It was infeasible to establish a research team devoted to Montenegro during the Scholars’ Initiative’s formative years. At the time, its politics and political culture were still in great flux, while its people sorted out both their relationship with Belgrade and the somewhat unique role that the republic had played in the wars of Yugoslav succession. The conditions have, however, become more favorable during the years since its secession and normalization of relations with the other successor states.

The impetus for forming a research team came from Michael Haltzel, who broached the idea in 2010 to Srdjan Darmanović, who had served for a decade as SI media liaison in Montenegro and had recently been named that country’s ambassador to the United States. With their encouragement, John Treadway began organizing the team during his year-long tenure as a senior Fulbright fellow in Montenegro in 2011-12. Crucial to this process were the contributions of Kenneth Morrison, who assisted Treadway in recruiting team members and assumed sole responsibility for researching and writing the chapter that appears here. As a high government official Ambassador Darmanović was recused from participation in all stages of the research, writing, and reviewing of Morrison’s draft, which was submitted to the team at the end of April 2012. Every other team member participated in the ensuing review process, which concluded shortly before the volume went into production. The team wishes to thank Purdue University Press Director Charles Watkinson and his staff for readily agreeing to delay publication of the second edition by several months in order to accommodate the inclusion of a twelfth team chapter.
Montenegro: A Polity in Flux, 1989–2000

Kenneth Morrison

Montenegro’s role in the disintegration of Yugoslavia and events within the republic during the critical years under consideration are often overlooked (or treated only superficially) in the plethora of literature focusing on the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Socialistička federativna republika Jugoslavija [SFRY]) and its subsequent wars of disintegration. Montenegro largely avoided war in the 1990s, but as Yugoslavia’s smallest republic it faced numerous challenges as the SFRY dissolved; it was by no means immune from the problems facing neighboring republics. The main focus of this chapter is, therefore, the impact of wider Yugoslav events on Montenegro’s internal politics, the relationship between ruling elites in Serbia and Montenegro, and the intraparty dynamics within Montenegro’s ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska partija socijalista [DPS]). So while war was avoided in Montenegro, the collapse of the SFRY had a significant impact upon the republic, resurrecting old divisions that pushed the republic to the brink of civil war in 1999.

Subject to war and occupation twice in the first half of the twentieth century, Montenegro’s status as a republic within the SFRY had eased tensions between those who defined themselves as Serbs and were inclined toward close union with Serbia, and those Montenegrins who argued that they were a distinct nation and were inclined toward independence.¹ But this preexisting division, one which had become manifest in the latter years of the reign of King Nicholas (Nikola I Petrović-Njegoš), was not the only fault line. The Greens (Zelenaši) and Whites (Bjelaši) division had also been compounded by the Partisan-Chetnik dynamic and, to a lesser extent, by the legacy of the 1948 Tito-Stalin split.² Broadly speaking, however, the SFRY provided stability in Montenegro, and these divisions were concealed, if not forgotten. Montenegro, a tiny republic of 625,000 inhabitants, benefited economically and politically from the Yugoslav system. In part because of the large number of Partisan “national heroes” among their ranks, Montenegrins were disproportionately represented in the Yugoslav bureaucracy,
police, and army. Ethnic relations were relatively stable and Montenegrins came to represent something of an ideal Yugoslav surrogate in their equidistance between Montenegrin and Serb nationalities. The postwar Montenegrin communist leadership was Yugoslav oriented, and Montenegro lagged behind others in the establishment of national institutions. Nationalism was, on the whole, contained. But as the SFRY began its painful demise in the late 1980s, Montenegro was thrust into a decade-long crisis, one that did not end until the fall of the regime of Slobodan Milošević in October 2000. During the period between 1989 and 2000, Montenegro passed through numerous internal political crises, from the so-called antibureaucratic revolution to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. Bitter political struggles rekindled preexisting, if concealed, divisions as the trajectory of politics in the republic was determined. Indeed, the tumultuous events of the 1990s, discussed here, would establish the foundations for the republic’s independence in 2006.

**Economic Crisis and the “Antibureaucratic Revolution”**

By 1988, both Montenegro and the whole of the SFRY were in the grip of economic crisis. As the communist leadership failed to deal with the crisis, nationalists sought to capitalize on the resulting social and political instability. The resurgence of the Serbian Question in the mid-1980s dictated that Montenegrins would again be forced to engage the question of their national identity. The argument that Montenegrins were part of the Serbian national corpus once again became de rigueur among intellectual and nationalist groups in Serbia, who maintained that Montenegrins were a branch of the wider Serbian nation, and that the Montenegrin nation had been a creation of the Yugoslav communists, who wished to tear Montenegro from its Serbian roots. Many Montenegrins responded warmly to these overtures. Even in the mid-1980s, the Montenegrin leadership recognized the dangers of increasing nationalism within the SFRY. Vidoje Žarković, the president of the Montenegrin League of Communists (Savez komunista Crne Gore [SKCG]), cautioned that brotherhood and unity (bratstvo i jedinstvo) in Montenegro, and throughout the SFRY, must be vigorously defended against what he described as “retrograde nationalist forces.”

Nationalism would play a key role in Montenegrin politics over the following decade, but it was not the main driver behind the discontent that became so acute in the late 1980s. It was, rather, the economy that presented the greatest challenge to Montenegro’s (and to Yugoslavia’s) communist leadership. By the early 1980s, the SFRY was in the midst of a critical economic crisis. Western banks and investors, which had funded the earlier growth periods of the 1960s and 1970s, grew nervous about the country’s ability to service its debts—and not without justification. The Yugoslav economy, after all, labored under a growing
trade deficit, a significant balance of payments deficit, and a burgeoning foreign
debt, which had risen from below $2 billion in 1970 to over $14 billion in 1979. By 1983, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) demanded that the country’s leadership restructure the economy in an attempt to contain the worsening debt crisis; such conditions were reluctantly administered by a government only too aware of the potential consequences. Unprofitable enterprises across the country were closed with much of the workforce thrust into significant personal difficulty. Not unfamiliar with Western consumer goods, private cars, and foreign holidays, Yugoslavia’s citizens began to feel the economic privations familiar to those living in neighboring Bulgaria or Romania. This economic turmoil was most acute in the poorer parts of the SFRY, such as Montenegro.

In an attempt to restructure the economy, the SKCG took drastic measures, introducing laws that allowed the government to initiate the liquidation of loss-making businesses. Nonviable enterprises were subject to these harsh measures as the state sought to limit manpower costs and reduce their fiscal commitments. A further austerity program ensured that the economic pain was felt by the majority of citizens. Yet such measures were insufficient to deal with economic anomalies that were both deep and structural. The seeds of Montenegro’s economic chaos lay in doctrinal socialist economic planning, which dictated that industrial centers should be established in underdeveloped areas. Enterprises were often located where there existed almost no preconditions (except labor) that would facilitate the generation of sustainable profits. Such structural anomalies were compounded by the uncomfortable reality that those unsustainable enterprises were the republic’s largest employers. External factors played a part, too. Even comparatively competitive firms such as the Radoje Dakić machinery plant in Titograd (Podgorica) labored under the pressure of unpaid debts and nonrenewal of contracts with foreign companies.

By early 1988, the SKCG issued unambiguous statements warning that the public should make preparations for what it described as “harder times.” By midyear, it was estimated that Montenegro’s share of the overall Yugoslav debt of $17 billion stood at $1 billion, more than the republic’s annual revenues. By then, more than 20 percent of Montenegrins were living below the poverty line and in receipt of social welfare benefits, leading to a conflict between the discontented citizenry and politicians within the SKCG that, seemingly, did not have solutions to the crisis. The economic crisis incrementally, but steadily, undermined the legitimacy of the Yugoslav communist leadership. The toxic blend of harsh economic conditions, unemployment, and increasing poverty created the conditions within which revolutionary fervor incubated. The SKCG’s economic strategy had neither halted the downward spiral nor assuaged the resentment of disgruntled workers, many of whom were facing unemployment. Protests became increasingly widespread, as the gravity of the government’s austerity pro-
gram became evident. Their actions set off a chain of events during which the protests evolved from localized and low intensity demonstrations to a popular antigovernment movement.\textsuperscript{15}

But the problems manifest in Montenegro took place within a wider context of increased tension between Yugoslavia’s republics. Dissatisfaction with the SFRY’s inelasticity soon led to a rise in nationalist sentiment throughout the republics, primarily in Serbia, where Slobodan Milošević had ascended to power in December 1987, utilizing as his vehicle the issue of Serb and Montenegrin status in Kosovo. His objective was to overturn the 1974 constitution that, it was argued, was detrimental to Serbian interests. Seeking to eradicate the slightly chaotic system of “collective presidency” left behind by Tito, Milošević’s strategy was to control four of Yugoslavia’s eight federal presidency votes. To facilitate this, he replaced the leadership of Kosovo and Vojvodina and sought to install a pliable leadership in Montenegro. By early 1988, conditions were ripe for Milošević’s “antibureaucratic revolutionaries” to harness popular discontent as a means of facilitating the downfall of Montenegro’s ruling elite.\textsuperscript{16}

The protestors in Montenegro were not, however, a monolithic group of Serb nationalists, but concerned citizens encompassing all social strata.\textsuperscript{17} Nevertheless, seeking to channel the existing discontent, the Kosovo Serbs organized “meetings of truth” in Titograd, Nikšić, Andrijevica, Cetinje, and Kolašin. They took their meetings onto the streets on 7 October 1988 when they, and workers from Radoje Dakić and other failing enterprises, descended upon Titograd.\textsuperscript{18} An estimated crowd of 25,000 gathered outside the parliament building. Shaken by the size and militancy of the crowd, the communist leadership declared a state of emergency and issued the police with orders to break up the demonstrations.\textsuperscript{19} Early the next morning, police used batons and tear gas to disperse the demonstrators.\textsuperscript{20} Later that day, employees from the Boris Kidrić plant in Nikšić began their journey toward Titograd to join the demonstrations. Fearing an even larger gathering in the capital, the authorities ordered the blockade of the protestors coming from Nikšić, with the police violently dispersing the protestors at Žuta Greda, on the road between Nikšić and Titograd.\textsuperscript{21} As news of the incident reached the protestors outside parliament, the atmosphere darkened. A series of speakers from the SKCG attempted to pacify the crowd, but to no avail. The character of the protests had evolved, and the authorities were no longer dealing simply with expressions of economic discontent, but demands for social justice and, moreover, ethnic justice.\textsuperscript{22} Speaker after speaker was jeered by a crowd demanding their resignation. And it was not simply their incompetence in economic affairs that was being held to account, but their “anti-Serb” policy and their legitimacy as a government.\textsuperscript{23} The use of force against the demonstrators proved a significant error of judgment, undermining the moral authority of the leadership and making them appear oppressive and desperate to cling to power.\textsuperscript{24} In the Montenegrin assembly, a vote of
confidence was called, which despite passing did not inhibit the resignation of the government. An interim administration governed for a two-month period before eventually acquiescing to the demands of the protestors.

The antibureaucratic revolution appeared to achieve the aims of the protestors. In January 1989, the interim leadership was replaced by young elites under the influence, if not patronage, of Slobodan Milošević. Under the slogan “We know how! (Mi znamo kako!),” the new “young, handsome, and intelligent” troika of Momir Bulatović, Svetozar Marović, and Milo Đukanović (Bulatović being primus inter pares) attempted to cast themselves as a new generation with novel ideas. Lauded in the state-controlled media as the vanguard of the “Montenegrin Renaissance,” their leadership was portrayed as progressive. But while they promised much, they delivered little in the way of solutions to Montenegro’s real problems.

Youthful and politically inexperienced, they were perhaps more pliable than their rhetoric implied. The antibureaucratic revolution had, in essence, brought to power a generation of politicians who had mentors outside the republic. Having achieved their objective, many of the workers, students, and young rank-and-file communists (particularly those seeking democratic reforms) were to be disappointed. The “happening of the people” was, in reality, an internal coup within the SKCG, one supported rhetorically and logistically by Belgrade. It did not represent a revolution generated from without, but change from within the existing system.

Conflict soon emerged among the new leaders of the SKCG. Following the January events, consensus ended, as two competing strands emerged: the conservative and doctrinaire wing fixated on maintaining the status quo, and the progressive wing advocating democratic reform. A bitter internal struggle ensued, ending with the purging of the reformist forces within the SKCG. The now dominant conservative wing of the party paid lip service to democratic reform; indeed, at the last SKCG congress, held in April 1989, their members discussed the possibility of introducing a multiparty system. The conclusion that “more parties do not mean more democracy” was interpreted to mean that democracy could be exercised without a multiparty system, or that one party could remain dominant within such a system. Transferring the state party into a controlled democratic environment did not need to undermine the power of the doctrinaire, conservative forces, who could claim democratic legitimacy, maintain power within one party, and stem the growth of political alternatives.

In October 1990, the Montenegrin assembly passed legalization allowing for multiparty elections. This led to the creation of a plethora of small parties within the republic, none of which were strong enough to challenge the SKCG. By the end of 1990 there were 20 registered political parties in Montenegro. In the subsequent multiparty elections that took place, the SKCG (who had retained their name) won by a landslide, winning 83 of the 125 seats in parliament. The victory
ensured that the SKCG could consolidate its power base in the nascent democratic environment. In June 1991, six months after Djukanović formed his first government (becoming Europe’s youngest prime minister at the age of just 29), the party officially changed its name to the Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska partija socijalista [DPS]). The change was largely symbolic, as the structure of the SKCG remained mainly intact, with its offices, personnel, assets, and funds transferring smoothly to the DPS, the new nomenklatura party. The membership of the DPS was, more or less, the same as the SKCG—a broad stratum of Montenegrin society—bureaucrats, security services personnel, company directors, and Yugoslav Army veterans. In essence, the party comprised powerful individuals and interest groups that had an interest in maintaining, as best they could, control over political life. It was not a nationalist party by any means, and although many within the party were uncomfortable with aggressive Serb nationalism, they were ambivalent. After all, the majority within the DPS held a vested interest in preserving the SFRY. This objective was broadly shared by Montenegro’s Serb nationalist parties, except that their views on the level of Montenegro’s autonomy within Yugoslavia, in whatever form, diverged. The most moderate was the People’s Party of Montenegro (Narodna stranka Crne Gore [NS]), led by Novak Kilibarda, which broadly supported (at least at the time) a Serbian nationalist agenda. A split within the ranks of the party, however, led to the formation of the People’s Democratic Party (Narodna demokratska stranka [NDS]), a small party formed by more radical elements of the NS. But the rhetoric of both parties was mild in comparison to that of the Montenegrin branch of the Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka [SRS]). Collectively, these pro-Serb parties represented a significant force in Montenegrin politics and would have a considerable impact on events as the SFRY continued to disintegrate.

The “War for Peace”: The 1991 Dubrovnik Campaign

In the postelection period, Montenegrin politics was characterized by deepening divisions and the crisis surrounding the SFRY’s disintegration. Far from making progress on democratic reforms, Montenegro simply shifted from one form of closed society (communist) to another (nationalist). In the year following the 1990 elections, the DPS’s monopolistic role within Montenegrin political life was reminiscent of its “conservative” Communist party predecessors, as the state’s main assets were gradually put in the direct service of the ruling party. The DPS was, ideologically speaking, comparatively vacuous, a party primarily directed by the need to preserve vested interests. It adopted its stance toward the question of Montenegro’s status largely because it was supported by the bureaucracy and by serving and retired army officers. Moreover, limited room for maneuver and the presence of the Serb-controlled federal army and aggressively pro-Serb groups in Monte-
negro forced the rank and file to bend toward Belgrade.\footnote{38} The party claimed to represent the center ground between Montenegro’s two political poles, but events within the SFRY ensured that those inclined toward a pro-Serb position became increasingly ascendant.

The trajectory of Montenegrin politics was, then, determined by events elsewhere in the SFRY. Following multiparty elections in Croatia in April 1990, Franjo Tudjman (and some powerful and radical émigrés from the Croatian diaspora) came to power (see also ch. 7). Croatia’s Serbs, already suspicious of Croatia’s nationalist government, embarked upon a rebellion following the announcement of a new constitution which relegated Serbs to the status of a minority. In December 1990, the Krajina Serbs established the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina, and three months later declared the region’s separation from Croatia.\footnote{39} An organized rebellion soon turned into a full-scale war, and as conflict between Croatian police and Serb militia intensified around Knin and Eastern Slavonia during the summer of 1991, Serb nationalists in Montenegro warned that the Montenegrin public was increasingly endangered by a resurgent Croatian fascism, backed by the Fourth Reich, that is, the postreunification German republic.

The voices of those advocating war became increasingly ascendant; combative rhetoric and warnings of dire consequences for Montenegro had a significant impact throughout the course of 1991.\footnote{40} The Montenegrin government and the Yugoslav People’s Army’s (Jugoslovenska narodna armija – JNA) frequently warned of the need for Montenegro to defend its border with Croatia. But these warnings sounded hollow in the context of the Dubrovnik area, which bordered Montenegro. There was no Serb (or Montenegrin) minority there and the area, which had been demilitarized in 1971, possessed no army barracks. The Serbian authorities, however, were determined to incorporate Montenegro into the conflict in Croatia, thus giving the impression that military operations were not simply unilateral Serbian but wider Yugoslav actions. With the beleaguered Croats already in retreat in Eastern Slavonia, a strong second front would put them under further pressure; a thrust from Montenegrin units on Croatia’s southern border could quicken Croatia’s capitulation. However, justification for an attack would need to be carefully engineered. With this objective uppermost, the Montenegrin leadership set about informing the public of the darkest of scenarios, constructing a climate of fear that would help to shape the public mind.

In this regard, it was not difficult to create a sense of foreboding. After all, if Croatia were to secede from the SFRY, the Prevlaka side of the entrance to the Bay of Kotor (Boka Kotorska) would fall into Croat hands, making any Yugoslav naval vessels there vulnerable to attack.\footnote{41} The fishing industry, so important to Montenegro’s coastal economy, could also be detrimentally affected, with Croatia making claims of extended territorial waters.\footnote{42} Moreover, the towns nestling
along the shores of the bay might be threatened. Milo Djukanović, playing on these fears, stated that the current border had been designed by “semi-skilled Bolshevik cartographers” and that the time had come to “draw the demarcation lines vis-à-vis the Croats once and for all.” In a similar vein, the government utilized the state-owned daily Pobjeda to provide justifications for an attack on the Konavle region. The pages of the paper were abundant with anti-Croat propaganda, nationalist slogans such as “Prevlaka is ours! (Prevlaka je naša!),” and even stark warnings of genocidal Ustashe (Ustaše) amassing at the Debeli Brijeg border between Montenegro and Croatia. The paper’s editorials, as part of the War for Peace (Rat za mir) propaganda campaign, featured numerous high-profile politicians making their case for war. And it was in the paper that Svetozar Marović, Deputy President of the DPS, implied that, in order to defeat evil, Montenegrins must first perpetrate evil. On the eve of the Dubrovnik campaign, for example, Marović assured the Montenegrin public that it was impossible to secure peace in any other way, and it was sometimes necessary to control evil through force.

Framed, therefore, as a defensive war, Montenegrins were encouraged to think of themselves not as aggressors but as defenders of the SFRY, fighters against resurgent pan-European fascism, even liberators of Dubrovnik. A significant number eagerly volunteered to carry out their patriotic duty when a mobilization call was issued in September 1991. Some joined simply as volunteers (dobrovoljci), while others had to be drafted. Those who objected, or made it known that they had no wish to participate, were placed under immense strain. In an interview for Pobjeda, for example, Milo Djukanović warned that those reluctant to serve in the army should be subject to a law that would involve harsh punishment for deserters, more than simply “firing them from their jobs.” Bizarrely, given the imminent military campaign, Momir Bulatović declared—with no apparent sense of irony—that Montenegro was to be the world’s first ecological state. Days after, Montenegro’s troops crossed their border with Croatia, with, evidently, little regard for environmental matters.

The attack on Dubrovnik was facilitated by the mobilization of Montenegrin irregulars, who were placed within the framework of the JNA’s second operational unit. The latter’s motivations were driven by necessity. Indeed, for many professional soldiers, the collapse of the SFRY would dictate not just that they would lose the privileges that they had become accustomed to, but that the very ideological principles in which they had been schooled would be defeated. The JNA’s legitimacy and survival depended, therefore, on the SFRY continuing to exist. Together they rampaged through the Konavle region, descending upon Dubrovnik from two directions (from Trebinje in Hercegovina, and from the coastal road through Herceg Novi). Upon their arrival on Croatian territory they met almost no resistance, and none of the thousands of fanatical Ustashe were amassing on Montenegro’s border with Croatia (as the soldiers had been told).
With little in the way of resistance, the JNA and Montenegrin reservists swept through the prosperous region, looting and burning village after village, until they reached and occupied the small port of Čavtat near Dubrovnik. In late October, the assault on Dubrovnik began. It was to be military folly and a public relations disaster for the Montenegrins. Images of the “Pearl of the Adriatic” being shelled were transmitted across the world, creating controversy. Realizing, albeit belatedly, the potential damage that could be incurred, the JNA, Belgrade, and Titograd did their best to make their case, denying that the old town of Dubrovnik itself had been attacked and making claims that Croats had set alight rubber tires within the walls of the old town to give the impression that the UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) protected area had been shelled. The Montenegrin leadership, shaken by the course of events, sought to distance itself from the Dubrovnik campaign, doing its utmost to provide justifications for a conflict that was primarily perceived in Montenegro as a defense of the SFRY, not a campaign to establish the borders of a Greater Serbia. Increasingly, Bulatović and Djukanović detached themselves from parliamentary delegates who continued to support the war.

It was in this context that Bulatović then took a significant political gamble. During the Hague Conference, organized by the European Community (EC) and chaired by Lord Peter Carrington, he boldly took a decision that would strain the consensus between Titograd and Belgrade. The subsequent peace plan, known as the Carrington Plan, envisaged the SFRY becoming a loose association of independent states that would have the status of subjects under international law. The position that the Montenegrin leadership would adopt seemed clear. Uniformity with the Serbian line (which was to reject the plan) was, surely, a certainty. However, during a session in the Montenegrin parliament immediately prior to the conference in The Hague, Bulatović had been given the authority to make the decision himself. Electing, controversially, to accept the plan, Bulatović shocked the conference with his announcement that Montenegro would sign. The decision convulsed a Serbian leadership that did not expect such dissention from the Montenegrins. Neither was Bulatović’s decision fully approved in Montenegro. While Bulatović was in favor of accepting Carrington’s proposals, others, including Branko Kostić, the acting president of the SFRY (and a strong advocate of Serb-Montenegrin unity), were less so. Bulatović argued that acceptance of the Carrington Plan would make it possible for Montenegro to secure its own interests and the interests of others and put an end to the war (the scales may have been tipped by the prospect of a generous EC aid package worth several million dollars).

For many in Montenegro (and Serbia), Bulatović’s actions were nothing short of treachery. Upon his return, he attempted to persuade delegates in the Montenegrin assembly. Bulatović knew there existed strong reservations (par-
particularly among delegates from Berane [Ivangrad] and Andrijevica in northern Montenegro) but hoped that most DPS delegates in other municipalities would acknowledge the merits of his decision.54 Opinion appeared to turn sharply against him, and in an emergency session of the assembly, reactions to Bulatović’s signing of the draft document were overwhelmingly negative. A series of speakers, including Branko Kostić, the vice-president of the SFRY, denounced his decision. Pressure was also applied by Belgrade, where Bulatović was invited to attend meetings held with the sole objective of forcing him to reverse his decision.55 During the meetings, Milošević insisted on the insertion of a clause in the plan that would allow the republics who wished to remain in a federation to do so, thereby creating the possibility of a new federation of Serbia and Montenegro. After the Belgrade meetings, the Montenegrin leadership returned to Titograd for consultations, and upon their return to the Serbian capital, Bulatović (and Djukanović) agreed to the amendment. A variant of the SFRY (a “rump” Yugoslavia) could continue to exist if two or more republics wished to remain in federation. On 30 October 1991, Serbia and Montenegro proposed an amendment to the Carrington Plan that would allow for those states who did not wish to secede from Yugoslavia to establish a successor federal state.

Thus plans were made by elites in Serbia and Montenegro to establish the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Savezna republika Jugoslavija [SRJ]), comprising approximately 44 percent of the population and around 40 percent of the territory of the defunct SFRY.56 These plans were made public only two months before their realization; constitutional experts took only five days to write the new constitution. Milošević’s SPS played the key role, the DPS a secondary role.57 The public remained largely uninformed.58 Similarly, opposition parties were not consulted regarding the make-up of the new state, determining that the character of the state’s inception created the conditions for the gestation of dissatisfaction with the SRJ from its inception.59 Following his Hague debacle, Bulatović proposed a framework for the state-legal status of Montenegro within the SRJ. He consistently argued that there was “a minimum under which Montenegro cannot go” vis-à-vis their status within any new federation.60 He advocated a no chains, no passport (ni lanci, ni pasoši) position, a compromise between virtual subordination by Serbia and outright independence. Initially, he advocated a confederal model that envisaged the SRJ possessing a single market, single currency, unitary monetary policy, foreign policy which would allow separate consular representations, and joint defense system, albeit with a degree of autonomy. But the subsequent negotiations with the Serbian leadership bore little fruit, and his vain attempts were dubbed his Second Hague (Drugi Hag). Bulatović was not negotiating from a position of strength; the SPS was not, after all, receptive to the idea of the equal status of Montenegro within the SRJ.61
In order for the new state to be realized, the Montenegrins would need to rubber stamp the idea through the mechanism of a referendum. Held on 1 March 1992, it would pave the way for the establishment of the SRJ. The process was somewhat flawed. The Montenegrin government adopted the Law on Referendum only a week before the vote, limiting public debate significantly. The opposition did their best to highlight what they argued was the undemocratic character of the referendum process, but the homogenized press and the campaigning of the DPS ensured an uneven playing field. The opposition, already dismayed by the Dubrovnik campaign, organized rallies to oppose the creation of the SRJ, to agitate against it, and to highlight what they argued would likely be Montenegro’s subservient role within it. The opposition was from different spheres (journalists, writers, intellectuals, ordinary citizens) and had engaged in antiwar protests and civil resistance, and its de facto leader was the leader of the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (Liberalni savez Crne Gore [LSCG]), Slavko Perović. His party’s explicit aim was to establish an independent state based upon “European values,” but the main target of Perović’s rhetoric was the Montenegrin government, which, he argued, was collaborating with Milošević’s SPS in the debasement of Montenegro. Consequently, Perović—and other opposition leaders—became frequent targets of state-controlled media, which waged a relentless campaign against them. Nevertheless, opposition rallies in Cetinje and Titograd attracted big crowds, who listened to speeches expressing opposition to both the military engagement in Croatia and the establishment of the SRJ. Counterdemonstrations in support of the creation of the new state in front of the Montenegrin parliament in Titograd were demonstrative of the deep divisions which the issue had intensified, although it was the supporters of the new state that were given cause to celebrate in the subsequent referendum.

The referendum result was seemingly comprehensive. An overwhelming number of Montenegrins voted to preserve union with Serbia (95.7 percent). But the legitimacy of the referendum was brought into question by the relatively low turnout of 66 percent. The LSCG, the key opposition party, denounced the referendum as a fraud, with similar sentiments being echoed by ethnic Muslim and Albanian parties. Momir Bulatović rejected these arguments, insisting that the referendum result could not be disputed. The formation of the SRJ was, he argued, celebrated by many Montenegrin citizens, and thus the creation of the state was not generally perceived as an imposition by the majority of the citizens of the republic. But the nature of the process and the undemocratic character of the referendum ensured that problems would soon emerge. Both Montenegrin government officials and the opposition disagreed with a number of aspects of the creation of the SRJ. While most delegates from the ruling DPS recognized the need for unity with Serbia, the opposition dismissed the SRJ constitution scornfully as the “Žabljak Constitution” after the town where the nomenklatura had
met in order to create the state. They argued that it was an unequal construction, flawed from inception, and that the SRJ was dysfunctional in that it comprised two federal units of disproportionate scale, population, and economic interests. Within such a structure, the smaller unit would be at a distinct disadvantage. Even within the DPS, some expressed fears that the SRJ structure did not sufficiently protect Montenegrin interests.

Tension in the Montenegrin Sandžak

The SRJ was created as war in Bosnia-Hercegovina began. In the border areas between Montenegro and Bosnia, tensions between Serbs/Montenegrins and Muslims increased, with the most serious manifestations in Pljevlja in the Montenegrin portion of the Sandžak. By April 1992, the town had become a place of fear for Muslims. Increasingly, violence and intimidation were meted out by both local extremists and paramilitary groups from Montenegro and Serbia. Foremost among these was a collection of small paramilitary formations brought together by, and under the command of, Milika Čeko Dačević, an SRS activist in Pljevlja. Acting on the dubious pretext that they were protecting local Serbs from aggressive, armed Muslim “fundamentalists,” his men began a cleansing operation of Pljevlja. Muslim workers would be sacked from local enterprises and Muslim businesses would be boycotted. If this was not sufficient to persuade Muslims to pack their bags, their property and businesses would then be attacked. The final phase would involve both psychological and, perhaps, physical violence. Seeking to justify these actions, Dačević claimed that tensions in the town had been fuelled by Muslims who “wanted to avoid paying taxes.” Numerous reports collated by human rights groups, however, suggest Dačević’s men incited the violence without pretext, harassing the Muslim community, subjecting them to random acts of violence, and looting their homes and businesses. These incidents went largely unreported; and while not sanctioned by the Montenegrin government, they largely went unpunished. Their lack of action was underpinned by what they believed were well-founded suspicions that Muslims were arming themselves in preparation for insurrection with the aim of creating an independent Sandžak. In June, for example, Montenegrin police in the coastal town of Herceg Novi arrested ten people who they claimed were part of a smuggling ring that engaged in trafficking arms from Croatia to the Sandžak.

But authorities in Montenegro were forced to take a more serious interest in events in Pljevlja after the situation there worsened dramatically. Following the arrest of Dačević by local police, his militia attempted to take control of Pljevlja, cutting off communications, occupying the radio station, and blocking roads into the town. With the darkest of scenarios possible, Belgrade and Podgorica sought to defuse the crisis. Despite the best attempts of the Montenegrin authorities to
play down the events, it was deemed sufficiently serious for the president of the SRJ, Dobrica Ćosić, and Momir Bulatović to visit the town in an attempt to find a resolution. They sought guarantees from local Muslim leaders that they would not “continue to seek autonomy,” but such was the fear among Muslims in Pljevlja, that no one dared utter the word. Satisfied that they had achieved their objective, they left giving assurances that Muslims would be protected, although they reiterated that Sandžak would receive no special status within the SRJ.

However, the fate of the village of Bukovica, near Pljevlja nestled on the border between Montenegro and Bosnia, and one of numerous Muslim-inhabited villages in the area, was demonstrative of the inability of Ćosić and Bulatović to rein in the paramilitaries. On 1 July 1992, the village was attacked. Many, with nowhere else to go, headed for Pljevlja, despite the events that had previously taken place there. Moreover, the anti-Muslim violence was not limited to the Pljevlja municipality or to the areas bordering eastern Bosnia. In July, following an increase in violent incidents throughout Serbia and Montenegro, Harun Hadžić, the leader of the Montenegrin branch of the SDA, appealed to Bulatović to personally guarantee the security of Montenegrin Muslims who, Hadžić claimed, had been subjected to attacks in Bijelo Polje, Berane, Nikšić, and Podgorica. By September, the Sandžak SDA estimated that 70,000 Muslims had fled the region in the face of military terror from the 29,000 Serbian and Montenegrin reservist troops stationed in the Sandžak (though these figures may be inflated). To some extent this was a bidirectional process, with some Muslim refugees from Bosnia being resettled in those predominantly Muslim municipalities in Montenegro. In May 1992, for example, hundreds of refugees, mostly women and children, from the town of Foča were taken by bus to Rožaje, with another several hundred arriving from Trebinje soon after. The impact on the communities who hosted refugees was significant; they were a strain on resources in areas already economically devastated. Attacks by paramilitary groups were the exception rather than the norm in Montenegro. In February 1993, however, a notorious group of Serb paramilitaries from Višegrad known as the Avengers (Osvetnici) and led by Milan Lukić and Oliver Krismanović, walked into the Štrpci train station in Bosnia (nestled on the border between Bosnia and Montenegro) and demanded that train No. 671 Lovćen en route to Bar from Belgrade be stopped. As the train was brought to a halt, a number of Lukić’s group entered the train, identified and removed 19 citizens of the SRJ (18 Muslims and 1 Croat) from it, and spirited them across the border to Višegrad, where they were subsequently murdered.

Yet despite the fact that Muslims were the primary victims, fear of Muslim insurrection, justified or not, still prevailed. Thus in January 1994, during Operation Lim, twenty-six members of the Montenegrin Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratska akcije [SDA]), among them Harun Hadžić, the leader of the party, were arrested by the Montenegrin police, albeit without for-
mal charge. Known as The Bijelo Polje Group, they were charged with conspiring to undermine the territorial integrity of the SRJ by clandestinely organizing the forceful secession of the Sandžak. The trial took place in a highly charged, emotive, and politicized context; the war in neighboring Bosnia was raging and news of Muslim atrocities against Serbs increased hostility toward Muslims. At the conclusion of the trial, and after a series of controversies including a hunger strike by the accused, 21 members of the Montenegrin SDA were sentenced to a total of 87 years imprisonment. Those imprisoned included Harun Hadžić, the Montenegrin SDA leader. Those imprisoned were subsequently pardoned by the republic’s president, Momir Bulatović, in 1996, following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), which brought the 1992-95 Bosnian war to an end. By then, however, the political landscape in Montenegro was on the brink of dramatic change. In early 1997, intra-elite conflicts within the ranks of the DPS inexorably led to a split that would fundamentally alter the dynamics of Montenegrin politics and have significant consequences for the relationship between Bosniak Muslims and the Montenegrin state. Milo Đukanović, who would become one of the central figures in the coming political crisis, had long been suspected of secessionist tendencies by pro-Serb parties and the pro-Serb faction within the DPS. As prime minister, he had always been pragmatic, and he had already sought to give the impression that he would proactively work to improve the situation for Bosniaks in the Pljevlja area by giving assurances that his government would endeavor to develop the economic infrastructure of the Bukovica region and open a new police station in the area to improve the security situation. By then, of course, Đukanović had already begun plotting his break with Bulatović and Milošević, and his flirtation with Bosniak leaders (whose support he would later need) predated the crisis that would engulf the DPS.

The subsequent split was personified by the conflict between Bulatović and Đukanović. While Montenegrins inclined towards defining themselves as Serbs rallied behind Bulatović, Montenegro’s Muslim and Albanian communities became crucial political allies for Đukanović, particularly during and after his presidential election campaign in late 1997, when he needed to secure their support. It did not seem to be a significant factor that Đukanović had been prime minister during the events in Pljevlja and during the period in May 1992, when Bosnian Muslim refugees (mainly from the Foča area in eastern Bosnia) were arrested in Herceg Novi, Pljevlja, Ulcinj, and Podgorica before being handed over to the Bosnian Serb authorities, whereupon they were killed. He was, in the view of the Bosniak Muslim population, the lesser of two evils. And as a consequence of their support for his endeavors, Đukanović brought Bosniak Muslims back from the political margins. Moreover, the key rhetorical cornerstone of the Đukanović-led government was the emphasis on historically stable interethic relations between Orthodox Montenegrins and Muslims, drawing on the period
of King Nikola, who had done much to integrate minorities into the Montenegrin state after territorial expansion and recognition of its independence following the Congress of Berlin in 1878. And the new coalition offered a mutually beneficial compromise for the subsequent Djukanović-led government and Montenegro’s Bosniaks. Overwhelmingly backing Djukanović’s DPS in the parliamentary elections of 1997, the minority vote ensured that the streamlined DPS retained power.

Djukanović’s “Volte Face” and the 1997 DPS Split

By the mid-1990s, however, the relationship between ruling elites in Serbia and Montenegro had become increasingly strained. Djukanović—not for the last time—sensed which way the wind was blowing. Assessing that Milošević’s time may be nigh, he opted to attempt to ensure his own political survival by denouncing him. The opportunity came in the wake of the Serbian elections in late 1996, during which opposition parties had accused the Serbian president of electoral fraud. As protests in Serbia, known as the Together (Zajedno) escalated, some within the DPS observed with interest. Initially cautious, they issued ambiguous statements declaring themselves in favor of recognizing the will of the electorate in Serbia. Such fudged statements indicated that all was not well within DPS ranks. Clear splits were emerging, as the three key actors within the DPS (Momir Bulatović, Milo Djukanović, and the vice-president of the DPS, Svetozar Marović) became increasingly divided. While Bulatović threw his support behind Milošević, Djukanović and Marović saw an opportunity to exploit the Serbian president’s weakness. For Milo Djukanović, in particular, this was a matter of both personality and politics. His relationship with Slobodan Milošević had been strained since late 1993, and his sparring with Milošević’s wife, Mira Marković, had increasingly made him persona non grata with Serbia’s most powerful political family. Djukanović had criticized Mira Marković’s Yugoslav United Left (Jugoslovenska udružena levica [JUL]) as a party “devoted to an ideologically retrograde and abstract society.” Marković responded by accusing Djukanović of being a “smuggler employed as a prominent politician.”

Personal matters aside, the fuse was lit by Djukanović’s implicit support for the Zajedno coalition-led anti-Milošević protests taking place throughout Serbia in the wake of the alleged electoral fraud. But while Djukanović’s early statements may only have implied support for the protestors, he was more explicit in his public pronouncement that Milošević was a spent force. As the Zajedno protests in Belgrade and other Serbian cities were shaking the foundations of the Milošević regime, Djukanović selected his moment, publicly declaring his opposition to Milošević, and leaving little space for ambiguity or misinterpretation. Utilizing the widely read Belgrade political weekly Vreme as the forum for his calculated swipe at the Serbian president, Djukanović boldly asserted that Milošević was an
“obsolete politician” who lacked “the ability to form a strategic vision of the problems this country is facing.” Milošević wasted little time in striking back. An orchestrated campaign by media under his control portrayed Djukanović as an amoral opportunist, a criminal, and a lynchpin in lucrative cigarette smuggling (an accusation that would haunt him for years to come) who was betraying Montenegrins. Undeterred, Djukanović subsequently sent a letter of support to the students in Belgrade who were the bulwark of the anti-Milošević protests, thereby willingly intensifying the conflict with Milošević. In this context, the DPS leadership had to take a position. Montenegro’s president, Momir Bulatović, calculated that Milošević would overcome the crisis; he chose not to follow the same path, while Djukanović gambled on the contrary. This was, therefore, not only a split between a faction of the ruling elite in Podgorica and the ruling elite in Belgrade, but also an open conflict within the upper echelons of the DPS.

The DPS split was personified by the growing bitterness between Djukanović and Bulatović. Close friends since their days in the communist youth, they had risen through the ranks together, had enjoyed a close friendship (they were neighbors in Podgorica’s well-heeled Gorica district), and had remained united during the difficult years of the Croatian (1991-95) and Bosnian (1992-95) wars. However, while Bulatović was participating in EC and International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) conferences, Djukanović was running the Montenegrin economy following the imposition of UN sanctions, facilitating the payment of state pensions, and attempting to limit the ravages. Bulatović, aware of the methods being utilized, often referred to Djukanović as a “magician.”

Djukanović’s controversial comments convulsed the DPS. Publicly, however, the party retained a visage of unity, with senior party officials emphasizing that although there may have been disagreements between Djukanović and Milošević, there was no conflict within the DPS itself. Despite the rhetoric of unity, however, a division was becoming increasingly manifest, and by March 1997 the party was in crisis. As intraparty tensions increased, Djukanović continued to court controversy—continuing the anti-Milošević rhetoric and referring to the SRJ as the “so-called” federation. Relations had become so strained that on 24 March, during the first DPS main board meeting since Djukanović’s Vreme interview, a vote was called that would ultimately determine the future direction of the party. Ostensibly arranged to discuss matters pertaining to wider political, economic, and social issues in Montenegro and the SRJ, the meeting instead became a debate on the implications of Djukanović’s actions. The direction of the
discussions demonstrated that the majority of senior members of the DPS were unconvinced of the wisdom of generating an open confrontation with Belgrade. Consequently, Djukanović was criticized by a number of his colleagues for his *Vreme* interview and Bulatović decided that the time for a showdown had come. Following lengthy discussion and argument, the main board voted. Bulatović’s pro-Milošević stance was convincingly confirmed. Sixty voted in favor, seven voted against, and 22 delegates abstained. This was seemingly an overwhelming endorsement and suggested a confirmation of Bulatović’s strength within the DPS (and the continuation of the party’s pro-Belgrade position). Djukanović, however, argued that the debate was conducted in such a way that delegates had been persuaded by the argument that Momir was for Yugoslavia while Djukanović was against Yugoslavia.

However, of the seven who voted for Djukanović and amidst those who had abstained were some of the most powerful individuals in Montenegrin politics. Crucially, Vukašin Maraš, the chief of Montenegrin state security (*Služba državne bezbjednosti* [SDB]) and Svetozar Marović both backed Djukanović. Both men would be factors in convincing wavering DPS members that the party’s interests were best served by distancing themselves from Milošević’s regime. An intense internal party power struggle ensued, both factions endeavoring to convince DPS members to support them and to take control of the state-controlled media—*Pobjeda* (the sole Montenegrin daily at the time) and Radio Television Montenegro (*Radio televizija Crne Gore* [RTCG]). Djukanović, however, applied significant pressure on those deemed pliable, breaking down most of those who had initially voted against him, and succeeding in building a powerful coalition of the key individuals with significant establishment interests. Djukanović had, therefore, wrested control of the party in advance of the second crucial meeting of the DPS Main Board. That meeting, held on 11 July 1997, was the last time that they would meet as a single unit. The majority, albeit a slim one, had confirmed Djukanović’s ascendancy. The two factions of the DPS now claimed ownership of the party while seeking to consolidate their respective power bases. Djukanović’s faction entered into an anti-Milošević front with the Social Democratic Party (*Socijaldemokratska partija* [SDP]), LSCP, SDA, and NS (among others), while Bulatović sought to strengthen his relationship with the SNS and Milošević’s SPS. Power blocs established, both Djukanović and Bulatović sought to win the presidency.

The subsequent campaign was a continuation of the bitter political struggle that had split the DPS. Djukanović was confirmed as the party’s official candidate for the presidential elections (although both he and Bulatović ran as DPS candidates). Of the 21 municipalities in Montenegro, the Djukanović wing controlled 16, while Bulatović and his bloc, although he could rely on additional rhetorical and logistical support from Serbia, controlled only 5. During the
campaign, Bulatović sought to portray himself as an ordinary guy who would appeal to middle- and lower-ranking members of the DPS and the older generations.\textsuperscript{111} Utilizing the rhetoric of his communist past, he defined himself as the binary opposite of Djukanović, whom he portrayed as a scheming capitalist whose primary objective was to separate Montenegrins from their “brothers” in Serbia. Djukanović, meanwhile, sought to portray himself as a modern, progressive reformer—an image that, despite obvious shortcomings, was nurtured by Western governments.\textsuperscript{112} Consequently, then, Bulatović and Djukanović’s support appealed to two groups: the former’s supporters were largely older, less educated voters from the north of Montenegro or the republic’s rural areas, while the latter’s were predominantly younger, urban, and educated.\textsuperscript{113} The campaign was, moreover, cast by Djukanović as a struggle between two fundamental positions: defenders of a conservative, orthodox, and anti-European politics and advocates of a more pro-European, progressive, and democratic politics. But the division between the pro-European and traditionalist positions manifested itself as a conflict not only between value systems but also between the advocates of preserving the SRJ and those of Montenegrin independence.\textsuperscript{114}

In any event, the result turned out to be exceptionally close. In the first round Bulatović was victorious, winning by a narrow margin of only 2,200 votes with a 67 percent turnout. It was not a result decisive enough to deliver a final victory. With a second round of voting required, Djukanović’s electoral team embarked upon an energetic pre-election house-to-house campaign that brought significant results. Consequently, Djukanović won the vote in the key municipality of Nikšić, while improving his share of the vote in other municipalities. The overall winners in each municipality remained as in the first vote, with Djukanović winning majorities in Kotor, Ulcinj, Plav, Cetinje, Bar, Rožaje, and Tivat, while Bulatović retained the traditionally conservative and Serb-oriented municipalities of Berane, Pljevlja, Bijelo Polje, and Herceg Novi (the latter being the only coastal municipality won by Bulatović).\textsuperscript{115} The final margin was narrow, with Djukanović gaining 5,884 votes more than Bulatović, who immediately cried foul. He and his supporters claimed that there were serious irregularities during the election process, citing intimidation of members of the electoral commission and Western pressure as examples.\textsuperscript{116} The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) rejected these accusations, claiming that the final results accurately reflected the will of the electorate.\textsuperscript{117} Minor protests by Bulatović’s supporters took place in front of the Montenegrin parliament and Milošević, for his part, tightened the noose around Montenegro, closing the SRJ’s common border with Albania and imposing a de facto blockade on the border between Serbia and Montenegro.\textsuperscript{118} Bulatović continued to question the legitimacy of the result.\textsuperscript{119}

On the eve of Djukanović’s inauguration, Bulatović assembled his supporters in Podgorica. It was a return to the politics of the streets, a method used to
devastating effect during the antibureaucratic revolution of 1988 and 1989. Initially, the protests were peaceful, but on the evening of the inauguration a peaceful walk descended into violence. As the protesters moved from the Assembly to the government building, tensions rose dramatically. An attempt to storm the government building was halted by police, who used tear gas to quell the increasingly violent demonstration. The police intervention had ensured that a bloody showdown was averted, and in the cold light of morning, both sides blamed each other for the chaos. Bulatović, increasingly on the defensive, described events as “a brutal police intervention against the citizens who were protesting because of the theft of the elections.” Thus, far from achieving their objective, the demonstrations turned out to be counterproductive for Bulatović. Djukanović was inaugurated as president on 14 January 1998, the day after the protests.

The Djukanović faction of the DPS consolidated its position of strength in the immediate weeks and months. The opposition was shaken by its failure to overthrow the government; support for Bulatović was receding and the pro-Milošević political bloc was in turmoil. Seizing the opportunity presented by the spirit of the times, Djukanović made preparations for the parliamentary elections. But first, his faction wanted to ensure that it retained the DPS brand. As the ruling party in Montenegro since 1990, the party name carried weight. Retaining the name would provide both continuity and legitimacy—critical in such a period of flux. The faction that could retain the original party name of DPS might be perceived by the public to be the legitimate successor to the previously monolithic version of the party. Both factions coveted the DPS brand, but the High Court of Montenegro ruled that Bulatović’s DPS must give up its claim on the party name. As a result, on 21 March 1998 the pro-Serbian faction, led by Momir Bulatović and members of the powerful and influential Podgorica Lobby (former high-profile DPS members who for years had been critical toward Djukanović), formed the Socialist People’s Party (Socijalistička narodna partija Crne Gore [SNP]). The new party relied heavily on supporters from towns in the north of Montenegro and rural areas and largely comprised individuals from a lower social and educational strata. Its core rallying call was the preservation of the SRJ and the defeat of the Djukanović-led “separatists.”

A more cautious, if ambiguous, platform was adopted by the new DPS. Initially, Djukanović remained cautious of aligning himself too closely with pro-independence parties, whose agenda he deemed too radical (particularly that of the LSCG, who would contest the elections independently). Instead, he maintained close links with Zoran Djindjić’s Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka [DS]), and created an alliance with the SDP and the (traditionally) pro-Serb NS, under the banner of “For a Better Life (Da živimo bolje [DŽB]).” Although this awarded Djukanović’s DPS and the DŽB coalition with an aura of being pan-Yugoslav, it created a division within the NS. Many high-profile members of the party re-
fused to work with the “separatist Milo Djukanović.” But at this stage there was no openly pro-independence position being advocated by the DPS. Indeed, Djukanović seemingly affirmed his commitment to Montenegro’s role within the SRJ, and was careful not to express explicit aspirations for Montenegrin independence (as doing so, at this stage, would be overtly risky). Instead, he continued to rhetorically support existing SRJ structures, while simultaneously emphasizing the Montenegrin government’s inability to cooperate with the Milošević regime. In this, Djukanović drew significant support from those favoring independence for Montenegro and the republic’s minorities. Given their negative experience in the early 1990s, many of these minorities (particularly Muslims and Albanians) deeply distrusted Bulatović, and they perceived the SRJ to be Milošević’s construction within which their rights were not sufficiently protected. The DŽB victory in the parliamentary elections, held in May 1998, demonstrated that the majority had supported Djukanović, and they were to be a key factor in the outcome of the elections.

The Kosovo Crisis and the NATO Bombing of Yugoslavia

Relations between the DPS and Milošević’s SPS continued to worsen following the May 1998 elections, with two key issues determinant. The first was the subsequent election of Momir Bulatović as the president of the SRJ, a development strongly opposed by Djukanović and his allies within the DPS. The second, however, represented an existential threat. While attempts were being made to distance Montenegro from the crisis in Kosovo, Montenegro, by accident or design, was incrementally drawn in (see also ch. 9). By the late summer of 1998, refugees were already streaming over the border from Kosovo to Montenegro, with the majority of those concentrated in the towns of Plav and Gusinje, near the Prokletije mountain range on the border with both Kosovo and Albania. As one of Montenegro’s poorest regions, residents there were ill equipped to provide support to the refugees. Endemic underfunding and the hosting of refugees from previous conflicts (in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina) had taken a heavy toll upon the already strained social and economic infrastructure.

As the crisis in Kosovo threatened to escalate into war, pitting the SRJ against NATO, the Montenegrin government sought to distance itself, declaring neutrality and advocating dialogue with Kosovo Albanians in conjunction with the European Union (EU). But continued military actions by Serb forces and retaliations by the nascent Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës [UÇK/KLA]) were driving Serbia (and thus the SRJ) into possible military conflict with NATO, which had warned Milošević to halt military activity in Kosovo. As the rhetoric sharpened and the crisis escalated, the Montenegrin authorities became acutely aware that despite their self-proclaimed neutrality,
Montenegro was home to strategic military sites that would be targeted as part of any NATO bombing campaign. Indeed, while the subsequent NATO bombing of Yugoslavia had significantly less impact in Montenegro than in Serbia, the internal situation in Montenegro steadily worsened as a result.

In the early days of the 78-day bombing, the refugee crisis intensified. The continuing flow of refugees, numbering 80,000 (over 10 percent of Montenegro’s total population), put a considerable strain on the economy, while threatening to destabilize the delicate ethnic and social balance in the eastern parts of the Montenegrin Sandžak. As NATO bombs began to fall on Montenegro, Djukanović’s government was placed under significant pressure. He appealed to NATO leaders to halt bombing operations in Montenegro on the basis that it could threaten to destabilize the republic. Additionally, he met with religious leaders in Montenegro, appealing to them to help calm the increasing tensions. Djukanović also appealed to the special envoy of the EU, Wolfgang Petrisch (who visited Montenegro to assess the situation), to help stop the bombing and renew the negotiating process in Kosovo.

Targeting Montenegro had only served to intensify internal political and social tensions. This was ominously manifested by a tense standoff between the Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslavije [VJ]) and the 7th Battalion (formally a unit of the Yugoslav Army, although constituted primarily of SNP members) on one side, and the Montenegrin police on the other. SNP and pro-Serb party members, generally excluded from joining the police, took matters into their own hands, many joining the 7th Battalion. Indeed, because Montenegro did not possess its own army, Djukanović strengthened the Montenegrin police force to around 20,000 loyal policemen. The new force consisted of individuals who had left the federal army, DPS loyalists, and a number of Muslims and Albanians, who supported Djukanović in the wake of the DPS split. The police force subsequently became increasingly militarized, evolving into an army in all but name. There were also a number of quasi-military structures operating throughout Montenegrin territory. The Lovćen Guard, a paramilitary group located in Cetinje, self-proclaimed defenders of Montenegrin statehood, vowed to defend Montenegro from aggression.

Awash with arms, Montenegro was on the brink. There were a number of scenarios in which a single shot would have facilitated chaos. In the areas of Debeli Brijeg on the Montenegrin-Croatian border and in Cetinje, the VJ added to the sense of crisis by erecting roadblocks and restricting movement between the hinterland and the coast. Within hours, protestors gathered outside the town’s municipality building, demonstrating against the roadblocks. When the VJ attempted to enter the town, a tense standoff between them and local militia began. The apprehension of three citizens by the VJ almost turned into an armed rebellion by the militia, the police, and ordinary citizens of Cetinje. Although
a peaceful resolution was found (the VJ ceased their attempts to enter the town), the incident was indicative of the growing tensions throughout Montenegro. Tension was palpable in Podgorica, where fears of a military coup were intensifying, fueled by statements emanating from Belgrade.\textsuperscript{135} While tensions ran high, a military coup against the Montenegrin government did not materialize. But problems intensified in the north of Montenegro, as the Albanian refugees (many of whom had returned to Kosovo) were replaced by Serb and Montenegrin refugees fleeing reprisals by angry Albanian returnees. Many northern Montenegrin towns (in particular Andrijevica, Rožaje, and Berane) were placed under significant pressure. But, holistically, the Montenegrin government’s policy toward refugees from different ethnic groups appeared to vindicate their claim that “new” Montenegro was a state that was a tolerant one that respected human and minority rights

The NATO campaign ended on 10 June, following the signing of a peace deal (known as the Military Technical Agreement) in Kumanovo, Macedonia. Milošević’s capitulation after 78 days of bombing dictated that Montenegro survived the war, despite the many risks and potential for open conflict.\textsuperscript{136} In the wake of the NATO campaign, the DPS consolidated its position as the dominant force in Montenegrin politics, while Djukanović visited the capitals of Western Europe and the US, making his case for greater independence for Montenegro. As a means of achieving this, the Montenegrin government created its own foreign service (which operated from Slovenia), headed by the former Yugoslav diplomat, Branko Lukovac. The assertion of greater independence from the SRJ came in the economic sphere, too. Montenegro adopted the Deutschmark (and later the Euro) and abolished the existing visa and customs regimes, in an attempt to attract greater Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). But tension between Belgrade and Podgorica remained acute. Incidents involving the 7th Battalion and a blockade of the Serb-Montenegrin border and a revision of the SRJ’s constitution (which the Montenegrin government opposed) demonstrated that Belgrade continued in its attempt to subvert the political situation in Montenegro. Serious escalation was avoided, but relations between Podgorica and Belgrade remained at a low. In the wake of the overthrow of Milošević following the 5 October demonstrations in Serbia, the party’s emboldened leadership adopted an explicit position and implemented policies vis-à-vis Montenegro’s independence, which would eventually be realized in 2006.

\textbf{Conclusion: On the Road to Independence}

While Montenegro avoided war on its own territory, the impact of the collapse of the SFRY was significant. Indeed, the tumultuous events of the 1990s created a context within which Montenegro’s independence became possible.\textsuperscript{137} The broad consensus within Montenegro’s ruling elite in 1990 had become increasingly
strained by the Dubrovnik campaign in 1991 and the establishment of the SRJ in 1992. While intra-DPS unity (and unity between ruling elites in Serbia and Montenegro) was maintained until the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in December 1995, it became increasingly evident that such a consensus was coming to an end. Divergent opinions regarding Montenegro’s position within the SRJ and its continuing support for the Milošević regime eventually led to the cathartic split within the DPS—an event that represented a key turning point in Montenegro’s modern political history. Montenegrin politics in the late 1990s was defined by the split within the DPS and the subsequent bifurcation of former political allies. Thereafter, Montenegrin politics was defined not simply by a pro- or anti-Milošević dynamic, but by the issue of statehood. In the struggles that followed, political forces realigned. The Djukanović-led DPS consolidated its power and began its evolution toward an explicitly pro-independence party (marginalizing the LSCG—the genuine party of Montenegrin independence—in the process). During the 1990s, therefore, the DPS began its evolution into the party that would chart a course toward independence. Indeed, Montenegro was, in many respects, de facto independent of the SRJ by the end of the decade, regardless of the change of government in Serbia in October 2000. Despite entering into an agreement to create the joint state of Serbia and Montenegro (Srbija i Crna Gora [SCG]) in March 2002, the Montenegrin government’s pledge to continued union with Serbia lacked commitment. The issue of statehood dominated Montenegrin politics in the period following Milošević’s fall, with momentum toward a referendum on independence inexorable.

Notes


2 The terms “Green” and “White” are used to describe opponents of unification with Serbia (or at least the character of that unification) and supporters of unification with Serbia, respectively. As a result of the 1918 Podgorica Assembly, Montenegro was absorbed into Serbia before the unification of South Slavs in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Delegates voted on green- or white-colored cards, depending upon their preference. For an excellent analysis of the Tito-Stalin split and its domestic consequences see Ivo Banac, With Stalin against Tito: Conformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).


Roberts, *Realm of the Black Mountain*, 432. In his insightful study of the antibureaucratic revolutions, Nebojša Vladislavjević argues that the degree of control asserted by Milošević might be overstated. While 1989 was a coup, it was achieved largely as a consequence of genuine mass protest and the fact that the leadership was discredited. See Nebojša Vladislavjević, *Serbia’s Antibureacratic Revolution: Milošević, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008).


Ibid.


This event was mythologized by the Serbian media and through the use of the gusle, the traditional musical instrument played by the Serbs (although its usage is not limited to Serbs). The Montenegrin gusle player, Vojo Radosinović, and the poet, Žarko Šobić composed a piece called Twilight of the Gods at Žuta Greda (*Sumrak bogova kod Žute grede*). According to Žanić, “the pro-Milošević media assigned the event almost mythic dimensions, turning it into a propaganda core for the preparation of a new, violent attempt to take power in Podgorica, which succeeded in January 1989.” See Ivo Žanić, *Flag on the Mountain: A Political Anthropology of War in Bosnia and Croatia* (London: Saqi Books, 2007), 93–94.

Ibid., 101.


27 Ibid., 27.

28 Andrijašević and Raštoder, _History of Montenegro_, 261.

29 Milan Andrejevich, “Montenegro Follows its Own Course,” _RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe_, 22 November 1991, 27. In the same report, Milan Andrejevich notes that the change of leadership was perceived in some circles to represent a revival of the Montenegrin national movement of the late 1960s.


31 Roberts, _Realm of the Black Mountain_, 435.


38 Čagorović, “Montenegrin Identity,” 133–34.

39 See Jovan Ilić, “Srbi u Hrvatskoj pre i posle raspada jugoslavije,” _Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke_ (Belgrade) no.120 (2006), 235-70. The rebellion was staged by the Croatian branch of the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka—SDS), whose support was among rural Serbs, not among the majority of Serbs in Croatia that inhabited Croatian cities.


41 James Gow, _The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries_ (London: Hurst, 2003), 64.


44 _Pobjeda_ and RTCG, the long-time political partners of the political establishment, became, even in the changed social circumstances—the so-called transition—an extended arm of the regime. Unaccustomed to free, critical opinion, public debate, and truth, they were to become perfect instruments of political will in the critical period of Yugoslav disintegration. For an excellent analysis of the character of regional media in the early
1990s, see Mark Thompson, *Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina* (London: Article 19, 1994).


47 Interview with Milo Đukanović in *Pobjeda* (Titograd), 18 September 1991, quoted in Srdja Pavlović, *Rat za mir* (Podgorica: Obala Production Company, 2004). The newspaper *Pobjeda* also published the names of “deserters” within its pages. As the Dubrovnik campaign continued, however, the JNA stopped releasing figures for Montenegrin desertions as they were too high and publishing them was deemed bad for morale. See Christopher Bennett, *Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse* (London: Hurst, 1996), 213.


49 For a detailed account of these events see Helsinki odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiju, *Rat za mir* (Belgrade: Biblioteka svedočanstva, 2006), 625-782.


53 Ibid., 229.


56 Vučetić, “Serbia and Montenegro,” 73.


58 The content of the Montenegrin leadership’s initial proposal in January 1992 was re-modeled following a meeting between the Serbian delegation (Slobodan Milošević, Borisav Jović, Radoman Božović, and Aleksandar Bakočević) and its Montenegrin counterpart (Branko Kostić, Momir Bulatović, and Milo Đukanović) held in Podgorica on February 5, 1992. See Bulatović, *Pravila čutanja*, 92–93.


69 Ibid., 21 June 2005. Following the referendum, Titograd reverted to its original name, Podgorica, on April 1 and Ivangrad to Berane on April 9.


See Bulatović, *Pravila ćutanja*, 89.


Andrijevich, “Sandžak,” 188.


An ongoing feud, played out through the media, had strained relations between the Milošević and the Montenegrin prime minister. Mira Marković had alleged that Djukanović was enriching himself and his associates by indulging in shadowy economic activities (cigarette smuggling) during UN sanctions. See Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom*, 330.

Esad Kočan, “Montenegro and ‘Shifting to the Left,’” *AIM Press* (Zurich), 4 October, 1995.


Djukanović ensured that the elderly citizens of Montenegro were paid pensions but used some of the finance garnered from “sanctions busting” activities to ensure this. Ibid., 25–54; and Roberts, *Realm of the Black Mountain*, 446.


Ibid.


See Mitrović and Eraković, *Sto dana koji su promijenili Crnu Goru*, 22.

Ibid., 31.


For a more detailed account of the July 11 DPS meeting see, Mitrović and Eraković, *Sto dana koji su promijenili Crnu Goru*, 337–44.

Article 5 of the Montenegrin Constitution stipulated that there could be only one candidate per party. However, the republic’s Electoral Commission ruled that both Bulatović and Djukanović could run on the basis that the former represented the federal DPS and the latter represented the republican DPS. As a consequence, Djukanović’s wing of the DPS challenged this in the Montenegrin Constitutional Court, which ruled that only republican parties could propose candidates (thus annulling Bulatović’s candidacy). A subsequent challenge from Bulatović led to the federal Constitutional Court abolishing article 5 of the Montenegrin Electoral Law, thus allowing Bulatović to run as a DPS candidate. See Bulatović, *Pravila čitanja*, 262.

111 While it was hardly a solid framework for analysis, there existed a perception, particularly among pro-independence Montenegrins, that Bulatović was “less of a Montenegrin” than Djukanović. The son of a Montenegrin-born Yugoslav Army officer, Momir Bulatović was born in Belgrade and soon after settled in Zadar, Croatia. He arrived in Titograd in 1975 to study economics at the University of Montenegro. Conversely, Milo Djukanović had lived only in Nikšić before enrolling at the Faculty of Economics in Titograd in 1981.


113 Thomas, Serbia under Milosević, 379.


116 See Bulatović, Pravila čutanja, 259–74.


122 Bulatović, Pravila čutanja, 277.


125 Thomas, Serbia under Milosević, 380.

126 For an excellent overview of the war in Kosovo, see Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). See also Florian Bieber and Židas Daskalovski, Understanding the War in Kosovo (London: Taylor & Francis, 2003.)


128 Interview with Milo Djukanović in “The Fall of Milošević Archive” Roll No.1/12b, 22.


the number of militarized police was closer to 10,000. See Richard Monk, *A Study of Policing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* (Vienna: OSCE, 2001), 34.


132 Ibid.


134 Ibid. See also Marko Orlandić, *Crnogorsko posrtanje* (Podgorica: Montcarton, 2005), 164.

