

Neo-Authoritarianism and the Contestation of White Identification in the US

Justin Gilmore

University of California, Santa Cruz

Follow this and additional works at: <https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb>



Part of the [American Studies Commons](#), [Comparative Literature Commons](#), [Education Commons](#), [European Languages and Societies Commons](#), [Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Commons](#), [Other Arts and Humanities Commons](#), [Other Film and Media Studies Commons](#), [Reading and Language Commons](#), [Rhetoric and Composition Commons](#), [Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons](#), [Television Commons](#), and the [Theatre and Performance Studies Commons](#)

Dedicated to the dissemination of scholarly and professional information, [Purdue University Press](#) selects, develops, and distributes quality resources in several key subject areas for which its parent university is famous, including business, technology, health, veterinary medicine, and other selected disciplines in the humanities and sciences.

CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture, the peer-reviewed, full-text, and open-access learned journal in the humanities and social sciences, publishes new scholarship following tenets of the discipline of comparative literature and the field of cultural studies designated as "comparative cultural studies." Publications in the journal are indexed in the Annual Bibliography of English Language and Literature (Chadwyck-Healey), the Arts and Humanities Citation Index (Thomson Reuters ISI), the Humanities Index (Wilson), Humanities International Complete (EBSCO), the International Bibliography of the Modern Language Association of America, and Scopus (Elsevier). The journal is affiliated with the Purdue University Press monograph series of Books in Comparative Cultural Studies. Contact: <clcweb@purdue.edu>

Recommended Citation

Gilmore, Justin. "Neo-Authoritarianism and the Contestation of White Identification in the US." *CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture* 23.1 (): <<https://doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.4014>>

This text has been double-blind peer reviewed by 2+1 experts in the field.

The above text, published by Purdue University Press ©Purdue University, has been downloaded 0 times as of 05/10/21.

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for additional information.

This is an Open Access journal. This means that it uses a funding model that does not charge readers or their institutions for access. Readers may freely read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of articles. This journal is covered under the [CC BY-NC-ND license](#).

CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and CultureISSN 1481-4374 <<http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb>>
Purdue University Press ©Purdue University

CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture, the peer-reviewed, full-text, and open-access learned journal in the humanities and social sciences, publishes new scholarship following tenets of the discipline of comparative literature and the field of cultural studies designated as "comparative cultural studies." In addition to the publication of articles, the journal publishes review articles of scholarly books and publishes research material in its *Library Series*. Publications in the journal are indexed in the Annual Bibliography of English Language and Literature (Chadwyck-Healey), the Arts and Humanities Citation Index (Thomson Reuters ISI), the Humanities Index (Wilson), Humanities International Complete (EBSCO), the International Bibliography of the Modern Language Association of America, and Scopus (Elsevier). The journal is affiliated with the Purdue University Press monograph series of Books in Comparative Cultural Studies. Contact: <clcweb@purdue.edu>

Volume 23 Issue 1 (March 2021) Article 5**Justin Gilmore,****"Neo-Authoritarianism and the Contestation of White Identification in the US"**<<http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol23/iss1/5>>

Contents of **CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 23.1 (2020)**Special Issue ***New Faces of Authoritarianism*. Ed. Max Tomba**<<http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol23/iss1/>>

Abstract: Justin Gilmore's article "Neo-Authoritarianism and the Contestation of White Identification in the US" examines how the political forces around Donald Trump are often interpreted as an external attack on American democracy, and how the dynamism of these attacks is thought to emanate from various sites of white chauvinism. This article argues that such an interpretation is partial. The upsurge associated with "Trumpism" represents a distinctive contestation of an alternative type of white identity, one that has been elemental for a progressive form of neoliberalism. Although the neoliberal construction of white identification is distinctive, and indeed kinder, its material basis rests on a financialized form of social reproduction that promotes white advantage without outright discrimination. Yet, ongoing economic stagnation has unsettled this foundation, opening up possibilities for radicalization from the right. This paper thus reframes the emergence of today's right authoritarianism as endogenous to the US political system.

Justin GILMORE

Neo-Authoritarianism and the Contestation of White Identification in the US

It has become common to characterize today's emergent right as an authoritarian foray into the heart of American democracy. But this assessment of the situation begins to fall apart if we take seriously the status of democracy in our time. Institutionally, the presumption of a healthy American democracy is a weak one, at best (Dahl). The substantive status of American democracy is, perhaps, even worse. Here, a set of generic conditions immediately present themselves: diminished legitimacy for non-repressive state intervention (R. Gilmore 78-86); the diminution of organizational civic density sufficient to adjust the balance of power (Putnam 38); the reduction of economic reform to the confines of a depoliticized financialized market regime (Krippner 63-85), to name a few. These conditions are not natural, but have been moved forward by fostering divisions within the US working class on the basis of racial ascription, particularly through the management of racialized surplus populations (McIntyre and Nast; Hagan and Albonetti). For social abandonment and political containment of significant layers of the racialized proletariat has lingered, and even widened, since 1964 (R. Gilmore 70-78). And after the crises and reactionary consolidation of the 1970s, we have seen a steadily closing horizon for potential political and social transformations at practically every level (Fisher). Under these historical conditions, authoritarianism cannot be understood as an attack on the formal mechanisms of American Democracy. Authoritarianism is, rather, a generalized condition that is embedded into the particularities of today's concrete situation and is interwoven into the dominant strain of contemporary neoliberal politics (Bruff 115-116). Nevertheless, the rise of today's right does indicate something new, even if it shares considerable overlap with the status quo. This begs the question: how to think about the development of authoritarianism amid authoritarianism?

In this article, I pull apart contending authoritarianisms through an analysis of white identity and its basis in a specific form of white social reproduction. I argue that the political orientation of today's dominant neoliberal politics—typically associated with the Democratic Party—rest on a mode of financialized white social reproduction which sustains and amends a specific type of "progressive" white subjectivity. Ongoing economic turbulence,¹ however, has seriously unsettled today's financialized white social reproduction, thereby also upsetting dominant forms of white identification. As a result, significant space has become available for formerly sidelined reactionary partisans to advance their case (Hawley 178-206). And they have done this with some success: the politics of economic nationalism aims to soothe dissatisfaction with dominant white identification by nostalgically harkening back to a kind of racialized Fordism. It is from this view, I contend, that we can begin to understand the authoritarianism associated with the forces within and around Trumpism. Here the political battlefield is set with two authoritarian forms facing off with one another. Their primary contention has little to do with democracy as such. With an eye to the future of American capital, each represents a wager around the normative contours and economic predicates of white identification.

White subjectivity is a historically enduring necessity for the construction and consolidation of bourgeois rule in the US. It is for this reason that I believe an assessment of US authoritarianism must discern how this prototypical reactionary tool is put to use. However, though white identification has been an underlying mechanism for solidifying American capitalist rule domestically, white identification has also remained capricious. Its content has constantly changed, shifted, become remade and has even been challenged by those for whom it claims to represent (Sonnie and Tracy). Capturing and reworking how white identification functions can make or break prospective ruling blocs and can produce sustained features in US politics. Transformations in and around the circuitry of white identity is therefore important to track and will help us understand the appearance of neo-authoritarian tendencies.

Tracking white identification and its attendant mode of social reproduction is difficult, however, if we mistake where and how it operates. This issue is actually related to a wider problem of perceiving today's right in general, and Trump in particular, as authoritarian antagonists set against democracy. The first section of this paper looks to disentangle this assumption and to set us on the path for understanding how the neoliberal and economic nationalist formations both represent different intrusions against democracy. Though they are far from equivalent, these two political forms contain their own set of authoritarian conditions. The second section considers the destabilization of white social reproduction and its relation to how white identification presents itself. The third section of this essay identifies how

¹ I am here referring to the tendency for contemporary capitalist economies to persist within a low growth and low productivity environment. Though the reasons for this are contested, diminished growth has become a structural feature of advanced capitalist economies.

failures in white social reproduction under neoliberalism have enabled new authoritarian forms to appear. What characterizes the authoritarianism of these emergent reactionary identities is their demand for the revelation of the white chauvinism that is concealed within dominant, neoliberal white identification. I then conclude the paper with brief remarks on our conjuncture and its stakes.

The Right Against Itself

Rarely has the radical right had a politics of its own choosing. This dynamic is not circumstantial, but structural. The reactionary, says Corey Robin, conceives a political defense of the old through means that resemble those used by their leftward enemies (55). Given this amalgamation, reactionary politics oftentimes burrows into the edifice of dominant political thought, altering its presuppositions indefinitely (Herf 152-188). Yet, Robin's astute observation is still complicated by the fact that situational conditions vary. It was Marx, after all, who famously observed that though humans make their own history, their social, political and economic contexts are never self-selected (Marx, *Brumaire* 15). It could be construed, then, that the radical right is homologous with political forces on the emancipatory left, in that the far-right also cannot produce terrain favorable for its chosen politics. But there is a serious error in this equivalence. The detritus of the status quo militates against challengers who are in fundamental opposition to them (Benjamin 253-264). But what of the right-wing radical who does not wish to dissolve historical wreckage, but instead to amalgamate it, and to pattern an even stronger force that advances a politics of restoration? From a political point of view, the transmutation of reactionary politics deepens the domination and exploitation by capital and the state in potentially new ways. These reactionary politics, which can grasp onto qualitatively different political objects, ideas, perceptions and even reifications for their own pursuits, therefore appear to move beyond the construction of difference through repetition.² Reactionary forms may technically seek divergence, but this divergence is achieved through an extension of the world that they develop within. If, for the radical right, the historical situation is more amenable to them, it is because many of the world's social objects already comply to their vision.

History may appear as various wreckages, strewn about pieces of detritus that, for the curious, form an infinite archaeological site. Yet, for those interested in human emancipation, the historical ruins have consistently disappointed. They move easily towards reaction, and even those constructed from the peak of struggle easily degenerate, falling from the heights of social or political insurrection and settling into mechanisms of conformity. Pasolini's adjustment of Benjamin's famous depiction of Klee's painting is sadly clarifying on this front: "The collapse of the present implies the collapse of the past. Life is a pile of insignificant and ironic ruins." For the melancholic, this conception of history may resonate. But there is still hope in the fact that history is not so one-sided. And unless we accept historical unfolding as utterly foreclosed, then we must view positive change atop of the historical ruins as still possible. We can temper Pasolini's pessimism by stating the following: that some social ruins may be more doomed than others. A primary example may be contemporary racial formations, white identification in particular, which practically functions as a form of bourgeois anthropology in the US (Abromeit, "Whiteness"). This is clear enough with the Ku Klux Klan, which became a truly mass organization in the 1920's, even though it had practically become extinct since the end of its initial phase that followed Reconstruction (Gordon 11, 182-185). What we are talking about are political orientations that are not merely transmitted from past political sequences, but ones that have their substance imbued into social material of the present. Like white identification, some forms simply cannot be appropriable for the left in just the same ways that they are useful for the far right.³ In a sense, the reactionary who stages a revolution from the right always swims with the historical current, even if they wish to change that current's tenor. This is, perhaps, why the reactionary position is always all the more seductive. Asserting reactionary politics within social formations long infected by regressive dynamics, such as white chauvinism, can be relatively frictionless process if its instigators have political acumen (Zeskind 35). Especially in contrast with emancipatory political forms that move in the opposite direction, the US radical right always has a kind of home court advantage.

Whether this historical flow is initially dominated by sentimental conservative traditionalists, or sanguine liberal modernizers, reactionary politics build an apparatus on the basis of the political tradition

² "Difference through repetition" is almost rendered algorithmic for the radical right. For the implied dimension of qualitative-quantitative shifting breaks down when we recognize that the inherently political dimension of elements that are central to a reactionary project.

³ Strasserism, yet another example, attempted to combine a "proletarian" viewpoint and the NSDP view of German distinctiveness. Unsurprisingly, this conception erred on the side of hyper-nationalism, practically always at the expense of its so-called proletarian concerns.

that is already present, but in a manner that may bring quantitative intensification strong enough to deliver qualitative social changes. In other words, when reactionary politics are successful, they accelerate (Noys 10; Land et al. 289-318). Thus, we are left with a paradoxical condition, whereby social change and even political challenge can appear to take place from the right, but without fundamental transformation.

While we may detect this tendency within today's political situation, ours has a particularly strange structure due a lack of left resistance (Balakrishnan). This unusualness is made obvious when focusing on what today's reactionaries target. To be sure, the contemporary right's aim is not primarily leveled at any serious left contender. Their crosshairs are instead mostly trained at the neoliberal regime and its agents. Even if the right's attack is set against neoliberalism's most "progressive" elements, it is incorrect to see this enmity as directed against a meaningful left-wing target. This mistake is nevertheless an easy one to make, especially given the history of European fascism, as well as the Ku Klux Klan in the US. Interwar European fascism was always preoccupied with detonating institutions and organizational centers of working-class power (Ayçoberry 100-124). Likewise, first period KKK was predicated on an acute enmity with Reconstruction, or what Allen Trelease described as the "reluctant revolution" (Trelease xv-xlvii). In spite of the irrationalism of Nazism's Jewish conspiracy and the KKK's anti-Black hallucinations, their opposition to forces of the left—however caricatured—played a significant role in legitimizing both for class fractions that opposed structural change.

Turning towards today, a different arrangement of political and social forces is present. Today's right-wing populists have fundamentally different antagonists. No longer are militant unions, workers' organizations, and state socialism the primary political nemeses of the international radical right. Since the contemporary radical right and its historical predecessors both exhibit a dependency on enmity—namely, that their political subjectification is dependent on the social forces that they oppose—misidentification of the right's shift from left-wing targets to neoliberal ones obfuscates our understanding of what the radical right is.

What we are witnessing is the right setting against itself, which is a condition of political morbidity. Cleavages between right-wing social forces have widened, opening up new antagonisms and exposing hitherto dormant ones. The rightward symptoms of today's capitalism—including an emergent type of authoritarianism—are products of contemporary political configurations, rather than something external to them (Abromeit, "Authoritarian Populism"). But, obviously, today's political morbidity has very particular features that are distinctive from those when Gramsci wrote from Mussolini's prison; unlike interwar Italy, the emancipatory tradition of socialism, and even working class organization in general, have been practically deconstructed (Eley 470-491). This makes the political dynamic around today's morbidity all the more dangerous. Whereas reactionary forces had before attempted to undermine their left-wing antagonists—enemies who might meet the challenge with equal ferocity—now the right's political battle lines are set against hegemonic neoliberal entities with highly ambivalent attitudes about the political content of the far right.

Interestingly, perception of this general layout appears to be mistaken by the persons who hold these views, persons of the radical right. This bewilderment is evidenced in the absolute misrepresentation of an imagined "left-wing" political ensemble for today's progressive elements of the neoliberal political consensus. "Cultural Marxism," the namesake sometimes given to this amalgamation, represents this amorphous collapsing of meaning most clearly. Right-wing front runners, such as Jordan Peterson, flanked by thousands of unknown persons on internet forms like *4chan*, often claim that their political enemies are the instigators of postmodernity (Haider). Setting aside the obvious problem—and, no doubt, irony—of thinking postmodernity as a choice rather than a structural social and political condition, this confusion is revealing. The proliferation of "cultural Marxism" as a representation of today's left, collapses those who are neoliberal, but also "progressive," into the historical tradition of social and political struggle as elaborated by Marx, and put into practice by millions of past militants. The right represents its enemy through an atavistic delineation of a postmodern "Marxist" who presides over the vast, world historical transformation of postwar capitalism—including the undoing of the welfare state—but also the acceleration of self-representative political expressions like gender fluidity, "miscegenation," social disenchantment, and, among many other things, the desacralization of American exceptionalism (Neiwert 33-48; Hedges 189). Functionally speaking, the amalgamated concept of "cultural Marxism" sustains an atavistic enemy that fits with right-wing populism's imagined trifecta: a corrupt elite who serves an "undeserving other" at the expense of the virtuous national people (Greven). While we may want to subject this "cultural Marxist" amalgamation to righteous criticism, it is important to note what this construction does express: that today's right is centered on a particularly anguished and confused antagonism with dominant neoliberal politics.

Here, we arrive at an important element for understanding the emergent nationalist right. While conspiracy theories have had a longstanding place in right-wing development, their capacity to act as a conduit for meaning relies on certain elements of truth that can be twisted into seductively irrational political commitments. This material groundedness may be the real gift of a Schmittian politics of enmity (Schmitt).⁴ Some of the most powerful reactionary movements had been centered on their opposition to real enemies of the left. The latter were forces that threatened to rupture not only traditional social relations but had, at times, rendered their mainstream liberal opposition ineffectual. That the radical right now centers its antagonism onto the neoliberal formation that had previously vanquished an organized left calls into question some basic presumptions about the current political arrangement.

Rather than the reemergence of fascism, Trump's rise can be perceived as something similar to a Bonapartist condition. The historical prerequisites for fascism simply do not exist today, including a dense enough civic society from which a fascist party could organize itself (Riley). Looking to Marx, we do find historical precedent for the right setting against itself in Marx's classic study on Napoléon Bonaparte's coup in 1852. There, the conditions of possibility for bourgeois governance become deconstructed through a series of self-defeating "victories." Most salient is Marx's perception that the refrain, far from allowing proletarian empowerment, moved the bourgeois classes evermore towards their own political negation. The hardline position against acceding power to proletarian enemies produces a situation whereby far right antagonists of liberal society are allowed room for maneuver: "That in order to save its purse, it must forget the crown, and the sword that is to safeguard it must at the same time be hung over its own head as a sword of Damocles" (Marx, *Brumaire* 67). In other words, the reproduction of the conditions of capitalist accumulation required the negation of bourgeois liberalism at the highest political level. Democratic deficiency begets more deficiency, and with disastrous cumulative effects. It is in this latter sense that we find ourselves practically stuck, not historically but perhaps narratively, in Marx's passages. For the ascendancy of the current dilemma marks a similar condition, whereby the "success" of preserving capitalist social relations have begun to express its ultimate consequences. The question then becomes: if democracy is not the direct question, what are the real conditions of contention between Trumpism and its neoliberal antagonists?

If today's right is set against "itself"—which is to say that an emergent right wishes to face off with the "progressive" neoliberal bloc—then the question of authoritarianism becomes all the more difficult to discern. To perceive it, we must take more seriously the connection between the forces around Trumpism and their false antithesis; to do this, we must investigate an important conjoining factor between them: white identification.

White Social Reproduction and its Crisis

"For every blue-collar Democrat we lose in western Pennsylvania, we will pick up two moderate Republicans in the suburbs in Philadelphia, and you can repeat that in Ohio and Illinois and Wisconsin" (Heer). These were the words of Democratic Party house minority leader, Chuck Schumer in July of 2016. A few months later, Schumer's words would become ammunition for his political opponents, as Trump won the presidency in an upset victory. Some have noted that Schumer's view of class clearly reflects the self-defeating priorities of the neoliberal wing of the Democratic Party (Shawn and Chomsky). But his emphasis on class is presupposed and conditioned by another ostensibly invisible element: white racial ascription. Indeed, the modifier "white" does not need to be stated for us to know that it is a "white blue-color Democrat" he is speaking of, and "white moderate Republicans" that are being referred to. It is there, in the unstated lacunae of Schumer's infamous utterance, that delivers to us a semi-open secret about the centrality of white identification for the neoliberal project. In fact, the problem of white voters is, and remains, the quintessential issue that has dominated the political scene since Trump's victory. At times, this concern has bordered on moral panic, with various popular texts written about the experience of working class whites and their apparently steeled determination to vote against their interests (Anderson; DiAngelo; Sonnie and Tracy; Hochschild; Wuthnow). Of course, this characterization of the "white working class" is more complicated, if not entirely untrue (Davis). But a wider question concerning the status of white identification within today's politics remains outstanding.

Long ago, W. E. B. Du Bois perceived the "color-line" as the defining political problem of the twentieth century (*Souls* 17). Despite the demolition of Jim Crow, current conditions demonstrate the longevity of his problematic. But, as Du Bois concluded later in his intellectual life, the demarcation of white from Black through the legal apparatus was a part of a long-standing problem of white chauvinism propelled by social and psychological benefits granted to whites (Du Bois, *Reconstruction* 700-701). These benefits

⁴ Notably, the neoconservative movement attempted to overcome this barrier by replacing internal enmity (leftists from within) with external racialized enmity.

have, in turn, functioned as a cornerstone for the construction of a reactionary faction within the US population, one that has thwarted working class solidarity from taking hold in, and through, a construction of the segmented white self (Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness*). From upheavals around Reconstruction (Parsons) to the crises of the 1970's (Cowie)—white identification has operated as a barrier to the development of proletarian solidarity. For the construction of "white interests," in and through the interpellation of persons under the sign of a white identity, is, perhaps, the most decisive social control mechanism in the development of US capitalism (Allen, *Volume I*).

How to think about the condition of white identification is itself subject of intense debate. The Du Boisian concept of the "wages of whiteness" have become a source of inspiration for thinkers of "whiteness" for some time now, with different camps arising with regards to the origin of white identification. Various interpretations of the status of white identity have arisen, congealing into two camps—one that views white chauvinism as a product of psychological origin, and the other contending that material benefits have produced this condition (Ignatiev, "Whiteness and Class Struggle"). Though the specifics of this debate lie outside of our present inquiry, it appears undeniable that both are operative, inasmuch as material conditions always share a relationship with affective constructions. It furthermore seems clear enough that the material empowerment of whites is a first-order necessity for psychic constructs to match the systemic political conditions that favor whites in US society. If it were not for the materiality of white advantage, what would its racist impact be on a world organized around concrete forms of economic and political power?

If we are to take seriously the racial character of today's capitalism, then, the question before us becomes less about abstract "whiteness" than the vulcanization of white identification into a historically-specific form.⁵ When white advantage is materialized and reinforced, it is not accomplished through psychic means, but is instead an expression of political power that is discursively refracted through certain affective forms. The political impact of white identification, then, signals a material wellspring that is not merely subjective, but embodied in objective economic and political processes (Du Bois, *Reconstruction* 237-241, 327, 350, 592, 673). This becomes clear enough if we consider that the removal of Jim Crow laws did not eliminate white identification nor the harmful social conditions for Black Americans (Alexander). In fact, their removal set off a whole new sequence of political events that was conditioned by a particular reconstitution of the relations of white advantage relative to wider economic and political formations. In other words, white advantage and identification is altered through its own conditions of reproduction (Roediger, *Working Toward Whiteness* 57-92), and always in accordance to the particular regime of capitalist accumulation in that moment. What we are talking about here is a specifically white mode of social reproduction.⁶

The solidification of white identification and its function as a proper social control mechanism was, and remains, conditioned by its attendant mode of social reproduction. This concept—white social reproduction—allows us to understand the continuity of white identification between periods of capitalist accumulation. Take, for example, the transformation of the postwar consensus into our current "neoliberal" phase.

In the postwar era, we have a particular mode of white social reproduction, one that is adequate to the historical moment of Keynesian governance. Keynesianism, which being a demand-side stimulation of capitalist economy, politically reinforced rising industrial wages which it saw as a conveyor belt for ever-expanding capitalist growth and, importantly, bolstered productivity (R. J. Gordon). Built into this arrangement was a particular mode of white social reproduction, whereby Blacks were the first fired and last hired, and were given access to lower-tiered wages (Freeman et al.). In this period, white social reproduction aimed at amending capitalism's tendency to reduce labor into a homogeneous form of abstract labor, by politically producing a special caste of white labor power that was granted exclusive access to particular parts of the division of labor. This engendered a situation whereby white labor power was always threatened with a particular kind of *déclassé*, which would mean its total subsumption into a homogenous form of abstract labor (Braverman 96-104). This follows Marx's analysis on the question of labor's transformation into a homogeneous substance under conditions of capitalist social relations, particularly since the generation of exchange values presuppose the commensurate sites of labor power that, through a complex division of labor, are congealed into the commodity (*Capital* 131-137). The

⁵ I avoid the term "whiteness" due to its tendency to become interpreted as an abstract, ahistorical form that exists independent of historical context. However, I do not think that this criticism invalidates the literature on "whiteness."

⁶ The famous passage in *Black Reconstruction* about the wages of whiteness is especially centered on social reproduction, e.g. schools, courts, public parks, etc. Such social infrastructures enable labor to become elevated under capitalist conditions (Du Bois, *Reconstruction* 700-701).

attempt, then, to protect white labor from this condition was always a losing battle, because white and Black labor were both conditioned by capital's objective of producing commodities that can facilitate value accumulation. What postwar racism did, then, was to police the concrete form of labor by rendering it into a site of racial division. This was sometimes accomplished through segregation in both unions and more broadly in the division of labor. Thus, the progressive element of Keynesianism that reinforced unionization was always potentially countervailed by a reactionary element,⁷ which was the division of white and Black forms of concrete labor, a division that became a fault line that was eventually exploited for doing away with the Keynesian consensus.

It might appear, at first glance, that the extension of white chauvinism in the wake of Jim Crow's demolition solidifies the idea of white identity as either a psycho-social condition, or as an ontological feature of "the West" (Wilderson III). However, the neoliberal phase of American capital also saw a transformation in the basic contours of white social reproduction. With an all-out assault on the postwar principal of steadily increasing industrial wages, and with the deconstruction of the political feasibility of instituting juridical boundaries between white and Black labor, white social reproduction was reoriented away from the site of waged labor and towards the asset-form. The extension of consumer debt as a compensatory means for proletarian self-reproduction would not be sustainable if it were not for the possibility of leveraging assets imbued with considerable values (Gonzalez). Indeed, these are values that, at least to some degree, were likely derived from the previous historical period where historically unprecedented economic productivity benefited whites considerably more. In other words, given the intergenerational manner in which asset wealth is transmitted, today's augmentation of white ownership over Black ownership seems to be a prolongation of racially segregated Keynesianism by new means. Our present condition can therefore be understood as an extension of the old, but modified to accommodate the newfound cadence of capitalist profitability in what's known as FIRE: finance, insurance and real estate capital. From this perspective, a quintessential feature of neoliberalism remains undertheorized: the "financialized wages of whiteness" (J. Gilmore).

This form of social reproduction is disentangled from its prior dependence on wages and has instead become centered on collateralizable forms of property, principally homeownership. "Wealth," not wages, which for most working-class people means the home, has become an increasingly central feature of working-class social reproduction, and is now the primary mechanism in which intergenerational advantages are transferred (Adkins et al. 10-14). Absent the principal of steadily rising wages—the best of which were reserved for white workers—as well as the destruction of public housing that might offset lower wages (Goetz), the reproduction of white advantage has turned towards financial capital. Indeed, the ascendancy of the "war on drugs" in the US is not tangential to this reorientation towards the asset. The war on drugs and the destruction of the war on poverty both represented a wholesale shift in the objective of the state, a new articulation of its purpose vis-à-vis the shifting tides within capital in the 1970s and beyond (Quadagno). The shift to a politics of law-and-order is, and remains, principally about the protection of property values (Harris)—a tendency that historian Nancy Maclean describes as "property supremacy" (MacLean). Such protectionism is, in fact, embedded within the interstices of real estate capital, as urban planners strategically elevate real estate values while moving typically non-white residents (Stein 71-125; Smith 117-161). It is in this way that ostensibly race-blind practices have become integral to white social reproduction in our neoliberal time.

As ever, this specific type of white social reproduction blocks proletarian solidarities, except this time through processes primarily centered on the particularities of real estate capital, along with its accelerated relationship to financial products. In distinction with the nature of abstract labor—which, because to capitalism's fundamental tendency to homogenize labor, requires a distinctively political intervention—real estate capital can work without the same kinds of juridical boundaries that draw on explicitly racial language, and at times can even traffic within an ostensibly progressive discourse (Goetz 111-122). For example, the emphasis on "urban renewal" and schemes that, in total, facilitate displacement and gentrification, and engender racial inequality but without the old redlining that once characterized purchasing a home. Redlining, after all, presupposed that nonwhite others could afford to purchase a home in higher-income areas to begin with. Here, solidarity becomes a fragment of its former self, and is, at best, diminished to personified rhetoric about anti-racism and inclusively. But these rhetorics do not change the underlying process in which white social reproduction stages itself in and through asset-inflation.

Though the particular content of white social reproduction seems flexible, the manner in which it determines the outlines of white identification share continuities between historical periods. White social

⁷ "Potentially," because history did not have to go as it did. It seems important to note that possibility appeared then, as it does now.

reproduction appears to move with the historical current, forming itself in accordance with the dictates of market activity. This makes white identification a kind of barnacle on the hull of US capitalist history; white identification becomes contained within projects of conservation and accommodation of the status quo. At most, it is capable of opportunistically leveraging conditions of capital accumulation, but not in a manner that moves against them in some fundamental way. In other words, the conditions of possibility for white social reproduction are such that it cannot move against the flow or orientation of the capitalist social and political dynamics of its historical time, and it therefore lacks the qualities of other subaltern subjectivities. This is what makes the perceptions generated by white identification substantively distinctive.

The viewpoint of "whiteness"—which is pedaled by white nationalist "identitarians" like Richard Spencer, and which claims white identity politics as being but one perspective among any others (Lyons 56-82)—is predicated on a material social reproductive ensemble that bends its epistemological insights towards various modes of conformism and reaction. The material ensemble that enables white identification is fundamentally attached to, and indeed dependent upon, processes of American capitalist accumulation. This subjective construction is altogether distinct from what Lukács theorized as the standpoint of the proletariat, for example, in which the systemic objectification of labor enables workers' a more total understanding of the social relations of capital, and it is also distinctive from feminist standpoint theory that was inspired by Lukács (Lukács; Hartsock). In a sense, the epistemological development facilitated by white identification always runs in the contrary direction. For the white social reproduction enables a perception of the world from the stunted vantage point of capital's handmaiden; the essential labor that enables the relative advantages of white identity—however dismal and pathetic these advantages may be—are naturalized and put out of sight.

But hitching the wagon to capital does not equate exception from economic conditions (Du Bois, *Reconstruction* 325-380). In fact, the US working class is more vulnerable than its European counterparts due to a relative lack of labor organization—a condition that is undeniably linked to the cross-class dominance of white identification. With the turn away from the postwar moment—including its forms of collective action and organization—white social reproduction has instead led many towards the rickety awning of the financial capitalism (Meister "Reinventing Marx"). Unsurprisingly, this move lacks any significant shelter from economic turbulence, especially in the thundering age of secular stagnation. The fundamental ideas of today's financial capital, of resilient self-indemnification, prevail in spite of white social reproduction and its turn towards asset accumulation (Lorey 64). Stuck in the shoals of neoliberal self-responsibility, white identification has come under increasing duress and has, it appears, begun to splinter. And where financialized white social reproduction begins to fail, we see the old "wages of whiteness" arise once more, except this time they are in stagnation (Pal Singh and Linh Tu).

Contradiction Within the Void: Authoritarianism and Neo-Authoritarianism

Anxiety and resentment around an unsettled financialized form of white social reproduction unveils its deeper predicate. Behind the coded language of progressive neoliberalism—a discourse that is supported by a racist "race-neutral" form of financialized white social reproduction—is the evergreen premise of white advantage. This perception of social and economic advancement is baked into the American experience; the American condition is itself a normatively infused lifeworld that is characterized by a kind of possessive individualism (Macpherson) that is intergenerationally advanced. While the unracial language of liberalism may assure why one deserves what they have gotten, it is much less effective at assuring why one has lost their rank. In a sense, this experience of an eroding white social reproductive base is an encounter with the real of capitalist modernity. But this situation is experienced under particular conditions interpenetrated by white identification itself. Here the ailments of class society stage themselves only to be re-subordinated to the mystification of a white identification that was camouflaged, but not deposed, by its neoliberal form. Thus, from the neoliberal form of white identification comes its archnemeses.

This condition of antagonistic interdependence is the result of mounting contradictions within contemporary white social reproduction. If the category of white identification is not an ontological prerequisite for some mythic West, but an enduring social control apparatus conditioned by a particular mode of social reproduction molded by a contingent accumulation process, then even the most inconspicuous transformation at the economic and thus social reproductive levels enables some foreseeable potential for a new sequence of politics, for better or worse. This is particularly true given white identification's centrality for constructing a hegemonic bloc in American political life. The gluing together of people who are ascriptively rendered "white" but who also inhabit distinctive class locations, be they of the lumpen proletariat, the working class, or petty bourgeoisie layers, has become a perennial

precondition for building a "majority" consensus (Allen, *Volume II* 239-260). Du Bois is clear enough that these transformations can bring about enduring political changes, the likes of which can have world-historical effects. Speaking to the demolition of American Reconstruction, Du Bois tells us this:

A new slavery arose. The upward moving of white labor was betrayed into wars for profit based on color caste. Democracy died save in the hearts of black folk. Indeed, the plight of the white working class throughout the world today is directly traceable to Negro slavery in America, on which modern commerce and industry was founded, and which persisted to threaten free labor until it was partially overthrown in 1863. The resulting color caste founded and retained by capitalism was adopted, forwarded and approved by white labor, and resulted in subordination of colored labor to white profits the world over. Thus the majority of the world's laborers, by the insistence of white labor, became the basis of a system of industry which ruined democracy and showed its perfect fruit in World War and Depression (*Reconstruction* 30).

Be it Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan, US imperial warfare exemplifies how white identification was decisive in mutating class solidarity, resulting in the willing invitation of mutilation and death of "their own," not to mention billions in wasted resources. To be sure, support for the Vietnam and Iraq wars were even more refutable than the World War that Du Bois focused on, inasmuch as the former were exceptionally asymmetrical (Hobsbawm). It would be wrong, obviously, to see these outcomes as inevitable: the durability of reactionary, cross-class solidarity of white skin is not hardwired into the white body and projected onto the political field by fiat. The white body is, rather, constantly being reconstructed (Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White*), a process in which white social reproduction can play a determining role. In turn, white social reproduction is both transformed, and given its lived expression, in and through the political instrumentalization of white identity into a ruling consensus. The release of outright white chauvinism from within the body of the white neoliberal subject is politically threatening to the ruling consensus, because its dislocation can produce instability, or even the cohesion of a new balance of class forces.

The durability of white subjectivity is, then, not an irresolvable item, but a social process that is responsible for sustaining political power. In our context—which is characterized by a stationary state, stagnating wages, and ferocious inequality sustained through the FIRE economy—white social reproduction has come under intense pressure. As systemic economic conditions continue to accelerate, the normative expectations sustained by white identification have become increasingly difficult to meet. There is, then, an emergent antinomy within white identification today that is not merely political, but structurally entangled with capital. The expectation that one will have material security and abundance for reasons that are innate to their being is a feature of white chauvinism that finds itself strained by contemporary economic conditions. The politics around Trumpism, and indeed other strains of reactionary thought, attempt to put this experience to work (Ganz), and call into question the surface-level de-racialization of white identification. Rather than perceiving the problem of today as one of capitalism, the set of normative ethics that have accommodated dominant white identity into a wider ruling block are attacked.⁸ Left in place is the idea of white identification and its centrality in liberal American politics. What is at stake in the fight between them is how white identity is to be perceived and configured. In other words, their contention becomes one whose central character is about how white identification should be politically constructed. Absent viable left forces whose wagers might decenter white identification as the form through which hegemony is constructed, white identification has become a central terrain of struggle in today's American politics.

Trumpism moves against its integral antagonist: a hegemonic neoliberal form of white identification that at first appears to reconcile the contradictions embedded in American capitalism. The financialization of white social reproduction has, over time, only appeared to overcome the need for an overtly racist discourse. White advantages gained from capital's most productive period were to be transferred into assets whose values could compound under post-Jim Crow "colorblind" conditions (Bonilla-Silva 53-76). If the postwar consensus required overt racism for policing a racialized division of labor, the neoliberal present requires the perception that the past had been put to rest even if the accumulations of that past generally continue through innovative financial products and "assetification." A past severed from the now allows white wealth generated in a racist past to smoothly compound through the asset-form without political intervention (R. Gilmore 30-86). To claim otherwise might inflict the abstract values accumulated in those moments with a political hue that could result in their augmentation becoming jeopardized. If the source of values can be politically construed as unjustified,

⁸ This helps to explain the focus on identity politics by operatives like Steve Bannon. Their focus is about attacking white subjects who uphold this discourse, and thus bringing about an all-white cross-class coalition under the Republican Party.

then their abstract form may become singled out, sanctioned, redistributed, or even disaccumulated. To this, the progressive neoliberal (Fraser) iteration of dominant white identification declares not only that the past is over, but that it shall never be repeated again (Meister, *After Evil* 144-174). The oft-said slogan, "Love Not Hate" therefore becomes the mantra from which neoliberal white identification depoliticizes values accumulated over the long arc of American racism that are now largely imbued into assets. Here, the financialized system of white social reproduction is not merely camouflaged as a non-racist form of economic life, but is billed as a positively anti-racist form that has transcended the age-old American problem of race. The hegemonic neoliberal type of white identification is, therefore, a load-bearing structure. For it upholds the current regime of financial capital by constructing a white political subjectivity that will defend it, not from the indefensible position of open white power, but from an ostensibly "progressive" political position of moral authority.

However, all of this presupposes that the arrangement of financialized white social reproduction will deliver. The consolidation of white identification is itself reliant on some capacity for bringing social advantage to the white working class and to the middle classes, such that they will not find themselves in alignment with other non-white proletarians on the basis of class. From this view, normativities around acceptance of the other, of individualized anti-racism, of discrete listening, and so on, are arranged into a structure that we can describe as secretly transactional. Their appearance in the social field allows for emergent political coalitions with non-white groups—an important condition for the reproduction of American capital. But, the decisive feature here is still white: for this arrangement enables an extension of the old white wages except through new, seemingly post-racial financialized means.

A nostalgic longing for racialized Fordism appears positioned against this dominant form of white identification (Toscano, Martin). Economic nationalism—a discursive project that was borrowed from the old paleo-conservative tendency—has made its way to the main political stage. But economic nationalism is a particular political shape given to undifferentiated resentment of whites by reactionary ideologues. Economic nationalism is, then, an interpellation rather than an organic expression of a subject's wishes. To be clear, access to "organic expression" is sealed shut; for there is no empirical methodology that can uncover unmediated feelings, nor some type of raw consciousness (Williams 95-100). However, though we hold no ability to access the organic expression of the forces behind Trumpism's rise, we can perceive changes in contemporary white social reproduction. And, as we have already noted, what we have at the level of white social reproduction is altogether unsurprising: a slow but ongoing decomposition of white advantage as a stable form that can deliver ever-augmenting economic outcomes.

Decomposition of white social reproduction's efficacy does not have to be absolute to allow room for new political tendencies to take root. Disruptions at the social reproductive level can have symptomatic effects which depend on the manner in which white subjectivity is configured. Conceptually, the basic predicate for displacing solidarities of class with those of racial or national belonging lie in the manner in which the latter are elevated in a political situation (Poulantzas 250-256). The advantages afforded by white social reproduction eventually become crystalized into an enduring habitus that is pregnant with the social normativities of the moment. The question is, then, about how the dominant construction of white identification, including its various discourses and affective structures, are meddled with when the reproduction of white advantage falls short. It is clear enough that today's "progressive" form of white identification are themselves predicated on certain concessions to non-white subjects that are, by and large, composed of non-material forms of recognition granted to non-white subjects (Reed Jr.). Thus the discourse of acceptance, such as the ability for upper-middle class whites to adopt the slogan of "Black Live Matter," are part of a recuperative logic that enables financialized white social reproduction to move forward.⁹ Rather than outright racism, this discourse provides sufficient cover for what Philip Mirowski calls "everyday sadism" (Mirowski 129), or what we might otherwise describe as structural racism. But minor disruptions at the level of material advantage makes such concessions take on an altogether different hue. Unmet anticipations of material advancement alongside normativities of acceptance and care for the other become an antagonism with centrifugal effects. As this antagonism intensifies, it disassociates white identification from the progressive neoliberal ensemble, thus providing room for potentially novel subjectivizations.

As learned from the history of interwar European fascism, departure from a hegemonic social consensus does not necessarily mean that the new iteration will be more progressive (Poulantzas 57-64). The affective form of Trumpism demonstrates this fact quite clearly. Trumpism takes this condition of emergent white disassociation and agitates it by ruthlessly attacking its previous neoliberal form.

⁹ Importantly, this is not an indictment of the Black Lives Matter movement, but an example of how this movement, and others like it, can become subordinated to a neoliberal political orientation.

What is being attacked is not some leftist enemy, but white identification's former self: the subjective normative other from which one becomes radicalized to the right is to be decisively overcome. The dominant form of neoliberal white identification is not merely a kind of traumatized foil. It is a structurally necessary precondition for the new authoritarianism, a site of production for the emergent right-wing subject. The demand to recant one's allegiance to the normativities embedded within progressive neoliberalism's form of white identification is a process of confessional transformation that has become central in the production of new rightward subjectivities (Neiwert 257-261). But this attack on the neoliberal mode of white identification is not merely about how white people see themselves. Rather, it is a broadside on the attendant normative commitments to racial and gender equality, however superficially and self-servingly defined, that this enemy subject aligns with. White identification and its functional integration within American capitalism is not taken as the problem at hand; rather, the problem for the right lies in the improper subordination of white identification to a set of ethical positions that diminish the white subject's ability to see itself as a real victim who owes nothing to the non-white other.

The neo-authoritarian streak that is inherent to the new right is not merely a rejection of the style of financialized market authoritarianism that persists in and through neoliberal white identification, but rather a reworking of its basic predicates. It is within this dynamic, of dwindling white social reproduction, and the rebellions from within its attendant construction of white identification, that we arrive at an important taproot of the right that has become associated with Trumpism. What distinguishes the far right's demand of authority is its desire to drag the white chauvinism that is central, but obscured, within neoliberal white subjectivity into the light of day. Here we encounter an analogous condition laid out by Balibar's assessment of racism: the violent longing for direct knowledge of social relations (Balibar and Wallerstein 19). Longing for this social relation is altogether self-centered and is oriented towards ensuring that the political promise of white advantage is no longer implied but said outright. "Make America Great Again," is, from this view, a wager that the neoliberal construction of white identification will not renege on its implied promise of ensuring that white social reproduction tracks an upward slope. Here, greatness is associated with the capacity to enjoy the fruits of preferential treatment that have long characterized white identification via political accommodations made to its social reproduction. Donald Trump's ostentatious performances are thus not merely distasteful, but an important element for the emergent reactionary white subject's construction. His utterances deliver to them the potential realization of the commitments that are already embedded and promoted within the sanitized neoliberal construction of white identification.

Consternation from those who believe that democratic liberalism is under attack by exterior authoritarian forces fail to understand that the source of their nemesis is inextricably linked to their esteemed liberal political object. Certainly, the diminution of democracy is a long chain whose origins reach well into the American revolution (Horne), and whose conditions of possibility were clearly teeming long before 2016. And yet, the conditions around which today's white identification simmer are particular. They exhibit certain possibilities of both the emancipatory and regressive type. It's in this manner that the problem of Trumpism is, in actual fact, a conjunctural problematic but with *longue durée* qualities.

Conclusion

The problem of conceptualizing the Trumpian right as an enemy who is exterior to recent and ongoing political forces in the US cannot be sustained. Worse, such a view is ultimately self-defeating. For our moment is characterized by a condition where the right is set against itself, which appears to follow Marx's considerations on Bonapartism. The nature of today's political contention and polarization is, at least to a strong degree, about white identification itself. Two visions of white identification are presented, one that is clearly more chauvinistic than the other. Though their distinction is inevitably important, it is also necessary to understand that each are mediated by the dominant form of neoliberal white social reproduction. Following Du Bois, this form of white social reproduction can be understood as a kind of financialized "wages of whiteness." It is from this form of white social reproduction that we can begin to decipher the various levels of rightward politicization, and with it, the specificity of their brand of authoritarianism.

Indeed, the disfiguring of American democracy long predated Trump, and has been at least latent since before our neoliberal time. Though certainly riddled with problems, the Fordist moment contained a small, but perhaps more clear-cut, window of opportunity for a new path of progressive human development, as labor unions had been relatively powerful at that time. However, the extension of a specific mode of white social reproduction that was remade through the conjuncture of the 1970s has diminished those prior opportunities. The closure of this emancipatory window has contributed to the

extremely complicated and altogether unclear situation that we are in today. Unlike Marx's writing on Bonapartism, the current nightmare is not constrained to the mind of the living, but is embodied in material practices, which I have described as white social reproduction. Solidified in the 1970's reconfiguration of capital and state, the exchange of outright racism for a kind of social forgiveness that allows values accumulated in a racist past to compound through financialized market activity is a live problem. Past sins, like racial segregation and other forms of outright racism, are put to rest, and assurances are made that such infractions will never again happen. But soothing our historical memories by putting the past to rest has not delivered historical justice. Rather, it has placed our moment into a historical bind. On the one side, an extension of white social reproduction, cloaked with seemingly progressive orientations, propels neoliberal capitalism, saps class solidarities, and exacerbates racial injustices. On the other, a militant white chauvinism stages itself against the neoliberal construction of white identification, not in order to do away with it, but to force the obfuscated status of white supremacy into the open. Each exhibit their own brand of authoritarianism, which manifest substantively as extreme market discipline and outright white supremacy, respectively.

Even if Donald Trump is defeated electorally—as Joe Biden has done—the source from which novel white chauvinistic authoritarianisms emerge will not have been eliminated. This is because the origin of the forces behind Trumpism do not lie within an abstract analytic of "hate." Nor are they merely residual features of a past that has largely been put down. As I have argued, the forces that now congregate on the far right draw their life against another rightward politics, the neoliberal construction of white identification, which is itself animated by a particular form of white social reproduction. This reactionary social formation may be preferable to Trumpism, and questions of political strategy must take their distinction seriously. However, the misidentification of the preferred neoliberal side as the antiracist option of the two is a serious political error that carries potentially destructive consequences. Doing so mistakes an endogenous set of systemic conditions—white social reproduction and its form of white identification—for an exogenous "illiberal" political challenge that draws nothing from the structural features of today's capitalist society. It is in this sense that our moment is, perhaps definitionally, a morbid conjuncture.

To be sure, the problem of egalitarian social transformation is not one that may be confined to the US. Today's capitalist totality is, no doubt, variegated and interstitial. Yet, the American condition doubles as a world condition, if only because the status of American power finds itself, in one way or another, metastasizing in every local and regional issue. This centrality makes the American case all the more imperative to understand and traverse. As Du Bois affirmed, the balance of power within the US will have lingering effects. To impart changes in the US may be of great consequence elsewhere, but change can only happen if we can perceive the challenge posed.

Works Cited

- Abromeit, John. "Frankfurt School Critical Theory and the Persistence of Authoritarian Populism in the United States." *Critical Theory and Authoritarian Populism*, by Jeremiah Morelock, U of Westminster P, 2018, pp. 3–27. DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.16997/book30.b.
- . "Whiteness as a Form of Bourgeois Anthropology?: Historical Materialism and Psychoanalysis in the Work of David Roediger, Max Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, and Herbert Marcuse." *Radical Philosophy Review*, vol. 16, no. 1, 2013, pp. 325–43. DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.5840/radphilrev201316126.
- Adkins, Lisa, et al. "Class in the 21st Century: Asset Inflation and the New Logic of Inequality." *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, vol. 0, no. 0, 2019, pp. 1–25.
- Alexander, Michelle. *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness*. The New Press, 2012.
- Allen, Theodore. *The Invention of the White Race - Volume I: Racial Oppression and Social Control*. 2nd ed., Verso, 2012.
- . *The Invention of the White Race - Volume II: The Origin of Racial Oppression in Anglo-America*. 2nd ed., Verso, 2012.
- Anderson, Carol. *White Rage: The Unspoken Truth of Our Racial Divide*. Bloomsbury, 2017.
- Ayçoberry, Pierre. *The Social History of the Third Reich: 1933-1945*. New Press: Distributed by W.W. Norton, 1999.
- Balakrishnan, Gopal. "Counterstrike West: The Alternate Modernity of the Inter-War Right." *New Left Review*, no. 104, Mar/Apr 2017, pp. 19–43.
- Balibar, Étienne, and Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein. *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*. Verso, 2011.
- Benjamin, Walter. *Illuminations: Essays and Reflections*. Edited by Hannah Arendt, translated by Harry Zohn, Schocken Books, 1969.
- Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. *Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America*. 5th ed., Rowman & Littlefield, 2018.
- Braverman, Harry. *Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century*. 25th anniversary ed., Monthly Review Press, 1998.
- Bruff, Ian. "The Rise of Authoritarian Neoliberalism." *Rethinking Marxism*, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 113–29.
- Cowie, Jefferson R. *Stayin' Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class*. The New Press, 2012.

- Dahl, Robert Alan. *How Democratic Is the American Constitution?* 2nd ed., Yale UP, 2003.
- Davis, Mike. "The Great God Trump and the White Working Class." *Catalyst*, vol. 1, no. 1, Spring 2017.
- DiAngelo, Robin J. *White Fragility: Why It's so Hard for White People to Talk about Racism*. Beacon Press, 2018.
- Du Bois, W. E. B. *Black Reconstruction in America: 1860 - 1880*. 1st ed., The Free Press, 1998.
- . *The Souls of Black Folk*. Signet Classics, 2012.
- Eley, Geoff. *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850 - 2000*. Oxford UP, 2002.
- Fisher, Mark. *Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?* O Books, 2009.
- Fraser, Nancy. "Progressive Neoliberalism versus Reactionary Populism: A Choice That Feminists Should Refuse." *NORA - Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research*, vol. 24, no. 4, Oct. 2016, pp. 281-84. DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.1080/08038740.2016.1278263.
- Freeman, Richard B., et al. "Changes in the Labor Market for Black Americans, 1948-72." *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, vol. 1973, no. 1, 1973, p. 67. DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.2307/2534085.
- Ganz, John. "Finding Neverland: The American Right's Doomed Quest to Rid Itself of Trumpism." *New Republic*, 17 Feb. 2020, <https://newrepublic.com/article/156368/finding-neverland-conservative-quest-rid-trumpism>.
- Gilmore, Justin. *The Mood of the Radical Right: Antinomies of Neoliberalism*. PhD Thesis (Ongoing).
- Gilmore, Ruth Wilson. *Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California*. U of California P, 2007.
- Goetz, Edward G. *New Deal Ruins: Race, Economic Justice, and Public Housing Policy*. Cornell UP, 2013.
- Gonzalez, Maya. "Notes on the New Housing Question: Home-Ownership, Credit and Reproduction in the Post-War US Economy." *Endnotes*, vol. 2, pp. 52-67.
- Gordon, Linda. *The Second Coming of the KKK: The Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s and the American Political Tradition*. 1st ed., Liveright Publishing Corporation, a division of W. W. Norton & Company, 2017.
- Gordon, Robert J. *The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War*. Princeton UP, 2016.
- Greven, Thomas. *The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Europe and the United States*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, May 2016.
- Hagan, John, and Celesta Albonetti. "Race, Class, and the Perception of Criminal Injustice in America." *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 88, no. 2, Sept. 1982, pp. 329-55.
- Haider, Shuja. "Postmodernism Did Not Take Place: On Jordan Peterson's 12 Rules for Life." *Viewpoint Magazine*, 23 Jan. 2018, <https://www.viewpointmag.com/2018/01/23/postmodernism-not-take-place-jordan-petersons-12-rules-life/>.
- Harris, Cheryl I. "Whiteness as Property." *Harvard Law Review*, vol. 106, no. 8, June 1993, pp. 1707-91.
- Hartsock, Nancy C. M. *Money, Sex, And Power: Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism*. Longman, 1985.
- Hawley, George. *Right-Wing Critics of American Conservatism*. UP of Kansas, 2016.
- Hedges, Chris. *American Fascists: The Christian Right and the War on America*. Simon and Schuster, 2008.
- Heer, Jeet. "The Democrats' Risky Pursuit of Suburban Republicans." *The New Republic*, Dec. 2017. *The New Republic*, <https://newrepublic.com/article/146345/democrats-risky-pursuit-suburban-republicans>.
- Herf, Jeffrey. *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich*. Reprint, Cambridge UP, 2003.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. *Globalisation, Democracy and Terrorism*. Reprint, Abacus, 2010.
- Hochschild, Arlie. *Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right*. New Press, 2016.
- Horne, Gerald. *The Counter-Revolution of 1776: Slave Resistance and the Origins of the United States of America*. NYU P, 2016.
- Ignatiev, Noel. *How the Irish Became White*. Routledge, 2009.
- . "Whiteness and Class Struggle." *Historical Materialism*, vol. 11, no. 4, Dec. 2003, pp. 227-35. DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.1163/156920603322889286.
- Krippner, Greta R. *Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance*. Harvard UP, 2012.
- Land, Nick, et al. *Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987-2007*. 2nd ed., Urbanomic ; Sequence Press, 2012.
- Lorey, Isabell. *State of Insecurity: Government of the Precarious*. Edited by Aileen Derieg et al., Verso, 2015.
- Lukács, György. *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, edited by Rodney Livingstone, MIT P, 2013.
- Lyons, Matthew Nemiroff. *Insurgent Supremacists: The U.S. Far Right's Challenge to State and Empire*. PM Press, 2018.
- MacLean, Nancy. *Democracy in Chains The Deep History of the Radical Right's Stealth Plan for America*. 2018. *Open WorldCat*, <http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=none&isbn=9781101980989>.
- Macpherson, C. B. *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*, edited by Frank Cunningham, Wynford ed., Oxford UP, 2011.
- Martin, Laura Renata. "Historicizing White Nostalgia: Race and American Fordism." *Blind Field Journal*, vol. August 3, 2017, Aug. 2017, <https://blindfieldjournal.com/2017/08/03/historicizing-white-nostalgia-race-and-american-fordism/>.
- Marx, Karl. *Capital: Volume 1: A Critique of Political Economy*. Translated by Ben Fowkes and Ernest Mandel, Repr., Penguin Classics, 1992.
- . *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. International Publishers, 1963.
- McIntyre, Michael, and Heidi J. Nast. "Bio(Necro)Polis: Marx, Surplus Populations, and the Spatial Dialectics of Reproduction and 'Race'1." *Antipode*, vol. 43, no. 5, Nov. 2011, pp. 1465-88. DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.1111/j.1467-8330.2011.00906.x.

- Meister, Robert. "Reinventing Marx for an Age of Finance." *Postmodern Culture*, vol. 27, no. 2, Jan. 2017.
---. *What Comes After Evil? Beneficiaries as Saviors in a Humanitarian Age*. (Working Paper).
- Mirowski, Philip. *Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown*. Verso, 2013.
- Neiwert, David A. *Alt-America: The Rise of the Radical Right in the Age of Trump*. Verso, 2017.
- Noys, Benjamin. *Malign Velocities: Accelerationism & Capitalism*. Zero Books, 2014.
- Pal Singh, Nikhil, and Thuy Linh Tu. "Morbid Capitalism." *N+1*, no. 30, Nov. 2017, <https://nplusonemag.com/issue-30/essays/morbid-capitalism/>.
- Parsons, Elaine Frantz. *Ku-Klux: The Birth of the Klan during Reconstruction*. U of North Carolina P, 2019.
- Pasolini, Pier Paolo. "Repudiation of the Trilogy of Life." *Heretical Empiricism*, translated by Ben Lawton, 2nd English ed., New Academia Publishing, 15 June 1975, pp. xvii-xx.
- Poulantzas, Nicos. *Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of Fascism*. Verso, 2018.
- Putnam, Robert D. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. 1st ed., Simon & Schuster, 2001.
- Quadagno, Jill S. *The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty*. Oxford UP, 1996.
- Reed, Jr., Adolph. "Marx, Race, and Neoliberalism." *New Labor Forum*, vol. 22, no. 1, Jan. 2013, pp. 49–57. *SAGE Journals*, doi:10.1177/1095796012471637.
- Riley, Dylan. "What Is Trump?" *New Left Review*, no. 114, Dec. 2018, pp. 5–31.
- Robin, Corey. *The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin*. Oxford UP, 2013.
- Roediger, David R. *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class*. Rev. ed., Verso, 2007.
---. *Working Toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White: The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs*. Basic Books, 2006.
- Schmitt, Carl. *The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition*. Translated by George Schwab, enlarged ed., U of Chicago P, 2007.
- Shawn, Wallace, and Noam Chomsky. *Noam Chomsky: "The Democrats Abandoned the Working Class Decades Ago" In an Interview with Wallace Shawn, Noam Chomsky Explains How Elitism and Atomization Have Created Political Rifts*. 22 Feb. 2020, <https://www.salon.com/2020/02/22/noam-chomsky-the-democrats-abandoned-the-working-class-decades-ago/>.
- Smith, Neil. *The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City*. Routledge, 1996.
- Sonnie, Amy, and James Tracy. *Hillbilly Nationalists, Urban Race Rebels, and Black Power: Community Organizing in Radical Times*. Melville House, 2011.
- Stein, Samuel. *Capital City: Gentrification and the Real Estate State*. Verso, 2019.
- Toscano, Alberto. *Notes on Late Fascism*. Historical Materialism, 2017, <http://www.historicalmaterialism.org/blog/notes-late-fascism>.
- Trelease, Allen W. *White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction*. Greenwood Press, 1979.
- Wilderson III, Frank. "Gramsci's Black Marx: Whither the Slave in Civil Society." *Social Identities*, vol. 9, no. 2, 2003, pp. 225–40.
- Williams, Raymond. *Marxism and Literature*. Oxford UP, 1978.
- Wuthnow, Robert. *The Left behind: Decline and Rage in Rural America*. Princeton UP, 2018.
- Zeskind, Leonard. *Blood and Politics: The History of the White Nationalist Movement from the Margins to the Mainstream*. 1st ed., Farrar Straus Giroux, 2009.

Author's profile: Justin Gilmore is a PhD candidate at UC Santa Cruz. His work focuses on how the US far right was conditioned by neoliberal transformations in the 1970s. His dissertation is specifically focused on how the recent destabilization of neoliberal hegemony has elicited changes to far-right politics, including the emergence of new reactionary practices, subjectivities and affective structures.

email: <jtgilmor@ucsc.edu>