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# Cases of Note - Copyright

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# Cases of Note — Copyright

Acuff-Rose in the News Again — Originality v. Novelty; Copyright infringement—Conflict of laws— Russian copyright law on works-for-hire; U.S. Copyright law—Works-for-hire— Reverse passing off

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#### Copyright - Acuff-Rose in the News Again — Originality v. Novelty

Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., \_F.3d\_\_ (2d Cir.1998); 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1810; 1998 WL 544189.

The Second Circuit is New York, Connecticut and Vermont.

The country music song "You've Got to Stand for Something" repeats the lyrics "you've got to stand for something or you'll fall for anything."

Plaintiff music publishing company Acuff-Rose owns the copyright. Defendant Jostens manufactures high school class rings. Its national ad campaign used the words "If you don't stand for something, you'll fall for anything." The trial court judge felt there was a question of fact for the jury as to whether Jostens copied the lyrics. Both sides insisted the judge settle the matter right there in a bench trial. The judge held that although Jostens did copy the lyrics, they were not original and therefore not protected by copyright. Acuff-Rose Music, 988 F. Supp. at 294. Acuff-Rose appealed.

Originality is required for copyright protection. "Original" means it was (1) "independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and (2) that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity." Novelty is not required. A work that resembles others may still be original as long as it was not copied. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).

Infringement occurs only upon copying. Thus two artists could independently arrive at an identical work. Neither would be <u>novel</u>, but each would be <u>original</u> and therefore copyrightable. *Alfred Bell Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts*, *Inc.*, 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951). "The <u>doctrine of anticipation</u> ... does not apply to copyrights ... The 'author' is entitled to a copyright if he independently contrived a work completely identical with what went before..." *Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.*, 81 F.2d 49, 53 (2d Cir.1936).

If this sounds weird, think of a teenage garage musician doing whatever one does to create new music on a guitar. Swearing he has never listened to the music of his grand-

parents, he writes the song "How Much Is That Doggy in the Window?" Can you really believe he did this on his own? Or would you think it more likely he heard the song somewhere? That is the question of fact for a jury, or in this case, a judge.

Jostens presented extensive documentation that the phrase had been around for a long time. Cited sources were the *Bible*, **Abraham Lincoln**, **Martin Luther King**, **Malcolm X**, **Ginger Rogers**, and a chaplain of the U.S. Senate. In 1985, **John Cougar Mellencamp** recorded a song using the lyrics. Their theory was that the lyrics in no way were original to the Acuff-Rose musicians. The words had to have been lifted from that body of "old sayings."

Acuff-Rose submitted a letter in which one of the authors of the song told a pal the lyrics were original to him. While that was some evidence of independent creation, the trial judge felt the phrase "enjoyed a robust existence in the public domain"—so robust that it seemed unlikely the author had created it despite what the letter said. Which is the function of the judge in a bench trial. Determine the law. Decide on the facts. The appellate court affirmed.

## Copyright infringement— Conflict of laws— Russian copyright law on works-for-hire

Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., \_\_F.3d\_\_; 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1810, 1998 WL 544189 (2d Cir.(N.Y.))

'This is an appeal from an injunction and damages. **Defendant** *Russian Kurier* is a Russian language newspaper in the New York area with a circulation of 20,000. **Plaintiff Itar-Tass Russian News Agency** is a wire service formerly known as TASS (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union). Other plaintiffs were various newspapers with familiar names like *Pravda* and unfamiliar ones like *Ekho Planety*. But no individual writers were plaintiffs, which becomes important.

Kurier admits copying individual articles distributed by Itar-Tass and published by a variety of Russian newspapers. No permission for the copying was ever obtained. Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1120, 1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

Under Russian copyright law, authors retain copyright of the articles they write unless they have surrendered it by contract. However, Russian copyright law, Art. 14(2) says that in the case of works-made-for-hire the employer has the exclusive right to "exploit" the works. But then 14(4) excludes newspapers from the 14(2) coverage. Also excluded are encyclopedias, encyclopedic dictionaries, collections of scientific works, reviews, and other periodical publications if you're curious.

Art. 11 (1) gives a compiler—like a newspaper—copyright in the selection or arrangement of subject matter if it is a creative one (Yes, that's just like *Feist*.). The <u>authors may exploit</u> the work—the individual articles—independently of the compilation unless they have contracted otherwise.

The district court granted an injunction and damages because the *Kurier* was copying not just the articles but the headlines and photographs as well. The whole kaboodle was being cut out, pasted on a layout sheet and sent to the printer by *Kurier* for photographic reproduction. The judge saw this as an infringement of the Russian newspapers' headline, arrangement and type-setting creativity. The judge also reasoned that publishers, having the economic incentive, would do a better job of preventing wholesale copying than authors.

On appeal, the Second Circuit discussed at length the issues of conflicts of laws—if Russian law on the subject is different from US, which applies? In the US works-for-hire are owned in their entirety by the compiler.

The **Berne Convention** is cited, but it does not settle the question of who owns the copyright of the articles. Berne provides only that the law of the country "where protection is claimed" (the US in this case): "defines what rights are protected, the scope of the protection; and the available remedies ..." Jane C. Ginsburg, *Ownership of Electronic Rights* and the "*Private International Law of Copyright*", 22 **Colum.—VLA J.L. & Arts** 165, 167-68 (1998).

In tackling this problem, the Second Circuit made a division between <u>ownership</u> and <u>infringement</u> issues.

In any question of <u>property ownership</u> the applicable law is that of the state with the most continued on page 57

## Cases of Note from page 56

significant relationship to the property. In this case it would be Russia where all the work was generated.

In tort cases (like copyright infringement), the governing law is the place of the tort which if you like Latin is lex loci delicti. See Hasbro Bradley Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 189, 192-93 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying US law to a work unprotected in its country of origin) which in this case is New York where the copying was done. Also, the infringer was a US corporation.

That sounds easy enough until you learn that US copyright law permits only the owners of an "exclusive right" to bring suit. Only the legal or beneficial owner of property has standing to sue. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b). Logic: some other turkey—or part-owner—can't bring your lawsuit for you and then throw it away. You might not even know the suit was going on.

So the appellate court had to use Russian law to determine who owned the copyright in the articles.

The meaning of foreign law is a question of law—i.e. one for the judge to decide. We don't put it to a jury. Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1; Bassis v. Universal Line, S.A., 436 F.2d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 1970). Dueling expert witnesses are brought in by each side of the litigation. But their demeanor—as in which one looks like he's lying and which is telling the truth—is not an issue. So appellate courts may freely reverse the trial judge based on the intellectual force of the expert opinions, Curley v. AMR Corp., No. 96-9690, 1998 WL 458509, at \*6 (2d Cir. July 22, 1998), which the Second Circuit did.

Russian law gives publishers the right to exploit the compilation and prevent wholesale copying of the newspaper. Authors have the exclusive right to exploit their work independently of the publisher's whole work. So only the author has standing to bring suit for the Kurier's article clipping style of copyright infringement.

That left only the district judge's gut feeling that newspapers would do a better job of stopping copyright violations. The Second Circuit noted that Russian law permits organizations for the collective rights of authors when bringing rinky-dink suits by individual authors would be uneconomic. Russian Copyright Law, Art. 44(1). And indeed there exists a news reporters' union.

## US Copyright law—Works-forhire— Reverse passing off

In contrast to the Russian rule, US Copyright Law vests all rights in the employer of a work-for-hire arrangement.

Cleary v. News Corporation, 30 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir.1994).

**Defendant News Corporation** owns HarperCollins which in turn owns Scott, Foresman, the publisher of the famous *Robert's Rules of Order* first published in 1876 by General Henry Robert.

Plaintiff Dr. James Cleary was hired in the 1960s to assist in revisions with General Robert's heirs for the 1970 edition. The royalty rate was so small that he was attracted to the work solely by the name credit. The contract stated Cleary was retained by Scott, Foresman on a work-for-hire basis.

Cleary received credit for his work in the 1970 and 1980 editions, but his name was deleted in 1990. Cleary sued under the **Lanham-Trademark Act** which prohibits false designations of origin and false representations in the sale of goods. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); *Smith v. Montoro*, 648 F.2d 602,603 (9th Cir.1981).

Copyright law vests all authorship rights in the employer of a work-for-hire. 17 U.S.C. & 201(b). Unless specifically provided otherwise, right to attribution is also relinquished along with the authorship rights. *Vargas v. Esquire, Inc.*, 164 F.2d 522, 524-27 (7th Cir.1947) (artist gave up right of attribution to his drawings in exchange for monthly salary); *Nelson v. Radio Corp. of Am.*, 148 F.Supp. 1 (S.D.Fla.1957) (singer had no right of attribution to songs when directly employed by recording company).

Cleary claimed work-for-hire did not apply because he was not a salaried employee. His contract, however, had an explicit work-for-hire clause. Cleary's testimony that he was orally promised attribution as an inducement to sign the contract was barred by the <u>parolevidence rule</u>.

This rule of evidence holds that the written agreement is the final expression of the parties and outside oral agreements are largely barred. Testimony to oral agreements made prior to or simultaneous with the writing are inadmissible. Without this rule, written contracts would be extremely feeble and could be contradicted by any and all lies that someone wanted to tell in court. A plausible liar might be far more persuasive than a writing if the jury had difficulty understanding a written contract.

You can hear how it would go. "Now I don't understand all this fancy lawyer writing. But where I come from, a man's word is his bond. We do business on a handshake. And what we agreed on was ..."

Despite this, Cleary still claimed attribution under the "reverse passing off or palming off" theory. §43(a) of the Lanham Act forbids mislabeling to mask a creator's contribution. Failure to attribute authorship to a co-author falls under this. *Rosenfeld v. WB. Saunders*, 728 F.Supp. 236, 243 (S.D.N.Y.) (citing *Lamothe*, 847 F.2d at 1407), *aff'd*, 923 F.2d 845 (2d Cir.1990).

Cleary's theory was that while he had done no work for the 1990 edition, the work was unchanged and he had always received attribution before.

The Ninth Circuit agreed the case law "suggests" that while there is no duty of attribution in Cleary's situation, he is protected against misattribution. See, e.g., Morita v. Omni Publications Int'l, Ltd., 741 F.Supp. 1107, 1114 (S.D.N.Y.1990); see also 2 Paul Coldstein, Copyright § 15.24.2.2 (1989). But no cases dealt with a situation where the author had given away rights in a specific workfor-hire clause. And the Vargas case was decided before the passage of the Lanham Act.

The purpose of the Lanham Act "is to prevent individuals 'from misleading the public by placing their competitors' work forward as their own." Summit Mach. Tool Mfg. Corp. v. Victor CNC Sys., Inc., 7 F.3d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.1993). The test is "bodily appropriation".

Reverse passing off is <u>express</u> when you continued on page 58

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
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# Questions and Answers — Copyright Column

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Answer: Since this matter has not been litigated, the law and tradition surrounding faculty-produced works generally is relevant. Many experts believe that the institution has a good claim on all copyrighted works produced by the faculty member since they are works for hire. However, the tradition in American higher education has been for the faculty member to own the copyright. Few universities claim any rights to these works even when they are textbooks or bestselling novels and there are substantial royalties involved. Sometimes, when the work is a videotape or software, the institution has asked to be reimbursed for expenses it incurred in the production of the work, but the faculty member "writes" these works as a part of their scholarly contribution. Thus, universities traditionally do not claim copyright.

Courses may present different issues. Both the faculty member and the institution have a good claim on the copyright. The course so developed is definitely within the scope of the faculty member's employment, and yet the tradition mentioned above would indicate that the faculty member should own the work.



Many universities are examining their copyright policies to deal with the ownership issue specifically because of the course development and course materials issue. The ideal solution is for joint ownership since both the school and the faculty member have a valid claim. This should be worked out in advance, however, and not after the fact when a dispute arises. Joint ownership agreements should cover continued use within the university, the faculty member's right to use the course should she move to another university, as well as the rights to market the course on the outside.

Question: What should an independent business research firm do when its clients request monthly digests or synopses of news developments on various topics? This could include monitoring competitor activities that are covered in the news media or tracking issues and trends. The clients then want to distribute these summaries/synopses widely within their companies.

Answer: This question indirectly raises the problem of using author or publisher produced abstracts versus doing one's own work. Published abstracts are separately copyrighted as adaptations of the original work, and the copyright belongs to the author or it may have been transferred to the publisher.

Gathering information, summarizing the factual content and producing this for a client is a fair use as long as the work the research firm does is original and does not copy extensive portions of copyrighted works. To some extent, this may be the difference in an annotation and an abstract. The annotation describes the work rather than extracts the research results. It uses phrases such as: "the author indicates that ...," "there are four pie charts that ...", and the like. Such summaries are fair use as long as they do not supplant the market for the original. Therefore, distributing them within the company should not present problems. The research firm may want to place some notice on the summary to indicate that the research product is not to be used outside the client's business.

Question: Our library is trying to get copyright clearance for a 1925 article to put on reserve for students. The journal is out of print and the publisher has disappeared. Is it safe to put the article on reserve without copyright clearance?

Answer: Most libraries do not seek permission to put copies of works, i.e., reproductions, for use the first semester or term. For subsequent semesters, they do seek permission based on the 1982 ALA Model Policy. Assuming that this is the second term use, the following applies.

The article may still protected by copyright. The journal publisher copyright holder would have received 28 years of protection, so the work was definitely protected through 1953. In 1953, the publisher would have to have applied for a renewal of copyright. If it did so, the copyright would have been renewed for an additional 28 years — until 1981. By that time the Copyright Act of 1978 continued on page 54

Cases of Note from page 57

remove a competitor's name or trademark from a product and stick on your own. It is <u>implied</u> when you obliterate the name and sell it unbranded.

You reverse <u>palm off</u> by slightly modifying a product and selling it under your mark. 7 F.3d at 1437 (quoting *Roho, Inc. v. Marquis*, 902 F.2d 356, 359 (5th Cir.1990)).

Put in the context of <u>copyright</u>, "bodily appropriation" is the "copying or unauthorized use of substantially the entire item." *Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc.*, 889 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir.1989). Consistent with this, trivial changes—salting a work with a few fresh sentences—would not let you slip past the Lanham Act prohibitions.

The 1990 edition of *Robert's Rules* had fourteen areas of revision. The court found that most of Cleary's chapters had changes—sentences, paragraphs, or pages. Some of

them altered previous rules. Cleary's work was not bodily appropriated.

The Second Circuit applies a "consumer confusion" test. In *Rosenfeld v. W.B. Saunders, A Division of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,* 728 F.Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 923 F.2d 845 (2d Cir.1990), the author of a first edition of a multi-volume treatise on plastic surgery had his name dropped from the third edition.

Rosenfeld holds that the harm of reverse palming off is (1) the ultimate purchaser is deceived as to what he is buying, and (2) the originator of the misidentified product is robbed of the advertising value of its name and goodwill.

The editor had in the preface described the author's contribution to the first edition. The court noted that the work was not "mass market." There was no danger of purchasers casually plucking it off a shelf deluded about what they were buying. Consumers of sophisticated reference books are only too aware that treatises with new editions build upon previ-

ous works. Indeed, they are probably familiar with the earlier editions.

At the risk of really confusing you, we've been talking about reverse passing/palming off. Straight passing off is done expressly by labeling your goods and services with someone else's trademark. It is implied if you use a competitor's advertising material to represent that your product is made by the competitor. Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corporation, 847 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir.1988). The Ninth Circuit has California and much of the music industry litigation.

Also on the subject of works-for-hire, see Anne Jennings Cases of Note, ATG, Sept. 1995. She discusses the case of the artist Patrick Nagel versus Playboy and the question of whether a painting is a work-for-hire if Playboy did not tell the artist what it wanted in the picture.