveys show, the identity tendency reversed between 1994 and 1996. As late as in 1992, the majority of people in Taiwan still perceived themselves as either "Chinese only" (44%) or "both Taiwanese and Chinese" (36.5%). Merely 16.7% claimed that they were "Taiwanese only" (MAC). After forty-odd years of KMT education instilling a China-centric identity and sentiment, it was not surprising that most people in Taiwan felt culturally close to China. Against such a background, how did the identity crisis come about so abruptly in the mid-1990s? Although the surveys were carried out by various institutions and their results did not always correspond neatly to each other, the general trend was congruent. Among twelve of the surveys conducted in 1994 and 1995, the number of those identifying themselves as "Taiwanese only" started to take up similar share to, or even more than, those who identified themselves as "Chinese only." Starting from 1996, all surveys showed a similar trend — the category "Chinese only" kept on falling and the category "Taiwanese only" continued to grow. Caught in-between of the two extremes, the category of "both Taiwanese and Chinese" became increasingly important and remained approximately 40% in the late 1990s.

The first identifiable cause for the shift was the impact of the Qiandao Lake Incident of 31 March 1994 when twenty-four Taiwanese tourists were robbed and burnt to death in southern China. The brutality of both the incident and the way in which the PRC authorities dealt with the aftermath shocked the Taiwanese. For the first time, the difference between two sides had become so real that it startled the people in Taiwan. The incident triggered suspicion towards Mainland Chinese authorities and dampened the affection towards China. The Taiwanese felt disappointed and were disillusioned by the imagined identity of being "Chinese." Furthermore, the Taiwanese realised how little say they had during
the incident and felt resentful about the PRC's authoritarian attitude towards the Taiwanese and their demands. As a result, the figures for the once dominant "Chinese only" group started to tumble. Nevertheless, the fatal blow had been dealt by the PRC missile threat in 1995 and 1996 when the PRC had tried to stop Taiwan's first presidential election. The resulting antagonism firmly secured Lee Teng-hui's legitimacy and reversed the Chinese/Taiwanese identity tendency. Yet, if this trend had only been caused by the PRC missile threat, then the continuing drop of the "Chinese only" identity and a steady growth of "Taiwanese only" identity in the second half of the 1990s was a puzzling situation. Furthermore, since calls for indigenisation had been made since the 1970s, why did identity change take place only at this particular point in time? Another baffling question concerning this shift is as to how come a deeply entrenched cultural identity changed so easily within only a period of two years, and continued to decline afterwards, with or without PRC aggression? There must have been other factors at work to keep arousing hostility towards China and sustaining this new discourse of "Taiwanese subjectivity." In other words, the identity shift might have been triggered by a political crisis or incidents; nevertheless, it was the maintenance of hegemony that really mattered. The state played a crucial role in the process of sustaining this Taiwan-centric cultural hegemony.

It might seem paradoxical to suggest that the KMT supported a discourse that eventually caused its own downfall. But, before we proceed to explore the state's role in securing and sustaining the hegemony of the new discourse, I would like to investigate the nature of identity. As Hall points out, cultural identities are not an "essence" but a "positioning" not always fixed but continuously changing and shifting ("Cultural Identity" 225-27). Identity is not something that already exists transcending time and space. It is subject to the constant "play" of history, culture, and power, and is constructed through a mixture of memory, fantasy, narrative, and myth. Hence, cultural identity is in fact a matter of "becoming as well as being" ("Cultural Identity" 225). Under two axes or vectors — "the vector of similarity and continuity; and the vector of difference and rupture," cultural identity is constantly evolving and transforming ("Cultural Identity" 225). Because of its slippery and ever changing nature, it is crucial to bear in mind that there is no essential "one true self" relying on a re-discovery of "lost history" or an unquestionable origin. How the Taiwanese viewed themselves depended greatly on how the hegemonic discourse defined "Taiwanese identity." Far from being fixed eternally in a definite origin and essentialised past, cultural identity is under continuous construction. Based on this understanding, I examine how this new identity discourse won hegemony and focus on the maintenance of its leadership. Hence, what follows is an exploration of the role of cultural policy in the process of incorporating and sustaining the new discourse.

Raising Awareness

On the surface, Taiwan's dramatic identity shift in the 1990s was touched off by conflicts, hostilities, and military threats. In reality, the identity issue was a deep-rooted cultural problem that had been brewing for decades. As early as the 1960s, calls had been made for the KMT government to democratise and adopt a more localised approach, one that would establish foundations for Taiwan awareness and a gradual change in the political culture. The KMT's post-war principle of Sinification only started to lose its total control over Taiwanese identity in the 1970s, as a result of the impact of international isolation, domestic demand for political reform, the end of the Cultural Revolution, and most of all, a cultural awakening in Taiwan. Thus, the KMT was forced to adopt a more localised and open approach in the political sphere. International isolation aroused both anxiety and a sense of righteous indignation. Since one's identity is affected by the recognition of others, both non-recognition and misrecognition will inflict harm: both are a "form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being" (Taylor 25). The disturbance created by non- or mis-recognition of the Republic of
China's (ROC; i.e., Taiwan) international status from the 1970s was painful and agonising. Since their Chinese identity was denied internationally, people in Taiwan were anxious to search for their "place in the world." The urge to reach out and a longing to be recognised accelerated the search for Taiwanese identity. As a result, a sense of "Taiwanese consciousness" gradually surfaced and indigenous culture and folk arts become the symbol of the increased awareness. A trend of "searching for cultural-roots" emerged. This was tolerated by the KMT as long as this longing was framed within a China-centric framework. Although local Taiwanese culture started to become popular in the 1980s, emphasis was still placed by the KMT government on Chinese cultural roots. Within this mindset, culture in Taiwan remained a "branch" of Chinese culture. Hence, the encouragement of Taiwanese culture was regarded only as part of the promotion of Chinese culture. It was only after the missile threats in the mid-1990s that the once adored "homeland" became a brutal "enemy." As Gramsci asserts, the waging of ideological struggle to transform popular consciousness is crucial to gain hegemony (238). In order to win the ideological struggle, a process of intellectual and "moral reform" is necessary to forge a collective will and create a shared view of the world. The cross-strait antagonism was also intensified by academic advocates and this was a crucial factor in changing people's views and reshaping their identity. Although the issues of Taiwanese subjectivity had been raised in the 1980s (see, e.g., Chang Yan-hsian 278), a broader-ranging debate started in the 1990s and spread across different disciplines. The most noticeable debates included two years of debate on Taiwanese subjectivity in the fine arts journal Xiongshi meishu (Lion Arts Monthly) (1991-1993); Tai Kuo-hui's discussion on the "Taiwan complex" and "China complex" (1994); the mocking of the concept of "fake Taiwanese" (Isle Margin, 1993, 1995); an exploration of nationalism in Taiwan by Chang Mao-kui (1993); intense debates on the definition of Taiwanese and Taiwanese subjectivity in 1995 in the journal Zhongwai wenxue (Chung-wai Literature); the theoretical debates on nationalism in Taiwan yanju shehui jikan (Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Science) in 1996; a struggle around the necessity or otherwise of setting up Taiwan literature departments at universities (1995 to 1997); and a fierce argument in 1997 concerning the new subject "Getting to Know Taiwan" taught in secondary schools.

By the second half of the 1990s, the term "Taiwanese awareness" had become a common phrase used in public discourse and the notion of "Taiwanese subjectivity" was supported by many while the term "Taiwanese identity" was commonly used in contradistinction to Chinese identity. In response to the PRC's aggression, the quest for a "true" belonging intensified. The demand for the Taiwanese to dangjia zuozhu (to be one's own master and to make one's own decision) became increasingly prevalent. Alongside the "re-discovery" of the past and the empowerment of local people, there was also a deliberate demonisation of the PRC. Looking back on this moment of time, Homi Bhabha's words ring true: "Cultural and political identity is constructed through a process of othering" (Bhabha qtd. in Rutherford 219). This othering process aroused both anxiety and excitement. On the one hand, the once degraded "local" was elevated and became the "rightful master" of the island. On the other hand, China was described as the colonial empire and a foreign regime. Hence, another group of people — mainlanders — was categorised as the unjust other. At the same time, the old China-centric values and discourses would not be given up without a fight. The struggles to define a "true" Taiwanese identity had been severe and an ideological battle was fought between one camp focusing only on difference and another emphasising sameness.

The KMT had also gone through great changes and the new leadership had steered the party towards indigenisation. Although the trend of indigenisation within the party started in the late 1970s, it was not until Lee Teng-hui took over the party leadership that the KMT's nature really changed. After the power struggle between the mainstream and the non-mainstream camps was finally settled in 1993, what followed was a total change of
direction and led by Lee Teng-hui, the indigenisation trend grew accordingly. The KMT's attempt to win indigenous public support and regain control was carried out mainly through culture. Although the discourse of "Taiwanese subjectivity" was advocated from the bottom-up by intellectuals and activists, it is fair to say that a Taiwan-centric mentality would have struggled for many more years and might not have even been able to gain ground without Lee's endorsement. After all, at the end of the KMT's "soft authoritarian" rule in the 1990s (on this, see Winckler), the state's influence was still strong. It is not to say that the 1990s identity shift was the state's design or its intention: the KMT only wanted to win public support and compete with the growing opposition, rather than giving up its China-centric mentality. Using cultural policy as the strategy to build a seemingly liberal and democratic image for the party, the KMT's cultural indigenisation was really an attempt to hold on to power and thus the state's cultural policy played a major role in the process of gaining hegemony of the new discourse, popularising its rhetoric, and undermining the dominant China-centric identity.

**New Cultural Zhongyuan**

Although the KMT factional strife ended in 1993, the symbolic division between competing views of Taiwanese identity had not been resolved. The identity dispute became apparent after PRC aggression and the gap was further enlarged whenever there was an election. The repercussions of this division were felt in daily life and aroused anxiety, frustration, and emotional debate among ordinary people. To reduce uncertainty and ease the tension, Lee Teng-hui raised a couple of cultural slogans and upheld them as the priorities of his state policy, e.g. "Community of Shared Fate" (1992), "Running Big Taiwan, Establishing the New Zhongyuan" (1994, 1995), "Spiritual Reform" (1996), and "New Taiwanese" (1998).

In contrast to typical KMT political slogans, Lee's calls indicated a new direction. The slogans were proposed for certain political purposes, either to ease the factional divisions, to call for cooperation, or to draw people's attention to the island they shared and lived on. Moreover, they were raised as Lee's "cultural policy" to create a more tolerant and multicultural Taiwan. In other words, Lee proposed a realistic cultural prospect that focused on Taiwan only. According to Lee, a shared fate brought everyone in Taiwan together. He said: "There are twenty-one million people in Taiwan. Apart from the aborigines, the ancestors of most people in Taiwan were migrants from the mainland, either fifty years ago, or hundreds of years ago. Every one of us has stuck together through thick and thin, and has created a civilised, and prosperous society here. For our future prosperity, we rely on one another. We are both Chinese and Taiwanese. There is no ethnic difference ... We should be able to have an equal footing and equal opportunity ... This is what 'Community of Shared Fate' is all about" ("Speech to the First Nation-building Research Group").

In order to construct Taiwan as a "shared community," which distinguished no groups in terms of ethnic difference, the first priority was to resolve the shengji conflicts. The term shengji refers to one's ancestral origin. Apart from 2% of the Indigenous population of Taiwan, most of the population are Han Chinese. People in Taiwan were generally grouped into following categories according to their shengji: the Indigenous people, Taiwanese (Minnan and Hakka), and Mainlanders. These divisions are not only connected to "origins" but also to the period in which one's ancestors arrived on the island (see Wachman 15-16). The "Taiwanese" in this context refers to Han Chinese who lived in Taiwan and whose ancestors migrated there before 1945. The category of Mainlanders refers to Chinese who came to Taiwan after 1945 and their Taiwan-born children. In the 1990s, the divisions became increasingly problematic because of the growing hostility towards China, which was subsequently extended to the Mainlanders.

In order to carry out Lee's idea of the "Community of Shared Fate," the Census Registration Law was revised in 1992. The entry of zuji (ancestral origin) was replaced with a record of "birth
place." Since then, the category of "second-generation Mainlanders" has been removed officially. The ancestral differences between Taiwan-born baby-boomers were made vague. This change demonstrated the government's intention to reduce the shengji division and to ease conflict between different groups. In 1995, Lee Teng-hui proposed another concept — "Managing Big Taiwan, Building New Zhongyuan" as his blueprint for national development. Zhongyuan literally means the "Central Plains" in China, an area comprising the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River. Usually, the phrase zhongyuan indicates the "homeland of the Chinese," "the central land of China," and "the legitimate Chinese regime." Symbolically, it was usually used to imply "China" or "Chinese regime." Lee's ideal of constructing a "new" zhongyuan had an underlying implication: the symbolic meaning of zhongyuan was not limited to a "geographical notion" but had more to do with its central position. Hence, the emphasis on building the new zhongyua implied his intention to construct Taiwan as the new center.

On the surface, the slogans and ideas Lee proposed in the first half of the 1990s were only empty words; in reality, they laid the foundations for the introduction of new cultural discourses, creating alternative narratives, and most of all, trying to shift attention to Taiwan. By the second half of the 1990s, the environment for cultural reform was ready.

**Cultural Construction for a New Homeland**

Starting with the second half of the 1990s, the rhetoric of the movement to build Taiwanese awareness aimed at the creation of a rooted identity. It aimed to foster community spirit, encouraged local people to engage in community affairs, and urged them to take pride in making decisions for themselves. From 1995 onwards, resources were poured in not only to help local people "re-discover" local history and culture, but also to empower twenty-three county and municipal culture centres to participate in cultural development at local levels. These actions transformed Taiwan's environment of culture. It was a change created by a mixture of forceful implementation, plentiful resources, and the attraction of idealistic concepts. The most popular response of this movement was the establishment of local "cultural and historical workshops." They mushroomed to over 400 all over Taiwan within only five years. Because the local government lacked professional training and had limited resources, they relied heavily on this sort of workshop to implement this movement and to prove the success of local cultural autonomy. Consequently, these workshops have become the most powerful local agents. Supported by local culture centres, many workshops concentrated on gaining funding or getting government contracts. However, even the CCA (Council of Cultural Affairs) found this cozy cooperative relationship between local workshops and culture centres worrying. Before the arrival of these professional workshops, community affairs developed organically. After the movement was launched, however, many local decisions concerning public affairs fell to the hands of expert advisors and better-educated newcomers. Hence, many criticised the movement for disregarding the differences between and within the communities, ignoring the elderly, and intensifying local factions. Furthermore, well-known workshops and local foundations even had sufficient influence to monopolise the decision-making process in local cultural affairs.

On the surface, since the 1990s, cultural policy has provided support to local cultural development and has been more tolerant of artistic freedom. However, through regulation, funding, and selection criteria that encourage only certain art forms, content and artists, cultural policy can increase the state's cultural capital, maintain its hegemony, and reinforcing certain selected ideologies in a subtle and indirect way. As soon as the mechanism is up and running, people tend to follow the rule voluntarily, so that meanings can be constructed with little notice or resistance. It is a crucial public arena in which different political camps compete to seize hegemony and win the right to write culture, and hence, is crucial in formulating and disseminating official discourse. In the case of Taiwan, because the focus was placed on community
construction, most resources were diverted to local and amateur activities. Once money and official support were placed on certain art forms and activities, a self-motivated cultural trend was triggered. The rapid growth of local cultural and historical workshops and the development of local cultural industries were typical examples of this self-initiating mechanism. Instead of constraining their behaviour, this form of regulation produces new subjects and tries to get members of groups to regulate themselves subjectively. The rise and fall of Beijing opera in Taiwan is a perfect example of "subjective regulation" (Hall, "The Centrality of Culture" 235). As an art form closely associated with Chinese cultural traditions, Beijing opera was under great pressure to answer for its claim to cultural legitimacy, the title "national opera," and its fully-funded status since the 1990s. After half a century of involvement, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) dissolved all Beijing opera groups and school in 1995. The only state-run Beijing opera group that survived was put under the control of the Ministry of Education (MOE) and was given the mission to "Taiwanise" Beijing opera. In contrast, during this same period, Taiwanese local opera forms have benefited from political support and an injection of funding. Both gezaixi (Taiwanese opera) and Hakka opera represented major ethnic groups in Taiwan and have been included in the state education system (which was previously monopolised by Beijing opera). Moreover, because gezaixi is the only locally born and bred opera form, it has replaced Beijing opera on tours representing Taiwan internationally. In the same way that Beijing opera had been promoted for ideological and political reasons in the 1960s, gezaixi and hakka opera were chosen to represent a "multicultural" Taiwan to canonise indigenous culture and to achieve the political aim of shengji equality. Through intentional funding and encouragement, Taiwan's traditional opera heritage offers an image of a new multicultural tradition. Consequently, a new tradition was created to represent a multiracial and multicultural Taiwan.

Narrative Rewriting

Another significant cultural change took place in the domain of education. In the past, education had always been both conservative and slow in response to social change. It played the role of the final stronghold for the ruling powers, by which ideologies could be constructed and values reproduced. Hence, although calls for educational reform had been raised since the early 1980s, change had been sluggish. Education reform and the indigenisation of the national curriculum took place around the mid-1990s, as a belated response to the changes in public attitude. Many restrictions on the education system started to relax. For example, the University Law was enacted in January 1994 to allow academic freedom and autonomy after almost two decades of advocacy.

There were three dimensions to the influence of education on the formation of ideologies: the design of national curriculum, the content of textbooks, and the hidden curriculum (see Apple 87). The struggle between competing discourses was at its most severe in these three domains. The most important change was the education reform. In 1994, the MOE set up the Education Reform Committee, which was headed by then President of the Academia Sinica Lee Yuan-tseh, a Nobel Laureate. The goal of this committee was to research and design open, humanistic, and inspirational education reform. Consequently, the committee restructured the education system and redesigned the whole national curricula. Since its establishment, the pace of reform accelerated. For example, the most criticised system, the textbook standardisation system, started in 1968. After two decades of implementation, it was relaxed in 1989, and finally abolished at the elementary level in the second half of the 1990s. After three decades of ideological standardisation, the choice of textbooks had been returned to the hands of educators. The previous China-centric tradition in the national curriculum was also resolved. Against the backdrop of the emergence of Taiwanese awareness, the absence of Taiwan became increasingly unacceptable. At the end of the 1990s, the
invisibility of Taiwan was rectified in school textbooks. Pressurised by public demand, the MOE formally confirmed that the new 1996 curriculum would focus on "indigenisation."

The MOE decided in 1993 to add "Local Studies" to the new elementary curriculum, covering Taiwan's history, geography, arts, and local dialects. Because of the small number of hours given to "Local Studies" teaching (only 50 minutes per week) and its status as an "optional module," the KMT's sincerity in promoting Taiwanese culture was questioned. The implementation of Local Studies was seen as "window dressing." In 1997, fierce debates broke out because the introduction of a new subject, entitled "Getting to Know Taiwan." Some scholars criticised the content for being full of errors and an overly politicised version of Taiwan's history (see Wang Chung-fu). Among all the academics on the editorial committee, the most controversial member was historian Tu Cheng-sheng, who was later appointed the Minister of Education for the Democratic Progressive Party after they seized political power in 2000. He famously proposed the principle of "concentric circle" for textbooks and advocated a Taiwan-centric ideology in education. After intense arguments, MOE regarded the subject to be a better option than the previous textbooks and implemented it from 1998 to 2001. Later, this "concentric circle" principle was extended as the guideline for all textbooks. In other words, the principle to prioritise Taiwan has become the norm in Taiwan's educational system.

Another example was the proposal to establish departments of Taiwan Literature at universities. In 1995, eighteen non-governmental organisations held a joint hearing in the Legislature and urged the MOE to establish such departments. However, this met with resistance. Within only a year, the tide turned. After seven applications and modifications, the Aletheia University (then the Danshui Management College) gained MOE approval in 1997 to set up the first-ever Department of Taiwanese Literature. In the following year, a proposal of the National Cheng-Kung University to set up a Masters degree course in Taiwan Literature was also approved. In 2000, Local Studies, a once insignificant extra-curricular option, was made a compulsory subject at the elementary school level. In 2001 MOE started a new system — the "Nine-Grade Curriculum Alignment for Elementary and Junior High Education," designed by the Education Reform Committee. Since then, the subject "Getting to Know Taiwan" has been abolished, and instead, "Local Studies" now takes up six hours each week, and encompasses history, geography, and citizenship. Moreover, all primary schools students have to take "Native Languages" lessons for two hours per week. In other words, rather than having only one subject to deal with Taiwan issues, the subject matter has been spread across the curriculum.

The struggle for Taiwan uniqueness in language, literature, and education had unsettled many, and the resulting disquiet continued to rumble on beyond the 1990s. The once dominant China-centric mentality had been stripped away layer by layer, not just through the work of academic advocates of Taiwanese subjective, but also by state cultural policy. The meanings that these cultural policies sent out were clear: Taiwanese culture had little Chinese influence; Taiwan literature had its own merits; Taiwan had its own history and tradition; and the Taiwanese were very different from the Chinese. The construction and maintenance of the new discourse relied heavily on cultural policy.

**Conclusion**

Taiwanese identity has always been a complex and problematic issue. The identity debate in the 1990s was a typical struggle for cultural and ideological hegemony between two camps. One side demanded social justice for Taiwan and its prioritisation; while the other, although accepting the principle of Taiwanese subjectivity, struggled to maintain the once dominant Chinese identity, and lamented the distancing and the denial of anything Chinese. Through building a "common sense" (prioritising Taiwan) and an othering process (severing Chinese connections), this battle was fought between two binary positions, a struggle between two extreme narratives. Before the former opposition took power in
2000, they had already built a coalition of oppositional groups united under shared goals — prioritising Taiwan, pursuing social justice, upholding democracy, achieving cultural and political autonomy, and so on. This new alliance echoed the Gramscian idea of the "war of position" — building up a broad bloc of social forces through the intermediary of ideology and unifying by a common view of the world (see Simon 25, 64). In Gramscian theory, "common sense" is not only the area that connects the leaders and the led, but it is also the site on which the dominant ideology is constructed (Simon 27). The 1990s identity shift was a result of the changes in discourse on all levels of society. In the process of challenging old ideologies and replacing them with a new discourse, cultural policy played a major role in creating a popular belief of "cultural autonomy" and "political self-determination." In other words, it systematically constructed a set of common-sense ideologies with little resistance.

The crisis of identity formation was accelerated by government interventions such as replacing a China-centric ideology with the Big-Taiwan discourse, changing the definition of Taiwaneseness, rewriting Taiwanese culture and history, rewarding Taiwanese uniqueness, and constructing a new meaning of "homeland." As a result, the discourse of Taiwanese subjectivity has firmly created a "regime of truth" (Foucault). In contrast to its dominant and coercive nature in the past (such as censorship, restrictions on mass media, standardised textbooks, language policy, etc.), cultural policy since the 1990s has made state control seem insignificant. Instead of imposing oppressive restrictions, the new strategy of cultural policy was to set up a kind of self-motivating and self-disciplinary mechanism. For example, instead of subsidising all Taiwanese opera forms as a whole, the state chose to encourage and fund gezaixi, especially those who performed in the most traditional style. This principle was set up not only to construct a sense of historical continuity, but also to distinguish the uniqueness of Taiwanese traditional culture through an art form having no direct connection with China. On the surface, cultural policy is designed to provide support and foster the arts. The possibility of state interference appeared to be fairly small; in reality, however, through regulating, encouraging, and funding selected art forms and artists, cultural policy can maintain control, increase cultural capital value, and reinforce selected ideology in a subtle way. Shifting and juggling between continuity and rupture, sameness and difference, there is indeed no one essential Taiwanese identity, but only various positionings. The "Taiwanese only" identity formation is in fact a construct of a new hegemonic discourse, exactly the same as the strong sense of "Chinese only" identity formation promoted from the 1950s to the 1980s, a product of then dominant Chinese discourse. That is to say, neither a Taiwan-centric identity formation nor a China-centric one is more "true" than the other.

Note: In my article I use the term "Taiwanese" as an adjective to describe something belonging to Taiwan, about Taiwan, etc., such as: "Taiwanese culture," "Taiwanese identity," "Taiwanese awareness," and "Taiwanese subjectivity." It has been argued that using the suffix "-ese" attributes a lesser status to the words to which it is applied, and therefore, the adjective "Taiwanese" might imply a less than sovereign status of Taiwan. No such implication should be read into my use of the term, which has been retained for purely grammatical rather than political reasons.

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Nativist Rhetoric in Contemporary Taiwan
Pei-Yin Lin

Introduction

Taiwan’s history contains multi-layered periods of colonial and foreign rule. Among these the Japanese period (1895-1945) and the Kuomintang (KMT) rule period (1945-2000) have had the greatest impacts on the formation of Taiwan consciousness and the development of xiangtu (native soil) nativism. In the early 1930s, theorists such as Huang Shihui and Guo Qiusheng advocated writing about Taiwan’s social reality and using the Taiwanese language as a response to the relatively elitist writing in Chinese vernacular. Their accentuation on Taiwan’s cultural particulars and call for a more amiable common language exhibited their assumption of an intimate relationship between not only nativist discourse and nationalism but also nativism and leftism. For example, to achieve the goal of popularization, Huang Shihui maintained that writers ought to write for “the laboring masses” (laoku qunzhong). For some intellectuals, however, nativist literature was not necessarily left-wing literature. Dissatisfied with both the elitist writing and the class-centered nativism, Ye Rongzhong proposed “the third literature,” (disan wenxue) founded on Taiwan’s unique culture. Ye analyzed the constituents of Taiwan’s defining factors, “the four-thousand-year Han cultural heritage, the cultivation of Taiwan’s social condition, and the influence of Japanese culture.” If Japanese rule somewhat facilitated the emergence of nativism in Taiwan by highlighting the distinctiveness of Taiwan, then the subsequent KMT period hindered such a notion with its promulgation of a series of China-centered political measures. Although voices stressing the uniqueness of Taiwan had always been present, they did not surface as an important cultural discourse until the 1970s. Kindled by the discontent with the authoritarian KMT regime and with an attempt to readdress the individualistic modernist writing,
Beginning with the native soil literature debate of 1977-1978, the result of which distinctly epitomized the trend toward literary nativization, nativist rhetoric in contemporary Taiwan has metamorphosed in many ways, but remained one of the premier cultural leitmotifs. Compared to Huang Shihui’s and Ye Rongzhong’s endeavors to popularize literature produced more than four decades earlier, the "second wave" of nativist rhetoric in the late 1970s showed a strong inclination toward realism as a mode of literary representation. Concurrent with the sociopolitical democratization of Taiwan in the 1980s, literary nativism was integrated with ideological identification and became heavily politicized. After the late-1980s, nativist discourse gradually intertwined with postmodernism and then with postcolonialism. The lifting of martial law in 1987 and the emergence of the first native Taiwanese president in 1988 further provided an extremely fertile environment for the growth of nativist discourse in Taiwan in the 1990s. This growth has varied from the heated debate on Taiwan’s subjectivity in Zhongwai wenxue (Chung-Wai Literary Monthly) to the efforts of Chen Fangming and Chen Yingzhen to explore the issues raised by a postcolonial Taiwan literary historiography at the turn of the millennium.

Looking back at those literary debates, the relationship between (Taiwan's) native soil literature and nationalism has always played a central role. Indeed, issues of identity and politics of difference have dominated the interdisciplinary scene of academic writing in Taiwan for the past few decades. Superficially, the theorists in the debates have been concerned with the substance of Taiwan literature, yet lurking under this are their divergent ideologies that frame their own concepts of Taiwan literature. As a consequence, what constitutes Taiwan native awareness has become a battlefield for theorists' competing cultural identities and postulates. In addition to thematizing nativist discourse in selected literary or cultural debates in contemporary Taiwan, this paper problematizes nativism and the very concept of native soil. It explores the development of the nativist trend, scrutinizing how the concept of native soil has evolved toward a politicized literary nativization and has combined with intellectuals' construction of a postcolonial historiography. After providing critical evaluations of the nativist discourse permeating Taiwan literature, this paper uses Zhu Tianxin as a case study to examine how contemporary Taiwan novelists have challenged the nativization tendency. The paper concludes with a preliminary look at how we might understand the trajectory of Taiwan literature based on the observations made.

On the Concept of Native Soil

The gradual crystallization of a nativist consensus in contemporary Taiwan can be traced back to the decade of the 1970s, when local intellectuals ardently demanded social reform and Taiwan had to reposition itself after a series of diplomatic setbacks. Such an attempt of constructing a native awareness was saliently exhibited in the proposals put forth among the advocates of nativism during the native soil debate between 1977 and 1978. At least three important definitions of the very term "native soil literature" were offered - the Taiwan-centered literature proposed by Ye Shitao, the Chinese nationalist literature proposed by Chen Yingzhen, and the reformist "reality-reflecting literature" (xianshi zhuyi wenxue) proposed by Wang Tuo. In his "An Introduction to the History of Native Soil Literature in Taiwan," Ye declared that "the so-called Taiwan native soil literature should be the works written by Taiwanese (those of the Han race and the aborigines living in Taiwan)" and that it should be written "by considering Taiwan as the center" (69; unless indicated otherwise, all translations are mine). He further introduced the notion of “Taiwan consciousness” (Taiwan yishi) — the collective colonized and oppressed experience of Taiwanese inhabitants — and argued that Taiwan's native soil literature must reflect such common resistance to imperialism and feudalism (fandi fan fengjian) (69). For Ye, Taiwan's historical development is different from China's and its literature has developed its zizhuxing accordingly. Although Ye did not explicate...
what he meant by *zizhuxing*, his Taiwan-centered stance was clear.3 Ye’s identification with Taiwan puts him at odds with Chen Yingzhen who claimed Taiwan’s native soil literature was simply Chinese literature on Taiwan without a separate history. Chen’s disapproval of the autonomy of Taiwan literature is also found in his criticism of Zhang Liangze’s proposal of neither Japanese nor Chinese, a “three-legged” Taiwanese identity. Despite harboring a great penchant for socially-engaging literature, Chen regarded Ye’s Taiwan-centrism as “deliberate separatism” (“The Blind Spot” 97). Compared to Ye and Chen, Wang was more interested in using literature as a means to speak for the masses. He clarified that native soil literature is not rural (*xiangcun*) literature dealing only with countryside and village folk, but a literature reflecting both the urban life and life in the country. After pronouncing three different meanings of native soil (one’s homeland, the reality in which one lives, and the countryside), Wang proposed that native soil literature is best understood as a “reality reflecting literature” (*xianshi zhuyi wenxue*) (115-16). By adopting the term “*xianshi*,” Wang effectively broadened the scope of nativist writing and avoided the Taiwan-China dissension embedded in the ideological discrepancy between Ye Shitao and Chen Yingzhen. Yet at the same time, Wang, like many other advocates of native soil literature, failed to critically address his self-assumed right to represent the oppressed or less privileged. In other words, those advocates’ accentuation on the struggles of the working man is a tendentious appropriation in order to propel their own vision of society.

Regardless of conceptual dissimilarities, scholars and critics reached agreement that Taiwan literature must be socially engaging and closely associated with the people of Taiwan. It is perhaps the obscurity (or flexibility) of the term “Taiwan’s native soil” (*Taiwan xiangtu*) that has led to the coexistence of nativists such as Ye Shitao and Chinese nationalists such as Chen Yingzhen; the native soil of Taiwan can be the repository of Taiwan’s uniqueness as well as Chinese tradition. However, oppositionists such as Yin Zhengxiong, Zhu Xining, Peng Ge, and Yu Guangzhong responded to the concept of native soil literature with reservation. Yin was anxious about a potential crisis whereby the designation “native soil literature” might be appropriated wrongly to become a means of expressing hatred; Zhu Xining was concerned that it might become too insular. Yearning for a “pure” national identity, Zhu was also apprehensive about the “negative” impact of Japanese rule on Taiwan. Both Peng and Yu criticized the class-centered ideas in native soil literature and went so far as to link it with the “Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Literature” (*gong nong bing wenxue*) promoted by the Communist Party. The debates reflected the dichotomy between modernist and nativist writing in Taiwan literature and more importantly the conflicting cultural identities among the critics (Great China-ism or Taiwan-centrism). The debates reflected the dichotomy between modernist and nativist writing in Taiwan literature and more importantly the conflicting cultural identities among the critics (Great China-ism or Taiwan-centrism). Even among the China-leaning critics, there existed ideological differences (Zhu Xining for example did not share Chen Yingzhen’s concerns over national liberation and class struggle). Despite the diverse visions of native soil, writings revealing a concern for the little characters in the process of modernization, urbanization, and Westernization, were highly celebrated among critics who commended native soil literature. In fact, the call for pro-active awareness of Taiwan’s social reality and the critics’ common attention on the less privileged groups conveniently dissolved the conflicts between left-leaning Chinese nationalists and Taiwan-focussed nativists.4 This indicates that these critics all seemed to construct their native soil imagination by regarding nation as a necessary locus. Such a pre-assumption of the relationship between nationalism and native soil literature is hardly innovative. Indeed, it can be traced back to the left-leaning intellectual Huang Shihui’s call for promoting Taiwan’s native soil literature in the early 1930s with an attempt to popularize literature among the masses. Like Huang’s advocating a socially-engaging literature, some critics (Chen Yingzhen, Wang Tuo, and Wei Tiancong among them) disapproved of the comparatively
individualistic and elitist modernist literature. Furthermore, the native soil debate can somewhat be understood as a confrontation between the pro-KMT camp and its rivals (Yang Zhao 134) — revolts against the idea of native soil literature were mainly from the KMT-leaning mainstream intellectuals rather than the modernist writers.

**From Native Soil to Politicized Literary Nativization**

The ideological divergence underlying this debate quickly surfaced after the publication of Zhan Hongzhi's 1981 article "Two Kinds of Literary Mentality," in which Zhan reckoned that Taiwan literature would remain regional literature in the future. Zhan's apparent regionalist pessimism attracted refutations among native critics. Gao Tiansheng's emphasis on the unique historical character with which Taiwan literature is embedded represents one of the earliest efforts. Similar attempts were also made by theorists and writers who clustered around the Kaohsiung-based quarterly journal Wenxue jie (Literary Taiwan) in 1982, which can be seen as a vital step consummating the nativization of Taiwan literature. Established by Ye Shitao and his literary friends, Literary Taiwan aimed to integrate indigenous, traditional and foreign literary trends and to establish a Taiwan literature with zizhuxing. Soon after its launch, Literary Taiwan became one of the most significant channels for native writers and critics to express their often political definitions of Taiwan literature.

In the first issue of Literary Taiwan, Ye Shitao continued to argue that Taiwan writers must reflect "the real picture of Taiwan" and Taiwan literature should head for its own unique development (zizhuhua). His Taiwan-centered literary concept is later seconded by Peng Ruijin, who went further to pronounce that the foremost issue for Taiwan literature lies in its nativization (bentuhua). Their uniform accentuation on literature with a native consciousness persisted to be popular among native intellectuals in the following few years though there were criticisms. As expected, Chen Yingzhen strongly denounced the uniqueness of Taiwan literature in relation to Chinese literature. To counter Ye's and Peng's apparent Taiwan-centrism, Chen proposed the concept of "the third world literature," an anti-colonial and anti-oppressive resistance literature. Chen stated that if Taiwan literature is unique, then its uniqueness lies in its resistance against the affluent countries in the West as well as Japan, and not against China.

The major difference between the nativist camp and the third world literature camp was more an ideological matter than a historiographical problem. The competing Taiwan and Chinese standpoints later evolved into the so-called Debate on Taiwanese Consciousness triggered by Hou Dejian's journey to China in 1983. Rising to fame with his morale-lifting song "Heirs of the Dragon" (long de chuanren) composed as a response to the United States ceasing diplomatic ties with Taiwan, Hou created his public image as a "patriotic" hero. He violated the KMT's travel restrictions and went to Beijing, and this inevitably became highly politicized. Disparate interpretations were offered with an attempt to justify Hou's actions. Yang Zujun maintained that the term "heirs of the dragon" refers to the China that Hou "speculated, hoped for, and was concerned with" (17). She sympathetically referred to Hou's trip as "a big step forward in his life" to clarify his long-term confusion (16). Echoing Yang who acknowledged the gap between the China imagined and the China in reality, Lin Shimin employed irony in connection with Hou's journey. He claimed Hou's trip would meet with disillusionment if he "could not even find the lively dragon in the soil on which he had lived" (14-15). Referring to his leftist ideology, Chen reiterated his Chinese nationalism, regarding Hou's song as an embodiment of the people of Taiwan's cultural and historical attachment to China. Promoters of Taiwan consciousness took advantage of this opportunity to vent their long felt discontent with the KMT and pushed for more freedom and democracy.

After the debate, Taiwan-centered nativism based on the island's social-economic reality and historical particularity was further confirmed and much energy was invested in propelling literary nativization. Compared with Ye Shitao's Taiwan-centered
Nativist Rhetoric in Contemporary Taiwan

perspective articulated in the late 1970s, the nativization trend in the 1980s displayed a stronger tendency of de-sinicization. In "Problems Related to the Indigenization of Taiwan Literature at the Present Stage," Chen Fangming highlighted how Taiwan's unique social reality was separated from China's. For him, the indigenous awareness of the people of Taiwan was awareness developed by the ancestors in their resistance against foreign rule. Chen proposed that Taiwan must establish its zizhuxing in order to prevent its literature being seen as a periphery or tributary literature in a China-centered world. Chen's call for a Taiwan-focused stance meshed with Ye Shitao's concept of native soil literature, widening the existing gap between Taiwan nativism and Chinese nationalism as represented by Chen Yingzhen.7 Chen Fangming asserted that Chen Yingzhen's work in fact should be considered Taiwan literature as it, similar to many other works from Taiwan, reflected only Taiwan's social problems and historical experiences. The publication of Chen Fangming's article triggered resentment among critics clustering around the magazine Xiachao (China Tide), who later wrote several articles to reproach the advancement of an independence-leaning Taiwan consciousness among the nativists. Although the advocate of Taiwan's literary nativization does not necessarily entail a longing for political independence, the nativists' plea for a common awareness based on Taiwan's cultural and historical events, effectively compliments the development of pro-independence ideology peaking with the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party toward the end of the 1980s.

The literary nativism in the 1980s was brought into full play with the publication of Ye Shitao's long-awaited Taiwan wenxue shigang (A Historical Outline of Taiwan Literature) in February 1987. This work, serialized a few months before the abolishment of marital law, marks the first attempt to rescue the term "Taiwan literature" from being a provincial tributary of Chinese literature and making it into an inherently self-contained entity with its own evolution. To respond to the PRC scholars' seemingly enthusiastic attitude toward Taiwan literature, major contributors of Literary Taiwan have endeavored to produce a historiography of Taiwan's literature in which the uniqueness of Taiwan literature is scrupulously accounted. Starting with the transmission of classical Chinese literature in Taiwan during the late Ming period, through Japanese rule to the post-war period, Ye's historiography offers the first comprehensive history of Taiwan literature with a distinctive Taiwan-centered perspective. Works by mainland Chinese writers were not excluded although Ye stated in the preface that his aim was to outline how Taiwan literature had developed its strong subjectivity through historical events. It is worth noting that Ye's Taiwan-centrism is not an insular fundamentalism, but a re-examination of Taiwan's literary trajectory as a unique and self-reliant system. Ye's alertness over excessive nativism in fact can be found in his remarks on writers of the two journals Li (Bamboo Hat) and Taiwan wenyi (Taiwan Literature). Applauding the realist and socially-engaging approach of both journals, Ye however was apprehensive that writers of these two journals would "lose their macro vision of analyzing native soil issues with reference to China or the world, and of absorbing and accepting new thoughts from western literature" (1984, 143). Ye's nativist historiography, as anticipated, was warmly backed. In 1988, Lin Yangmin and Song Zelai went one step further to propose a national literature,8 reemphasizing the association between literary nativization and nation-building narrative. Consequently, Taiwan consciousness increasingly became a pivotal quality of not only native soil literature, but also of the only politically-correct literature from Taiwan since the 1990s.

Toward Postcolonial Nativism or Postmodern Hybridity?

With the introduction of postmodernism and postcolonialism into Taiwan, nativist rhetoric in Taiwan underwent another turn and also became caught up with identity politics in the 1990s. The playful postmodern call for "de-centering" and the celebration of hybridity tenders a convenient means to explain the emergence of previously repressed voices. Postcolonial discourse, though not
necessarily incompatible with postmodern theory, functions as another expedient interpretive method that has enriched the debates pertinent to Taiwan's unsettled identity. Both analytical frameworks were popular among intelligentsia, yet a postcolonial approach was overall more widely adopted by nativist critics to interpret the changed social imagery brought about by the reversed political condition. The debate on whether Taiwanese Mandarin can be taken as an indigenous language, as initiated by Qiu Guifen and Liao Chao-yang, showcases the application of postcolonial theory in Taiwan's nativist discourse. Drawing on Bhabha's concepts of hybridity and mimicry, Qiu Guifen acknowledged the hybrid nature of Taiwan culture, proposing to regard Taiwanese Mandarin as a "native" Taiwan language instead of depreciating it as a "foreign" language (156). In contrast, Liao Chaoyang argued that by accepting Taiwanese Mandarin one would risk rationalizing the colonial power and disregarding the anti-colonial efforts. For Liao, hybridity implies the colonized being assimilated into the colonizer's culture, and there is not much resistance from the colonized during the process as one must have subjectivity first before one can talk about hybridity (57). To respond to Liao, Qiu proposed cultural syncretism with an attempt to dissolve the dichotomy of colonizer and colonized (33-34). Despite their different focuses, both Qiu Guifen and Liao Chaoyang harbored positive attitudes toward Taiwan's indigenous culture.

In 1995, debates on Taiwan's nativization movement were elicited after the publication of Chen Zhaoying "On Taiwan's Nativization: An Examination of Cultural History" in which the people of Taiwan's love for China (the homeland) is considered instinctive. In this article, Chen divided Taiwan's nativization into three stages: anti-Japan (1895-), anti-Westernization (1949-), and anti-China (1983-), and differentiated Taiwan consciousness from Taiwan independence consciousness. In principle, Chen agreed with what she termed "Chinese-style Taiwan consciousness" — an identity "naturally" originating from Chinese consciousness. By suggesting Chinese consciousness as an intrinsic element which forms Taiwan consciousness, Chen positioned Taiwan-independent consciousness as alienation (yihua) of Chinese consciousness and self-alienation (ziwo yihua) of Taiwan consciousness. She further suggested that unification would be the solution to conquer such alienation. Chen's taking Chinese nationalism for granted stirred up feelings. Liao Chaoyang for instance drew on Zizek's idea of cogito (the basis of the subject) as an empty space, proposing Taiwan subjectivity as a forever-fluid void that can be filled-in and emptied-out any time according to circumstantial change (1995, 118-121). Coinciding with China's missile tests in the Taiwan Strait, this debate surrounding Taiwan's nativization became especially complex and was shortly extended to Taiwan's long-unsettled issue of unification or independence.

Although nativist discourse remained prevalent in Taiwan's academia, there were diverse voices concerning this issue. For example, Liao Xianhao sided with Qiu Guifen's concerns over the dominance of Hoklo culture in the nativist movement, and therefore proposed to form a cultural federalism. Chen Guangxing followed the steps of Marxist literary theorist Aijaz Ahmad to address the bourgeois tendency of the nationalists. Yet unlike Ahmad who confirmed the necessity of such a middle-class-dominated nationalist movement, Chen Guangxing called for a post-national class-focused strategy in which marginalized groups should unite together to fight against the nationalist movement. Convincing as it is, Chen's scheme offers no answer to the class issue embedded within the under-represented social groups as Liao Binghui has convincingly argued. In addition to offering more theoretically-engaging academic discussions over Taiwan's identity issue, these two debates taking place respectively in 1992 and in 1995-1996 were conducive to sharpening the applicability of both postmodern and postcolonial theories in the Taiwan context and strengthening the critics' self-reflexibility. It is evident that the two potential pitfalls — the hegemony of an exclusive nativization movement, and the power struggle within the nativist discourse — persisted to be the main concerns among critics concurring with the nativization.
The most explicit postcolonial application in Taiwan lay in Chen Fangming’s active construction of an alternative Taiwan-centered literary historiography to challenge the KMT’s decades-long cultural hegemony. The action itself, together with Chen’s reading of the KMT rule as a re-colonial period in Taiwan, is highly political. In 1999, Chen published "The Construction and Periodization of Taiwan’s New Literary History," the first chapter of his ambitious project in Lianhe wenxue (Unitas). Chen’s historiography exemplifies not only a refined modification of his earlier concept on the periodization of Taiwan literature but also a methodological tendency commonly adopted by certain (although not all) native Taiwan scholars to view the KMT as a "foreign" cultural colonizer. Such a viewpoint was unwelcome by the left-wing pro-unification critic Chen Yingzhen who joined the debates in 2000. By proposing three periods (colonial, re-colonial, and postcolonial) to refer to Taiwan literature during the period of Japanese rule (1895-1945), between 1945 and 1987, and the post-1987 Taiwan, Chen Fangming’s historiography could not avoid oversimplification. The feasibility of considering Taiwan a de-colonized society and the applicability of a postcolonial theory in Taiwan remain contentious. Although Chen Fangming regarded the KMT rule as a period of "Han-centrism, male superiority, and Confucius thinking" (165), his reading of 1987 as the watershed for Taiwan’s postcolonial period is only applicable to Han-Taiwanese and not to Taiwan aborigines. In fact, Chen Fangming’s historiography entails a dilemma of historical authenticity and cultural/ethnical hybridity. The first two periods fall into the former, while the last (post-1987) period moves toward the latter as Chen Fangming harbored an all-embracing attitude which considers the various writings emerging during the period as monolithic "postcolonial literature." Such a vision is not much different from Liao Xianhao’s broad application of "postmodernity" of which Chen Fangming disapproves. Chen Yingzhen’s criticizing Chan Fangming’s for mixing up postcolonial with postmodern thus appears to be eloquent (2000, 158-159).

The verbal battles between Chen Fangming and Chen Yingzhen over the interpretation of Taiwan’s literary history inevitably reverted to their political (un)consciousness. This really related to how to position Taiwan culture in relation to Chinese culture (and the KMT rule), and what constituents of the concept “Taiwan literature” deserve to be resolved at the outset. Thanks to Taiwan's complex history, its indigenous consciousness has been shaped by and negotiated through several “others” such as China, Japan, and the U.S. The validity of a postcolonial narration purported by Chen Fangming, though explicable, risks oversimplifying other inherent power politics. The legacy of China, Japan, and America particularly in the realm of popular culture for example, disallows Taiwan to be seen as completely "decolonized" from her "others." Less concerned with Taiwan’s amalgam of influences from Japan and the U.S., native Taiwan scholars have tried hard to forge their historical "authenticity" in a fashion of radical de-sinification. Yet their claim is doomed to failure when challenged by the more "authentic" discourse voiced by the island’s aborigines, not to mention Taiwan’s “neocolonial” emergence both culturally and economically in South East Asia. Many of these layers and even the discursive translated concept of "hybridity," which is “always mediated,” have unfortunately not been taken into full consideration in the debates.

Beyond the Limits of Nativism

Although the critics persistently strive to forge a certain Taiwan consciousness, the writers’ abundant creativity continues to surpass the limits of nativist writing and the rising Hoklo chauvinism. One salient example comes from Zhu Tianxin’s writing which exhibits the interplay between postmodern and postcolonial: written with self-reflective sentiments, Zhu’s 1999 magnum opus "Gudu" ("Ancient Capital") tackles not only the sense of loss caused by modernization but also the anxiety generated by a weak history and unreliable personal memory. From the first line: "Is it possible that none of your memory counts?" (151, all quotes are from the 1999 edition; all translations are mine unless indicated otherwise), "Ancient Capital" speaks of the irrecoverable nature of
Nativist Rhetoric in Contemporary Taiwan

Pei-Yin Lin

the past, a time when the sky "was much bluer" (151). Despite the story's preference for the past, the narrative does not really reflect upon how exactly the protagonist feels about her past. Neither does it detail the past that the protagonist actually experienced. It seems that the past is the past as imagined and idealized through memory, and thus the nostalgia is directed more to the present or even to the future than to the past. Throughout the story, personalized experiences remain textually repressed and are deliberately substituted by a pastiche of lengthy spatial depictions (such as boutiques on certain streets in Taipei or afternoon tea at the Takashimaya Department Store in Tokyo) to create a melancholic mood.

One of the strategies used to recollect Taiwan in the 1970s in this work is that of "collecting" all the "objects" such as the famous music groups. Moreover, the use of the second-person pronoun "you" generates a sloppy identity which can defeat readers' willful attempts to specify and identify, as a hermeneutic need, to whom the "you" is uttered. In this second-person narrative, the "you" can be a character, the narrator, a reader/narratee, or no-one especially, or even a combination of these. In "Ancient Capital," the pronoun "you" can be read as the narrator's self-projection as if she (possibly Zhu Tianxin herself), through the narration, is talking with her inscribed subject. This pronoun not only provides a camouflage for the narrator to hide her personal perceptions, but also makes the nostalgia permeating this work at best a narrative tone in which commentaries of the present are mediated. This resonates with what Mikhail Bakhtin has termed "historical inversion" (147), a transposition onto the often romanticized or abstracted past of what is not lived at present or could only possibly exist in the future. In this work, what is yet to be attained is the preservation of cultural heritage as exemplified by the elegant Kyoto. In the process of modernization, Taipei has become a place that only confronts the protagonist with postmodern amnesia. Horrified by the "storm of progress," the narrative character is like Benjamin's trapped "angel of history" who is still obsessed with the past yet is compelled to turn toward the future (Benjamin 249). Yet, although the protagonist constantly appeals to the past, the text's excessive use of intertextuality, one of the most commonly identified characteristics of postmodern writing, actually sabotages the narrator's possibility for overcoming her melancholic sense of loss. After returning to Taiwan, the narrator disguises herself as a Japanese tourist with a colonial map and embarks on an anthropological and epistemological ramble in Taipei. She strives to match the present day Taipei with the city's past under Japanese rule, and frequently uses the images of American landmarks to emphasize the overlapping of Taipei's multi-layered histories. For example, the narrator refers to the utopian Peach Blossom Spring that Tao Yuanming's fisherman has found, and the elegant Kyoto in which Kawabata Yasunari's Chieko is strolling, to contrast with Taipei's excessive modernization during which intrinsic historic values are forever lost. When quipping about the rapid transformation of Taipei's high street landscape, the narrator refers to the American architect Frank Lloyd Wright's remark on the modern city as "a place for banking and prostitution and very little else," to depict the change of Meiqi Hotel into Shanghai Commercial Bank (190).

Undeniably, the intertextual references and quotations make Taipei not only a city with multiple, non-linear histories but also a locale where "history has become geography" (Wang Dewei, 23). When endeavoring to trace the historical genealogy of Taiwan, the narrator relies on her extensive knowledge and alludes to various geographical remarks made by Chinese officials during the Qing dynasty to present how people in different historical times have varied impressions or images of the island. Although these negative citations are often regarded as Zhu's attempt to "justify" her self-alienation toward Taiwan, the competing intertextual quotations and allusions discount simultaneously the narrator's apparent discontentment with Taipei/Taiwan. The use of intertextuality in fact turns the text into a multidimensional space in which the writer Zhu Tianxin acts more as an orchestrator "to mix writings, to counter the one with the others, in such a way as never to rest on any of them." (Barthes 146). Hence, rather than
settling on one single experience as the bona fide one, the use of intertextuality becomes a self-conflicting device that paradoxically opens up the text and undermines the narrator’s persisting quest for cultural authenticity.

Regardless of its postmodern vogue, “Ancient Capital” can be interpreted as a postcolonial text. The melancholia pervading the whole novella offers a powerful means to bridge the postmodern and postcolonial condition of Taipei. Through the contrast between the well-preserved Kyoto and historically-amnesic Taipei, the earlier part of the work evokes mourning over the loss of one’s cultural memory. Back to Taipei, the narrator’s concern about temporal changes gradually evolved to spatial exploration and this aggravated her dislocation anxiety. The concern with place and displacement is a major feature of postcolonial literatures where one’s identity crisis comes into being. To read “Ancient Capital” in this light, the text suitably becomes an ethnic allegory of a second generation of Mainland Chinese in fin-de-siècle Taiwan. The term postcolonialism in this text should not be understood as a teleological sequence replacing colonialism, but a contestation of hegemonic discourses or power hierarchies. As the government loosened its control over Taiwan’s public sphere after 1987, critics and writers of various ethnic backgrounds were eager to define what it means to be "Taiwanese" and claim the legitimacy of their personal memory. During a decade in which nativist discourse is still prevailing, the narrator’s (like Zhu herself) ethnic background as a second generation Chinese mainlander inevitably becomes politically incorrect. Thus, the narrator’s lamenting for her private experience conveniently becomes what Fredric Jameson may term as “ethnic allegory.” In his 1986 essay “Third World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism,” Jameson stated that all third world literatures are necessarily allegories of the collectivity, as there is “no radical split between the public and the private” (69). In spite of Jameson’s own first world biases, his theorization provides a plausible interpretation of the ethnic dimension in several of Zhu’s works including "Ancient Capital." In "Xiongyali zhi shui" (“Hungarian Water”) for example, the juancun (residential compounds for the KMT civil servants or military personnel) memory recollected by the Mainlander narrator “I” is joined by the reminiscing about Taiwan’s agricultural past of his friend “A” who is native Taiwanese. Yet unlike A’s recollection which has a concrete object (his previous girlfriend), the narrator “I” finds his own recollection lacking a substance as even the residential compound has long been removed.

The identity crisis deepens in the text when participating in a political campaign with her native Taiwanese husband, the narrator encounters hostility which excludes people with her ethnic background as Taiwanese. Yet simultaneously she doubts whether there is truly a place to which she can retreat (170). With this high sensitivity to identity, Taipei’s landscape in the narrator’s eyes turns into an ethnicity indicator. For example, “it will definitely not be chrysanthemum or osmanthus if your father is Mainland Chinese, and it will not be hibiscus orchid if your father is native Taiwanese” (165). The narrator’s identity dilemma — wishing to identify with Taiwan but unwilling to compromise with its lacking cultural preservation, yet having nowhere else to go — becomes worse when the nativist discourse constantly demands and mistrusts her loyalty to the island. This strong sense of alienation and displacement makes the text well justified as a collective attempt of (second generation) Mainland Chinese to re-inscribe their effaced memory. Such a sense of isolation peaks when the narrator steps inadvertently into an unfamiliar riverside neighborhood. The community, a metaphor of exclusive nativization, epitomizes a primordial nationalist discourse which would eventually grow stagnant if not self-destructive. Dislocated from her birthplace and disillusioned by the collapse of an ideal hometown, the narrator cries out in the finale. Within her outcry, a symbolic gesture rejecting the absolute significance of (an idealized) native soil, she is eventually able to encounter reality and reach a sublime understanding.

Citing Lian Heng’s Taiwan Tongshi (A General History of Taiwan), the narrator recalls the great ancestral mandate commonly shared by Taiwanese dwellers of all ethnic groups: “Ocean of grace, island
of beauty” (233) is an abstract, intact imaginary through which Taiwan identity is renegotiated and ethic heterogeneity respected. It is within this openness and the narrator’s recognition that her own life is closely bound with Taiwan that the quote from I.V. Foscarini at the beginning can be deciphered. The “I” who is watching the dance of the Moors in San Marco Plaza of Venice in the citation can be read as the narrator, while "you" refers to the collective memory of Taiwan. In a decade when nativist discourse entailed not only writing about Taiwan content-wise but also writing with specific characteristics rooted in quasi-spontaneous nationalism, Zhu's self-reflective account is certainly against the trend. Yet, the "outdated-ness" of this text is exactly where Zhu's ambition lies. In addition to its convergence of postmodern and postcolonial, "Ancient Capital" offers an alternative possibility for native soil writing which challenges both the limits of nativist discourse and the semantic boundary of the term "Taiwan literature." Instead of quickly "converting" to her maternal Hakka background to be more "native," Zhu chose to engage with the nativist discourse by exploring the identity anxieties primarily encountered by the Chinese mainlander group where her paternal side exists. Her deliberate "leaning against the wind" shows she is not "constantly yearning for ‘political correctness’" (He 340). Zhu not identifying with Taiwan could in fact be taken as a challenge of Taiwan nationalism. To argue that embracing Taiwan nationalism will cure Zhu's self-alienation, as Qiu Guifen has suggested (Qiu), disregards Zhu's effort made to compose this piece.

Conclusion

Native soil imagination and rhetoric in Taiwan literature has played a significant role to promote collective consciousness and propagate a specific literary and political ideology. Its emergence and prevalence can be seen as a projection of a desire for a reliable identity or coherent understanding of what exactly being "Taiwanese" and "Taiwan literature" mean. The call for native consciousness in postwar Taiwan during the past three decades is an ongoing process of identity negotiation culturally, socially, and politically. From its initial advocacy in the early 1930s to its most recent debate on Taiwan's literary history, nativist rhetoric in Taiwan has gone through at least four different stages-popularizing, socially-engaging, politicization, and the re-nationalization of Taiwan's literary historiography. All of the phases illustrate attempts to forge a native Taiwan-centered consciousness. Theorists involved in the debates tended to acknowledge Taiwan's local specificity, but they held varied views on whether or not such a socio-historical process is part of the broader Chinese experience, or a standalone one sustained by Taiwan's uniqueness. Although Ye Shitao, and his follower Chen Fangming, attempted to write an alternative Taiwan literary history, their proposal and assumption of a linearly continuous historical narrative on Taiwan's literary development risks generalization. This is a concern given that Taiwan literature is so often filled with multi-layered patterns of change. Another concern is the literary critics' privileging of certain forms of nationalist sentiment. Consequently, literary works that are not necessarily subversive to the colonial power are doomed to be marginalized or repressed in a nationalist and moralistic reading which presumes all Taiwan writers are intrinsically anti-Japanese. Since what is native and what is not can only be articulated in relative terms, nativization should be better taken as a process instead of an ultimate aim. Likewise, a nativist identity is never inherited or static but a construction which is constantly defined and redefined.

Indeed, the discursive terms such as native soil and Taiwan literature have for a long time been a source of contention where individual critics declare their ideological inclinations and prospects for Taiwan. Their emotionally-invested ideological clashes have amounted to competing literary historiographies, and led to a political rather than a literary judgment of nativist writing. The various literary debates and frameworks consistently epitomize the rich and complex cultural dynamics of Taiwan society, particularly during the post-martial-law period. Literary production is no exception. Zhu's case shows the interplay between postcolonial
and postmodern in melancholia, demonstrating an alternative strategy of national narration. It challenges not so much nativism as a cultural discourse but the narrow and self-interested criteria that are imposed on the supposedly fluid native soil imagination. Although often being imprudently labeled, Zhu's "regressive" works test the limits of nativism. Any tendentious appropriations of her writing will merely reflect the critics' ideological agenda or thematic/stylistic chauvinism. It is fair to consider the debates taking place in contemporary Taiwan as the collective nativists' re-nationalization. Such efforts made toward national literature are likely to be subject to the future political development of the island. Yet contemporaneous to this, a reconceived concept of national narration based on ethnic differences and multifaceted histories, bring to mind the endeavor of Zhu Tianxin's (in)famous "old soul" in "Ancient Capital" to highlight the contingency of one's identity. The phobia toward cultural provincialism of Zhu's narrator serves as a memento articulating that to simply replace the current pedagogical monologism with another (indigenous) counter-discourse is never sufficient. The liability of nativist rhetoric in Taiwan lies precisely in its "double writing" that concurrently provokes and deters such nationalist narrative. It is within this discursive post-national space that the contending forces are continuously negotiated such that imaginings of Taiwan can be in Duara's term "rescued from the nation" and remain unexploited.

Notes

1 Despite the fact that freedom to speak was still restricted (as martial law was replaced by a less stringent National Security Law), the abolition of martial law for many Taiwanese intellectuals was a symbolic epoch-making milestone as far as nativist historical awareness is concerned. With the winning of Chen Shuibian in the 2000 presidential election, Taiwan encountered for the first time in its post-war period the transition of ruling parties from the KMT Party to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). This event is often considered the final realization of the ideals of nativation and democratization since the Li Denghui (Lee Teng-hui) period (1988-2000).

2 The prelude of the native soil debate in 1977 and 1978 can be found in the debate on modern poetry in 1972 and 1973 triggered by John Kwan-Terry (Guan Jieming) and Tang Wenbiao. The former criticized mainly Yip Wailim's English anthology, arguing that most of the compiled works were too Westernized. The latter censured poets such as Yu Guangzhong and Zhou Mengdie for divorcing from the social reality as their works lacked a social function and were poetry of escapism. See Yvonne Sung-sheng Chang's Modernism and the Nativist Resistance and Ming-yan Lai's Nativism and Modernity for a more detailed analysis on the 1977-1978 debate. A-Chin Hsiau's Contemporary Taiwan Cultural Nationalism and You Shengguan's Taiwan wenxue bentu lun de xingqi yu fazhan (The Emergence and Development of Taiwan's Literary Nativism), both provide a fairly comprehensive introduction to Taiwan's nativist discourse.

3 It was only until April 1983 when he published "Taiwan xiaoshuo de yuanjing" ("Prospectus of Taiwan Novels") that Ye Shitao offered "originality" as the English equivalent. According to Xiaobing Tang, it was the term's literary meaning as "self-determination" or "autonomy" that had a greater significance in the nativist movement. See Tang's "On the Concept of Taiwan Literature" in Writing Taiwan: A New Literary History (Durham: Duke UP, 2007), 55.

4 One of the examples showing the coexistence between left-leaning intellectuals and native intellectuals can be found in the contributors to the journal China Tide founded in 1976. Although the magazine now is often associated with a pro-China stance, contributors for China Tide in the late 1970s and the early 1980s in fact included left-leaning critics such as Tang Wenbiao and Chen Yingzhen, as well as the native intellectuals Wang Shilang, Ye Shitao, Zhong Zhaozheng, and Zhang Liangze.

5 The journal was founded jointly by members from two closely interacting literary groups: the Li Poetry Society and members of Taiwan wenyi (Taiwan Literature).

6 See Chen Yingzhen's "Zhongguo wenxue yu disan shijie wenxue zhi bijiao" ("A Comparison between Chinese Literature and Third World Literature") Wenji (Literary Quarterly) 1.5 (1983) and
Another debate caused by the literary critics' ideological differences can be found in Chen Yingzhen's disagreement with Zhang Liangze regarding one of Zhang Liangze's papers calling for a more historicized analysis on the works of Nishikawa Mitsuru presented in Tokyo in 1979. Chen in 1984 criticized Zhang's pro-Japan colonizer's mentality. More details can be found in *Taiwan yishi lunzhan xuanji: Taiwanjie yu zhongguojie de zong juesuan* (Collection of Selected Essays on the Debate of Taiwan Consciousness: Total Account of Taiwan Knox and China Knox), edited by Shi Minhui.

Both critics announced the urgency of establishing "Taiwan's national culture" in order to construct a new cultural system different from Chinese culture. On 3 and 4 May, Lin Yangmin published "Taiwan xin minzu wenxue de dansheng" (The Birth of Taiwan's New National Literature) in *Taiwan shibao* (Taiwan Times). From 9-11 July in the same newspaper, Lin published another article "Taiwan xin minzu wenxue buyi: Taiwan wenxue dake wen" (Remains of Taiwan's New National Literature: Answers to Questions on Taiwan Literature). In the same year (1988), Song Zelai also commented on Taiwan as a nation in his collection of essays *Taiwanren de zhiwo zhuxiun* (The Self-searching of Taiwanese People). See also Song's "Taiwan minzu' san jiang" ("Three Lectures on 'Taiwan Nation'") and "Yuesheng zhong de 'Taiwan minzu lun'") ("The Rising 'Notion on Taiwan Nation'") in particular.

Qiu Guifen's "The Development of 'Postcolonial' Theory in Taiwan," in her *Rethinking Postcolonial Literary Theory in Taiwan*, offers a detailed account of the "travels" of postcolonial theory and its evolvement in Taiwan. Several articles attempt to answer whether postmodern or postcolonial can best map out Taiwan's literary trajectory: see Chen Fangming's article and Liao Binghui's article, both in *Shuxie Taiwan: Wenxue shi, houzhimin yu houxiandai* (Writing Taiwan: Strategies of Representation) published by Maitian in 2000 and Liu Liangya's "Wenhua fanyi: houxiandai, houzhimin yu jieyan yilai de taiwan wenxue" ("Cultural Translation: Postmodernism, Postcolonialism and Taiwan Literature since 1987") in *Zhongwai wenxue* (Chung-Wai Literary Monthly). 34.10 (2006): 63-84.

This was particularly attributed to the lifting of martial law in 1987, the death of Jiang Jingguo (Chiang Ching-kuo) and Li Denghui's succeeding Chiang as the first island-born president in 1988.

In an analysis on the film "Xiangjiao tiantang" (Banana Paradise) published in December 1994, Liao Chao-yang already proposed the concept of "empty subject." Chen Zhaoying's article in fact was a response disapproving of Liao's seemingly radical statement.

In 1995, Chen Fangming pointed out that the so-called postcolonial society refers to the post-1945 period - after the KMT takeover. Yet in his newly proposed historiography, the KMT period is considered a "re-colonial" period. See Chen's "Bainian lai de Taiwan wenxue yu Taiwan fengge — Taiwan xinwenxue yundongshi daolun" ("Taiwan Literature and Taiwan Style: An Introductory Discussion on the History of Taiwan's New Literature Movement"). *Zhongwai wenxue* (Chung-Wai Literary Monthly) 23.9 (1995): 44.

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Nativist Rhetoric in Contemporary Taiwan

Poetry, Politics, and the Reception of Yu Guangzhong's "Nostalgia"
Weiliang Huang

Introduction

While Confucius values poetry highly as an instrument in state craft, Plato contends that the poet should be banished from his Republic. These different views, opposite as they are, testify to the fact that poetry is closely related to politics. As the history of literature demonstrates, without the political complexities of the Warring States period in ancient China, Qu Yuan (340-278 BC) would not have written "Encountering Sorrows" ("Li.sao") and as a reaction to Edmund Spenser's *Faerie Queene*, King James demanded that the poet be subject to his rule (see Goldberg 1.3).

About ten years after the publication of Edward Said's *Orientalism*, the author complained that his book has been misinterpreted and construed according to the interpreters' political backgrounds (214). Politics has played an important role in Taiwan literature in the past half century or so. Since the early 1950s, for about three decades, the KMT (Kuomintang; Nationalist Party) had influence, in one form or another, on literature. As Taiwan prospers, there are more and more writers who are no longer politically active. They may have more time to express their feelings in writing, but they are still influenced by politics. There are "native" (*bentu*) writers versus "out-of-province" (*waishen*) writers. Writers are further classified as *dupai* who advocate the independence of Taiwan and *tongpai* who advocate reunification with Mainland China. Of course there are also those in the grey area, i.e., those who do not have a professed or apparent stance for independence or reunification. The *dupai* are green and the *tongpai* are blue. The colors black and white imply racial difference or even racism in some Western countries; the colors green and blue imply, one may say, political "racism." In recent years, on numerous occasions, one has observed that green and blue "color" symbolisms in Taiwan literary circles are as intricate as they are interesting. A case in point is the...
receptions of the poem "Nostalgia" (Xianchou) by Yu Guangzhong (1928-).

In the present article I explain the story of "Nostalgia" from its publication and early reception in Taiwan and then its story on the Mainland. "Nostalgia" is Yu's own translation of the original Chinese title "Xiangchou." There are two kinds of chou or sadness in this poem: the feeling of sadness while being separated from (including on the death of) his beloved and the feeling of sadness while being separated from his home town and/or country. The first three stanzas of the poem deal with the first kind of sadness and the last one with the second kind. The word nostalgia has two meanings: longing to go back to one's home (hometown or homeland) and longing for something in the past of happy circumstances.

The climax of the story occurred in December 2003 when Premier Wen Jiabao of the People's Republic of China quoted a line from this poem and set off much discussion on it. On 21 January 1972, Yu, at home on Xiamen Street in Taipei, wrote "Nostalgia": "When I was young, / Nostalgia was a tiny, tiny stamp, / Me on this side, / Mother on the other side. // When I grew up, / Nostalgia was a narrow boat ticket, / Me on this side, / Bride on the other side. // But later on, / Nostalgia was a lowly grave, / Me on the outside, / Mother on the inside. // And at present, / Nostalgia becomes a shallow strait, / Me on this side, / Mainland on the other side" (130). It took him only twenty minutes to complete this folksong-like poem to become famous and influential in the following decades. The earliest warm welcome came probably from Chen Dinghuan who, in an essay in a newspaper appearing on 29 and 30 March 1972 hails the poem as expressing "the profound and touching nostalgia of the Chinese people from ancient times to the present" (qtd. in Huang (1) 261); Chen was so fond of this poem that he translated this "new poem" into an ancient-style one (see Huang 261).

"Nostalgia" spread in Taiwan and then to Hong Kong and other Chinese communities overseas. In 1975, an album by Yang Xuan entitled Zhongguo Xiandai MingeJi (Modern Chinese Folksongs), in which "Nostalgia" was included, was released. This is probably the first time the poem was set to music. Approximately ten years after its appearance, "Nostalgia" was introduced to Mainland China. A Hong Kong writer sent collections of poetry by Yu Guangzhong and other Taiwan poets to the Sichuan poet Liushahe (1931-), who in turn sent poems including "Nostalgia" to Mainland newspapers and magazines for publication. The Hunan critic Li Yuanlo (1937-) by chance read "Nostalgia" and "Nostalgia: Four Rhymes," another poem of the same theme by Yu and deeply impressed in 1981 wrote an essay to praise them. Li stated that "Nostalgia" had been recited in a number of literature and arts gatherings in the country (qtd. in Huang (2) 125-133); in other words, the poem had already been circulating in the early 1980s on the Mainland.

In the summer of 1984 in Beijing, on my visit to Qian Zhongshu (1910-1998), this renowned scholar mentioned, among a variety of topics, that he had read Yu's "Nostalgia" in The People's Daily (Renmin Rebao) (Qian qtd. in Huang 33). The poem, according to recollections by scholar-critic Yuan Kejia (1921.), was broadcast by the Central People Radio station and was well known in every household in China (qtd. in Yuan 162-63). Apart from print media and radio, "Nostalgia" was also televised in its song form and performed at least once in the program "Joyous Spring Performing Arts Evening" in early 1992. "Joyous Spring" is an annual program produced and broadcast by CCTV Channel One appearing on the eve of the Chinese lunar new year and watched by over half of the total Chinese population. This has contributed to the enormous popularity of the poem. Furthermore, at the mid-autumn festival and similar festivities, television shows often include the recitation or singing of "Nostalgia." There are various versions of "Nostalgia" set to music but the exact figure of versions is difficult to obtain. In addition to all these, the poem has been included in the syllabus of Yuwen (Chinese language and literature) for high school students. This is no doubt a kind of "canonization" for a piece of contemporary literature.

Yu left Mainland China in 1949 and settled in Taiwan in the following year and did not return to Mainland China until 1992. In
1958-59, 1964-66, and 1969-71 he had stayed in the United States as a student and later as a visiting professor. During his sojourns in the U.S., his obsession with China as a backward country with oftentimes political turmoil could not be stronger. Beginning from 1966 and lasting for ten years, the Cultural Revolution in China was criticized by most of overseas Chinese intellectuals including Yu. Still, in "Nostalgia" as well as in a number of other poems written during 1960s and 1970s, Yu expressed his love, longing, and hope for his homeland. In this, Yu is as patriotic a poet as, for example, Qu Yuan, Du Fu (712-770) and Lu Yu (1125-1210) in the history of China.

In the early 1980s, a few years after the official announcement of the termination of the Cultural Revolution, the Mainland was "back to normal," policies of reforms and opening-up were adopted, and reunification with the long separated Taiwan appeared on the political agenda in Beijing. The patriotic sentiment of a distinguished Taiwan poet longing for his homeland was without any doubt greatly cherished by the Beijing leadership.

The reputation of "Nostalgia" reached its zenith on 8 December 2003 when Premier Wen Jiabao, during a visit in the United States, quoted the line "(Nostalgia becomes) a shallow strait" from the poem in a speech delivered to a gathering of overseas Chinese, stating Mainland's firm policy of reunification with Taiwan. Wen said, "This shallow strait is indeed our biggest national tragedy, our deepest nostalgia" (United Daily News, 9 December 2003). His speech, together with the quoted line and the name Yu Guangzhong, was instantly reported by newspapers in Chinese all over the world. As a result, the fame of the poem and of the poet already high, rose even higher. In what follows, I analyze comments on the poem and the poet in relation to Wen's speech that appeared in a number of Taiwan newspapers thus exemplifying the issue of the relation between literature and politics in Taiwan.

Wen's speech was the head-line story on the third page of the United Daily News (9 December 2003). The across-the-page title reads: "Wen Jiabao at First Tough and Then Soft: Taiwan Is the Deepest Nostalgia." The rather long subtitle includes the following: "In a sentimental mood rarely seen in Communist leaders, Wen quotes Yu Guangzhong's poem 'Nostalgia' ... Wen Jiabao's soft-touch language has moved many of the overseas Chinese at the gathering." In a side column on the same page there is a story entitled "The 'Nostalgia' of Yu Guangzhong," which provides the text of the poem and related information: Wen's "emotional speech let people from all walks of life strongly feel the tenderness of Wen's style"; Yu is "a poet charmingly influential across the strait," his "Nostalgia" and other poems are "widely popular in the Mainland." The same speech was also the headline story on the third page of China Times on the same day. The subtitle of the story states that "Wen told the overseas Chinese 'the shallow strait is the deepest nostalgia'." In the news report, the quoting of Yu's line is described as "Wen's emotional appeal" to the Taiwan people. On the same page, an interview with Yu entitled "Yu Guangzhong: Nostalgia Means Longing for the Mainland" reveals that upon the call by the reporter Yu was caught by surprise, not knowing that Wen had quoted his poem. After being informed of Wen's speech, Yu pointed out that his poems — from "Let Spring Start from Gaoxiong" ("Ran Chuntian chong Gaoxiong Chufa") to this "Nostalgia" — "have been used by people in politics for many times." Information concerning the background, the meaning and the spreading of the quoted poem was given in the report. "Being used by people in politics" is a key phrase in our context here. High officials of the government and the Democratic Progressive Party solicited for commentary by reporters from United Daily News and China Times, pointed out the "heaviness" and "icy coldness" of "nostalgia" in Wen's speech, as opposed to the impression of soft-touch and tenderness stated in the news reports just mentioned.

On December 9 and 10, on the pages of Liberty Times and Taiwan Daily responses to Wen's speech and Yu's poem sound even "heavier" and "colder." Wen was attacked and ridiculed. People in Taiwan, the two dailies opine, do not have any nostalgia for the Mainland; they have only Taiwan in their hearts. Another target for criticism and scorn is Yu and his poem.
In an essay published on 10 December in *Liberty Times*, Ceng Guihai, president of the Taiwan PEN Association, made the following points:

When Wen Jiabao in the United States loudly sang that "That shallow strait is the biggest national tragedy and deepest nostalgia," across the wide Pacific Ocean, in Taiwan, there is the reputed poet Yu Guangzhong who, nourished in his whole life by the rice produced on Taiwan mountains and rivers and by tax-payers' money, cheerfully announced that the poem quoted is his poem. Apparently Yu thinks that he is Chinese poet laureate. This renders one coldly sad for not knowing ... Wen's and Yu's words do not represent the voice of the Taiwanese. Yu wanted to use poetry to fulfill his mission as destined by his very name Guangzhong — brightening and broadening China. This is the highest mission conceived after he has made fun of the youthful college students, has eulogized the ... from childhood recollections. … Contrary to Yu's singing duet (together with Wen) and his Chinese feelings, the voice of the Taiwanese people can thus be expressed, by transforming Yu's lines into "A shallow strait / Is nostalgia without roots / Is our nightmarish national tragedy? (130)

In a democratic society, it is commonplace to criticize and even ridicule public figures and it is perfectly tolerable to interpret or even misinterpret works of literature according to the reader's "horizon of expectations." Be that as it may, however, any interpretation or criticism, in order to claim credibility, has to base its arguments on facts. To deconstruct Ceng's explicitly political bias in his criticism, the following points can be made: Ceng's metaphor of Yu "singing" a duet with Wen about nostalgia and the national tragedy of separation is a misplaced and overtly political act where Yu is put in the same category as the premier and the same goes for the image of Yu walking alone proudly on the beach at National Sun Yat-sen University in Kaohsiung chanting nostalgia and of national tragedy. Further, "Nostalgia" was composed and published in 1972, while Yu came to Kaohsiung to assume a professorship at National Sun Yat-sen University in 1985 and the poem was quoted by Wen in 2003. If Yu's "Nostalgia" had been written in the 1980s when Mainland China's reunification with Taiwan was announced as national policy, there is the possibility for expounding the poem as Yu's intentional "singing a duet" with the Beijing leadership. But this is not the case. As mentioned above, "Nostalgia" was written during the time of the Cultural Revolution, a decade filled with chaos, barbarism, and destruction. Like many Chinese intellectuals then not in the Mainland, Yu denounced the Cultural Revolution and what it did publicly. He had in fact written a number of poems with this theme. What Yu felt nostalgic about were the people, the culture, and the history of China, and by no means the political leadership, the political ideology, and the political situation of the state of the People's Republic of China. In short, written in 1972 and expressing what he felt then, "Nostalgia" was not, in terms of the authorial intention and its actual contents, a political poem.

Ceng's statement that Yu is ungrateful to Taiwan as the country that all his life nourished him is a cheap take on nationalist sentiment Ceng accuses Yu to lack. In fact, Yu has spent altogether and in different intervals over 37 years on the Mainland, the United States, and Hong Kong; he has not been living his whole life in Taiwan. With regard to Taiwan, Yu has penned numerous poems and essays depicting with thankfulness the beauty of the landscape and the abundance of agricultural products in Taiwan. Ceng's statement that Yu has eulogized the Jiang Dynasty is also misleading. Ceng connotes that Yu has in his works eulogized Chiang Kai-shek and Jiang Jinguo (Chiang Ching-kuo). The fact is that apart from the poem "Farewell" ("Songbie") on the death of Jiang Jinguo (recited in a memorial ceremony in Kaohsiung on 24 January 1988), Yu has written nothing else about Jiang or Chiang Kai-shek. In "Farewell" the late president is remembered as a friend of the Taiwan people. Ceng's exaggerated connotation
misleads the reader to think that Yu has made a political statement by praising the Jiangs, that is, the so-called Jiang Dynasty, when in fact it is Ceng whose connotation is explicitly political in addition to being misleading.

Politics is often involved in the interpretation of poetry and other genres of literature. Scholars of Chinese poetry have known all too well that the first poem in the first Chinese collection of verse, *Shijing* (The Classic of Poetry), considered by many as a love song, was expounded as an eulogy for the virtue of the imperial wife. Theories of hermeneutics, phenomenology, and reader's response today seem to encourage pluralism in interpretation; readers, if they put on politically tinted glasses, can virtually paint the text under criticism green, blue, or whatever color or disregard works by authors with different political colors. Imaginative ways of reading help render the study of poetry interesting and colorful. However, interpretation based on fabricated or distorted information, intentionally or unintentionally provided, for political purposes or otherwise, diminishes sound judgment. My examples of the criticism of Yu's "Nostalgia" are tinted with political colors on both sides of the strait separating the island of Taiwan from the Mainland. Beijing promotes "Nostalgia" for the purpose of reunification with Taiwan. The *dongpai* in Taiwan report the event of Wen's quoting the poem and the poem itself with positive tones and the *dupai* interpret the event and the poem with hostility. The above examples suggest political motivation by the critic and the controversy around Yu's poem "Nostalgia" is a clear indication of the interplay of literature and politics in contemporary Taiwan cultural discourse.

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Taiwan, China, and Yang Mu’s Alternative to National Narratives
Lisa L.M. Wong

For every nation, history writing has often been monologic since the legitimization of the ruling party necessitates a singular, unitary narrative. The rise of the post-colonial discourse does little to put the monologic practice of history writing into question. On the contrary, the change of position of enunciation and the urge for decolonization facilitate the same singular, essentialist approach to the past. Writing projects of “recovery” rely heavily on testimonies from the minority position alone. This table-turning strategy common in literature of resistance is still trapped within an oppositional imagination. As manifestation of decolonization, history writing blooms during the early period of national independence. The rescue of the suppressed past articulates native resistance and persistence in different media. The historiographical use of literature for nation building and identity construction is almost as old as literature itself. The intentionalist hermeneutics of “poetry verbalizes intent” in the Chinese literary tradition has fostered a biographical-historical criticism that deciphers invariably a poem in terms of a personal-national narrative. Given this history writing imperative, poets as well as critics have contributed in different degrees to the production of a coherent, monologic narration, which more often than not, complies with the dominant narrative of the time. In this regard, the history writing in Taiwan literature during the last three decades of the twentieth century is an interesting locus for critical inquiry. Much of Taiwan’s past has been decided by external powers. People there had been under the rule of the Dutch in the early seventeenth century until 1662 and Taiwan had been a Japanese colony from 1895 to the end of the Second World War. At the Potsdam conference of 1945, Japan surrendered the control of the island to the Republic of China represented by the Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang, KMT). As the Chinese Communist Party established the Peoples’ Republic of China in the mainland in 1949, Taiwan had remained the Republic of China under the KMT before Chen Shuibian, the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party, was elected President in 2000. For more than four hundred years, the people of Taiwan have suffered from a troubled national identity and an unsettled international status.

There are at least three main master narratives in Taiwan's negotiations with a national-cultural identity. The first national narrative is told from the perspective of the Han settlers. One instance was the Ming subjects' dream of recovering the mainland from the Manchus; the other was the KMT's national project of claiming back the sovereignty from the hands of the communists. The historical situation was further complicated by the influx of cultural influence from the West in the mid-twentieth century, which resulted in the second national narrative in the essentialist rhetoric by pitting Chineseness against Westernism in the literary milieus. From the Modern Poetry Debate in the early 1970s to the decline of "Native Soil Literature Movement" in the early 1980s, the decade witnessed the emergence of Taiwanese consciousness, which is conspicuously distinct from the Chinese cultural nationalism of the past. The third narrative bespeaks the separatist agenda of those who foregrounded Taiwanese's nativist consciousness in the 1990s. With the figurehead of the Democratic Progressive Party as the President, the turn of the millennium marked the post-KMT era in Taiwan. In the light of history writing in Taiwan literature, Yang Mu's poetry is doubtlessly a succinct demonstration of a cultural practice of intervention, similar to what Homi Bhabha proposes: "[I]t is a space of intervention in the here and now … To engage with such invention and intervention requires a sense of the new … an insurgent act of cultural translation. Such art does not merely recall the past as social cause or aesthetic precedent; it renews the past, refiguring it as a contingent 'in-between' space, that innovates and interrupts the performance of the present. The 'past-present' becomes part of the necessity, not the nostalgia, of living" (7; on the theoretical notion of "in-between" as a location of culture, a widely divergent and diversely employed concept, see, e.g., Tötösy de Zepetnek). In
Yang Mu's Alternative to National Narratives

Taiwan, China, and Yang Mu's Alternative to National Narratives

Yang's works, the Chinese practice of historiographical writing in poetry is adopted not only as an aesthetic precedent but also as a means of inversive intervention. Many of his poems can be read as a space of intervention in which the poet imaginatively explores the liminal moments of the past and supplies the missing voices in History. His first-person poems in particular allow an expressive catharsis in the voice of those on the periphery. The dramatic monologue of a lyrical persona such as a Dutch soldier, a Chinese concubine, or a cultural pilgrim native of Taiwan visiting Changan in contemporary China reveals the constructedness, fluidity, and multiplicity characteristic of the post-structuralist sense of self and place. Their personal reading of the historical upheavals destabilizes the official accounts.

To introduce Yang Mu: born as Ching-hsien Wang — Yang Mu is his alias — in 1940 in Taiwan, he is professor of comparative literature at the University of Washington. He served as dean of National Dong Hwa University in Hualien and Director of the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy at the Academia Sinica in Nankang, Taiwan. To date, he has published over twelve books of poetry since his teens and is considered one of the most important Chinese poets now writing. In 2000 he received the Taiwan National Award for Literature and Arts. English translations of his poems include Joseph R. Allen's Forbidden Games and Video Poems: The Poetry of Yang Mu and Lo Ching (Seattle: U of Washington P, 1993), and Lawrence R. Smith and Michelle Yeh's No Trace of the Gardener: Poems of Yang Mu (New Haven: Yale UP, 1998). German and French translations of his work are Patt beim go. Gedichte chinesisch-deutsch by Susanne Hornfeck und Wang Jue (München: Al Verlag, 2002) and Quelqu'un m'interroge à propos de la vérité et de la justice by Angel Pino and Isabelle Rabut (Paris: You Feng, 2004). The poems I selected for the present study are all set in a "post" context such as post-Dutch occupation in Taiwan and post-Cultural Revolution in the People's Republic of China. "Zeelandia" ("Relanzhe cheng" 1975) talks about the end of the Dutch occupation around 1662, while "The Story of Five Concubines" ("Wu Fei Ji" 1983-84, 1990) relates to the fall of the Eastern Ning Kingdom into the hands of the Qing in 1683. Both hinge on the crucial events during the change of the ruling regime in the seventeenth century. "Difficult is the Journey" ("Xinglu Nan" 1982) gives an account of a traveller's traumatic encounter with the Chinese cultural imaginary, Changan, after a long separation between Taiwan, the Republic of China, and mainland China, the People's Republic of China. When these poems are read in close reference to the period of unease between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, Yang's refiguration of the contingent historical moment shows how a poet can deploy the "in-between" space of the "past-present" to interrupt the prevailing national narratives. His poems are "history plays" in which disparate "histories" come into play and where his inventive detour to address the contemporary political conditions both evokes and erases the mainstream narrative of Taiwan in which the poet was situated historically. Strictly speaking, among the poems to be analyzed here, only "The Story of Five Concubines" can be categorized generically as "history play." Other examples such as "Zeelandia" and "Difficult is the Journey" are poems that display dramatic qualities such as conflicts of values and roles, as well as the expressive power of dramatic monologue behind masks. In the works selected, the invisible "I"s articulation is dramatized in a spent tension between two worlds. The elision of subject position from which the poet writes offers a variety of enunciative positions for the dramatic personae to intervene the widely accepted version of History. Instead of orchestrating a stable, continuous account of national narrative that makes explicit of a positive understanding of the course of historical events, individual personae in Yang's literary texts speak through fissures to challenge the invented coherence of the official narration, doing what Jonathan Arac calls, an explication of the silence (148). In "Zeelandia" and "The Story of Five Concubines," voices of both the colonizers and the colonized, from the centre and the margins are amplified to engage national narratives in a dialogue. In "Difficult is the Journey," one hears a traveler's dramatic monologue, animating the shadows of a
suppressed history beneath the communist agenda on the billboards.

In turn, for the reading and writing of literature of decolonization, a bi-polar reasoning of violence such as victory versus defeat, or power versus lack, prevails. Edward Said's post-colonial reading of Yeats's poem "Leda and the Swan" operates on the assumption of a lack in the colonized (284). If the open question in "Leda and the Swan" suggests that the colonial violence effects the acquisition of "his" knowledge and power that can enable Leda to write and fight back, the empowerment of the subaltern is fake. To seize the power and knowledge of the colonizer cannot guarantee national liberation, as Frantz Fanon warns us (see, e.g., 222-23). The power and knowledge that the national bourgeoisie appropriated from their ex-masters only help to perpetuate colonial rule in new forms even after national independence. Reading "Zeelandia" against poems of decolonization, one can see Yang's adoption of the gendered metaphor of colonization as sexual intercourse is in fact an inversion of the patriarchal hegemony in the colonial discourse. Zeelandia is at the south of Taiwan, the first region on the island colonized by the Dutch in 1624. The town was built and developed by the colonizer and it is the place where the Dutch governor had lived until Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) took over the place in 1661. Zeelandia is a significant historical site, which marks the beginning of colonial experiences of Taiwan. In Yang's writing of colonialism, Zeelandia is situated at the historical juncture when the Dutch rule was about to end: "Zeelandia" is a spatial inscription of the local history of Taiwan. The Dutch soldier's confession in the poem in this last moment of occupation in Taiwan is an insertion of an alien position into the "Chinese" monolithic version of national recovery in 1661. The gendered representations such as taking the landscape as the female body and national resistance as buttons on woman's clothes are stereotypical, yet the agency for change is not predominately male. Unlike "Leda and the Swan" in which the colonized cannot save herself except by co-opting the other into the self, the colonized in "Zeelandia," as a local female being
Taiwan, China, and Yang Mu's Alternative to National Narratives

the same time casts doubts on the Han celebration of national recovery solely ascribed to Zheng Chenggong's military success. In-between two nations' historical battle in 1661, the Dutch soldiers in diaspora and the local people on the island — the agents living in the juncture of authoritative national narratives — spell out disparate narratives from their marginal positions.

Following the chronology of historical events, Yang's "The Story of Five Concubines" is a sequel to "Zeelandia." To put an end to the Dutch occupation of Taiwan, which had started in 1624, a fierce battle was fought at Zeelandia in 1661, resulting in the defeat of the Dutch and the victory of the Ming troops led by Zheng Chenggong. In October 1661, Zheng, who was granted a dynastic surname, Zhu, set up the regime of "Eastern Capital" on the island, in relation to the capital in the mainland now fallen into the hands of the alien Manchus. The name "Eastern Capital," suggests that it is a Ming empire taking Taiwan as a temporary refuge with a view to an eventual return to the mainland. The ultimate ambition of Zheng is to expel the Qing and restore the Ming. When Zheng Chenggong died in 1664, his son Zheng Jing succeeded to the ruling position by crooked means. He changed the Eastern Capital to Eastern Ning so as to establish a Ning kingdom independent of the Ming. Under his rule, the power and prospects of the Ning regime declined. Despite a few conquests along the coast east of the mainland, conspiracies and corruption reigned on the island while across the strait the Qing empire had prospered and became a great power. "The Story of Five Concubines" consists of three fragments from an incomplete verse drama. The play captures the liminal moments when the Eastern Ning kingdom of the Zheng family is about to fall in 1681. In contrast to the "official" History of high politics, which is usually written by male inscribers from the ruling regime, "The Story of Five Concubines" impresses its readers for the diversity of fragmentary experiences from female perspectives. Similar to "Zeelandia," the history writing of this poem is mixed with individual consciousness "living" in history. The difference is that each of the three fragments presents a distinct framing of the historical event within a specific role: Madame Xiu, one of the five concubines of Prince Jing, Shen Guangwen, a poet-cum-historian, and Zhu Shugui, Prince Jing of Ning Kingdom. The soliloquy in each fragment poses a challenge to the history writing of Han patriarchy: "Fragment 1: She Foresees the Catastrophe" opens with the question "What date is it today?" to a concubine, Madame Xiu. While fabricating an appropriate response, she reveals her foresight of the historical circumstances and her own location in it. Madame Xiu is shrewd and self-conscious, fully aware of her gender role in history: "Oh summer, a magnificent theatre / Happy and bright. / All living creatures / Fit well in their pre-given positions / And grow. Let us too, before a meticulously designed / Setting, concentrate on playing our designated roles / To please and beg, to envy and love madly / In blood and tears, to perform a play well" (Shiguang mingti 93-94). A play is going to be staged. The concubines and the princesses have to commit suicide together with the emperor himself at the fall of the dynasty. So is the predestined fate of the women in the "Chinese" patriarchal culture, as it is the fate of the concubines in a displaced miniature Ning kingdom offshore in Taiwan. The ritualistic sacrifice is a significatory act of female loyalty. The female body and life are commodified as the properties of an emperor. If the territory cannot be protected and the palace cannot be taken away, the evacuation of the royal family by death is both total and final. This absolute prohibition of the concubines being taken into the possessions of the usurper is an illustration of patriarchal fetishization and hegemony on the female body. To the concubines, the traditional gender code of conduct assigned for them is clear. However, the particular nature of such construction does not go under-ground into their collective subconscious. It is foregrounded and identified in terms of Madame Xiu’s awareness and interest in the dramatic plot. Thus, this Han tradition of patriarchal hegemony over the female is presented in a deconstructive way. Madame Xiu’s recognition of what is demanded of her in order to complete the sacrificial practice makes the scene ironic and the juxtaposition of the seasonal activities of living creatures in nature with the female's fated roles in such a historical moment is allegorical. The
"pre-given positions" to the ants and bees in nature are compared to the "meticulously designed setting" in which they are required to "perform" their "designated roles." What happens in the natural cycle is deployed to highlight what is unnaturally demanded of the female in the "man"-made historical cycle. With this awareness, Madame Xiu's compliance is not a result of loyalty or submission, but an indication of her professional ethics as an "actress." If she commits suicide at the end of the play as the plot suggests, her suicide will signify nothing more than the performance of a self-initiated act, which destabilizes the conventional narrative of female allegiance to the nation and patriarchal culture.

An official narrative of events connected by their long-term and immediate causes is common in history writing: "Fragment II: Shi Lang Sets off from Mount Tong" presents such an account of Taiwan history in the seventeenth century. Shen Guangwen, the persona in this fragment, was a subject of the Ming dynasty and was under threats of persecution when Zheng Jing rose to power. His writing career prospered after the Qing Empire took over Taiwan. He was considered the founder of Taiwan history and literature. In the poem, Shen Guangwen plays the role of a poet-historian. Through a flashback, Shen gives a historical account of the Han takeover of Taiwan in 1661 and at the same time accounts for the eminent fatal battle waged by Shi Lang in 1681. In Shen Guangwen's narrative, Shi Lang was once a sworn brother of Zheng Chenggong. In 1651, in a conflict caused by jealousy and power struggle, the father and brother of Shi Lang were killed by Zheng. Several years later, Zheng departed for Taiwan and settled on the island. For thirty years, Shi Lang had not given up his determination to avenge his family members and the chance finally came in 1681 when he was entrusted with the task of recovering Taiwan by the Qing emperor, Kang Xi. This soliloquy of Shen Guangwen is delivered at the time Shi Lang sets off from Mount Tong to Taiwan. The tempest is imminent. This is the moment when the catastrophe is about to befall the concubines and the Ning ruler in Fragments I and III respectively. Shen's version of history is chronicled by the events organized along the paternal line where women have no part to play. The persona in the third fragment is Zhu Shugui, Prince Jing of Ning kingdom. The soliloquy in "Fragment III: Prince Jing of Ning Kingdom Sighs in His Life of Refuge" (1990) shows the prince's personal despair immediately after the fall of the Ning Kingdom. Zhu is a ninth generation descendant of the founder of Ming dynasty, seeking refuge in Taiwan at the time of political turmoil. Now a fugitive on the move, his sighs show some humble wishes to dismantle the wall, so that he can find a way to flee and a place to settle, physically and spiritually: "Oh sigh if you may / If sighing, or weeping, or wailing / Can burst open your bottled up chest / Let those shames and furies gathered over time / Leak, from the back of your mind, or pour / We shall all sigh loudly" (Shiguang mingti 101). Zhu Shugui is contemplating a heroic exit. This last act of a play can be taken as a dramatic climax to honour the Zhu's, paying the last tribute to the Ming, who has now reached its final fall. The prince's pathetic urge to disintegrate and to let go of the kingdom, and his identity with it, is a plea for liberation from the national narrative, which has circumscribed his existence: "Oh sigh if you may / Weep, wail. Let the furies of the universe / Blow up, explode, to shock the cosmos / Make the tempest shake my way out / Of the broken walls at the southeast; Make mountains and rivers tremble / Whip the cracked earth, for the sake of the ancestors / Create a genuine doom for the last time" (Shiguang mingti 101-02). Zhu wishes to blast his way out from ancestral narrative. Ironic to the sacrifice demanded of the woman in Fragment I, the national myth is inverted by the myth-bearer, the Ming descendant: what he demands is a wham, not a whimper, for staging a dynastic annihilation.

The three fragments that make up "The Story of Five Concubines" offer three different perspectives to a single historical event. The conventional national narrative dissolved into various strands of family histories, individual predicaments and burdens of gender role. The characters in the verse drama are not competing for representation of authenticity. Each occupies a separate scene, enjoying an equal right to speech. The concubines whom history
objectifies, marginalizes, and obliterates are placed at the centre of the stage, spotlighted by the title. The historical significance of their story is restored. The poet-historian's organized narrative in the second fragment is written in linear time with a strong sense of causality, following the common practice for documentary record. Zhu's fantasy for a boisterous and flamboyant last act is tainted with a pathetic vanity, despite its deconstructive effects on the orthodox national narrative. The dramatic figures are situated on a temporal "national" border at a dynastic turn. The concubines, the poet-historian and the fugitive prince are placed together not in a service of "free play." Rather, their separate presences in three different fragments offer multiple narratives that underscore the constructed nature of social, historical realities. As there are different ways of imagining time, there are different histories. Just like the designated roles in a play, none is less inventive than the other. The concubines are inside a gendered historical imagination, which is over-determined and under-discussed. A historian's imagination works by proper names and dates — signifiers that claim to be credible documentation of the signified — and achieves objectivity and reliability. However, the irony is conspicuous when the female voice in the preceding fragment is immediately erased by this official account. In History, proper names of the female do not count. The royal version of the Zhu's is an exclusive, linear familial concern. Ancestral inheritance and continuity is the basis of the Han patriarchy hegemony. In contrast, Zhu's ambivalence towards this burden of familial-national tradition and duty exposes the fissures in this grand narrative. While the first two fragments were written in 1983, the third was added in 1990, and the verse-drama was first published in 1997. The poem marks the gradual dissolution of the Han legitimacy of rule in Taiwan since the lifting of martial law in 1987. Incomplete though it is, "The Story of Five Concubines" stages different histories that play against one another in a moving dramatic tension.

Yang is at his most powerful when he deploys a mixture of poetic forms and referents to render the very moment of national-cultural crisis itself. The poet often fractures a text by intercutting it with other texts, and lets the speaker's train of thoughts and observations bring disparate texts together and draw the verse forward. This precarious and temporary suturing of different referents at the intersection of positionalities is itself a performative act. The subject thus produced is one of mobility and multiplicity as in François Lyotard's post-modern conception: "each exists in a fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever before ... a person is always located at 'nodal points' of specific communication circuits, however tiny these may be. Or better: one is always located at a post through which various kinds of messages pass" (15). In Yang's poetry, the nodal point of communication circuits is usually animated by a dramatic persona who is situated at a historical juncture. His dramatic monologue spins out a narrative of history, which is displayed as constructed, or sometimes, self-deconstructive. A prominent example of such a dramatic persona is the traveller in "Difficult is the Journey": the poem taken from the section labelled "New Yuefu" in Yang's ninth book of poetry, You Ren (Someone). Yuefu is a nominalization of ballads gathered from the society in the Han dynasty (206 B.C. to 220 A.D.). The genre is often compared to the realist literary canon of Shi-jing for its expression of communal concerns. Since it was institutionalized as cultural products of the Music Bureau in the later period, its relation with the everyday realities of the people has slackened. Yuefu has gradually become part of ceremonial rites and diplomatic exchanges employed by court officials on imperial occasions. The New Yuefu, as advocated by Bai Juyi (772-846), was meant to be an inversion of the official Yuefu. Through a revival of the ballad form of the early Yuefu poetry via a vernacularization of the genre, "New Yuefu" was claimed to be accessible to old women, indicating its simplicity and plainness. Interestingly, Yang's poems collected in this "New Yuefu" section are in fact texts that destabilize the generic distinction. Read against the history of Yuefu, the "newness" of Yang's "New Yuefu" is significant in that echoing the thematic characteristic of the genre, the poet admits that these poems are composed in reaction to immediate circumstances, both local and global. Instead of
presenting the mundane daily experiences in a simple and direct way, Yang problematizes the factual account of events by digging up the suppressed narratives. Among the poems in the "New Yuefu" section, "Difficult is the Journey" is a notable example of how two contrasting historical readings of a place come into play. "Difficult is the Journey" is a long narrative poem that delineates a traveller's sojourn in Changan and his meditation on Chinese cultural history (You ren 176). The Yuefu title is sutured with the first two lines from Lu Zhaolin's poem, "Can you not see that beside Wai bridge north of Changan / Rotten logs lie across the ancient fields" (Lu 76). Lu's poem is a Yuefu composed at Changan during the early Tang. The last line of Yang's poem alludes to the fourth line of Lu's work, depicting the alluring scenery of a prosperous Changan, which entices "the mist as well as the smoke" (Lu 76). Since Changan was the capital for thirteen different dynasties of ancient China, it has witnessed the rise and fall of empires and become a significant cultural signifier for the Chinese.

When the sedimentation of cultural and historical significance is invested in a place, a conceptual shift occurs. An attachment to the place can signify a location of identity as Caren Kaplan observes, "When a 'place on a map' can be seen to be a 'place in history' as well, the terms of critical practice have made a significant shift ... The notion of a politics of location argues that identities are formed through an attachment to a specific site — national, cultural, gender, racial, ethnic, class, sexual, and so on ... Location can be seen to be a place in relation to history, used ... to unpack the notion of shared or common experience" (25). In Chinese culture, the imperial centre Changan not only is a place in history, but is history itself. The location conveys an embodiment of rich literary and cultural treasures. For the culturally and politically ambitious, the yearning for Changan has been a persistent theme for writing in classical literature. "Difficult is the Journey" begins with a prelude, composed of stanzas one to four, in which the persona records his journey to Changan, and a time-travel into History: "A donkey-drawn cart clumsily rolls down the street / I stand before a loess alley, gazing at History / Before my eyes, a crowd of shadows wriggles on the red wall / Dry, peeled off; it seems that among them is me: / Wrapped up layers over layers behind the billboards, a thin one that / Hardly bears the spring chill. People push towards me / Slanting body temperature gradually touches my blood and bones / I turn to distinguish left and right, and find that they are but overlapping shadows / On the wall, the shapes are false. I then understand / How alien and alone, insignificant and insubstantial, I am / And cannot help shivering in the twilight that has survived since ancient times" (You ren 140-41). As a traveller strolling in Changan, the persona sees History as distorted, broken shadows projected onto the red wall. The wall admits who is inside and who outside, and installs who is at the centre and who at the periphery. It is a screen on which History can be read and written. The colour of the wall on which History is inscribed simultaneously conjures up juxtaposing images: the palace walls of Changan in imperial China, the wall under the Gate of Heavenly Peace of the People's Republic of China, as well as the Red Wall of communist Russia. Changan is a hybrid of all these, historically and ideologically. These shadows are fragmented beyond recognition, wrapped up by billboards and big character posters. Other than the traveller, no local inhabitants bother whether the shadows are fakes or not: "but I know / Their interests lie in chestnuts, cigarettes / Flour, vegetables, salt and lard / And in snow, pasture, flooding outside the city wall / I gaze at the magnificent Goose Tower. Their / Interests lie not in the tower, nor in me" (You ren 142-43). At a historical instance when people are preoccupied by their livelihood, the cultural and religious symbol of the Big Goose Tower falls into oblivion. In contrast to the persona who makes a cultural pilgrimage to Changan, the local inhabitants who are situated inside the cultural capital lead their lives outside its cultural influence. They are cultural exiles unaware of the importance of return.

The traveler, with an outsider's gaze external to the present place, perceives a fissure in History. He resists the temptation of oblivion, which conceals and represses memories of past glory by repeating his elegiac laments for the loss of a cultural China, punctuated by the refrain "Can you not see." Three nostalgic
outbursts introduced by this refrain are located in stanzas 5-6, stanzas 7-10 and the last five lines of stanza 10, respectively. The first appeal addresses the loss of art and poetry. Changan is a cultural signifier frequently invoked in classical poetry. Besides, one famous site of the capital is the Forest of Calligraphy Steles. Calligraphy is a virtual inscription of art, poetry and history. The contents of these works of calligraphy and carving inscribe the canonical texts, records of visits to the place, people's preoccupations and pastimes, as well as poems, prose and epitaphs of different dynasties. These writings not only display the evolution of literary skills and calligraphic styles, but also exhibit the livelihood and current events in different historical periods: "Can you not see the miserable wind at the tower of Cien Temple / There hide the ghosts and gods, and there poetic spirits sob" (You ren 143). The rich cultural life lived by the ancestors is nowhere to be found. Nonetheless, the persona continues his journey and eventually comes across a man who sells fiction. To the pursuer of a cultural China, this man's face is both familiar and unfamiliar: "That face is a face that I cannot recall, not / Old nor young, without joy and without / Sorrow. This is an extremely familiar face — / I have seen it in books; a face I have imagined / A boatman, a rickshawman, a herdsman / Fleeing for refuge in ancient times, making connections and ties in modern days / He is literate; he has seen The Strange Phenomena Witnessed in the Last Twenty Years / He has seen workers, peasants, soldiers; he looks up / Astonished — he has seen me too" (You ren 144). Unlike Tiresias who has seen all and has foresuffered all in The Waste Land, this face is an indifferent face, unaffected by all that it has come across. The encounter between the persona and the fiction-selling figure dramatizes how an individual conceives History and how History receives an individual in return. This face "has seen" people and events in history as if it "has seen" a novel. By cataloguing what this face "has seen," the poet stresses this "seeing" which sweeps over both immediate realities and fictional writings in an all-leveling glance. The textuality and fictionality of History are foregrounded. On the contrary, the persona has seen Changan inscribed in books, in calligraphy and in poetry only. Revived by the traveller, the cultural imaginary, Changan, rises from repressed narratives and astonishes the indifferent History. At the moment when he is about to be appropriated into an anonymous category or an umbrella phenomenal term, the persona recognizes the familiar/unfamiliar face of History/Fiction. In a self-alienating gaze at himself, he sees what he is in the eyes of History: "My temples gray as an alien's, and I / Am actually an alien who has travelled thousands of miles to this place / Standing independently in the cool shades of the tower, gazing at / History: its dust, its mud and its blood / I heard the sonorous clamours of swords and spears, the cries for a break-through / The devouring flaming tongues, the falling roofs / Thunders, lightnings, rainstorms and gales / The refugees' song of exile" (You ren 144-45).

After the Cultural Revolution, Changan has become an anacoluthon that ruptures the narrative of the cultural imaginary. The distancing of the persona as the alien to the locals questions the cultural grid in relation to which Chinese intellectuals of the past have situated themselves. The locals are now preoccupied with what concrete realities of daily subsistence and political practices demand of them. Changan is now a cultural signifier that is purged of its usual signified. The persona who now feels himself culturally dislocated has paradoxically become a culturally dislocating excess to the stable, homogeneous historical narrative fabricated by the present regime. As a matter of fact, few would have the mindset of the traveller as to expect to see the cultural Changan in the People's Republic of China in the 1980s. The historical circumstances do not allow such nostalgic imagination. Thus, the "I" is an "excess," or a surplus that astonishes the figure of History who has seen all. The sweeping glance of History, which is used to collecting and absorbing stray details and residues into a homogeneous narrative, finds it hard to assimilate this alien's anticipating gaze. The persistent gaze functions like a dangerous supplement, as an inherent, internal "excess" which impedes from within the "smooth-running" history writing of the ideological
Taiwan, China, and Yang Mu’s Alternative to National Narratives

apparatus, as its immanent antagonism. The second emotional outburst introduced by “Can you not see” describes the traveller’s forlorn leave-taking: “Can you not see the dark clouds sweep by the west side of Baishui / The official path is haunted by weeping willows” (You ren 145). The persona’s position in this cultural matrix is ambivalent. He is not exactly an exile who reiterates laments of the paradise lost. Following the traditional practice of travellers fashioned in classical Chinese poetry, the persona does ponder over the cultural centre at a window in the night: “Starlight of March / Glitters, and floats across the silent north / Oh China! A guard patrols under the iron gate / Keeps watch and stands in the shadows of swaying willows” (You ren 146-47). The traveler’s quest for the essential, cultural China is doomed. China is kept watched by the iron gate and the guard, who stands on an ancient land, not knowing that the place has, for a long time, been known to be rich in feelings and perseverance. The guard stands amidst the swaying willows, unaffected by its literary and cultural references to sentimentality: “Attentively, I look and listen, wishing to find / Some sound, to grasp the pulse of the old city / Yellow and dark, yet an undying face / Wishing to sketch the dawn upon the night” (You ren 147-48). To his disappointment, he finds only the ruins in the land, which “was once as fertile as home” (You ren 148). Changan, which was a metonymy of cultural China, now relates to the traveller only as the ruins in the north. The traveller occupies an ambivalent position between an exile and a tourist. Having known the place from literary and cultural inscriptions, he now goes for a re-cognition of these inscriptions locally. The traveller is a cultural exile, who finds Changan, the marked space of a national culture is now nowhere to be placed on site.

The lament reaches its height in a lyrical chanting by incremental repetition. In the last five lines, the persona cries: “Yet can you not see / Can you not see that beside Wai bridge north of Changan / Where travellers walked into daybreak, in those days of yore / Where thousands of steed sped by, today only the cold / Mist mixes with deserted smoke. Can you not see” (You ren 148-49). The pathetic, insistent appeals to take heed of the lost treasures in the national tradition exemplified by the compassion, richness and beauty of Tang culture, seem to be futile. The rhetorical question “Can you not see” as used in classical poetry, is an apostrophe to mark a striking scene. Here, the question is asked three times, as resolute attempts to draw the inhabitants’ attention to the cultural deprivation in their living, but at the same time, the repetition betrays the speaker’s despair. The accelerated refrains of “Can you not see” mount in crescendo, only to fall into an affirmation of blindness — you cannot see. If Changan is the centre on which a system of cultural coordinates can be set up, this centre no longer holds. Roaming in the ancient cultural capital, the shadow of the traveller and those of the local people merge to compose a picture on the red wall. Yet, their preoccupations never meet. Only in a distanced projection can these differences be erased, yet the distortions do not go unaware. The spatial mobility of the traveller in the place results in a discovery of temporal banishment from the cultural imaginary. The transposition of the lyrical voice into Tang poetry parallels a dispersion of a unitary personal voice into a cultural one. The sense of loss is intensified by the disturbances caused by an absence, not so much an absence of the memorable past as the absence of the memories of the past. The fragmented but continuing connections between the lost Changan, as a point of departure for the cultural imaginary, and the present Changan the traveller finds as a site of arrival to the cultural realities, can still be made. The encounters in the persona’s cultural sojourn are staged as critical commentary on the cultural ruptures caused by a historical upheaval. The journey is difficult indeed because the traveller locates himself on a specific itinerary. A symbolic location of the self in a discursive and imaginary topography is a self-enclosure in a communication circuit. This visit to the pre-communist, national-cultural China is a problematization of diasporic imagination. The attachment to a
Taiwan, China, and Yang Mu's Alternative to National Narratives

special cultural and literary site that used to serve as the basis for diasporants' identity formation is now proved irrelevant, if not infeasible. The traveller’s discoveries urge a rethinking of the place-based consciousness of the cultural home. The anxiety and despair experienced by the traveller uncover disparate national narratives suggested by the Changan symbol.

Compared with the common cultural practice of re-narrating the past by installing a place, "Difficult is the Journey" is a meta-criticism of this construction of an elected cultural identity for the present. Politics of location in identity discourse argues for a place-based conception, but one has to note that the chosen site is always open to historical revisions; as Kaplan reminds us, "that site must be seen to be partial and not a standard or norm ... the stakes in the politics of location lie in the effort to address a perceived gap between poststructuralist relativism and rigidly essentialist articulations of identity" (You ren 25). Through the encounter of the persona’s anticipating gaze with History's all-seeing glance, Yang addresses this gap of perceptions and juxtaposes disparate history writings in the poem. In addition, "Difficult is the Journey" displays the performative power of deploying the past to demystify the present. The incessant reminder of "seeing" and "not seeing" works between blindness and insights in a way Berger has already suggested: "The past is never there waiting to be discovered, to be recognized for exactly what it is. History always constitutes the relation between a present and its past. Consequently, fear of the present leads to mystification of the past, The past is ... a well of conclusions from which we draw in order to act" (You ren 11). In the poem, the traveller is an excess, attaining an existence free from the historical frame of the present. By a different drawing from the past, he draws a different present. The cultural reverie embedded in his preconceived Changan makes him see the lack and the loss in the place he has landed. The ancient Changan is then detached from the place as a cultural imaginary that travels with the traveller. It is no longer a place, nor an origin, but a set of cultural signifiers drawn from the past. The location of identity is to be
deterritorized as an imaginary homeland in which the persona's identity is lodged. While History continues to patch up the gaps with fictionality for fashioning a singular, unitary narrative, the poem's open ending questions the nature of history writing itself — a chanting in a double-bind of record and erasure, between "can you not see" and "you cannot see." If, as Berger says, fear of the present leads to mystification of the past, perhaps hope for the future lies in demystification of the past and the present. In this paper, the three poems of Yang are read as history plays in which the field of national discourse becomes a field of contention, peopled by different subjects voicing their individual consciousness. Voices of the native Taiwanese, the women and the diasporant articulate contested stories of a historical event or a historical site. The "lived" experiences of the participants rupture the orthodox narratives, whether it is the Dutch imperialist conquest, the Ming glory of national recovery of Taiwan and royal allegiance of the subjects, or the place-based cultural imaginary of Changan. Yang's poems are attempts at demystification as well as political critique. They are history plays in which disparate histories play against each other, letting open a myriad of alternatives for addressing national narratives in post-colonial Taiwan and in contemporary China from some peripheral positions.


Works Cited


The Position of Sinophone Malaysian Literature within the Taiwan Polysystem of Literature
Tee Kim Tong

Sinophone Malaysian literature is a border literature in the Malaysian literary polysystem because its activity is confined to the ethnic Chinese community and it has been denied the legitimacy as a national literature.¹ The nature and position of Sinophone literature in Malaysia is that of a literature produced in the country, but since it is not written in the national language — Malay — it is not recognized by the official political and cultural discourse of the country as a national literature. To describe the structural relationship between literary products written in Chinese in Malaysia and the national concept of Malaysian literature, terms such as sectional literature, ethnic literature, and "Malaysian literature" have been used. These terms, however, merely re-state that although produced by Malaysian writers in Malaysia, Sinophone literature has been denied its national nature in the country’s public sphere. Thus I am using the term "border literature" to highlight the peripheral position of Sinophone Malaysian literature within the borders of the Malaysian literary polysystem (for the polysystem theory, see Even-Zohar).

When writers of Sinophone Malaysian literature settle in Taiwan and produce literary works there, they have to relocate themselves by connecting the border position of Sinophone Malaysian literature with TaiwanLit (Taiwan literature/Taiwanese literature) in the context of transnationalism.² The literature produced in Taiwan by Sinophone Malaysian writers — who form a diasporic literary community that crosses different borders within and without the Taiwan literary system — is designated as "Sinophone Malaysian literature in Taiwan" [hereafter SMLiT].³ SMLiT is a border and transnational literature because it is not situated in the central position of the Taiwan literary polysystem or in the Sinophone Malaysian literary polysystem. Moreover, crossing the geographical Malaysian border into the Taiwanese border, Sinophone Malaysian writers make the sojourning place their “home,” hence the crossing of the semantic border of the concept of “homelessness and/as
Such a proposition manifests the significance of "border" in SMLiT and the concept of "border literature" in constructing a theory of literature of (Asian) transnationalism. Besides positing SMLiT as a border and transnational literature to illustrate its nature and position in TaiwanLit (and Sinophone Malaysian literature), I aim to use it as an example to explore a theory of transnational Sinophone literatures in Asia by emphasizing the trans-nationality of Asian diasporic writers and focus on the idea of Sinophone literature in Malaysia and SMLiT as a border literature. On the other hand, in discussing the concept of transnationalism, I share with Ng Kim Chew's idea of "Sinophone literatures without nation," which provides a perspective beyond the immutable and homogeneous identities of national literature.

To construct SMLiT as a border and transnational literature contributed by a diasporic literary community in the metropolis manifests a link between borderlessness and border — a link of different borders that intersect Sinophone Malaysian/Taiwanese literary fields. In SMLiT, the Taiwan literary field is transformed from a place into a space. Although as a transnational literature SMLiT transgresses the national border into the literary field, it often does not write about the present place. Paradoxically, when SMLiT is viewed as a border literature, the borderlessness of the literary space of the Taiwan literary field becomes a bordered place. It is by this postulate of the seemingly paradoxical concept of borderlessness as border that SMLiT is situated as a border and transnational literature in both the Taiwan and Sinophone Malaysian literary polysystems. The focus of this paper, however, is mainly on the connection between MLiT and TaiwanLit, although references to Sinophone Malaysian literature are inevitable.

The existence of SMLiT as a transnational literature in Taiwan has a long history which started from the early 1960s, when ethnic Chinese Malaysian students were encouraged to go to Taiwan for higher education under the Nationalist [KMT: Kuomintang] government's Overseas Chinese educational policy. Some of these students were already active writers in Malaysia, but there were also others who began their writing career after their arrival in Taiwan. In Taiwan, Chinese Malaysian students were regarded as qiaosheng (students born overseas) meaning they were Chinese born outside Taiwan. In a sense, Taiwan is not the birthplace of these diasporic Chinese. While staying in Taiwan they were holding residence permits but were not granted citizenship; they were also regarded as individuals "returning to the homeland" (huigui zuguo) (although in those days qiaosheng from Hong Kong and Macao who "returned" to Taiwan and they were granted citizenship automatically).

Sinophone Malaysian writers who were active in Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s represent the "cultural return" paradigm of Malaysian diasporic Chinese writers: they not only contributed to literary journals such as Xiandai wenxue (Modern Literature) and Zhongwai wenxue (Chung-Wai Literary Monthly) but also established their own literary societies and launched their own journals. For example, Xingzuo shishe (Constellation Poetry Society), established mostly by a group of qiaosheng from Malaysia and Hong Kong, namely, Chen Huihua (Chen Peng-hsiang), Wang Runhua (Wong Yoon Wah), Dan Ying (Lew Poo Chan), and Ao Ao (now better known as Zhang Cu or Dominic Cheung), launched Xingzuo shikan, the society's journal. A second example is the Shenzhou shishe (Divine Land Poetry Society), established mostly by qiaosheng from the Malaysian state of Perak, notably Wen Rui’an, Fang Ezen, Zhou Qingxiao, and Huang Hunxing, published the Shenzhou shikan (Divine Land Poetry Journal) and Qingnian Zhongguo zazhi (Young China Magazine). While members of the Xingzuo group were active in Taiwan in the 1960s, Shenzhou's prime time was the second half of the 1970s.

The notion "cultural return" indicates a cultural link between the diasporic Chinese literary community and the Taiwan metropolitan Taipei and thus emphasizes the dominant position of the capital as the center of modern Sinophone literature in the 1960s and 1970s. It also suggests the flow of a tributary literature into the cultural mainstream as represented by the arrival of the members of the Xingzuo and Shenzhou societies to and the production of their works in Taiwan. It further suggests the incorporation and co-option of diasporic and border voices into the center of the literary and cultural...
At the same time, the rationalization of designating the qiaosheng writers’ sojourn in Taiwan as "cultural return" and "self-exile" became the focus of a debate in Zhongguo shibao (China Times) and this was perhaps the first time when Sinophone Malaysian literature was seriously discussed outside Malaysia. Although the concept of transnationality was not the central issue, the debate concerned national as well as transnational cultural identity. The debate included questions about the cultural identity of " Overseas Chinese" writers who reside in Taiwan and write outside their nation and issues such as absence, presence, (re)location, language, place, and home. The respective "return" to Taiwan of SMLiT writers such as Li Yongping, Wen Rui'an, and Lin Xingqian in different periods indicates a gesture of embracing the dominant Chinese literary and cultural ideology by diasporic Chinese. Li, who traveled to Taiwan in the late 1960s, attempts to embody in his novels, particularly Jiling chunqiu (The Jiling Chronicles) and Haidong qing (Haidong Blues), a textual utopia of "pure" Chinese language. Wen, who represents the case of diasporic Chinese's cultural return of the 1970s attempted to actualize his "Northern voyage of expectation" by promoting the concept of "cultural China," knowing that Taiwan is not China de facto. Ironically, in 1981 Wen was deported by the KMT government — the government that claimed to be the promoter of Chinese culture — under the accusation of propagandizing communist China. And Lin, a representative figure of the cultural return paradigm of the younger Sinophone Malaysian generation, who came to Taiwan in the late 1980s, established himself as an essay writer and poet, left Taiwan for Hong Kong when he felt disillusioned with the ideological changes in Taiwan.

Lin's disillusionment exposes the deficiency of using the paradigm to describe the younger writers of SMLiT who emerged as a literary community in the late 1980s and 1990s. A different interpretative paradigm is thus needed here to think from a transnational perspective. For writers such as Ng Kim Chew, Chen Dawei, Zhong Yiwen, and Xin Jinshun, like their predecessors, their (im)migration to Taiwan was an educational and cultural passage followed by a professional and/or political choice. Moreover, although by now they teach at various universities in Taiwan, they return to their Malaysian homeland from time to time and their works are also published in the literary journals and newspaper supplements of Malaysia. Their frequent travel back and forth between their country of origin and current country of residence represents different form of diaspora, one that Shirley Geok-lin Lim terms "traveling transnationalism."

The paradigm shift with regard to SMLiT can be contextualized in the period after the 1987 Operasi Lalang (Long-bladed Grass Operation) and of the rise of Mahathirism in Malaysia. The Operasi Lalang was the Mahathir government's action in December 1987 against political, social, and cultural dissidents for preventing ethnic conflicts. Many people, ethnic Chinese and Indian in particular, in disappointment with the political development and future of the country, emigrated to other Asian and Commonwealth countries. Yet, in the case of SMLiT writers, many of them left the country in the post-Operasi Lalang era but as said before return frequently to their homeland for short term stays. So there is a process of leaving-and-returning in their transnational moves: they leave because they do not want to stay and they return because they cannot leave the site of their cultural and life memory. What matters therefore is not the place, but the space in their mind and memory. Thus when they write, they mostly write about their experience of things past and time lost in their Malaysian homelands. Such a relationship between writers of SMLiT and their homeland can be viewed as a representation of the bordered subject of changing or fragmented identities in transnational mobility and relocation. Another fact about SMLiT as transnational literature is that although most of the diasporic writers have chosen to live transnationally in another country, they remain Malaysian citizens. We can thus posit that, on the one hand, they choose to preserve a link with their homeland and they are divided between double or fragmented identities on the other hand. By adopting Taiwan as a cultural home, they become metropolitan, like the (im)migrants in Salman Rushdie's novels as postulated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. But their identity as a metropolitan is assumed at the same time with their identity as residents of
Taiwan, whereas by preserving their Malaysian citizenship they maintain their national identity. In addition to positioning SMLiT as a border literature relocating it to an alternative center, the proposal of SMLiT as a transnational literature helps explain the reason the writers of SMLiT tell stories more about their homeland than matters in Taiwan. They simply attempt to preserve their diasporic Chinese cultural identity in their writing by sustaining the memories of their childhood, hometowns, cities, and ethnic history. Yet, such an identity is embodied in the literary artifacts they produced in metropolitan Taipei, where, on the one hand, Taiwanese Nativism and nationalism is the mainstream cultural ideology, and, on the other hand, the cultural market is dominated by consumerism and fetishism.

In Taiwan, the years after 1980 marked the age of post-martial law when the country began to reconstruct its own subjectivity as well as its political, cultural, national, and ethnic identities. Alongside with the rise of Taiwan Nativism and nationalism, the period also witnessed the import of Western master theories including such as postmodernism, postcolonialism, and globalism. It was also during this period that the institutionalization and (re)definition of TaiwanLit took place. In this context, since TaiwanLit has reclaimed its own Taiwanese identity, I argue that it is anachronistic and insignificant to view the existence of SMLiT as a mode of "return to cultural China." Instead, it should be viewed as part of the transnational process in which intellectuals move from postcolonial places to other spaces. The interaction and intersection of SMLiT and TaiwanLit within the Taiwan literary polysystem in terms of identity politics, however, manifest the ambiguous position of SMLiT. On the one hand, as border literature, SMLiT seems to be politically incorrect and un-Taiwanese (or un-nativistic) because it expresses the Malaysian experience of the writers. On the other hand, some SMLiT writers, such as Li Yongping and Zhang Guixing, besides telling stories of their Malaysian imagination and experience, attempt to translate the language used from vernacular Chinese (Huawen) common in diasporic Chinese communities to standard Chinese (Guoyu) (see Ng, "Lisan de Poluozhou"). The result of such cultural translations could be regarded as a kind of misplacement and displacement because contemporary Taiwan literature tends to embrace a cultural syncretism and hybridized literary style rather than one of pure Chinese.

Critics and scholars of TaiwanLit often state that SMLiT tends to express more about the world that its writers have left behind than the place they are living at. On the other hand, critics in Malaysia accuse the writers of SMLiT of misrepresenting their homeland. The (Taiwanese) complaint and (Malaysian) accusation, in fact, suggest a mislocation of cultural translation, putting SMLiT in the midst of liminality between reality and fiction. Such a double (dis)position or displacement of the writers of SMLiT provokes reflections on the dialectical issues of transnationality and homelessness as home or borderlessness as border space of contemporary TaiwanLit in particular and Sinophone literature or new literatures in Chinese at large. Ng's critique exposes the problematics of positioning SMLiT from the singular perspective of national literature. In an article on SMLiT of Sinophone Malaysian literature/Un-TaiwanLit of Taiwanese literature (or Un-TaiwanLit of Sinophone Malaysian literature/SMLiT of TaiwanLit) Ng deconstructs the border (dis)position of SMLiT in Taiwan (and in Malaysia) by proposing the concept of "Sinophone Literature without nation" (see "Wu guoji"). Hence the question involved here is that of literary (trans)nationality and/or that of the (trans)nationality of the writers. Ng's radical concept, in short, involves the questions of literary, cultural, and political identities. Ng also uses terms such as "nation[ethnic]non-national literature" and "non-national literature" to describe the border and transnational position of Sinophone literature in the Malaysian literary system. Ng's concept, in fact, echoes and contributes to the idea of a diasporic and Sinophone transnational literature in Taiwan.

Comparing the historiography of TaiwanLit with that of Sinophone Malaysian literature, Ng advocates that since Taiwan is (still) not a nation (but an imagined community?), from the perspective of (national) literary history, we may say that
Sinophone Malaysian literature, likewise, is also a literature without nation in Ng's argument. Whereas the assumption of TaiwanLit as a literature without nation is derived from the politics of recognition, the theory of Sinophone Malaysian literature as a literature without nation is based on the fact that the Chinese language is not an official or national language in Malaysia: "Relatively speaking, even from the aspect of the language used by Sinophone Malaysian literature (Chinese as non-official language), we can say that it is excluded by national literature and hence forced to confined itself to its ethnic and linguistic boundary. It is therefore legitimate for us to say that Sinophone Malaysian literature is a literature without nation or an ethnic-non-national literature" (Ng, "Wu guoji" 217; unless indicated otherwise, all translations are mine). Ng points out that the position of SMLiT as a (trans)national literature lies actually in the intersection of the two literatures without nation. Such a position, of course, does not secure SMLiT a position in Taiwan literary history at all since it does not concur with the nativist definition of TaiwanLit, which, in turn, is based on "Taiwanese consciousness, Taiwanese localism, Taiwanese ethnicity, and patriotism." In this context, Ng concludes that SMLiT is "by no means TaiwanLit (for it is even not eligible to be patriotic) and hence should be categorized as the unTaiwanLit in Taiwanese literary history" ("Wu guoji" 217-18). I should like to note that Chiu Kuei-fen responds to Ng's postulates by pointing out the issue of violence in the writing of literary history. Chiu suggests that it is possible that writers of TaiwanLit might not be pure-blooded Chinese, but hybridized Taiwanese, so it is right to assume that TaiwanLit is not a literature in Chinese. This is of course an innocent logic based on an anthropological perspective. Such a nativist view of TaiwanLit, according to Chiu, is "a consensus in the studies of TaiwanLit from a local perspective" (286). Chiu's critique, however, problematizes the comparative study of Sinophone Malaysian literature and TaiwanLit based on the assumption that both are (diasporic) literatures in Chinese.

It is from the above discussed perspective of self-decentralization and deterritorialization of SMLiT that I view Ng's theoretical endeavor as a project of transnational literature. Sinophone Malaysian literary texts, produced transnationally in Taiwan and known as "SMLiT" (Sinophone Malaysian literature in Taiwan), are indeed the "SMLiT of Taiwanese literature" since they are produced in Taiwan, not in Malaysia, meaning they are TaiwanLit, not Sinophone Malaysian literature. But to argue that SMLiT is Taiwanese literature involves an examination of the definition of TaiwanLit. According to Huang Deshi, authors of TaiwanLit texts are those of Taiwan background (meaning born in Taiwan) and who carry out their writing in Taiwan (on this, see Tee, "Lisan shuangxiang"). These writers of SMLiT, of course, were not born in Taiwan, although over the years they have established their writing career in Taiwan. So either the exclusive definition is insufficient or the texts of SMLiT are indeed not qualified as part of the repertoire of TaiwanLit.

The literary polysystem of Taiwan, however, consists of literatures from different Taiwan and non-Taiwan ethnic communities such as Mainland Chinese, Hokkien- or Minnan-speaking Chinese, Hakka, the Indigenous (Aboriginal), and diasporic Chinese (Overseas Chinese), all of whom reside in the country. Together they form a polysystem producing texts in various languages — predominantly Chinese (see Tee, "Taiwan wenxue"). Among literatures produced in Chinese by diasporic Chinese writers who reside in Taiwan is SMLiT. Thus, although these writers were not born in Taiwan, they carry out their writing activity in Taiwan and thus their literary products are eligible to be part of the TaiwanLit repertoire, regardless of their un-Taiwanness categorization from a traditionalist Chinese perspective. Such a definition of transnational TaiwanLit is obviously more inclusive than the notion of national literature.

Another proposition suggested by Ng is that "un-TaiwanLit" in the Taiwan literary system could also be termed as the "un-
TaiwanLit of Mahua literature” since it is un-Taiwanese, meaning it is Sinophone Malaysian literature and not TaiwanLit. But how could these un-TaiwanLit texts produced in Taiwan considered SMLiT when they are not produced in Malaysia? Again, if we use Huang Deshi’s criteria in defining what is and what is not TaiwanLit by substituting Malaysia for Taiwan, then SMLiT is Sinophone Malaysian literature for these writers were born in Malaysia and they have not declined their nationality, although they do not write in Malaysian. Chen Dawei, on the other hand, proposes the division of Sinophone Malaysian literary field into three different zones, namely SMLiT, Sinophone literature produced in East Malaysia, and Sinophone literature produced in West Malaysia (32). Elaborated in Chen’s context, SMLiT is an extra-territorialized / deterritorialized Sinophone Malaysian literature since Taiwan is not a geographical zone of Malaysia. In this case the nationality or national identity of the writer is an insiders’ criterion in defining Sinophone Malaysian literature. When the Malaysian Chinese Writers’ Association published Mahua wenxue daxi: duanpian xiaoshuo 1965-1980 (Anthology of Sinophone Malaysian Literature), Li Yijun, the anthology’s fiction volume editor, wrote that “My principle of selection is based on the nationality of the author. If the authors are no more Malaysian citizens, their works are not included. However, for those who have become citizens of other countries, if they published their works when they were still Malaysian, the texts are considered Sinophone Malaysian literature” (vi). Thus, as long as the literary text is produced by a Sinophone writer of Malaysian nationality, it is a Sinophone Malaysian text, regardless of the writer’s location of residence. This of course varies from Deshi Huang’s definition of TaiwanLit, which stresses on both the identity / nationality of the writer and the place of production.

In the Malaysian context, Ng’s theory of “literature without nation” points out that Sinophone Malaysian literature has no position in the agenda and the master narrative of “national literature,” a postulate in the government’s official culture policy. In short, it also involves the politics of recognition. In Malaysia, the official discourse embraced monolingualism in the 1960s and Malay has since enjoyed its prestigious status of the sole national language, although Chinese and Tamil are also used in each ethnic community while English remains the lingua franca. Thus Sinophone Malaysian literature becomes a border literature, a literature of "lesser diffusion" (see Pivato, Tótösy de Zepetnek, Dimić) since its market is limited to those who can read and write Chinese. From another perspective, Sinophone Malaysian literature is a minor literature (littérature mineure) in Deleuze’s and Guattari’s sense of the term and could be discussed from the idea of minor transnationalism (on this, see Tee, "Xiao wenxue"; see also Lionnet and Shih). Ng’s theory, in fact, is built on the paradox of SMLiT as un-TaiwanLit of both the Sinophone Malaysian and Taiwan literatures.

In conclusion, SMLiT as Sinophone Malaysian literature is a priori a border and "in-between" literature since in Malaysia it is officially denied the status of national literature. When this non-national literature (re)crosses the national border into the field of TaiwanLit, it is designated a border and non-national literature again. But, given the fact that SMLiT, as a kind of border literature, trans-crossing the borders of national literatures in both the Malay and Taiwan literary polysystems, it is important and relevant to re-map it dialectically into the network of Sinophone literatures in the age of transnationalism and globalization. In 2004, in a paper on global literature, Shih Shu-mei re-coined the term "Sinophone literature," following the concept of Francophone and Anglophone literatures, to mean "literature written in Chinese by Chinese-speaking writers in various parts of the world outside China, as distinguished from "Chinese literature" from China" (29). Likewise, David Der-wei Wang has proposed the use of the term "Sinophone Literature" to include all modern literatures in Chinese. According to Wang, the term, on the one hand, corresponds to terms such as "Anglophone Literature," "Francophone Literature," and "Hispanic Literature" but on the other hand differs from them in terms of the relationship between the Chinese language and Chinese culture in diasporic Chinese society and China: "In the past hundred years or so, owing to political and economic factors, a great number of
Chinese migrated abroad, especially Southeast Asia. They built various types of communities, in which a Chinese linguistic and cultural aura was consciously formed. In spite of all the familial and national disorders and changes, Chinese writing has always been a symbol of cultural (if not political) continuity for the Chinese subjects of these regions. A typical example is Sinophone Malaysian literature" (Wang E7). Ng's comparative study of the literary historiography of TaiwanLit and Mahua literature offers a model to problematize the mode of writing of literary history that is based on the immutable ideology of national literature. Ng’s model further helps develop a transnational and multicultural perspective that goes beyond the notion of border into borderlessness in constructing the cultural and national identities of TaiwanLit.

Note: The above paper is a revised version of Tee, Kim Tong. "'Literature without Nation': A Study of 'Mahua Literature in Taiwan' as Transnational Literature," Tamkang Review 37.2 (2006): 170-88.

Notes

1 In my previous work I employ the term "Mahua literature" to refer to Sinophone Malaysian literature, that is, writings in Chinese by Malaysian writers; in this article I use the acronym "SinoMaLit."

2 I use the term "TaiwanLit" — similar to "CanLit" used for Canadian literature — the English translation of Taiwan wenxue; on transnationalism, see, e.g., Lionnet and Shih.

3 Whereas Mahua in the phrase "Mahua literature" is a blend of the Romanized words Malai(xi)ya huawen, which is, in most cases, commonly used to mean "Malay(si)an Chinese-language," MahuaLit is my acronym for "Mahua literature in Taiwan"; however, since my terminological preference for Mahua literature is "Sinophone Malaysian literature," I use the acronym "SMLiT" to refer to writings produced by Sinophone Malaysian writers residing in Taiwan.

4 Here the reference of "homelessness" and "home" is to Abdul JanMohamed who describes the situation of those he calls "border" intellectuals as in "worldliness without world, homelessness as home"; here I borrow the phrases to define the nature and position of "Sinophone Malaysian literature in Taiwan" as a border and transnational literature.

5 I use the term "diasporic Chinese" rather than "Overseas Chinese" in order to refer to the Chinese (im)migrants and their descendants in countries outside China.

6 "Shenzhou" means "the divine land," referring metaphorically to China.

7 The Malaysian government introduced the education quota system when the National Economic Policy was implemented, under which a much higher percentage of admission to universities was reserved for the Bumiputra (native Malays). Thus, Non-Bumiputra applicants were forced to resort to other countries, including Taiwan. This is one of the factors contributed to the Taiwan educational passage of many non-Bumiputra applicants of Chinese background since the 1980s.

8 "Mahathirism" is a term to describe the political and economic phenomena of Malaysia under the prime-ministership of Mahathir (see, e.g., Khoo; Hilley).

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To discuss the relationship between dialect and vernacular language and cultural identity in Taiwan literature means to inquire into the history of culture and the formations of literary language(s) in Taiwan. Taiwan is an island influenced by the cultures of Mainland China, as well as by that of invaders and colonizers throughout different periods of her history. For four hundred years before the rule of the Japanese and the Kuomintang (KMT), people of Taiwan — including the Holo and the Hakka — took Chinese as their written language while Taiwanese and Hakka were their main spoken dialects. The beginning of using local dialects to write poetry occurred in the 1920s when resistance against Japanese oppression coincided with the development of Taiwan consciousness. As Yang Tsun-han writes, the tendency of merging dialects with the development of an indigenous Taiwanese culture has receded when the KMT halted the developing of local literature and dialects by means of monopolizing media and education (56-89) and it is thus that Mandarin Chinese became the official standard for writing during Chiang Kai-shek's rule of Taiwan.

In cultural theory, the vernacular is recognized as a vehicle that provides for and preserves the wealth of folk traditions. The power of the vernacular, furthermore, is found in poetic traditions in both canonical and popular literature. In the English literary tradition, for example, Chaucer and literary ballads are found especially precious; the Celts used by the Irish as well as the dialects spoken on the Pacific Islands and African continents carry significant cultural meanings because the power of the word is inseparable from the poetry and the lives of the people. When a dialect is expressed in a certain written form, the words of the dialect that the writer used not only provide new colors to the work but also represent the soul of the local culture through the use of the sounds and rhythms that belong to the specific culture. To Summer Iive, the use of the vernacular or a dialect that is marginal is a kind of renewal of the language spoken by the people. According to her, when poets write in dialects, they have often been "acutely conscious that they were depicting something peculiar, something different from their own conception of the 'standard' language" (146). To Elizabeth C. Fine, the form of the language is not important, but "soul is," since the "soul" is embedded in the dialects (323-29). However, although the vernacular in dialects carries beauty and the essence of a certain culture, people are more daring by breaking the general rules and it is a difficult path to have it used in writing especially under political turmoil. Taiwan has a colonial history and the dialect used by the common people was discouraged in the period of Japanese colonization. The KMT discouraged the use of Taiwanese for at least two decades afterwards. The revival of the vernacular was seen in three stages. The first stage was initiated under the Japanese occupation when Taiwan intellectuals started reforming classical Han writing by arguing against traditional rhetoric. The protest was seen in Teng-chhong Ng's 1922 "Essay on the Mission of Vernacular Writing" (6-19) and Tsau-khim Ng's 1922 "Issue of Reforming the Classical Han writing" (25-31). The second stage was demonstrated through vernacular texts by Tsung-yuan and Hsiang Yang. With the cultural movement since 1980s, the vernacular Holo dialect, as well as the Hakka dialect has become a part of Taiwan cultural consciousness. Since the Holo dialect in written literature has been extensively explored, here I summarize the value of the vernacular recognized in the field of Western literary and cultural theory followed by an analysis of the use of the Hakka dialect in Taiwan vernacular poetry.

Thomas Bailey Aldrichis is a US-American poet of the late nineteenth century. As an immigrant to the United States he notes that people tend to take accents to represent menace and alien. In twentieth-century scholarship, Aldrichis's idea was shared by Homi Bhabha, Mary Louise Pratt, Ivan Illich, and many other scholars. According to Illich, the most notorious elimination of the languages of the colonized was in the age of discovery, when Isabella restored Iberian Peninsula from the Moors. Her courtier Elio
Antonio de Nebrija in 1492 proposed his *Gramática Castellana*, an institutional language policy, by "colonizing the language spoken by her own subjects; he wants her to replace the people's speech by the imposition of the queen's lengua — her language, her tongue" (89-121). Furthermore, he offers Isabella a tool to renew classical grammar and rhetoric. Nebrija wrote two books demonstrating his synthesis of languages and his purposes at the service of the queen's regime. Nebrija's proposal was not unlike that of Spencer when he reminded Queen Elizabeth I that the Irish were the descendants of the Scythians (i.e., barbarians) so that their language and customs had to be disciplined. The language policy under the nation-state political structure tended to eliminate the voice of the minorities. During the nineteenth century, however, when Romanticism promoted individualism and heterogeneity, Wordsworth preferred a selection of the spoken language (1-12) while MacDiarmid promoted the revival of the Scot vernacular. Perhaps Dante was the first European writer emphasizing the beauty of the Tuscan language and thus elevated the Tuscan vernacular to Italian. In his *De vulgari eloquentia* (1304), he expressed his favor of using his native language: by "vulgare illustre cardinale, aulicum et curiale" Dante referred to the vernacular as the more noble language: first, because the "illustrious" vernacular is the language originally used by the human race. It is natural and the "father" of the family, while the hegemonic language is, in contrast, artificial (see Spitzer 80-81).

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the vernacular is "the native language of a country or locality": The earliest recorded European vernacular literature is that written in the Irish language. As Ireland escaped absorption into the territory of Roman Empire, it began developing into a highly sophisticated ethnic literature with the bards and poets. Ireland hence self-fashioned her literature into prose and verses that record Gaelic ancient myths and sagas. In the wide range of Gaelic literary tradition, folksongs and poems on religious, political and geographical themes were involved with the heritage of Ireland (Ross 10). King Alfonso of Spain (1221-1284) was the first European monarch to use the vernacular as his chancery language. He ordered his scribes to study through Muslim and Christian books and transformed them into the vernacular. Before this time, any intellectual achievement besides Latin was not possible (Marquez 54). As Ward has found, scholarly work, as well as administrative material, court documents, laws and regulations, etc., in Europe before the fifteenth century was written in Latin, so the works written in a native language such as Italian or German were said to be in the vernacular. Thus, with the decline of Latin as a living language in the middle ages, new written forms of spoken vernacular languages developed. Although they were structurally loose and not elegant, written literature based on oral vernacular languages appealed to the common people. Furthermore, the similarity of these new written forms to spoken languages in everyday use allowed them to be easily assimilated so that the use of these vernacular languages rapidly expanded in all areas in European countries (Ward 88-91). In history, the rising of nationalism is always the reason why the authorities reinforced the dominant language. During the diminishing of national power, the formation of local culture emerges which in turn allows for the vernacular to obtain legitimization. However, when a dominant language and its uses are in power, differences in dialects can affect the quality of education received by some students both academically and socially (see Labov 82-96) and this is the case in contemporary times. Donna Christian, in her examination of vernacular dialects in US schools found that a child's dialect may interfere with the acquisition of information and with various educational skills such as reading and writing (43). William Labov suggests that the social consequences of belonging to a different dialect group may be more subtle, but are just as important. Thus, Donna suggests that "people who hear a vernacular dialect make erroneous assumptions about the speaker's intelligence, motivation, and even morality" (1). There is no wonder that most imperialist holds negative attitudes about dialects with the belief that vernacular dialects are linguistically "inferior" to standard versions of the language. Theoretically, language systems of various groups of
speakers may differ and in fact no single system is inherently better than any other. However, there is no denial that a unified language promotes communication while variations in language and multi-linguistic phenomenon only reflect cultural and community differences. Those who assimilate to the dominant culture will turn out to be easily fitted to the structures of the society. However, the tricky issue lies in the fact that the more one dominant language or culture is emphasized, the more dialects are degraded, neglected and marginalized. Only in a local cultural movement common people tend to reject the traditional culture and literature of the dominant culture.

Mark Jeffreys notes that in the Anglophone world some examples of writing in individual vernacular and dialect are many (196-205). They include William Barnes’s poems in the dialect of Dorset County (United Kingdom) and Tennyson’s Lincolnshire dialect poems, the texts of Hugh MacDiarmid (Scotland), Basil Bunting (Northumbria), E.K. Brathwaite (Barbados), and Melvin B. Tolson Harriet Mullen (USA) (196-205). The most important collections of dialect verse of poetry include W.J. Halliday’s *The White Rose Garland of Yorkshire Dialect Verse and Local Folklore Rhymes* and the collection *Westmoreland and Cumberland Dialects: Dialogues, Poems, Songs, and Ballads*, by Various Writers. Vernacular drama in Medieval times appealed to the public with the vernacular language of the people, while in the twentieth century, the indigenous drama employed the vernacular as their way to construct their identity. In recent years Tom Paulin’s poetry draws the attention from the public through his reflecting the political situation and cultural movement in Northern Ireland and the sectarian violences seen in his poetry and dramas. Mathew Hart thus comments that the value of synthetic vernacular poetry lies in the possibility of a new critical framework for the understanding of writing at the intersection of the vernacular and modernist traditions and in poetries of race, region, and nation that conform to neither established notions of dialectical authority or modernist cosmopolitanism (2-3). The most important criticism on vernacular and the dialect as found in literature is Norman Francis Blake's *Non-standard Language in English Literature*. His focus is the use of non-standard language as used by characters in literature (1-15).

Paralleling the development of dialect and vernacular literature in European languages, Taiwan has a similar phenomenon in cultural movement and the reaction against hegemonic forces. Chang Chun-huang, a woman author, has done a great deal in writing in Taiwan dialect and her pioneering work, *Zing zun e lo tuo* (Paths to Youth), is written in the local vernacular of Hakka. While Chang was not the first writer concerned with the use of Taiwan dialect in creative writing, her texts are perhaps most widely appreciated. The issue of the Taiwan dialect goes back to the 1920s when writing in Taiwan dialect became an important phenomenon with representatives such as Lai Ho, Lin Tsung Yuan, Hsiang Yang, Chiu Yi-fan, and Chen Rey-hsiang. The strategies for them to use dialect in writing poetry assisted the construction of a Taiwan cultural discourse, one that was shared by most of the Hakka writers. During the past twenty years when the Minnan dialect has been used by writers and discussed among scholars, the interest in incorporating the Hakka dialect in Taiwan writing emerged. This development represents a sensibility for the culture of Hakka and the importance of the collective memory of the Hakka. Hakka literature is defined today to include works by writers of any ethnicity who can demonstrate the Hakkian perspective or the Hakka dialect; the themes and motifs are not limited to those found in the Hakka communities of Taiwan; the core of the writings must be related to the Hakka dialect or the consciousness of the Hakka; historical perspectives are acceptable in demonstrating the essence of the Hakka (Huang Heng-chiu 2-4). In sum, Hakka literature refers to the writings containing the essence of Hakka history including their five waves of migration. Hakka poetry demonstrates in particular everyday lives in their tradition. The themes range from marriage, farming, and love to animals, political turmoil, diaspora, and the yearning for a Hakka identity. In the past one-hundred-years of Taiwan literary history, Hakka writers were a dominant group and among the most notable
writers we would list Chuo-liu Wu, Yin-chung Lung, Li-ho Chung, Chiao Li, Tieh-ming Chung, and Rey-chin Peng. Authors who write in the Hakka dialect poetry include Tu-P'an Fang-ko, Li Yu-fang, Huang Heng-chiu, Fan Wen-fang, and Yang Chen-dao. Huang Heng-chiu’s collection of poetry and the poems of Tu-P'an Fang-ko and Chang Fang-tse have drawn with their descriptions of Hakka life, their wish for future, their attitudes toward life much attention. Their intention to decode Hakka culture culminates the core of their cultural representations.

Representations of ordinary Hakka people are often seen in vernacular poetry. For example, in the poem "Ping-an Hsi" ("The Play of Peace"), the hardworking image and simple life of the Hakka people suggest that the Hakka are easily satisfied in material life and their humble expectation for peace is a recurrent theme. The hope of good fortune is expressed in Li Yu-fang's "Huan Fu" ("Retribution of Fortune"), in which the poet represents a picture of the New Year celebration when a family writes Chinese calligraphy on pieces of red paper and pastes them on the gate, doors, and the barns where the cattle is kept. The poem captures the image of a heritage conscious people who dedicate themselves to work and wish for a peaceful year. Another poem written in Hakka dialect is Chen Ning-kuei's "Hsin Ding" ("New Member") where the happy atmosphere of the family upon the birth of a new baby is described and how the baby as a new member of the family will bear the responsibilities and will help his parents to see through the future. The tone of the poem combines stoic wisdom with the toughness of the Hakka spirit. The Hakka, just as the Chinese word "Ke" meaning "guest," suggests, has a long history of migration including the period of the Wei-Chin dynasties when northern tribes invaded China to the most recent migration during the late Ming Dynasty (ca 1600-1644) or the early seventeen century when there was a high level of political unrest and as a consequence Hakka emigrated to southeastern Asian countries and some to Taiwan; thus the Hakka’s diasporic experience has become an important factor in their history and literature. Some of Taiwan’s leaders, for example Sun Yat-sen and Lee Denghui, are known for their Hakka bearings.

In order to illustrate the above referred to thematics in Hakka poetry, here is the example of a short poem about a new-born baby: the poem not only demonstrates the concerns of a group of culturally constructed people but also represents the internal bondage that commemorates the collective history of the Hakka: "A new member, / Is a pair of new eyes / which will see into the far future. / A new member, / Is a pair of fresh shoulders / which will bear the mission of the family" (Chen, "Webpage of Chen Ning-kuei"; unless indicated otherwise, all translations are mine). Chen compares the situation of the Hakka dialect to their situation as a people, one that "floats away from Formosa" because he perceives the Hakka people are getting fewer and thus the significance of the Hakka and the their culture’s meanings are destined to pass. Chen criticizes the political atmosphere in which it has been decided to engage in an aggressive construction of a homogeneous culture with the result that the assimilation policy of course deprives the Hakka of their capabilities to maintain their culture. While Chen did not claim that his views would be sacrosanct, his worries have been and are shared by many writers and intellectuals of his generation. For example, the problem of identity and the mother tongue is the theme of the following poem by Li Yu-fang through a cat: "Fewer and fewer people can identify / My birthplace. / Only with my ears, / I listen to my own murmur, / In order to prove that my tongue still exists. / In the southern homeland where egrets flutter, / People go on with their tongue, / Holding on to their dialect, / Singing their Hakka folk songs. / But there is no place where people can defend with anger and passion" ("Mao" ["Cat"] 327-28).

The poem was written in Mandarin Chinese; however, it narrates the sadness that the dialect of the speaker uses is fading away. In the dictatorial atmosphere of Taiwan before 1970s, speaking a minority dialect was identified with the notion of separation while Mandarin Chinese was identified as siding with the communist regime on the Mainland. As Tse Kwock-ping points out,
ethno-linguistic conflict is deliberately avoided by means of using English on some particular occasions (161). However, in terms of cultural discourse, questions of identity and issues of the diaspora are only a part of the collective voice of those who would fight for their mother tongue and culture. Dorothy Holland and Michael Cole point out that whenever discourse is mentioned, it is involved with the system through which people come to be self-administered because institutional treatment and interaction tend to be imposed upon people (481). Following from this, I argue that poems such as introduced above can be classified as ethno-poetic. On the one hand, these poems are unlike Han poetics that views itself as high culture of gracefulness and of grandeur in tone where the beauty of the sublime or the cultivated wordings and phrases convey the sophistication of learned poets. In contrast, vernacular poetry in Taiwan literature tends to be straightforward in tone and it carries the syntax of the local dialect. This kind of ethno-poetics represents poetic traditions which are typically seen as tribal or otherwise ethnic by choice of diction, figures of speech, imagery, and turns of phrases identifiable local. On the other hand, wordings such as "new member" and "a pair of fresh shoulders" reflect vernacular phrases used in the Hakka community.

Ethnopoetics, a term created by Jerome Rothenberg and Diane Rothenberg, is an aesthetic movement. Ethnopoetics signifies the revival of oral and ethnic traditions, although it refers to the study of the linguistic use and structure in oral narration, including poetry, prose narratives such as folk tales, ceremonial speeches, and other forms of similar texts (Symposium of the Whole 1-12). Although the poetry written in vernacular Hakka is still unlike the writings of the Cherokees or Hawaiian poetry, some elements in it do comprise collective cultural memory and some elements of collective cultural discourse. Ethnopoetics, as defined by the Rothenbergs, "refers to a redefinition of poetry in terms of cultural specifics, with an emphasis on those alternative traditions to which the West gave names like 'tribal,' 'oral,' and 'ethnic.' However, in its developed form, it moves toward an "exploration of creativity over the fullest human range" (xi). Ethnopoetics is involved with locality, but ethnopoetics also refers to the politics of difference:

The ethnopoetics that I knew was, first & last, the work of poets. Of a certain kind of poet. As such its mission was subversive, questioning the imperium even while growing out of it. Transforming. It was the work of individuals who found in multiplicity the cure for that conformity of thought, of spirit, that generality that robs us of our moments. That denies them to the world at large. A play between that otherness inside me & the identities imposed from outside. It is not ethnopoetics as a course of study — however much we wanted it-but as a course of action. "I" is an "other," then; becomes a world of others. It is a process of becoming. A collaging self is infinite and contradictory. It is "I" and "Not I." (Rothenberg 524)

The Rothenberg’s definition of ethnopoetics as an aesthetic movement to subvert conformity and politics of difference and the notion about the relationship between self and the other parallel Homi Bhabha’s idea of “locality” in the post-colonial dimension. Bhabha emphasizes that locality is an experience that depends on temporality rather than history (141). According to this, a nation needs repeated performative acts of narration that is based on the "scrap's, patches and rags of daily life" turned into prophetic signs of national identity. To sustain itself, we can extrapolate to the poetics of a daily renewed engagement with the conditions of a possible life (142). Hakka poetics is, indeed, about patches of life, patches of collective identity, and patches of cultural memory. It is through cultural discourse, however, the Hakka try to express themselves. Although the Hakka in Taiwan experienced migration, colonial resistance as the other local Taiwanese did, Hakka cultural consciousness is constructed upon the notion that under the threat of modernism and globalization ethnic identity is undergoing the process of degeneration. The fear of losing the mother tongue parallels the attempts to find a collective identity that involves with preserving the mother tongue. Tseng Kuei-hai, for example, writes: "The diasporic Asian tribe / Gave their lives to the dark and deep strait, / Arriving at the Pintong Plain of southern Taiwan / Speaking Hakka to the earth dike, cows, pigs and crops. / More than three
hundred years they guarded the land, / Being afraid that the sweat of the ancestors falls into the rivers" ("Liu Due Ke Chia Ren," Yuan-Hsiang Yieh-ho 69-70). When Tseng meditates on the cultural history of the Hakka, Li Yu-fang narrates how a young woman was married off:

My earrings dangling
Telling the feeling as I am married off my family.
Fingers with golden rings, signifying love,
Bracelets upon my right wrist,
Blessings embraced each ring.
Father bid me farewell with virtues of women
Aunt with one sentence,
Told me not to forget the words of the forefathers
A hazy veil hung on my head
But I could read with my heart
The long rules of the tradition.

Behind the cart that carries the bride
I would cherish the water that was poured off.
A paper fan flew off my hand to the groud.
My mother picked it up, fanning herself
And uttered four lines,
Wishing me to be cherished by parents-in-law
and bear children soon. ("Chia" ["Being Married"],<http://www.hakka.bravehost.com/hakkapoet.htm#5>)

The above is a first-person narrative poem about a bride on her wedding day. With her dangling earrings and shining bracelets, she is showered by blessings and words that remind her of her duties and women's virtues to follow. With the ritual of the splashed water, she becomes a member of her new family, and she follows the ritual of throwing off the paper fan that symbolizes separation. The mixture of rituals and ceremonies that the bride goes through foreshadow the hardships to come. The poem reflects on Hakka women who in the past embodied hard working, humbleness, and devotion. Dialect writing may represent heterogeneity in a community but it may suggest competitive forces that construct the differences between a dominant language and the dialect. Just as most dialect literature writers note that under the education of dominant culture, when there is an urge to write, it is to write in traditional Chinese. In this sense, dialect writing becomes a kind of aesthetic experimentation that forms its own particular cultural discourse. However, these dialect and vernacular poems may also suggest inadequate forms as compared to the more elegant and refined traditional literary texts. However, as Larry McCauley has pointed out that the function of dialect literature is to preserve disappearing elements of the nation's linguistic heritage and to provide a historical view about multi-cultural phenomenon (290), this is precisely what Hakka poetry is intended for. Examining the study on Victorian dialect in England, McCauley notes that "Early in the century, study of the vernacular was essentially antiquarian; its aims were to preserve disappearing elements of the nation's linguistic heritage, both for posterity's sake and as an adjunct to literary study. With the rise of comparative philology at mid-century, however, dialects came to be granted more than mere historical significance or perhaps historical significance of a different nature" (290). Similarly, in Hakka poetics, Hakka culture and its local color provide not only regional cultural heritage but also an opportunity for both the tradition bearers and common readers to understand another part of existing culture. The reconstruction of the Hakka memory of the past and the representation of modernity in the community, Hakka poetics finds a path for fashioning its own cultural identity.

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Language Experiments and Subjectivity in Modern Taiwan Literature

Yu-Lin Lee

Introduction

In the history of Taiwan, translingual practice has been one of the primary features of modern Taiwan literature. In his essay "One Hundred Years of Taiwanese Literature and Styles," Chen Fang-ming addresses the linguistic "dislocation" in modern Taiwanese literary practice, which reveals consequently particular literary "styles" (44-55). Speaking historically, Taiwan writers were constantly caught in the dilemma of choosing a language for their literary practice. When Japan occupied Taiwan in 1895, it adopted assimilation as its primary colonial policy in which language education and cultural assimilation were emphasized overwhelmingly. As Patricia E. Tsurumi remarks, a "segment of traditional China" was forced to be transformed into "an integral part of modern Japan" (11). Consequently, local classical Chinese literary circles withered away and the new generation began to adopt Japanese as the medium in their literary production. Prior to World War II, with the intensification of the imperialization (kominka) movement, the circulation of Chinese was totally banned. And yet when the Kuomintang (KMT) took over Taiwan after the war, history repeated itself. Except for Mandarin Chinese, which has been the only official language on the island since then, other languages including Japanese and local tongues were silenced. Given this historical background and language experience, a particular way of literary expression in modern Taiwan literature has resulted in which multiple languages are combined, mixed, and synthesized.

In the present study, I explore this particular linguistic style, recognizing it as a form of cross-writing in which writers cross linguistic boundaries in seeking ways of expression. I argue that translingual practice in writing connects and traverses boundaries of linguistic and cultural realms and informs, accordingly, a process...
of deformation, transformation, and becoming. Concurrently, translingual practice in writing forms an opening process of creation that provokes a new literature. This paper highlights the crossing of linguistic boundaries, a liminal writing space occupied by polyglot writers, whom I call "linguistic nomads." First, I examine various linguistic experiments in modern Taiwan literary history according to different historical periods and second, I introduce the concept of the nomad following Gilles Deleuze's and Félix Guattari's concept of nomadism and relate it to the subject in cross-writing. I argue that translingual practice in Taiwan literary production not only depicts an alternative history that emphasizes hybridity and multiplicity, as evidenced by literary texts, but also signifies the transformative force that induces literary creation in the local context.

**Varieties of Language Experiments in Modern Taiwan Literary History**

Known as the “father” of New Taiwan Literature in local nativist discourse, Lai Ho (1894-1943) inaugurated a new literature that centered on local people and affairs, which was accomplished through the use of native language. His insistence on the use of native tongue — i.e., vernacular Taiwanese — in his composition led consequently in his writing to reflect a hybrid linguistic mixture of language. Despite the distinction between the intentional / conscious and unintentional / unconscious hybrid, as M.M. Bakhtin deliberates in his theory of novelist discourse, Lai's particular linguistic form displays not merely a mixture of multiple languages, but also demonstrates an effort to mold a new language "in the light of another language" (362). The former case may be seen as a historical result of the development of a language; the latter, however, registers Lai's literary mode and style. It is acknowledged that Lai's writing consists of a process of translation from Classical Chinese to vernacular Chinese and then to vernacular Taiwanese. Alongside Japanese words that would symbolize the modern world, vocabularies, syntactic structure, and grammar of the local tongue are embedded — intentionally or incidentally — in the narrative inscribed by Chinese, the dominant language in the early stages of Japanese occupation. Critics have pointed out the various degrees of influence of the Chinese language, including classical and vernacular, in the different stages of Lai's literary career (for further discussion of this, see Chen Chien-chung 234-50).

Not surprisingly, Lai's hybrid linguistic form of writing displays traces of translation (on this, see Wang Chen-hua 116-17). The composition and recognizes it as a companion to his life experience of fighting imperialist colonialism: "In composition, he had to translate classical Chinese into colloquial words, and then [into vernacular Taiwanese], until they stood independently on their own" (11). Shih argues that Lai's composition implies "a reversal of translation," "a psychological reversal of historical and social conflict," which "reflected his personal tragedy" (11). His literary taste and aesthetic concepts were molded by Classical Chinese literary canons and he strived to create a new one by disrupting this continuity by way of translation. For Lai, the struggle for language was not simply the difficulty of translating words from one language into another, but also the process of transporting and appropriating literary canons in a new literary field.

We should note that Lai was a medical practitioner, a modern intellectual trained in scientific knowledge in the Japanese educational system. Given the socio-political environment of the time when the Japanese colonial policy of assimilation was carried out through the enforcement of imperial Japanese language, the use of a local tongue took on an anti-colonialist character. By his seemingly infeasible practice of the native tongue, Lai heralded the plight and predicament of using language in the face of colonialism. And in his attempt to catch the aura of a new age and depict lives of ordinary local people, Lai experienced inevitably a process of self-translation, which resulted in a hybrid mixture of multiple languages. Alongside Japanese words that would symbolize the modern world, vocabularies, syntactic structure, and grammar of the local tongue are embedded — intentionally or incidentally — in the narrative inscribed by Chinese, the dominant language in the early stages of Japanese occupation. Critics have pointed out the various degrees of influence of the Chinese language, including classical and vernacular, in the different stages of Lai's literary career (for further discussion of this, see Chen Chien-chung 234-50).
following excerpt is from Lai's short story "Ru" ("Disgrace"), one of Lai's early texts:

It is the next day of the birthday of the Birth-Blessing Goddess, plus the birthday of the Sun Princess, the field theater has lasted for three days. The daytime performance has ended. The sun has gradually dropped into the sea. A dried soybean peddler drags his voice, coming out from a small lane; few cubes are left in his loads. A tofu peddler has returned from the end of the market; few are left also. The power company has delivered electricity. Street lights are on now, but they seem dim due to shining sunset clouds. Lights on the stage are not yet on. Food vendors alongside the road are not ready for the night market yet; they squat by the stall, having their dinners. It is still early for the nighttime performance, but from the stage to the front yard of the temple has already been filled by benches and stools for occupying the seats. Some kids who came earlier stay in their seats they previously occupied, having sugarcane and ice sticks, laughing and fighting. Some are throwing sugarcane dregs at one another; some are grabbing and hitting one another for better seats; some boys are flirting with girls. These activities on the ground yard are even more boisterous and funny than those on the stage. (91; unless indicated otherwise, all translations are mine)

The English translation disguises the quality of hybrid linguistic mixture available in the original text. In the original passage, readers would observe that local vocabularies (chhit-niû-má "Birth-Blessing Goddess," j...t-hî "daytime performance," soah-k̓ "has ended," j...t-thâu "the sun," tiân-hóe-kiõk "the power company," tà°-á-kha "stall," biö-kháu "front yard of the temple," peng-ki "ice stick," i-liâu "benches," i-thâu-á "stools") are embedded in the narrative; syntactic structures (bô-chhun-kúi-tè "few cubs were left," tò-t¡g--lâi "has returned," pâi-bô-kúi-tè "few are left") and grammar patterns of the local tongue (ü iöng kam-chia-phoh sio tàn--ê "some kids are throwing sugarcane dregs at one another," ü in-üi cheⁿ üi-á khiú heng-khám sio phah--ê "some are grabbing and hitting one another for better seats," ü cha-p°-gin-á teh thiau-láng cha-b°-gin-á--ê "some boys are flirting with girls") are also appropriated in the seeming "Chinese" writing. By mixing these local vocabularies and syntax, transcribed in Chinese characters and embedded in a Chinese narrative, Lai actually invents a new form of language, a new writing system which can no longer be recognized as either classical Chinese or vernacular Chinese. The hybrid mixture of multi-languages marks the primary characteristic of this new form of literary expression. I argue that these local vocabularies and syntax that suggest local essence should not be understood as an "impure" narrative or as "remnants" in the process of translation. On the contrary, in the scope of cross-writing, they should be regarded as vital ingredients that mark the peculiar style of Lai's writing. These ingredients, although transcribed as Chinese characters, distinguish themselves from Chinese and cause a certain degree of alienation for Chinese readers. In such a seemingly Chinese narrative, the intervention of the local tongue and Japanese violates the regulation of Chinese and disrupts chains of signification in the Chinese narrative. The violation, as indicated, is not merely a simple linguistic amalgamation but also grammatical intrusion. As a result, a new language is born and a new semiotic system is formulated. It is from this perspective that Lai invented a new linguistic form of expression and inaugurated a new literature. To put it more precisely, vocabularies and syntax of Chinese, Japanese, and Taiwanese, along with their linguistic significations and cultural connotations, depart from their original semiotic systems and conjoin in a linguistic sphere composed of previous linguistic elements through a process of deforming and transforming. This new semiotic system, albeit one that still subsists on previous significations, invents regulations and institutions of its own.

Many critics have treated the hybrid linguistic quality of Lai's vernacular writing either as an alternative project to preserve Chinese characters in the face of Japanese assimilation or as a literary exercise responsible for the rise of Taiwan cultural nationalism with a distinct Taiwan identity (see, e.g., Chen Chien-chung 246). Also, Lai's vernacular writing should be understood in the context of the contemporary literary environment where the "social realist" aesthetic prevails and the yen-wen yi-chih ideology of writing dominates: the former maintains that the primary ends
of literature are to voice concerns about the local and to serve the masses and the latter advocates a language reform that seeks the unification of the spoken and written languages. The promotion of the "social realist" aesthetic is known as the *hsiang-tu* literary movement in the local context and it considers *yen-wen yi-chih* its indispensable vehicle. Initially, *yen-wen yi-chih* was promoted, for the most part, as a movement to popularize the vernacular and to publicize a new writing style by employing colloquial Taiwanese in place of Chinese writing, for the latter had been criticized as a "dead" language and literature. Due to the fact that a system of written Taiwanese had not been well developed by that time, the effort of the movement was eventually directed toward the reform of the Taiwanese written language. Except in its primary purpose of establishing the "correspondence" between the spoken and written languages, *yen-wen yi-chih* in fact advocates a phonocentric ideology that gives priority to the spoken language and regards writing as subordinate to speech; also, it preaches a "realistic" aesthetic that aims at "truthful" presentation of sounds and emotions of the local masses. To most Taiwan writers during that time, Mandarin, like Japanese, represented a borrowed tongue. *Yen-wen yi-chih* has denied Chinese writing — a borrowed written form — for the writing of local literature; the debate on the reform of the Taiwanese writing system has centered on the issue of whether or not Chinese characters should be abandoned.

Lai's experiment with vernacular writing embodies the linguistic and writing ideology of *yen-wen yi-chih*; it aims to record lives of local ordinary people with recourse to the manipulation of the local tongue. As mentioned above, *yen-wen yi-chih* is not merely a linguistic reform that demands a new writing system; it is also a revolutionary writing ideology that advocates the priority of local speech and "realistic" presentation. In a sense, Lai's mixed linguistic form of writing reveals that the reconstruction of the Taiwanese language is not through a total "abrogation" of Chinese characters, but, rather, an "appropriation" of Chinese writing. From the perspective of cross-writing, Lai's vernacular writing inscribes emitted linguistic flows that move among multiple linguistic and cultural realms, and in so doing, it heralds a linguistic and literary revolution in which linguistic elements are forced to escape from their previous semiotic systems, forming a new linguistic terrain and new aesthetic principles. Such linguistic transformation and aesthetic revolution is of course accomplished through the intervention of the local tongue endorsed by the phonocentric ideology of *yen-wen yi-chih*.

**Taiwan's Japanese Writing as a Hybrid Form of Colonial Translation**

As mentioned above, as an effect of Japanese assimilation and imperialization, young Taiwan writers were forced to choose Japanese as the medium of literary production. In fact, their texts possess great aesthetic quality and have received high praise from Japanese literary circles. What is more intriguing is that Taiwan-Japanese writing during the colonial period presents a very different linguistic landscape, one where a migration of signs takes place. Signs alongside their significations detach from their previous language systems — i.e., Chinese and the local tongues — and enter the linguistic domain of Japanese and such traces of the migration of signs are evident in the bulk of Taiwan's Japanese writing. They appear in various ways. Mostly, Chinese and local vocabularies are disguised as "Japanese" in the narrative. Here are examples from a short story by Long Ying-tsung, "papaiay no aru michi" (1) ("A Town of Papaya Trees") "The street is filthy and aged; the wood-pillars under *teishikyaku* [a particular style of Taiwan architecture similar to Japanese *kairō*] appear smoky and shaky because of being eaten by termites. To block strong sunlight, in front of the door of each shop hangs a big cloth screen on which such names of shops as *rōgōsei* and *kinyasukazu* are printed with bold strokes" (Nakajima and Kawahara 11); 2) *zubon* "black pants," *wonna* "woman" (Nakajima and Kawahara 15); 3) *heikin* (similar to the Japanese *yuinōkin*, but for the islanders it means marriage trade) (Nakajima and Kawahara 21); and 4) "Hey, you" (it corresponds to the Japanese word *kimi*, but it might sound
disdainful to the islanders) (Nakajima and Kawahara 26).

In these passages, one may observe that to translate the local essence, local vocabularies (teishikyaku, for example) are retained and disguised as "Japanese" words woven into Japanese sentences, and mostly, followed by Japanese interpretative "translations." This is not an exception, but a common strategy for Taiwan-Japanese writing during the time. These local vocabularies, with their local essence and cultural implications, resist being translated in the process of wiring. These quasi-Japanese words often appear as kanji (Chinese characters) followed by corresponding Japanese interpretative translations and in most cases they appear as a bizarre combination of kanji and kana notation (both katakana and hiragana are used and function differently). As one may argue, the interpretative "translations" cannot be recognized as a form of translation proper; it is "intra-lingual translation" or "rewording" in the same language rather than "interlingual translation" or "translation proper," following Roman Jakobson (114). Likewise, the hiragana cannot be recognized as a "real translation" in a rigid sense, not simply because a proper name or signifier cannot be transported from one language system into another, but also because of the juxtaposition of the original and translation. In addition, one may argue that in its expression, kanji serves as a common ground that makes possible the communication among these different languages. Kana is added on the top and functions as a pronunciation sign; mostly, hiragana is for the Japanese pronunciation (zubon, wonna, heikin) and katakana, by contrast, indicates the sound of the original language (li).

Such Japanese writing can be seen as a particular form of colonial translation. In her book, Japanese Literature and Taiwan, Lee Yu-hui has looked into such a particular form of expression adopted by Taiwanese subjects and that she characterizes as "abstract translation," an inner, self-translating process which inevitably occurs in the writing by the colonial subjects who write in a non-native language (183, 205). According to Lee, in some cases, the added hiragana has to function as a translation for the communication between the original and translation. As in example 2) above, local vocabularies such as zubon ("black pants") or wonna ("woman") are retained as kanji, in which hiragana serves as a translation. And it is in such a connotation that one can observe the function of hiragana as translation, although the act of translation employed by kana must be exercised by the Japanese reader. However, in other cases, the translation procedure is reversed. As in example 4), katakana is applied and still functions as a role of translation and yet the particular use of katakana reverses the direction of the translation process. The kanji can be regarded as a translation (Japanese) since the word was legible to most educated Japanese readers of that time and the katakana above kanji indicates the sound of the original language (a local vocabulary). In reading, the reader will experience a "reverse" process of translation, from translation to the original, from the empire to the local. And such a reversal of translation is of course made possible by the juxtaposition of the original and translation, and more importantly, "the untranslatable" in the process of translation, as recorded in the kanji-kana connotation.

What interests us most is the "mixed, hybrid" nature of such kanji-kana notation (see Lee 201). The juxtaposition of the original and translation makes the kanji-kana connotation half Japanese and half local tongue. The connotation is the Japanese translation and yet it always signifies back to the original. Kana (both hiragana and katakana) functions as both an act and representation of translation, thus making possible the communication between the original and translation. The kanji-kana connotation is a contingent, provisional combination of the two different systems of signification, which permits the oscillation between the translatable and untranslatable across difference. From the perspective of cross-writing, local vocabularies, disguised as Japanese, are woven into a Japanese narrative and yet still subsist on significations and institutions of the original. In a similar way, kana, as a form of Japanese, must function as a translation by indicating the pronunciation of either Japanese or the local tongue. The "difference" inherent in Taiwan colonial translation appears as a form of cross-writing, a hybrid form of linguistic topography in
which linguistic boundaries never cease shifting in a virtual field made possible by a line of continuous linguistic variations. In these cases, new ways of expression are being sought out and new significations are being invented in the continuous changing of linguistic boundaries.

The bulk of Taiwan's Japanese literature has often been recognized as a repertoire of the inscription of Taiwan colonial subjectivity and cultural difference under Japanese occupation. The writing thus becomes the very space of its own elaboration since the Japanese colonial discourse has imposed the colonizers' language and deployed its significations through the dominant forces of assimilation and acculturation. The writing also reflects the ultimate paradox of the colonized, the paradox of having to write in the colonizers' language. Albert Memmi has described such a "colonial bilingual" as a "stranger" as he/she remains "exiled" in a linguistic realm of not his/her own (106-07). In addition, this paradox of colonial bilingualism echoes Homi Bhabha's claim that the space of writing is a space of both "splitting" and "doubling" since adoption of a masters tongue makes the subject become native and stranger, self and other at the same time (44). To the extent that the writing subject is trapped in-between languages and discourses, Taiwan-Japanese writers remain exiled in their writing. They travel as foreigners in two separate linguistic and cultural domains, bringing up the sense of linguistic and cultural withdrawal that Memmi has termed "foreignness" (107). This is precisely the dilemma faced by the colonial subject in the construction of identity through the colonizers' language. Paradoxically, in such separations from self, language, and discourse, the colonial subjects create for themselves a valid and coherent sense of identity. In other words, the writing in the masters' tongue enables the colonial subjects to inscribe subjectivity through rewriting the established codes of self and other. This is the power that Bill Ashcroft and others have ascribed to the practice of (post)colonial wiring, namely "a radical subversion of the meanings of the masters' tongue" (146).

Thus, for Taiwan Japanese writers, the splitting and doubling of writing space is also a space of both "destruction" and "creation." Haunted by the paradox of having to write in the colonizers' tongue and driven by a sense of exile, Taiwan-Japanese writers understand well that the masters' tongue provides the means for writing and eventual subversion as well. Viewed in this light, the hybrid form of colonial translation presents a linguistic experience that makes possible the rewriting and subversion of the discursive framework of oppression from the very space of its own elaboration. And yet, the crossing of different linguistic and cultural domains always implies something missing and yet something gained. The migration of linguistic signs and significations, which always move toward a new linguistic and aesthetic domain unknown, reveals the author's effort to rewrite the established codes of self and other, and consequently, to constitute their own history of subjectivity. By interrupting and subverting the standard and regulations of the Japanese language, the Taiwan writers relocate the implementation of the Japanese colonial discourse and re-examine the effect of the Japanese assimilation and imperialism.

**Wang Chen-ho and Heteroglossia**

In the genealogy of Taiwan cross-writing, local writers during the Japanese colonial period, including Lai and contemporary Japanese authors, depict linguistic flows that have escaped from their previous semiotic systems and resided in a new linguist terrain, which results in a new form of literary expression. In their writings, one may observe a continuous shifting of language boundaries in which linguistic flows are blocked, limited, compartmentalized, regulated, reorganized, and recoded in a new linguistic territory. The tendency of such linguistic flows is no doubt challenged and influenced by social change and political force, and that is vividly evidenced by the writing of Wang Chen-ho in postwar Taiwan in the face of neo-colonialism. The renowned Taiwan writer has been known for blending heterogeneous languages in writing, in which
the flow of dominant Mandarin, including its rhythm, syntax, semantics, and signification, is constantly disrupted and changed by such languages as Japanese, English, Min, Hakka dialects, and aboriginal languages. The hybrid nature of Wang's linguistic style is evident, and a great many comments have been made on Wang's peculiar use of languages under a certain social and political circumstance. For example, Chiu Kuei-fen, from a postcolonial standpoint, uses "heteroglossia," a literary term borrowed from Bakhtin (to indicate "the diversity of speech types" which permits "a multiplicity of social voices and a wide variety of their links and interrelationships" inherent in the novel as a genre [263]), to indicate the quality of multi-voices and the potential linguistic counter-force inherent in Wang's blending of multiple languages (181). Chiu underscores the dialogized and social-ideological aspect of the term and recognizes "parodic stylization" in Wang's language, particularly in Meikui Meikui woaini (Rose, Rose, I Love You), as a form of heteroglossia in the novel. Heteroglossia, in this sense, pertains to Bakhtin's idea of the carnivalesque, which he discovers in Rabelais's world, whose "emphatic and purposeful heteroglossia" and "multiplicity of styles" appear opposed to the "official" language (Pomorska x). It is in the same vein that Chiu ascribes the potential for overcoming the dominant language in the given context to Wang's linguistic manipulation. Bakhtin postulates the opposition between "unitary language" and heteroglossia, the poetic genres and the novel. He argues that "every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear" (272). That is to say, "the process of centralization and decentralization, of unification and disunification intersect in the utterance" (272). Seen in this light, it would be interesting to observe the active participation of the utterance in heteroglossia that determines Wang's writing style, in which he cuts, splices, and synthesizes heterogeneous linguistic elements: "When Wan-fa came home from his carting job he would go to the ryoriten* for a good meal. He had finally come to own his own ox and cart. With his oxcart he got as much as thirty dollars for a hauling job. Things are going rather well for him, of late. Compared with the past, one might say the present was quite comfortable for Wan-fa. He no longer needed to support his family, so he could spend everything he earned on himself. And this after being released from prison! He had not expected it, certainly. It was strange, was it not?" (Wang, "An Oxcart for Dowry" 75). In this passage, English readers would not be aware of the mixture of multi-languages and its effect. In the original passage, a large number of local vocabulary and Japanese words are embedded in the Chinese narrative, in which neologisms, arabesques, and circumlocutions are widely used. In addition, plenty of classical vocabularies, rare words, abstruse words, newly coined words, short segments, fragmented phrases, and wrongly put punctuations are added to a series of syntactic and grammatical errors. These fragmented phrases, syntactic hybrids, and grammatical "errors" deviate from standard usage. Bakhtin has emphasized the power of disruption and the "decentralizing, centrifugal forces" inherent in the heteroglossia of the novel (The Dialogic Imagination 273). I would further argue that these fragmented phrases and syntactic hybrids, whereby Wang "deterritorializes" language, not only bring freshness to Mandarin Chinese, but they also introduce transformative forces that induce vibration and disequilibrium in Mandarin. In other words, by cutting and splicing words and phrases, blocking and redirecting linguistic flows, alongside the use of neologisms, arabesques, circumlocutions, among others, Wangs linguistic experiment pushes linguistic flows to go beyond the limit of language boundaries. Consequently, linguistic elements that have been forced to depart from their original designations reside in new linguistic terrain, forming new regulations and institutions. Many scholars and critics have pointed out the linguistic and cultural significance of Wang's frequent crossing of linguistic boundaries. Thus, such linguistic hybridization, often ironically, conveys political, social, and cultural implications. As Hsiao Jin-mian notes, they are expressed through the particular use of quasi-homonym or pidgin English, such as Meijun jiushi mejin ("American Army is American money"), Neixin duei neisin, pigu
duei pigu ("Nation to Nation, People to People"), Mani jishi danichusi ya ("My name is Patricia") (266). In fact, Wang constantly travels and transverses in-between multiple languages, whose tension manifests itself in his highly syntactical hybrids. This quality appears in his earlier texts such as "An Oxcart for Dowry" and "Hsiao Lin Comes to Visit Taipei" and in his later works, including Portrait of Beauties (Portrait of Americans) and Rose, Rose, I Love You we find more intensive and extensive operation of such a narrative strategy. Such mixture of languages is primarily, yet not exclusively, between Mandarin and Taiwanese, Mandarin and English, Taiwanese and English, Mandarin and Japanese, Taiwanese and Japanese, and English and Japanese. The crossing of language boundaries forces linguistic elements to detach from their original semiotic systems and enter absolute deterritorialization, a linguistic terrain in which words are deprived of signification and become multiple circuits of intensities. The process of deterritorialization, however, is immediately followed by a process of reterritorialization through which a new semiotic system is formed. The process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization thus constitutes a process of linguistic transformation. Seen in this light, the hybridization of heterogeneous languages becomes for Wang a convenient, if not indispensable, strategy to violate regular semantic patterns and grammatical structures of Mandarin Chinese and to invent the line of continuous linguistic variation that formulates a new semiotic system.

Deleuze and Guattari, the first characteristic of minor literature is that "in it language is affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization" (Kafka 16). Ronald Bogue remarks that "central to the concept of minor literature is a particular use of language, a way of deterritorializing language by intensifying features already within it" (Deleuze on Literature 91). Thus, following Deleuze's and Guattari's concept of minor literature, understood as an effect of deterritorialization of language from within, Wang's employment of fragmented phrases, syntactic hybrids, and grammatical "errors" may exemplify the "minor" utilization of language, as these elements tend to intensify the inherent features of Chinese writing and deterritorialize the language itself by continuously violating its standard usage and regular patterns (the major usage).

Deleuze and Guattari designate a production of minor literature by means of a minor use of the major language: "To be a foreigner, but in one's own tongue, not only when speaking a language other than one's own. To be bilingual, multilingual, but in one and the same language, without even a dialect or patois" (A Thousand Plateaus 98). This does not mean to speak a language other than ones own, rather, to speak in ones language like a foreigner: "Multilingualism is not merely the property of several systems each of which would be homogeneous in itself: it is primarily the line of flight or of variation which affects each system by stopping it from being homogeneous" (Deleuze and Parnet 4). From this perspective, with his idiosyncratic writing style characterized by the intermingling of heterogeneous language, Wang has invented his own bilingualism and multilingualism in the language he has created. As a result, his writing is not merely a vivid presentation of the subaltern languages of contemporary Taiwan society that accounts for his satirical comedy, it is also an excellent exemplification of "minor" usage of language, whereby the author invents his own means of escaping from the "major" usage of the dominant language. And in these unexpected traces of the line of continuous linguistic variation in Wang's stylistic writing, one witnesses a transforming process of a developing literary canon inaugurated by a complex linguistic experiment.
The socio-political dimension of Wang's mixture of multi-languages is frequently emphasized. Chiu Kuei-fen's postcolonial view of Wang's "heteroglossia" on the one hand embodies the linguistic experience of Taiwan subjects under colonialism and on the other hand registers the potential of subverting the privileged status of the dominant language. Such views are also informed by the fact that linguistic manipulation is also a socio-political act. As Chiu comments, "Wang's hybrid linguistic form is actually a political gesture" (182). Wang's linguistic experiment, whose multilingualism induces vibration and disequilibrium within Mandarin Chinese and forms new regulations and institutions in turn, becomes a social practice and a political event with a potential to shape new social relations and political order.

Nomadism and the Subject

The crossing of heterogeneous linguistic boundaries — as heralded by Lai's vernacular writing, Taiwan Japanese writing, and Wang's heteroglossia — informs limits of linguistic and cultural realms and renders a moment of displacement. In Lai's texts the use for the intervention of the local tongue breaks the original signification chains of Chinese writing and forces escaped linguistic elements to flow and to compose a new semiotic system. In the hybrid form of Taiwan colonial translation, the "untranslatable" local vocabulary creates ruptures in the representation of translation, announcing "difference" inherent in this particular form of writing. In his blending heterogeneous languages, Wang "determinitorializes" the language itself by continuously violating its standard usage and regular patterns from within. "Determinitorialization" in this sense becomes the term for the displacement of language and subjectivity. Borrowing the term "determinitorialization" from Deleuze and Guattari, Caren Kaplan locates the mode of displacement in language and literature: "In one sense, it describes the effects of radical distanciation between signifier and signified. Meanings and utterance therefore become estranged. This defamiliarization enables imagination, even as it produces alienation" (188). Kaplan further relates the paradoxical nature of the moment in displacement to Deleuze's and Guattari's concept of minor language and literature: the writing "travels, moves between centers and margins ... this process ... [is] both determinitorialization and reterritorialization — not imperialism but nomadism" (358-59).

Deleuze and Guattari define nomadism through a complex concept of "smooth space." In their discussion, "smooth space" is frequently opposed to "striated space," whose opposition seems easy to comprehend. As Bogue explains, "smooth space is space undivided and unmeasured, whereas striated space is crisscrossed with grids of dividing and measuring lines" ("Nomadic Flows" 14). However, the distinction is not as evident as it might appear initially. As Bogue summarizes, first, they are not necessarily two separate spaces, but "exist in fact in mixtures of one another"; second, the distinction is not strictly spatial and can be extended to "such figurative spaces as music, art, and mathematics"; third, and most significantly, the terms "smooth and striated describe not simply space per se, but also ways of inhabiting and using space, and in this sense, ways of creating a smooth space or a striated space" ("Nomadic Flows" 14; emphasis in the original). Thus, the difference between smooth space and striated space depends not only on their different modes of composition but also on different ways of inhabiting space. And nomadism refers to the composition and creation of smooth space.

The notion of nomadism is essential here because it permits the discussion of language in a deterriorialized space, a "smooth space" free of linguistic limits and regulations. Rather than assuming a hierarchy of power and political opposition among languages, nomadism centers on the flows of dispersed linguistic signs that indicate the line of flight escaping from structured semiotic systems. Nomadism envisions an extensive "space" where linguistic signs encounter and relate to one another, defining the transformation of language boundaries. The language of flows is thus salutary here because it encourages an empirical analysis of the interconnection and interchange of various linguistic signs and semiotic elements. Therefore, the space of cross-writing becomes a
linguistic site, composed by lines of transit and transgression. From this perspective, the genealogy of Taiwan cross-writing demonstrates a map or diagram of the constant shift of language boundaries where the authors travel and transverse with a pack of signs. And, of course, the deterritorialization of language is accompanied by a process of reterritorialization whereby "striated space" is measured where linguistic power hierarchy is established and semiotic system is structured.

Such nomadic aesthetics should not be confused with those of exile, migrant, and postcolonial literatures. On this issue Rosi Braidotti provides insight into the nature of these genres. According to Braidotti, exile literature, based on "an acute sense of foreignness, coupled with the often hostile perception of the host country," is "marked by a sense of loss or separation" (24). On the other hand, migrant literature, "caught in an in-between state," is about "missing, nostalgia, and blocked horizons," in which "the past acts as a burden" (24). In postcolonial literature, as juxtaposed to the migrant genre, the sense of home or culture of origin is being activated and conditioned by the host culture, and the memory of the past participates in the living experience. Braidotti states that "the ethical impulse that sustains the postcolonial mode makes the original into living experience, one that functions as a standard of reference" (25). The nomadic aesthetic, by contrast, aims neither at homeless sentiment nor at compulsive displacement, neither at nostalgia for the past nor at subversion of the master; rather, it is an active, continuous momentum toward the unknown. The nomadic consciousness, for Braidotti, is akin to Michel Foucault's idea of "counter memory," "a form of resisting assimilation or homologation into dominant ways of representing the self" (25).

In the scope of nomadism, Taiwan cross-writing obtains a more positive and creative reading. In it linguistic boundaries collapse and blur. Linguistic elements emitted from heterogeneous semiotic systems appear approximately and contact directly. Therefore, the reminder in the process of translation that characterizes Lai's composition as a form of cross-writing should be taken seriously. They should not simply be recognized as marks of rhetorical strategy that aim to preserve the local spirit and memory, but rather as positive linguistic ingredients that help mold new aesthetic ideology and modern society. In Deleuze's and Guattari's concept, these heterogeneous elements preserve linguistic multiplicities that are engaged in an ongoing literary and cultural transformation process. Likewise, local vocabulary embedded in Japanese translation is not simply historical residue or frozen memory that provokes nostalgia, but active substance that sustains identity with reference to the other. Wang's efforts are always directed toward creating a minor literature, which mostly relies on deterritorializing the language from within and pushing linguistic elements beyond their limit. The production of minor literature emphasizes the line of flight, which is also a line of becoming, of escaping from history and of constant socio-cultural transformation. In this regard, nomadic linguistic flows in Taiwan cross-writing always encourage a literary and cultural invention based on the local, while avoiding preaching an authentic identity and promoting indiscriminate hybridization.

Consequently, authors who constantly move in between languages and write in the interstices of semiotic systems gain a different name. They are no longer "strangers" but "nomads." The figure of the nomad, as opposed to the exile, allows us to think of the dispersion and dissemination of signs in the linguistic terrain, not only based on the hegemonic model but also as forms of resistance to "the stable, the eternal, the identical and the constant" (Kaplan 189). The authors are bilingual and multilingual in the language that they have created. They are polyglots, whom Braidotti calls "linguistic nomads" (8). The linguistic nomads, being in between languages, have no vernacular. And yet, they constitute "a vantage point in deconstructing identity" (Braidotti 12). It is precisely at this vantage point that local Taiwan writers are allowed to inscribe their own history of subjectivity by way of deconstructing the dominant mode. More significantly, linguistic nomads are on the margins as "nomadic thinking is a minority position" (Braidotti 29). Viewed in this light, the performative act of
Taiwan authors of cross-writing in their linguistic experiments not only inscribes a history of subjectivity with the local as a standard of reference, it also entails an aesthetic and socio-political revolution that seeks a new literature and a "people-to-come."

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Notes

1 In his elaboration of hybridization as an artistic device in the novel, M.M. Bakhtin distinguishes the intentional / conscious hybrid from the unintentional / unconscious hybrid. He argues that "unintentional, unconscious hybridization is one of the most important modes in the historical life and evolution of all languages" and a conscious hybrid "as distinct from a historical, organic, obscure language hybrid" is "precisely the perception of one langue by another language" (358-59).

2 This aesthetic ideology is actually the one for the writing of hsiang-tu literature, a literary trend initiated by Huang Shi-hui to express concern for local people and matters. It involves the use of the local tongue as Huang Shi-hui claims that one should "use Taiwanese to write poems, novels, and folk songs and to depict Taiwanese matters" (qtd. in Liao 488). The term hsiang-tu which literally means "country and soil," can be roughly translated into English as "native," "local," or "regional."

3 The yen-wen yi-chih movement in early twentieth century Taiwan, introduced by Huang Shi-hui and Kuo Chiu-shen, is usually recognized as the Taiwanese Written Language Reform Movement by Taiwan literary historians and critics. The idea of yen-wen yi-chih can be found as early as 1920 in Chen Hsin's article "Literature and Its Mission"; in the article, however, Chen did not touch the issue of reforming Taiwan written language, although he complained that Taiwan colloquial speech could not be completely transcribed through Chinese characters. He viewed the yen-wen yi-chih movement — as practiced in modern China — primarily as a movement to popularize the vernacular in order to educate the populace. The issue of yen-wen yi-chih has been supported among

Taiwan intellectuals including Huang Chao-chin, Huang Cheng-tsun, and Chang Wo-chun, who suggested that Chinese writing be reformed for use in Taiwan. In contrast, Huang Shi-hui proposed the Taiwan written language reform in order to create Taiwan hsiang-tu literature (see, e.g., Hsu Chun-ya, 142-46).

4 The English version is with a footnote about a Japanese-style restaurant for the word ryoriten. For the Chinese version, please consult the reference.

5 The distinguishing features of the smooth and the striated space as proposed by Deleuze and Guattari are complicated and not always illuminating; msommary of their difference relies on Bogue's interpretation in his "Nomadic Flows," especially 13-18.

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Immigrant Brides and Language Problems in Taiwan
Chin-Chuan Cheng

Immigrant Brides

Around 2006 a large number of international marriages in Taiwan caught the attention of the media and the general populace. The China Times reported on 8 May 2006 that in the entire year of 2005 one-fifth of the newly-wed couples had a foreign spouse (China Times). The Department of Statistics of the Ministry of the Interior reported that in that year there were 141,140 marriages in total. Of that total, 14,619 (10.36%) spouses came from Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau, and 13,808 (9.78%) spouses came from foreign countries. Thus 20.14% of the marriages in 2005 had non-Taiwan spouses (Ministry of the Interior, 2006). It was not an exaggeration for the media to state that for the entire year one-fifth of the marriages in Taiwan had foreign spouses. However, 2005 was not the year with the highest number of non-Taiwan spouses in marriages. The number of foreign and Mainland spouses (54,634, 31.86%) peaked in 2003. In early 2009 the Ministry of the Interior published statistics showing nationalities of spouses of the marriages that occurred in 2001 through 2008 (Ministry of the Interior, 2009a). As in this article we focus on the brides of the marriages, we have rearranged the government statistics in Table 1 to make the number of male and female spouses more obvious:

The column "Foreign & Mainland Spouses (A)" represents all the spouses of the non-Taiwan nationals including those from Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, Southeast Asia, and other countries who married Taiwan nationals. For example, in the marriages that took place in 2003 there were 54,634 spouses in this category. The "Male" column shows the number of male spouses and the "Female" column displays the number of female spouses among the non-Taiwan nationals. For each year the total number of marriages is given in the column "Newlywed Couples." The number in this column includes all registered marriages in Taiwan. The column "Percentage of (A)" is the international marriage percentage of the newlywed couples. For example, 31.86% of marriages in 2003 involved foreign and Mainland spouses. That was the year with the highest percentage. The table continues to list the number of spouses from Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau, Southeast Asia, and unnamed other countries.

From Table 1 we see a couple of remarkable patterns. First, as said before, the number of foreign spouses of the newlyweds peaked in 2003 involving 31.86% of marriages. There was a yearly decline since then and the number came down to 14.03% in 2008. The reason for the decline, according to the Ministry of the Interior, was the requirement of potential foreign spouses to have face-to-face interviews with government officials before marriage (Ministry of the Interior, 2009a). The requirement of an interview was intended to prevent fake marriages but at the same time discouraged people from seeking international marriages. Another point of interest is the large number of female foreign spouses in comparison with male foreign spouses. For example, in 2003 there were only 6,001 male foreign spouses, but there were 48,633 female foreign spouses. The female foreign spouses were generally called "waiji xinniang" ("foreign brides") by Taiwan nationals (Hsia 1-20). As can be seen in the geographic distribution columns of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Foreign &amp; Mainland Spouses (A)</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Newlywed couples</th>
<th>Percent of (A)</th>
<th>Mainland</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Macau</th>
<th>Southeast Asia</th>
<th>Other countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>46,202</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>42,802</td>
<td>170,515</td>
<td>10.36%</td>
<td>17,156</td>
<td>23,516</td>
<td>21,552</td>
<td>20,082</td>
<td>1,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>49,013</td>
<td>3,368</td>
<td>45,647</td>
<td>172,655</td>
<td>10.39%</td>
<td>18,892</td>
<td>21,763</td>
<td>21,788</td>
<td>20,557</td>
<td>2,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>54,634</td>
<td>4,001</td>
<td>50,633</td>
<td>171,483</td>
<td>10.86%</td>
<td>18,485</td>
<td>22,485</td>
<td>22,180</td>
<td>20,984</td>
<td>2,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>31,310</td>
<td>3,174</td>
<td>28,134</td>
<td>131,453</td>
<td>10.82%</td>
<td>10,642</td>
<td>14,103</td>
<td>12,884</td>
<td>12,858</td>
<td>2,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>28,427</td>
<td>3,129</td>
<td>25,298</td>
<td>141,140</td>
<td>10.14%</td>
<td>14,288</td>
<td>18,288</td>
<td>18,298</td>
<td>17,890</td>
<td>2,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>22,930</td>
<td>3,214</td>
<td>20,716</td>
<td>142,669</td>
<td>12.77%</td>
<td>13,964</td>
<td>16,950</td>
<td>16,950</td>
<td>16,950</td>
<td>2,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>24,700</td>
<td>3,141</td>
<td>21,559</td>
<td>135,041</td>
<td>10.29%</td>
<td>14,721</td>
<td>18,526</td>
<td>18,526</td>
<td>18,526</td>
<td>2,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>21,729</td>
<td>3,516</td>
<td>18,213</td>
<td>154,066</td>
<td>12.74%</td>
<td>12,274</td>
<td>16,059</td>
<td>16,059</td>
<td>16,059</td>
<td>2,948</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1, most of the foreign spouses came from Mainland China and Southeast Asia. Even after they were married and became Taiwan nationals, they were still called "foreign brides." The connotation of the term was that they were not readily accepted by the community. Some people who were aware of the implications of the term then coined the phrase xin yimin nüxing ("new immigrant females") or ruji xinniang ("immigrant brides") to make it socially more acceptable.

As to why so many men in Taiwan married foreign women, the social factor is not the main concern of this writing. However, there were some public discussions on this matter. For example, the website of Kaohsiung Medical University had a forum posting articles and comments from 2004 to 2009 discussing why a quarter of female singles in Taiwan did not want to get married (<http://dlearn.kmu.edu.tw/~gendereq/phorum/read.php?11,245 7,2535 >)\(^1\). Essentially the reason was that they did not want to get into families to become second-class citizens with the dominance of husbands. Some postings further pointed out that as a consequence men in Taiwan had to go to Southeast Asia to get their brides.

These new immigrants often encountered problems related to their native languages. Some issues of our concern here are the loss of language identity and personal dignity. In her article Fenghuang Chen expressed great joy when her children were willing to identify themselves as Vietnamese because of their mother's original nationality. She was also delighted when her children were able to say something in Vietnamese. Normally the immigrant brides had to learn Mandarin and/or some local languages. The chance for them to teach their children their mother tongues was rare. Thus they lost their identity that could be best identified with their native languages. Furthermore, some of their children were said to be slow learners at school for no justifiable reason. People naturally attempted to explain the alleged "learning deficiency" in the context of international marriage. This suggestion naturally hurt the personal dignity of the foreign brides (Zhang 237-39).

Table 2. Geographic distribution of foreign spouses up to year 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>57,939</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>57,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>9,631</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>9,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>9,037</td>
<td>3,118</td>
<td>5,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>3,772</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>3,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>2,422</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2,323</td>
<td>1,064</td>
<td>1,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1,476</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1,348</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>92,650</td>
<td>9,283</td>
<td>83,367</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Generally speaking people from Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau speak Mandarin and a variety of Chinese dialects. The immigrants from those regions would have no problems communicating in Mandarin with people in Taiwan. However, those from the other countries would encounter problems in language communication. Before we deal with this matter, let us look at language problems in a larger perspective. Besides immigrant spouses, there were many foreign laborers in Taiwan. According to the Ministry of the Interior ("Neizheng Tongji Tongbao") there were 365,060 foreign laborers in Taiwan at the end of 2008 (http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/week/week9803.doc):

Table 3. Number and nationality of foreign laborers in Taiwan as of 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>127,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>81,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>80,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>75,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>365,060</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the past few years as I needed to travel from Taipei to Xinzhu frequently to do linguistic fieldwork or to visit relatives during weekends, I rode in local trains. In the trains between Taoyuan and Xinzhu, I often found myself surrounded by people who spoke some foreign languages. These people were most likely laborers from Southeast Asia working in the factories of the Dayuan, Zhongli, Pingzhen, Youshi, Guishan, Guanyin, Linkou, and Xinzhu industrial parks. They took trains to visit friends or other cities on weekends. Moreover, I also observed that many foreign females working as maids appeared around garbage collecting trucks in the evenings in Taipei. When such trucks came to the designated street intersections to collect household waste, foreign maids came out from the nearby apartments and houses to dump garbage bags. They took the opportunity to chat with their fellow nationals in their languages. The presence of factory workers and household maids made Taiwan society overtly multicultural and multilingual.

Multilingualism in Taiwan

Taiwan has a variety of Chinese dialects and Austronesian languages whereby Mandarin is the standard language. Southern Min has the most speakers and Hakka is another Taiwan Chinese dialect. The Indigenous Peoples have more than a dozen groups speaking as many Austronesian languages. According to the Ministry of the Interior (2009c), the population in Taiwan and outlying islands in February 2009 was 23,049,407. A survey of 51,803 random samples executed by a group commissioned by the Council for Hakka Affairs (2008) estimated the population of the ethnic groups in 2008 on the basis of respondents' self identification as given in Table 4 below:

Table 4. Estimates of population based on samples of ethnic self-identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Estimated population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern Min</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>15,890,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan Hakka</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>3,108,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>1.92%</td>
<td>441,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainland Hakka</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>97,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainland Other</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>2,050,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Taiwanese&quot;</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>922,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>132,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>333,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus we see that Taiwan was originally a multicultural and multilingual society. As foreign workers and immigrant spouses each numbered over 300,000 in the past few years, their native languages also had some impact on language services in Taiwan. It was necessary for some government offices to offer services in many languages. For example, the Motor Vehicles Office, Taipei City Government (2009) provided a simulative written test online
Language facilitates human communication. Communication occurs in various places. The most important place for language communication is home. In linguistics literature, we found that spatial distribution of language was determined by surveys of a few households. The languages of the sampled locations then were used to represent the languages of the entire administrative region. As a result, language maps produced in the past were all very sketchy and inaccurate. For example, the Language Atlas of China draws Xinzhu, Taiwan in one color indicating Hakka speaking area as given in Figure 1.

Beginning in 2003 we formed a geographic information system working group at the Academia Sinica to investigate spatial distribution of languages in terms of all the households of an area. Using a geographic information system and aerial maps we were able to identify the language of each household on the maps. By early 2009 we have surveyed more than 30,000 households in Xinfeng Township (Xinzhu County), Lunbei Township (Yunlin County), Erlun Township (Yunlin County), and Xinpu Township (Xinzhu County). With the detailed household-based language maps, we can show the spatial attributes of multilingualism.

Figure 2 shows the language map of Yuanshan Village, Xinfeng Township, Xinzhu County (Cheng 23.35). In the language map, the two major languages are Hakka and Southern Min (both are dialects of the Chinese language). On the aerial map, where each building is visible, Southern Min households are marked in blue and Hakka families are marked in red. The red marks include the Hailu, Sixian, Meinong, Dongshi, and Raoping Hakka varieties for the entire Xinfeng Township. The minor households are shown as Mazu, Philippines, Burma, Indonesian, Mainland Chinese, and Austronesian as indications of origins of the household’s recent relocations. While one can find clusters of residents of one ethnicity in some areas, many people of different ethnic backgrounds live in the same community. As we see in the map, the village has a mixture of languages, and thus the map displays the geographic nature of a multilingual community:

Ethnic diversity entails multilingualism. In the case of the Xinfeng Township, Hakka, and Southern Min are the major languages and many people speak both dialects while Mandarin remains the standard language. Immigrants had to learn to speak Mandarin to function in the community. For example, the cases listed in Table 5 show the use of Mandarin as the standard language for communication while native languages have fallen in disuse or have been forgotten (Cheng 2007). In the table below, we also list subjects’ original languages prior to their move to Xinfeng:

Figure 1. Language map of Taiwan (from the Language Atlas of China)
In the past several decades, the promotion of Guoyu or Mandarin as the common and official language of Taiwan was successful. The media, education, group activities, and even personal communications use mostly Mandarin. Mandarin allowed ethnic groups and communities to communicate easily in one standard language. Even people who migrated from other countries could quickly use Mandarin in order to be integrated into the society. However, the promotion of the standard language was often blamed for the inability of people to speak the mother tongues of Southern Min, Hakka, and Austronesian languages. Some scholars blamed the government’s Draconian practice of monolingualism for the loss of the young generation’s mother tongue (e.g., Raung-fu Chung, 2007).

**Linguistic Rights and Language Equality**

In the face of the multiplicity of language and culture, Taiwan was confronted with issues of language rights (e.g., Cheng-feng Shih, 2007) and language policy (see, e.g., Jung-Mao Liang, 2007; Hakkhim Tiunn, 2007). In 2003 the National Language Committee of the Ministry of Education formed a Yuyan Pingdengfa Cao'an (Draft Act of Language Equality) stipulating equality for all languages in Taiwan (National Language Committee, 2003). The Draft Act designated Hakka, "Ho-lo," "Chinese language" and the languages of the indigenous ethnic groups of Amis, Atayal, Paiwan, Bunun, Kavalan, Puyuma, Rukai, Tsou, Saisiyat, Yami, and Thao as the "national languages." It stipulated that all the languages and their written forms were legally equal and their use was not to be limited or prohibited. This was meant to be a manifesto of the principle of language equality. In the same year the Draft Act was transmitted.

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**Table 5. Language use of some immigrants in Xinfeng Township**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Birth place</th>
<th>Original Language</th>
<th>Can still use original language?</th>
<th>Can children use original language?</th>
<th>Current language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hualien, Taiwan</td>
<td>Amis, Southern Min</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Mandarin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Indonesia, Southern Min</td>
<td>Indonesian, Southern Min</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Mandarin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Taidong, Taiwan</td>
<td>Puyuma</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No children</td>
<td>Hakka, Southern Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Indonesia, Hakka</td>
<td>Rusty, Hakka</td>
<td>Cannot speak but can understand</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mandarin, Hakka</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2. Language map of Yuanshan Village, Xinfeng Township, Xinzu County**
to the Council for Cultural Affairs for further action. The Council then modified the Draft and renamed it as Guojia Yuyan Fazhan Fa Cao'an (National Language Development Act Draft) (LibertyTimes, 2003). As of early 2009, this Act has not been approved by the legislators.

Immediately after the announcement of the Draft Act of Language Equality, negative views from the society were expressed. For example, on 22 February 2003 in Taipei the Broadcasting Corporation of China (2003) had a call-in session to air various views. All the calls were opposed to the stipulations of the Draft Act. They can be summarized as follows. The idea of making all 14 languages as national languages gave these languages rights; but Guoyu (National Language or Mandarin) had served the function of the standard language for communication among the various ethnic groups. It should not be replaced by these other languages in official settings. Moreover, once a language was designated as an official language, the government should have appropriate measures for its practice such as providing personnel for interpretation and translation in meetings, in court, at school, and on other occasions involving people of different ethnic groups. Such a practice was obviously not practical for all the fourteen languages. Moreover, the opposition argued that the deliberate use of the romanization "ho-lo" with a term in Chinese characters "tai yu" in parentheses to replace Chinese characters "Minnanhua" ("Southern Min") and the use of Huayu (Chinese language) to replace the commonly used Guoyu (National Language) in the Draft Act was intended to "desinify" (to get rid of things Chinese, implicitly for Taiwan for independence). The phrase "tai yu" means the languages of Taiwan, and the Draft Act used the term to represent Southern Min only. So the Draft Act was thought to be an expression of Taiwanese chauvinism. Some people further suggested that the Draft Act should have focused on preservation and development of multi-culture. Thus, not much happened to implement that idea of language equality. Promotion of local languages in the areas of personal communication, media, literature, performing arts, and even education is quite a different matter from making all the fourteen tongues official languages.

The Council for Cultural Affairs received from the Ministry of Education the Draft Act of Language Equality in 2003. Over the years it held seven rounds of meetings to discuss the contents. In January 2007 it then submitted the National Language Development Act Draft to the Executive Yuan (the Executive Branch of the Central Government) for consideration. The Executive Yuan then submitted it to the Legislative Yuan for approval. The Legislative Yuan, however, did not complete the evaluation during its regular session. Thus the Executive Yuan resubmitted it to the Legislative Yuan on 1 February 2008 (Council for Cultural Affairs, 2008). Negative comments on the Language Development Act were quite similar to those in opposition to the 2003 Draft Act. Liu (2007) also commented that the Democratic Progressive Party then in power attempted to legislate for language rights in 2003 before the 2004 presidential election. This time in 2007 it again tried to legislate for language development before the 2008 presidential election. He stated that it was obvious that these attempts to legislate for language rights and developments were a political scheme to win votes from people who were not in favor of keeping Chinese elements in the culture. In 2009 the Act remains in dormant in the Legislative Yuan.

As I discuss above, immigrant spouses and foreign laborers were large in number, approaching the population of the indigenous groups. But their linguistic rights and language developments have not been formally discussed in government agencies. They were supposed to be integrated into the society automatically. Their struggle in linguistic integration will remain a topic for academic research for some time to come.

**Conclusion**

There is a variety of ethnic groups and languages in Taiwan. In the last decades, the infusion of international spouses and foreign workers from Southeast Asian countries has made Taiwan even
more multicultural and multilingual than in previous times. Government agencies have not treated linguistic rights well enough to make various advocacy groups happy. While some facilities are available for immigrant spouses to deal with language problems, generally speaking, there are no systematic, national projects to integrate them into the society.

Notes

1 Phorum, a Bulletin Board System, supported by Kaohsiung Medical school, collects numerous news reports on the reasons why a quarter of female singles in Taiwan did not want to get married. See the following web page: http://dlearn.kmu.edu.tw/~gendereq/phorum513/read.php?11,2457,2535 (retrieved 2009.08.07)

Works Cited


Immigrant Brides and Language Problems in Taiwan


Author's profile: Chin-chuan Cheng is an Academician of Academia Sinica. He received BA and MA in Chinese from National Taiwan University and Ph. D. in linguistics from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. He taught linguistics at the University of Illinois from 1970 to 2000 as assistant professor, associate professor, professor and Jubilee Professor. In year 2000 he became emeritus professor and moved to Hong Kong to assume the position of head of the Department of Chinese, Translation and Linguistics with the title of chair professor of Chinese and linguistics at the City University of Hong Kong. In 2003 he moved to Academia Sinica in Taiwan and in 2004 became distinguished research fellow and the founding director of the Institute of Linguistics. In 2007 he took the position of chair professor at National Taiwan Normal University. His research includes measurements of similarity and mutual intelligibility among Chinese dialects, Chinese phonology, lexical semantics, Chinese corpora, e-learning, and language geographic information system.
Analyzing East/West Power Politics in Comparative Cultural Studies
William H. Thornton

In the post-Cold War thought of Samuel Huntington, culture has supplanted ideology as the shaping force of global politics ("Erosion" 39). Unlike the postmodern culturalist, who celebrates "difference" as an unequivocal virtue, Huntington's cultural politics is marked by multipolar and multicivilizational strife (Huntington, Clash 21). Nevertheless, he partakes in the cultural imperative that has become almost synonymous with postmodernism in foreign affairs: international relations, security studies, and international economics (Mazarr 177). Political realists find themselves in a bind, for it was on their watch that culture was strictly marginalized (Lapid 3).

Drawing on the realist wing of comparative cultural studies, in this article I explore the place of culture in East/West power politics. It undertakes to preserve the strategic potency of political realism while putting culture back on Asia's geopolitical map. This requires that "classical" and "neo." realism alike be revised in favor of a new "cultural realism": a post-Cold War melding of geopolitical strategy and geocultural negotiation, or what Joseph Nye has called "hard power" and "soft power" (181). As here employed, the term "cultural realism" carries a double meaning, tied at once to geopolitical and literary/cultural discourses. Its concern with the emic channels of local knowledge owes much to postmodern realism in cultural theory. The politics of postmodern realism — as developed in my Cultural Prosaiscs: The Second Postmodern Turn and previous studies such as "Cultural Prosaiscs" and "Cross-Cultural" — is congruent with Bakhtinian cultural dialogics rather than the epistemological anomaly of deconstructionist or Foucauldian theory (see Thornton Cultural, Chapter Six). The latter school of thought powerfully influenced Edward Said, but could not be sustained where Said turned his attention to the particulars of cultural politics. His Covering Islam, as Bryan Turner points out, is built upon a solidly realist epistemology (6).

On its geopolitical side, cultural realism is a manifestation of what Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil call, in their anthology of that title, The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (1996). The term "cultural realism" has been applied specifically to Chinese cultural politics by Alastair Johnston (1995), who argues that a tradition of realpolitik lies beneath China's cloak of Confucian-Mencian moderation. This inclines China to be much faster than most states to use force in territorial disputes. Johnston considers this cultural proclivity to be heightened by improvements in China's military capabilities. Here I broaden the application of "cultural realism" to the whole question of East/West geopolitics, qualifying rather than replacing the standard realist concern with balance of power relations. Johnston's insights, for example, lend cultural depth to the realist admonitions of Bernstein and Munro (1997) concerning China's destabilizing impact on the current Asian balance of power. Globalists tend to overlook the inertia of the bureaucratic and authoritarian tradition that traces to the Qin dynasty, and the isolationism that traces to the Ming (builders of the Great Wall). In this study, however, cultural realism is equally concerned with traditional and emerging relations between political cultures, e.g., the Chinese and the Vietnamese. It is thus the perfect medium for "soft power" analysis.

This "soft" realism offers a timely corrective to the cultural tunnel vision of both globalism and classical realism. The latter, according to Hans Morgenthau, has been distinguished by the subordination of all factors that lie outside a rational calculation of "interest defined in terms of power" (Morgenthau 5). This is supposed to render politics "autonomous" by purging realism of "irrational" elements such as religion and moral valuations. "Neo." or "structural" realism, as developed by Kenneth Waltz (1979), begins with that same purgation but moves farther toward what is considered a scientific geopolitics, one in which the basic balancing act of realism operates systemically and without any necessary conscious intent (see Sheehan 194; Forde 142). Francis Fukuyama denigrates realism for treating "nation-states like billiard balls, whose internal contents, hidden by opaque shells, are irrelevant in..."
predicting their behavior. ... International politics, then, is not about the interaction of complex and historically developing human societies, nor are wars about clashes of values. ... [Nonetheless the] earlier generation of realists like Morgenthau, Kennan, Niebuhr, and Kissinger allowed some consideration of the internal character of states to enter into their analyses, and could therefore give a better account of the reasons for international conflict than the later academic school of "structural" realists. The former at least recognized that conflict had to be driven by a human desire for domination, rather than from the mechanical interaction of a system of billiard balls" (End 248 and 256).

In The Clash of Civilizations (1996), Huntington likewise points the way towards a revised realism where "internal contents" count as much or more than external mechanics. Thus Huntington implants culture or "civilization" in the very heart of realism — if only negatively, by way of a sweeping cultural agonistics. The stress he gives to intractable conflict undermines the democratic trajectory of his previous book, The Third Wave (1991), where he granted the problem of a geopolitical rent between East and West, yet clung to his modernist optimism (310). As late as 1991, then, it could still be said that he broadly concurred with democratic optimists such as Fukuyama, Rueschemeyer, and Di Palma (see works cited) on the thrust of liberal democratic globalization. By 1995, however, Malcolm Waters should have qualified his linkage of Huntington with Fukuyama's liberal democratic teleology (Waters 118-19); for Huntington's Foreign Affairs article of 1993 had clearly marked his cultural turn. This shift is all the more dramatic because his previous work was so often the epitome of cultural myopia. Thirty years before, in Political Order in Changing Societies, he famously overlooked the moral and cultural weaknesses of Soviet modernism, viz., the destabilization that was sure to erupt in a system built on the hard politics of lies, militarism, and ethnic repression (see Lane).

Just as he had been too pessimistic regarding the staying power of the Soviet system, he was now too trusting of the new democratic teleology. That optimism, however, was nowhere to be found in his incendiary Foreign Affairs article, "The Clash of Civilizations?" His subsequent book, which dropped the question mark in the title, details the ethnic and civilizational factors that fracture nations even as they threaten to culturally fuse whole regions, such as East Asia, against the West. Although Huntington's credentials as a realist are a solid fixture of Cold War history, the germ of his cultural turn can be traced to his 1968 classic, Political Order in Changing Societies. There he argued that it was simply unrealistic to press developing countries to become instant democracies when they lacked any semblance of democratic traditions. Hence, given the grim realities of Third World cultural politics, strong central authority must first be established. Whatever its intent, Political Order was widely read as a case for the realist suspension of Wilsonian idealism in foreign affairs. Walden Bello points out that it quickly became the handbook for a whole generation of development-minded officials in organizations such as the State Department, the Agency for International Development, and the U.S. dominated World Bank (33). In Clash, Huntington easily disposes of the non-cultural competition within realism by noting that by their pristine logic Western Europe (either by classical realist design or neorealist structural reflex) would have coalesced with the Soviet Union against the U.S. in the late 1940s (24). Likewise, in the post-Cold War world, the core states of non-Western regions should logically unite against America and the West. This has been attempted, but its force is limited by the constant factionalism that stems from deep cultural/civilizational distrust (185).

One can credit the cultural turn of Huntington's realism while rejecting the fatalism of his "Atlanticist" retreat from Asian cultural politics (see Huntington, Clash 312) — a retreat that would leave as little room for the art of diplomacy as does neorealism. By rejecting that retreat and neorealist positivism alike, this study keeps diplomacy in the geopolitical game and in that respect moves closer to classical realism. Where it profoundly differs is in its focus on culture as a vital element of political reality. In the tradition of Vico's verum-factum principle (whereby we know
history or culture far better than nature, insofar as we create the former), cultural realism makes no apology for not being "scientific." The one element that will be salvaged from Huntington's cultural retreat is his recoil from any attempt to impose Western values and institutions as a blueprint for global development. Since most "globalism" — here defined as the ideology of those who "are in the habit of praising the current process of globalization" (Salih 137; my emphasis) — follows that Orientalist blueprint in all but name (see Waters 3), this study is in that sense anti-globalist. Especially it opposes what Huntington calls "Davos Culture": The convergent interests and values of the small global elite that controls virtually all of the world's dominant international institutions (Huntington, Clash 57). However, in place of Huntington's cultural agonistics, my weapon of choice against Davos Globalism is a realism built on cultural dialogics. For me this involves a post-Bakhtinian commitment to crosscultural engagement, including political engagement. In such a dialogics, cultural identities take shape very much as do individual voices: "in response to and in anticipation of other voices" (Bialostosky 214). This makes for a fluid identity, but hardly a vacuous one. As Caryl Emerson convincingly argues, Bakhtin's dialogics kept the self intact, since it is only by asserting one's own uniqueness that one can hope to engage a unique Other dialogically (110). Thus the twin acts of taking a stand and interacting become integral to the twin processes of identity formation and political action. I therefore depart from Emerson, in Cultural Prosaics and elsewhere, by extracting from Bakhtin the ingredients of a political counterdiscourse that she would not countenance. This political grounding avoids the cultural relativist trap of holding that on all issues one cultural perspective is as good or just as another — an attitude that has permitted such pressing global issues as human rights and the environment to be labeled "Western" and hence "imperialist." These agonistic labels are designed to block communication and freeze geopolitical discourse in an East/West or South/North mode. The dialogic reach of cultural realism equips it to cross those agonistic lines to deal with vital transnational issues that have no place in classical realism or neorealism.

One such issue is global environmentalism. The rise of environmental consciousness has given "Third World countries an important potential source of blackmail, with countries (not all of them very poor) demanding to be paid to carry out environmental measures which are actually in their own interest as well as everyone else's" (Beloff 5). Insofar as global ecology is a moral or in any case a transnational concern, neither classical realism nor neorealism is equipped to handle it; whereas cultural realism is perfectly suited to the task. As with all realism (Lentner 39), one of cultural realism's primary concerns is assuring security. But in an increasingly global age, security can no longer be restricted to "national interest" in the limited sense. And just as there is now a place for "green" issues within realism, so too there is a growing "realo" wing within Green parties. These groups recognize that although the state has often worked against the environment, its powers are "needed to match the scale of ecological problems. ... [and to] counter corporate power" (Dryzek 35-36). The environmental recklessness of international organizations like the World Bank and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a matter of record. Between 1976 and 1986, for example, the World Bank funneled $600 million into deforestation / resettlement programs in Indonesia alone. The result was massive erosion that "degraded the soil to the point where it could not sustain subsistence agriculture or even absorb water" (Bello 53). John Dryzek points out that in 1991 "a GATT committee declared that the United States' ban on imported tuna caught in ways that caused the deaths of large numbers of dolphins contravened the GATT. If a state wishes to guarantee by law or regulation that its food imports do not contain unsafe levels of pesticides, then that, too, will be a violation of free trade" (81).

Meanwhile, environmentalism has taken a postmodern turn in the direction of a new moral/cultural realism. Its goals are no longer tied so closely to an empirical and hence material frame of reference, exclusive of the moral and aesthetic concerns that are
now embraced by "post-environmentalism" (Eder 214-15). The result of these various trends is a remarkable fit between the new (as opposed to "neo") realism and the new ecology, including the new literary eco-criticism. Clearly, this is part of a broad postmodern shift from mere survival values to well-being values, and from achievement motivation to postmaterial motivation (Inglehart 77). Once realism takes this postmodern turn, however, it confronts the agonistic realities that killed the "New World Order" in its infancy. At that point it faces a stark choice: Huntingtonesque retreat into cultural insularity or the development of a more "engaged" moral realism (as explored in my "Back to Basics"). What Huntington's *Clash* gives us is negative realism. In the post-Cold War world that *Clash* so well describes, but declines to fully engage, affirmative realism requires that cultural agonistics be tempered by cultural dialogics.

Cultural realism bypasses both sides of the East/West incommensurability argument, as propounded by Huntington on the Western side and Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew on the side of "Asian values." Fortunately there are dialogic alternatives to both. Elsewhere, as part of my case against East Asian exceptionalism, I have contrasted the "Singapore model" of authoritarianism with the democratic voice of Kim Dae Jung, Korea's inveterate dissident-turned-president (see Thornton, "Korea"). The coexistence of economic and political development in Kim's "Korean model" would free American foreign policy from the burden of choosing between the false antipodes of stability and social justice. That blighted choice was thought necessary during the Cold War, when the West hesitated to advance its own values for fear of driving developing countries into Moscow's camp (Kausikan 27).

The always dubious rationale for treating oppressive regimes as full strategic partners died with the Cold War. With it died, also, the rationale for a virulent strain of realism that helped produce — in terms of genocide, ethnocide, and environmental apocalypse (see Bello, Chapter 7) — the most destructive century in recorded history. Many, unfortunately, did not get the message. On 9 March 1991, in the wake of the Gulf War, President Bush declared, "By God! We've kicked the Vietnam Syndrome once and for all....The specter of Vietnam has been forever buried in the desert sands of the Arabian peninsula" (qtd. in Long 397). By retreating from post-Cold War global imperatives, the "Vietnam syndrome" was indeed an invitation to trouble, and no realist should lament its passing. Unfortunately, the cultural sensitivity that attended that syndrome is also put at risk by the return of the old power politics. What is needed, in the absence of a new world order, is a *via media* between Fukuyama's dialogic liberalism and Huntington's undialogic realism. Huntington's agonistics stems from his still-modernist habit of treating whole cultures as reified systems. It must be granted that the agonistic worldviews of Hobbes and Huntington are in many ways closer to global reality, and especially Asian reality, than are dialogic alternatives such as the Grotian notion of a salutary society of nations (see Sheehan 11-12). Here my objective is simply to keep dialogics in the game by charting a course that is "in but not of" agonistics. The last effective metatheory of global peace — based largely on a nuclear balance of terror — could not survive the passing of the Cold War. Its heir apparent, Fukuyama's posthistorical vision of a New World Order, never materialized. History refused to go away. That is not to say that Fukuyama's liberal globalism is a feckless illusion. Rather, it is intertwined with its theoretical opposite, realism. Too often globalism turns out to be little more than a front for vested interests, while "realism" is but a euphemism for the purchase of stability or geopolitical advantage at any price. Theoretical distinctions between the two then evaporate. For example, the opposition one would expect between Clinton's manifest globalism and Kissinger's nominal realism all but vanishes where China is concerned.

The operative theory behind Clinton's China policy has been a market-obsessed economism that even Fukuyama could not endorse (see *Trust* 34). This vision of unproblematic economic growth rests on the expansion and empowerment of the middle classes, which are expected in turn to demand political reform.
Proponents of such economic prioritization often point to the development patterns of South Korea and Taiwan. However, as Kanishka Jayasuriya counters, Singapore and Malaysia could just as well be spotlighted in support of the opposite case. Both sing the praises of authoritarian "Asian values," despite the fact that each is "dominated by a party with strong middle class support ... Hence, those who suggest that Asian middle classes will demand greater liberalization are likely to be sorely disappointed. The Asian values ideology serves only to provide a comfortable canopy for this middle class" (Jayasuriya 88).

The unilateral privileging of economic over political liberalization in the Singapore model differs from Japanese economism in that the Japanese people have clearly given their consent to these priorities. In that sense the authority behind the Japanese model could be called, if not quite bilateral, then at least top-down by consent. It is the more forceful removal or manipulation of consent which distinguishes the "Asian values" model from the Japanese. In Singapore's case this hegemonic turn had its debut in 1963 with the PAP (People's Action Party) Operation Cold Store: The arrest of one hundred opposition leaders. Since that time all Singaporeans have been subject to constant political surveillance (see Chua 16 and 44). But for the most part PAP has operated through the less direct means of intense media control and a unilateral scripting of tradition. If "other" Asian values have been politically dormant in Japan, they have been forcefully suppressed in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, and virtually crushed in Myanmar and the People's Republic of China. Here the de facto motto might go beyond "growth first" to "growth only." This dictum was spelled out by Deng Xiaopeng, and its place in post-Deng CCP ideology is hardly less secure. By no means, however, does this development strategy stop at the boundary of "Asian values." It is a potent factor throughout the Third World, or what is increasingly — metaphorically more than geographically — called the South, where authoritarianism is primarily an instrument for suppressing the unrest that is bound to erupt from gross inequality in distribution. Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly in 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger asserted that the "notion of the Northern rich and the Southern poor has been shattered" ("Common Response" 3). Indeed, many countries that fall under this "Southern" rubric did make impressive gains prior to the 1980s in terms of GDP per capita. Only on closer analysis, with attention shifted to the actual distribution of gains, does the "Southern" argument strike home. As the South Commission reported in 1990, inequalities "tended to widen as the economy grew and became more industrialized... Increasingly, the rich and powerful in countries of the South were able to enjoy the life-style and consumption patterns of developed countries of the North. But large segments of the population experienced no significant improvement in their standard of living, while being able to see the growing affluence of the few" (qtd. in Thomas 5).

Consequently, the stage is set for what Jayasuriya — generalizing a term that Jeffrey Herf applied to Nazi Germany — calls "reactionary modernism" (82-84) — a condition of radical divorce between economic and technical modernization, on the one hand, and political (liberal democratic) modernization on the other. Where cultural or civilizational friction reaches the proportions described by Huntington's *Clash*, we can expect reactionary modernism to be the rule rather than the exception in developing countries. In India, for example, Hindu fundamentalism is less a threat to material modernization than to the secular state and the whole democratic apparatus. Countries such as Algeria, Nigeria, and Sudan have reverted to military authoritarianism, while Egypt, Peru, and Russia have shifted to repressive state controls. Elsewhere, as in Guatemala, Argentina, Uruguay, and (until very recently) Chile, the ongoing veto power of the military has reduced democracy to a stage prop (Shaw and Quadir 49).

It is no accident that President Clinton's development strategy in foreign affairs — built on the assumptions of vintage modernization theory — bears remarkable resemblance to Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Both lay stress on the cultivation of the middle classes as the alpha and omega of development. This class/ic error — a naive faith in class alone as the engine of
progress — had its first incarnation in the Old Left notion of the proletariat's innate progressivism. After the German working class threw its support behind Nazism and the war, Frankfurt School critical theory laid that class/ic blunder to rest. Soon, however, it had a second, liberal incarnation in the American vision of the middle class as the "vital center" (as Arthur Schlesinger called it) not only of US-American political culture but of global development. Castro believed that insofar as Kennedy's Alliance for Progress rose above the vested interests of corporations, foreign regimes and the Pentagon, it was doomed to fail (Schlesinger 147). And Castro was right. At least Kennedy's naïveté can be defended on the grounds that — apart from the experience of fascism, which could be dismissed as a twentieth-century aberration — reactionary modernization had not yet made its full global debut. Clinton has no such excuse. Indeed, as Richard Rorty argues in Achieving our Country (1988), US-American society is itself being split into a cosmopolitan upper crust and a downwardly mobile remainder. America's own "vital center" is decomposing even as American foreign policy strives to create new "vital centers" around the world. This might be a harmlessly quixotic enterprise except that extant power elites are imagined to be the vanguard of these proto-democratic "centers." Likewise, growth of any kind is imagined to be progress. One of the chief architects of Clinton's China policy, Anthony Lake, a self-described "centrist," so closely equates U.S. interest with Chinese economic growth that he has pressed the U.S. not to expose Chinese exports of nuclear materials to Third World clients (see Heilbrunn<http://www.tnr.com/textonly/032497/txtheilbrunn032497.html> [inactive]). Whatever argument might be made for these policies from a globalist perspective, there is no reconciling them with any form of realism — not at a time when China is the paramount source of Asia's growing imbalance of power — a fact that is only compounded by the prospect of Korea's reunification (see "Japan"). This raises the question of the purity of Kissinger's realist credentials even during the Cold War. Legend has it that his policies dislodged the illusion of monolithic communism from American foreign policy. In fact, Kissinger was inclined toward a highly ideological reading of world affairs. Daniel Patrick Moynihan points out that, as Secretary of State, Kissinger warned that America must "face the stark reality that the [Communist] challenge is unending" (qtd. in Moynihan 145). The context of this almost eschatological utterance was America's by then obvious failure in the Vietnam War. The domino theory, the most commonly stated rationale for escalating the war in the first place (Kolko 75), was being justly discredited by a new brand of culturalism, as in, for example, Walker Conner's case for the vital political role of ethnic heterogeneity in Asian political cultures (see Conner; and, specific to Vietnam, FitzGerald, Fire in the Lake). At this of all times, Kissinger blew second wind into America's Cold War ideology by naturalizing its communist adversary.

Nonetheless, Kissinger recognized the limits of the domino theory as applied to Vietnam (Kissinger, Years 82) and China, which he perceived as a nationalistic entity vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and North Vietnam alike. Kissinger was aware that China secretly condoned U.S. operations in Laos, despite (or even because of) its negative impact on North Vietnam (Kissinger, Years 58). He favorably cites André Malraux's belief that China's support of North Vietnam was an "imposture," for the historical animosities between China and North Vietnam ran too deep (Kissinger, White House 1052). In global balance of power terms, it was no secret that China feared the possibility of Vietnam becoming a Soviet satellite state, thus completing the encirclement of China (Kolko 419). If Kissinger's early China policy can be credited with
promoting a global balance of power, it now lives on as an effete mockery of realism; for China is fast becoming the major agent of Asian instability. By any "realist" logic, the fall of the Soviet Union and the concomitant rise of China should have prompted an immediate shift in Kissinger’s position on China. This naturally raises suspicions that his refusal to budge an inch in that direction is directly related to the operations of the firm he founded, Kissinger Associates, which assists corporate clients in setting up business ties in China. Thus Kissinger the arch-realist has become, in actual practice, a closet globalist.

Having served as president of Kissinger Associates, former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger now works for a law firm that likewise helps businesses to obtain contracts in China; and another president of Kissinger Associates, former National Security Advisor Brent Snowcroft, freely mixes public policy advice with private business connections via his consulting firm, the Scowcroft Group, which operates out of the same office complex as the nonprofit policy group he founded: The Forum for International Policy. In 1996 he helped Dean O’Hare, chairman of the Chubb insurance group, secure a meeting with Chinese Premier Li Peng. All the while, not surprisingly, he has defended China assiduously on issues such as MFN and Chinese sales of nuclear material to Pakistan, which he has publicly blamed — through a bizarre twist of logic — on U.S. non-proliferation legislation (see Judis), as if China did it to save face when confronted with evil imperialist pressures. Next to Kissinger himself, however, the most egregious China-card player is former Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Kissinger’s aide during the opening of China. Haig has the distinction of having been the only prominent American to join the October 1989 celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the PRC — i.e., to join Deng Xiaoping in Tiananmen Square just four months after the Tiananmen massacre. His continuing role in the defense of MFN and as a critic of anyone who defends Taiwan has earned him a good deal more than praise from the Chinese. Deng saluted his "courage," but what counts are the contracts: One of the major clients of his consulting group, Worldwide Associates, has hauled in billions of dollars in business deals with the Chinese (see Judis). Haig is not one to be concerned about theoretical contradictions, but more might be expected from his realist mentor, Kissinger.

With the end of the Cold War, the brutal amorality of Kissinger-esque realism has lost whatever justification it could ever claim. So too, its cultural indifference renders it obsolete, for culture has emerged as a prime mover of world affairs (see Kahn). Fukuyama has managed to keep his version of globalism in the game by taking a modest cultural turn, blurring the stock association of economism with rationality and culture with irrationality (see Trust 37-38). Perhaps it would be fair to call his position a cultural globalism, as far removed from unalloyed globalism as cultural realism is from traditional realism. Kissinger, however, holds fast to the tablets he brought down from the mountain. His hard line realism treats culture as local color, style, or sentiment rather than political substance. In his Washington years he perpetuated Cold War logic by putting containment in an older realist package: The classic balance of power that tries to reduce international relations to a cold calculation of interest. Moynihan wryly notes that Kissinger's "realism" put him out of touch with the inner substance of political reality (145-46). It certainly obscured the cultural and civilizational realities that suffuse Moynihan’s Pandaemonium (1993) and Huntington’s Clash. Where East Asia is concerned, responses to this cultural challenge range from globalist denial, on the one hand, to militant agonistics on the other. Huntington’s thesis, for example, receives a concerted challenge from the collection of papers contained in Techno-Security in an Age of Globalization: Perspectives from the Pacific Rim, edited by Denis Simon (1997). One reviewer, Steven Rosefield, points out that these papers collectively comprise a national security paradigm consistent with "Lester Thurow's and Francis Fukuyama’s notions about the global triumph of capitalism and the end of history. ... Traditional international security concerns, it is intimated, have become obsolete. Imperialism is dead, great nations are war averse, economic systems don’t matter (because there is only capitalism), and Huntington’s clash of civilizations is a
mirage. What really matters today, the authors variously contend, are technological threats ... and other lower intensity quarrels" (751).

At the opposite pole there is the all-too-coherent realist manifesto of Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro (The Coming Conflict with China). In a recent Foreign Affairs article, Bernstein and Munro attempt to distinguish their approach from that of Huntington, on the ground that theirs is strictly geopolitical rather than cultural or civilizational ("Coming" 21). That distinction, however, runs aground on several points. First, it is granted that part of the reason for China's new assertiveness is its traditional view of itself as Asia's preeminent power (22). That is a deeply ingrained cultural viewpoint, entirely consistent with Huntington's thesis. Second, Bernstein and Munro's working assumption that China will not readily go the route of democracy, despite its rising affluence, is based on the absence of such key ingredients as a tradition of limited government, individual rights, independent judiciary, etc. (26-27). Are these absences not part of China's political culture? Notions such as the consent of the governed and the will of the majority are not just ideas, but deeply rooted cultural institutions. A thriving market economy can be conducive to the formation of such institutions. Perhaps it is a necessary but insufficient prerequisite for their development. The bottom line, as Bernstein and Munro point out, is that China treats opposition as treason. So far that cultural fact has not proved incompatible with China's new techno-nationalism. Bernstein and Munro, in any case, have the good fortune of not being the classical realists they imagine themselves to be.

One reason why their warning is not being heeded is likewise culture-related. Americans view Asia as a far more alien place than Europe. Even if they see China as a budding superpower, they are not inclined to see her regional power as posing so serious a threat to their culturally defined interests as would an equivalent military threat on the European side. This bias skews Americans' sense of shifting global priorities. As Fareed Zakaria argues, two simple facts define today's geopolitics: "Russian weakness and Chinese strength. ... Yet increasingly the Clinton Administration's foreign policy looks as if it were intended to meet precisely the opposite challenges. ... the Administration is spending vast amounts of time, energy, money and political capital to deter [Russia] from launching an invasion of Central Europe. China, on the other hand, is surging economically, bulking up its armed forces and becoming more assertive by the day" (Zakaria<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/zakaria.htm> [inactive]). Early in May 1998 India shocked the world by conducting three nuclear tests. It was generally assumed that this breach of nuclear nonproliferation was aimed almost exclusively at Pakistan; but for Henry Sokolski — the Bush Defense Department's top official for nuclear nonproliferation issues — it amounted to "an act of impatience with failed American efforts to stop China and North Korea from developing and spreading strategic weapons": Sokolski quotes The Times of India's comment that "by the time the Clinton Administration wakes up to the danger posed by the China-Pakistan-North Korean axis, it will be too late for India" (Sokolski <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/sokolski.htm> [inactive]). This view gains credibility in the light of India's former conciliation towards Pakistan. Despite friction over Kashmir, the two antagonists had renewed ministerial contacts and, guided by Indian Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral, were seeking more economic cooperation (International Institute for Strategic Studies 146). The U.S., however, was sluggish in revising policies formed when Pakistan was a Cold War ally and India a leader of "nonaligned" nations and a major recipient of Soviet economic and military aid (Kennedy 507). By the 1990s, if not before, that Cold War mindset was worse than obsolete. In combination with Clinton's China policy it contributed to renewed militarism in the region. Likewise, the perpetuation of a Cold War China policy is aggravating an already dangerous imbalance in Northeast Asian (NEA) geopolitics. Even as the Cold War abates between the two Koreas, new power configurations must be taken into account. By the early 1990s, thought was being given to an ASEAN-type NEA...
unity. Like AFTA in the south, one goal of this accord was a trade bloc that would exclude the U.S., Australia, and Canada.

From 1967 to 1989 ASEAN (the Association of South-East Asian Nations: Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, plus Brunei in 1984 and Vietnam in 1995) was the only regional political organization in Asia (Godement 281). A first step toward a more globally attuned regionalism was taken by APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), which was founded in 1989 under Western auspices. The U.S. and Australia sought to circumvent trade barriers by transforming APEC from a mere consultative group into a formal trading bloc. Asian governments immediately perceived this as an attempt to saddle them with a U.S. free-trade package. Indeed, a key figure in the U.S. strategy was Fred Bergsten, who by no accident had also been a lobbyist for GATT and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area). ASEAN, which leaned heavily toward state-assisted capitalism rather than free trade, reacted to this Western initiative by shortening the timetable for their own AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) trade bloc. Another anti-Western shock wave erupted when Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia's prime minister, proposed an East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) under the aegis of Japan, with China and Korea invited but with the U.S., Australia, and Canada strictly excluded. Still another shock came when the Philippines shut down the American naval base at Subic Bay, to the tune of an anti-Western diatribe from the Philippine Senate president, Jovito Salonga: "Today we have summoned the political will to stand up and end 470 years of foreign military presence in the Philippines" (Bello 3). Meanwhile the potential for a Northeast Asian (NEA) accord was being explored. The idea had obvious economic merit: Coupled with China's huge and affordable work force and Russia's abundant natural resources, the capital and technology of Japan and South Korea could be expected to turn the NEA region as a whole into an Asian "mega-tiger." By 1994, however, this dream had all but disintegrated (see Rozman 1, 4). Gilbert Rozman points out that the prospect of NEA regionalism "brought to the forefront true civilizational divides" (22).

Fearing that Japan would turn NEA cooperation into its own "flying-goose" cartel, China upgraded her diplomatic relations with Moscow, thus putting both Tokyo and Washington on edge. Increasingly, however, the U.S. took the brunt of Chinese invective (Rozman 20). Since NEA multilateralism tends to vary inversely with U.S. diplomatic strength in the region, it was not good news for the U.S. when, in the middle of Clinton's first term, China's Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji got a warm reception on his trip to Tokyo, when Japan's Hosokawa reciprocated with a visit to Beijing, or when President Kim Young Sam of Korea visited both ("Time" 19). An even worse omen was the April 1997 Moscow summit between Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin, both of whom pledged support for a multilateral world order to block the hegemony of any state — meaning, obviously, the U.S. (Wishnick 1049).

What kept the U.S. in the game was the enormous distrust that every NEA power feels towards every other. This same distrust makes the June 2000 summit between North Korea's Kim Jung Il and the South's Kim Dae Jung a dubious blessing so far as regional stability is concerned. Reunification would revive the centuries-old competition for hegemony over Korea (see "Japan"). Given the region's culturally ingrained distrust, the U.S. has a vital role to play as a counterbalance to resurgent Sino-centricism. This strategy, however, requires close attention to the minutia of cultural realism. To follow Huntington in his concentration on "civilizational" fault lines is already to miss those details: This would reproduce in cultural geopolitics the monolithic scale that encumbered domino theory logic, and with the same catastrophic results. Not only would it do a disservice to legitimate U.S. security concerns, but to the interests of all Asian nations under China's hegemonic shadow. Without outside support, weaker Rim countries will be pushed into a politics of accommodation where the center holds all too well, while stronger countries will be forced into a costly and perilous arms race.

By grounding balance-of-power politics in national and local (not just civilizational) social reality, the cultural realism of this article moves beyond Huntington and Fukuyama alike. It avoids the
monolithic fallacies of political realism on the one hand and "reverse domino" globalization on the other. This affords a more effective realism, but, it must be granted, one which is still but a tool in a larger foreign policy schema. In terms of means and ends, it is still only a strategy — a means in search of a suitable end (suitable, that is, to both poles of a given cultural dialogue). In forthcoming work I argue that the end most commensurate with cultural realism — which I term "moral realism" — gets past Huntington's negative, retreatist realism by re-engaging other political cultures on an ethical plane. In the spirit of post-Bakhtinian dialogics, rather than any neo-imperialism (including, most emphatically, that of corporate globalization), this cultural realism turns Huntington's cultural isolationism on its head.

**Works Cited**


Contested (Post)coloniality and Taiwan Culture: A Review Article of New Work by Yip and Ching
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The reciprocity and complexities of the (post)colonial conditions are some of the issues that propelled new theoretical developments in postcolonial studies and a recent surge of scholarly interest in modern Taiwan. Emerging from this renewed interest in postcolonial theories is an acute awareness of Taiwan's indeterminable status. A number of critics have noted that whether or how the postcolonial model can be deployed (see, e.g., Liao, "Taiwan" 85-86; Chou 15) depends on whether Taiwan is in fact being "re-colonized" under a US-American cultural logic (see Liao, "Postcolonial Studies" 1-16) or when Taiwan entered a postcolonial phase: "Was it with the end of Japanese rule in 1945? With the end of martial law and the KMT's (Guomindang, GMD) "internal colonial" rule in 1987? Or is Taiwan still under US-American "neocolonial" rule?" (Teng 250). At stake is not simply a problem of periodization or ambiguous terminology deployed by politicians, but a critical impasse surrounding Taiwan's contested (post)coloniality and modernity. Indeed, Taiwan can be said to be occupying a liminal, in-between space. This perpetual indeterminacy has given rise to quests for personal and cultural identities in Taiwanese literature, film, and historical narratives. Spatial and temporal ambiguity bred narratives that are challenging categories.

In this review article I examine these idiosyncrasies and cover two recent monographs on colonial Taiwan (1895-1945) and postcolonial Taiwan (1960s-1990s) by two US-based scholars: June Yip's Envisioning Taiwan: Fiction, Cinema, and the Nation in the Cultural Imaginary (Duke University Press, 2004) and Leo T.S. Ching's Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation (University of California Press, 2001). Yip and Ching confront and complicate all the aforementioned questions. Envisioning Taiwan and Becoming "Japanese" cover two of the most important periods in Taiwanese identity formation in chronological order: the Japanese colonization in the first half of the twentieth century and democratizing decades in the second half of the twentieth century. Read together, the books' contrasting periods of study and choices of examples help to illuminate the many ironies in the tropes of nationhood in Taiwan and in the greater Cultural China. These two studies position Taiwan in a truly transnational context in and beyond what Tu Wei-ming has called "Cultural China," an emergent cultural space produced through the interaction of three symbolic universes: societies with ethnic Chinese majorities (China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), diasporic Chinese communities, as well as non-Chinese individuals who interact with the idea of "China" (Tu 1-34). Envisioning Taiwan and Becoming "Japanese" do not treat Taiwan and its cultural production simply as a part of Cultural China, Japan, or any of perceivably dominant cultures. Both books treat Taiwan as a hybrid (in Ching's case) and "newly emerging globalized" cultural space (in Yip's case) where different sets of highly contingent metanarratives are produced and negotiated. Bridging literary studies and historical analysis, both works make significant contribution to a marginalized but important field of study in relation to our understanding of globalization, nationalism, and the "China" question.

Some background information is necessary in order to understand Ching's and Yip's projects, given Taiwan's contested (post)colonial conditions and the idiosyncrasies of "Taiwan Studies" — which is not recognized by many as a field of study in its own right. I begin with Taiwan's unique situation. An island is a paradox, confined simultaneously by the ocean surrounding it, yet open to trade and exchange opportunities afforded (or made obligatory) by the ocean. The political and cultural history of Taiwan reflects these paradoxical configurations. An island off the southeast coast of the People's Republic of China, Taiwan was governed by a number of political bodies with contrasting ideologies. After four decades of Dutch colonial rule (1624-1662), Taiwan was governed by the Chinese (1662-1895), which was followed by Japanese colonization (1895-1945). The Japanese rule
Contested (Post)coloniality and Taiwan Culture

had a decisive impact on the formation of highly contested “Taiwanese” identities. Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and the defeat of the Republican nationalist government (which fled to Taiwan), both Taiwan and China have claimed sovereignty over each other. Within Taiwan, there have been three almost equally powerful forces at work: one that imagines a pure Taiwanese identity that is anterior to the perceived “Chinese-ness” of Taiwanese culture; one that champions the centrality of Chinese influence in the Taiwanese cultural identity; and one that seeks solace in maintaining Taiwan's current ambiguous political status. Contributing to these complex conditions is Taiwan's linguistic and ethnic diversity. The residents of Taiwan include different ethnic groups that have immigrated to the island in different times: Han Chinese, Taiwanese, Hakka, and nine aboriginal tribes. While Mandarin Chinese is the official language, other dialects (especially Taiwanese and Hakka) are widely spoken and employed in the literature and film from the island. At times, these works problematize this linguistic diversity. Therefore, Yip has devoted an entire chapter to the relationship between language and nationhood as epitomized in Hou Hiao-hsien's films (chapter 5 and especially its sections on heteroglosia and bilingualism, pages 162-69).

Taiwan's multiply determined history is reflected by Yip's and Ching's interdisciplinary and border-crossing approaches. Yip delineates a Taiwanese identity in relation to the presence of Japan, China, and the West in Taiwan's nativist (hsiang-t'u) writer, Hwang Chun-ming, and a New Cinema filmmaker, Hou Hiao-hsien. Ching focuses on the Japanese colonial discourse of assimilation and its relation to Wu Cho-liu's The Orphan of Asia. Yip's and Ching's studies shed new light on the paradox of Taiwan's geo-political and cultural locations, approaching these topics in a manner that is both historically and critically alert. They consider not only the roles different languages played (Japanese, Mandarin, Taiwanese, among others) in Taiwan's contested identities, but also the attendant promises and challenges of this diversity. Ching argues that the Japanese colonial discourse of assimilation (doka) and imperialization (kominka) entailed not only resistance but various forms of collaboration. Ching's book makes a great read before one comes to Yip's study. Ching provides an important historiography for the decades preceding those treated by Yip's book. Yip traces the continuous developments of senses of self and Taiwan's perceived others in the years after the Japanese colonial rule and the tensions between Taiwan's past ties with Japan and its current connections and disjunctions with a new nationalist China. New forms of assimilation can be seen in the literary and cinematic works examined by Yip.

Further, Taiwan's tumultuous political history prompted both Yip and Ching to begin their books with anecdotal accounts of key historical moments that illuminate their analyses of identity politics in subsequent chapters. Ching details the 1979 incident when seven Taiwanese aborigines traveled to the Yasuguni jingja shrine to demand the return of the spirits of their husbands who were drafted and died fighting for the Japanese empire. Yip theorizes the implications of the 1999 Taiwan Strait crisis triggered by Taiwan's first "native born, [pro-Japan], democratically elected" President Lee Teng-hui's remark on the "special state-to-state relationship" between Taiwan and China, a "surprising departure from the intentionally ambiguous terminology in which Taiwan's status has traditionally been shrouded" (Yip 1). In response, Beijing conducted military exercises and extensive missile "tests" in and around Taiwan, issuing a statement about Taiwan's status as part of the Chinese nation. On the other hand, Taiwanese officials rely on "slippery semantics" to describe Taiwan's undefined status (Yip 2). In the 1979 incident, both the Taiwanese aborigines and the Japanese officials at the shrine could not reach a consensus on how to handle the delicate requests in post-war and post-colonial conditions. Both parties demanded respect for their customs and values (Ching 3), and both parties were quite certain about their cultural affiliations and identities and refused to recognize any possibility of contaminating hybridization. Similarly, President Lee, a pro-Japan and US-American-educated "native" Taiwanese, was confident in his cultural coordinate in the cultural space and the
Contested (Post)coloniality and Taiwan Culture

political world. However, both the Chinese and Taiwanese considered his identity politics problematic and perilous, for President Lee did acknowledge in an interview in 1994 "he was 'Japanese' before the age of twenty" (Ching 174).

In both instances, all parties involved exhibit an irrepresible desire for recognition. Ching observes that, not unlike his contemporary writers and filmmakers and their predecessors, Lee Teng-hui's enunciated multiple cultural and national affiliations shows that what is really at stake is not "the verity of what they have claimed [of their and other's identities], but the facility with which those claims were made" (175). In this light, Ching reads Wu Cho-liu's *The Orphan of Asia* as a political allegory. Despite its channeling of politics into a personal journey and personal identity crisis, the novel imagines an "emergent" Taiwan at the juncture of the failed and "residual" Chinese culturalism and the "dominant" Japanese colonialism (Ching 176-77). Yip's observations based on a rather different set of examples echo some of the issues raised by Ching. Yip maintains that "the rural idyll" (192), a trope found in Hwang Chun-ming's *hsiang-tu* (regionalist or nativist literature) stories, has a "powerful emotional appeal" to readers in a society that was in transition from agrarian society to urbanization (Yip 191). What belies this fascination is not just the nostalgic mimicry but the "imagined sense of unity" (191) exposed and critiqued at once by these works.

In terms of methodology and scope, *Envisioning Taiwan* and *Becoming "Japanese"* are unique in their interdisciplinary approach as well as transnational focus that question the presence of national boundaries in cultural production and in cultural analysis. However, these two books also represent the wave of interest in identity formation that emerged in the past few years. They are part of the paradigm shift toward studying Taiwan's cultural history in the larger contexts of global movements of material and cultural goods. In recent studies of Taiwanese cultural scenes, we find a recursion to the island's long overlooked colonial past and its ambiguous relationship to the Anglophone West and two of its most powerful neighboring states: China (including the Qing dynasty and the People's Republic of China) and Japan. Taiwan's artists, writers, filmmakers, and consumers of these cultural products all wrestle with difficult questions of identities in one form or another.

A number of titles that appeared in the past years revisit the vexed question of identity politics in the colonial and postcolonial eras. They framed their inquiries around Taiwan, a rediscovered site for differing theoretical exercises ranging from postcolonial studies to postmodernism. These books include Mark Harrison's *Legitimacy, Meaning and Knowledge in the Making of Taiwanese Identity* (Palgrave, 2006); Chun-chieh Huang's *Taiwan in Transformation, 1895-2005: The Challenge of a New Democracy to an Old Civilization* (Transaction, 2006); Nancy Guy's *Peking Opera and Politics in Taiwan* (University of Illinois Press, 2005); Melissa J. Brown's *Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities* (University of California Press, 2004); Emma Teng's *Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683-1895* (Harvard University Press, 2004); Yvonne Sung-sheng Chang's *Literary Culture in Taiwan: Martial Law to Market Law* (Columbia University Press, 2004); Michelle Yeh and N.G.D. Malmqvist, eds., *Frontier Taiwan: An Anthology of Modern Chinese Poetry* (Columbia University Press 2001); and Ying-Hsiung Chou and Joyce Chi-Hui Liu, eds., *Shuxie Taiwan: Wenxue shi, hou zhimin yu hou xiandai* (Writing Taiwan: Strategies of Representation) (Maitian Chubanshe, 2000). Many of these works focus on the complexity of identity formation: some celebrate the diverse and not always harmonious visions in art and poetry, while others challenge the very institution of postcolonial studies. Echoing Leo Ching's argument about the absence of a decolonization process at the end of Japanese colonialism (Ching 15-50), Emma Teng finds that a similar absence of decolonization "determines contemporary China-Taiwan affairs" and the identity of Taiwan (250). Michelle Yeh concludes in her introduction to the anthology that modern Chinese poetry in Taiwan represents "a synthesis of heterogeneous forces and contending visions: aboriginal and Han Chinese, Chinese and
Japanese, traditional and modern, local and global, 'mainlander' and 'Taiwanese' (50-51). She attributes the sources of this distinct identity in poetry to multiple cultural transplantations. Working on a completely different medium, Nancy Guy analyzes the fate of Peking opera in Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period. Not unlike Yeh, Guy pays special attention to identity politics. She argues that the most important factor for Peking opera's rise to popularity in Taiwan was the literati's need to "strengthen cultural ties with China, which in turn affirmed their identity as Chinese [and not that of the undesirable colonizers]" (Guy 15).

In light of these recent theoretical developments, Yip's and Ching's focus on nationhood and cultural identity is no coincidence. Yip highlights Taiwan's history of "multiple colonizations" and "its globally mobile population" (11). Both Envisioning Taiwan and Becoming "Japanese" are persuasive in their assertion of the limitations of conventional models of postcolonial studies that subscribe to or seek to deconstruct the nation. Yip and Ching emphasize the reciprocity of cultural categories that are correlative terms: local/global, national/international, authenticity/hybridity, and more. Ching argues that Taiwanese or Taiwaneseness "do not exist outside the temporality and spatiality of colonial modernity, but are instead enabled by [the colonial condition]" (11).

As such, Envisioning Taiwan and Becoming "Japanese" represent the beginning of the next phase of Taiwan studies, a field complicated by Taiwan's nativist campaign (or "indigenization," Yip 5), Taiwan and Chinese nationalist sentiments, and the conscious effort toward institutionalization of the field in the U.S. (as represented, for example, by the founding of the Center for Taiwan Studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara). In the context of postcolonial and Asian studies, Yip's and Ching's books also signify a new wave to study Taiwan in comparative contexts, to recognize and theorize the legacy of the Japanese Empire and Chinese nationalism. Just as colonialism has become an integral part of the theorization of modern life and identity in the West, Yip and Ching's works, along with others that emerged over the last decade, have exposed the ironies of any homogeneous nation formation, be it nationalist China, post/colonial Taiwan, the homogenizing West, or imperial Japan. These contexts made Ching and Yip self-conscious about their own historicity and locality in relation to the study of Taiwanese literature and culture, and this is why both books end with a reflection on the institution of postcolonial critical discourse itself. They discuss the implications of the recent surge of scholarly interest in Taiwan as a marginalized (post)colonial site rife with tensions. In their metacritical positions, Yip and Ching bring the anxieties and identity crises in works they analyze to bear on the attendant perils of the marginalization (by the US-American academe and by world politics) and centralization (by Taiwan's indigenization movement) of Taiwan. Their analyses of Hwang Chun-ming, Hou Hsiao-hsien, and Wu Cho-liu not only call into attention what Ching calls "radical consciousness," a dialectic strife between overlapping yet ideologically opposed values (210), but also bring to light new challenges of new directions for postcolonial studies in a post-national era. Most of the texts Yip and Ching examine have been canonized and thus the issues they raise are not new. They have been fiercely debated in contested terms, especially in the scholarly communities of Taiwan and China. However, through their innovative approaches, Yip's and Ching's studies reposition these texts and the discipline itself at an interesting vantage point. They give equal attention to the processes and the dialectic of identity formation. Ching anticipates and Yip echoes Melissa Brown's argument in her ethnographic study that ethnic or cultural identities are based on complex personal and social experiences rather than common culture or ancestry. Since identity is "a matter of politics," Brown suggests that critics "must untangle the social grounding of identities from the meanings claimed for those identities in the political sphere" (2). Yip and Ching make it clear that they are not interested in producing attractive or politically "correct" results. They are self-conscious about the need to be critically alert to the identity politics they are analyzing, local politics on site (Taiwan, China, Japan), and the US-American academe. Ching calls for an end to
the "ghettoization" of postcolonial studies. Yip declares up front that her purpose is "not to shoehorn Taiwan into any particular metanarrative" (11). She challenges the orthodoxies of both the KMT (Guomindang, GMD) Party, which envisions a globally articulated identity for Taiwan, and the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party), which embraces a decidedly more local and nativist identity. Yip's deconstruction of the nation as a critical category and an ideology defies extremism. *Envisioning Taiwan* suggests a Taiwan that is neither a part of China nor a postcolonial nation.

One of the paradoxes in cross-cultural studies is the mutual exclusiveness of two approaches that, ironically, seek to expand critical possibilities and to accommodate the fluidity of globalizing processes. Yip identifies this paradox aptly as epitomized in the co-existence of the tendency to emphasize transnational contexts and the corresponding recursion to the nation. There have been two main groups of these competing "metanarratives": one that envisions the multiplicity and hybridity of post-national cultural spaces, and the other that insists on the "continued importance of local differences" and "reinscribes the nation into the critical discourse" (Yip 3). Yip does not subscribe to either mode of engagement because the conventional models of the nation and postcoloniality are no longer effective to analyze the "complex cultural heterogeneity" (5) of Hwang and Hou's programmatic production of a post-war Taiwanese identity. This vantage point allows Yip to see Taiwan as one of the first post-national or supra-national sites that demonstrate a number of postmodern characteristics (perhaps Yip would find it advantageous to inquire into the post-national situation of Canada?). Similarly, Ching has found postcolonialism to be a rather ineffective and limiting critical category in the contexts of Japan's "continuous disavowal of its war crimes and coloniality" (12) as well as the reconfiguration of Taiwan's conditions and consciousness (51-88). Ching suggests a "class-based interrogation" (as opposed to the ethnocentric mode) of the articulations of Taiwanese, Japanese, and Chinese consciousness and he theorizes Taiwanese identity as a triple consciousness. Emma Teng's remark (in her book published the same year as Yip's) about the significance of Asian postcolonial studies sums up the contribution of *Envisioning Taiwan* and *Becoming "Japanese"* to comparative cultural studies including postcolonial studies: "The study of Qing imperialism [in Taiwan] is important not simply because we are adding another regionally specific case to the already long list of colonizers, nor because such a study can show us what is 'missing' (from Western colonial theory) or what is 'different' [about Qing imperialism]. It is important precisely because it destabilizes the dichotomy between the West/colonizers and the non-West/colonized" (257-58).

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Contested (Post)coloniality and Taiwan Culture


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Bibliography for the Study of Cultural Discourse in Taiwan


Index

fin-de-siècle Taiwan 67
foreign bride 162-63, 174
foreign laborers 165, 172
Fukuyama, Francis 178-79, 184, 190, 194
Giddens, Anthony 18, 20-21, 25, 28
Gramsci, Antonio 31, 37, 49-50
Great China-ism 56
Guattari, Félix 118, 139, 151-54, 156, 158, 159
Guoyu (National Language or Mandarin) 113, 170-71
Hakka 40, 43, 69, 116, 123-24, 128-37, 147, 166-70, 174, 203
Han poetic 131
hegemony 23, 30-32, 35-37, 46, 62-63, 91, 94, 97, 194
Hillenbrand, Margret 23, 28, 220
hiragana 145-46
homeland 33, 37, 41, 47, 55, 61, 79, 81, 106, 110, 112-14, 130, 217, 233
Hou, Hsiao-hsien 11, 16, 22, 208
City of Sadness (Beijingchengshi) 16, 22
hsiang-tu wenxue (regionalist literature) 143, 157-59, 205
Huang, Alexander C. Y. 211, 220-21
Huang, Heng-chiu 128-29, 135
Huang, Weiliang 86, 221
Huntington, Samuel 177, 179-81, 184, 186, 190-91, 194-96
The Clash of Civilizations 179-80, 196
huigui zuguo (returning to the homeland) 110
Hwang, Chun-ming 203, 205, 208
hybridity 60-61, 63-64, 139, 207, 209, 215
Illich, Ivan 124, 135
immigrant brides 161, 163-64
imperialist colonialism 140
imperialization 138, 144-48, 204, 217, 221
The International Herald Tribune 26, 28
intentional hybrid 139, 157
international marriage 161-63
Jakobson, Roman 145, 159
Japanese period (Japanese colonization period) 11, 52, 214
Johnston, Alastair 178, 197
Kang Xi, Emperor (Kang Hsi) 95
Kaplan, Caren 99, 105, 107
Katakana 145-46
King Alfonso of Spain 125
Kissing, Henry 179, 184, 186-90, 197
Kuomintang (KMT; Guomindang, GMD) 31-39, 45, 52, 57-58, 63-64, 68, 71, 74, 78, 87-88, 109-11, 123-24, 138, 201, 209
Kurosawa, Akira 16
Lai, Ho 128, 139-43, 160
language equality 170-73, 175
language map of Taiwan 167
language policy 47, 125, 170
Lee, Leo 19, 28, 223
Lee, Teng-hui (Lee, Denghui) 35, 38-39, 49, 72, 74, 83, 130, 204-05
Lee, Yu-lin 160, 223-24
Lee, Yu-hui 145, 159
Li, Chiao 129
Li, Yih-yuan 33, 49
Li, Yu-fang 129-30, 133, 136, 216
Lian, Heng 68
Taiwan Tongshi 68
Liang, Jung-mao 170, 174
Liao, Chao-yang 61, 74-76
Liao, Ping-hui 210, 224
Lin, Pei-yin 77
Lin, Tsung-yuan 124
linguistic rights 170, 172-73, 175-76
linguistic topography 146
Literary Culture in Taiwan 10, 28-29, 206, 214
literary polysystem of Taiwan 116
Literary Taiwan (Wenxue jie) 57, 59-60
Liberty Times (Tsu Yu Shi Pao) 85
Lytotard, François 98, 107
Lu, Yu 81
Mainland China 10, 13-17, 21, 27, 32, 78-80, 84, 90, 123, 161-63, 165
Mahua literature 117, 119, 122, 230
Malaysia 108-22 164-65, 185, 193
Malraux, André 188
Mandarin 61, 123, 130, 138, 143, 149-51, 153, 163-71, 203
Ming Dynasty 95-96, 129
the Ministry of the Interior 161-62, 164-66, 175
modernism 16-21, 23-24, 72, 132, 135, 177, 186
Moynihan, Daniel 188, 190, 198
multilingualism 152-53, 166
nation-building 40, 49, 60
nation-state 10, 12, 15, 125, 178, 215, 216
national identity 50, 56, 75, 88, 113, 117, 132, 221, 234
national narration 71
native soil imagination 56, 69, 71
nativist rhetoric 52-53, 60, 70-71
neo-imperialism 195
new cultural Zhongyuan (Chungyuan) 41
New Taiwanese 39, 159
nomadism 139, 153-58
O'Hare, Dean 189
Peng, Ruijin (Peng, Ju-Chin) 57
phonocentric ideology 143-44
post-Cultural Revolution 89
post-Operasi Lalang era 112
postmodern hybridity 60
Pratt, Mary Louise 124
pronunciation sign 145
Qiandao Lake Incident 34
Qin (Ching) dynasty 178
Qu, Yuan (Chu, Yuan) 78, 81
Rabelais 149, 159-60
Rashomon 16
regime of the truth 30
Republican Chinese literature 24
Rorty, Richard 187, 191, 195
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich 179, 198
Rushdie, Salman 112
Said, Edward 12, 78, 86, 107, 179, 198
Shi, Lang 95
Shih, Cheng-feng 170, 175
Shih, Shu 139
Shih, Shu-mei 118, 121
Sino-centricism 194
Sinophone Malaysian Literature (SMLIT) 108-09, 111, 114-22
Sinophone sphere 13
social conflict 140
Spenser, Edmund 78
“The Story of Five Concubines” 89-90, 93, 96-97
Tai, Kuo-hui 37
Taiwan awareness 36
Taiwan-centrism 55-60
Taiwan consciousness 52, 54, 58-62, 64, 73, 123
Taiwan discourse 47
Taiwan New Cinema 11, 16, 28
Taiwan residence permission 164
Taiwan Studies 10.12, 15, 24, 202, 207
Taiwan subjectivity 62
Taiwanese aborigines 204
Index

Taiwanese awareness 30, 33, 38, 41, 44, 48
Taiwanese identity 30-31, 34-39, 46, 48, 55, 113, 201, 203, 206, 209, 223
Taiwanese literary modernity 20
Taiwaneness 47, 207, 213
Tang poetry 104
Tee, Kim Tong 119, 229
The Third Wave 179, 196
Thornton, William H. 199-200, 230
Tiunn, Hak-khiam 170, 176
translingual practice 138-39
Tsai, Ming-liang 11
Tseng, Kuei-hai 132, 137
Tu, Cheng-sheng 45
Tu, Wei-ming 12-13, 29, 202 210
Tu-P'an Fang-ko 129
unconscious hybrid 139, 157
unintentional hybrid 139, 157
vernacular Hakka 131
vernacular Holo dialect 124
vernacular writing 24, 124, 136, 142-43, 153
Vietnam Syndrome 184
Wang, Chen-ho 148, 159-60
Wang, Dewei (Wang, David Derwei) 66, 76
Wang, I-chun 137
Westernism 88
Wong, Lisa L. M. 107
Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers
Literature (gong nong bing wenxue) 56
Wu, Chuo-liu 129
"Xinglu Nan" 90
Yang, Edward 11
Yang, Mu 85-102
Yang, Zujun 58, 76
Ye, Shitao (Yeh, Shih-tao) 54-55, 57-59, 70, 72, 77
Yeh, Michelle 89, 206, 222
You Ren 98-105, 107
Yu, Guangzhong (Yu, Kwang-chung) 55, 72, 78, 80-83, 86
"Nostalgia" 78-88
"Nostalgia: Four Rhymes" 80
Zheng, Chenggong (Koxinga) 91, 93, 95
zhonghua minzu (chunghua minzu) 15
Zhu, Rongji 194
Zhu, Tianxin (Chu, Tien-hsin) 54, 64-66, 71, 75-77
Zhu, Xining (Chu, His-ning) 55-56