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The text incorporates substantial material collected during a series of interviews with former public officials, most notably with Belgrade publicist Milenko Marković, who held a senior leadership position in the Serbian League of Communists and was in charge of Kosovo affairs prior to being removed from that position by Slobodan Milošević. Project-wide reviews in January-February 2006 and August-September 2007 elicited extensive comment and criticism from project participants, most notably James Gow, Marko Attila Hoare, James Lyon, Leon Malazogu, Stan Markotich, and Sabrina Ramet.
Kosovo under the Milošević Regime

◆ Dusan Janjić, with Anna Lalaj and Besnik Pula ◆

Slobodan Milošević’s rule over Kosovo (1989–1999) was marked by intense political conflict that led to open rebellion followed by international military intervention. By invoking the so-called ethnic principle, the government he led tried to establish a state in which Serb interests and aspirations would not be threatened by other ethnic groups, particularly by Albanians in Kosovo, but also across the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In Kosovo and elsewhere a premium was placed on “historic rights” and the sanctity of state sovereignty. Albanian leaders responded by building “parallel state” institutions and eventually proclaiming their own independent republic. Both sides justified their agendas in historic terms with nationalist Serbs claiming to preserve Kosovo as Serbia’s cradle of statehood and nationalist Albanians endeavoring to reverse the division of Albanian lands by the Great Powers in 1913. This conflict has a long history. Yet the particular course that the conflict took at the end of the eighties was largely determined by the institutional framework inherited from the socialist era and by the particular political dynamics that precipitated and followed Yugoslavia’s dissolution.

Kosovo as a Catalyst for Milošević’s Rise to Power

As late as the 1980s, most of the Serbian political establishment preferred an authoritarian government in which a leading autocrat decided what is best for the people. The choice fell on Slobodan Milošević, who was strongly supported by Serbs in the highest ranks of the military. His open ambition for absolute power inspired the military leadership with the hope that he would be able to provide it with the budgetary support needed to maintain control over the Yugoslav federation. Apart from that, they also shared with him the same ideology and a common desire to maintain state socialism. In order to meet these goals, Milošević proposed constitutional changes within Serbia, intending to resolve the state issue by activating Serb nationalism.1 Hiding behind the idea of protecting Yugoslavia,
Milošević pursued a policy of homogenization and ethnic mobilization of the masses aiming at a thorough “reorganization of Serbia and Yugoslavia.”

The first step toward dominating Yugoslavia was to subjugate Kosovo. Existing tensions between Serbs and Albanians served Milošević’s strategy of reinforcing ethnic distance and distrust. It endeavored to make Serbs feel threatened and promote new institutions based on ethnic principles that would inevitably marginalize and frustrate Kosovo’s Albanian majority. Massive rallies were frequently organized in Serbia around one leader, Slobodan Milošević. This atmosphere of ethnocentric superiority promoted the feeling of belonging to the nation and the need for a “firm hand.” For example, the media delivered the message that “Serbs are brave, honest and civilized; others are cunning and mean and we will not let them rule over us.” Dissatisfaction was intentionally turned into an aggressive large-scale national movement that fostered a spirit of revenge and retaliation.

The Serbian public was exposed to the “psychology of the wounded lion,” based on the belief of Milošević’s supporters that the broad autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo had weakened Serbia. The number and influence of those who shared this conviction helped intensify and escalate the crisis through fear that the dissolution of Yugoslavia would unite the Serbs’ rivals while leaving them divided among several states. Survival necessitated “quick and sharp solutions,” efficiently administered by the traditional resort to centralism and Serbian nationalism. Many journalists, academics, and politicians who supported Milošević viewed any decentralization or federalization of Serbia as capitulation to the slogan “Weak Serbia—Strong Yugoslavia” dating from the time of Stalin’s Comintern that would lend “support to Albanian and other minority separatism” and Serbia’s fragmentation.

Serbian nationalist awareness of Kosovo was dominated by the conviction that “Old Serbia” had been “Albanicized” by a colonizing Albanian population. The possibility that Kosovo would separate from Serbia and turn it into an “ethnically clean” region was viewed as a direct threat to Serbian national identity. Kosovo was linked with the vital national interests of the Serbs, giving it a special role in Serbian history and ideology. Therefore, appeals to end Albanian repression against Kosovo’s Serb minority were widely accepted by the Serbian public.

They were reinforced in 1986, by the Communist leadership in Kosovo Polje, which demanded the removal of officials in Kosovo, Serbia, and elsewhere in Yugoslavia who did not have sufficient sympathy for their plight. Their campaign fed an explosive mix of official nationalism, demagoguery, and populism that served the republic’s bureaucratic and political establishment. Milošević’s party packaged what was an essentially antireform agenda as an “antibureaucratic revolution” and “people’s initiative.” The organizational nucleus of this
movement inspired conflicts within the Communist bureaucracy both within and between the republics. The culminating event of this process was the Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (23–24 September 1987), during which nationalism became the official policy of the Serbian political leadership. Pro-Yugoslav, antinationalist, and reform elements led by Serbian President Ivan Stambolić were removed or hounded from office. The beleaguered president’s policy of preserving Yugoslavia, coexisting, and negotiating with Kosovo’s Albanians while building a joint frontline against Serb and Albanian nationalism was branded as opportunist and contrary to the interests of the Serb people. It was easily trumped by Milošević’s promises to end the Albanian “terror” against the Kosovo Serbs and to solve the “Serb issue” by uniting all Serbs in one state. By 1987–1988, all preconditions were in place for reviving the Kosovo myth to mobilize the Serbs, first for political purposes, then for war against Yugoslavia’s other nations.

By raising the Kosovo issue and escalating political conflicts, the federal government hoped to recentralize power, perhaps in anticipation of Yugoslavia’s future entry into the EC. On 11 February 1987, the regime presented its Proposal of the Presidency of Yugoslavia for Constitutional Changes, which foresaw a reduction in Kosovo’s autonomy. The federal, republican, and provincial parliaments duly gave their consent one month later, after which began debate about the federal project, including amendments to the constitution. Apart from the request for a strong federation, Milošević initiated an intense propaganda campaign against the “powers of secession and counterrevolution.” In April he interrupted a meeting with Serbian officials in Priština who had many complaints about difficult living conditions for Serbs in Kosovo by going outside to join crowds of Kosovo Serbs who were quarreling with the police. He approached them by saying, “Nobody will beat you anymore. You must stay here. This is your land, your gardens, your valleys, your memories. . . . Otherwise you will disgrace your predecessors and disappoint your descendants. . . .” The very stridency of these words greatly influenced the future developments in Kosovo. Milošević presented himself very successfully as someone who cared about Serbs and their human rights. His attitude displayed a lot of aggressiveness, bitterness, disappointment, and regret that was shared by many intellectuals in Serbia, particularly in Belgrade. He now established close cooperation with them, spreading one-sided and inflammatory nationalist rhetoric in framing what they represented to be the Serb national interest in Kosovo. He thereby forged what came to be seen as a unified, well-organized, and focused alliance.

Stambolić recognized Milošević as the executor of the program whose real creator was a group of high-ranking Serb nationalist intellectuals in the Communist Party of Serbia, JNA, Serbian Orthodox Church, and various cultural and scientific institutions, such as the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
A leading figure among them, often referred to as the father of the nation, was the writer Dobrica Ćosić, whose speech to the Central Committee of the Serbian Communist Party on 16 September 1966 became a blueprint for resolving the Kosovo problem. The group’s activities promoted aggressive tactics that they represented as necessary for the Serbs’ survival. Their first public act was a memorandum signed by 216 prominent intellectuals in January 1986 and addressed to the federal parliament. The so-called SANU Memorandum claimed that Kosovo’s Serb minority was being subjected to genocide. They cited the case of Djordje Martinović, whose brutal violation by a broken bottle they applied to the whole Serb nation. The nationalists would later seize on the 3 September 1987 murder-suicide committed by Aziz Kelemendi, a mentally unbalanced Kosovar Albanian soldier who killed four other soldiers in their JNA military barracks in Paraćin in central Serbia. Although Kelmendi’s victims included two Muslims, a Slovene, and only one Serb, Milošević and his allies quickly characterized it as part of an anti-Serb conspiracy, a judgment that was readily embraced by most of the Serbian public. Many Kosovo Albanians interpreted the incident and its misrepresentation in official circles and media as part of a conspiracy to justify their repression. They were, however, hardly in a position to buck the trend being set in Belgrade and trumpeted by the media. The nationalists soon organized a series of “meetings of truth and solidarity with the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo” that lasted throughout 1988 and was reciprocated by a “council for organizing protest meetings” by Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo Polje, which made appeals for “ending the Holocaust of the Serbs” and “defending Serb honor” with slogans like “Serbia is a winner in war and a loser in peace” and “We want weapons in Kosovo.”

The Albanians’ only recourse was to schedule meetings of their own that elicited some sympathy from the other republics but had little impact within Serbia proper. By then, however, Milošević had won the media war, both with the leaders of the other FRY republics and with Serbian Communists such as Stambolić, whose Titoist vision of a supranational state went down with them. Faithful mouthpieces like Politika and Belgrade TV replaced “brotherhood and unity” with crude stereotypes of Albanians, Slovenes, and Croats, thereby preparing the public for broad interethnic conflict.

Much of Milošević’s support rested on long-simmering resentment of the federation. Many Serbs believed that SFRY had been imposed on the Serbs, with devastating material, spiritual, and cultural consequences under both Tito and his immediate successors. The implication was that the anti-Serb, Cominterm policy expressed by the slogan “Weak Serbia—Strong Yugoslavia” had survived Tito’s death. According to this nationalist belief, Communist Yugoslavia saw an enemy in each Serb, an antipathy that promoted the cleansing of Serbs from Kosovo, Croatia’s abolition of the Cyrillic alphabet, the disappearance of Serb cultural and
national institutions from Bosnia-Hercegovina, the unchecked autonomist spirit in Vojvodina, and separatism in Montenegro. One grievance that united Serbian officials, academics, media, and the public behind Milošević was the 1974 constitution, which had ceded essential state functions from Serbia to the two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, thereby undermining its sovereignty and turning it into a “semistate.” Therefore, Serbs in Kosovo and throughout Yugoslavia shared with Milošević the belief that only constitutional changes that recentered power in Belgrade would enable Serbia to govern effectively. Certainly this would reduce the space for “Albanian separatism.” So would the unification of all Serbs (possibly including those living in Bosnia and Croatia) in one state—a policy hidden behind their rationalization of the “struggle for preserving Yugoslavia.” Indeed, by representing their agenda as the struggle for preserving Yugoslavia they hoped to elicit support from nonnationalists and ensure for Serbia and its allies a claim to leadership within the federation.

But whereas Milošević’s rhetoric incited resentment of Yugoslavia’s other constituent peoples, it instilled a genuine fear of the Albanians. The Serbian public believed that Kosovo already enjoyed all basic rights and a high level of autonomy, interpreting Albanian calls for a republic as an intolerable sign of disloyalty that undermined the state unity of both Serbia and Yugoslavia. The quest for republican status was, therefore, seen as a precursor to outright secession and independence, which would reduce Kosovo’s Serbs to a minority in their own state. Albanian separatists already stood accused of pressuring Serbs to leave Kosovo, fueling a steady collective emigration of Serbs that the regime blamed on the ineffectiveness of the League of Communists (see chapter 2). Many Serbs perceived Albanians as a people who were fond of violence, whose riots, demonstrations, and rallies hurt both themselves and the development of Kosovo. By contrast, Serbs viewed themselves as a true nation, whereas the Albanians were considered only a national minority that should not expect more than autonomy.

As repression of the Albanians intensified, so did the revival of the Serbs’ Kosovo myth that culminated on St. Vitus Day, 28 June 1989, the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo. Milošević and other republican leaders joined the Serbian Orthodox Church at a large public commemoration in Kosovo Polje. The Serbian president’s speech employed the Kosovo myth in justifying his political agenda: a lack of unity and betrayal had followed the Serbs ever since the battle, for which reason they now needed to pledge unity and courage in order to remain undefeated. The rally crowned Milošević’s triumph in the struggle for Kosovo. Now he simply had to impose constitutional reforms that eliminated the Albanian bureaucracy’s hegemony within the province, thus affording the diminishing Serb minority the protection and support necessary “to stay in Kosovo forever.”

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The Constitutional Changes

Having captivated Serbs everywhere, Milošević now pressed for a basket of measures that created the impression that he knew how to handle Kosovo and other problems that Serbia and Yugoslavia faced, so long as the federal and provincial bureaucracies of Kosovo and Vojvodina did not interfere. The true character of Milošević’s regime in Kosovo surfaced in a series of directives delivered to a joint session of the federal and state presidency on 8 September 1988. Milošević announced that it would use “all political, administrative, and compulsory means” (i.e., state of emergency, police and army) in the fight against Albanian nationalism. Part of this policy included “ideological and political differentiation” in the party and other social and political organizations and state authorities, meaning that individual organs of the League of Communists and state authorities would become mono-ethnic in composition. Town and street names were changed, as were the contents of educational TV programs that heralded Kosovo’s entry into an era of concrete change. Then, in November 1988, the province’s Albanian Communist leader, Azem Vllasi, was removed from office. The Kosovo leadership responded with major demonstrations that included five days of rallies that drew 300,000–400,000 participants.22 There were also a protest march by Trepča miners and a miners’ hunger strike in January 1989.

Federal bodies responded by trying to settle the problem in Kosovo. However, this made the situation even more complicated by raising the question of whether Kosovo was the problem of Serbia or Yugoslavia, thereby pitting other republics like Slovenia and Croatia against the regime in Belgrade, which insisted that Kosovo was an internal, Serbian matter. In an attempt to control the situation, the presidency of Yugoslavia met on 26–27 February 1989 and decided to impose a partial state of emergency in Kosovo to be enforced by the military. Some 15,000 JNA and police personnel were deployed there with supporting armor.23

The show of force coincided with a series of special measures at the beginning of March that outlawed strikes and instituted a province-wide curfew, enforced by the special police of the Interior Ministry (MUP).24 Then, on 23 March the Kosovo Assembly was convened to approve the reductions in autonomy that had already been worked out in Belgrade, including the assembly’s right to block legislation adopted by the Serbian parliament. Before the ballot, each deputy was interrogated by security police, who made a show of force inside the building while tanks stood guard outside.25 A week of sometimes violent demonstrations followed, in which twenty-two protestors and two policemen were killed, dozens more wounded, and hundreds arrested in fighting between the army and Albanian protestors.26 The province’s Albanian leadership promptly resigned in protest, but Belgrade refused to accept the resignations, although it did order the arrest of
Azem Vlasi, together with thirteen leaders of the Trepča miners, including the chairman of its managing council, Azis Abrashi, plus the Stari Tërgu mine director Buhran Kavaja. The interior minister declared that they would be tried by the courts, although their sentences were vacated under pressure from the other republics and international community.

By 28 March the Serbian Parliament had proclaimed the abolition of autonomy and the establishment of a united Serbia. Kosovo and Vojvodina had now been defederalized, losing the attributes of statehood that extended beyond the veto to the loss of legislative, administrative, and judicial power. When the Kosovo Assembly’s MPs resisted the unilateral revision of the Serbian constitution, the republic dissolved it altogether and assumed its functions. In fact, a system of special laws for Kosovo was established, including the Law on the Action of Republican Agencies under Special Circumstances, the Law on Termination of Work of the Assembly of Kosovo and the Executive Council of the Assembly of Kosovo, the Law on Labor Relations under Special Circumstances, the University Law, the Primary Education Law, the Secondary Education Law, and the High School Law.

Thus ended successfully the first phase of defining the Serb national interest and officially inaugurating the “unitary state.” Yet the abolition of the constitutionally granted political and territorial autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina changed relations among the republics. The unitarist pacification of Kosovo rang an alarm in the other republics. Slovenia argued that breaking the Trepča miners’ strike was tantamount to “overthrowing the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia.” On 27 September 1989 it used the destruction of Yugoslavia’s federal system and the specter of Serbian hegemony to justify its intention to become the first republic to “escape” from Yugoslavia. Slovenia’s proclamation of sovereignty and the right to secede was public confirmation that the Kosovo crisis and the Serb–Albanian question were not the only problems in the former Yugoslavia.

The constitutional changes further escalated the intensity and breadth of the Albanian resistance. Job actions became the chief weapon. By September 1989, 230 enterprises throughout Kosovo had experienced strikes or other work stoppages at a cost of nearly two million work hours. On 3 September the resistance called its first general strike, which included private shops and supermarkets, to protest the dismissal of 15,000 Albanian workers from their jobs. All work halted throughout Kosovo in a powerful show of solidarity. Yet far from yielding to pressure, the Serbian regime responded by firing 5,000 additional workers. Meanwhile, Belgrade was systematically changing the constitution and reorganizing power in the province by positioning selected cadres in the executive and judicial branches, as well as in public companies and enterprises.
By the end of 1989 Albanian opposition had spread well beyond union workers to embrace virtually every segment of Albanian society, including students, children, politicians, and farmers. Previously illegal Stalinist-oriented groups now surfaced, growing into mass organizations. Most prominent among them was the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), which was established in December 1989. Inspired by a group of writers and intellectuals led by Ibrahim Rugova, the LDK rapidly became Kosovo’s largest political organization and, with the introduction of political pluralism throughout Yugoslavia, its first non-Communist political party. Within a year its membership had exploded, with its leaders claiming more than half a million members. Kosovo’s first human rights groups emerged, as did the prodemocracy United Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI), which established a branch in Kosovo in 1989. By 1990, labor opposition had coalesced in the Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo (BSPK), which broke with the old Yugoslav Federation of Trade Unions (FTU). There were also a large number of smaller Albanian political parties vying with the LDK, though united with it against the Milošević regime.

Although Belgrade characterized the Albanian opposition as counterrevolutionary, separatist, and irredentist, the large-scale student demonstrations that followed in Kosovo were merely protesting the violation of their constitutional rights. Yet this did not discourage Milošević, who pointed to the cooperation of loyal Albanians as proof that his Kosovo policy enjoyed popular support. Instead, the regime had forfeited the allegiance of a majority of the Albanian population. Moreover, the mistrust that his policies had sown between Kosovo’s Albanian and Serb communities had extended the official policy of differentiation beyond politics and government to all levels of social and commercial relations. Supported by officials and media, Serb villages even organized guard units and prepared for armed conflict with weapons provided from government stocks. Meanwhile, during 1990 the regime took the precaution of removing Albanians from the province’s police force.

Amid the swirl of events generated by Milošević’s rise to power, it is possible to identify two major consequences for Kosovo. First, his policies had mobilized the Serbs for conflict with the Albanian majority and introduced some elements of democracy in the political life both there and in Serbia, including a multiparty system, but had failed to establish effective democratic control over Kosovo. While pluralism was taking root in Kosovo, it had become extremely polarized along ethnic lines. The new local political organizations were exclusively Albanian, whereas Serbs and Montenegrins remained tied to the state apparatus, now coming under the direct control of Belgrade. Serbian parties that had emerged following the collapse of one-party rule in Serbia were primarily branches of Belgrade-based parties that expressed little opposition to Milošević’s policies in Kosovo. Second, Kosovo and the Serb-Albanian conflict constituted a
formidable challenge to maintaining internal national and state stability throughout Serbia, with detentions, persecution, and terror against Kosovo’s Albanian population by a now exclusively Serbian police force driving a strong wedge between the populations, resembling apartheid.33

Intensification of Conflicts

At the beginning of the 1990s, political and ethnic conflicts intensified. In March 1990, the state imposed large-scale repressive measures as more than seven thousand people (mostly Albanians) were arrested. This forced the Albanian leadership to minimize the risk of public protests. When the war broke out in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Albanians became very cautious not to be dragged into the conflict. Hence, the Albanian movement, which stood for one of the most explosive movements in this part of Europe, changed into a nonaggressive one.

Kosovo’s provincial assembly articulated this desire for sovereignty when it convened 2 July 1990. When Milošević loyalists locked the doors to the assembly, the delegates proclaimed independence on the stairs in front of the building. The move came as a surprise to Belgrade, which believed that it had secured the loyalty of the provincial leadership in toeing its line. Up until this point, the assembly still had no formal connection with opposition groups like the LDK, whose leaders were largely unaware of its plans to declare independence. Yet this act of defiance helped forge a link between itself and the Albanian opposition groups led by the LDK, giving the Albanian demands a strong legal basis. Serbia responded by altogether suspending the assembly and all of Kosovo’s provincial governing organs, thus establishing direct rule in the province, and it reinforced its security presence with police reinforcements from Serbia. Undeterred, the assembly held a second, clandestine meeting in the southeastern Kosovo town of Kačanik, with two thirds voting on 7 September 1990 to adopt a new constitution for an independent republic of Kosovo. Yet both the “Staircase” and Kačanik meetings reflected the Albanian political leaders’ commitment to nonviolent resistance consisting principally of public demonstrations and strikes—although some opposition elements occasionally launched isolated, hit-and-run attacks against law enforcement personnel. In reality, the policy represented by the Albanian political leaders as a nonviolent resistance was a package of pragmatic political decisions that ultimately led to radical political demands.

The shift ultimately affected the LDK. Upon holding its first congress in May 1991, the LDK’s position was still that Kosovo should become a republic within the Yugoslav confederation—a new loose federal order advocated at the time by Slovenia and Croatia. However, the demand for republic status became untenable only a month later, when Yugoslavia entered its first phase of disintegration with Slovenia’s and Croatia’s departure. The LDK, which had virtually turned into a
coalition of a variety of political currents among Kosovo’s Albanians, now faced two difficult challenges. First, more radical currents within the party called for radical action – the unification of all Yugoslav Albanians into a single republic, and their unification with Albania as the rectification of historical injustice. Team member Shkëlzen Maliqi has characterized this as a conflict between “legalists” and “anti-legalists” within the LDK, the former maintaining that the demand for independence should adhere to some legal basis in the former Yugoslavia constitutional order, and the latter viewing the conflict in stark historic terms that demanded radical solutions. Second, the LDK had to strategize its actions based on the rapidly unfolding developments that followed Yugoslavia’s disintegration, including the outbreak of fighting in Slovenia and Croatia and the diplomatic intervention of the European Community (EC) and the United States. During the summer of 1991, the LDK revised its platform to embrace independence, while other Albanian parties followed suit.

The tense situation in Kosovo deteriorated after an incident involving the poisoning of some Albanian schoolchildren from Podujevo, Priština, Mitrovica, and Vučitrn. Around 200 parents of Albanian children petitioned for a school boycott. The Serbian Health Authority and Military Medical Academy stated officially that there were no signs of poisoning. On the other hand, Albanians claimed it had been organized by the Serbian secret service. Although the details of this incident are still not clear, it served as a classic trigger that produced a massive emotional and political mobilization of Albanians, who now prepared to forsake Kosovo’s schools and other institutions. This “boycott of institutions” facilitated Belgrade’s takeover of Kosovo’s police, health system, schools, economy, and media, which it justified by representing Albanians as “primitive and mean.” Republican authorities had already imposed emergency measures in 1989 and 1990. Although they had reported them to the UN secretary-general based on Article 4 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, some of these measures were contrary to the Yugoslav constitution. Meanwhile, the LDK and especially the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) in 1990 began intensifying human rights monitoring efforts throughout Kosovo, producing daily and monthly reports of incidents of police violence, brutal treatment of Albanians while in custody, and other cases of ethnically driven maltreatment and violence perpetrated by the authorities.

For its part, the Serbian authorities represented their actions as a Program for Peace, Freedom, Equality, and Prosperity for Kosovo Province, which the Serbian Assembly adopted on 22 March 1990. The state pledged to employ “all legal means” to guarantee (1) the security of people and property of the Serb, Montenegrin, and all other “nations and nationalities whose rights are violated” in Kosovo; (2) “national equality and respect for national traditions, religious freedoms, and all civilization accomplishments” of the Albanian citizenry; (3)
the human rights of all citizens of Kosovo; (4) “remedy for injustices done to
displaced Serbs and Montenegrins and the creation of conditions for their return,
and good environment for everybody who wants to live and work in Kosovo”;
(5) establishment of a directorate for improvement of economic and social develop-
ment of Kosovo, from the republic’s resources (a euphemism for taking over one
of the federal functions), and (6) the establishment of an efficient “legal state,”
which empowered the Serbian Assembly to abolish those laws and decisions of
the Kosovo assembly, which violated the constitution and the principles of the
program itself.

The program was supported by the Operational Plan for the Implementation
of Program Tasks for the Establishment of Peace, Equality, Democracy, and Pros-
perity in the Province of Kosovo. 40 Numerous laws were also adopted in order
to implement Milošević’s policies, including the Law on Republic Authorities in
Extraordinary Circumstances,41 Article 2, Item 4 of which allowed for the impos-
sition of temporary compulsory measures. The implementation of this law and
the introduction of these constraints was authorized by the Decision on Defining
Extraordinary Circumstances on the Territory of Kosovo Province that was ad-
opted by the Assembly of Serbia and published the same day (26 June 1990). The
temporary compulsory measures were enforced on an *ad hoc* basis, unlike the
emergency compulsory measures, which applied to all vital functions and all life
in Kosovo. The temporary compulsory measures meant taking over the executive
functions of administration, economy, health, education, and justice. According
to the Serb narrative, “mass dismissal” of Kosovo Albanians from state institu-
tions during 1990–1991 was not the result of a Serbian government decision; but
rather, according to Serbian narratives, Kosovo Albanians were ordered by their
political leaders to leave their jobs as a sign of protest against the revocation of
Kosovo’s status in 1989. 42 In many cases, Serbs and Montenegrins were hired
instead of Albanians, who were dismissed from their positions. The assembly,
the executive council, and the presidency of Kosovo were all abolished.43 Their
abolition was followed by the closing of schools, dismissal of Albanian teach-
ers, restrictions on Albanian children’s right to enroll in Albanian schools, and
suspension of financing for schools that did not adhere to Serbia’s “integrated
educational program.”44 Another “discriminatory law” was the Law on Special
Requirements for the Sale of Property of 1991, which was originally adopted in
1989 as the Law on Restriction of Sale of Property.45

Following the abolition of Kosovo’s Academy of Sciences, Ibrahim Rugova
led representatives of eleven Albanian political parties in signing a declaration
(17 October) offering three options for the solution of the “Albanian issue in Yu-
goslavia.”46 Four days after the Kačanik Assembly had adopted a Resolution on
Independence and Sovereignty of Kosovo, an independence referendum was se-
cretly organized for 26–30 September 1991.47 The referendum won overwhelm-
ing support, with 89 percent of registered voters participating and 99 percent of the slightly more than one million balloters endorsing independence. When it next met on 19 October, the Kačanik Assembly proclaimed the independence of Kosovo and duly amended the September 1990 constitution to reflect the popular vote for independence. From this point on, the common goal of the Albanian movement—affirmed by “popular will”—became independence. After the referendum, any alternative platform or support for compromises over this issue became tantamount to treason.

Five days later, Albania recognized Kosovo’s independence. On 13 December the conflict reached the floor of the federal parliament after sixteen Albanian MPs petitioned the UN secretary-general, accusing Serbian authorities and Yugoslav military of the armed massacre of Albanians and demanding the introduction of UN peacekeepers in Kosovo. Ten days later the Republic of Kosovo asked the EU for recognition. In an attempt to stop the escalation of the Albanian nationalist movement, the government of Serbia removed from office Riza Sapunxhia, the representative of Kosovo in the presidency of SFRY on 18 March and three days later appointed a “loyal Albanian,” Sejdo Bajramoviq, who according to many Albanians was a Roma from Montenegro and not an Albanian.

By 1992, Kosovo had developed two irreconcilable political blocs: the regime, which reintroduced a Serbian nationalizing project and was bent on breaking the political will of Albanians at all costs, and a popular Albanian secessionist movement that maintained its position that Kosovo was occupied and viewed the Serbian takeover as completely illegitimate and the Serbian regime as a colonial authority engaged in brutal repression. These stark differences not only manifested themselves across Kosovo’s political institutions but pervaded all social life, thus forming the basis for the segregated, parallel political and social frameworks that Albanians and Serbs maintained in Kosovo for most of the 1990s.

By 1992, nearly all of these types of public protest either had ended, had been suppressed, or in the case of guerrilla attacks, had become marginal. By 1992, the parallel state had assumed its institutional shape, with the LDK leadership claiming ultimate authority in all matters political. The Albanian movement came to be known both locally and internationally as a nonviolent resistance movement—with Rugova gaining the mantle of an “Albanian Gandhi”—that defied Serbian authority by maintaining a set of parallel institutions. Meanwhile, the marginalization of guerrilla attacks greatly reduced the risk of armed conflicts being provoked by the Albanian side.

Disagreements arose between the LDK, on one hand, and the Youth Parliament and other groups, on the other, concerning the organization of nonviolent protests. Borrowing from symbolic protests in eastern Europe under authoritarian regimes, the Youth Parliament, supported by the Association of Sociologists and Philosophers, organized a series of nonviolent protest events such as the Peti-
tion for Democracy, Against Violence, symbolic demonstrations where protesters carried empty caskets to symbolically bury the violence, and protests against curfews by knocking on pots and pans and shaking keys during curfew hours. The LDK’s objections to such events resulted in the stifling of initiatives such as these, soon after which public demonstrations subsided.

**Kosovo-Left off the International Agenda**

Although the international community endorsed the nonviolent course charted by Rugova, it focused wholly on the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the status of the former republics, and the ensuing wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The EC Arbitration (Badinter) Commission expressed the consensus in its first opinion of 29 November 1991 that the SFRY was “in the process of its dissolution” and in its opinion of April 1992 that the process had “come to its end” because the SFRY did “not exist as a state any more.” Yet, despite intense lobbying in Switzerland, Germany, and Scandinavia by Kosovo’s government in exile and the Albanian diaspora there and in the U.S., the Kosovo Albanians failed to get the international community to include the Kosovo crisis in its Yugoslav deliberations. The EC and the U.S. refused to support the Kosovo Albanians’ contention that the former federal unit be recognized as an independent state like Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia, insisting instead that a high level of autonomy within Serbia and the FRY was the only solution.

The government of the Republic of Kosovo that formed right after Kačanik also sought international recognition of its independence on the basis of the principle of self-determination. The request was addressed to the EC on 23 December 1991. Yet the EC Arbitration Commission for the former SFRY did not apply this principle in the case of Kosovo and Vojvodina, basing its decision instead on the Helsinki Principles concerning the inviolability of European borders. According to the EC Declaration on the Recognition of New States, the Council of Ministers agreed to extend recognition by 15 January 1992 only to those republics that met the conditions of recognition. On 15 January 1992, the EC internationally recognized Slovenia and Croatia but not Kosovo. More than one year later on 27 April 1992, the FR Yugoslavia, through the federal assembly, issued a Declaration on the Formation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, known as Žabljak’s Yugoslavia. The issue of the “direct succession” of the former Yugoslavia was a central feature of Milošević’s policy interpreted narrowly in Serbia’s interest. But it had opened a question of the succession of the dissolved federal state. The important issue was the date of succession, at which point the seceding state replaced the predecessor state. According to the opinion of the EC Arbitrage Commission, the dissolution process itself extended from 29 November 1991 to 4 July 1992.
Kosovo’s failure to achieve international recognition as a sovereign Yugoslav successor state created many new problems for the Albanian leadership. Clearly they had to do much more if they wanted to be placed on the international agenda. They were helped in part by the Milošević regime’s violations of human and civil rights, which they diligently reported to the international community as evidence that their nation stood in jeopardy. Moreover, as the number of Milošević’s opponents increased, they found new allies in the common struggle.

Creating Parallel Institutions

In the summer of 1992, the Serb and Albanian communities in Kosovo lived in apartheid and open hostility and without true communication. At the same time, the Kosovo Albanians tried to consolidate their parallel state and to present their Republic of Kosovo before the international public and the international community as a “strong and united mini-state.” Indeed, the Albanian resistance was chiefly organized through newly established parallel bodies that its organizers argued were Kosovo’s only legitimate institutions. One of the most visible was the school system, which was established when Albanian teachers refused to abide by a new curriculum promulgated in 1990 by the Serbian Ministry of Education. Led by the Alliance of Albanian Teachers (LASH) and the Independent Teachers Union (SBASHK), instructors continued to use the old curriculum set by the now defunct provincial authorities. Primary education was less targeted than secondary education. Out of 441 primary schools, 41 functioned in alternative premises, and 60 out of 66 secondary schools operated outside of their original facilities. That same year the Mother Teresa Association (MTA) was established as the first large-scale organization to offer free medical services. It became truly indispensable at the end of 1992, following the mass dismissal and expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo’s public and social life, which deprived around 750,000 of their social insurance and free medical care in the state and private clinics. Although the fledgling parallel state had neither the proper organization nor resources to respond to this challenge, the MTA was assisted by international humanitarian organizations and by 1998 was providing medical care to 350,000 people.

Albanian residents and police learned to coexist and by 1993 had achieved a modus vivendi that permitted Albanians to patronize parallel institutions and conduct private economic activity so long as they deferred to police authority. The situation was less tenable in rural areas. After the removal of autonomy, MUP forces began a campaign of random house raids in villages throughout Kosovo, allegedly to search for hidden weapons. The raids, usually conducted at night, were intended to humiliate as much as to actually confiscate weapons. They included arrests, beatings, and even the killing of family members. Peace activist Howard Clark describes one such incident, which occurred in December...
1991 when the people of Prekaz in the traditionally unruly Drenica region fired shots at a police battalion marching into their village. The day after the incident, the village was immediately visited by LDK and CDHRF activists, who were responsible for documenting the incident and urging restraint.

On 24 May 1992, the Albanian political parties organized parliamentary and presidential elections for the parallel state. Serbian authorities declared the elections illegal but only interfered in a few municipalities, where they impounded ballots and other election material and arrested some of the people in charge of the elections. The elections acquired a degree of legitimacy from the presence of eight observer teams from the United States and Europe—including U.S. congressional staff and reporters from more than one hundred foreign media organizations—who stated that the elections had been largely regular. Although Serbia called the elections illegal and dispersed the meeting of the new parliament a few days later, Milošević allowed it to proceed, apparently to avoid compounding Western condemnation of the violence in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Many Albanian political parties participated in the elections, which filled one hundred seats by direct election, and allocated thirty more proportionally by party. The LDK won ninety-six mandates and the Muslim Slavs five, with the remaining twenty-nine being divided among other parties and independent candidates. An additional fourteen seats had been reserved for Serbs and Montenegrins, who refused to fill them by boycotting the election. Meanwhile, LDK presidential candidate Ibrahim Rugova ran unopposed, garnering 99.5 percent of the votes. The elections completed the process of establishing parallel institutional structures for Kosovo. Yet the parliament and government in Kosovo were never established as standing institutions. Instead, President Rugova oversaw and coordinated the activities of groups of officials whose work gave the appearance of sovereignty.

Although the cultivation of relations with Albania’s ruling Democratic Party representatives served this purpose, the parallel government was snubbed by the rest of the international community. When the British government and the United Nations organized an international conference in London to end the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Kosovo Albanians were only permitted to observe the conference on TV monitors set up in a side room. Although the conference decided to send human rights observers to Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Sandžak and pledged to broker an agreement with Belgrade for normalizing Kosovo’s educational system, the London conference was a significant humiliation for people who equated their suffering with Bosnia’s Muslims.

Perhaps it was their relative isolation that gave the Kosovo Albanians an unrealistic perception of their importance on the international stage. Berisha, Rugova, and other Albanian leaders had accepted Washington’s assurances that the Kosovo issue would be placed on the international agenda when, in most
matters, it remained only a side issue. Meanwhile, the Albanian media paid much too much attention to Rugova’s visits to Western countries, interpreting them as signs of international recognition of Kosovo’s independence even though Rugova was received only as an NGO representative. Nor was anything achieved when Rugova and Milan Panić, the newly elected and reform-oriented Yugoslav federal prime minister, met at the London conference. Panić openly supported an improvement of conditions for Kosovo Albanians and the reopening of schools and hospitals, claiming at the same time that Kosovo was part of Yugoslavia. Although he believed in respecting the Kosovo Albanians’ human rights, he expected them to participate in the political life of Yugoslavia and take part in the coming elections. However, according to LDK, there was almost no difference between Panić and Milošević, neither of whom was prepared to consider self-determination. Negotiations on the reopening of the schools and the university in the Albanian language started in 1992 in Belgrade between an Albanian delegation led by Fehmi Agani and the Serbian Minister of Education, Dr. Ivan Ivić. Although Belgrade accepted the Albanian request to talk about education at all levels, no agreement could be achieved due to the complexity of the Kosovo problem and the need for finding a political solution first. In fact, the status of Kosovo and education in the Albanian language were tied together.

Faced with growing desperation, the Serbs founded in Priština the Serb Block for Colonizing Kosovo with the goal of pushing the authorities in Belgrade to boost the number of Serbs in Kosovo. Belgrade responded by offering loans, construction of houses and apartments, and jobs to Serbs and Montenegrins who wanted to move there. By March 1992, fewer than 3,000 Serbs had accepted the offer, most of them Slav émigrés from neighboring Albania. Evidently the resort to “modern colonization” as applied by nationalist movements in the early twentieth century would not work overnight. Nonetheless, the Milošević regime did not waver, despite Serbia’s obvious lack of financial and other resources to maintain its position in Kosovo. Although it is not possible to fix the precise cost of maintaining control in Kosovo, some assessments indicate that Serbia spent more than six billion dollars to maintain peace in Kosovo after 1989. Yet few Serbs were prepared to negotiate a settlement with the Albanian leaders, and no Albanian was willing to talk about anything but independence for Kosovo.

Instead the Kosovo Albanian leadership persisted in its policy of passive resistance amid the growing tensions, thereby avoiding the bloodshed that had enveloped Bosnia-Hercegovina. This was partly due the presence in Kosovo of Serb paramilitaries like the notorious “Tigers” led by Željko Raznatović (“Arkan”), whose earlier depredations in Croatia and Bosnia had made him a key player in the Milošević regime’s game of fear. The Albanians dreaded all-out war, just as the Serb minority dreaded an Albanian rebellion. The concept was to mobilize the Serbs by fear and to get their support for the program, with the
goal of keeping the main industrial plants in northern Kosovo. There one found lead mines in Trepča and a ferronickel factory in Glogovac, all of which were in Serbian hands. Therefore, Milošević tolerated the situation but controlled his enforcer, Arkan, because he was aware of the international community’s likely negative reaction if he played this game openly. The result was strong showings by the Serb ultranationalist parties in Kosovo during the Serbian parliamentary and presidential elections of December 1992, which only intensified fear among Kosovo’s Albanians.62

Rugova’s absolute commitment to passive resistance foreclosed the option of armed uprising. He recognized that he had no other realistic option, given the likely severity of reprisals by Serbian security forces. Nevertheless, Rugova’s insistence on both nonviolence and independence created a status quo that was intolerable for a growing number of Albanian radicals.63 In the spring of 1993, activists of the Kosovo Republic National Front disseminated leaflets calling for the removal of Albanian officials who abandoned the ultimate goal of unifying all Albanians in one country. The National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK) appealed to people to take up arms. In May, a group of armed Albanians killed two Serbian police officers in the village of Glogovac. With the 4 October arrest of several LKCK operatives in Dečani, the existence of an Albanian resistance organization could no longer be kept secret. Nonetheless, the LDK persistently denied the existence of any Albanian armed forces in Kosovo and rejected the statements that the parallel government led by Bujar Bukoshi controlled the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Such claims of Rugova’s followers were refuted by reports from within the Albanian resistance that described Kosovo’s liberation forces as a two-layered organization made up of military and special forces. The Kosovo army units were originally organized into four regiments and deployed in Kačanik, Prizren, Priština, and Podujevo. They were financed by entrepreneurs through smuggling, the sale of drugs, and money provided by Albanians living abroad. Arms were purchased from the black market and in the open international market, while recruits were trained both in the mountains and in nearby Albania.64

In January 1994, the Albanians boycotted the FRY elections, which not only enabled Milošević to remain in power but also made it possible for the extreme Serb nationalist Arkan to be elected MP in Kosovo.65 Otherwise, Kosovo’s Albanian majority likely would have taken control of twenty-four of the province’s twenty-nine municipalities, a minimum of twenty-four seats in the Serbian Assembly, and twelve more in the federal Parliament—all at the expense of the major Serbian parties, thereby significantly affecting the balance of political power. Yet the LDK had no intention of contributing to the democratization process in Serbia by abandoning its territorial agenda. At the same time, there was a widespread feeling that the situation in Kosovo would explode without a relaxation
Dusan Janjić, with Anna Lalaj and Besnik Pula

of the repression. The feeling spread that Rugova’s policy of peaceful resistance and parallel institutions was enabling Serbian authorities to employ all means, including violence, to control Kosovo and force the Albanians there to emigrate. The situation became especially sensitive in August 1995 when 200,000 Croatian Serbs fled to Serbia following the Krajina’s forced reintegration into Croatia. Although thousands of refugees were sent to Kosovo, most of the young men promptly returned to Serbia proper, leaving only women, children, and the elderly in Kosovo.  

The Belgrade regime’s justification for transferring the refugees to Kosovo was that they would bring balance to the national structure in Kosovo at a time when Serbs were believed to constitute as little as 6 percent of the population.  

The Kosovo Albanians persistently tried to raise the problem posed by Serb refugee-colonists from Croatia on the international level but did not fully succeed. Despite some initial support, the international community continued to reject unilateral secession from Serbia and Yugoslavia, which would extend the conflict, first to Macedonia and then to other neighboring countries. Bearing this in mind, Milošević during his visit to Kosovo in 1995 spoke of it as a region of mutual trust, cooperation, and coexistence. At a meeting in Mitrovica, he openly showed his intention to divide Kosovo’s Albanians from their political leadership by advocating a policy of “national equality” that would make “all citizens equal to each other.” He asked the Albanians to reject their political leaders and support the Serbian administration. Yet during the same visit, it became clear that he and his Socialist Party were not prepared to negotiate with the Albanians and that an agreement between Rugova and Milošević was not possible.  

The conclusion of peace in Bosnia and Croatia at the Dayton conference left Milošević with two options: either guarantee the Albanians’ rights inside Serbia and FRY or follow the Bosnian example by splitting Kosovo in two along ethnic lines. Despite the Bosnian precedent, it was unlikely that Kosovo could be divided without serious local and regional conflict. Yet Milošević could not risk weakening Serbia and the federation by granting the province either full autonomy or outright independence. Any solution would have a high political price. Dayton confronted Kosovo’s Albanians with equally stark choices. Despite their wishes and efforts, the Dayton Accords had wholly ignored Kosovo, let alone the question of independence. Thus the most important lesson they drew from Dayton was that the international community had rewarded the armed struggle of Bosnian Serbs by recognizing Republika Srpska. In other words, the international community understood only armed conflict, not nonviolence.  

As a result, two parallel processes began after Dayton. First, official public discussions on Kosovo’s status, which had been frozen until then, started independently of, or rather against the will of, the government and political leadership. These were led by domestic and foreign NGOs, including the Forum for
Ethnic Relations (FER). The government, political leaders, and parties (SPS and LDK), both hard-liners and moderates, joined the discussions later. Second, there was a radicalization of the Albanian movement and political life and intensification of political conflicts among the Albanians themselves. By 1996, there was a growing tendency, particularly among younger Albanians, to reject the non-violent policy of Ibrahim Rugova. This hardening of anti-Serbian attitudes culminated in a series of “test attacks” by LKCK and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which began on 22 April 1996 and grew into full-scale armed insurrection in 1998 and 1999. Throughout this period, the KLA attacked and killed not only Serbian police officers but also ethnic Albanians whom it perceived to be “collaborators” or “the people of the Serbian regime.” It also kidnapped and murdered many ethnic Serbs and ethnically cleansed some areas where there were insignificant numbers of Serbs.

Rather than emulate Dayton’s promise of peace, both the Albanian and Serbian political leadership continued their sparring while cynically affecting a willingness to negotiate. Their lack of responsibility abetted the radicalization of the political situation. Thus official LDK sources still denied the existence of the KLA and the LKCK by blaming extreme Serb nationalists for frequent armed attacks on authorities and local Serbs, whom they alleged wanted to goad the Albanians from passive resistance and give them an excuse for military intervention. On the other side, the government in Belgrade and its media marginalized the complexity of the situation in Kosovo, believing that the problem could be resolved simply by amending the constitution and granting the Albanians genuine autonomy. As late as 1998, Belgrade’s authorities and media also downplayed the KLA’s influence and threat of armed resistance. For example, all newspapers and journalists who failed to use the word alleged before the acronym KLA were penalized. Instead, the authorities insisted through the media that, whereas all politically active Kosovo Albanians qualified as terrorists, their attempts to destabilize Kosovo were being orchestrated from abroad, assisted by senior diplomats in the Albanian Embassy in Belgrade under the direct control of President Sali Berisha.

Meanwhile, the international community continued to press Serbs and Albanians to find a middle way that would ensure both the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and self-determination for the Albanians. As late as 1996 some Albanians were still publicly proposing a solution inside the framework of Yugoslavia. Adem Demaçi advocated the idea of Balkania, in which an “independent and sovereign Kosovo” would remain within the new federal Yugoslavia. Demaçi’s plan envisaged the revival of the old concept of a Balkan federation, with Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo as the core states. Other former Yugoslav republics could join later. There were also different proposals from the Serb side. First, the Serbian Renewal Movement led by Vuk Drašković proposed a mul-
tistage autonomy; Vojislav Koštunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia advocated limited local decentralization; and Zoran Djindjić’s Democratic Party proposed regionalization. Yet all of the opposition party proposals were focused more on blaming Milošević for failing to solve the Kosovo problem than on solving it themselves.

Nor were Milošević and Rugova any more sincere or hopeful in their own gestures toward a negotiated settlement. Through the intermediation of the Italian NGO St. Edigio, they briefly lifted spirits by signing an agreement on 2 September 1996 normalizing education for Albanian schoolchildren and students in Kosovo. The agreement foresaw reopening the schools and faculties in the 1996–1997 school year. Yet neither side was serious about the agreement, which was never implemented. Their intention was, however, only to demonstrate to the international community a capacity for peacefully resolving problems, when what they really wanted was to buy more time in prolonging the status quo. Achieving a peaceful settlement was virtually impossible because the starting point of the middle way was for Kosovo to be treated as an integral part of Serbia, which was not acceptable to the Albanians, particularly following the intensifying mistrust and anger after the St. Egidio efforts failed. Thus neither side confronted the mounting frustration of Kosovo’s youth, who had expected to return to school but who now filled endless protest rallies and, increasingly, the ranks of the KLA.

Radicalization and Rebellion

At the end of 1996, rejection of Rugova’s policy escalated among the Albanians, especially among the youth. More and more young people listened to messages sent by Adem Demaçi and to long interviews by Rexhep Qosja in Intervista magazine. Both of them clearly argued that Rugova’s policy had not achieved anything in five years. The LDK leadership was accused of lacking flexibility and damaging Kosovo’s future. Rugova’s claims that the international community would solve the issue of Kosovo “with a firm hand,” were branded as lies. At that time, the vast majority of the population was totally divided. Most of the Albanians, like most of the Serbs, left contact with the other community to their political leaders.

In 1996, it became clear to many Serbs that the solution to the Kosovo problem would be a bitter loss for them, and it seemed clear to most Albanians that they would get less than they wanted. It created among Kosovo’s Serbs a feeling of anxiety and intensified their dilemma of whether to leave or stay. This anxiety grew worse when the Kosovo Serbs saw the indifference expressed by Serbia when Serb refugees arrived from Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina and when they realized how much they yearned for their homes. Yet Kosovo Serbs continued to sell their land and houses to Albanian buyers, thereby confirming that subjecting
Kosovo under the Milošević Regime

Kosovo to Belgrade’s direct control had not brought meaningful security and economic prosperity to the majority of Serbs. On the contrary the state sector as the main employer of Kosovo Serbs suffered tremendous damage from international sanctions and bad management, whereas the private sector, which was run by the Albanians, remained almost unchanged. Most of the Serbs in Kosovo sank into poverty, further complicating their problems. As the situation deteriorated and become more dangerous, the Serbs decided not to end up like the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia and started to mobilize themselves in an effort to keep Kosovo inside the borders of Yugoslavia. At the same time, the Albanians in towns of southern Serbia asked for self-determination and unification with Kosovo.

Tensions in Kosovo increased in the middle of July 1996, after a statement by SANU President Aleksandar Despić that Albanian demographic superiority in Kosovo justified the “peaceful and civilized secession of that area from the Federation.” The LDK welcomed this statement, which LDK Vice-President Fehmi Agani interpreted as a sign that Milošević’s policies had failed. Nevertheless, Despić’s speech disturbed Kosovo’s Serbs, who feared that Belgrade was about to sell them out. Several thousand expressed their fear in a mass demonstration at Gračanica Monastery organized by the Serbian Renewal Movement, at which they demanded that all Serbs reach a consensus and clearly define the Serb national interest before making any proposal for resolving the Kosovo problem. After that, lack of any consensus in Kosovo became an issue of general political discussion in Serbia.

Meanwhile, time was running out. The chaotic March 1997 rebellion in Albania against the government of President Sali Berisha accelerated the military agenda of the KLA, whose training camps in northern Albania benefited from the pillaging of government arsenals by Albanian mobs. By intensifying its attacks on Serbian police and civil officials the KLA became the “movement worth joining,” albeit at the expense of Rugova and the LDK. As it grew, the KLA began to emerge from the shadows as the prime mover in the Albanian drive for independence. It was formed in 1992, initially from Marxist-Leninist resistance groups that had been active during the previous decade. By 1994 it had established a general headquarters in Priština’s Qendra district, camouflaged as a student home. There were other bases for meetings, including Kodra e diellit and Dardani in Priština and Prekaz in Drenica. In March 1998 the KLA moved its headquarters to Likoc (Drenica), by which time it had developed several departments for personnel, information, logistics, finance, policy, military, and civil relations, and others. The military arm was divided into seven operational zones (OZ), each with its own commander and various political and military structures similar to Kosovo’s. The KLA had its own military anthem and emblem, featuring a double-headed black eagle on a red field, surrounded by the words Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (Kosova Liberation Army) and its UÇK acronym. Meanwhile, outside
Kosovo, the foundation Vendlindja thërret (Fatherland Calls) served as its main financial source, funded mostly by donations from Albanian emigrants abroad.

Although the KLA had a general headquarters, it had no sole commander. Some have assigned Azem Syla that role, while others mention Adem Jashari, who led the Drenica Operational Zone until his death. Nevertheless, we do know that the members of general headquarters who also served as OZ military commanders included Mujë Krasniqi, Rexhep Selimi, Sulejman Selimi, Shaban Shala, and Sami Lushtaku. The KLA’s political representatives were Sokol Bashota, Xhavit Haliti, Jakup Krasniqi, Bardhyl Mahmuti, Faton Mehmetaj, and Haşim Thaçi, while Adem Demaći was their principal representative at all important domestic and international meetings. The KLA had its propaganda organs such as Radio Kosova e Lirë (Radio Free Kosova) and the news agency Kosovapress situated in the Berisha Mountains.

For years its leaders employed pseudonyms when communicating with the international media to obscure their identity. Although the 22 April 1996 attack represented something of a watershed in the armed resistance movement, no KLA official actually appeared in public until 28 November 1997, when three of its fighters, Mujë Krasniqi, Daut Haradinaj, and Rexhep Selimi, attended the funeral for “martyred” teacher Halit Geci in Llaushë (Drenica) while dressed in military uniforms with the KLA crest on their arms and hats. Moreover, the KLA initially targeted only Serbian police and officials—as well as ethnic Albanians who were perceived to be collaborators or people of the Serbian regime. Full-scale operations required not only the funds being raised abroad by Fatherland Calls but the weapons to spend them on. This need was met in 1997 during the pyramid crisis in neighboring Albania, when army depots were emptied and much of their stock transported to Kosovo. From there, the three OZs bordering on Albania (2, 3, and 6) transshipped the looted armaments and munitions. They even helped establish training camps in northern Albania for KLA recruits who now flooded in not only from Kosovo but also from the Albanian diaspora, especially in Germany and Switzerland. Thus, whereas the chaos in neighboring Albania unnerved the LDK leadership, it strengthened the hand of the KLA and emboldened those calling for a more radical, violent solution. Thus, it was a combination of widespread public unrest, disappointment with the Dayton Accords, and the sudden availability of weapons that fueled the KLA’s decision to launch full-scale military operations.

The uneasy coexistence of peace and sporadic violence ended on 28 February 1998, when demonstrators in Priština were severely beaten while protesting the killing of twenty-five Albanians in Drenica and Likošan in retaliation for the deaths of four Serbian policemen. On 5–7 March thousands of police and soldiers surrounded the Jashari family compound in Prekaz. During the three-day battle that followed, OZ commander Adem Jashari, Shaban Jashari, Hamzë Jashari, and fifty-seven other family members were killed. The next major action took place
on 29 May as an Albanian delegation composed of Ibrahim Rugova, Bujar Bukoshi, Fehmi Agani, and Veton Surroi was meeting with American President Bill Clinton in Washington. Serbian police equipped with heavy artillery attacked the KLA’s Dukagjin OZ, killing dozens of people and wounding several hundred. Thousands more fled their homes, while the VJ set up a security cordon along the Djakova–Dečani–Peć road. In response, Albanian negotiators who had attended peace talks with Serbian officials on 22 May canceled a follow-up meeting that had been scheduled for 5 June. Now the only road open was war.

Notes
4  Among Serb intellectuals, there was a high level of consensus that it is “illogical for Serbia to have three Constitutions” (Miroslav Živković, “Realistic Search for the Feasible,” in “Contribution to the Public Debate on the Constitution,” special issue, Sociološki pregled, 1–2 (1988): 152, and that the amendment of the constitution of 1974 was the “first political precondition” for “the revival of Yugoslavia” (Mirjana Todorović, “Prerequisites and Principles of Constitutional Changes,” in “Contribution to the Public Debate on Constitution,” special issue, Sociološki pregled, 1–2 (1988): 136. That was also witnessed by the constitutional model proposed on 28 March 1988 by the PEN Club of Serbia, the Sociological Society of Serbia, and the Philosophical Society of Serbia. Mirjana Todorović, “Prerequisites and Principles,” 137-41. Serbia was claimed to be the one and only state in the world not executing its constitutional power. In order to be able to do so, regulation of rights, responsibilities, and organization of provinces would have to be internal matters of the Republic of Serbia. Until then, Serbia, compared to other republics, would be on an unequal footing. Miodrag Jovičić, “Bringing Back the Constitutional Power to Serbia,” Književna reč, 25 October 1988, 330; Ratko Marković, “Division of Legislative Functions in SR Serbia, Changes of SFRY Constitution and SR Serbia Constitution, study material,” School of Law of the Belgrade University, Institute for Legal and Social Sciences of the School of Law (Belgrade, 1988), 417; Gajo Petrović, interview in Stav, 29 December 1989, 36.
5  Preventing War in Kosovo (Lund: Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, 1993), 4.
10 Ivan Stambolić, Put u bespuće (Belgrade: Radio B92, 1995), 166.
13 Cosić, Kosovo, 63–66.
18 Preventing War in Kosovo, 17.
19 A perception that has already been used to justify the invasion of northern Albania early in the century. (Dimitrije Tucović, Srbija i Albanija. Kritika osvajačke politike srpske buržoaske klase (Belgrade: Socijalistička knjižara, 1914), 117–18.
21 Svetislav Spasojević interview with Momčilo Trajković, executive secretary of Local Board of the Serbian Communist League in Priština, NIN, March 1987.
22 Significantly, there were as yet no separatist slogans; the slogans dwelt instead on saving the Yugoslav Federation and autonomy status of Kosovo with cries of “Long live 1974 Yugoslav constitution,” “Long live unity and brotherhood,” “Tito-party,” “Save the 1974 autonomy.”
25 The media reported that only ten members voted against the legislation; a photograph taken at the time showed thirteen hands raised in opposition. See: Zekeria Cana, “Apeli 215 i intelektualëve shqiptarë” (Prishtinë: 2001), 266.
28 Official Gazette of the SR Serbia, nos. 5, 30 33, 40 (1990) and no. 50 (1992)
29 Others included the Social Democratic Party of Kosovo, Parliament of the Youth of Kosovo, Peasant Party of Kosovo, Independent Trade Union of Kosovo, and Committee for the Truth about Kosovo.
30 This was illustrated by positioning Rahman Morina as the president of the Communist League of Kosovo; he had been the chief of internal affairs during the 1980s.
31 Fond za humanitarno pravo, Sudioje Slobodanu Miloševiću: Transkripti (Belgrade: Fond za humanitarno pravo, 2006). The Humanitarian Law Center published twenty-six volumes containing transcripts from the trial of Slobodan Milošević in BCS languages. Publications present a detailed insight into the indictment brought against Slobodan Milošević and the evidence that the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor presented to the chamber, as well as the evidence presented by Milošević himself. More evidence will be available after the publication of the transcripts of the ICTY trial of Milan Milutinović,

Milošević’s success in the nationalist policy was possible thanks to the fact that he, in an utmost radical way, raised the painful issue of equality, namely of the position of the Serbs in the federation, which led to the raising of the Serbian national issue. Nevertheless, Milošević did not succeed in solving those issues but only intensified them. He understood them as state rather than democratic issues. Micheline de Félice, “La Yougoslavie en question,” *Les Temps Modernes* 519 (1989): 106.

Compare the “legalist” argument for independence in Gazmend Zajmi, *Vepra I* (Prishtinë: Akademia e Shkencave dhe e Arteve e Kosove, 1997), 143–44, and the “antilegalist” approach in Rexhep Qosja, *Cëeshtja shqiptare: historia dhe politika* (Tirana: Toena, 1998), 287–316. Although neither Zajmi nor Qosja were members of the LDK, their arguments represent both schools of thought.


As it was by the withdrawal of the Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian MUP contingents heretofore stationed in Kosovo. The intensifying conflict within federal institutions also led to the release of Azem Vllasi and his fourteen fellow prisoners, as well as the amnesty of Adem Demaçi, who had been imprisoned for twenty-eight years because of his commitment to Albanian separatism and Greater Albania. Poulton, *Balkans*, 68–69.

For example, the right of authorities to restrict the freedom of movement of persons suspected of being capable of jeopardizing public law and order, by placing them under house arrest or forcing them to reside in other places, most typically in jail. Such a possibility existed under the then applicable republic and provincial laws on internal affairs; however, in 1989, this was only applicable in the provisions of Articles 53 and 54 of the Provincial Act on Internal Affairs in Kosovo. *Official Gazette of SAP Kosovo* 46 (1987). It was yet another example of disrespect for Albanian rights, but also of the extremely low standards for collective minority rights as a whole. Vojin Dimitrijević, “Ethnicity and Minorities in the Yugoslav Federation,” in *Open Problems of Ethnicity in Yugoslavia* (Novi Sad: Pravo i Univerza v Mariboru, Evropski center za proučevanje medetnisnih odnosev in regionalizma, 1991), 56–57.


The plan’s ninety-five articles established the republic’s control over judicial, military, police, and other functions, applied its regulations in science, culture, education, media, welfare, healthcare, etc., and opened employment to Serbian citizens from outside Kosovo. *Official Gazette of the SR Serbia* 15 (1990).

This act was based on the Act on Termination of Particular Acts and other Regulations. *Official Gazette of the SR Serbia* 18 (1993), Article 1, Item 7. Particularly interesting is Article 2, disestablishing Kosovo’s assembly, executive council, and presidency which would be reconstituted following new “direct and secret elections under the provisions of the Constitution and provisional statutory decision to be made by the National Assembly”—which never took place. *Official Gazette of the SR Serbia* issue nos. 33 (1990) and 15 (1991).

See the testimony of ICTY indictee Fatmir Limaj in *ICTY vs. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala and Isak Musliu*. 

As a result, approximately 250,000 students were unable to continue their regular education. By 1991 only 28.8 percent of students were allowed to enroll in secondary schools. Numerous elementary and secondary schools were closed, and segregation on a national basis was introduced. *Vreme*, Belgrade, 3 June 1991; *Borba*, Belgrade, 31 May and 26 June 1991; *Republika*, Belgrade, July 1991, 12.

Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia 22 (1991). This law restricted property transactions within the area covering the territory of Serbia without Vojvodina for a period of ten years. Article 3 determined that the Ministry of Finance would approve any property transaction so long it “does not cause a change in the national structure of the population or the emigration of members of a certain nation or nationality.” The law’s official rationale was to “prevent the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo, by restricting property transactions between Serbs and Montenegrins on the one hand, and the Albanians, on the other hand.”

The three options were: (1) if SFRY’S external and internal borders remained unchanged, Kosovo would become a sovereign and independent state with the right of association in a new union of sovereign Yugoslav states in which Albanians in central Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro would enjoy the status of a nation and would not be a national minority; (2) if only SFRY’s internal borders were changed, but not the external ones as well, an Albanian republic would be established to include Kosovo and Albanian-populated territories in central Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro; (3) if SFRY’s external borders changed, the Albanians would by referendum unite in one, inseparable Albanian state with ethnic borders proclaimed by the First Prizren League in 1878. Predrag Simić, *The Problem of Kosovo and Metohija, and Regional Security in the Balkans* (Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics, 1996), 13.

Kosovo Information Center, *Albanian Democratic Movement in Yugoslavia: Documents 1990-1993*, (Priština: Kosovo Information Center, 1993). According to the official Albanian interpretation, Kosovo would not be integrated with other Albanian regions. Nevertheless, documents from Albanian organizations outside Kosovo have shown that the unification of all those regions into one state had been prepared for quite some time and that such regions would be united with Albania, specifically within the ethnic boundaries claimed by the Albanian movement in 1913. Rexep Ismajli, *Kosovo and the Albanians in Former Yugoslavia* (Prishtinë: Kosovo Information Center, 1993). After all, the desire for unification was common for all Albanian groups and parties, which in the course of 1990 integrated the political activities of Albanians in Kosovo and in western Macedonia. So, for example, as early as 1 February, around 2,000 Albanians demanded that this part of Macedonia with a majority Albanian population be guaranteed independence. On that occasion, the protestors in Tetovo shouted, “We want Great Albania!” As regards the issue of language (June 1990), even more massive rallies were organized (in Struga, around 11,000 Albanians took part); later the rallies spread to Kumanovo and Tetovo, and on 25 August 1990, the Party of Democratic Prosperity of Macedonia (PDP) was founded with Nevzet Hallili as its leader. Despite the fact that this party carried a nonethnic name, the goal of the party was to unite all the Albanians into one state. Consequently, in Macedonia, basic political conflict occurred between the Albanian block—PDP—and the National Democratic Party, on the one hand, and their political Macedonian counterpart—VMRO–DPMNE—on the other. In achieving this goal, not even the municipalities in the south of Serbia were forgotten.
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(Bujanovac and Preševo), where the Albanians represented the majority. B. Kosumi and S. Vinca, “Kjo eshte Kosovo lindore i Ky esthe vullneti i populit,” Zeri, 29 February 1992, 14–15. In March 1993 Rexhep Qosja, who was the most determined public advocate of pan-Albanian unification, wrote Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha an open letter appealing for unification of “all the territories populated by Albanians,” reminding him that unification is their “prime national interest” and calling Berisha a traitor for betraying this interest. Borba, 19 March 1993, 11.


49 Although guerrilla groups had existed in Kosovo in the early 1980s, these had virtually disintegrated due to weak organization, lack of weapons, or the killing or imprisonment of the militants. By 1987, organizations such as the Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo (LPRK) staged guerrilla attacks and various acts of sabotage. “Ne vitin 1985 nis levizja guerile e Kosoves,” Zeri, 5 February 2001, 5.

50 Opinion No. 1 of 29 November 1991, point 3.


53 According to the village of Montenegro where the new Constitution for FRY was drafted.

54 Parts of this section were contributed by Besnik Pula and have appeared in “The Emergence of the Kosovo ‘Parallel State,’ 1988–1992,” in Conflict in Southeastern Europe at the End of the Twentieth Century: A Scholars’ Initiative, ed. Thomas Emmert and Charles Ingrao, Nationalities Papers 32, no. 4 (2004).

55 Toward that end in March 1992 Prime Minister Bujar Bukoshi visited Copenhagen, Vienna, and Helsinki, and Deputy Prime Minister Nick Geloshi went to the Vatican. Neither achieved anything beyond lukewarm congratulations for the peaceful approach of the Kosovo Albanians and a promise that “Kosovo shall not be forgotten.”

56 Prior to 1990, curricula were adopted by the provincial secretariat for education. See Pajazit Nushi, “Shkaterrimi i arsimit, i shkences e i kultures shqiptare dhe i sistemit institucional te tyre nga sunduesi serbomadh,” in Reenimi i autonomies se Kosoves, ed. Bardhyl Caushi (Prishtina: Shoqata e Pavarur e Juristeve te Kosoves, 1992), 73–74.

57 The failure to close all Albanian primary schools was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that they enrolled 300,000 students, which would have made their closure an overwhelming task. Denisa Kostovicova, Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space (London: Routledge, 2005), 130.

58 At the time, there were an estimated 166 such centers or clinics in Kosovo, with volunteer Albanian medical workers who had been dismissed from their former positions. A majority of the centers was not suitable for medical work, lacking sufficient medicines, medical supplies, and equipment and entirely without sanitary equipment and, in some cases, running water. Serbian authorities occasionally closed the clinics and arrested staff.

59 For example, in 1995, more than 2,324 households had been searched for weapons. Kostovicova, Kosovo, 53.

60 For the LDK version of the incident, see “Barbaret ne Prekaz,” Illyria, 4 January 1992, 2. Rifat Jashari, brother of Adem and Hamze Jashari, witnessed the police raid and confirmed in an interview that the LDK’s and CDHRF’s mediation helped avoid bloodshed. See “Rrethimi i trete,” Illyria, 22 February 1992, 4.
See interviews with Rugova in “Ne kemi legjitimitet per zgjedhje te lira ne Kosove,” *Illyria*, 16 May 1992, 12, and “Bota e dë i ca do te thote okupim,” *Illyria*, 27 May 1992, 12. The government continued to function in exile and wielded no real authority in Kosovo.

Milošević’s Socialist Party won forty-seven seats in the federal parliament, whereas thirty-three seats went to the Serbian Radical Party led by Vojislav Šešelj, the extreme nationalist leader who in the course of the electoral campaign advocated expelling all Albanians from Kosovo. DEPOS, the main opposition coalition, won only twenty-one seats. Kosovo Albanians boycotted the elections, despite the international community’s appeals to them to vote for Milan Panić, who promised to restore human rights and to negotiate some form of autonomy for Kosovo. The LDK condemned as traitors those Kosovo Albanians who advocated participating. Although one million Albanian votes could have toppled Milošević, Kosovo Albanian leaders freely admitted that they did not want him to be removed from power because his regime was creating a framework for the final success of the Albanian national project.

One such group from Peć, led by Reshat Nurboj, demanded “more active resistance measures,” whereas Adem Demaçi began a hunger strike to protest the closing of *Rilindija* and other Albanian-language media, promising that “I will die for freedom of speech,” and the LDK news bulletins declared that “Demaçi must not die!” *Bulletin 109*, 31 May 1993; *Bulletin 110*, 4 June 1993.


Of twenty-four representatives elected from Kosovo, twenty-one were from Milošević’s Socialist Party, two from the Serbian Radical Party, and only one from DEPOS, the democratic opposition. Those MPs represented the choice of the Serbs because the Albanians boycotted the elections, as did the Party of Democratic Action (PDA) representing Serbia’s 60,000 Muslim Slavs and the Turkish National Party, which spoke for the republic’s 12,000 Turks.

The perhaps 6,000–7,000 “new” refugees from Krajina joined about 4,000 registered Serb refugees who had arrived earlier from Bosnia. Previously, 700 Serbs had settled in Kosovo during the summer of 1992, occupying cabins in the weekend cottage settlement Pishat e Decan near Dečani. Apart from the refugees, the main users of the confiscated Albanian land and houses were the Serbian soldiers. Vast areas were confiscated in Globočica (a part of Kačanik close to the Macedonian border), especially in Xhemajl Zeka, where the army started to build military facilities in Ponosec, close to the Albanian border, occupied by the reservists of the Serbian army. See *Dismissals and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo*, Report by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Brussels (October 1995), 6.

Ger Duizings, Dušan Janjić, and Maliqi Shkëlzen, eds., *Kosovo: Confrontation or Co-Existence* (Nijmegen: Peace Research Centre, 1997), 70-72. Adem Demaçi, at that time the leader of the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (PPK), the main rival of LDK, and the president of the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms in Priština, summarily dismissed the international community’s refusal to tolerate any change of borders: “I think that the borders have been changed. The fact that borders are discussed at this time is absurd, since Yugoslavia does not exist any longer. All of its borders have been nullified and one cannot apply different criteria according to which some borders may and some may not be changed” (D. Gorani, *IWPR*, May 1996).

For more about KLA activities, see Perritt, *Kosovo Liberation Army* and Derens, *Kosovo*, 111–18, 120–26.
Belgrade claimed that there were two main goals behind this new campaign of Albanian violence: (1) to play the nationalist card harder on the eve of Berisha’s election campaign, and (2) to secure in advance a strong negotiating position for future debates on the status of Kosovo; this sounded more convincing.

For useful contemporary discussion of possible solutions, see Alberto l’Abbate, Kosovo: Una guerra annunciata (Firenze: Dipartimento di Studi Sociali - Universita degli Studi di Firenze, 1996).

The agreement was signed and transmitted via facsimile by Milošević in Belgrade and Rugova in Priština, but the texts differed. It manifested itself through contradictory reactions. According to Tanjug, “this Agreement commits the Albanians to accept the curriculum applied in schools throughout Serbia.” Abdul Rhama, the spokesman for Kosovo Albanians’ educational issues stated: “In this stage, the Albanian party agreed not to negotiate the manner of financing of the educational system in Kosovo,” whereas Fehmi Agani, the vice-president of DSK, pointed out that the agreement does not mean that the Albanians will rejoin the educational system of Serbia but only that they will continue their education in proper school buildings: “We will keep our own system,” said Agani. Bujar Bukoshi’s reaction to the agreement was cautious: “This agreement should be welcomed as a gesture of the good will of the Albanians and their hope that this represents an opportunity for re-opening of their schools. It is wrong, however, to play on uncontrolled and naïve enthusiasm, but very cautious optimism may be considered. The experience with the agreements signed by Serbia has taught us that Serbia signs them easily, and does not respect them even more easily, even with the mediation of the UN Security Council.” Ministry of Information of the Republic of Kosovo, Bulletin 277, 9 September 1996.
