New Perspectives on Kristallnacht: After 80 Years, the Nazi Pogrom in Global Comparison

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New Perspectives on Kristallnacht: After 80 Years, The Nazi Pogrom in Global Comparison

The Jewish Role in American Life

An Annual Review of the Casden Institute for the Study of the Jewish Role in American Life
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Foreword

The idea for a volume reassessing Kristallnacht came together at the Association of Jewish Studies Conference in December 2016. At the time, I was writing about the impact of Kristallnacht in Los Angeles, while my colleague Wolf Gruner, the Shapell-Guerin Chair in Jewish Studies and History and founding director of the USC Shoah Foundation Center for Advanced Genocide Research, was researching the mass destruction of private homes and Jewish reactions toward violence during the November 1938 pogroms.

The historical works I consulted suggested that the horrors of Kristallnacht turned American—and much of world—public opinion against the Hitler regime. Yet, what I discovered was that despite worldwide condemnations, very little changed for Jews in the United States. Although American anti-Nazi groups became more forceful in their attacks on Nazi Germany after the November 1938 massacres, so, too, did members of the German-American Bund grow more militant. Inspired by the lack of western opposition to Hitler, Bundists began preparing in earnest for Der Tag, the day Nazis would seize control of the American government.

If the American response to Kristallnacht was more complicated than historians had suggested, I wondered how much more complex European responses must have been. With the 80th anniversary of Kristallnacht only two years away, Wolf Gruner—who was far more expert in the period—and I agreed to organize an international conference that would reassess the worldwide impact of the horrible events of November 9–10, 1938. With the help of outside funders and the staff from our two institutes—the USC Casden Institute and the Center for Advanced Genocide Research—we succeeded in bringing twenty-two scholars from six countries to the University of Southern California on November 5–7, 2018 to reassess the events surrounding Kristallnacht and its lasting legacy.

Volume 17 of the Casden Annual includes fifteen of the articles presented at our conference “New Perspectives on Kristallnacht: After 80 Years, the Nazi
Pogrom in Global Comparison.” Examining events eighty years after the violent pogrom of 1938, contributors to this volume offer new cutting-edge scholarship on the event and its repercussions. We hope the essays will inspire further research into one of the most important tragedies of the twentieth century.

I wish to thank my co-editor, Wolf Gruner, for helping to make the conference and this volume a reality. I also wish to thank Marilyn Lundberg Melzian for her wonderful work as our volume’s production editor.

Steven J. Ross
Myron and Marian Casden Director
Professor of History
On November 9 and 10, 1938, under the pretext of revenge for the assassination of a Nazi diplomat by a young Polish Jew, SS, SA, and citizens in Germany, Austria, and the Sudetenland, acting on orders of the Nazi leadership, launched the deadliest violence in the region’s history. Armed with axes and sledgehammers, with gasoline and pistols, groups of perpetrators systematically demolished Jewish synagogues, schools, businesses and other properties while looting, beating, raping, and murdering innocent Jews. By the time Joseph Goebbels stopped the violence, the soon-dubbed “Kristallnacht” pogrom left an unknown number of Jewish men and women dead (estimates are as high as several hundred), more than ten thousand Jewish businesses destroyed, and over two thousand synagogues burned to the ground; thirty thousand male Jews were arrested and sent to Nazi concentration camps, where several hundred more died from beatings, starvation, and cold.1

The reasons for the violence went back to the end of 1937, when the Nazi leadership began to realize that strategies developed since 1933 to expel the Jews from Germany stalled because of the growing pauperization of the Jewish population and the unwillingness of countries abroad to accept Jewish refugees and emigrants. After Germany annexed Austria in March 1938, previous efforts at expulsion evaporated, as greater numbers of Jews lived under Nazi rule.2 Moreover, a war seemed increasingly imminent as the political crisis over the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia heated up. The Nazi leadership, however, was determined to drive all Jews out of the country before the outbreak of a potential war. In August 1938, the Nazi state decided to dedicate all its hard currency to prepare for war instead of financing mass emigration. This created a fundamental dilemma: on the one hand, the Nazis wanted all Jews to leave
as soon as possible; on the other hand, they did not want Jewish emigration to cost the Nazi regime any money. To cut this Gordian knot of the expulsion policy, which the government itself had tied, the Nazi leadership proceeded with violence and brutality. On the evening of November 9, 1938 in Munich, after learning about the passing of the German diplomat vom Rath in Paris, Hitler decided that the Jews should now “feel the force of the people’s rage,” and Goebbels gave later instructions on how this “upsurge” of popular anger should be organized.³

However, even with the launch of previously unprecedented, organized nationwide anti-Jewish violence, the National Socialist leadership did not succeed in their main goal: to expel all Jews from the German Reich. Blaming the victims for instigating the violence, the Nazi government imposed a $400 million (1 Billion Reichmark) fine upon the German Jewish community. Yet, the lack of money prevented many Jews from leaving. The Nazi leadership, thus, developed a new double strategy: to force emigration by all means, while separating the remaining Jews from the rest of society.⁴

This volume offers new and innovative scholarly research that changes our traditional views of the course of and the reactions to the violent anti-Jewish event. The selected essays originate from an international conference, “New Perspectives on Kristallnacht: After 80 Years, the Nazi Pogrom in Global Comparison,” held on November 5–7, 2018 at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles and Villa Aurora in Pacific Palisades. This was the only international academic conference to mark the 80th anniversary of the fateful events of November 1938.

The event was co-organized by the USC Shoah Foundation Center for Advanced Genocide Research and the USC Casden Institute for the Study of the Jewish Role in American Life, and presented in cooperation with the Jack, Joseph and Morton Mandel Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington DC, and the Center for Research on Antisemitism at the Technical University Berlin, Germany. Our gathering featured twenty-two junior and senior scholars from six countries (the United States, Germany, Israel, Canada, the United Kingdom and India), who represented multiple disciplines, including history, literature, philosophy, religion, political science, film and cultural studies, and French and Jewish studies. The conference aimed to resituate the anti-Jewish pogrom in its historical context as well as its place in world history.
NEW RESEARCH ON THE VIOLENT EVENTS

Kristallnacht is often thought of as one of the most well researched events in the history of the Third Reich. The essays in this volume challenge a variety of traditional perceptions of the pogrom of November 1938 and explore facets of the two days of carnage throughout Greater Germany that have not received significant scholarly attention. Our authors offer insights into new aspects of the violence, including the impact of violence on gender, the mass participation of citizens in rioting, the destruction of homes, and the wide variety of Jewish reactions—from the Yiddish press in Eastern Europe to orthodox rabbis throughout the world to Jewish organizations in the United States. The volume’s concluding essays examine the lingering global legacy of Kristallnacht by exploring violent events in Rwanda, India, and Israel.

In the opening chapter, Francois Guesnet (London) and Ulrich Baumann (Berlin) trace historical shifts in terminology regarding the events of November 9–10, 1938—shifts that carry enormous political implications. At the time it occurred, the November violence was widely referred to as a pogrom, while soon after 1945 politicians and scholars referred to it as Kristallnacht or Reichskristallnacht, a term that had emerged before the war ended. However, over the past several decades, historians and citizens—especially in Germany—started using the term pogrom or November pogrom, since they found the former too euphemistic for the violent event. The authors make us aware that these terms and their use deserve further scrutiny. For the authors, pogrom generally refers to unplanned eruptions of anti-Semitic violence by local groups, yet the events in November 1938 need to be understood as state-sponsored violence. To label them as pogroms, they argue, is to minimize the scope of violence by simply attributing it to disgruntled local anti-Semites rather than to a clear government policy. Thus, both authors advocate using “state terror”—not pogrom—as a term that better captures the centrally organized dimensions of Kristallnacht.

Wolf Gruner’s research provides surprising insights into two greatly overlooked aspects of Kristallnacht: the mass destruction of private homes, and, Jewish reactions toward violence. Using examples drawn from large cities and small towns throughout Greater Germany, he reveals how the demolition and vandalizing of Jewish homes was systematic and of an astonishing scale and intensity. The widespread destruction of home furnishings was accompanied by beatings, sexual violence and murder. This rampant violation of privacy had enormous impact on families and on the Jewish population as a whole. Gruner also shows how Jews reacted in unexpected ways to the violent event:
Jews petitioned the Gestapo to stop violence and arrests; they documented the destruction of synagogues and shops; they protested in public or with anonymous letters; and they physically defended themselves from attacks.

Examining the gendered nature of violence against married Jewish-Christian couples, Maximilian Strnad argues that mixed religious households headed by Jewish men experienced far more death and destruction during Kristallnacht than those headed by Christian husbands and their Jewish wives. Jewish-headed mixed households also had higher rates of family separations and divorces following the November violence. For intermarried Jews, Strnad concludes, the feeling of being responsible for the misery their families experienced often lasted for decades.

Mary Fulbrook turns our attention to the less well-understood role of ordinary citizens in “bystander” violence, passivity, complicity, and courage during the November terror. She explores five categories of what she calls “bystander” reaction: active intervention on behalf of victims; demonstrative sympathy for victims; neutral, inactive, impassive eyewitnesses; support for acts of perpetrators; and, active participatory complicity on the side of perpetrators.

ON MEDIA AND OTHER REACTIONS
The extraordinary violence unleashed during Kristallnacht was reported in newspapers, radios, and newsreels throughout the world. Various essays in this volume explode the myth that people around the world did not know what was happening in Germany. Norman Domeier examines media coverage of Kristallnacht by American journalists based in Berlin. Drawing from a wide variety of sources, Domeier details the experiences, reports, and reflections of four journalists who wrote for the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune and the Associated Press. His chapter shows how quick and thorough the event was covered in the American press. Domeier argues that until December 1941, the American public was the best-informed public in the world about Nazi Germany.5

Chapters by Anne-Christin Klotz and Jeffrey Koerber dealing with press coverage of Kristallnacht in Poland and the Soviet Union deepen our understanding of what was known and shared among Jewish and non-Jewish citizens in both countries at the time. Klotz examines the ways in which Polish-Jewish journalists and the Yiddish press in Warsaw reported on events in Germany.
from 1933 to 1938. She recounts the extent to which reporters actively tried to help Jewish compatriots suffering inside the Nazi regime. Journalists found the boundaries between “objective” reportage and activism continually blurred during times of crisis. Likewise, Koerber looks at the ways in which Soviet Yiddish- and Russian-language newspapers covered growing anti-Semitism in Germany—coverage that allowed Jewish readers to follow developments in Nazi Germany long before the onset of World War II. He explores the similarities and differences between the coverage of events by the Soviet Yiddish- and Russian-language newspapers.

Turning to Great Britain, Stephanie Seul describes how Kristallnacht caused an outcry from the British press and Parliament but not from the BBC—which acted as an unofficial wing of the Foreign Office. Both the government and the BBC’s German-language broadcasts refrained from criticizing the event or the Hitler regime. Seul argues they did this for three reasons: Whitehall feared that any public condemnation of Germany would worsen the situation for its Jewish residents; the British government viewed anti-Jewish policy as a purely German internal affair; and, finally, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain believed his nation was not militarily prepared for war and therefore did not want to risk aggravating already tense relations with Nazi Germany.

The media was not the only source of information about Kristallnacht or the only ones to analyze the event and the causes of rising anti-Semitism in Germany. Jewish thinkers and organizations throughout the world tried to make sense of the difficult situation unfolding before their eyes. Gershon Greenberg looks at how Orthodox Jewish rabbis and commentators in Eastern Europe, Palestine, and the United States responded to the violent events of Kristallnacht. Many Orthodox writers (predominantly rabbis), he argues, blamed the events of November 1938 on German Jews who were supposedly being punished by God for abandoning Torah in favor of assimilation.

Looking beyond the usual government and public responses in the United States, Hasia Diner sees 1938 as a turning point for Jews in America. Rejecting the idea of American Jewish passivity, she argues that following Hitler’s rise to power many groups and individuals discussed the best ways to respond to growing repression and anti-Semitism in Germany. The events of 1938, culminating in Kristallnacht, motivated American Jews to act, organize, and speak out. Diner details the range of communal reactions and responses, including raising funds for refugees, greater public and political advocacy, forming Jewish community councils, and reorganizing Jewish organizations.
to respond more quickly to escalating dangers and needs both abroad and in the United States.

Steven J. Ross argues that Kristallnacht had a major impact in the United States, but not in the way we usually think. Focusing on Los Angeles, he shows how Nazi aggression abroad was accompanied by Nazi aggression at home as local Bundists secretly began preparing for Der Tag, “the day” when Nazis and their supporters would seize control of the American government. Yet, the knowledge of the Kristallnacht violence also produced an increase in local Jewish resistance. Leon Lewis, who had run a local spy ring against pro-Nazi activities in Los Angeles since the summer of 1933, stepped up his efforts at infiltration and surveillance after November 1938, and passed on information gleaned from his undercover operatives to the FBI, and Naval and Army Intelligence that helped foil a series of Nazi and fascist plots aimed at murder and sabotage in California.

AFTERMATH AND LEGACY
The legacy of Kristallnacht lasted for decades well beyond the November terror and in places well beyond Greater Germany. Alexander Walther challenges the supposed absence of commemorations in East Germany. Kristallnacht and the Shoah, he argues, were memorialized throughout the GDR’s existence. Yet, for most of that time, East German authorities used November 9 commemorations to celebrate communist resistance to Nazism and to criticize capitalist West Germany, while—as an overlooked aspect—the East German Jewish communities used the days of commemoration for their political agenda and internal audience. Not until the 1970s, and especially after the collapse of the GDR, was East Germany’s Jewish minority (especially its survivors) able to highlight the experiences and sufferings of the state-sponsored November pogrom’s Jewish victims to a broader public.

Turning to Israel, Liat Steir-Livny shows how left and right public figures have used the memory of Kristallnacht and the Holocaust in varied ways to boost their political agendas. Her essay examines a violent demonstration against African immigrants orchestrated by right-wing activists in South Tel Aviv on May 23, 2012, which was immediately dubbed and condemned by left-leaning political groups as “Kristallnacht in Tel Aviv.” Israelis on both sides of the ideological spectrum used social media to exploit the original histori-
cal event by turning references to Kristallnacht into a series of symbols and memes, while newspapers in Europe, Russia, and the United States referred to the Tel Aviv riots as the “Israeli Kristallnacht.” By so doing, Steir-Livny argues, Israelis and media coverage deprived the 1938 event of its profound historical context and meaning and turned Kristallnacht into a simple metaphor for shattered property and violence toward “others.”

Associations of racial violence and Kristallnacht also made their way into literary narratives written by survivors of the Rwandan genocide and the mass violence in Myanmar. Focusing on works by Rwandan Scholastique Mukasonga and Rohingyan Habiburahamn, Nathalie Ségeral describes how these authors used the terms Kristallnacht, pogrom, and Holocaust when referring to the waves of massacres perpetrated by the Hutu against the Tutsi from the late 1950s to the culmination of violence during the 1994 genocide, and to the persecution of the Burmese Rohingyas that lasted until 2018. In both instances, she concludes, the Kristallnacht paradigm is employed as highly relevant to contemporary “minority” histories and as the lasting symbol of a turning point in genocidal violence.

The volume’s concluding chapter brings our discussion back to the opening essay’s concern with terminology. Baijayanti Roy compares the German pogrom of November 1938 with the “Gujarat pogrom” perpetrated by members of the majority Hindu community against the minority Muslims in the Indian federal state of Gujarat between February 28 and March 1, 2002. Although often referred to in the press as a pogrom, Roy—like Baumann and Guesnet—argues that the violence was not spontaneous (as were most pogroms) but was comprised of a series of premeditated, carefully orchestrated attacks on Muslims instigated by today’s Indian prime minister and back-then chief minister of Gujarat Narendra Modi and right-wing Hindu nationalist groups with the aim of ethnic cleansing. The deadly state-sponsored violence that left one thousand to two thousand dead (mostly Muslims) and 150,000 rendered homeless, she argues, had more in common with the Nazi state-sponsored “Kristallnacht” than it did with more spontaneous communal oriented pogroms of Eastern Europe.

This volume marks the beginning of what we hope will be a major re-examination of Kristallnacht, an event that many perceive as a turning point leading to the Holocaust. Our authors demonstrate how important new knowledge can be gained by re-approaching a well-known event and challenging traditional assumptions. Yet, there is so much more to explore about Kristallnacht that goes beyond the themes raised in this volume. In particular, we need to
know more about the reactions and responses, the defiance and resistance of the individual Jews and their organizations and communities. Likewise, we need a fuller exploration of the participation of ordinary Germans and Austrians in the destruction and plunder, the sexual violence and murders, which seemed to have been more widespread than previously assumed. Finally, we need to understand the context and lasting legacy of the state sponsored terror of November 1938. We hope that scholars will use this volume as a launching point for exploring new avenues and interdisciplinary perspectives on one of the crucial events of the twentieth century.
Notes


Bibliography


INTRODUCTION

The past several decades have witnessed a major shift in terminology concerning the events of November 9 and 10, 1938 in Nazi Germany and Austria, namely from “Kristallnacht” to “Pogrom.” Given that the attacks against the Jewish population represented a major stepping stone from discrimination and exclusion of German and Austrian Jews to persecution and violence, it seems remarkable that this shift in terminology—its context and motivations—has not been investigated by historians more carefully. This chapter questions and challenges in particular the motives for the ubiquitous use of the term “pogrom,” both in academic and non-academic parlance, for this terror attack on the Jewish population under Nazi control in November 1938. “Pogrom” seems to reflect an urge for an expression commensurate to the horror with which we view such a case of organized violence upon a defenseless minority. It furthermore avoids the risk in using a euphemism, such as “Kristallnacht,” a term which was apparently coined shortly after the events. For these good reasons, the term “Kristallnacht” has somewhat faded to the background.

This chapter posits that the term “pogrom” is equally misleading, if only for a different set of reasons. As we will demonstrate, it refers in its original eastern European setting to interethnic violence in consequence of a breakdown
in the complex social and cultural interaction between majority and minority groups. The inaction or ambivalence in the attitude of state actors is of crucial relevance in these occurrences, very much in contrast to the events in 1938, when the Nazi regime unleashed its destructive potential on the already diminished Jewish community under its control. Not in the least because of the centrality of the events in November 1938, it is more than appropriate to use more adequate terminology, as will be suggested in the conclusion of this chapter.

In the immediate context of the events, a variety of terms were used. The perpetrators—various agencies of the Nazi regime—called the attack on German and Austrian Jewries an “Aktion,” the “Judenaktion,” “Vergeltungsaktion” (revenge action) or “Rath-Aktion,” after Ernst vom Rath, the murdered German diplomat. At that time, the oddly sarcastic and inappropriate term “Reichskristallnacht” emerged. It is first recorded in June 1939, in a speech by the NSDAP speaker Wilhelm Börger (1896–1962), at a party convention in Lüneburg about the policies of the regime towards the Jews. In it, he referred to the term “Reichskristallnacht” as having “elevated [the attack on the Jews] through humour”:

After the Reichskristallnacht last year, November 11, for instance—look, this matter enters history as Reichskristallnacht [applause, laughter]. You see, this has thus been elevated by humour, well. One might have asked, is this economically viable? One has to import the window panes from Belgium, for foreign currency. One can have different views on this. One thing however is for sure: they [the Jews] now know perfectly well: when one pushes the button, the bell rings, everywhere [laughter].

The most likely origin of the term “Reichskristallnacht” is Berlin popular parlance mocking the pomposity of Nazi vocabulary adding “Reich” to whichever project the regime undertook. Both the reaction of the audience—made up of Nazi functionaries—as well as the flattered appropriation by Börger illustrates the ambiguities of the term. The speech also reflects with great clarity the further reaching objectives in the Nazi hierarchy; “There has not been enough kicking [during Kristallnacht], they should have beaten the heads much more [laughter], and we would have been done by now [applause].” These quotes demonstrate that the term “Reichskristallnacht” resonated in ambiguous ways, on the one hand as expression of a distant attitude towards dictatorship (ironic enough not to be persecuted by the Gestapo), and on the other hand taken up and willingly misinterpreted, by a high-ranking Nazi.
This article first reflects on the term pogrom as it emerged in the eastern European context and how it has been discussed in recent scholarship. Additionally, we would like to shed light on the trajectory of the terminology used in the German and English languages. To that end, this article discusses how after the war, both Reichskristallnacht and Kristallnacht, the short version of the term, gained common currency in public as well as academic discourse, in both East and West Germany, Austria, and beyond German speaking countries. Over time, however, it has been supplanted by the term “pogrom,” which has become almost ubiquitous in a range of variations, both in common parlance as well as in academic language. The use of terms like Pogromnacht (pogrom night), Reichspogromnacht, Novemberpogrom or Novemberpogrome, was motivated by the hope, especially from the 1970s onwards, that such a terminology allowed one to avoid seemingly euphemistic terminology such as Kristallnacht, which was perceived as highly inadequate. The final part of the chapter will focus on the emphatic use of the term pogrom outside of Germany, and mostly by Jewish authors after 1938.

“WHAT IS A POGROM?” THE TERMINOLOGY ON ANTI-JEWISH VIOLENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE

Over the past generation, historians have broadened our understanding of anti-Jewish violence in eastern Europe and the history of the term “pogrom.” The Russian term originally referred to widespread devastation, particularly in the context of wars. It was first used to identify anti-Jewish violence after the attack on the Jewish community in Odessa in 1871. The mass occurrence of anti-Jewish violence in 1881–82 led to a narrowing of its meaning in the Russian language to mark interethnic violence against Jews.4 In his recent analysis of the pogrom in Kishinev in 1903, Steven Zipperstein presents convincing evidence that the term pogrom did not gain common currency beyond Russia before the early years of the twentieth century.5

Interethnic violence, including anti-Jewish violence, was a recurrent phenomenon across Europe since time immemorial. Both Jewish and non-Jewish contemporaries, however, considered the more than four hundred anti-Jewish riots in 1881–82 in Eastern Europe as a new phenomenon, for which the relatively recent term “pogrom” seemed appropriate. John D. Klier (1944–2007) argued that these incidents represented a major shift in anti-Jewish
violence. Their novel character resided in the fact that they would take place in urban settings and that they were triggered by more recent developments of infrastructure like railways and telegraphs, and the wider dissemination of the press, which established the idea of the anti-Jewish pogrom in the popular mind, as Klier wrote.

In their studies, Hans Rogger (1923–2002), I. Michael Aronson, and John D. Klier have rejected the hypothesis that the pogroms of 1881–82 had been ordered, inspired or triggered by the Tsar or higher echelons of the Russian imperial administration. They have emphasized the contrast between the very high number of incidents (four hundred between April 1881 and May 1882, in three major waves of violence) and the relatively low intensity of the violence itself: among the nearly forty fatalities, half were pogromists. Klier has also emphasized the virtual absence of religious framing in this instance, citing the example of Orekhov, Tauride province, where the synagogue was the only Jewish building that was not touched during the pogrom.

The violence occurred in the southern provinces, which did not have a long history of Jewish residence and experienced considerable in-migration occasioned by rapid economic change. It was also in these southern provinces of the Empire that in 1903 the pogrom of Kishinev would mark the transition to a much more lethal pattern of pogrom violence: with forty-five Jewish victims, twice as many people were murdered in the three-day Kishinev pogrom of 1903 than during the hundreds of incidents of 1881–82. The pogroms of 1898 in Galicia, recently analyzed in depth by Tim Buchen, featured patterns very similar to those in Russia 1881–82: local residents turning against their Jewish neighbors after a period of intense political mobilization and the targeted spreading of rumors. A similar picture emerges from Darius Staliunas’ investigation of the infrequent cases of anti-Jewish violence in Lithuanian provinces around the turn of the twentieth century. He follows the definition of pogrom violence of German sociologist Werner Bergmann, who describes a pogrom as “a one-sided, non-governmental form of social control.” Pogrom violence can be mobilized in situations when one group feels legitimated to get down to “self-help” against another group because it does not expect any support by the state. This definition reflects the significant impact of the competitive ethnicity model proposed by Roberta Senechal de la Roche. Among the ingredients for the triggering of interethnic violence, Senechal de la Roche identified the perception among a majority or hegemonic community of a perceived upward shift in the position of a minority or marginal community, combined with a perception of state authorities to be weak and/or not taking action against this
upward shift. Prejudice and stereotypes about the minority or marginalized community are a further prerequisite in the transition to physical violence, as it contributes to polarization and thus lowers the threshold of using force against a group of people one has cohabited with for extended periods of time.

The relative deprivation theory at the basis of this model describes the violence as “culturally constructed, discursively mediated, symbolically saturated, and ritually regulated.” As Buchen and Staliunas emphasize, anti-Jewish violence in Eastern Europe of this period was considered to “redress” or “rectify” the injustice of Jews occupying space and status they did not, in the eyes of the pogromists, deserve. One key feature of this attitude was the expectation that Jews were “enemies for one day,” though part of the social fabric after being “put in their place” by the attacks.

A perspective which both the competitive ethnicity model as well as the analysis of the “deadly ethnic riot” by Donald Horowitz share is that each outbreak of violence lessens social constraints and taboos against this form of violence in the future. This undoubtedly applies to mass violence against the Jews in eastern Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with specific places and towns being again the site of such attacks in 1905.

While scholarship has by now established that the authorities did not order or authorize the anti-Jewish riots of this period, they were by no means neutral. The empathy expressed by officers, ministers, or monarchs after violence had occurred, encouraged a significant shift in perception of anti-Jewish violence around 1900. Initially, in 1881, pogroms were seen as misguided and undesirable, but nonetheless understandable acts directed against Jewish exploitation. In the early twentieth century, as Jews were collectively viewed as an unreliable political element, pogroms came to be viewed as action in support of the government. Thus, Nicholas II, in grateful disbelief, interpreted the pogroms embedded in the revolutionary disorders of 1905 as a form of political mobilization in support of the autocracy. The instances of eastern European anti-Jewish riots that gave a certain type of interethnic violence their name—pogrom—were neither ordered nor authorized by the government or the authorities. Leading officials, members of governments or heads of state would come to condone such riots, but their fear of loss of control would prevent them from making the incitement to mass violence, or its implementation, a tool of governance. Instead, these riots were the result of strong intercommunal tensions, anti-Jewish resentment, and targeted incitement by anti-Semitic authors, agitators, and movements. In his recent book on pogroms in the Russian Empire, Stefan Wiese has argued that to comprehend the violence we
Ulrich Baumann and François Guesnet

need to study the opportunity structures of the riots (including even weather conditions) and the leeway for negotiations between potential victims and attackers.21

The difference between these pogroms and the Nazi terror on the Jews of Germany and Austria in November 1938 is that the former was locally instigated, often slowly developing, while the latter was orchestrated by the state and carried out area-wide within a few days. As historians have now documented, the attacks in November 1938 originated in an order by Hitler to Goebbels. Formulated in indirect terms by Hitler, the decision to embark on violence all over the country was conveyed by phone from the Old City Hall in Munich to the Nazi leadership on the level of the provinces (or Gaue) and further down the chain of command to district and local branches of the party. Uniformed members of the SA and SS, gathered for the celebrations commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the Hitlerputsch in 1923, started the attack while it was still night. In the course of a few hours, Jewish individuals, shops and dwellings, as well as places of worship, were attacked and often destroyed. The attacks encompassed the entirety of the Jewish communities in Nazi Germany and Austria, from Ostfriesland to the Burgenland, from Baden to Eastern Prussia, and mark a major transition from discrimination, expropriation, harassment

Hof (Saale), November 10, 1938, destruction of the synagogue by the I. Sturmbann of the 41st SS Brigade. The photos were taken by the firm Foto Eckart and were presumably placed in the town archive before 1945. The series is part of the exhibition “Kristallnacht”—Anti-Jewish Terror in 1938. History and Remembrance,” curated by Foundations Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe and Topography of Terror; Stadtsarchiv Hof.
and persecution to mass arrests and targeted violence against broad segments of the remaining Jewish leadership, and to the physical destruction of property and buildings. After this terror attack, Jews in the reach of the Nazi regime ceased to be (second class) citizens worthy of political or moral consideration, but had become mere objects of police and Gestapo measures.\textsuperscript{22}

**POSTWAR GERMANY, DEUTSCHER HERBST AND THE “POGROM TURN” IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY**

In the postwar period, commemorations of the November events were, it seems, limited to Germany, and revolved around the round or “half round” anniversaries.\textsuperscript{23} In 1948, commemorative events referred to the November 1938 attacks exclusively as “Kristallnacht.” They were organized by the VVN (Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes, an association of those persecuted by the Nazi regime), with the most prominent ceremony taking place in the Deutsches Theater in Soviet occupied zone of Berlin.\textsuperscript{24}

In hindsight, the 1953 commemorations on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the events seem a turning point leading to what Schmid identifies as a process of “pluralization” and “growing routine” (Habitualisierung) of historical memory at least in the Federal Republic of Germany. At this point in time, the German Democratic Republic followed the template of Stalin’s Soviet Union and adopted anti-Semitic policies. The regime accused Jewish citizens of being “Zionists.” In consequence, one third of East Germany’s Jews fled to West Berlin in February 1953. Prominent displays commemorating Jewish victims of National Socialism were held in the GDR until 1963. They started again on a modest level, as a nervous, Cold War reaction of the East German leadership to the increasingly flourishing “culture of commemoration” in western Germany. Indeed, in the Federal Republic a broad range of institutions, parties, movements, and religious communities made the November events an often-marked reference for the memory of the Nazi terror.\textsuperscript{25} Commemoration ceremonies often took place at the sites of former synagogues, and commemorative plaques and monuments often framed the persecution in 1938 as an attack on German and Austrian Jews exclusively in religious terms. In this period (1950s to 1970s), these increased activities for commemoration in western Germany were accompanied only by limited public interest in getting to know details about how the crime took place locally.
This would change during the next decades. Early on, there had been a growing discomfort with the designation of the events. The late 1970s and 1980s saw a tendency in the Federal Republic of Germany to avoid the term of “(Reichs-) Kristallnacht” in public and academic discourse when speaking of the events of November 9–10, 1938. “Reichskristallnacht” became a synonym for a trivialization of the crimes in 1938. It euphemized smashed glass as “crystal” and it left aside any reference to the perpetrators—it neither spoke of the state’s or the Nazi party’s role, nor about local perpetrators. Hence using the term was seen as a cynical obfuscation of what happened.26 Over the years, this led to a complete avoidance of the word in public discourse.

We find a paradigmatic expression of the motives for this shift in an article by one of the pioneers of western German Holocaust research, Wolfgang Scheffler (1929–2008). It was published in 1978 in “aus politik und zeitgeschichte,” a high-impact supplement to the weekly Das Parlament with wide distribution to schools, the media, and the political world and worth quoting at length:27

Pogrom—this Russian term means ‘annihilation, destruction, riot,’ and, as the Brockhaus explains, “a persecution specifically of the Jews, combined with plunder and violence.” History offers many examples of this. The events beginning in the night from 9–10 November, commonly known as “Reichskristallnacht,” was an exemplary case of a pogrom. One should therefore identify these events as such, and restrict the generally used “Kristallnacht,” which expresses only one aspect, namely the smashing of windows, only in passing/as a footnote.28

This quote demonstrates the attempt to distance scholarship from the use of the term “Reichskristallnacht.” As historiography would turn to the question of how to define anti-Jewish violence in Russia and eastern Europe only in the following ten years, it is no surprise that Scheffler had to refer to a general encyclopedia in order to define a pogrom, and not expert scholarship.29

Scheffler’s article was part of a massive expansion and broadening of commemoration referring to November 1938 in West Germany. “It is like the floodgates have opened,” wrote the New York magazine Aufbau in December 1978 in an article on the Federal Republic’s commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the wave of terror in November 1938. There were at least 380 events, held in 101 towns. For the first time, a German Chancellor delivered a speech on this anniversary and it was the first time that the Federal President attended such an event. The ceremony in Cologne Roonstraße Synagogue was broadcast live on television.
The shift in terminology—from “Reichkristallnacht” to “Pogrom,” “Novemberpogrom” or “Reichspogromnacht”—was part of the increased interest in the events of 1938. It reflects both a renewed interest in history in general and more specifically, in the history of National Socialism. The reasons are manifold. Western German society experienced an increased interest in history, triggered in part by doubts about the sustainability of economic development and a growing general apprehension about future environmental issues. Consequently, history became more politicized, partially as a consequence of the youth and student movements of 1968 and the increased emphasis on understanding the history of everyday life and ordinary people. This new sense of urgency in engaging with local and regional history would lead to the founding of initiatives like the Geschichtswerkstätten (historical workshops), a development influenced not in the least by the turn to social history in English language historiography: “Grabe wo du stehst” (“Dig where you are”) became the leitmotiv of this new historical sensitivity.

Furthermore, the so-called Hitler craze (“Hitler-Welle”) after 1973, with glorifying references to National Socialism and attempts to commercialize this interest by marketing memoirs, illustrated volumes and records, demonstrated that Germany had not fully turned its back on the Nazi past. Jewish communities were alarmed. The Central Council of Jews in Germany hosted a “2nd Youth- and Culture Conference” in Dortmund on November 10, 1978, dedicated to investigate “Nationalsozialismus und die jüdische Gegenwart” (National Socialism and the Jewish Present). Among younger politicians in attendance was the head of the Jusos, the youth organisation of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the later chancellor Gerhard Schröder. They faced critical questions from young members of the Jewish community (including Micha Brumlik and Henryk M. Broder, who would later become well known public intellectuals) concerning impending time limitations for accusations for murder, including crimes committed during Nazi rule and World War Two. Such restrictions would have significantly curtailed any persecution of Nazi crimes. This statute of limitations was permanently lifted by the German parliament only in 1979.

The reluctance to use the term “Reichkristallnacht” occurred simultaneously with the introduction of the term “Reichspogromnacht.” Its first use dates back to November 9, 1977, when two social-democratic members of parliament, Klaus Thüsing (b. 1940) and Karl-Heinz Hansen (1927–2014) fitted a commemorative plaque onto the walls of an ancient fortress, Wewelsburg, which had served as an SS-“Ordensburg,” located close to the former Niederhagen
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concentration camp (not far from the district town of Paderborn). These left-wing members of the SPD wanted to ensure that the lessons of the catastrophe of National Socialism were not forgotten. It is by no means accidental that the term “Reichspogromnacht” emerged in this context. The term was used for the first time in one of the speeches during the fitting of the plaque. In his autobiography, Karl-Heinz Hansen described the general ambiance of the moment as follows:\footnote{34}

\begin{quote}
The year is 1977. Deutscher Herbst [German autumn], 9. November, 39th anniversary of the pogrom. (…). The papers in Düsseldorf write about expressions of sympathy for the SS murderers accused in the Majdanek trial, and about insults against concentration camp witnesses (…). The head of the Christian Democrats in Bremen asks for the burning of Erich Fried poetry.\footnote{35}
\end{quote}

Hansen thus clearly situates the commemorative plaque in the context of debates and events of 1977. Looking back in his memoirs and probably overstating the ferocity of the political confrontations at the time, he blends different aspects: the climate of political panic in the context of far-left terrorism (“German Autumn”), and the perception of persisting right-wing attitudes.

The western German Left undoubtedly was on the defensive. The legislation restricting professional activities of those suspected of having a critical view of the constitution, the “Radikalenerlass,” led to 3.5 million checks of political reliability, mostly targeting individuals on the left. Terrorist attacks of the RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion) and the abduction and murder of Hans-Martin Schleyer, president of the employers’ federation, were branded as a left-wing continuation of national-socialist crimes by conservative media. In this difficult context, one exit strategy for the left was empathy with the victims of National Socialism and an identification with them—not in the least in contrast to the students’ movement of the 1960s, which was still largely indifferent to their fate.

This identification—for which the term “Reichspogromnacht” stands as a code—allowed them to bridge this gap. The term pogrom offered a stronger sense of immediacy of the danger emanating from the political right, and thus compared the situation of the political left to the one of Jews during the terror attacks of November 1938. Thus the advent of the term “Reichspogromnacht” cannot be explained by referring to a single development (like the “Hitler craze”), but is a reaction to complex changes within left and liberal segments of the western German public.


A number of scholars and activists criticized this change in terms. In the words of the well-known author, Barbara Noack:36

Does Reichspogromnacht offer a more adequate description of these horrors? Pogroms are unfortunately frequent phenomena. Do we [the Germans] want to hide by blending into the mass of rioters? and pretend we’re actually the same? By the same token, we will help let fade into the background the uniqueness of the Nazi crimes, the dimensions and the unheard-of systematic character of how we Germans proceeded gets lost.37

This was the year when both terms, “Reichskristallnacht” and “Reichspogromnacht,” were listed by the Society for German Language as candidate terms for the “Word of the Year.”38 Thus, political context and motivations need to be taken into consideration when attempting to historicize the history of the term. However, to identify one’s own embattled situation with the one of the persecuted Jews in Germany and Austria, as significant segments of the liberal and left-wing public in the Federal Republic of Germany did, represented a historical short-cut of considerable dimensions. The ambiguous term “Kristallnacht” or “Reichskristallnacht” was replaced by the equally problematic neologism “Pogromnacht.”

“POGROM” AS AN EMPHATIC TERM USED BY JEWISH AUTHORS
In his recent assessment of the 1903 pogrom in Kishinev—which marked the transition from incidents of anti-Jewish riots in east central and eastern Europe with a comparatively low degree of physical violence to massacres with high numbers of Jewish fatalities—Zipperstein observes that the term “pogrom” is “sturdily portable” and “was believed to capture accurately centuries of Jewish vulnerability, the deep well of Jewish misery.” Zipperstein sees a complete contrast to the Holocaust, since “pogroms would never—despite their Russian origins—be tethered to a particular time, place, or dictator.”39

It thus does not come as a surprise that immediate reactions by Jewish observers outside Nazi Germany would frame the events as a pogrom.40 Press outlets frequently used this term in headlines while stressing in the actual analysis that the events had been carefully masterminded and orchestrated by the Nazi regime. Thus, the headline of the November 11, 1938 issue of Nasz Przegląd, the
flagship paper of the Polish-Jewish intelligentsia, “Terrible Pogrom of the Jews in Germany,” emphasized that despite the fact that Goebbels referred to the violence as an outbreak of popular wrath, “thousands of proofs demonstrate that the entire anti-Jewish campaign (in the Polish original: akcja) was ‘inspired by Nazi forces.’”41 One of the earliest treatises assessing the catastrophic impact of the attack on Jews in Germany and Austria was published under the title Die Novemberpogrome in Deutschland by the “Centre de Documentation” in Strasbourg still in 1938. Rejecting the collective responsibility forced upon the victims of the attack, it described the propaganda strategy of the Nazi regime:

In Germany, however, the press undertook it to bring the public mood to boiling point in order to have a “psychological” explanation at hand for the terrible outbreaks of hate which erupted between 9 to 11 November and which were carefully prepared and reminded everyone of the Russian pogroms of the Tsarist period, and to pretend, that they were the result of an all-too-well understandable anger (Erregung) of the entire German population, that they were, as Mr Göbbels [sic] formulated, a “reaction of healthy instinct” of the German people.42

There are indications that the publishers of this treatise belonged to the circles of exiled Social Democrats and Communists in Strasbourg, probably around Ernst Roth (1901–51, SPD, later member of the German Bundestag) and Robert Klausmann (1896–1972, KPD).43 The Germany Reports (Deutschlandberichte) of the Social Democrat Party leadership in exile stressed the same points as the Strasbourg publishers: the violence had been executed by the Nazi party suborganizations; it was part of a general and persistent “terror against the Jews” which had already developed into a “permanent pogrom” (in the original: Dauerpogrom).44 Publications within the proletarian resistance movement in Nazi Germany used the term “pogrom” as well.45 One can surmise that this emphatic term was used in these contexts in order to stress the violence of the attacks and to frame them as reminiscent of anti-Jewish violence in the Middle Ages or in nineteenth-century Russia.

American correspondents in Nazi Germany witnessing the events of November 9–12 often used the term “terror” to describe the events, and emphasized the coordinated character of the attack and its obvious function in stepping up the oppression of the Jewish population. As of November 15, 1938 (“A New Phase in Germany”) New York Times op-ed noted:46
It is evident now that last week's day of terror in Germany signified something more than the unleashing of Nazi ferocity. It marked an important stage in the development of the National Socialist revolution. For it is now clear that the outbreak of violence was a prologue to a performance previously prepared and rehearsed. The punitive decrees which have followed in quick succession are too drastic and comprehensive to be improvised on the spur of the moment.

An undated British typescript drafted undoubtedly very close to the events and preserved in the Wiener Library equally referred to the attack as “German pogroms.” This item, which probably has been redacted in Alfred Wiener’s office or in Amsterdam or in London explains that November 10, 1938 meant the eruption of “popular fury.” It was, like everything in the Third Reich, by order—no further proof being required since the facts in themselves are plain enough evidence.

The explicit reference to “German” pogroms in the title of this collection of short reports obviously invites the association of the term “pogrom” with the more familiar “Russian pogroms,” thus integrating the atrocities of Nazi Germany into the grand narrative of anti-Jewish violence, or the “deep well of Jewish misery,” as Zipperstein put it. It seems, however, noteworthy that by referring to the violence as “pogrom,” these authors reiterated Goebbels’ deceitful reference to the events as the result of “popular wrath” or “vengeance” and not as coordinated state-sanctioned violence.

In the postwar period, the religious framing of the attack appeared in texts dedicated to the November events outside Germany, and resonated with the development of the early commemorative culture in western Germany.

Lionel Kochan (1922–2005) wrote in 1957 that the term “pogrom” integrated the events into the long history of Christian anti-Judaism and that for religious reasons, “Jew and European stand at opposing poles.” In a 1959 publication commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the event, Eva Reichmann (1897–1998), a central figure in the Jewish support and rescue organization within Nazi Germany until 1938, pleaded to avoid the term “Kristallnacht” as it evoked ideas of youthful tricks or at the most of laddish pranks, thus trivializing the horrors of the events: “What happened in reality was the crime of sacrilege,” referring to the events later in the lecture as “Pogromnacht.” Like Reichmann, other Jewish authors qualified the enormity of the devastation of the November attacks by using the term “pogrom” and integrating it into a history of religious prejudice. By so doing, the core
dynamic of the terror as an instance of state-directed violence exacted on the Jews of Germany and Austria got lost.

CONCLUSION: 1938—A POGROM?
In the night from November 9–10 and on November 10, 1938, Jewish places of worship in Nazi Germany were destroyed, Jewish property vandalized or robbed, thousands of Jews were arrested or hurt, and hundreds killed. While the details of the terror attack only became apparent over days and weeks after the events, their enormity was perceived immediately. This is reflected in both the neologism of Kristallnacht or Reichskristallnacht, which sought to encapsulate the unheard-of character of what had happened, as well as in the term “pogrom,” integrating devastation, persecution, and murder, into a terminological framework shaped by the Jewish historical experience in eastern Europe.

It is also a reflection of the inability of “polite society”—of Jews and non-Jews—to comprehend that the institutions at the very foundations of civil society—the police, uniformed people, political representatives—would be at the very core of this violence inflicted on the Jews of Germany and Austria, or contribute, as, for instance, fire departments, to its devastating effect.

In contrast to the anti-Jewish riots as they unfolded in eastern Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the violence directed against Jews, Jewish property, and Jewish places of worship on the night of November 9–10, 1938 appears of a very different character: coordinated, centrally organized, and executed by armed and uniformed units directly depending on the central agencies of the Nazi regime. It was a systematic, comprehensive and coordinated terror attack, as the simple exercise of overlaying the maps of Jewish communities in 1933 and of the location of the attacks in November 1938 demonstrates: with the exception of those territories appropriated by Nazi Germany since 1933, these maps are congruent.

Indeed, spontaneous and popular violence occurred in the context of this state-sponsored terror attack. But it was clearly a phenomenon that accompanied the centrally organized attacks. Those responsible for spontaneous acts of violence have not yet been the objects of sufficient systematic research, although the brutality of their actions did equal the one of the terror attacks involving the SA, the SS and members of other branches of the NS hierarchy.
So far, we only have preliminary research by Edith Raim, who surveyed post-
war trials in the French, British and American zones of occupation (as well as a
smaller number of trials that took place in the Federal Republic of Germany). 51
Further research could be based on a comparative analysis of reports and tes-
timonies of these 2,468 investigations and 1,174 trials. Among these 17,700
individuals were members of both groups: perpetrators involved in the terror
attack orchestrated by the Nazi hierarchy, as well as those involved in sponta-
neous attacks, which in part undoubtedly qualify as pogroms.

To use the identical term for these two sides of the November events
is historically misleading. It would be problematic not in the least because it
would fail to call out Goebbels’ deceit of the “spontaneous people’s wrath.” To
avoid the term pogrom does not exclude the events of November 9–12, 1938
from the long history of anti-Jewish violence. The advantage of an increased
terminological precision would, however, help distinguish the dynamic which
unfolded in the case of the unique dynamic towards the catastrophe of the
genocide and make it much more tangible. 52 These events were planned, or-
ganized, centrally triggered and executed, to the most devastating of effects. A
variety of designations would reflect this dimension of a state-sponsored ter-
ror attack on a minority population, such as “November terror,” “anti-Jewish
terror” or “state terror,” which would all identify the events of November 1938
more adequately as a coordinated and systematic attack of a depraved regime
on a defenseless minority.
Notes


2. Wilhelm Börger gave his speech on June 24, 1939. Börger had been a member of parliament for the NSDAP since 1930 and since 1938 a high level official in the Reich Department for Labor (*Reichsarbeitsministerium*). In the original: “Nach der Reichskristallnacht voriges Jahr, am 11. November, sehen Sie, also die Sache geht als Reichskristallnacht in die Geschichte ein (Beifall, Gelächter). Sie sehn, das ist humoristisch erhoben, nicht wahr, schön. Man hätte sagen können, ist das wirtschaftlich richtig? Die Scheiben müssen wir aus Belgien holen, das kostet Devisen. Kann man zweierlei Meinung darüber sein. Eins aber steht fest, die wissen jetzt ganz genau, wird auf’n Knopf gedrückt, hat es jeklingelt, überall (Gelächter).”

3. In the original: “Es ist zuwenig getreten worden, die hätten noch mehr auf die Birne hauen müssen (Gelächter), dann wären wir fertig damit (Beifall).”


7. [The press] provided the newspapers, official broadsides, and printed decrees that expedited the spread of the misinformation and rumor that played such an important role in sparking pogroms. Most importantly, these factors established the idea of the anti-Jewish pogrom in the popular mind, creating a precedent, and a model, for future riots. Klier, *Jews, Russians, and the Pogroms*, 59.


11. Tim Buchen, *Antisemitismus in Galizien. Agitation, Gewalt und Politik gegen Juden in der Habsburgermonarchie um 1900* (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2012). Buchen does not undertake a systematic group analysis of the “pogrom specialists” in Galicia, although his thick description would have allowed for that. In contrast, see the


13. “I define pogroms as a one-sided and non-governmental form of social control, as ‘self-help by a group’ that occurs when no remedy from the state against the threat which another ethnic group poses can be expected. The pogrom is different from other forms of control, such as lynching, terrorism, and vigilantism, in that the participants in such a pogrom hold the entire out-group responsible and therefore act against the group as a whole, and also in that it usually displays a low degree of organization,” in Werner Bergmann, “Ethnic Riots in Situations of Loss of Control: Revolution, Civil War, and Regime Change as Opportunity Structures for Anti-Jewish Violence in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Europe,” in *Control of Violence: Historical and International Perspectives on Violence in Modern Societies*, ed. Wilhelm Heitmeyer, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Stefan Malthaner, and Andrea Kirschner (New York: Springer, 2011), 488.


16. David Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). Horowitz identifies the following core elements of the deadly ethnic riot: (1) a growing focus on the hated group, to the neglect of others; (2) a belief that the hated group possesses fixed characteristics and dispositions to action; (3) a compression of intragroup differences attributed to members of the hated group; and (4) a sense of repulsion toward the group and its members” (543).

17. *Die Judenpogrome in Russland. Herausgegeben im Auftrag des Zionistischen Hilfsfonds in London von der zur Erforschung der Pogrome eingesetzten Kommission (Allgemeiner Teil)* (Frankfurt am Main: Jüdischer Verlag, 1910), 1:189–91. This was the case among others for Balta, Elisavetgrad, Kiev, Kishinev, Konotop, Odessa, Pereiaslav, and Smela.

18. Nicholas II reportedly stated that “a whole mass of loyal people suddenly made their power felt. Because nine-tenths of the troublemakers are Jews, the People's whole anger turned against them. That's how the pogroms happened,” cited in Klier, *Russians, Jews, and the Pogroms*, 88.

19. The impact of strong policing in Prussia 1882–84 and in Galicia 1898, and its absence/impossibility in underpoliced Russia, seems one of the most relevant differences in coping with xenophobic incitement—a difference which seems to have lost nothing of its pertinence in twenty-first century Central Europe.

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Kristallnacht—Pogrom—State Terror: A Terminological Reflection


34. Karl-Heinz Hansen, “Es ist nicht alles schlecht, was scheitert”: Ein politischer Lebenslauf (Hamburg: KVV Konkret Verlag, 2014), 92.

35. Erich Fried (1921–88), born to a Viennese-Jewish family, was a poet and politically involved author of considerable popularity especially in the 1970s and 1980s. After his father had been killed by the Gestapo, he had fled Nazi Germany in 1938. Fried was identified with the Left and more specifically with the disarmament and peace movement. The mentioned politician was Bernd Neumann (CDU), later Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media in the cabinet of Chancellor Angela Merkel. He indeed expressed the wish of burning a poem of Erich Fried during a heated debate with the deputy Henning Scherf (chairman of the Bremen branch of SPD). Neumann later met Fried.


38. Erika Ising, “Kristallnacht—Pogromnacht: Schlusspunkt oder neue Fragezeichen?” Der Sprachdienst 33, no. 6 (1989): 171; Detlev Claussen and Harald Martenstein, Vor aller Augen. Verfolgung, Vertreibung und Vernichtung der Juden in Deutschland (Berlin: Pressestiftung des Tagesspiegels, 1988). Other terms listed were Robbensterben (the mass phenomenon of seals perishing in the North Sea), Kälbermastskandal (a scandal involving the cramming of veals) and Europäischer
Binnenmarkt (the European single market, introduced then). The term selected by a search committee was “Gesundheitsreform” (the reform of the German health care provision system).


42. Die Novemberpogrome in Deutschland, ed. the Centre de documentation, Strasbourg, 1938, Wiener Library microfilm 88038/K211. In the original: “In Deutschland aber versuchte man, durch die Presse die Volkserregung bis zur Siedehitze aufzupöten, um für die sorgsam vorbereiteten an die russischen Pogrome zur Zeit der Zarenregierungen erinnernden entsetzlichen Hassausbrüche, wie sie sich zwischen dem 9. und 11. November ereigneten, eine ‚psychologische‘ Erklärung bei der Hand zu haben, um vorzutäuschen, dass sie ‚spontan‘ aus der ‚allzubegreiflichen tiefen Erregung des gesamten deutschen Volkes‘ herzuleiten seien, dass sie, wie sich Herr Göbbels ausdrückte, noch ‚eine Reaktion des gesunden Instinks‘ des deutschen Volkes‘ gewesen wären” [no page numbers, emphasis in original].

43. The unkown publishers of the pamphlet refer to information given by a “Service d’information in Strassburg.” A report written by the Gestapo (Staatspolizeistelle Neustadt an der Weinstraße) from September 1939 does link Roth and Klausmann to a Service d’information, see a report to the Gestapo/Berlin, from the Staatspolizeistelle Neustadt a. d. Weinstraße (September 28, 1939), Landesarchiv Speyer, Inventory: Geheime Staatspolizei Neustadt/Ermittlungsakten (H 91), Nr. 566. The authors express their indebtedness to Jens Späth (Universität des Saarlands) for sharing these details.

44. Deutschland-Berichte, 1181.

45. Schmid, Erinnern, 82; Detlev Peukert, Der deutsche Arbeiterwiderstand gegen das Dritte Reich (Berlin: Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand, 1990), 32.

46. We are grateful to Norman Domeier for sharing his insights into the history of American reporting about Kristallnacht, focusing specifically on the reporting of Otto Tolischus and Ralph Barnes. The latter defined the attack as “Police-controlled reign of terror planned by Nazis” already in his first despatch of November 9, 1938 (New York Herald Tribune, November 10, 1938). For further details see Norman
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48. Lionel Kochan, Pogrom: 10 November 1938 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1957), 13. He continues: “There was nothing spontaneous about the pogrom. But nor was it wholly contrived and organized. Of necessity, a great deal had to be left to local initiative. The result was a horrible combination of anti-Semitic passion set in motion, and sometimes reinforced, by every kind of technical resource. The lower links in the chain of command were still animated by the same crude mentality as had been their precursors in, for example, Eastern Europe. But technical advance made it possible to replay them on an unprecedented scale.”


50. See the observations by Mary Fulbrook, “Social Relations and Bystander Responses to Violence: Kristallnacht November 1938,” in this volume, on the considerable role of young people already socialised in Nazi Germany.


52. It is not the task of this contribution to propose yet another term for the events. Describing it as an act of state terror would, however, undoubtedly add to a more adequate contextualization.
Bibliography


The USC Casden Institute for the Study of the Jewish Role in American Life

The American Jewish community has played a vital role in shaping the politics, culture, commerce and multiethnic character of Southern California and the American West. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, when entrepreneurs like Isaias Hellman, Levi Strauss and Adolph Sutro first ventured out West, American Jews became a major force in the establishment and development of the budding Western territories. Since 1970, the number of Jews in the West has more than tripled. This dramatic demographic shift has made California—specifically, Los Angeles—home to the second largest Jewish population in the United States. Paralleling this shifting pattern of migration, Jewish voices in the West are today among the most prominent anywhere in the United States. Largely migrating from Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the East Coast of the United States, Jews have invigorated the West, where they exert a considerable presence in every sector of the economy—most notably in the media and the arts. With the emergence of Los Angeles as a world capital in entertainment and communications, the Jewish perspective and experience in the region are being amplified further. From artists and activists to scholars and professionals, Jews are significantly influencing the shape of things to come in the West and across the United States. In recognition of these important demographic and societal changes, in 1998 the University of Southern California established a scholarly institute dedicated to studying contemporary Jewish life in America with special emphasis on the western United States. The Casden Institute explores issues related to the interface between the Jewish community and the broader, multifaceted cultures that form the nation—issues of relationship as much as of Jewishness itself. It is also enhancing the educational experience for students at USC and elsewhere by exposing them to the problems—and promise—of life in Los Angeles’ ethnically, socially, culturally and economically diverse community. Scholars, students and community leaders examine the ongoing contributions of American Jews in the arts, business, media, literature, education, politics, law and social relations, as well as the relationships between Jewish Americans and other groups, including African Americans,
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