Courage and Passion in the Reading of the Later Foucault of the Cynics

Inmaculada Hoyos Sanchez
University of Granada, Spain

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**Abstract:** In her article "Courage and Passion in the Reading of the Later Foucault of the Cynics" Inmaculada Hoyos Sánchez aims to determine what role the passions played in the courage of the truth of ancient Cynicism, for which purpose she analyses the lectures Foucault gave at the Collège de France in 1984. The hypothesis put forward in this article is that what makes Cynic courage different from other manifestations of the courage of the truth, such as Socratic courage, is that it specifically involves the eradication of shame, a passion that is social and public in character, rather than an overcoming of the fear of dying. Thus, Cynical askesis, on which courage is based, entails work not only on the passions themselves but on all the passions of humanity, so that Cynic courage points to another world. In the final part of the study, the author poses an open question as to whether the courage of the truth can or cannot be an active affective force.
Courage and Passion in the Reading of the Later Foucault of the Cynics

What modes of relation can be found between the courage of the truth and the passions? This is the question that this study wishes to raise, building on the lectures Foucault gave at the Collège de France in 1984. I propose, therefore, to analyse those lectures, paying particular attention to the interpretation the French thinker makes of the ancient Cynics. In classical Cynicism, according to Foucault, the courage of the truth is expressed in a more radical and complex way as it is incorporated into the mode of life, and, to this extent, as I understand it, we can find in Cynicism an especially fertile way to tackle the question through the connections between courage of the truth, passions and affects.

Of course, not only ancient Cynicism posed the important question of the courage of the truth. In his lectures, Foucault refers to a certain courage of a political nature that was exemplified by Solon, and to Socratic, ethical parrhēsia. We can also find an interesting reflection on the negative evaluation that courage is given by Christian literature, such as in Sayings of the Fathers, which consider this courage, from the standpoint of defending obedience to and fear of God, as arrogance and a lack of respect. In modernity, Spinoza maintained the thesis that courage—or fortitude, which was the term he preferred—is an active and rational affect, contrary to fear and stronger than it insofar as it conquers it or overcomes it. In the Scholium to Proposition 10 of Book V of his Ethics, Spinoza considers that “to put aside fear we must in the same way reflect on resoluteness, often describing and imagining the common dangers of life, and how they can be best avoided and overcome by presence of mind and strength of character” (365). Spinozan courage or fortitude (fortitudo), which is divided into resoluteness (animositas) and nobility (generositas), is an affect certainly active or rational, which supposes knowledge and rational transformation of our passions so that, using the power of joy we defeat, as far as is possible, sorrow (Spinoza, Ethics 102). Nietzsche also shows in Ecce homo that courage is the power of life to affirm to oneself, a surplus of strength that takes us closer to the truth (85). Paul Tillich also states in The Courage to Be that this “is the ethical act in which man affirms his own being in spite of those elements of his existence which conflict with his essential self-affirmation” (3). We thus see that in these three cases, courage seems to be thought of as a force that brings us closer to a truth of ethical nature, or even a force or power that is itself rational, an active rational affect.

Foucault also indicates in his last lectures given at the Collège de France that between courage and truth there is a fundamental connection that can be expressed in various ways. The question is what role the passions play in those different expressions of the courage of the truth. Is that courage a passion, a power, a force or even an active rational affect? There is no one answer to this question. Not even Plato in the Laches was able to say of what courage truly consists: “We have not discovered the true nature of courage,” Socrates says (143; qtd. in Foucault 150). Foucault emphasizes this and states that to deal with these questions we must first determine the different modes in which the courage of the truth has appeared in history. In this study, as I have stated earlier, I will focus above all on the distinctive characteristics of Cynical courage.

Nevertheless, before starting I would like to stress the ways in which this problem is situated methodologically in Foucault’s thought, and the way it fits in with the triple theoretical shift that he operates, from the theme of knowledge to that of veridiction, from the theme of domination to that of governmentality, and from the theme of the individual to that of the practices of self. Hence it is a question, as Foucault himself stated, of “studying the relations between truth, power, and subject without ever reducing each of them to the others.” (9) If we think of how Cynical courage can be expressed in these three spheres, we can say, firstly, that the courage of the truth is embodied in the life of the Cynic as a form of veridiction that involves harmony not only between what one thinks, says and does, but also between the truth and the body. The Cynic is the visible statue of the truth. Secondly, it involves a labor of knowledge, esteem and care of the self, of others and of the world, through which the Cynic constitutes himself as the moral subject of his behaviour, and the world becomes other (third aspect: ἕθος). The question I try to tackle in the text is what relation or function the passions undertake in this triple dimension of the courage of the truth characteristic of the Cynics.

In Foucault’s Collège de France lecture of February 1st, 1984, he states that for there to be parrhēsia, in the truth act there needs to be a questioning of the relation between the two interlocutors. Courage is one of the necessary conditions of parrhēsia, as Daniele Lorenzini has also indicated in his study on the seven characteristics—absence of codified effect, freedom of the individual speaking, criticism, dangerousness, courageousness, transparency, and aethurgy – that make it possible to distinguish the act of parrhēsia from other acts of speaking that could also fall under the denomination of speaking true (“Performativé”). Parrhēsia entails, therefore, a certain form of courage, whose minimal form consists
of the fact that the parrhesiast runs the risk of undoing the relation with the other that was precisely what enabled his discourse; and whose maximum form resides in confronting the danger in which the parrhesiast puts his own life by saying what he says. In this case, Foucault refers to Plato and his speaking truth to Dionysius the Elder. However, it is important to highlight that parrhesia involves a certain form of courage not only in the parrhesiast but also in the receiver of this spoken truth. Foucault says that at the core of the parrhesiastic game there is a pact by which the receiver of the truth (a people, king, tyrant, prince or friend) also possesses the courage to accept it, however offensive it may be for the passions or own interests. Therefore, the first aspect that I wish to highlight is that this double courage of the truth entails “greatness of soul,” an uplifting with respect to the passions or own interests both in the one who says and in the one who listens to the truth (Foucault 12). It is therefore a question of specifying what passions need to be overcome, because in this way we can elucidate the differences of Cynical parrhēsia compared to the Socratic.

In the case of Socratic parrhesia, Foucault emphasises the idea that the courage of the truth in Socrates involves an overcoming, or more accurately an elimination, of the fear of dying. It is not, therefore, that courage entails overcoming all fear, but one in particular, the fear of death itself. In the Apology, Socrates prefers death to betraying his task, that is, the care of others and of the self. It is also the importance of carrying out this function that explains, according to Foucault, why Socrates moved away from the political forum and instead exercised an ethical parrhēsia. What Socrates fears is not death but not performing his function. If he devoted himself to politics then they would kill him and he would not be able to undertake the care of self and of others. And this is what matters, not death. (Foucault 80-81. For a comparison between this Socratic overcoming of the fear of dying, and that of Foucault himself, see Frédéric Gros, “Course Context” 347-48). What are the passions, the interests, that the Cynics would have to overcome to embody in their own lives the courage of the truth? In this case, it seems that it is not only a question of overcoming the fear of death but above all of getting rid of shame, the fear of public ridicule, of the unconventional. And this partly explains what the singularity of Cynicism is and why Foucault ends up coming to it in the last stage of his thought.

In the lecture of February 29th, 1984, and in the framework of reflecting on the relation between aesthetics of existence and speaking truth, Foucault states that “in Cynicism, in Cynic practice, the requirement of an extremely distinctive form of life—with very characteristic, well defined rules, conditions, or modes—is strongly connected to the principle of truth-telling, of truth-telling without shame or fear, of unrestricted and courageous truth-telling, of truth-telling which pushes its courage and boldness to the point that it becomes intolerable insolence” (165). The image that Epictetus offers us of the Cynic also says to us that the Cynic overcomes the fear, he does not let himself be impressed or paralysed by it to announce the truth (Epictetus, Discourses 139; qtd. in Foucault 167). Now, what Foucault wishes to highlight is that if Epictetus does not emphasize Cynic shamelessness more, if he does not specify that the overcoming of that fear gives rise to Cynic shamelessness, it is because his version of Cynicism is particularly imbued with the aim of strengthening the connections between it and the Stoicism that he upholds. The immediacy with which the mode of life and speaking truth are articulated in Cynicism—because theory does not interfere in them or is much less important compared with other movements such as Stoicism—and the complexity and above all the precision with which mode of life and truth-telling are related, is also translated into the character that the courage of the truth has in the Cynics. This supposes an overcoming of those passions that have a special, practical, social dimension, a dimension easily recognisable by others. And here shamelessness and the passions derived from it play a fundamental role.

Shamelessness, or anaideia, is what is different about the Cynic. It is curious, moreover, that when the Christian critics of parrhēsia refer to it they define it as “looking at a brother without shame (anaidōs),” and in general, associate it with the lack of modesty, respect or shame (Dorotheos of Gaza 114; qtd. in Foucault 336). Foucault does not discard the hypothesis that there is here an explicit reference to Cynic shamelessness. But what is important, aside from whether that reference is explicit or not, is that precisely because the Cynic mode of life had to be easily recognizable by others, it had to have singular and striking characteristics, not conventional, and its fundamental hallmark is shamelessness. And this is what differentiates Cynic courage, linked with shamelessness, from Socratic courage. Foucault himself refers to it in the context of his analysis of the Laches. Although this work already deals with the relationship between truth-telling and mode of life in a general way, Cynicism entails going further because within it the relation between mode of life and speaking truth is expressed in a much more concrete and specific way. Foucault states:

The Cynic mode of life is not just a life which demonstrates and manifests virtues like temperance, courage, and wisdom, which Socrates had given evidence that he possessed. The mode of life which is entailed and
The staff can also function here as a symbol of Cynic insolence. Diogenes Laertius relates how Diogenes of Sinope, wishing to be a disciple of Antisthenes and become a Cynic, did not shrink from Antisthenes raising his staff against him. "Strike," Diogenes exclaims, "for you will find no wood hard enough to keep me away from you, so long as I think you’ve something to say". (bk. 6: 21). From that moment Diogenes became one of the Cynics, he himself with his own staff. In this anecdote of Antisthenes and Diogenes, the staff symbolises that dog bite that Cynics are also associated with. Stobaeus recalls in this regard how Diogenes declared that other dogs bit their enemies, whereas he bit his friends in order to save them (bk. 3: 27). With this course of the truth that involves shamelessness and insolence, the Cynic also provokes a particular reaction in others that involves specific work on the passions.

What the Cynic achieves by demonstrating his mode of life based on the courage of the truth and expressed with shamelessness and insolence is that others overcome their anger and reject what they admit, or claim to admit, on the level of principle. Socratic irony also has as its effect this overcoming by others of anger, irritation and vengeance, although in the case of Socratic parrhēsia the purpose is to care for the soul.

The simplest case, political bravery, involved opposing the courage of truth—telling to an opinion, an error. In the case of Socratic irony, it involves introducing a certain form of truth into a knowledge that men do not know they know, a form of truth which will lead them to take care of themselves. With Cynicism, we have a third form of courage of the truth, which is distinct from both political bravery and Socratic irony. Cynic courage of the truth consists in getting people to condemn, reject, despise, and insult the very manifestation of what they accept, or claim to accept at the level of principles. It involves facing up to their anger when presenting them with the image of what they accept and value in thought, and at the same time reject and despise in their life. This is the Cynic scandal. (Foucault 233-34)

This last reflection also refers to another of the peculiarities of Cynic courage and it is that this, unlike political and Socratic parrhēsia, involves risking one’s life not only by saying the truth. In the case of the Cynic scandal, life is risked in the same way as it is lived. The Cynic exposes his life in all senses of the word—that is, he shows it and by showing it, risks it: he risks his life by showing the truth in his way of life. Cynicism makes evident that the place where truth emerges is life. In this sense, Lorenzini has shown that the originality of Foucault’s reading of the Cynics in the 1984 lectures resides in having revealed that truth, more than a noun, is an adjective that qualifies life. Cynic parrhēsia refers to the true life. Or, as Gros says, the truth is not something that is discussed, but something that is lived (Lorenzini, “Foucault, il cinismo” 8; Gros, Verità 298). Foucault states repeatedly that one of the fundamental dimensions of Cynicism is precisely the connection that is shown in Cynicism between forms of existence and manifestation of the truth. Furthermore, with this statement Foucault corrects the intensity with which some interpretations, such as that by Tillich, have emphasized the individualistic character of Cynicism (180). Vanessa Lemm has also argued along the same lines that the Cynic incorporates truth in the body, and in this way his courage acquires an important public, or political, dimension. Hence this incorporation of truth in the body or in the mode of life is made possible in Cynicism through training or askesis that not only refers to the state of the individual but also to the state of humanity as a whole.

The first thing that must be said regarding Cynic askesis is that care of the self in Cynicism, unlike Platonism or Stoicism, is not based primarily on the acquisition of a body of theoretical knowledge, but is founded on practice. Cynic askesis is a training, a labor upon the body and the soul that concerns the regimen of life in its totality. Diogenes the Cynic shows in this sense that in life nothing at all is achieved without training, and that it is preferable to choose useful efforts, in other words, those that are in agreement with nature. And among them, disdain of pleasure has a prominent place. “The despising of pleasure,” he says, “is itself most pleasurable, when we are habituated to it; and just as those accustomed to a life of pleasure feel disgust when they pass over to the opposite experience, so those whose training has been of the opposite kind derive more pleasure from despising pleasure than from the pleasures themselves.” (bk 6: 71).

This physical and mental training that entails poverty, a food diet, working on the passions and, particularly, on pleasure, has important peculiarities. Comparing Cynic askesis with Christian askesis,
Foucault recognizes elements of continuity between the two but also points out some aspects in which Christianity goes further than Cynicism. In terms of diet, which was of key importance in antiquity, Foucault shows that the Christians radicalized the practices of renunciation of the Cynics.

You know that through continual work of self on self, Cynicism sought to reach a point where the satisfaction of needs would be fulfilled exactly, with nothing granted to pleasure. Or rather, the Cynic practiced a form of reduced diet so as to obtain maximum pleasure with minimum means. What Cynicism sought, in short, was to reduce one’s diet, to reduce what one eats and drinks to the basic food and drink that gives maximum pleasure at least cost, with least dependence. With Christianity we have, however, something different. We have the same idea that one must seek the limit, but this limit is in no way a point of equilibrium between maximum pleasure and minimum means. Instead, it will be the reduction of all pleasure so that neither food nor drink ever gives rise in itself to any form of pleasure. (Foucault 317)

This characteristic of Cynic askesis is quite significant because what Foucault appears to say in that in Cynicism there is not an absolute renunciation of all forms of pleasure. So what type of pleasure would there be place for? For the pleasure that is obtained from effort, endurance and training – the pleasure, or the force, maybe in which the courage of the truth incorporated into life consists? At the end of this article I will return to this consideration. Before that, however, I wish to draw attention to another of the traits of Cynical askesis. And it is that this consists in an exercise that the Cynic carries out not only on the self but also on the passions of humanity. Beginning with the first, Foucault cites Epictetus on several occasions to specify what this struggle consists of, this Cynical athletic combat against evils and vices. The Cynic has to look at himself in the mirror and examine his shoulders, determine what kind of loins he has (Epictetus, Discourses 149; qtd. in Foucault 296). He must know himself, make a just appraisal of himself, and he must also watch himself, in particular he has to be vigilant over the movement of his representations, watch his thought, and this implies also watching over his passions. For Epictetus, who tries to narrow the ties between Stoicism and Cynicism, Cynic askesis implies not giving assent to those representations that wrongly attribute moral value to the external events that are not under our control – in other words, askesis prevents us from having passions. “Would there be in him [the Cynic] hasty assent, thoughtless propensity, unsatisfied desire, aversion unable to avoid its object, purpose without result, disparagement, baseness of soul, or envy? Here is where the Cynic,” Epictetus states, “concentrates his attention and energy” (Discourses 167; qtd in Foucault 311).

However, what differentiates Cynic training from Socratic or Stoic combat against the passions themselves is that Cynic askesis also refers to the general state of humankind, to conventions and institutions. In reality, Cynic askesis is not a struggle only against certain passions of the self but also against certain passions of humanity, against the vices that affect the human genre in its totality, and from which customs, life habits and ways of acting emerge or on which these are supported. In his lecture of March 21st, 1984, Foucault makes clear that “the Cynic battle is therefore not simply that military or athletic battle by which the individual ensures self-mastery and thereby benefits others. The Cynic battle is an explicit, intentional, and constant aggression directed at humanity in general, at humanity in its real life, and whose horizon or objective is to change its moral attitude (its ēthos) but, at the same time and thereby, its customs, conventions, and ways of living” (280).

The heroic figure for the Cynic is Heracles: a hero of endurance who fights for others. Heracles, Foucault explains, does not choose an easy life of debauchery and voluptuousness; rather he chooses the arduous life of exercise and endurance. Heracles has received a mission, like the Cynic, and in this mission he does not wage a battle against his vices (he has none) or against his evils (neither does he have these), but against the vices of the world and the evils of humankind. This is what is important. Heracles has to cleanse the world and, in a certain way, bear the responsibility for the ugliness and infamy of humanity. This reference to Heracles in Cynic practice and discourse, Foucault concludes, is a constant (281). In the later version of the Romans, who were sympathetic to Cynicism but already in contact with the first Christians, as for example in Dio Chrysostom, Heracles appears as a suffering and struggling hero, who arouses pity for the harshness of his fate. Only after his death would he be recognized. The parallels with the version Diogenes Laertius offers us of Diogenes the Cynic are notable. After his death, Diogenes of Sinope was also recognized, for showing a life of endurance, of freedom as absence of fear and of non-dependence. “Time makes even bronze grow old: but thy glory,/ Diogenes, all eternity will never destroy,:// Since thou alone didst point out to mortals/ the lesson of self-sufficingness and the easiest path of life” (Diogenes, bk. 6: 78).

I think that these last two verses express the Foucauldian thesis that the purpose of Cynic askesis is the transformation of others and of the world. The purpose is not, hence, to achieve a kind of individual serenity, as is typical of other Hellenistic schools such as Epicureanism or Skepticism. Even Epictetus,
in his idealized and somewhat Stoic version of the Cynics, refers to "the courage to speak with complete freedom to his own brothers, to his children, in a word, to everyone of his race?" (*Discourses* 165; qtd. in Foucault 313). The care of others is fundamental here. But it is a care that is undertaken in a very precise and singular way, through the exhibition of a denuded life, in truth, without hiding, which involves labor on the self and on others, a labor on the personal passions and those of humankind. The result is, therefore, a transformation of the form of life and behavior not only of the Cynic but also of customs, the mode of life of others and the general configuration of the world.

With this interpellation of another world, of an other life, Cynicism also exemplifies that the courage of the truth has another condition of possibility: otherness (l’altérité). There has to be a place for ethical differentiation for speaking truth and living true to be possible (Foucault 64). Judith Revel has pertinently highlighted this reference to the other life as part of the legacy that Foucault has left us (224-29). Though Foucault did not come to pronounce this at the end of his lectures, it is preserved in the publication of his last lectures, where he says: "But what I would like to stress in conclusion is this: there is no establishment of the truth without an essential position of otherness; the truth is never the same; there can be truth only in the form of the other world and the other life (l’autre monde et de la vie autre)” (340).

It is precisely the Cynics who embody this other life in their courage of the truth, radically different from the conventional. Another of the better known and most referenced clichés of the Cynics is the one that presents Diogenes as a forger of coin (Diogenes, bk. 6: 20-21). What this forgery symbolizes is a transvaluation of values, as Nietzsche would say. It is an alteration, a showing of an other life with respect to what is the conventional mode of life of human beings. Referring again to the mixed reading that Epictetus makes of the Cynics, Foucault declares that what the Cynic intends is not to convince a group of individuals to lead a different life, but to show all men that they live an other life and not that which they should live. "And thereby it is a whole other world which has to emerge,” Foucault explains, "or at any rate be on the horizon, be the objective of this Cynic practice” (315). The Cynic does not try to say and exemplify what the world is in its truth; he intends to show that the world can only reach its truth if it is completely altered, if it becomes other. And he reveals, embodied precisely in his form of life, that alterity, that otherness, that difference without which the truth is not possible.

In this regard, Gros stresses that the dissonant irruption of the Cynic true life should be interpreted as a political undertaking. Foucault calls it "philosophical militancy” (Gros, "Course Context” 354). Other, more strictly political movements of militancy have also been the heirs of Cynicism. In his lecture of February 29th, 1984, Foucault refers to the revolutionary political movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in which the witnessing of the true life by life itself proved fundamental. The Cynical legacy also reached modern art. And long before, the first Christians were also influenced by Cynicism. Yet it is striking that barely any presence of the legacy of Cynicism has remained, in terms of the connection between life and truth, in modern and even contemporary philosophy. There are, of course, exceptions: Diderot, Nietzsche (Niehues-Pröbsting). But in general terms in contemporary and modern philosophy it is thought that the question of telling truth refers to the question for the conditions in which a statement can be recognized as truthful. The truth is only an epistemological issue for us. Our relation with the truth is revealed, according to Foucault, in the form of scientific knowledge. Philosophy forgot life and not only being (236-7). Nevertheless, Cynicism—and this is one of its great contributions—showed that there is a fundamental link between truth and life, and showed, perhaps as no other school, that philosophy is a form of life, a mode of life, a style of life that questions itself not only by the form of our discourses but also by the form that life must have so that it be possible to practice the truth. And in its answer, courage plays a fundamental role.

Up until now we have seen that this courage implies an overcoming of fear, or more specifically of shame and modesty if we consider the Cynics. And I have also shown, regarding the Foucauldian reflection that courage needs otherness, ethical differentiation, to show itself and be practiced. The analysis of Cynic askesis, of that training that strengthens us to lead a sovereign life, refers to a change in the passions of the Cynic, but also a transformation of the passions of humanity. The Cynic courage of the truth also involves a change in the world, which would become other as a result of the contrast, the difference, with that other life, that true life of the Cynic that shows the truth in a scandalous way. Moreover, the work on the passions that the Cynic undertakes does not seem to be aimed at rejecting all forms of passion or affect but rather, unlike later Christian ascetism, the Cynic admits, according to Foucault, certain forms of pleasure with which, as I see it, courage is linked. And so one last question remains to be asked: what is the courage of the truth in truth? It is not easy to try to specify what it is that characterizes this Cynic courage of the truth, whether it is a force, and whether this is of an affective character or more purely rational. And even then, it is perhaps worth the effort to attempt a reflection about this always open question.
We have only the reconstruction that Diogenes Laertius and Epictetus, among few others, made of the Cynics, so it is impossible to determine what Cynicism is independently of its reception. In all cases the interpretations are mixed, in that the characteristics of Cynicism are mixed with those of other schools, such as Stoicism. And thus arises the ambiguity that is always to be found when attempting to answer a question posed about them. In my opinion, in this regard, there are elements in the reconstruction of Cynicism, both in Diogenes Laertius and Epictetus, or in that of Foucault himself, for conceiving courage as a force, namely, a fortitude that produces and results from a spiritual and corporal toughening up or training. In the versions by Diogenes Laertius and Epictetus, that force has a character that is more markedly rational and would be associated with apathy. The praise for the Cynics’ self-effort is directed at not needing anything, to apathy (Diogenes, bk. 6: 2, 15). It is also stated that “to fortune he [Diogenes the Cynic] could oppose courage, to convention nature, to passion reason” (Diogenes, bk. 6: 38). And it is said that Diogenes thought that, just as servants are the slaves of their masters, so the weak are the slaves of their passions (66). As we have also seen, some of the texts by Epictetus, quoted by Foucault, maintain that the Cynic is vigilant over his assent in order to prevent passions being generated, and that he should not get married given that he must be free from all impulses (Foucault 301). Nevertheless, in the reading that Foucault proposes of Cynic courage, it seems to me that he refers to the force of the truth, which is different from the truth of the force (Lorenzini, _La force_), and whose nuances leave room for conceiving this force in the style of an active affective power and not passive or irrational. In this sense, I think that the Spinozan and, above all, the Nietzschean interpretations can help to understand the character of this force of the truth that disturbs and scandalizes by revealing itself in an _other_ life.

Manuel Barrios Casares has proposed a highly interesting reflection, in comprehending the Nietzschean will to power, undoubtedly connected with courage, as love. “The activity of the will to power, according to Nietzsche, has more of amorous conquest than of military conquest” (62). It is virtue that makes gifts, the generosity of the needy, which is but an expression of fortitude, Barrios states. I therefore think it possible to understand Cynic courage in this sense as well. It is true that there are differences between ancient Cynicism and Nietzsche’s proposition. In the Cynics we find high praise of poverty, self-sufficiency and austerity. Foucault also on occasion conceived Cynic courage in analogy with the soldier, who keeps vigil and watches over others, which distances us from the idea of a conquest of love. It needs to be recognized that in Cynicism there is a more negative view of the passions than in Nietzsche, even though we can think that there is something of active rational affect in that force that characterizes Cynic courage. Yet it is striking that Diogenes Laertius stresses that the Cynic “will not disdain to love, for only the wise man knows who are worthy to be loved” (bk. 6: 11); and that he repeats this idea in his final summary of Cynicism. “The wise man is worthy to be loved, impeccable, and a friend to his like; and that we should entrust nothing to fortune” (bk. 6: 105). The Cynic philosopher Hipparchia fell in love with Crates for his discourse and his conduct (bk. 6: 96). And although in some texts love is associated with certain pleasures that would make lovers unhappy (bk. 6: 67) and Crates himself declared with a certain irony that “hunger stops love, or, if not hunger, Time, / Or, failing both these means of help, – a halter” (bk. 6: 86), even so, I repeat, I believe that to the extent that the Cynic shows the truth in his life, he exposes or displays it before others, questioning them, his courage must be a force of an affective nature, albeit active and to that extent rational. For it is the affects that open us up to the other. The affects refer to otherness. Foucault at times refers to the bond of friendship that the Cynic establishes (Foucault 300). And the shamelessness with which Cynic courage is associated shows that this has a public dimension, and therefore always refers to the other, that it is not us, that it is outside of us and over which we have no control. This force that courage consists of should, therefore, have a certain affective character although—I stress—it is active and rational. Reason, in Epicureanism, for example, is more individualistic. It can close in on itself. But this is not the case in Cynicism. Cynic reason opens itself to the other, critically and scandalously questioning the other, and for this it needs the courage of the truth possibly understood as affect.

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**Author's profile:** Inmaculada Hoyos Sánchez teaches History of Philosophy at the University of Granada (Spain). Her scholarly interests include the reception of Antiquity in contemporary thought, connections between philosophy and literature with a focus on issues of ethics and politics of the passions. Hoyos Sánchez's publications include “Estéticas y políticas de la existencia en la literatura antigua: las lecturas de Foucault y Nietzsche” Badebec. Revista del Centro de Estudios de Teoría y Crítica literaria (2017), Sobre el amor y el miedo. Tópicos antiguos y enfoques modernos (2016), and “La théorie cognitive des passions chez Chrysippe: une opinion faible peut-elle se traduire par une hormē pleonazousa?” Philosophie Antique (2016). **E-mail:** <ihoyos@ugr.es>