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The Geopolitics of Canadian Defense White Papers: Lofty Rhetoric and Limited Results

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THE GEOPOLITICS OF CANADIAN DEFENSE WHITE PAPERS:
LOFTY RHETORIC AND LIMITED RESULTS

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ABSTRACT. As the United States northern neighbor, Canada serves as a NATO ally and a strategic partner with Washington through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Canadian forces have fought honorably and bravely in concert with American forces in many wars. Canada’s Government, however, has been less consistent in promoting a credible vision of Canadian national security policy and geopolitical interests in its defense white papers. These documents have often contained idealistic rhetoric about adhering to a rules-based international order and defending freedom. In reality, Canadian governments of varying political parties have consistently failed to provide the sustained funding and coherent national security strategy to make Ottawa an effective partner with the U.S. and the NATO alliance in addressing historical and emerging national security threats. This article examines Canadian defense white papers for several decades and recommends ways Canada can ensure its defense policy planning can have greater credibility in the national security policymaking corridors of its allies and with potential adversaries.

Keywords: Canada; defense white papers; geopolitics; national security policymaking; defense spending; Canadian military policy; Canadian military strategy


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Introduction

Throughout its history, Canada has struggled to develop consistent defense rhetoric and policy to match its lofty rhetoric about promoting international peace and security while being a valued member of the world’s free nations. While Canadian military personnel have frequently fought and died for freedom, their government
has been inconsistent in ensuring Canada has the military force structure and political and fiscal support necessary to remain a militarily credible member of the world’s free nations and a valued ally of the U.S. This has been reflected in oscillating Canadian political attitudes and levels of public participation in the defense policymaking process from willingness to cooperate with the U.S. in continental and global security matters to willingness to distance Canadians from hard power realities of human nature and international politics and security. This national security free-riding has occurred due to Ottawa’s geographic proximity to the U.S. and close integration with U.S. military policymaking structures such as North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).¹

Frustration over Canada’s uncertain attitudes toward defense policy and spending was reflected in a February 3, 1947 speech in Canada’s House of Commons by MP John Bracken (1883–1969) (Progressive Conservative (PC)-Neepewa, MB) attacking the Liberal Government of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King (1874–1950) (Liberal (LIB)-Glengarry, ON):

We have been placed in a ludicrous position. From the point of view of effectiveness we were the fourth striking power in the war, and we were in it from the time it began. We were welcomed on the battlefields, but we are excluded from the peace talks. Our soldiers were asked to fight, occupy a place in decisive battles and help to win wars. When it comes to peace making we are gracefully accorded only the privilege of submitting our views. Either we are a part of this world organization or we are not, and until all the mysticism is cleared away about what we are – a little, middle, or great power, a power on our own, a power working in cooperation in cooperation with other British countries, a North American power in association with the United States – until our government makes up its mind on some such questions as these, who can say whether our defence money is wasted or not?²

Canada was one of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) founding members with Foreign Minister Lester Pearson (1897–1972) (LIB-Algoma East, ON) signing the original agreement on April 4, 1949 in Washington, DC. Pearson, who would later serve as Prime Minister from 1963 to 1968 also personified the idealistic utopian strand of Canadian security policymaking winning the Nobel Peace Prize for proposing and sponsoring the creation of a United Nations peacekeeping force in the Sinai Peninsula following the 1956 Arab–Israeli war which also involved France and the United Kingdom.³

Demonstrations of realism in Canadian national security policymaking during the 1950s were provided by Ottawa’s participation in the Korean War in which more than 26,000 Canadians served and 516 were killed⁴ and by the May 12, 1958 NORAD agreement. This pact began in 1955 and sees U.S. and Canadian military forces engaging in aerospace warning and control of North American aerospace by monitoring man-made objects in space and detecting, validating, and warning of
attack against North America by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles. NORAD is part of the U.S.’ Northern Command (NORTHCOM) force structure and an April 28, 2006 extension to this agreement expanded this coverage to include maritime approaches with this arrangement being headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base (AFB), CO. These objectives are accomplished through networks of satellites, ground-based radar, airborne radar, and fighters to detect, intercept, and engage any air-breathing threats to North America. NORAD’s commander is appointed by and responsible to the U.S. President and Canadian Prime Minister. Additional NORAD facilities are located at Elmendorf AFB, AK, Tyndall AFB, FL; and Canadian Forces Base Winnipeg, MB.\(^5\)

Despite this variegated national defense and international peacekeeping activity, Canada did not begin compiling defense white papers and engaging in the complicated policymaking process of preparing these documents until the 1960s in an effort to develop a distinctively Canadian defense policymaking contrasting with British or American policies.\(^6\)

**1963 Royal Commission on Government Organization (John Diefenbaker/Lester Pearson)**

Some impetus for compiling a uniquely Canadian defense policy was instigated by the 1960 Royal Commission on Government Organization (Glassco Commission named for prominent Canadian businessman John Grant Glassco (1905–1968) established when John Diefenbaker (PC) (Prince Albert, SK) (1895–1979) was Prime Minister which sought to address the managerial efficiency of Canadian government agencies in the early 1960s. The section on Canada’s Department of National Defence (DND) when this department’s report was released in 1963 stressed that DND had been singled out due to its size, range and cost of activities, impact of Western defense alliances, and consisting of military and civilian personnel. The Glassco Commission noted that the $CAN 1.652 billion ($CAN 13.381 billion in 2017) spent by this department in this year represented 25% of total federal expenditures and involved supporting 126,500 personnel.\(^7\)

This report also stressed the Canadian defense arrangements do not envision independent military action by Canadian forces and that such forces are designed to operate collaboratively with NATO, NORAD, and United Nations peacekeeping activities. This document went on to stress that unification of Canadian military forces may be required maintaining:

> Although no western country has yet achieved unification of its Armed Forces, doubts have been raised in all countries in all countries in recent years about the traditional Service basis of organization. Combined operations are becoming the rule rather than the exception, with each mission requiring the participation and close cooperation of all three Services. Operationally, the anti-submarine forces of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) bear a much more distant relationship to the Air Division in
Europe or the air defence forces under NORAD than to the anti-submarine forces of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN); both elements operate, in the North Atlantic, under the command of SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic).  

The Commission cautioned that effective force consolidation could not be based on joint control of the three military services if the government desired to maintain traditional responsibility of individual service Chiefs of Staff for armed forces control and administration. This document went on to recommend the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff receive “control and administration” of elements common to two or more services as designated by the Defense Minister and that the new title of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff become “Chief of Canadian Defence Staffs.”

1964 White Paper (Pearson)

Recommendations from the Glassco Commission played a key role in the Pearson Government’s March 1964 defense white paper whose principal author was Defense Minister Paul Hellyer (LIB-Trinity, ON). This document opened by stressing that Canadian defense policy objectives included preserving peace by supporting measures for deterring military aggression; supporting Canadian foreign policy including Ottawa’s participation in international organizations; and providing for protecting and surveilling national territory, airspace, and coastal waters. It went on to stress the emergence of nuclear weapons and long-range missile delivery systems as posing new problems for North American defense; emphasized the need for Canada to establish a Joint Staff and develop means for joint planning and intelligence; naively believed that China would not acquire an effective nuclear arsenal; and realistically recognized that many Communist leaders consider détente as a tactical measure and a means to buy time.

It went on to stress that Canadian defense is part of the larger strategic issue of North American defense, emphasized what Ottawa saw as the critical importance of participating in United Nations peace-keeping, and sought to move its military toward a more unified organizational structure without providing cost estimates on how much funding or personnel capabilities would be required to meet these objectives. The emphasis on force unification for perceived cost-benefit and organizational safety purposes is detailed in the following assertion:

Following the most careful and thoughtful consideration, the government has decided that there is only one adequate solution. It is the integration of the Armed Forces of Canada under a single Chief of Defence Staff and a single Defence Staff. This will be the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada. The integrated control of all aspects of planning and operations should not only produce a more effective and coordinated defence posture for Canada, but should also result in considerable savings. Thus, integration will result in a substantial reduction of manpower strengths in headquarters, training and related establishments, along with
other operating and maintenance costs. The total savings to be effected as a result of such reductions will make available funds for capital equipment purchases, and eventually make possible more equitable distribution of the defence dollar between equipment and housekeeping costs. Sufficient savings should accrue from unification and permit a goal of 25% of the budget to be devoted to capital equipment being realized in the years ahead.\textsuperscript{11}

On July 6–7, 1964 Canada’s House of Commons debated bill C-90 containing much of the content of the Defense White Paper including proposals on military force unification. Criticism of this legislation was expressed by former Defence Minister and MP Douglas Harkness (1903–1999) (PC-Calgary North) who noted Parliament had received no evidence that the new system would not be more confusing or cumbersome than the status quo and that there would be four or five chains of command from the top down to individual units. He went on to stress how important it was for the Defence Minister to receive separate independent military advice instead of being exclusively dependent on one source of military advice.\textsuperscript{12}

Hellyer stressed that this legislation would implement Section 5 of the White Paper calling for implementing and expanding the capabilities of Canadian Forces out to 1974, stressed that the Air Force had more than enough pilots to execute its missions, and that the government had fulfilled its responsibilities in providing for national defense requirements. Bill C-90 was approved by voice vote on July 7, 1964.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{1967 Canadian Forces Unification (Pearson)}

The Pearson Government went ahead with its plans to unify Canadian military forces in 1967. This produced contentious and controversial debate which continues affecting Canadian defense policymaking five decades later. Debate on Bill C-243 \textit{The Canadian Forces Reorganization Act} consumed much of April 1967. MP Josh McIntosh (1909–1988) (PC-Swift Current-Maple Creek, SK) criticized the proposed unification on April 4, 1967 contending that it made sense only if Canada opted out of its other defense commitments, that there was no way of knowing how it would impact Canada’s security and unification’s impact on Canadian allies, and that the Defence Minister was destroying combat troops and making them useless for existing military commitments if unification occurred. He also proclaimed:

\begin{quote}
Unification will not save the taxpayers money. It will not improve the effectiveness of our armed forces. Unification will disrupt and destroy the alliances to which we are now committed. It will destroy our national sovereignty and destroy our national pride. It will get us into many situations that will be dangerous for us.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

On April 11, 1967 Hellyer defended forces unification and government defense planning maintaining that they would provide a CAN $1.5 billion five year equip-
ment program for the Canadian forces including armored personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles; the capacity for peacekeeping operations; anti-tank missiles and guns; helicopter-equipped destroyers to increase naval anti-submarine capacity; purchasing additional operation support ships; and mobile force fighter bombers. He went on to contend that such equipment would give Canadian forces the ability to carry out tasks mandated in the 1964 Defence White Paper.\textsuperscript{15}

Bill C-243 was ultimately approved in a 127–73 general party line vote on April 25, 1967. It went into affect on February 1, 1968 when the RCN, RCAF, and Canadian Army were eliminated and unified into the Canadian Armed Forces which became known as the Canadian Forces. This ostensible unification did not eliminate armed service branch loyalties with a 2009 analysis of this legislation saying it created a bias against national security planning from a national perspective and tied to annual federal budget dynamics.

2009 analysis of this legislation stressed that Hellyer rejected Pearson’s advice to retain important elements of service traditions and many distinctions between air, land, and sea components. Hellyer dismissed this recommendation and believed that all Canadian military personnel should wear the same green uniform, have the same rank structure and promotion ladder, have the opportunity to be employed across all three services, and identify themselves primarily with the Canadian Forces and consequently change their value and loyalties. This did not occur and service-centered loyalty remains entrenched in Canadian military culture though this culture must evolve to meet emerging national security challenges instead of blaming flawed historical policy decisions.\textsuperscript{16}

1971 White Paper (Pierre Trudeau)

The next Canadian Defence White Paper Defence in the 70s was issued in February 1971 by Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (1919–2000) (LIB-Mount Royal, QC) and Defence Minister Donald MacDonald (LIB-Rosedale, ON). This document reflected the Trudeau Government’s desire to maintain some distance between Canada and the U.S. on military issues, Trudeau’s desire to develop a distinctively “Canadian identity” on the international stage, aspirations for upgrading Canadian rhetoric about the importance of international peacekeeping and protecting national sovereignty, while attempting and achieving limited success in efforts to develop and fund a coherent national defense policy.\textsuperscript{17}

Rationales for developing this document included desiring to focus on the strategic nuclear balance between the U.S. and Soviet Union, Richard Nixon’s upcoming visit to China, and the desire to promote Canadian interests in the Arctic including emphasizing promoting “social justice” and ensuring a harmonious national environment. This document preposterously claimed that bomber defenses made military bombers relatively less important, that peacekeeping remained a core component of Canadian foreign and defense policy resulting in preventing or spreading hostilities, and believed that Canadians should not worry about nuclear
fallout resulting from U.S. anti-ballistic missiles intercepting Soviet missiles flying over Canada, and contended that an agreement limiting deployment of ABM systems would be beneficial to Canadian security interests.18

One clear point in this document is the key role geography plays in Canadian security as reflected in the following statement:

Canada is a three-ocean maritime nation with one of the longest coastlines in the world, and a large portion of the trade vital to our economic strength goes by sea. The Government is concerned that Canada’s many and varied interests in the waters close to our shores, on the seabed extending from our coasts, and on the high seas beyond, be protected.19

This document went on to describe how Canada has passed legislation extending its territorial sea from three to twelve miles; that fishing zones encompassing 80,000 square miles had been established in Queen Charlotte Sound, Dixon Entrance and Hecate Strait on the West Coast, and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Bay of Fundy on the East Coast. The report went on to acknowledge the importance of air and maritime surveillance in protecting Canadian waters and airspace with this capability being most effective by submarines in temperate zone waters but not in detecting Arctic water submarine activity.20

This report, while recognizing Canada’s security challenges, refused to commit to specific defense spending levels based on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) other than staying within 1% of GDP and reducing manpower to a level of 83,000. The unwillingness of Canada to sustain a credible level of defense spending to meet NATO and NORAD obligations has been a hallmark characteristic since 1960 with the GDP of Canadian defense spending dropping from 4.143% in 1960 to less than 0.991% in 2016. While Ottawa’s defense spending rose from $CAN 1.538 billion in 1960 to $CAN 5.063 billion in 1980, Canada’s preeminent commitment to social program spending and transfers to provinces is reflected in these expenditures rising from $CAN 1.764 billion in 1960 to $CAN 25.371 billion in 1980. In 1960 Canada’s mobilized military manpower was 120,000 from a population of 17.91 million while in 1972–1973, Canada’s mobilized military manpower had dropped to 84,000 from a population of 21.8 million.21

1987 White Paper (Brian Mulroney)

Except for a brief Conservative minority government under Joe Clark (PC-Yellowhead, AB) in 1979–1980, Trudeau and a brief Liberal Government in 1984 by John Turner (Vancouver Quadra, BC), dominated Canadian government and its defense policymaking during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. However, in 1984 Canadians elected a Conservative Government lead by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (Baie Comeau, QC) which held power with a parliamentary majority until 1993. These years saw improved Canadian relations with the U.S. due to the presence of somewhat similar ideological administrations of Ronald Reagan and
George H.W. Bush and the strong personal relationship Mulroney had with these two presidents.22

Canada’s first defense white paper under Mulroney’s Government was released in 1987 and also involved the influence of Defence Minister Perrin Beatty (PC-Wellington, Grey, Dufferin, Simcoe, ON). This document reflected the ongoing reality of the Cold War between the U.S. and Soviet Union and sought to contrast what it saw as Liberal defense policy deficiencies by promoting an honest assessment of Canadian national security and to provide sufficient financial resources to execute national security requirements.

This paper acknowledged that détente’s early promise was exaggerated, that East-West relationship problems were not readily negotiable, and that Canadian security policy must promote a stable international environment due to Canada’s geographic location between two heavily armed superpowers. Emphasis was placed on the existing importance of the Arctic and Western Europe to Canadian security, acknowledging the Asia-Pacific region’s emerging importance, and stressing the increasing Soviet military use of space demonstrated by having nearly 150 operational orbital satellites with over 90% of these engaged in gathering intelligence on Canada.23

*Challenge and Commitment* also stressed the importance of protecting Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, urged creation of a nuclear submarine program to assist in this effort, stressed the age of Canada’s military equipment including the Navy relying exclusively on ships in commission or under construction in 1971, ship, the Air Force using 75% of the aircraft it had in 1971, regular maritime forces of 10,000, land forces of 22,500, and air forces of 23,050. It acknowledged Canada’s inability to carry out Arctic Sovereignty operations by air and sea while also expressing concern that Ottawa might have to surrender space-based surveillance operations to the U.S. The Mulroney Government proposed increasing defense spending by 2% annually after inflation for the next fifteen years, recognized that increase beyond that might be necessary, and that there would be sufficient flexibility in this spending to account for changing financial, military, strategic, and technological developments.24

Initial public response to this document was positive as reflected in newspaper articles and broadcast commentaries. Between 1984 and 1990, Canadian defense spending saw the following increases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Canadian (C$)</th>
<th>U.S. ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>7.9 billion</td>
<td>$10.356 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>8.386 billion</td>
<td>$11.488 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>9.143 billion</td>
<td>$12.617 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>9.708 billion</td>
<td>$12.717 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>10.206 billion</td>
<td>$12.553 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>10.982 billion</td>
<td>$12.958 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1990 | 11.323 billion| $13.134 billion |25
This document was criticized for failing to discuss internal security or rank defense priorities and not addressing the expensive nature of defense weapons systems technologies. Criticism was also leveled at the White Paper for failing to explain why acquiring nuclear submarines was essential for Canadian security. Additional factors limiting the implementation of this document were improving relations between the West and the Soviet Union during Mikhail Gorbachev’s tenure resulting in the Soviet Union’s ultimate collapse and increasing Canadian budget deficits which saw Canada’s national debt rise from $CAN 24.887 billion in 1984 to $CAN 45.034 billion in 1990 which would see Ottawa’s defense spending fall to $CAN $10.580 billion ($14.394 billion) by 1994.26

1992 White Paper (Mulroney)

The initial early post-Cold War defense white paper released by Canada was also produced by Mulroney’s Government and Defence Minister Marcel Masse (1936–2014) (PC-Frontenac, QC).27 Canadian Defence Policy noted the seismic geopolitical and strategic changes wrought by the Soviet Union’s collapse. Where Europe was concerned this document noted the following paradoxical reality:

Nationalism is in the ascendant. It can be a powerful constructive force. Yet, as ancient nations reappear, ethnic hatreds also rekindle the violent confrontations of earlier eras. Ironically, even as nationalism reshapes the borders of Central and Eastern Europe, the nations of the continents western half are foregoing sovereign prerogatives in the interest of greater economic efficiency and political stability. At their historic December 1991 meeting in Maastricht, European Community leaders agreed to a further monetary integration and increased cooperation in security and defence matters.28

This document also noted the increasing role of religion as a source of tension and division in various global areas and that globalization can have positive and negative effects in global regions. It also stressed that Canada continues to see NATO as a force for European stability and Canada’s willingness to make its forces available to NATO if crisis or war occurs and remain closely engaged in European security. It also stressed the only the U.S. has the military capabilities necessary to defend North America’s geographic expanses and that Canada would maintain its existing security relationship with the U.S.29

Changing international strategic environments and domestic political and economic contingencies, however, would require Canada to end its military bases in Europe and reduce the size of its armed forces from 84,000 regulars in September 1991 to 76,000 by 1995–1996 while defense spending would decline to $CAN 10.580 billion ($14.394 billion) by 1994. This document also announced plans to cancel construction of a facility in Kuujjuag, QC, close a military station in Bermuda
in 1994, and consolidate regional supply and publications depots to locations in Edmonton and Montreal.\footnote{30}

This document also stressed that Canada must maintain its ability to defend against air attacks and would do so by enhancing aerial surveillance and reconnaissance capability by enhancing CF-18 fighter squadron capability at Cold Lake, AB, and Bagotville, QC while providing additional air squadrons at Comox, BC, and Shearwater, NS for combat support, electronic warfare training, and coastal patrol while also assisting maritime and land forces. It also emphasized Ottawa’s strong belief in maintaining and strengthening international arms control regimes such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and Missile Technology Control Regime.\footnote{31}

This white paper was criticized in various Canadian newspapers as being a “muddle of wishful thinking and idle negligence,” the State Department expressing disappointment over planned troop withdrawals; that it is bad policy for the Finance Minister instead of the Defence Minister to set defense policy; and Navy Captain Robert Thomas said the white paper was more inward looking than Canadian foreign policy and criticizing the document’s naval policy contending:

> The attempt to respond to a full range of maritime tasks inherent in the announced defence policy is neither economically or militarily sound. With a skimpy fleet divided between two coasts (and unable to guard the third), the resulting capacity will be insufficient to fully satisfy national requirements or to make a significant difference to an alliance. The Canadian Navy of the future cannot satisfy national security requirements if it tries to be all things to all people.

Thomas went on to argue that the planned acquisition of six new conventional submarines and six new corvettes should be cancelled and that 18 new frigates should be purchased to build what he saw as a stronger more flexible Navy.\footnote{32}

\section*{1994 White Paper (Jean Chretien)}

The next two years saw significant change in Canada’s electoral composition. Mulroney’s increasingly unpopular government ended with his 1993 resignation and brief replacement as Prime Minister by Kim Campbell (PC-Vancouver Centre, BC).\footnote{33} This unpopularity resulted in a splintering of the Progressive Conservative Party with a conservative populist Reform (REF) party based in Western Canada and lead by Preston Manning (REF-Calgary Southwest, AB) taking away support from the PC’s. This ideological splintering proved to be a political windfall for the Liberals who won a decisive victory in the 1993 election reducing the PC’s to two House of Commons seats and giving Reform 52 seats while paving the way to thirteen consecutive years of Liberal governance with Jean Chretien being (LIB-San Maurice, QC) Prime Minister from 1993–2003.\footnote{34}
The 1994 White Paper on Defence was the premier defense policy document of Chretien’s premiership and produced by Defence Minister David Collenette (LIB-Don Valley East, ON). Its rhetoric reflected the idea of a “peace dividend” due to the Soviet Union’s collapse apparently obviating the need for significant Canadian military forces. This mindset and concern in Chretien’s government over reducing a $CAN 40 billion budget deficit saw defense spending decrease 30% in real terms between 1993–1994 and 1998–1999; military personnel reduced from 75,000 to 50,000 and the delay and cancellation of new equipment.\(^35\)

Broad topical white paper contents included proclaiming the Cold War’s conclusion, the rise of ethnic, religious, and political extremism and the spread of advanced weapons technologies as major security problems, the need for combat capable forces within budgetary constraints, protecting Canada by being able to monitor and control activity within national territory, airspace, and maritime jurisdictional areas, maintaining defense cooperation with the U.S., and contributing to international security by participating in multinational peacekeeping operations, strengthening the United Nations, and participating and reforming NATO.\(^36\)

Specific combat operational capabilities promised by this document included:

- A naval task force with up to four combatants (destroyers, frigates, or submarines) and a support ship with appropriate maritime air support;
- Three separate battle groups or a brigade group consisting of three infantry battalions, an armored regime and artillery regiment with appropriate combat and combat service support;
- A wing of fighter aircraft with appropriate support and a squadron of tactical transport aircraft;
- Earmarking an infantry battalion group as a UN standby force or serving with NATO’s intermediate reaction force; and
- Terminating Canada’s commitment to maintain a battalion group for defending northern Norway.\(^37\)

Further provisions of this document included cutting acquisitions by at least $CAN 15 billion over the next 15 years, reducing the DND civilian workforce to approximately 20,000 by 1999, placing acute emphasis on social engineering in Canadian forces employment by providing “equitable employment opportunities” for personnel regardless of gender, race, sexual orientation, or culture, and reducing anti-submarine warfare activities, focusing on protecting shipping and countering missile-carrying submarines in the North Atlantic and increasing participation in UN and multilateral operations.\(^38\)

This document reflects a reassertion of idealism and utopianism in Canadian national security policymaking. It may have been realistic in terms of Canada’s budgetary environment and extant public opinion and in reflecting increasing Canadian interest in Latin America and the Asia-Pacific. However, it did not accommodate for Canadian participation in the Kosovo War and intrastate conflicts in countries as varied as East Timor, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia resulting in increasing operational tempo and stress on Canadian Forces, the rise of Islamist terrorism, the
emerging threat of ballistic missiles and the refusal to develop indigenous ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems or participate in the U.S. BMD system, and displeasure by Canadian military officers that their concerns about operational capability erosions were not listened to by policymakers unwilling to cope with the reality that international military commitments require high-quality personnel, equipment, and significant financial resources to sustain and have domestic and international credibility.\(^{39}\)

### 2004 National Security Policy (Paul Martin)

Chretien resigned in 2003 and was replaced in 2004 by Paul Martin (LIB-Lasalle, Emard, QC).\(^{40}\) Between 2000 and 2006 Canadian defense spending was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CAN Dollars</th>
<th>US Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>12.314 billion</td>
<td>($12.787 billion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>13.191 billion</td>
<td>($13.126 billion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>13.379 billion</td>
<td>($13.193 billion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>14.143 billion</td>
<td>($13.436 billion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>14.951 billion</td>
<td>($13.945 billion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>16.001 billion</td>
<td>($14.558 billion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>17.066 billion</td>
<td>($15.234 billion)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This period also saw the numbers of Canadian military personnel increase from 81,600 in 2001 to 87,700 in 2006. Key reasons for these increases included the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., the need for Canada to increase its border control and counterterrorism capabilities, and Canadian participation in antiterrorist operations in military operations in Afghanistan. A key step in upgrading Canadian defense capabilities was the December 2003 establishment of a Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. At the same time, Canada refused to participate in antiterrorist military operations in Japan and the U.S.’ ballistic missile defense programs for various reasons including not being seen as to close to the George W. Bush Administration’s policies, retaining its interest in multilateral and peacekeeping oriented solutions to international security problems, and deifying United Nations resolutions as having preeminence over national government policy.\(^{42}\)

Martin’s government released a national security policy statement in 2004 and a defense document to an international policy statement in 2005. His government would be one that lived on borrowed time due to increasing public dissatisfaction with a long period of Liberal Government demonstrated by the Quebec sponsorship scandal which saw government publicity contracts to promote Canadian federalism in Quebec go to advertising firms connected with the Liberal Party. The evolution of this scandal diminished public confidence and trust in the Liberals, produced a highly critical governmental commission report, and ultimately resulted in the Liberals being toppled from power in January 2006 by the reformed Conservative Party of Canada (CPC).\(^{43}\)
The April 2004 document was the first Canadian defense white paper in a decade and involved Martin and Defence Minister David Pratt (LIB-Nepean-Carleton, ON). His service as Martin’s defense minister would be cut short by his June 28, 2004 federal election defeat to a CPC candidate and Bill Graham (LIB-Toronto Centre, ON) would serve as Defence Minister for the remainder of Martin’s Government.44

This document claimed Canada’s three core national security interests were:
1. Protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad;
2. Ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; and
3. Contributing to international security.

Additional policy measures described in this document included establishing an Integrated Threat Assessment Center to ensure all threat-related information is compiled, assessed, and reaches policymakers needing it in a timely and effective manner; establishing a National Security Advisory Council consisting of non-governmental experts; developing an advisory Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security consisting of members of Canadian ethno-cultural and religious communities, and making the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness the entity responsible for testing and auditing federal agency departments critical security responsibilities.45

Developing threat assessment capabilities, establishing a National Security Advisory Council, and giving Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada key security testing and auditing powers are sound measures. However, establishing a Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security is pandering to separatism and group identity politics when national security policymaking should be focused on national cohesion and a coordinated national governmental response to security crises and the military strategic and operational realities influencing these crises and the ability of governments to respond to them.46

Functional areas of Canadian policymaking targeted in this document included intelligence, emergency planning and management, public health, transport security, border security, and international security. Specific performance measures targeted for enhancement within these component entities included increasing spending to enhance Canadian intelligence collection capability emphasizing security intelligence; increasing federal cooperation with provincial, territorial, and municipal emergency operations centers; replenishing and updating the National Emergency Services Stockpile System; clarifying responsibilities and strengthening marine security sectoral coordination; deploying facial recognition biometric technology on Canadian passports consistent with international standards; and ensuring Canadian Forces are flexible, responsive, and combat-capable for wide operational ranges including allied interoperability.47

The National Security Strategy was projected to cost over $CAN 500 million and balance national security with personal freedoms with maritime security being a major recipient of this funding. The conservative National Post, however, referenced the recent Al Qaida attack on Madrid’s train station by stressing that
Canadians do not believe they are locked in the 21st century’s long war against Islamist terrorism, warning that then current generations of Canadians had not experienced security environments like their ancestors did in two world wars and the Cold War, contending that the Martin Government’s policy was short on details and shorter on money, and warning that it may take the occurrence of terrorist events within Canada for Canadians to become more security conscious. Criticism of this nonchalant attitude toward national security was expressed in a letter to the Ottawa Citizen warning the Canada was good at wasting money on questionable heritage projects, government advertising, a gun registry, and bilingualism when giving the military the resources needed to protect the public from terrorism would be a better use of taxpayer dollars.48

2005 International Policy Defense Statement (Martin)

The following year the Martin government Foreign Ministry released a five volume series of international policy statements with one of the volumes covering defense policy. These document compilations were issued by Defence Minister Graham and Foreign Minister Pierre Pettigrew (LIB-Papineau, QC) and also covered foreign affairs, international trade and international development.49

Themes addressed in the defense volume of these reports included the international security environment in the early 21st century, a new vision for Canadian Forces, protecting Canada and Canadians, the Canada–U.S. defence relationship in a changing world, contributing to a safer world, and future tasks for Canadian forces. This document proclaimed that the Canadian forces personnel would be increased by 5,000 regular and 3,000 reserves which would enable Canada to participate in international operations anywhere, that land forces would receive the vast majority of this increase effectively doubling their capacity to undertake overseas operations, and that Canada would gain the ability to continuously sustain up to 5,000 personnel on international operations while also better responding to natural disasters and terrorist attacks.50

This document also noted the increasing operational tempo of Canadian Forces since 1990 saying that in May 2004 Canada ranked second among NATO countries in the percentage of personnel deployed on multinational operations and sixth in terms of total numbers. It also stressed how the complex and chaotic contemporary operational environment (three-block war) meant that land and naval forces could carry out integrated operations in one city block, stabilization operations in another block, and humanitarian operations in an adjacent block while also enforcing maritime exclusion zones, air forces flying in supplies and humanitarian aid while also needing to engage opponents. Such developments would require Canadian forces to better integrate maritime, land, air, and special operations forces; adapt their capabilities and force structures to deal with threats arising from instability in failed states; and requiring forces to become more responsive by enhancing their ability to respond quickly to domestic Canadian or international crises by arriving
on the scene faster, making rapid transitions to operations upon arrival, moving more expeditiously within theater, and sustaining deployments for extended periods.\textsuperscript{51}

This document dubiously claimed that Canada no longer faced the threat of Russian bombers in Canadian airspace when this would become a recurring problem over the following decade. It correctly stated at terrorist groups could use hijacked airliners, crop dusters, drones, and cruise missiles to attack Canadian targets and that the government must improve its gathering, tracking, analysis, and use of threat information.\textsuperscript{52}

One conservative journalistic analysis of this document described it as “drunk on bureaucratic babble” and “these pages deliver nothing except pious declarations of intent.” A Liberal Party Senator stressed that Canada needed to spend money on its military stressing that Army commanders had to scramble to find parts, equipment, and personnel from one another to mobilize; that the Navy had serious problems with every class of fleet ships being designed to fight yesterday’s wars; that the Air Force had insufficient capacity to move troops effectively and quickly to combat zones and humanitarian relief sites; that Canada’s military needed to increase its size from 62,000 to 90,000 to carry out the demanding tasks assigned to it by the government; and that while Canadians are spending about $CAN 373 per capita on defense, Australians and British per capita defense spending are $CAN 688 and $CAN 988 per capita respectively.\textsuperscript{53}

\textbf{Canada First Defense Strategy 2008 (Stephen Harper)}

Liberal Party rule came to an end in 2006 when a minority Conservative Government was elected under the leadership of Prime Minister Stephen Harper (CPC-Calgary Southwest) and remained in power until late 2015 following two successful reelection campaigns in 2008 and 2011.\textsuperscript{54} Harper’s party continued the ongoing Canadian rhetorical tradition of vowing to increase Canada’s defense capabilities, achieving some success, then failing to follow through on these rhetorical commitments for various reasons. A $CAN 5.3 billion defense spending increase spread over five years was introduced in the government’s first budget in May 2006. The Arctic was an early area of emphasis for the CPC Government with Defence Minister Gordon O’Connor (CPC-Carleton-Mississippi Mills, ON) announcing in June 2006 that the Cabinet would approve spending $CAN 3.4 billion for Boeing C-17 Globemaster air military transport aircraft. However, media revelations in February 2007 showed the government backing off many of its Arctic promises.\textsuperscript{55} On May 12, 2008, Harper and Defence Minister Peter Mackay (CPC-Central Nova, NS) issued the next defence white paper \textit{Canada First Defence Strategy}.\textsuperscript{56}

Contents of this document stated Canadian forces would have the ability to conduct the following six core missions:
• Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD;
• Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics;
• Respond to a major terrorist attack;
• Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster;
• Lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period, and
• Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods.  

Additional commitments and objectives promised by this document included providing predictable defense spending increases over the next 20 years including increasing this spending from 1.5%–2% of GDP beginning in Fiscal Year 2011–2012; increasing such spending from $CAN 18 billion in 2008–2009 to over $30 billion in 2027–2028 for a cumulative total of approximately $CAN 490 billion. Proposed equipment acquisitions included purchasing 17 new C-130J Hercules tactical airlift craft, 16 CH-47 Chinook helicopters, three replenishment ships, 2,300 trucks, up to 100 Leopard 2 tanks, and 6–8 Arctic/offshore patrol ships. Balanced investments were promised in the following foundational military capabilities including personnel, equipment, readiness, and infrastructure. Specific metrics of these investments included:
• Increasing military personnel to 70,000 regular forces and 30,000 reserve forces;
• Replacing core equipment fleets including:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment Type</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 ships to replace existing destroyers and frigates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–12 maritime patrol aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 next-generation fighter aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A fleet of land combat vehicles and systems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Strengthening the overall state of Forces readiness to deploy and their ability to sustain operations once deployed; and
• Improving and modernizing defence infrastructure.  

This policy was praised and criticized by varying sectors of Canadian politics and the defense community. Laurie Hawn (CPC-Edmonton East, AB) told the House of Commons on May 14, 2008 that the government supported the Canadian forces, would provide them the necessary equipment, and provide Canada’s defense industry with the jobs and tools to achieve these objectives.  

Criticism of the white paper and its funding was expressed on May 16 by MP Marlene Jennings (LIB-Notre Dame-de-Grâce-Lachine, QC) who criticized the government for not allowing the defense plan to be read and demanded the government provide more specifics including how much the strategy would cost Canadians.  

A 2010 article in the Canadian Military Journal maintained Canada First was a good first step for restoring Canada’s international reputation and that $CAN 30 billion in annual defense spending is a small insurance premium for protecting Canadian interests and the Canadian economy. A 2009 article in Survival criticized Harper’s Government for acknowledging that its northern military moves are
responding to increased Russian assertiveness, that Harper is recreating “myths of the Cold War,” and that identifying Russia as a potential threat is contrary to the Northern Dimension of Canada’s foreign policy declaring that Canada is positioned to develop an Arctic strategic partnership with Russia. An analysis that same year by the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute praised this document for summarizing governmental defense perspectives and plans and approved of its proposed small but steady defense funding increases. However, it also faulted Canada First for having an excessively general strategic framework and failing to prioritize its initiatives.\(^{62}\)

A 2009 consultant’s report prepared for DND revealed various findings about support for Canada’s military, awareness of defense spending, and different regional breakdowns in support for Canadian defense efforts. Report findings revealed that 82\% of respondents support the Canadian Forces with over 54\% strongly supporting Canadian Forces. Overall support for these forces has historically tended to be lower in Quebec though there was an increase in support for these forces in this province from 62–73\% between March and December 2009. Public support for significant government defense spending is fairly high at 75\% but in Quebec this falls to 51\% with Alberta ranking highest in support with 91\% of this province’s respondents favoring significant defense spending.\(^{63}\)

Additional report findings showed 61\% of Canadians were relatively optimistic that the government could meet Canada First funding objectives with 71\% of those in Atlantic Canada being most optimistic and 56\% of British Columbians being least optimistic; awareness of plans to increase new military equipment saw 66\% aware of the intent of purchasing land combat vehicles, 63\% military aircraft; and 45\% ships; only 36\% of Canadians believed the Forces had the equipment to do their job, only 26\% believe that DND gets good value when making major equipment purchases, and 71\% believed that defense infrastructure spending benefits local economies.\(^{64}\)

During the Harper Government’s tenure in power between 2006 and 2015, defense spending occurred at the following levels:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Spending (C$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>17.066 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>19.255 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>21.100 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>21.828 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>19.255 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>21.808 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>19.978 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>18.764 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>20.076 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>19.431 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During Harper’s Government Canadian defense spending as a percentage of GDP began in 2006 at 1.2\%, peaked at 1.4\% in 2009, before dropping to 1\% in 2015.\(^{65}\)
A March 23, 2017 NATO analysis revealed that Canada ranked 23rd out of 28 NATO countries in the percentage of GDP it spent on defense with only Belgium, the Czech Republic, Iceland, Luxembourg, and Spain spending less on defense. This assessment also revealed that Canada spent 18.06% of its budget on defense equipment which is less than NATO’s guideline of 20% spending on defense equipment, less than NATO’s recommended 2% of GDP for defense spending, and that Ottawa’s 2015 per capita expenditure was U.S. $492 as opposed to the NATO average of $939. On a positive note, Canadian military personnel increased from 60,000 in 2009 to 66,000 in 2015 though this last figure declined from a peak of 68,000 between 2011 and 2013.\(^67\)

### 2017 Strong, Secure, Engaged (Justin Trudeau)

After nearly ten years of Harper’s Government, in late 2015 the Canada’s electoral pendulum shifted with Canadians reverting to a Liberal Government with Justin Trudeau (LIB-Papineau-QC) as Prime Minister. In May 2017, this Trudeau’s Government, including Defence Minister Harjat Singh Sajjan (LIB-Vancouver South) released its new white paper *Strong Secure Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy.*\(^68\)

Compilation of this document involved a public consultation process including crowdsourcing from various individuals and organizations. Nearly 20,200 online submissions to the *Defence Policy Review* were made through an online consultation portal and over 4,700 participants contributed comments or votes using this forum. Eight cross-country roundtable meetings were held with two in Ottawa and the others in Edmonton, Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, and Yellowknife. House and Senate Defence Committees also contributed to the process as did indigenous Canadians. An online public consultation report based on this feedback was released on October 24, 2016.\(^69\)

University of Calgary Political Science Professor Rob Huebert stressed the Arctic’s renewed geopolitical importance stressing increasing American and Russian aircraft and submarine capabilities in this region. Maintaining that this requires Canada to rethink its previous emphasis on Arctic cooperation, he urged Canada and NORAD to improve an aerial surveillance system which had not been updated since 1985 and to make a decision on replacing the aging fleet of CF-18 jet fighters. He also stressed that Canada needs to rethink former Prime Minister Harper’s decision that there is no place for NATO in the Arctic by contending that Canada should accept Finland and Sweden into NATO membership in order to strengthen Arctic defense against a resurgent Russia which has been making increasing aerial incursions into those countries.\(^70\)

David Bercuson, a University of Calgary historian colleague of Huebert’s stressed the perennial problem of Ottawa’s unwillingness to meet the NATO standard of spending at least 2% of its GDP on defense. He also maintained that Canada must decide which global parts are most important to Canada’s interests; which defense
spectrum arenas Canada should try to cover; and the extent to Canada engage militarily in areas where it has limited national interests.71

Dr. Karen Breeck, the former President of Medical Women of Canada who as served as a Canadian Forces flight surgeon, complained that the Canadian military’s force structure was:

still largely based on the stereotypical soldier of Canada’s past: male, white, European background, able-bodied, heterosexual, married with a stay-at-home wife, born in Canada, English or French mother tongue, Christian religious background, and with a core notion that war and soldiers = masculinity, as reinforced by Hollywood and popular media. If diversity truly is our strength as a nation and people are our most important asset, then defence priorities, policies, and practices must support and enable the “other” as a full and valued CAF team member.

She went on to maintain that the Canadian military should provide nationalized funding to ensure address gender integration problems including research, military equipment modification, life support equipment, pregnancy related needs, and formalize, analyze, and disseminate lessons learned from such integration.72

Jennifer Allen Simons of the Vancouver-based Simons Foundation stressed pleasure that Canada was taking up its former position at the United Nations (UN), seeking a UN Security Council seat, maintained that conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance, and maintained diplomatic engagement should be more important than military conflict. She went on to assert that “currently no threats to Canada require a military response;” that threats to Canada are natural disasters and terrorist threats; that Canada should not participate in ballistic missile defense since the threat of missile attack has grown more slowly than anticipated; that China is threatened by U.S. sea-based anti-missile defenses; that Canada should rejuvenate nuclear disarmament; and that Ottawa should not invest in fighter aircraft since it is not under threat from such weaponry.73

Strong Secure and Engaged also includes the fingerprints of Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland (LIB-University Rosedale, ON) whose foreword to this document proclaims that defense policy will make it possible for Canada to implement a “progressive, feminist foreign” policy to achieve shared objectives. An earlier journalistic essay by Friedland saw her describe Russian President Vladimir Putin as “cuddly, cooing,” expressed hope that he might only serve two terms as President, and would eventually consider a second career as an environmental activist.74

This white paper claimed it was the most rigorously costed Canadian defense policy ever, that it would meet Canada’s domestic and international defense needs, and that governmental defense spending would increase from $CAN 18.9 million in 2016–2017 to $CAN 32.7 million in 2026–2027. It stressed it would provide various kinds of support for Canadian military personnel and their families while also promoting an agenda of social engineering by increasing the number of women in Canada’s military from 15% of personnel in 2017 to 25% of personnel in 2016.75
Force structure enhancements promised by this document including acquiring 15 surface combatant ships for the RCN and recapitalizing the Canadian Army’s land combat capabilities and aging vehicle fleets along with modernizing command and control systems in order to expand its light force capabilities to be more agile and effective in complex operational theaters including peace operations. Strong Secure Engaged committed to acquiring 88 advanced fighter aircraft for the RCAF for enforcing Canadian aerial sovereignty, meet its NORAD and NATO commitments, and recapitalize aircraft such as the CP-140 Aurora anti-submarine warfare and surveillance aircraft. Additionally, Canadian Special Operations Forces Command is to be given the means to expand its operational capacity and invest in capabilities enabling rapidly deployable and agile forces to carry out domestic and international missions.  

Force projection enhancements also aspired to in Strong Secure Engaged include increasing the size of regular Canadian armed forces by 3,500 to 71,500 enhancing Arctic coverage with drone aircraft and enhanced satellite capability, enhancing cyber capabilities by hardening defenses and conducting active cyber operations against potential enemies in government authorized military missions, and developing capabilities such as supporting two sustained deployments of 500–1,500 personnel, a one time-limited deployment of 500–1,500 personnel for 6–9 months duration, and expanding abilities to provide civil assistance to authorities in terrorist or disaster situations.

A good example of how this is more a social policy document than a national security policy document is reflected in the number of times selected individual words appear within its contents:

| Ballistic Missiles | 2 |
| China | 3 |
| Diversity | 47 |
| Gender | 40 |
| Inclusion | 17 |
| Islam | 0 |
| North Korea | 4 |
| Nuclear | 13 |
| Peacekeeping | 7 |
| Russia | 10 |
| Strategic | 19 |
| Strategy | 28 |
| Terrorism | 18 |
| War | 278 |

Strong Secure Engaged is an egregious example of using a defense white paper as a document for promoting victim oriented group identity political objectives such as diversity and gender theory instead of containing sound military policy and threat analysis. The purpose of defense white papers is providing credible strategies and the sustained financial resources necessary to meet national security objectives.
through diplomatic, economic, military, and political means such as combat readiness and collaboration with allied countries.

Strong Secure Engaged received favorable support from the Liberal Party when it was unveiled in Parliament, but scorching criticism from the CPC opposition. Defence Minister Sajjan said on May 29, 2017 that Canada had tripled its trainers and doubled its intelligence on Iraq and that funding in the defense policy review would give Canadian forces the predictable and sustainable funding escalator they need to carry out their operations. On June 13, 2017, Jean Rioux (LIB-St. Jean, QC) contended that Conservative mismanagement of renewing Canada’s jet fighter fleet had forced the Liberal Government to explore purchasing 18 new fighters until a replacement for the CF-18 could be found and that a modern air fleet was vital for Canada to defend its airspace and sovereignty.79

Five days earlier, Shadow Defence Minister James Bezan (CPC-Selkirk, Interlake, Eastman, MB) proclaimed:

Yesterday, the Minister of National Defence presented Canadians with a book of empty promises. In two years the Liberals have failed to deliver a single piece of military equipment, and they do not plan on buying anything for our troops until after the next election. The Prime Minister already believes that our troops are appropriately provisioned. The Minister of National Defence cannot explain where the money is going to come from. When the Minister of Finance was asked about this yesterday, he said, “Go ask the defence minister. Where is the money going to come from”?80

Bezan resumed his attack on Sajjan and what he saw as shortcomings in defense planning and funding with this June 20 riposte:

Mr. Speaker, we are not questioning the minister’s record. We are questioning his trustworthiness. Case in point, the sole-sourcing for 18 Super Hornets where the capability gap is imaginary. We already know that 88% of defence experts and 13 former Royal Canadian Air Force commanders have said there is no capability gap.

We have already seen $12 billion worth of cuts in two budgets under this minister. The government has done a defence policy review, but there is no money to actually resource it. If there is no money to resource it, then it is a book of empty promises.

The minister has been out there doing his tour. Canadians and members of the Canadian Armed Forces are hoping it is his farewell tour, because this is a minister who has gone out, and tried to sell something when we know the money is not in the budget. The Minister of Finance has said that currently the Canadian Armed Forces are properly provisioned. I can tell the House the money is not there to do the things the government says it is going to do.81
Analysis – A 2017 report by Canada’s Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) wearily proclaimed that repeated Canadian governments came to power proclaiming that “Canada is back” and that defense policy reviews have been sporadic occurrences. It went on to argue that the Trudeau Government may not have had real interest in a serious and extensive review of national defense policy, and that governmental defense policy should focus on just defending Canada but being victorious in defending Canada. CDA went on to argue the “government must overcome its debilitating timidity about defence matters” and that effective defense never has been, never is, and never will be cheap. It also criticized Canada for following the opposite of Theodore Roosevelt’s aphorism of “speak softly and carry a big stick” and that over the past five decades Canada has relied heavily on U.S. taxpayers to defend it.  

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute also excoriated this white paper. While acknowledging it made important contributions to improving the military’s ability to manage threats and advance Canada’s overseas interests, it asserted it did not provide an adequate conceptual foundation for DND to plan for the future. It faulted Strong Secure Engaged for vaguely speaking of Canada’s declining to identify specific threats facing Canada and its allies, and not linking threats facing Canadian interests to actual responses. Such failure in providing proper planning guidance hinders the military’s ability to adapt to emerging contingencies in an accelerating technologically developing security environment revolutionizing the conduct of war. Macdonald-Laurier said that without prioritizing Canadian Forces must prepare for all scenarios scattering finite resources over a wide area leaving significant capabilities gaps.  

Canadians have conflicting and often ambiguous attitudes on military policy matters according to recent polling by Angus Reid and Forum Research Inc. A June 15, 2017 poll on important issues facing Canadians found terrorism and security was ranked as the most important by 13% of respondents behind the economy, the deficit/government spending, health care, and jobs/unemployment. An October 24, 2014 poll showed that 55% of Canadians said they were not confident in the ability of security services to prevent domestic terrorist acts, 50% of Canadians consider terrorism and ISIS top security threats ahead of Russian aggression and climate change. A September 25, 2014 poll showed 2/3 of Canadians supported some kind of involvement in U.S.-led action against ISIS, 38% supporting Canada sending military advisors to assist the U.S., 28% favoring using Canadian troops; 23% opposing Canadian involvement, 11% not sure; and 73% thinking U.S. efforts against ISIS will achieve some success against ISIS. A May 26, 2014 poll found that 44% of Canadians have a great deal of trust in Canada’s military making it the country’s most trusted institution; an April 16, 2015 poll showed 48% of Canadians approving and 40% disapproving of a Canadian Forces mission to Ukraine with this support being most popular among males, middle income individuals, individual in the prairie provinces and Alberta, Conservatives, and Anglophones and least popular in Quebec, among Liberals, New Democrats, and Francophones. Finally,
an October 17, 2017 poll noted fears of nuclear war among Canadians are rising with 55% of respondents describing this as a very serious or fairly serious problem for Canada and 29% of Canadians saying they should join the U.S. ballistic missile defense system with 44% of Canadians should not join this system.\footnote{84}

\section*{Conclusion}

The insularity many Canadians may have felt toward global security topics was brutally shattered with the October 22, 2014 attack in Ottawa on the Canadian War Memorial and Canadian Parliament by Michael Zehaf-Bibeau resulting in the murder of a Canadian soldier. Zehaf-Bibeau was killed by a parliamentary security officer inside the Houses of Parliament while many members were present including Prime Minister Stephen Harper. A report on this incident expressed concern over duplicative security jurisdiction over the Parliament Hill complex between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Ontario Provincial Police, and parliamentary security forces.\footnote{85}

Canada has contributed and continues making positive contributions and sacrifices for global security and advancing freedom. This has been demonstrated in Afghanistan where 158 Canadian soldiers were killed between 2002 and 2011 and by Ottawa’s valued contributions to NATO and NORAD.\footnote{86} Canada’s 2016 defense budget is $CAN 20.322 billion ($15.157 billion); active duty personnel in Canadian Forces number 63,000 out of a July 1, 2017 population of 36,708,083, and the 2016 Warsaw Summit of NATO countries saw Canada agree to provide 450 personnel to a battle group in Latvia.\footnote{87}

Unfortunately, commitment to essential defense spending and serious military strategic planning and sustainment have been an afterthought for decades in Canadian defense white papers and political debate. A key problem underlying this lack of sustained Canadian commitment to military policymaking is that social programs take preeminence in Canadian political priorities and government spending. Recent articles maintain that the influence of Canada’s 1966 Medical Care Act gives Canada a social welfare commitment resulting in political leaders giving preferential treatment to “butter” over “guns,” regardless of their partisan perspective, consequentially leaving augmenting social spending as a focal prerequisite for enhancing the political survival of Canadian leaders.\footnote{88}

This schizophrenia between short-term rhetoric on fulfilling national security requirements and domestic social spending and prioritizing perceived social policy requirements has been reflected in the text of the Canadian defense white papers analyzed here and in other Canadian defense policy statements and debate. Another recent example of this schizophrenia appears in a June 2017 parliamentary committee report on the importance of naval forces to Canadian security. This document’s conclusion featured many sensible recommendations such as ensuring that the RCN is a key pillar of national security and sovereignty; that the fleet’s size and budget be increased to meet domestic and international obligations; that a
National Shipbuilding Strategy be supported; that the submarine fleet be replaced and upgraded to have under-ice capabilities, that drone technology be integrated into the fleet for Arctic and maritime domain awareness; and that there be increased focus and doctrine to advance Canada’s Arctic naval capability and presence. Unfortunately, this same document also let itself fall into the abyss of group identity politics when said the RCN “must ensure that its personnel better reflect Canadian society.”

The quality of Canadian defense policymaking is also constrained by weak parliamentary oversight. Parliamentary defense committees do not have access to classified information. Such access could be statutorily granted by Parliament but this has not occurred. Consequently, this enables the government to keep such information from these committees limiting their ability to engage in intense oversight of defense matters. It also results in opposition parliamentarians preferring to engage in public criticism instead of secret monitoring of DND and the armed forces. Effective parliamentary oversight of defense is essential if Canada hopes to upgrade the quality of its military power and defense activities. Ottawa’s defense policy-making commitments are also weakened by an internationalist orientation and reputational concerns combining to create a cycle of engagement and re-engagement where extrication from military commitments comes with high reputational costs. A result of this is Canadian participation in multilateral operations is being seen as a good ally but ceding control over the strategic duration of these commitments to forces beyond national control or not participating in such commitments and risking international standing.

Demonstration of the relatively short-term nature of Canadian international military operational commitments is reflected in the following two tables:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Combat mission, Kandahar</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>ISAF rotation, Kabul</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Combat and Provincial Reconstruction (PRT) Kandahar</td>
<td>9–12 months &amp; 18 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>First Kandahar extension</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Second Kandahar extension</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>NATO training mission</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>March 2011</td>
<td>Naval and air support</td>
<td>3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>Naval and air support</td>
<td>3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September 2011</td>
<td>Naval and air support</td>
<td>3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-ISIS</td>
<td>October 2014</td>
<td>Training; air campaign</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 2015</td>
<td>Training; air campaign</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Canada’s Strategic Duration Explained

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>Logistical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>Alliance, operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>9–12 months and 18 months</td>
<td>Alliance, operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>Alliance, multilateral, dyadic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>Alliance, multilateral, dyadic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>Alliance, dyadic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2011</td>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2011</td>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-ISIS</td>
<td>October 2014</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2015</td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>Pragmatic, electoral(^{91})</td>
</tr>
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Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King in 1937 asked if it was possible for Canada to maintain friendly relations with the U.S. and ignore its defenses. An internal government memorandum published soon after contended that if Canada placing its defense in American hands “would virtually make us a Protectorate of the United States – subjecting all our external policy and some of our internal policy to the supervision of Washington.”\(^{92}\)

In a world characterized by increasing Russian aggression in the Arctic, Middle East, and Eastern Europe; Chinese aggression in the East and South China Seas; an increasingly bellicose North Korea developing a nuclear arsenal capable of reaching North America; various forms of Islamist terrorism; and assorted methods of cyber warfare, spaced-based power projection, and weapons of mass destruction; Canada can no longer cling to the belief that its good intentions immunize it from hostile global forces. Canadians must learn to accept hard power realities of international affairs, the innate and unrelenting aggression of human nature and international power politics, and the threats of external aggression and potential subversion to its security and vital interests.

This can be done by increasing and sustaining its defense spending to well over the NATO recommended 2% of GDP, increasing the size of its active duty armed forces to over 100,000, augmenting its air, land, and naval capabilities to achieve greater interoperability with NATO countries, developing forces capable of sustaining unilateral expeditionary operations, joining the U.S. ballistic missile defense system, exclusively focusing its military policymaking on defending its vital interests in North America, Europe, and the Asia–Pacific in collaboration with NATO and Pacific Rim allies, and making its Defence Minister the most important cabinet position after the Prime Minister.

Canada must jettison its utopian belief in peacekeeping and social engineering as valid instruments of national security policymaking and make the requisite financial and human resource commitments necessary to national defense in its force structure and defense policymaking documents. This must be done, even at the expense of popular social programs and its perceived internationalist reputation,
if Ottawa wants to be taken seriously as a credible player in international security policymaking among the world’s democratic countries.93

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