Of the Processes of Subjectivation as a Subspecies of the Event: the Deleuzian Reading of the Later Foucault

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"Of the Processes of Subjectivation as a Subspecies of the Event: the Deleuzian Reading of the Later Foucault"

Abstract: In his article, “On the Processes of Subjectivation as a Subspecies of the Event: the Deleuzian Reading of the Later Foucault” Francisco Alcalá discusses the well-known theoretical separation that occurred between Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault after the publication of _The Will to Knowledge_. Deleuze disagreed with the new function that Foucault attributed in this book to the apparatuses of power (to be constitutive of truth) because he considered that such an approach denied an inherent status to the phenomena of resistance, making all reality a truth of power. The aim of this paper is to analyze this controversy: first, from the confrontation of the concepts of apparatus and assemblage that made it appear; secondly, from the Deleuzian interpretation of the Foucaultian topic of the processes of subjectivation as a subspecies of the event, which finally resolves it.
Francisco J. ALCALÁ

Of the Processes of Subjectivation as a Subspecies of the Event: the Deleuzian Reading of the Later Foucault.

The separation, both theoretical and personal, that occurred between Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault after the publication of *The Will to Knowledge* is well known. Deleuze referred to it, after Foucault’s death, in an interview given during that period: Foucault had, in his last years, been through some kind of crisis on all levels – political, personal and, of course, philosophical – which had led him to a certain seclusion that distanced him from his less intimate friends: “I’m afraid I didn’t see him in the last years of his life: after the first volume of *The History of Sexuality* he went through a general crisis, in his politics, his life, his thought. As with all great thinkers, his thought always developed through crises and abrupt shifts that were the mark of its creativity, the mark of its ultimate consistency. I got the impression that he wanted to be left alone, to go where none but his closest friends could follow him. I needed him much more than he needed me” (Deleuze, *Negotiations* 83).

In an attempt to regain a closer relationship with Foucault, for whom he felt a mix of sincere affection and profound philosophical admiration, Deleuze wrote him a letter immediately after the publication of *The Will to Knowledge* in 1977, sending it to him via François Ewald. It is thanks to the testimony of this intermediary that we know of the intention that Deleuze harboured in that letter, in which he expresses his impressions with respect to the development of the philosophy of Foucault that his newly published book entailed. Among other things of notable importance, Deleuze considered that *The Will to Knowledge* constitutes a new advance with respect to *Discipline and Punish*, to the extent in which it confers a clearly more ambitious function to the apparatus (dispositif) of power: the old normalizing function through the formation of knowledge is replaced by a constituent function – constituent of nothing less than truth, of a *truth of power* (Deleuze, *Two Regimes* 123; Foucault, *Discipline* 183, 306).

The main problem posed by this new function that Foucault attributed to the apparatuses of power is that of the phenomena of resistance, insofar as they react against the former, must pass through the same channels, not being able to be either ideological or anti-repressive (Deleuze, *Foucault* 28-29). Regarding the status of the phenomena of resistance, Deleuze notices three possible directions in Foucault’s work published thus far: first, in *The Will to Knowledge*, in which these phenomena were a kind of “inverted image of the apparatuses,” which their antagonistic action opposed (Deleuze, *Two Regimes* 125-126; Foucault, *The Will* 95-96); second, that suggested in “The political function of the intellectual,” which explores the possibility of countering that truth of power with a *power of the truth*, as a counter-strategic response to strategy (Foucault, *Dits* 109-114); lastly, a third way that passes through the route of the body and its pleasures, outlined in the second volume of *The History of Sexuality*. Deleuze considers that the three directions seem to lead into a dead end: “He finds ammunition which can be turned against power? But I don’t see how. We will have to wait for Michel to give his new conception of truth, on the micro analytical level” (Two Regimes 128-29).

In contrast to this crossroads in which Foucault’s thought found itself, Deleuze stresses that, in the context of his philosophy, the status of the phenomena of resistance is not a problem insomuch as it is prior to the relations of force, to power; in the same way as the plane of consistency is prior to the plane of organization.

It should not be forgotten that in Deleuze’s thought the plane of consistency is the plane of immanence that corresponds to the realm of Nature; the milieu of the relations of power, however, corresponds to the plane of organization that, mediated by a transcendent instance or a foundation, stratifies Nature, distributing the free singularities that populate it in accordance with the demands of the double articulation. It is not in vain that Deleuze and Guattari declare, in a chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus* eloquently entitled “The Geology of Morals”, that the strata that distribute the earth, imposing a form or an organization to its intensive matter, established through transcendent principles, are “judgements of God” (Deleuze and Guattari 40).

The earth is, on the contrary, informal matter, nomadic distribution of singularities not yet rooted in stable relations, putting up an almost inertial resistance (detrerritorialization) to the shoves of the strata or organization (reterritorialization), a disjunctive synthesis that is none other than that of the univocality of Being, opposing any attempt to make the earth pass through the double articulation of the God-Lobster, distributing it into categories, genres, species, hierarchies... forms of content and forms of expression. From this it follows that the detrerritorialization carries out the same function in the sphere of the earth that univocality performs in that of Being. The same question remains: the need to assume...
the defoundation in which thought will have to develop, withdrawing all the spheres over which thought is exerted from both foundation and its action, the distribution of judgement (Lapoujade 39, 57). The atheism of Nature precedes, in any case, the judgements of God, which capture the natural intensities giving rise to the strata of organization that configure the terrestrial surface. Consequently, the plane of consistency of the earth is prior to the plane of organization that is unfolded on its stratified surface and the diagram of forces that acts as an abstract machine of both planes is necessarily ambivalent: on one side, it presents a diagrammatic pole, the essential instability of which refers to the movements of deterritorialization that come from the plane of consistency; on the other, it presents a programmatic pole that is found beforehand subordinated to the plane of organization and to the reterritorializations that it operates.

Deleuze appears to understand that to the extent that Foucault describes the apparatuses in terms of power relations, he conceives exclusively one sole type of diagram in this moment of his research: the programmatic diagram linked to the plane of organization. In Foucauldian thought, therefore, it is the apparatuses of power and the truth they constitute that have the last word: if all apparatus is an apparatus of power, set up on a programmatic diagram and carried out on a plane of organization, the status of the phenomena of resistance stays relegated to second place, not capable of being understood as anything but a reaction to power. While he conceives, as we have seen, a pole of the diagram corresponding to the plane of immanence, Deleuze remains unconvinced by the dead end of power where Foucault’s investigations seem to end up at this point in their development: “I would say that the collective field of immanence, where assemblages are made at a given point in time and where they trace their flight lines, also has a veritable diagram (...) I can stop since two very different types of planes would be interacting here: a kind of transcendent plane of organization against the immanent plane of assemblages. We would fall back into the previously mentioned problems. And, from there on, I no longer know how to situate myself in terms of Michel’s present research” (Two Regimes 133).

Suffice it to add that the assemblage the diagram of the plane of immanence or of consistency makes is the war machine, which corresponds neither to the State and its military institutions nor with the Foucauldian apparatus of power. Its nature is molecular – that which carries out the diagram as plane of organization is the State, of molar nature. The two poles that the diagram presents appear then to be extended in a double nature that also divides the assemblages. We shall now examine this, as well as the relation that is established accordingly between the assemblage and the apparatus.

Deleuze himself had already emphasized that a certain indeterminacy seems to hang over the concept of assemblage, rendering its nature enigmatic to the extent that it can refer to strongly territorialized institutions, to deterritorializing intimate formations and even to the plane of immanence that the former bury and on which the latter take place. Zourabichvili stressed that more than a sole, equivocal use by the author, this disparity of cases of assemblage refers to two complicated poles in the concept itself, which illegitimates all dualism between desire and the institution or the molar and the molecular. Zourabichvili therefore distinguishes a double nature in all assemblage, which can only be elucidated insofar as the predominance of one of the poles can be confirmed, the stratified pole in the molar assemblages and the abstract machine pole in the molecular assemblages, the reterritorialization movements or those of deterritorialization, in such a way that the former consist of "large social assemblages defined by specific codes, and characterized by a relatively stable form and a reproductive operation: they tend to collapse the field of experimentation of the individual's desire back onto a pre-established formal distribution"; and the latter consist of "specific assemblages that "decode" the stratified assemblages or "put them into flight"” (Zourabichvili 146). The way in which the individual participates in those large molar assemblages lies in these other molecular assemblages, in which the individual himself/herself is caught. In short, every assemblage "looks" both to the plane of consistency and to the strata of organization, by virtue of the two poles that correspond to it. Yet, the movements of deterritorialization advanced by the plane of consistency of the desire in which the assemblages are encoded always seem to prevail.

Consequently, if the assemblage can be both molar and molecular and if the Foucauldian apparatus ultimately lies in relations of power, more than opposing the apparatus the assemblage must subsume it as one of its components. This is how Deleuze understands it when he identifies the apparatuses of power with the reterritorializations that take place in the assemblages, also – and even principally – subject to movements of deterritorialization. Such assemblages or apparatuses of desire are those that hold authentic constitutive power of which the apparatuses of power naturally participate, but only to the extent in which they form a part of them (Two Regimes 125).

Lastly, we will try to examine the nature of desire as Deleuze conceived it: from desire comes the status of the phenomena of resistance that he sees as missing in Foucault’s work up to 1977.
Although Foucault described the apparatuses in terms of power relations in *Discipline and Punish*, Deleuze openly expresses his reservations about this, understanding that the assemblages cannot help but be described in terms of desire (*Two Regimes* 124). Being impersonal and intensive individuation, desire in Deleuze can be characterized as a distribution of free pre-individual singularities or singularities of resistance, belonging to the plane of consistency where they distribute the social field in assemblages from which, strictly speaking, they cannot be distinguished. Desire is, hence, a distribution of singularities still not involved in the established power relations, characteristic instead of the programmatic pole of the diagram of forces and of their integration that takes place on the level of the plane of organization: "for me, power is an affection of desire" (*Two Regimes* 125), states Deleuze. This shows the derived nature of power as opposed to desire on an ontological level.

Therefore, far from firstly giving an account of the established rule of the organization and relations of power, the philosophy of Deleuze shows the phenomena of resistance: desire, free singularity, line of flight... as first determinations that precede the power relations defined in the programmatic pole of the diagram, which are produced by them and are situated on them as on moving earth. What needs explanation in this thought are rather the organization of the strata of knowledge and the programmatic diagrams on which they are laid – in other words, the fixed relations of power and the knowledge that is a function of them. There is thus no room for doubt about the precedence of the phenomena of resistance versus those of power in Deleuzian thought and, particularly, of the assemblage of desire as opposed to the apparatus of power (*Two Regimes* 129).

This being so, the assemblage lies on the movable floor of the plane of consistency, on the points of deterritorialization that the lines of flight must cross, which must determine both the expiry of the assemblages and the transit from one to others. Resistance is, in short, ontologically prior to power relations in Deleuze’s thought and therefore, the flight from some apparatuses to others equally precedes the establishment of these in law.

 Needless to say that we have here one of the biggest sticking points between the philosophies of Foucault and Deleuze which concerns the status of the phenomena of power and of resistance and consequently, the contrast between the apparatus and the assemblage, the former positioned on the plane of organization and the latter on the plane of consistency. Zourabichvili has shown that differences that separate the thought of Deleuze and Foucault can be evaluated around the notion of assemblage (148). Foucault’s situation is certainly more awkward than that of Deleuze. Bearing in mind that he characterizes the apparatus as apparatus of power, linked as such to the programmatic pole of the diagram and to the plane of organization, so that it has the reproductive or reterritorializing characteristics of the Deleuzian molar assemblage, Foucault comprehends resistance as a reality derived from the relations of power: "where there is power, there is resistance" (*The Will to Knowledge* 95). He understood that it is always a question of a second-order phenomenon, of a reaction whose domain is the space of freedom and of creation, which the action directed to control of the action, the action of power, leaves in the action of whoever undergoes it. Consequently, if resistance is a phenomenon without its own status and if, therefore, power has the last word concerning the apparatuses that distribute the social field in strata of organization, the variations of the diagram and, hence, those of the assemblages, remain unexplained in Foucault’s thought with no other status for resistance being discerned other than the reactive. So how would the mutations in the relations of forces that give rise to socio-political change be explained in his philosophy? (Frédéric Gros set forth the problem in similar terms in an interesting article ["Le Foucault" 60]).

The text "The political function of the intellectual" also provides a good example of this particular conception of resistance. In it, Foucault discerns the emergence of a new type of intellectual in the second half of the 20th century: the rise of the specific intellectual is due, in brief, to the idiosyncrasy of the knowledge that each holds, touchstone of the regime of truth in their time. To this extent, the political problem is to constitute a new politics of the truth, to separate power from the truth of the hegemonic power, counteracting the truth of power with this power of the truth as counter-strategy (Foucault, *Dits* 114).

Accordingly, in earlier texts, both from 1976, Foucault gives a counter-strategic foundation to the phenomena of resistance, explaining them on a strictly strategic level: in the first text, as reaction provoked in the oppressed pole of the power relation; and in the second, as tied to a supposed power of the truth that would be its repository, to the extent to which it had been disconnected from the hegemonic forms of power of which truth was a function, in order to be associated with other rebellious powers. In both cases, resistance is still the product of a power and takes place in the sphere of strategy. This is why the supposed power of the truth clearly continues to be a truth of power.

Only three years later, however, there is a significant change in Foucault’s position in the text “Useless to revolt?” that appears to bring him closer to Deleuze’s thesis. It is a text in which he analyses
the phenomenon of uprisings, in which individuals make history in a literal sense, by opposing the powers. It is in this sense that Foucault refers to the revolt as to that phenomenon in which "subjectivity (not that of great men, but that of anyone) is brought into history, breathing life into it" (Essential 452), describing, also, the morality that guided his work as an intellectual as anti-strategic, positioned on the side of the universal rights of those singularities that revolt against power, giving foresight of a divorce between both instances, that of subjectivity and that of power. If henceforth the singularities have an absolute value in themselves with independence from all general economy and if the observance of universal rights or principles must also prevail in every action of power, how could the action of power continue developing positively and how could the singularities continue to be a function of that power that tends to sacrifice them?

Whatever the case, for Deleuze resistance is an ontologically primary phenomenon, although it can in fact be supplanted ad nauseam by the relations of power that oppose it with such vehemence: resistance is always first, prior to power in the sphere of the law. It is, consequently, power that must be founded or explained and not resistance, which gives an account of itself. This is an instance that would be responsible for explaining, therefore, all the mutations of the diagram as its opposition in the strict sense to the strata of organization that are erected upon it. Such an explanation clearly contrasts with the interpretation of the matter that, at least up until 1976, predominated in the work of Foucault.

It was not until the publication of Lives of Infamous Men and, above all, of the two later volumes of The History of Sexuality, that Deleuze was reconciled with Foucault’s thought, stating in the introduction to the theme of the processes of subjectivation the explanation of the status of the phenomena of resistance that he felt was needed. The question inevitably arises: how to cross the line, how to find in the power that is constitutive of truth a power of the truth that is not already a truth of power, that is to say, a truth that is derived from the transversal lines of resistance and not from the lines that are integral to power? “I will be told: ‘That’s so like you, always with the same inability to cross the line (…) always the same choice, on the side of power, of what it says or causes to be said. Why not go listen to these lives where they speak in their own voice?’” (Foucault, Essential 161).

Foucault found the answer to this question in the processes of subjectivation, as power of the truth or third axis that differs equally from the axes of power and knowledge, to the extent that it constitutes an outside common to both. In this regard, Deleuze understands that the very operation of subjectivation is the direction of the force that is man upon himself, self-government or fold of the force that constitutes a Self that evades both power relations and the formations of knowledge that are a function of them. It is both the stratum and the strategy because it consists of an interiorization or a fold of the outside that clearly differs both from the interiority commonly attributed to the subject and from the mere exteriority of the world of the senses (Foucault 97, 110).

In other words, what is defining of the outside is force, and force is essentially relation with other forces: it is, therefore, inseparable from power, from the power to affect and be affected. So it is not surprising that a relation emerges of force with itself as government of self that makes possible government over others. The Greek diagram established that only free men could dominate others, but, to do so it was necessary for these free men first to be capable of dominating themselves. It is therefore necessary that the relation with others doubles a relation with themselves, that from the moral codes that implement the diagram in the different spheres (city, family, …) a subject is freed who no longer depends on the code in his interior. Such is the great merit, as Deleuze understands it, that Foucault attributes to the Greeks: they have folded force without it ceasing to be force, relating it with itself and removing it through this astuteness from its relational nature, from its dependence with respect to power. Thus they invented the subject, but as the product of a process of subjectivation. Foucault’s fundamental idea is that of a subjectivity that, despite arising from power and from knowledge, no longer depends on them. Hence, rather than a return to the subject, Deleuze observes in the later Foucault a growing interest in the processes of subjectivation, as acts of resistance to power par excellence.

Therefore, Deleuze distinguishes an evolution through three ontologies in Foucault’s thought, each which subsumes the previous and constitutes by itself an answer to the question “what does it mean to think?”: an ontology of knowledge (epistemology), an ontology of power (strategy) and an ontology of self (topology or subjectivation). The third ontology is sketched in The Use of Pleasure, and in it he leaves both the strata and strategy to go into topology, discovering the processes of subjectivation. The fold of force appears, therefore, when the forms are already interconnected, giving rise to a “self” in which the outside constitutes a co-extensive inside.

As the third axis that evades knowledge and power, the processes of subjectivation have great importance regarding socio-political struggles and change, that is, regarding the historic step from some assemblages to others, history of the assemblages inspired by the becoming of the diagrams, with the
always "untimely" creation as horizon. They present, in this sense, an eminent vocation for transgression, which counters the general laws of nature and of morals with its facultative, ethical and aesthetic legality – and this up to the point that Deleuze refers to these processes of subjectivation as "the extreme edge of an apparatus [dispositif]," which escapes the powers and knowledge of the present apparatus in order to end up reinserting itself in those of a future apparatus, whose forms it anticipates (Two Regimes 341-42).

This leads us to wonder about the logic that inspires this new creation in the assemblage, which is that of counter-effectuation, and which similarly explains the link that exists between subjectivation and event: in order to elucidate it, we need to go back to where the event is made the central theme, from The Logic of Sense to A Thousand Plateaus.

The pure event, as expressed in the proposition that is attributed to the bodies in The Logic of Sense (Deleuze 22), has an essential relation with language without being linguistic itself and is ascribed or effectuated in the bodies without being bodily itself, so that it connects both divergent series according to the irrational logic of disjunctive synthesis, the non-relation as a more profound relation (Zourabichvili 167-171). Exteriority of the relations ensures immanence and avoids relapse into a representational system: a system, in other words, that is founded once and for all on principles whose transcendence is passed on to the relation that links the bodies and the propositions. The event is, therefore, a paradoxical instance that explains the genesis of sense in language, that is to say, it explains that language "functions" in fact in the world, even though in law no relation at all is established between the series of the bodies and that of the propositions.

Looking to broaden their earlier research in the social field, in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari redefine the event in the framework of the assemblage as an instantaneous and incorporeal act or transformation that, made in enunciations, is nonetheless attributed to the bodies of a society. The two segments of this assemblage translate the Stoic duality between the mixtures of bodies and propositions that expressed the events, making it come to earth in history and shaping the stratum of knowledge. The heterogeneous series of The Logic of Sense are pulled down to the terrestrial surface giving rise to the form of content and the form of expression.

The event in A Thousand Plateaus is therefore an instance of intermediate or paradoxical nature that relates two heterogeneous series in accordance with the irrational logic of disjunctive synthesis. The event thus inaugurates a mode of inserting the expression into the contents and of intervening in them at the level of the diagram, setting the assemblage to alter, that is, determining whether the movements of deterritorialization and molecular nature predominate in it. The following gives an eloquent account both of the anticipation of the enunciation with respect to the content in the event and of the relevance that the processes of subjectivation it entails have regarding socio-political change: "This text constituted an incorporeal transformation that extracted from the masses a proletarian class as an assemblage of enunciation before the conditions were present for the proletariat to exist as a body. A stroke of genius from the First Marxist International, which "invented" a new type of class: Workers of the world, unite!" (Deleuze and Guattari 83).

The logical sequence is therefore as follows: first, there is an event as incorporeal (of sense) act or transformation that goes unnoticed and extracts an assemblage of enunciation that realizes it. The influence of Guattari’s ideas are evident here, referring to these incorporeal transformations in terms of significant breakthrough (240-41). Second, that event-assemblage carries within it a process of subjectivation, which is to say that it causes a new subjectivity that establishes equally new relations with all spheres of life: the force that is man is directed upon itself, evading the power relations and forms of knowledge of the present assemblage, such that what before was quotidian now proves intolerable. Lastly, there is the need to counter-effectuate the event, that is, to create new assemblages that respond to the call of a people that have need of the new subjectivity, situating individuals and societies at the height of what is happening (to them): it is in these completely new assemblages that the subjectivity that inspired them, anticipating their forms, will be reinserted.

With the aim of examining this in detail, let us turn to another example: "May '68 is more of the order of a pure event (...) a visionary phenomenon, as if a society suddenly saw what was intolerable in it and also saw the possibility for something else. It is a collective phenomenon in the form of: ‘Give me the possible, or else I’ll suffocate.’ The possible does not pre-exist, it is created by the event. It is a question of life. The event creates a new existence, it produces a new subjectivity" (Two Regimes 233-34). Consequently, it demands that "society must be capable of forming collective agencies (...) that match the new subjectivity, in such a way that it desires the mutation" (234). Therefore, in its dimension as an event, the French 1968 is not, as historians claim, an empirical consequence to explain through a retrospective reconstruction of the causes, but an incorporeal cause that happened as such unnoticed, giving rise to all the occurrences that took place later. Hence Deleuze and Guattari conclude that it is
not that ‘68 has been overcome, since "even if the event is ancient, it can never be outdated: it is an opening onto the possible" (233). On the contrary, it was French society that was not up to the event: "French society has shown a radical incapacity to create a subjective redeployment on the collective level, which is what ‘68 demands” (234).

Contravening equally the transcendental selection operated by metaphysics and the rejection of selection that is characteristic of negative nihilism, Deleuze established an immanent criterion of selection regarding the assemblages: the power of novelty and of creation that they express. In this respect, subjectivity constitutes the bastion of newness in the assemblage, placing in communication, as subspecies of the event, the deterritorializing pole of the assemblage with the diagrammatic pole of the abstract machine and, in short, the assemblage with the plane of consistency and the diagram whose becomings – deterritorialization – determine the history of its variations – reterritorializations. The creation of possibles through the event, to which Deleuze frequently alludes, eminently concerns subjectivation, which is raised in “the final dimension of apparatuses.” This makes it possible to judge or select them “according to immanent criteria, according to their content in ‘possibilities’, freedom, creativity with no call to transcendental values” (Two Regimes 343-44). Being a bastion of creation, the processes of subjectivation constitute the yardstick by which to measure in the future the height of those assemblages to come that succeed in counter-effectuating the event, placing individuals and societies at the height of what happens to them in the event. Therefore, “each apparatus [dispositive] is thus defined by its content of newness and creativity, which at the same time indicates its ability to change or even to break for the sake of a future apparatus [dispositif], unless, on the contrary, there is an increase of force to the hardest, most rigid and solid lines. Since they escape the dimensions of knowledge and power, lines of subjectivation seem particularly apt to trace paths of creation, which are constantly aborted but also taken up again and modified until the old apparatus [dispositif] breaks” (Two Regimes 344-45).

Counter-effectuation is now understood as politics of the event, leaving behind its conception as ethics of the event that was present in The Logic of Sense. It was then said that either the moral has no meaning or it only has one: "not to be unworthy of what happens to us,” but "to will and release the event” (149). Counter-effectuating the event that is realized in our body was, hence, "to give to the truth of the event the only chance of not being confused with its inevitable actualization” (161), making that truth the object of an affirmation with independence from our particular fortune or misfortune: impersonal Death is turned against all deaths, including one’s own. Here is the point where amor fati and the battle of free men come together, safeguarding the insurmountable nature of the pure event: "Amor fati, to want the event, has never been to resign oneself (…) but (…) to counter-effectuate the event, to accompany that effect without body, that part which goes beyond the accomplishment" (Deleuze and Parnet 65). The ethical aspect of the counter-effectuation thus concerns the individual who "not only comprehends and wills the event, but also represents it and, by this, selects it, and that an ethics of the mime necessarily prolongs the logic of sense” (Deleuze, The Logic 147).

We should now consider the shift from ethics to the politics of the mime. Although it may seem that the concept of counter-effectuation has become unrecognizable from The Logic of Sense to A Thousand Plateaus, in both cases it is a question of a test of will that calls upon us to accompany the event up until its ultimate consequences, including those that involve an often painful corporeal effectuation. In the ethical dimension of counter-effectuation it was essential to be the mime of the event that was being effectuated in our body, in order to reach the surface of the pure event, limiting the effectuation to the instant without mixture (Aion) and thus allowing us to want the event. In A Thousand Plateaus we are, conversely, called to be the mime of the assemblages that make up the stratified surface of the earth (“mimic the strata,” [Deleuze and Guattari 160]), which constitute a kind of effectuation, in order to reach the pure surface of the plane of consistency, the mutations of which vary them according to the deterritorializing logic of the pure event, communicating the assemblage with the plane of consistency from which, ultimately, it originates, always passing through an abstract machine constituted as diagram and not as program. Here we discover the sense of the political dimension of counter-effectuation: rising from the effectuation in the stratum up to the plane of consistency, in favour of an effectuation to come (more “untimely” than simply future, connected as such to the event). It is now society, therefore, that must respond to the incorporeal event, wanting it even in the effectuation in the stratum of which it is the cause, insofar as its action on us is limited through the constitution of the assemblages that demand the new subjectivity and the event itself as future effectuation: the creation of new modes of being or styles of life is, as we have revealed, the immanent criterion of selection regarding the assemblages.

In the political variation of counter-effectuation it is about creating new modes of being or lifestyles that place us at the height of what happens to us: the point at which the inversion of Platonism with its recognition of the power of the false (remember how Deleuze challenged the argument from privileged
experience in "Letter to a Harsh Critic", adducing those affects and precepts as effects as could be obtained through media different to the "true" media of life experience or corporeal effectuation [Negotiations 11]; also his interpretation of the Foucauldian concept of fiction (Foucault 120) coincides with the philosophy of the event, to which it clears the way. Nor should we forget that the inversion of Platonism is in Deleuze, as in Nietzsche, explicitly related with the overcoming of negative nihilism as abandonment of the project of selection before the fall of the transcendent criteria through which it was realized. Selection based on immanent criteria on which Deleuze pinned anti-Platonism thus coincides with the creation of new modes of being or lifestyles as criteria in order to select the assemblages, which again shows the close relation that exists between the core themes of the inversion of Platonism and the philosophy of the event. Affirmative nihilism consists of producing novelty out of the nothing of being, therefore selecting what exists through its power of creation, joyful constructivism and immanent selection in which it is easy to recognise the Frenchman’s thought.

It is, lastly, in virtue of this vocation for all-around manifest transgression that Deleuze understands that the processes of subjectivation, exactly as Foucault understands them, are a subspecies of the event associated with the constitution of a counter-knowledge, which consists of a minoritarian becoming of knowledge. Such counter-knowledge is not strategic anymore, in that it is subtracted from the sphere of power relations insofar as it derives from the lines of resistance. Therefore: "Subjectification isn't even anything to do with a "person": it’s a specific or collective individuation relating to an event (...) it’s a specific dimension without which we can't go beyond knowledge or resist power" (Negotiations 98-99).

It should be noted here that the Kierkegaardian formula “Give me the possible, or else I'll suffocate!” is invoked by Deleuze both for the event and the processes of subjectivation. It is no wonder, for what is in play in Kierkegaard is, as Deleuze sees it, to "make something new of repetition itself: connect it with a test, with a selection or selective test; make it the supreme object of the will and of freedom" (Difference 6), opposing it to the general laws of nature and morals. Immanent creation and selection, whose facultative, ethical and aesthetic legality, which is neither moral nor individual but singular, agrees well with the reinterpretation of the processes of subjectivation in the wake of Foucault as outside of knowledge and power, which creates possibilities beyond the possible itself, in the virtual, assuming the exhaustion of all transcendent principle: a power of the truth, finally, against all the truths of power. “If you believe in the world you precipitate events, however inconspicuous, that elude control, you engender new space-times (...) Our ability to resist control, or our submission to it, has to be assessed at the level of our every move. We need both creativity and a people” (Negotiations 176).

By way of conclusion, we must first stress the fact that Deleuze's reinterpretation of the processes of subjectivation as a subspecies of the event that produces the historical change of the apparatuses leads to a general reinterpretation of Foucault’s thought, which would finally have found in subjectivation the longed-for status for the phenomena of resistance. To confirm it, it is enough to compare, for example, the optimist tenor of the text “What is a Dispositif?” (1988) with that mixture of prudence and reserve that characterizes the general tone of "Desire and Pleasure" (1977).

This leads to the convergence of two lines of research in the Deleuzian reception of the Foucauldian theory of the processes of subjectivation. On the one hand, their thematization as a subspecies of the event works in favour of cultural and socio-political change, that is, of the creation of new modes of being or lifestyles both on an individual and a collective level. On the other hand, the study of discourse, both literary and philosophical, as a counter-knowledge associated with the processes of subjectivation, establishes a synergic relation with them to the point that “style, in a great writer, is always a style of life too, not anything at all personal, but inventing a possibility of life, a way of existing” (Negotiations 100). With the purpose of verifying the new status of counter-knowledge that now concerns philosophy and literature, one only needs to consult, respectively, the introductions of two of Deleuze's last texts: Negotiations and Essays Critical and Clinical.

A final horizon thus opens, one that is common to the philosophies of Foucault and Deleuze beyond the evident divergences regarding method and approach to problems, corresponding to the conviction that discourse (philosophical, literary, political...) has to be a machine for producing events (Morey 14).

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