

“Back To the Future”

Philosophy of Education as an Instrument of Its Time

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Abstract

In this 2006 John Dewey Society Invited Address, I place Dewey in a larger philosophical and historical context. My hope is that by doing so we can learn more about the future prospects for the role of philosophy of education. I see Dewey as one of those rare canonical philosophers whose reputation as a philosopher is intricately tied to their writings on education and I want to explore why this tie makes sense with some canonical figures, such as Plato and Rousseau, but not with others, such as Aristotle, Locke, Whitehead, and Russell, who have also contributed to our understanding of education.

It is an honor to present the Dewey lecture this year. As some of you know I have been occupied with the contribution of Dewey on and off for much of my professional career, and I want then to take the occasion of this talk to place Dewey in a larger philosophical and historical context. My hope is that by doing so we can learn more about the future prospects for the role of philosophy of education. I see Dewey as one of those rare canonical philosophers whose reputation as a philosopher is intricately tied to their writings on education and I want to explore why this tie makes sense with some canonical figures but not with others who have also contributed to our understanding of education.

Consider, for example, the difference between Plato and Aristotle. Certainly Aristotle's contribution to our conception of a liberal education has been profound. And it is not as if the appropriation of Aristotle for the purposes of education is over, as witnessed by Randy Curren's productive mining of Aristotle for our own

times.¹ It is rather that we can think about Aristotle without connecting him to education in a way that we cannot do when we think of Plato. Plato without the *Republic* is simply not the Plato that we know today. The *Republic* is truly a work in educational philosophy; it speaks to the systematic production and reproduction of consciousness and the intersubjective understandings that must be generated to maintain a projected social order. Aristotle's writings on education are part of something else, his politics or his ethics—written in both the upper and the lower case. With the *Republic* it is education all the way, and if anything, the politics and the ethics are woven into the educational project, rather than the other way around.

The same might be said about Rousseau, the second canonical philosopher, whose philosophical identity is intricately tied to *Emile*, his work on educational philosophy. Why is *Emile* so much a part of Rousseau's philosophical identity, whereas Locke's *Thoughts on Education* is a neglected component of his philosophical work? Dewey, the third figure in my trilogy, is somewhat easier to understand, given the time and space that he devoted to the practical matter of schooling. Yet here too there is a puzzle. Bertrand Russell opened his own experimental school with his wife in the 1920s and had many things to say about education, most of which are simply forgotten today, and Alfred Whitehead's essay "Aims of Education," a most sensible work, sits dusty and unopened on many library shelves.

Now what I want to ask in this talk is why this identity of some canonical philosophers with their writings on education makes sense in some cases and not in others. Is it reasonable that Plato, but not Aristotle, that Rousseau, but not Locke, that Dewey, but not Russell or Whitehead, be identified as educational philosophers as well as, well, *just* philosophers. I want to argue that it is justified, but not because one or the other provides a more coherent argument, but rather because the educational writings of the former capture the historical moment and bring it to fruition in an image of a new social order with a new form of intersubjectivity.

The traditional view is that the works of these writers are to be understood on their own terms as arguments about the aims of education and the instruction of the young. Hence, as works in philosophy, they are neither to be seen as responses to their own time nor to be evaluated in terms of their influence on the educational process. While this standard may be appropriate for evaluating the arguments put forth in any given work, it is inadequate for understanding why one work and not another is part of the philosophical canon. And it is not as if the work of Plato Rousseau and Dewey were not without serious philosophical gaps. It could be argued that the only recognizably philosophical argument in the *Republic* occurs in the very first part in the disputations on the nature of justice, and that Plato never really answers Glaucon's question, why a person should choose to be moral if he were sure that he could get away with being immoral. Perhaps Plato's answer, for the sake of the soul, would satisfy someone whose soul was already whole, but it is unlikely to satisfy mere mortals with fragmented souls and limited vision. Similarly with Rousseau, if his educational importance lies, as some have

suggested, in his discovery of childhood as a distinct period in a person's life, it was a discovery in which many of the particulars were inaccurate. It was childhood but perhaps without children.

Even looked at through the more generous lens of education rather than through the more rigorous lens of philosophy, it is not easy to see why Plato the autocrat and Rousseau the romantic remain such an intractable part of the canon. Certainly, most classroom teachers do not find much that is useful in their work. The same cannot be said for Dewey, who has inspired much that is still evident in education today. Yet Dewey's own experience with children was limited to the self-selected upper-middle-class children in the lab school, and he was unable to adequately address the forces faced by working class or minority children and their parents.

In addressing the question: Why Plato, Rousseau and Dewey and why not Aristotle, Locke and Whitehead or Russell? I am not asking who was the better philosopher, an activity that occupies the idle moments of many academic philosophers. In terms of sheer technical capacity, Aristotle and Locke might well edge out the more poetic Plato and Rousseau. Rather, I am asking why the *Republic* is thought to be quintessentially Plato and *Emile* is quintessentially Rousseau in a way that Aristotle's writings or Locke's writings on education are not. I want to suggest that the answer has little to do with the cogency of argument or the pedagogical soundness of their insights. As I mentioned, Plato's *Republic* has but one section—the disputation on the nature of justice—that is devoted to argument in any philosophically recognizable sense and even that section fails to provide a convincing response to the critical question it poses: Why be just if one can be unjust and get away with it? Yet somehow the *Republic*, along with the *Apology*, is probably the most frequently assigned writing of Plato.

If it is hard to find a successful philosophical argument in Plato's *Republic*, it is even harder to find an attempt to present a reasoned argument in Rousseau's *Emile*. Recently feminists have argued convincingly that Rousseau had a bias against women and saw them as fit only for a maternal role. The power of this argument is only mitigated somewhat by the fact that Rousseau had a bias against many groups—blacks, tradesmen, English people and meat eaters, to mention but a few. *Emile*, filled as it is with prejudice and unsupported opinion, was, according to a recent biographer, largely dismissed in its own time as the writing of a second-rate intellect.²

Dewey's educational writings might be more difficult to dismiss, but his notion of growth is notoriously vague, and in some respects inadequate. Growth arose through the development of ever more interests and ever increasing associations, as he makes clear in his chapter on democracy in *Democracy and Education*. Yet in reality growth in one area limits growth in another. The muscles of a ballet dancer are formed to move differently than those of a runner. Whitehead's "Aims of Education," while brief, is much more sensitive to different stages of learning, and it is somewhat of a mystery why Dewey's reputation should be so linked to his

work on education whereas Whitehead's and Russell's writings on the topic are largely ignored in any assessment of their philosophical contributions. Indeed, if Dewey's reputation as a philosopher were anchored in his technical writing we would look to works like "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," not to *Democracy and Education*, as representative of his philosophical prowess. That this is not the case suggests the theme of this paper, that with regard to philosophy of education, it is not the argument that always carries the day but often the day carries the argument, and thus we must explore beneath the text in order to understand its significance both for its own time and for ours. I begin with Plato.

Let me begin not with the *Republic* but with the *Apology*, a dialogue that best expresses what we could call the paradox of Plato. The power of the *Apology* is found in the fact that it holds up Socrates as the paradigm of rationality. It is Socrates who, appealing to rational argument, advances his defense against the charge that he has corrupted the youth of Athens and made the worse the better and the better the worse cause. Plato continues this theme in the *Republic*, first with the disputations regarding justice and finally with the reification of rationality in the forms. Yet ironically the *Apology* rests its rational appeal on the most irrational foundation, the whisperings of the Oracle of Delphi, who tells Socrates that he is the wisest man in Athens. Socrates, accepting this commendation with the minimum of inquiry—a methodologically flawed and unrepresentative survey of a few selected Athenians—defends himself by proposing that since his wisdom comes from knowing that he does not know, he could not corrupt the youth of Athens.

This paradox of the *Apology*, which grounds rationality in the voice of a non-rational oracle, is repeated more self-consciously in the *Republic* as Plato juxtaposes the appeal to the rationality of the reader with the appeal to myth and the justification of lies that will be told to students and citizens of the Republic alike. Scholars have tended to focus on the myths and the lies themselves, but I think that the interesting point is the self-consciousness of the appeals. Why not just tell the noble lie to reader and citizen alike? Why label it for the one—here comes a myth; or, now I am going to tell a lie—while concealing it from the other?

The answer is that reason cannot take Plato as far as he wants to go. True, he acknowledges that it cannot take him the psychological distance—that is why he proposes to tell the noble lie. What he fails to acknowledge, but what is equally true, is that it cannot take him the rational distance either. When forced to respond to the problem raised by the ring of Gyge—why be moral if we can get away with being immoral—he is required to place logic aside and to turn to mythology. Yet the mythology he turns to is new in its self-consciousness.

What is important to notice here is that the significance of the *Republic* cannot be in its representation or modeling of rational argument. As a continuation of the paradox introduced in the *Apology*, the *Republic* offers an irrational source as the foundation of rationality and provides, except for the negative disputation on the nature of justice in the introductory books, very little in the way of dialogue or disputation. This is why, after the very first part of the *Republic* and the huffy exit

of Thrasy-machus, Socrates' interlocutors are largely reduced to a one- or two-word assent—yes Socrates, indeed Socrates, clearly it must be so Socrates.

If it is hard to find a successful philosophical argument in Plato's *Republic*, it is even harder to find a positive reasoned argument in Rousseau's *Emile*.³ After we extract the notion that childhood has its own character that must be respected, *Emile* is a work that is full of prejudice and unsupported opinion. For example, Rousseau advises children to be active and as lightly dressed in winter as in summer, a prescription that he supports by the fact that "this was the practice of Sir Isaac Newton during his whole life and he lived eighty years" (*Emile*, p. 127). Or he describes meat eaters, especially the English, as more cruel and ferocious than other men (p. 153). (He neglects to say whether Newton was a meat eater, or if so, whether he was also cruel and ferocious.) Further examples are when he quips, "the needle and the sword cannot be wielded by the same hands. If I were sovereign I would permit sewing and needle trades only to women and to cripples reduced to occupations like theirs" (p. 199); or when he suggests black people are inherently inferior. Much of the appeal of *Emile* is to be found not in its appeal to logic but to poetics, as it is with *Emile*'s first lesson in geography, taught not from books, but from observing daybreak as the sun rises, revealing to the boy the earth in all its splendor. Rousseau describes *Emile*'s awakening to a new day as follows: "the veil of darkness is drawn back and falls. Man recognizes his habitat and finds it embellished. The verdure has gained a new vigor during the night. The nascent day which illuminates it, the first rays which gild it, show it covered by a shining web of dew which reflects the light and colors to the eye. . . . There is a half hour of enchantment which no man can resist. So great, so fair, so delicious a spectacle leaves no one cold" (p. 168).

Dewey, of course, confined his poetry to, well, his poetry, but there was not a lot that was really new in his practical pedagogy. Many of the practices of the lab school had been anticipated by Colonel Francis Parker, whom Dewey himself acknowledged as the "Father of Progressive education" and by Ella Flagg Young, his head teacher at the lab school. And much of Dewey's criticism of traditional education had been expressed by the muckraking journalist Joseph Mayer Rice in his exposé of the nation's schools in the magazine *The Forum*, in 1892. Moreover, even Dewey, in addressing *Experience and Education* to his overzealous followers, allowed that his earlier educational ideas were subject to misunderstandings, and misinterpretations, misunderstandings that many attribute to the openness or vagueness, take your pick, of the earlier writings.

Given the gaps, contradictions, ambiguities and prejudices that we find in these authors I suggest that it may not be the argument that carries the day, but rather the day that carries the argument. Each of their philosophies addresses a society or way of life in decline, but their writings on education provide the script in which they imagine the ideas and values, the intersubjective possibilities, upon which a new age might be built. Education is central to this imagination because youth is the slate upon which the script for a new form of consciousness is written.

Unlike Hegel's owl of Minerva, who flies only after dusk has settled, these philosophers also fly with the swallows in the early dawn.

With Plato we know more about the dusk than the dawn. Plato wrote the *Apology* and the *Republic* after Athens had been vanquished by Sparta—its powerful navy destroyed, its empire lost. The trial of Socrates was an episode of recrimination similar to those that often occur after national defeat and humiliation. That was the dusk.

The dawn was equally challenging and more profound. The problem that Plato addressed was the problem of establishing a just order that might emerge out of this defeat. Socrates' passing had signaled a deeper transformation, one that according to Eric Alfred Havelock (*Preface to Plato*) involved the transition from an oral, mimetic society to a written one. In the former, moral codes were embedded into the very rhythmic structure, and close identification with the heroic stories was passed on from one generation. In the latter, distance, reflection and generational forgetfulness was possible. I will not go into Havelock's most interesting thesis here except to note that Socrates' passing may have marked the end of this oral tradition in philosophy and Plato's script the beginning of this new literate tradition as the mode of philosophizing. Ironically then, what Plato laments when he mourns the death of Socrates is his own role as executioner. And thus the *Republic* is about finding a new way to order a society where the norm can be disembodied from its exemplar, the heroic figures, and preserved as marks on a page. Myth is not abandoned, but it is made self-conscious as Plato proposes, perhaps for the first time, that the education of the young become a consciously directed product of collective social reproduction. The greater significance of the *Republic* then resides in this fact alone as Plato surveys the terrain both as dusk falls and then as dawn might appear, as one form of legitimation dies and the other waits to be born: *The education of the young, the formation of values and intersubjective understandings is a collective responsibility.*

In at least one important way Rousseau and Plato share the same educational vision. Both seek to tame desire and to bring it in line with reason. And for both reason lies beyond the reach of childhood. For Rousseau a man's (need I note *sic*?) strength is measured by the balance between his capacities and his desires. When his desires are greater than his capacities, he is weak; when his capacities are greater than his desires, he is strong. The education of Emile is a training in the taming of desire, and the mark of a reasonable person is one who can bring his desires in line with his capacity, taking into account the responsiveness of the natural order to his efforts.

The difference between them is that while Plato reified reason, placing it in the unchangeable forms, Rousseau brings it down to earth by identifying it with knowledge of the natural order of things. Plato's ideal was one of harmony between parts in accord with reason. Rousseau's was harmony of the capacities of men with the laws of nature, with the former as unyielding as the latter and brought about through the taming of desire (*Emile*, p. 85). These two forms of harmony translate

into quite different educational aims; where Plato educated for order and obedience to the philosopher-king and the philosopher-king to the forms, Rousseau spurns the ideal of obedience and educates the child so that he understands what nature requires. Necessity, not obedience, could be Rousseau's motto.

While the larger aims of Plato and Rousseau—that of harmonizing capacity and desire—were the same, the most stunning feature of Rousseau's pedagogy was his scheme to empty the child of all externally imposed habits and information, to teach him to avoid the opinion of others and to rely on his own understanding and initiative.

If Plato's educational writing is included in the philosophical canon as the first systematic presentation of education as conscious social reproduction, Rousseau may be said to be the first to present education as conscious social deconstruction. What counts most in the education of *Emile* is his own authenticity, his capacity to hear his own inner voice and to align his behavior with the basic law of human nature, self-love, amour de soi and the authentic love that occurs through sexual attraction that results in marriage, the love of one's family, which is eventually extended to patriotic affection for the political order in return for its protection of the family.⁴

Unlike Plato, where children are selected early and educated for specific occupational roles, Rousseau's education seeks to create a person who is able to transcend any single individual role, defined only by family and citizenship. Thus the first task of the educator is to empty the child of habits and opinions tied to authority and to allow him to be shaped by his senses alone and by his own inner directed voice.

Europe's population began to rise around 1750, more than a decade before the publication of *Emile*,⁵ and given the rapid growth of an urban population, the suggestion to forget old habits and authorities may not have been so impractical as it appears today. As a result of population pressures, more and more people had left organic rural communities and, like Rousseau himself, immigrated to ever growing metropolitan areas. In the years preceding the revolution the urban bourgeoisie doubled in size,⁶ and their wealth and influence grew along with the cities that housed them.

When Rousseau's owl surveyed the scene, dusk was falling on an essentially agrarian way of life while influence, status and wealth were migrating to the city. In this context it would not have been totally foolish for a tutor to suggest that a child be denied the habits and products of cultural memory that had served his father. The life the child would likely lead was one very different from that led by the father. Hence Rousseau's owl surveyed the ebbing, not of a political regime—that was to come later—but of a social, political and moral authority, which he wisely advised *Emile*'s tutor to help him forget.

If Rousseau summarized the ending of one age he also anticipated the dawning of another as he wrote in justification of the education of *Emile*: "You trust in the present order of society without thinking that this order is subject to inevitable revolution, and it is impossible for you to foresee or prevent the one which may affect

your children. The noble become commoners, the rich become poor, the monarch becomes subject. . . . Happy is the man who knows how to leave the station which leaves him and to remain a man in spite of fate.”⁷

In the end, *Emile* is about preparation for a revolution in which all knowledge, all authority will be turned upside down, and in place of the sovereign crown will stand the sovereign citizen. *Emile* is the ideal democrat, the new Descartes, who accepts nothing on the basis of authority, and who, like Descartes, believes that the truth will be found through an inward search. Yet unlike Descartes, the path is not through the transparency of logic, but through the transparency of experience, and the result is not the discovery of God, but rather the discovery of the fixed laws of nature and eventually of one’s own inner, authentic voice.

Because desire has been tamed and self-interest absorbed into the whole, one can listen to the voice of the other and evaluate it in terms of the common good or the general will. In other words, Rousseau’s *Emile* belongs in the philosophical canon if for no other reason than it anticipates the ideal of the citizen sovereign, the person who, skeptical of authority, decides matters for himself in the interest of the political community and who, in learning to listen to his own voice, serves as spokesperson for the general good. In anticipating the qualities of this citizen, Rousseau invents the ideals of authenticity—that in being true to oneself, one is true to the good—and of autonomy, or a certain way of governing oneself according to one’s own true motivations and within a political community of similarly autonomous beings.⁸

True, part of the notion of autonomy was anticipated by Locke in his idea of liberty, but Rousseau is much more aware than is Locke of the way in which external influence can be appropriated to manipulate our motives, and hence he is aware that not all choice is an expression of oneself. What makes a choice an authentic choice for Rousseau as well as for Kant is that it is an unmanipulated expression of who I am.

Yet the irony, perhaps even the hypocrisy, of all of this is that *Emile*’s education is totally constructed by his tutor in a Disney-like imitation of a “natural environment” and therefore his authenticity is really someone else’s creation, and his view of nature as fixed and unyielding is imposed on him. And, of course, as imposed, it truly is fixed and unyielding. Nature is rigid because Rousseau has deemed it so and it is not as transparent as it seems, since Rousseau hides from *Emile* the elaborate stagecraft of his tutor. And so one might add that this was the tragedy of the French Revolution that was to come. It required the taming by the grand puppeteer who shaped citizens into soldiers as he marched the revolution’s ideals throughout Europe, carrying his version of democracy on the back of the French army.

Dewey challenges three critical features of Rousseau’s educational platform. First, his idea of nature and human nature, second his idea of desire and freedom, and third the relationship of the new to the old and hence the character of the educator’s task.

Before sketching these ideas, let me begin by rehearsing a familiar history. Dewey himself was born in a time of great turmoil. The Civil War was a year away, rail travel was just beginning, Darwin's *Origins of Species* was just published, and so America began its great transformation from an agricultural rural society to an industrial urban one. His birth marked the end of an era and of America—a rural, farm-based America with an unchallenged privileged white, male, Protestant population mainly from northern and western European countries. The telegraph and the radio had yet to be invented, the transcontinental rail line was not yet finished. By the time of his death the telephone and radio were fixtures in the American home, television and commercial jet travel were just over the horizon, and the civil rights movement was poised to begin.

If Plato's significance is in his understanding of education as conscious social reproduction and Rousseau's as conscious social deconstruction, Dewey's can be seen as conscious social co-construction. To understand the significance of Dewey in the philosophical and the educational canons is to understand how he used the image of the child as an incomplete, dependent, yet emergently interdependent being to bring together the organic rural community and its established, dependable and settled norms, with the emerging industrial age and its dynamic uncertainty, risk, openness and possibilities.

Education for Dewey would be the instrument to create the intersubjective understanding required to bring these two ages together. It had the potential to engage the possibilities that science and technology created without destroying the solidarity that, in his mind, belonged to the more settled agrarian communities.

In articulating this emergent form of intersubjectivity he was required to rethink the concept of nature inherited from Rousseau, as well as the relationship between desire and capacity shared by both Rousseau and Plato. He imagined a nature that was not fixed but was fraught with possibilities. He realized that childhood, Rousseau's discovery, is peopled by real children. He understood that children do not stand ready to conform to nature's demands, as a bright pigeon in a laboratory. They are independent experiencing agents, both constrained by and shaping of nature. And as products of this new age, they have the opportunity to cooperate with nature and to develop its possibilities. Nature and its laws are but instruments, tools to aid us in both shaping and realizing desire. Desire is not just to be tamed by capacity. Desire is capacity's partner, co-evolving in response to a changing physical and social environment and to new challenges and opportunities. Education reflects this partnership as the teacher stretches the child's capacities to shape new desires, thus building on the old and allowing capacities to grow in new and deeper ways. Dewey's educational subject is not just the child. Rather, it is the social order itself.

In stark contrast to Rousseau, however, his reconstruction involved not overthrowing the past but appropriating and reshaping it to serve present needs and future possibilities. Yet these possibilities were always to be accomplished collec-

tively as part of a communal effort whereby the community itself would evolve as different individual possibilities were realized.

As different as Dewey and Rousseau were they both operated under an assumption of national independence and sovereign state that had first been ironed out in the Treaty of Westphalia in the year 1648. This meant that both the agent and the object of collectively conscious self-reproduction was the nation-state. This is obvious in the case of Rousseau, who wrote in anticipation of the change from subject to citizen, whether it be of France, Poland, or Switzerland. It is less obvious in the case of Dewey, who often spoke as if the authority of science might replace the authority of the nation-state, largely assuming—at least until the end of the First World War and likely after—that American would serve as the spearhead to carry science and democracy, which he often conflated, to the rest of the world. This, in the final analysis, was the significance of the Polish study that I first wrote about in *Reason and Rhetoric*. It is why Dewey could, with clear conscience, submit to the War Department a chauvinistic study that would be classified confidential and proposals that expressed fear about the ultimate loyalty of Polish Americans to the United States and posed a de facto test of loyalty on the leaders of the Polish American community.⁹ For Dewey there was little conflict between his commitment to advancing the ideas of scientific inquiry, for him a critical plank in the advance of democracy, and his concern to assure the loyalty of the Polish community to the American nation even after the war was over. As he warned in a seemingly uncharacteristic passage, “The great industrial importance of Polish labor in this country must be borne in mind and the fact that there will be a shortage of labor after the war.”¹⁰ The contradiction is reconciled by the belief that this country was, as Wilson had proposed, making the world safe for democracy. Hence chauvinistic nationalism merged here with Dewey’s cosmopolitan impulses.

Both Rousseau and Dewey had cosmopolitan ideals of sorts, expressed in different terms: the general will, the public interest, and democratic associations, but each assumed that these ideals would be expressed independently within a relatively self-contained national formation. For Rousseau these ideals were eventually carried forward on the backs of Napoleon’s armies. For Dewey the hope was that they would be advanced through the opportunities provided by American schools.

Conditions Today

No one can predict when or whether any emerging canonical philosopher, if there be one, will be as closely identified with education as Plato, Rousseau, or Dewey, and it is possible that philosophy of education will continue to take a course that is informed by but relatively independent of philosophy.

In any event our present conditions suggest a task for philosophers of education, continuous with the spirit of Plato, Rousseau, and Dewey, to expose the normative fissions and possibilities created by the new conditions. Today in an ever shrinking world, flattened out by rapid transportation and instantaneous

communication—in a world in which a sneeze on an elevator in Hong Kong can initiate an epidemic in Toronto, where a half-ounce of pressure on the enter key of a computer can send a billion dollars flying at the speed of light from one part of the world to another with thousands of jobs following it; where a seed designed in a laboratory in Illinois can be developed in China and save thousands of lives in the Sudan; where a movement begun in India can inspire a letter on rights issued by a minister sitting in a Birmingham jail and where that letter can lend sparks to a revolution in Johannesburg and Soweto—in such a world we have no choice but to address the aims of education not just as citizens of nations but as the planetary species with the recognition that we alone have the responsibility for survival of all life that dwells here, with us.

The problem for the new philosophers of education in addressing and shaping norms of intersubjectivity will be to do so in ways that extend individual identity globally without destroying the sense of self so often associated with being located within a specific place and with belonging to a coherent community. To address this challenging problem philosophers of education will not be able to draw solely on the material and inspiration of one nation or one intellectual tradition, but will need to function as normative ethnographers, translating one community to another while engaging the forms of understanding and norms that are embedded in each.

When the new canonical philosophies of education are written, they will not be from the standpoint of the nation-state, with clear national boundaries, with singular cultural and linguistic preferences and sharply defined loyalties. Rather they will be written from the standpoint of a citizen in an ever-interdependent world, one where childhood represents the emergence not from dependence to independence, but, as Dewey thought, from dependence to interdependence, where education involves learning to reconstruct self and desire conscious of finite resources and of other peoples.

Notes

1. Randall R. Curren, *Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

2. Leo Damrosch, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Restless Genius* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin), p. 2.

3. One of the appeals of Rousseau is his capacity for powerful negative critiques, critiques that for Rousseau are accompanied by biting sarcasm. For example, noting the connection between religion and mostly forgotten languages he writes: "Is this not a simple way of instructing men—always speaking to them in a language they do not understand." (Bloom translation, p. 303.)

4. Allan Bloom, "Introduction," *Emile: or, On Education* (New York: Basic Books, 1979), p. 17. In Bloom's excellent introduction to *Emile* he speaks of loyalty to the political order, but this seems to make the relation too instrumental, loyalty in exchange for protection. It may be better to speak in terms of patriotism or a love of country, which may initiate in the family but expands out beyond it.

5. Fernand Braudel, *The Structure of Everyday Life: Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century*, vol. 1 (Sian Reynolds, tr.) (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), p. 33.

6. P. M. Jones, *Reform and Revolution in France: The Politics of Transition: 1774–1792* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 56.
7. *Emile*, p. 194.
8. Charles Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
9. See Walter Feinberg, *Reason and Rhetoric: The Intellectual Foundations of Liberal Educational Policy* (New York: John Wiley, 1975), pp. 103–108.
10. John Dewey, *Conditions among the Poles in the United States: Confidential Report* (Washington: War Department, 1918), p. 79.

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