

The Chuanyue (Traversing) of Western Cultural Industry Theories in China

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Abstract: This paper discusses the reception and transformation of western theories of Culture Industry in China during the Reform Era (1978-present). It proposes the term 穿越 (*chuanyue*, traverse), rather than communication or traveling theory, in order to probe into the complexity of the interaction, modification and transformation of western theories of Culture Industry and creative industries in China. The paper focuses on 1) issues of time lag or disjunction, in that it took more than half a century for the critique of Culture Industry to enter China; 2) divergent interpretations of Culture Industry with a strong critical edge of capitalist commodification of culture and cultural industries as related to the state policy of economic growth; and 3) pragmatic appropriations of Critical Theory.

Hui LI and Naihai ZHAI

The *Chuanyue* (Traversing) of Western Cultural Industry Theories in China

The Chinese Reform and Opening Up Era (1978- present) has been the era of China's integration into globalization. Western ideas have rushed into China en masse, like whirlwinds playing across the grand stage of China. How to understand the reception, modification, and transformation of western ideas and theories, and their impacts on Chinese cultural and intellectual scenes, then becomes an urgent issue. In what follows, we discuss the traversing (穿越 *chuanyue*) of western theories of Culture Industry, cultural and creative industries in China. We focus on the 1) issues of time lag or disjunction, in that it took more than half a century for the critique of Culture Industry to enter China; 2) divergent interpretations of Culture Industry with a strong critical edge of capitalist commodification of culture and cultural industries as related to the state policy of economic growth; and 3) pragmatic appropriations of Critical Theory.

The story of such a traversing theory shows a significant aspect of the intellectual encounter between China and the West, that is, an about-face of attitudes, almost a complete reversal of positions, occurred during this traversing process. The first group of Chinese scholars engaged in critical study of mass culture and critique of Culture Industry were strongly motivated by critical spirit. The same group, however, made an about-face in terms of research orientation, methodology, and attitudes, sparing no effort to endorse China's economic growth and cultural industry development. Such an uncanny U-turn of positions and attitudes of those Chinese academics reveals precisely the complexity of the traversing Western theory in China. It is far from a wholesale acceptance. Hence, we propose the term "traversing theory" instead of "communication" or "traveling theory" to uncover this complexity. In Chinese, 穿越 *chuanyue* means "passing, crossing over" with a strong connotation of time-travel scenarios as in fantasies, modern-day fairy tales, and science fiction. Traversing in English means "to pass or go over or back and forth over (something)" and "to move or cause to move sideways or crosswise" (Webster's Dictionary). In the recent popular genre of *chuanyue* fiction in China, the protagonists detach themselves from a certain social situation and reach a strange space in the past or in the future with the help of some mysterious power. The time and space that the protagonist has gone through is indeterminate and sometimes confusing. This perhaps adequately captures the sense of reversal or even betrayal in the Chinese reception of Culture Industry and creative industry theories.

Time Disjunction in Reception of Western Theories

Far from synchronous with the debut in their home countries, western theories of Culture Industry were belatedly translated, received and studied in China. For instance, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophic Fragments* in which Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno proposed the concept "Culture Industry" was first published in German in 1947, but its earliest Chinese version came out in 1989 (translated by Hong Peiyu and Lin Yuefeng and published by Chongqing Publishing House), before Chinese academics rushed into the field in the mid-1990s. Hence, it took half a century for Horkheimer and Adorno's theory to enter China. Another example is *Performing Arts, the Economic Dilemma: A Study of Problems Common to Theater, Opera, Music, and Dance* (1966), a masterpiece on the cost-disease issues in performing arts and a foundational work of cultural economics, co-authored by American economists William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen, which has not been translated into Chinese to this day. *On New Cultural Industries* by the Japanese economist Kimindo Kusaka, a best-seller, was translated into Chinese and published 10 years after its first publication in 1979. However, it was not until 2000 that Si Da discussed Kusaka's new economic theory in detail for the first time, and recognized that Chinese society has been ushered into an "Era of Cultural Development." Thus, at that point, 20 years had passed since the publication of the Japanese version of the book. Regrettably, no one has ever taken Kusaka's cultural industry theory as the subject of serious studies in Chinese academic circles.

In effect, the development of China's cultural industries and its social reality contribute to the time disjunction between western theories of Culture Industry and their traversing in China. The factors that over-determine the timing and scope of the traversing western theories of Culture Industry may include the development of China's cultural market, the cultural needs of consumers and the level of cultural consumption, China's political and cultural institutional reforms, and its integration into

globalization by opening up to the larger world. From the 1950s to 1970s, China had an underdeveloped cultural market, a low-income population with weak consumption spending, a staggering political and cultural system, and isolated status from the outside world. In other words, China had little consumer demand, and it lacked the industrial organization, market, legal system, and political atmosphere which were prerequisites for Chinese academics to develop their own theories of Cultural Industry. In addition, western theories of Culture Industry were then by no means guaranteed to gain official recognition or favor of Chinese academia even if one or two scholars might have found them interesting.

Since Chinese Reform and Opening Up in 1978, China has gradually integrated into globalization. As cultural industries emerged in China, the condition for the reception of Western theories of Cultural Industry seemed ripe. First of all, since replacing its planned economy with a market one, China has nourished its cultural market. After China announced the policy of "market economy with Chinese characteristics" in 1992, the cultural market started to grow. Second, the Chinese public became relatively wealthier, and demands for consumer cultural products rose. Cultural industries prospered. Third, overstaffed, overleveraged and inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in cultural sectors became a financial burden for the state. Therefore, China's cultural and artistic institutions gradually opened up to private markets in order to invigorate their productivity. Nevertheless, as a central means for ideological indoctrination, Chinese ideological state apparatuses (ISAs) have kept tight control over the cultural industries, while allowing a limited number of private companies to complement the cultural SOEs, such as most film studios, and *all* television channels, newspapers and magazines. Fourth, after China's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, it found that its international image did not correspond to its economic strength, and then spared no effort to launch incessant "external propaganda campaigns." These have included dispatching large contingents of media personnel and multiplying international branches of Chinese media organizations such as China Global Television Network (CGTN), an international offshoot of China Central Television (CCTV); setting up Confucius Institutes all over the world; offering exorbitant funds for translating and publishing Chinese books overseas; and, starting with the 2008 Beijing Olympics, hosting a staggering number of international cultural events, festivals and expositions. Nevertheless, the effects of these efforts are still dubious, with little hard data and analysis as supporting evidence of their effectiveness. Regardless, cultural industries have become indispensable tools for China to boost its soft power.

Chinese academics feel compelled to work towards China's global soft-power objectives. Yet they lack basic theories and methodology. They have desperately looked for western resources, and have found theories of Cultural Industry and cultural economy amenable to their needs. The earlier inquires within a small coterie of intellectuals regarding Critical Theory's critical potency then quickly vanished. Instead, Chinese academics began passionately embracing any western theories of cultural economies and industries. Since 2006, western theories of Culture Industry have been translated and studied with enormous enthusiasm. In less than a decade, one witnessed the appearance of translation series sponsored by leading academic presses, such as "Cultural and Creative Industries Translation Series" by Renmin University of China Press, the "Cultural and Artistic Economics Translation Series" by Northeast University of Finance and Economics Press, the "Overlook of the Contemporary World Cultural Creativity Industry Classics Translation Series" by Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Press, and Commercial Press's "Cultural Economics Translation Series." Contrary to the time lag in the past, pre-Reform era, nowadays Chinese translations of the latest western works appear in a short period of time, sometimes in less than a year or two after their western publication. In addition, translation covers a lot more countries of origin. Not only have works from Britain, the United States and Australia been frequently translated, but also from Italy, Switzerland, France, and Belgium. The time lag between the publication of western theories and their Chinese versions has narrowed significantly, and Chinese academics' exposure to the latest western theories has multiplied.

Creative Interpretations in Translating

During their traversing in China, many concepts of western theories are modified and altered to fit Chinese contexts. For instance, the German term "Kulturindustrie" (Culture Industry) was first rendered in 1979 as "*wenhuagongye*" (文化工业). Throughout the 1980s, Chinese academics invariably adopted the term 文化工业 *wenhuagongye* when discussing the Frankfurt School Critical Theory. Again, in 1989, Hong Peiyu and Lin Yuefeng adopted the Chinese term 文化工业 *wenhuagongye* in their translation of Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Almost at the same time, the term 文化產業 *wenhuachanye* referring to "cultural industries" appeared in China. It was a Japanese expression in *kanji* (Chinese) characters or "和制汉语" (*wasei-kango*) that Japanese translators use

profusely to translate terms and concepts from western languages. It is worth noting that the term 文化產業 *wenhuachanye* appeared in a paper published in exactly the same issue of the journal *Social Sciences in Foreign Countries* in 1979. In *The Japanese Image at the Turning Point of History-A Blueprint for Japanese Social Reform*, Kijima Masamiti states that Japanese industries should be classified into cultural industry 文化產業 (*wenga-sangio*), environmental industry 環境產業 (*kangkio-sangio*), life industry 生命產業 (*seimei-sangio*), and welfare industry 福祉產業 (*fukusi-sangio*) (29). In 1980, Chinese scholar Yao Liming suggested that in "Japan's 'Fourth Consumer Revolution,'" Japan's cultural consumption consisted largely of education, news, art, music, et cetera (26). In brief, during the 1980s, when discussing the new developments of the Japanese economy and its implication for China, Chinese academics basically adopted 文化產業 *wenhuachanye* from the Japanese *kanji*, whereas 文化工业 *wenhugongye* was reserved for the key concept of the Frankfurt School.

Then, the confusion of terminology occurs in Wang Keping's 1998 translation of "Kulturindustrie" in Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory* (30-32). Wang translated Kulturindustrie as 文化產業 *wenhuachanye* from the Japanese *kanji*. As Yao Wenfang puts it, "This confusion puts us in an awkward situation. Once the Frankfurt School is involved, we use 文化工业 *wenhugongye*. When it comes to the modern market economy, we have to use 文化產業 *wenhuachanye*. Such translations are really weird" (121). How weird? And why? Yao never explains. However, it is quite clear that the "weirdness" comes from conflating a German notion of Kulturindustrie with a Japanese notion of 文化產業 (*wenga-sangio*). Since a significant number of Chinese translations in recent decades are re-translations of English translations of French, German, Italian and Spanish works, it is not too far-fetched to assume that Wang Keping's rendering of Adorno's work is retranslated from English, which uses Culture Industry as a standard translation of Kulturindustrie. If Wang had been aware of the crucial differences between Culture Industry and cultural industries (lower cases in plural forms), he could have chosen his words more carefully.

It is of great necessity to differentiate the two translations. Actually, they provide two contrasting research paradigms for Chinese academics in terms of theoretical standpoint, conceptual categories, methodology, and approaches. On one hand, 文化工业 *wenhugongye* refers exclusively to the Frankfurt School's theories on mass culture, which attack the large-scale reproduction, commodification, and standardization of mass culture, and consumers' passivity in the face of cultural industries. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, 文化產業 (pronounced as *wenga-sangio* in Japanese, and *wenhuachanye* in Chinese) comes directly from Japanese *kanji*, and is what Kimindo Kusaka first systematically formulated in his *New Cultural Industry Theory*. With its economic, cultural and social connotations, the concept is more akin to European and U.S. cultural economics than the German critical concept of Kulturindustrie. The confusion of the terminology in China is quite telling. Chinese academics seem to prefer Kimindo Kusaka's theories now that cultural industries thrive in China. Meanwhile, the echoes of the Frankfurt School's critique of commodified mass culture have become weaker and weaker over the years.

Pragmatic Appropriations of Western Theories

Chinese academics have chosen to receive and assimilate some western theories while rejecting others in the past decades, not simply for academic reasons. Rather, they do so according to their own agenda. In other words, the ups and downs of western theories of Culture Industry "traversing" in China depend on how well China's cultural industries grow and what roles they play.

Since the Reform and Opening Up (1979-), Chinese intellectuals have enthusiastically embraced a wide variety of western theories in order to free themselves from the prison-house of thought, so to speak, and to engage in nationwide debates on ideological and cultural issues, hoping to influence China's future direction. However, after the establishment of the market economy in the early 1990s, confronted with emerging popular culture and cultural industries, these academics who once held authorial prestige over cultural matters felt powerless and bewildered. They then turned to the Frankfurt School's critique of Culture Industry and mass culture. They embraced this in a Procrustean way, against the burgeoning popular cultures and cultural industries. Actually, they were then still unaware of other theoretical resources and therefore gave too much credit to Horkheimer and Adorno's critique of mass culture. Spared from Nazi atrocities and eventually immigrating to the United States in the late 1940s, Adorno and others were still living under the shadows of Nazism and felt disoriented in their encounter with the prosperous popular culture and the burgeoning cultural

markets in the United States. They sniffed out the fascist totalitarianism in American dramas and movies inundated with singing and dancing, and therefore cried out loudly against them. Apparently, the Frankfurt School grew out of a specific historical context under Nazism and often read too much into the American cultural phenomena. Their theories were at odds with historical facts. On the contrary, popular cultures in China were not parallel with American ones and played the different role of liberating Chinese people's closed minds in the 1980s and 1990s. Chinese academics found that Adorno's theory were misleading and were not convincing in interpreting China's cultural issues. At the turn of the new millennium, China joined the World Trade Organization, and culture industries had won official support and investment. Thus, the theories of the Frankfurt School flew in the face of state policies and became even more anachronistic. These once glittering theories were forsaken and eventually fell into oblivion.

In addition, in terms of social roles, Chinese academics in the humanities found culture industries provided them with a rare stage to speak to society and dispense with their marginalized positions in a market economy. In the 1990s, Chinese academics in such fields as philosophy, literature, and history found that their time had finally arrived, and they might use their knowledge to become wealthy and escape the predicament of marginalization. Therefore, they looked for alternative theoretical resources and then, acting as government think tanks, offered enterprise management consulting, and also planned and designed cultural programs. For instance, they began to follow with interest the creative industries built by the British government during the economic recession; they also turned to Australian and British notions of creative industries, and Japanese cultural industry theories on economic transformation. At last, they formulated their own theories of cultural industries, giving up their critical spirit.

Divergent Objectives and Approaches from the West

In contrast to the studies of cultural industries in the West, Chinese academics are rather ambitious and committed to establishing a grand and systematic theory of Chinese cultural industries and have tried every means to achieve that goal. The leading figures in the field in Britain, the United States and Australia are only experts in specific fields such as movies, television, performances, museums, art galleries, tourism, cultural industrial parks, and digital media. None of them have ever planned or even attempted to set up a consistent, coherent study of cultural industries. Even David Hesmondhalgh, the author of *The Cultural Industries*, only explores the concept, features, evaluation, interpretation, and historical changes of cultural industries and does not provide a systematic formulation. Richard E. Caves merely proposes contract theory in his *Creative Industries* to interpret specific issues, rather than formulating an all-inclusive "theory." In fact, under the rubrics of "cultural economics," and "economics of art and culture," no western academic in the field tends to produce a coherent theory of cultural industries. Western academics do not seem to be motivated or ambitious in this regard and the reasons are not hard to find. First of all, starting from the 1960s, western cultural economics has experienced more than 50 years' development and has covered extensive areas. Scholars in the field usually are trained in economics, taking cultural economics as a sub-division of economics, and are not motivated to set up a new discipline. Although recognized by leading academic journals of the American Economics Society as a sub-discipline, cultural economics is still a minor rather than a major member of the crowded family of economics. Secondly, for western scholars, a theory of cultural industries is neither desirable nor possible. After a long history of development, cultural industries are divided into the performance industry, newspaper industry, magazine industry, film industry, television industry, art industry, information industry, design industry, et cetera, and each and every one of them has been studied in depth. Under such circumstances, who will say he or she has the knowledge or qualification to do all-encompassing research?

By contrast, in China, many humanities academics have assiduously pursued the goal of setting up a discipline of cultural industries for some obvious reasons. A comprehensive discipline or study needs sufficient research funds, academic influence, recruitment of students, and career prospects. Regrettably in China, there is hardly a sustainable platform for academic circles. With little research funding and few students, the obstacles for convening a plausible field of studies seem unsurmountable. Moreover, although sharing some common interests, Chinese academics do not adhere to a uniform research agenda dictated by the state since there is none, and their research topics seem to run haphazardly, largely relying on their personal interests. This contributes to the varied traversing routes of western theories of cultural industries in China. Good examples are Tao Dongfeng and Shan Shilian. Tao Dongfeng, a well-known scholar of cultural studies in China, contends that cultural industries should be approached by "criticizing while constructing." In the 1990s, Tao was whole-heartedly enamored of the Frankfurt School's theories. However, he has since reconsidered his

early infatuation with German Critical Theory, taking into account China's complex cultural realities since the Reform and Opening Up. He points out that the popular cultures burgeoning in the late 1970s and early 1980s were initially enlightening, liberating the Chinese minds from the prison-house they have inhabited since the Cultural Revolution (1966-1978), recovering their long-suppressed humanity, and arousing Chinese intellectuals' enthusiasm for democratic reform. However, in the 1990s, the popular cultures in China develop in the opposite direction with the rapidly growing market economy, and their demerits manifest themselves: consumerism runs rampant; the public's political demands give way to material ones. On this ground, Tao argues that scholars of cultural studies should stridently critique China's cultural realities. However, he knows too well that to be always critical is not plausible in China. As an academic in the humanities in a public university, he has to deal with such practical issues as discipline development, student training, research fund procurement, and journal publication, which means he has no choice but to engage in the contemporary realities rather than turn his back on them. He therefore asserts that "the purpose of public cultural services is to cultivate qualified citizens" (Tao 10), trying to bridge the gap between official demands and popular needs. In this sense, Tao will not find a way out of the dilemma and his seemingly politically-oriented approach will lead to nowhere. He has not kept enough critical distance from the realities and therefore has lost his critical foothold.

Meanwhile, Shan Shilian, another leading professor of cultural studies in China, put forward a strategy of "constructing while criticizing" for the same purpose of formulating a theory of cultural industries. Shan Shilian and Cen Guang both believe, "A change of terms from Kulturindustrie (文化工业 *wenhuagongye*) to cultural industries (文化产业 *wenhuachanye*) means a rectification of research paradigms for the study of cultural industries" (40). In other words, the Frankfurt School's critical theory may be useful in defining the characteristics of cultural products, describing the relationships between culture and capital, culture and power. However, it is a hindrance when attempting to "develop a set of cultural industry theories with Chinese characteristics. We therefore should reformulate the cultural discourses beyond the political and aesthetic perspectives [of the German Critical Theory]" (Shan 13), Shan believes that going beyond the doctrines of the Frankfurt School is the prerequisite of building a systematic theory of cultural industries. Other ways include breaking boundaries between the humanities and social sciences, and joining knowledge of cultural studies into that of cultural industry theories, and so on. His *Cultural Transformation: Criticism and Interpretation-A Study of Western Cultural Industry Theory*, a huge tome of 1.5 million Chinese characters, is a good illustration of his strategies. In the book, he dives into the heterogeneous theories of cultural industries, tracing their historical developments, digesting various concepts and comparing their discursive modes in an attempt to find a universal theory there. However, his efforts to propose a systematic theory cannot succeed, in that cultural and creative activities can be found in every corner of Chinese society, and with multiplying and complex objects, his research subjects become quite vague and too broad to handle. Moreover, with no disciplinary training, how could a humanities scholar like him adeptly use methods and tools borrowed from social sciences such as economics and management? And when the postmodern mindset and skepticism of grand theoretical narratives still stand, what kind of self-evident and autonomous theory can he provide?

Western scholars in Australia, Britain, and the United States focus on training students' professional and practical skills in arts, design, new media and other fields, and have no intention to set up a discipline of cultural industries, or programs of culture industry management. However, both Tao Dongfeng and Shan Shilian are committed to pursuing a grand theory of cultural industries, although they diverge in theoretical preferences and approaches to the Frankfurt School. Sharing Tao and Shan's objectives and ideals, Chinese academics move fast and have already established a large number of research centers and institutions for cultural industries at their universities. At present, Peking University, Communication University of China, Shanghai Jiaotong University, and other leading universities have already set up schools, research institutes or research centers, and undergraduate or graduate programs of cultural industries, fighting for the title of first-level program of cultural industry studies and getting admission into the official "Catalogues of Disciplines and Majors Conferring Doctoral Degrees, Master Degrees and Postgraduate Training" promulgated by the Degree Committee of the State Council of China. Regrettably, though the cultural industry management program was listed in the Undergraduate Program Directory (2005), master's and doctoral programs have so far not gained legitimacy in the official Program Catalogues. In such cases, academics find alternative ways and put programs under other programs' roofs. For instance, in some universities, they place the cultural industry program in the first-level disciplines such as philosophy, theoretical economics, applied economics, ethnology, sports, Chinese language and literature, journalism and

communication, Chinese history, business administration, public management and art theory. Although most Chinese academics in the field are from traditional humanities departments and lack disciplinary training in economics and management or practices in the industry, they have made great efforts in setting a new discipline and are still on their way to putting forward original theories of cultural industries.

Limited Accomplishments in Theoretical Innovation

In fact, Chinese academics make limited accomplishments in theoretical innovation and feel powerless to expound China's fast-growing cultural industries. This is partly because, as we mentioned above, when resorting to western theoretical resources, they are highly selective and even biased. In other words, they intentionally exclude some western theories, meanwhile embracing others due to the realities of China's cultural industries and their practical needs. The cost disease theory is a good case in point. From the perspective of welfare economics, William J. Baumol discovered the long-term cost disease problems in the performance industry in the 1960s and 1970s. With the help of his discovery, performance businesses win subsidies from government and some non-profit organizations, sparing themselves from bankruptcy. However, in the past 40 years, China has endeavored to reform its cultural and artistic institutions like troupes and theatres by stopping the public funding and transforming them into private enterprises, since the reform of culture industries can enhance Gross Domestic Product (GDP), upgraded industrial structures and employment rates. Obviously, it is untimely for Chinese academics to sell cultural economics to governments and non-profit institutions and ask them to continue to sponsor overstuffed cultural organizations. Therefore, they prefer western creative industry theories to cultural economics. However, cost disease problems still exist in performance industries, delaying the reform of cultural institutions, and then Chinese academics lost their ability to voice an opinion on the issues due to an inadequacy of knowledge, let alone put forward a new solution.

Kimindo Kusaka's theory is another example. In his *New Cultural Industry Theory*, Kusaka analyzes Japan's severe economic and social plights of the 1970s, and its means of developing cultural industries to solve them (5-37). What Japan experienced 40 years ago is amazingly similar to China's current situation, however, Chinese academics are reluctant to talking about Japanese culture industry theories and their value to China even 40 years after the Reform and Opening Up due to the troubled relationship between the two countries. Also, Chinese scholars like preaching with great enthusiasm about cultural theories of creative industries, and copyright industries from Britain, Australia and the U.S., but neglect mentioning intellectual property protection, free and open markets, and so forth. They focus on enhancing the productivity of cultural industries as the Chinese government does, while ignoring extensive topics on creative capabilities, creative clusters, creative strata, creative cities, creative networks, et cetera.

Besides, another reason that Chinese scholars are not innovative is that they are infatuated with a grand theory and are not keen on doing serious theoretical inquiry or solving practical problems. They are not interested in digging into the specific contexts from which western theories originate, regardless of the fact that they encounter many western theories each year. For example, without the guidance of a Ministry of Culture or a national cultural industry plan, how does the United States develop the most vibrant cultural industries in the world? Britain hosts its academics on cultural economics and creative industry researchers in a limited number of cities such as London, Edinburgh, and Birmingham, so why can this country still exert influence over the whole world? These problems are worthy of detailed analysis by Chinese academics. They would rather prepare junk-food-like annual reports without any theoretical depth than work out a practical solution to real problems. They lack the abilities of independent analysis of China's current problems, and blindly agitate for the bright prospects and profits, while unaware of risk factors in human resources, finance, technology, laws and institutions in the area. Without proper advice and warnings, a large number of cultural industry parks have been deserted, and many cultural enterprises ultimately go bankrupt after aggressive expansion.

However, although lagging behind Britain, Australia and the United States, cultural industry studies in China have seen positive advances in this area after so many years of learning from the West. For instance, Chinese scholars have more frequent exchanges on culture industry issues with their western counterparts. They become members of the International Cultural Economics Society and their research appears in the *Journal of Cultural Economics*. China's culture industry research integrates itself into the world with an accelerating speed, narrowing the gap between itself and others. Cases of culture industries in Beijing and Shanghai have won praise from western cultural researchers.

Nowadays, Chinese academics are facing new challenges as well as opportunities in an era of technological advances. New technologies such as big data, deep learning, and artificial intelligence are beginning to come into conjunction with cultural creativities. Cultural creativity also will help traditional agriculture, industry, service industries and other industries to upgrade. Since these issues are not only facing China but also other parts of the world, developed and developing countries alike, Chinese academics are provided with an opportunity to join others in solving problems, rather than putting forward a distinct theory vis-à-vis the West. Professor Liu Kang at Duke University suggests that, for a long time, Chinese academics have confined their ways of thinking in the expression "the world and China" which takes China as an autonomous country existing parallel with the rest of the world. He says, "In both thinking and speaking, we should use the attributive preposition 'of ' rather than the conjunctive 'and'. I emphasize, we should use the expression 'China of the world' instead of 'the world and China'" (18). Chinese academics need a huge change in their way of thinking, and must take China as an indispensable part of the world rather than an isolated existence.

In conclusion, western theories of Culture Industry have undergone profound transformation in their traversing in China. The theories that originate in the West have taken root in China after a time lag and their terms are creatively interpreted when translated into Chinese. Chinese academics have gradually cast off their critical stances, set divergent academic objectives and adopted different approaches from the West. However, their theoretical achievements are limited or even disappointing. Only when Chinese academics regard themselves as part of the world rather than an exception can truly substantive exchanges be made, and only when no one stresses China's "uniqueness" will China be integrated into the larger world.

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