When seeking the origins of World War I, understanding the chain of events in the late nineteenth century that led to the breakdown of relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia and facilitated the rise of an aggressive Serbian nationalism is crucial. This book focuses on the hitherto unexplored Hungarian influence on the Habsburg Monarchy’s policy toward Serbia after the 1867 Ausgleich. It argues that this early period was critical in shaping policy after 1871, down to the imposition on Serbia in 1881 of a system of economic and political control.

The Ausgleich, the Austro-Hungarian compromise that reconstituted the Empire as a dual monarchy, gave Hungary a limited voice in foreign affairs; and it was at the request of the Hungarian premier, Count Gyula Andrássy, that the young politician Benjámin Kállay was appointed representative at Belgrade in 1868. Both men were obsessed with the threat posed by Russia and particularly concerned that Serbia might be used as a stalking horse for Russian influence among the Monarchy’s South Slavs. They pursued a shadow policy designed to draw Serbia firmly into the Monarchy’s sphere of influence, which contradicted that of the foreign minister, Count Beust, and resulted in a serious deterioration in relations with Serbia by 1871. After 1871 Andrássy, as foreign minister, laid the foundations for a more explicit control of Serbia; Kállay, as a senior diplomat, negotiated the treaties that, by 1881, locked Serbia into satellite status for a generation.

Through detailed archival research in multiple languages and a painstaking reconstruction of diplomatic events, Armour illuminates a crucial period in Central European history, showing how the origins of a war that claimed millions of lives can be traced to political maneuverings almost fifty years before.

Ian D. Armour was, until his retirement in 2014, associate professor of history at Grant MacEwan University, Edmonton; he previously taught in the UK at Staffordshire University and the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, where he completed his PhD in 1994. He is the author (with Ian Porter) of Imperial Germany 1890–1918 (Longman, 1991), and sole author of A History of Eastern Europe 1740–1918: Empires, Nations and Modernisation, 2nd edition (Bloomsbury, 2012), as well as numerous articles in peer-reviewed journals. He is currently working on A History of Eastern Europe 1918–Present for Bloomsbury Academic, and a study of the Austro-Serbian relationship in the period 1881-1903.
Apple of Discord
The “Hungarian Factor” in Austro-Serbian Relations, 1867–1881
Central European Studies
Charles W. Ingrao, senior editor
Gary B. Cohen, editor
Franz Szabo, editor
Daniel L. Unowsky, editor
Apple of Discord
The “Hungarian Factor” in Austro-Serbian Relations, 1867–1881

Ian D. Armour

Purdue University Press
West Lafayette, Indiana
Contents

Rough Guide to Pronunciation vi
List of Images viii
List of Maps ix
Concordance of Place Names x
List of Abbreviations Used in the Notes xi
Foreword xiii
Preface xv
Introduction 1
Chapter 1: Austria, Hungary, and Serbia in 1867 19
Chapter 2: Kállay Goes to Belgrade 55
Chapter 3: The Obrenović Assassination 77
Chapter 4: The Karadordević Prosecution 1868–70 101
Chapter 5: The Bosnian Question 1868–70 121
Chapter 6: Managing the South Slavs 155
Chapter 7: Effect of the Franco-Prussian War 175
Chapter 8: The Bosnian Question Revisited 1870–71 197
Chapter 9: The Karadordević Fiasco 1870–71 219
Chapter 10: Serbia’s Swing Toward Russia 1870–71 237
Chapter 11: A Problematical Relationship 1871–78 259
Chapter 12: The Imposition of Satellite Status 1878–81 283
Conclusion 311
Bibliography 317
Index 337
Rough Guide to Pronunciation

Hungarian

All letters not listed below are pronounced as in English. Stress is always placed on the first syllable.

a  broad ‘as’ as in ‘father’
á  sharp ‘a’ as in ‘at’
c  ‘ts’ as in ‘tsar’
cs, ccs  ‘ch’ as in ‘church’
e  short ‘e’ as in ‘pet’
é  long ‘e’ as in French ‘épée’
gy  ‘d’ plus ‘y’ as in ‘duke’
i  short ‘ee’ as in ‘beet’
í  long ‘ee’ as in ‘see’
j  ‘y’ as in ‘yes’
ly  ‘y’ as in ‘yes’
ny  ‘n’ plus ‘y’ as in ‘new’
o  short ‘o’ as in ‘bone’
ó  long ‘o’ as ‘doe’
ö  short vowel modification as in ‘colonel’ or German ‘schön’
ő  long vowel modification as in ‘colonel’ or German ‘schön’
s, ss  ‘sh’ as in ‘shut’
sz, ssz  ‘s’ as in ‘sit’
u  short ‘u’ as in ‘boot’
ú  long ‘u’ as ‘sue’
ü  short vowel modification as in French ‘vu’
ů  long vowel modification as in French ‘vu’
zs  ‘zh’ as in ‘leisure’
Serbo-Croat

Vowels are given full quality in Serbo-Croat, but are otherwise straightforward. All consonants not listed below are pronounced as in English. Stress varies, but is never placed on the last syllable.

c  ‘ts’ as in ‘tsar’
č  ‘ty’ as in ‘tune’
đ  ‘dy’ as in ‘duke’
dž  ‘dj’ as in ‘jury’
h  ‘ch’ as in Scottish ‘loch’
j  ‘y’ as in ‘yes’
lj  ‘l’ plus ‘y’ as in ‘yes’
nj  ‘n’ plus ‘y’ as in ‘new’
š  ‘sh’ as in ‘shut’
ž  ‘zh’ as in ‘leisure’
List of Images

Image 1. Constitutional Structure of the Habsburg Monarchy after 1867

Image 2. Count Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust

Image 3. Count Gyula Andrássy

Image 4. Benjámin Kállay

Image 5. Prince Michael Obrenović


Image 7. Prince Alexander Karađorđević
List of Maps

Map 1. The Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary after 1867

Map 2. Nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy

Map 3. The Balkans in 1815

Map 4. Serbia and the Vojvodina, 1860s

Map 5. Europe at the Conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War, 1871

Map 6. Plan for the Partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1870–71

Map 7. The Balkans after the Congress of Berlin, 1878
Concordance of Place Names

G: German; H: Hungarian; S-C: Serbian or Croatian; Sl: Slovak; I: Italian

Names in present-day usage are listed first. Where an Anglicized version of a place name has become common, such as Vienna, or Belgrade, this has been used in the text.

Buda (H); Ofen (G)

Kotor (S-C); Cattaro (I)

Novi Sad (S-C); Neusatz (G.); Újvidék (H)

Bratislava (Sl); Pressburg (G); Pozsony (H)

Dubrovnik (S-C); Ragusa (I)

Rijeka (S-C); Fiume (I)

Zagreb (S-C); Agram (G); Zágráb (H)

Zemun (S-C); Zimony (H); Zemlin (G)
List of Abbreviations Used in the Notes


AR: Administrative Registratur, Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna.


FH: Folio Hungarici.

FO: Foreign Office files (Public Record Office, Kew; now The National Archive).


HHSA: Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv (Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Vienna).


KA: Kriegsarchiv, Vienna.

Kállay Diary: Kállay Béni naplója [The Diary of Béni Kállay], Magyar Országos Levéltár, Budapest, P344, C.d. 1–4 (31–34 k.)

MOL: Magyar Országos Levéltár [Hungarian National Archive], Budapest.


OSZK: Országos Széchenyi Könyvtár [National Széchenyi Library], Budapest.

PA: Politisches Archiv, Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna.


PRO: Public Record Office, Kew; now The National Archive.

Ristić Letters: Pisma Jovana Ristića Filipu Hristiću od 1870 do 1873 i od 1877 do 1880 [The Letters of Jovan Ristić to Filip Hristić from 1870 to 1873 and from 1877 to 1880] (Belgrade, 1931).
Foreword

This is the author’s first book-length study of the role that Hungarian statesmen played in determining Habsburg policy toward Serbia. He anticipates producing a second volume that will take the story to the bloody palace revolution of 1903, and, perhaps, a third that would conclude with the outbreak of World War I.

This first installment is certainly timely, appearing as it has on the hundredth anniversary of that epochal event. At this very moment historians and journalists across the Atlantic community are busily commemorating the centenary of the “Great” War. One theme that will surface repeatedly both in print and in conference presentations will be the causes of the conflict that consumed so many lives, institutions, and whole societies during the course of the twentieth century. Experts and pundits alike will invoke the names of the ill-fated Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his assassin, Gavrilo Princip. Some will pontificate about the respective roles of Serbian intelligence, Germany’s “Blank Check,” the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, and the Schlieffen Plan. A few will dig deeper by examining the statesmen and diplomacy that created the two rival alliance systems that seemed predestined to resolve their differences on the battlefield.

This volume gives due attention to the circumstances, events and personalities that produced the secret Austro-Serbian alliance of 1881. Although the few Habsburg officials in the know in both Vienna and Budapest hailed it as a diplomatic triumph, the treaty had succeeded all too well for the Dual Monarchy’s long-term interest. Moreover, there was a subplot to the story: namely, the agendas of Hungarian statesmen like Gyula Andrássy and Benjamin Kállay. Over the centuries, Habsburg statesmen had advanced the monarchy’s remarkable career by assembling coalitions that had been activated by its partners’ appreciation of a common interest and sanguine anticipation of mutual benefit. Time and again, monarchs and diplomats from Maximilian to Metternich had forged alliances through judicious moderation and mutual accommodation. They did so not out of some inbred timidity or empathy, but because the monarchy’s finite resources and vulnerable frontiers demanded an abiding sensitivity to core interests of
constituencies both within and beyond its frontiers. The circumstances surrounding the treaty of 28 June 1881 were different. The Habsburg negotiators could afford to play from a position of unusual strength vis-à-vis Serbian Prince Milan. In imposing their will they demonstrated that they were no different than other hegemons when conditions gave them a free hand.

With the benefit of hindsight, historians can pass judgment on those victors who, in retrospect, should have been more careful what they wish for. The refrain applies to Austria-Hungary in 1881, much as it would to Serbia and so many of its victorious allies in 1918.

Charles W. Ingrao
The history of relations between the Habsburg Monarchy and Serbia has always been bedeviled by emotion, partisanship, and special pleading. It has also undergone radical changes in the outlook of those writing on the subject, depending on current events and coverage in the media. Before the First World War, for instance, it was rare to find defenders of the Serbian point of view, a circumstance conditioned to some extent by Serbia’s obscurity, but determined even more by the negative image of Serbian politics, especially the brutal palace revolution of 1903, and the general atmosphere of political conspiracy which hung over the country. The Habsburg Monarchy, by contrast, and for all its manifest faults and dysfunctionality, had no shortage of defenders and well-wishers, right down to the point at which, in 1914, it tipped the rest of Europe into cataclysm by its response to the Sarajevo assassination.

With the outbreak of the First World War, Serbia underwent what a modern PR consultant would call a makeover. It became “gallant little Serbia,” the plucky ally of the Western powers, the blameless underdog vis-à-vis the malevolent empire to the north, which was now tarred as Germany’s partner in war guilt and which was in any case, it was claimed, a multinational state doomed to dissolution. When Serbia, after many tribulations, re-emerged triumphant in 1918 and presided over the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, it managed to transfer to the new, theoretically “Yugoslav” state this wartime image of heroic blamelessness. In the eyes of many outside observers Yugoslavia was simply Serbia writ large. Even the multiple problems of the interwar period, rooted in the fact that Yugoslavia was more a sort of Greater Serbia than the federal condominium desired by its other peoples, could not entirely dispel this positive picture, in which all Yugoslavia’s virtues were attributable to its Serb leadership, while all its vices were the fault of misguided non-Serbs, corrupted by external influences. This misinterpretation of Yugoslavia reached its apogee in 1942 with the publication of Rebecca West’s extraordinarily Serbophile *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*: the country’s ills were put down to the burden of Slav
history and the manipulation of alien hegemons, chief among them the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires.4

The Second World War effected yet another transfiguration. Bizarrely, the victory of Josip Broz Tito’s Communist Party in the three-cornered civil war that engulfed Yugoslavia following its invasion and partition by the Axis powers did not impair Serbia’s generally good standing in the minds of foreign commentators. On the contrary, the heroic image had been consolidated by the Serb-dominated coup d’état of April 1941, which provoked the Axis invasion; as Winston Churchill later wrote, Yugoslavia had thereby “found its soul.”5 The fact that the subsequent Serb-led royalist resistance of Draža Mihailović was a tragic failure, and spent so much of its energies combatting the rival Communist Partisans that it laid itself open to charges of collaboration with the Axis, was overlaid by the Partisans’ success as a resistance movement, and the eventual transfer of Allied support from Mihailović to Tito. Tito himself was literally Yugoslav, being of Croat-Slovene parentage; and his Communist Party picked up support as the only genuinely Yugoslav resistance movement on offer, one which transcended nationalist antagonisms. Yet the postwar Yugoslavia, although a federal state along Soviet lines which nominally put all its peoples on an equal footing, was in a curious way another installment in the long afterlife of Serbia. Despite post-Tito complaints by Serb nationalists about their alleged disempowerment under Communism, the Titoist state continued Serbian primacy within the Serbian Republic, including the two “autonomous” provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.6 Serbs also, for many years under Tito, dominated the federal security services; more importantly, for the purposes of the present work, they enjoyed a real ascendency in the Yugoslav historical profession.

This is not the place for a detailed disquisition on post-war Yugoslav historiography, but suffice it to say that the majority of work done by Yugoslavs after 1945, on Austro-Serbian relations in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, conformed to the picture of Serbia as underdog, and that this perception filtered through into at least some of what was written about the subject in the West. Some Yugoslav historians, in response to the new political dispensation, preoccupied themselves with the history of the working class and the beginnings of socialism; still others endorsed the Yugoslavist ideology of the regime, in line with Tito’s assertion in 1948 that “The unification of the South Slavs was needed and had to be accomplished.”7 Yet the longer Communist Yugoslavia lasted, and the more its initially sham federalism was parlayed into a more genuine federalism, progressively Balkanizing the Communist Party itself, the more nationalist viewpoints emerged, or rather re-emerged, since many of the pre-war generation remained academically active.8 The result was an historiographical tradition in which Serbia was habitually depicted as on the side of the angels: striving first to free itself from the Ottoman Empire, and then to liberate those Serbs, and
other South Slavs, still languishing under foreign rule, while at the same time resisting efforts by the Habsburg Monarchy to impose a different type of domination. In this narrative the Monarchy was almost invariably the negative element, a multinational, dynastic anachronism battling the inevitable with unscrupulous determination. As an example of how this could translate at the level of popular consciousness, I will never forget being informed, by an earnest young Yugoslav tour guide in Sarajevo in 1981, that the Archduke Francis Ferdinand had been deliberately sent to his death, not only by the Habsburg authorities, but by the German Empire, so that his assassination would provide the pretext for war in 1914!

Needless to say the resurgence of Serb nationalism in the 1970s and 1980s, which did so much to accelerate Yugoslavia’s break-up, powerfully reinforced this tendency to see Serbian history as one of unrelenting victimhood. Even more disturbing was the fact that prominent Serbian historians like Milorad Ekmečić and Vasilije Krestić were in the forefront of the nationalist movement, the latter being one of the architects of the notorious Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1986, which complained about the “genocide” being perpetrated against the Serbs.9 Krestić, as will be seen below, has never wavered in his conviction that Serbs have always been the victims in the relationship with the Habsburg Monarchy; his additional conviction that the Serbs’ former cohabitants in Yugoslavia, the Croats in particular, were willing adjuncts to this victimisation is now also a matter of record.10 In the wake of the Yugoslav wars the former Yugoslav historical profession is now a house divided against itself. Hard-line nationalists seem to dominate the profession in Serbia even a decade after the fall of Milošević, and are well represented in the far-flung Serbian diaspora.11 On the other hand, both Serbia, Montenegro and the émigré community harbor many conscientious scholars who are doing their best not to see the history of Serbia’s relations with the outside world as uniformly one of underdog versus oppressors.12

Non-Yugoslav historians, as one might hope, have never subscribed wholesale to this Serbs-as-victims interpretation of Austro-Serbian relations. On the contrary, there has been no shortage of sympathetic, if critical, treatments of Habsburg foreign policy in this period, by scholars such as Joachim Remak, Charles and Barbara Jelavich, Paul W. Schroeder, Roy Bridge and Samuel Williamson, Jr.13 The few western specialists in Serbian history, such as Wayne S. Vucinich, Michael Boro Petrovich, David MacKenzie and Gale Stokes in the United States, Horst Haselsteiner in Austria, and Imre Ress in Hungary, have on the whole done their best to see the story from both sides.14 Yet the long period in which Serbia, and then Yugoslavia, was regarded generally as being on the “winning side” of history has inevitably affected perspectives.

Prior to the break-up of Yugoslavia it was uncommon to see highly critical examination of the Serbian nation-building story of the nineteenth century. All history is written with the benefit of hindsight, but in the case of Serbia the
hindsight until the 1980s was that provided by Tito’s Yugoslavia, with its federal structure, its vaunted “workers’ self-management” (taken far too much at face value by some in the West), and its parade of “brotherhood and unity.” Whatever the tragedies and errors of Balkan nationalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it could be argued, the peoples of Yugoslavia, Serbs included, had collectively transcended these troubles and had subliminated their national identities in Yugoslavism. The dark underside of all nationalism, the intolerance of others, and the unwillingness to compromise, were not part of this picture.15 Only in the light of the wars of the 1990s does the nineteenth-century “pre-history” of Yugoslavia assume a more complex significance.

Should we therefore approach the record of the Habsburg Monarchy, in its dealings with Serbia and the rest of the South Slav world, in a different light too? Is there a case to be made for the Monarchy as a preferable alternative to the modern world of nation-states or would-be nation-states, an agenda that, in the eyes of present-day Serb, Croat and Albanian nationalists is very much unfinished business? It is my considered opinion that the answer to these questions still has to be “no.”

My first original research in this field began when I registered for a master’s programme at the London School of Economics in 1976–77. My thesis topic, under the supervision of the late Professor James Joll, was British involvement in the Austro-Serbian “Pig War” of 1906–11. This was a choice driven to a large extent by my location in London and the availability of British archival records; it was also a subject in which it was easy to see Serbia as the victim of Austro-Hungarian economic and political domination.

When, some years later, I registered for a part-time PhD at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, it was not long before I found myself gravitating towards what was increasingly my main preoccupation, the story of the Habsburg Monarchy’s attempts to deal with Serbia between the Ausgleich, or Compromise, of 1867 and the outbreak of the First World War. This, again, was a narrative in which Serbia stood out as object, rather than subject: the constant object of Habsburg policy was to control Serbia, to limit its size and influence so that it could never pose a threat to the multinational Monarchy itself. Within that larger framework, the story that really intrigued me was the way in which the new constitutional government of Hungary tried to shape policy towards Serbia in the period immediately following the Ausgleich. And central to this saga was the fascinating personality of the young Benjámin Kállay, Austro-Hungarian consul-general in Belgrade between 1868 and 1875. Kállay went on from this influential posting to become one of the principal architects of Austro-Hungarian policy towards Serbia in the crucial years 1878–81, when a series of treaties were imposed on Serbia which made it a satellite of the Monarchy for the next generation. He then became Austro-Hungarian common finance minister in 1882, in which
capacity he was the chief administrator of the newly-occupied Ottoman province of Bosnia-Hercegovina until his death in 1903. Originally intending an insanely ambitious “life and times” of Kállay, I eventually narrowed my thesis down to the more manageable subject of Hungarian influence on Serbian policy between 1867 and 1871, but in the process wound up researching the period down to the treaties of 1878–81 in considerable detail.

What emerged out of this research, and which forms the basis of the present book, constitutes a lesson in Realpolitik, but also a sort of morality tale. The practical political lesson is that great powers will usually behave according to how they perceive their interests, and that those interests transcend, indeed frequently offend, what most reasonable persons would consider everyday standards of morality. What is most striking, in the records left behind by Austrian and Hungarian statesmen like Kállay, or his patron Count Gyula Andrássy, was how much they assumed that Austria-Hungary had the right to dictate to Serbia, and that Serbian governments had virtually a duty to accommodate themselves to such dictates. Morality does not enter into such a dialogue, because the relationship is based on power.

The problem with this top-down approach by great powers towards small powers lies in the reversibility of the relationship. The Habsburg Monarchy’s lordly attitude towards its Balkan neighbors was always conditioned by an underlying fear of their attractive power over co-nationals in the Monarchy itself. By the end of the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, Austro-Hungarian policy was driven by the most existential fear of all, that it would be the next target of a Balkan alliance aiming at its dissolution. That there was little likelihood of such a coalition in the immediate future was irrelevant; the leaders of the Monarchy in 1914 saw Serbia, and Serbian nationalism, as direct threats, and acted accordingly in reaction to the Sarajevo murders. And although the real danger of an attack was exaggerated, there can be little doubt that, in the minds of Serbian nationalists like the Sarajevo assassin, the nineteen-year-old student Gavrilo Princip, or the leader of the conspiratorial “Black Hand” in Belgrade, Colonel Dimitrije Dimitrijević, it was the claims of Serbian nationhood which took priority over such concepts as dynastic legitimacy. Morality, for such nationalists, is the twisted sort which can justify political murder, “ethnic cleansing,” and all manner of further mayhem in pursuit of the ultimate goal, the unitary nation-state. For Serb nationalists, however, the justifiability of the nation-building project was reinforced by generations of great power bullying and manipulation. In this litany of grievances it was Austria-Hungary’s role which stood out as the most negative.16

The morality tale lies in the essential futility of the bullying. In its fear of Serbian nationalism, the Habsburg Monarchy from the early nineteenth century pursued policies of containment, manipulation, and coercion, which bred resentment on the part of Serbs everywhere, without ultimately averting the consolidation
of Serbian autonomy and the gradual expansion of the Serbian nation-state. When, after 1867, Hungarians were in a position to influence policy towards Serbia, their involvement made things worse. In the period under investigation in this book, Hungarian meddling first sowed the seeds of unconquerable suspicion on both sides, and then contributed to a revival of the traditional policy of coercion. By locking Serbia into a position of economic and political vassalage by 1881, however, this policy did more than anything else to ensure the outcome least welcome to the Habsburg Monarchy. In a political explosion in part reflecting nationalist resentment of this situation, Serbia cast off all controls after 1903, and a full-blown nationalism emerged more than ever committed to the liberation of fellow nationals, under both Ottoman and, eventually, Habsburg rule. In pursuit of an unattainable control, Austrian and Hungarian statesmen conjured up the threat they had most to fear.

The present work is neither an apology for the excesses of Serbian nationalism in the late twentieth century, nor a defense of the Habsburg Monarchy’s dismal record in managing its relationship with the South Slavs. It is an attempt to chart the beginnings of a story which culminated in the outbreak of the First World War, but whose fatal tendency towards misunderstanding and antagonism was set by policy decisions taken in the 1860s and 1870s.

As is probably usual when making acknowledgements of this sort, I am aware that so many people have assisted in the completion of this project that there is a real possibility of leaving someone out.

I owe the most profound debt of all to my doctoral supervisor, the late, great Professor László Péter (1929–2008). A Hungarian émigré of 1956, László combined a laser-like intelligence with an awe-inspiring command of the English language; his knowledge and understanding of nineteenth-century Hungarian politics was encyclopedic, and his editorial pen went through verbose post-graduate ramblings like a hot knife through butter. Any conceptual clarity which I have developed over the years I owe largely to this occasionally aloof, but infinitely patient man, whom I learned to regard with great affection.

Among other senior scholars to whom I am conscious of a heavy debt, Professor Roy Bridge stands out for his kindliness and conviviality. Roy spotted me early on in the Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna and, in the course of successive encounters over the years, not only shared his expert knowledge of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy, but introduced me to others in the field both in Austria and elsewhere. One of these was the Hungarian historian and later (post-Communist) foreign minister, Dr. Géza Jeszenszky. Géza and his wife Edit were unfailingly hospitable on my visits to Hungary, even when personal preoccupations cannot have made this easy for them, and were particularly kind to me.
and my brother David when we spent some months in Budapest in 1987. I also profited from discussions of my subject with, among others, Dr. Ferenc Glatz and Dr. István Diószegi in Budapest, Dr. Imre Ress (then in Vienna), Dr. Andrija Radenić in Belgrade, and Dr. Robin Okey and the late Dr. John Leslie in London. Professor Mark Cornwall, now at Southampton University, was a fellow researcher in the Austrian archives in the 1980s, whose conversation was as instructive as his company on the occasional pub-crawl was welcome.

Among personal friends four deserve special thanks. Georg Siegl not only put me up repeatedly in Vienna, but through his hospitality and sociability extended my circle of acquaintance, and in the process improved my German no end. The night-life more than once got in the way of the archival research, but no researcher in a foreign city could have wished for a more congenial base. In London, my friend and co-author, Ian Porter, was not only an intellectual sounding-board for years, and a critic with a profound knowledge of German history, but provided me with the use of his computer for producing my thesis; it is no exaggeration to say that, without his technical assistance and patience, the thing probably would not have been finished. Paula Porter, while all this was going on, put up with me as a sort of daytime house-guest for the better part of three years, providing me with lunch and endless cups of coffee. Another who deserves mention is Esther MacKay, who tolerated my continuation in her house as a perpetual student for longer than we both probably care to remember. These are not debts that can be meaningfully repaid.

Innumerable public servants, most of them anonymous, were of assistance along the way. This includes the staff of the Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv and the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna, the Hungarian National Archive and the Széchenyi National Library archive in Budapest, the Historical Institute in Belgrade, and in London the Public Record Office (now crassly renamed the National Archive), the British Library, the Institute of Historical Research, Senate House Library, and of course the library of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies. Since returning to Canada in 2006 I have benefited immensely from access to the libraries of Grant MacEwan University and the University of Alberta and their unfailingly helpful staff.

Finally, I owe a peculiar, because unquantifiable, debt to my wife, Jane Leaper, who is not an historian, but whose historical insight has frequently enriched my own understanding. I was involved in the topic of the present book long before I met Jane; but her enthusiasm for holidaying in obscure parts of Eastern Europe has since enriched my own understanding of the region. More importantly, her company has kept me on my toes mentally for the last two decades. She also executed the charming diagram on page 23. Needless to say, however, all defects of this book are mine, and no one else’s.
Notes

1 For a revealing example of how even a well-intentioned writer could convey this negative picture, see Mrs. Northesk Wilson, _Belgrade the White City of Death. Being the History of King Alexander and of Queen Draga_ (London: R.A. Everett, 1903).


6 Two expressions of what might be called the paranoid style in ex-Yugoslav cinema are Emir Kusturica’s _Underground_ (1995) and Srđan Dragojević’s _Pretty Village, Pretty Flame_ (1996). Both films depict the Communist period as a species of con-job perpetrated on the Serbs, who are metaphorically driven “underground.”


8 An outstanding example was Vaso Ćubrilović, one of the teenaged conspirators of 1914, and whose influential _Istorija političke misle u Srbiji XIX veka_ [The History of Political Thought in Serbia of the 19th Century] (Belgrade: Narodna Knjiga, 1982 [1958]) is still in print.


This is an interpretation which, in my opinion, still holds true, despite the sustained indictment of the Serbian government’s policy in Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (New York: HarperCollins, 2012), chapter 1 *passim*. The fact remains that the Austro-Hungarian government did not have to resort to war in 1914, nor did it have convincing proof of Serbian government responsibility for Sarajevo, as opposed to the incontestable responsibility of individual Serb nationalists and organizations.

In a sequel to the present work, provisionally entitled *Train-Wreck in Slow Motion: Austria-Hungary and Serbia 1881–1903*, and currently being researched, I hope to cover the period of Serbia’s satellite status and bring the story down to the Serbian revolution of 1903.
This page intentionally left blank
Introduction

This study is largely concerned with the changes effected in the policy of the Habsburg Monarchy toward Serbia between the Ausgleich of 1867, when a Hungarian factor appeared in the formulation of that policy, and the appointment of a Hungarian, Count Gyula Andrásy, as joint foreign minister late in 1871. It then continues to the conclusion of the secret treaty of 1881 between the Monarchy and Serbia. The role of the politician and diplomat Benjámin Kállay is of importance here, not just because he was Austria-Hungary’s consul-general in Belgrade in the formative period of 1868–75, but also because, as Andrásy’s nominee for the post, he represented a particular, Hungarian view of how relations with Serbia should be conducted. Yet Kállay’s views, as well as Andrásy’s, had undergone significant modifications by 1871, and this contributed to the nature of the settlement imposed on Serbia in 1881. It is one of the purposes of this study to show how fateful those shifts of emphasis were for the subsequent development of relations between the Habsburg Monarchy and Serbia.

It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the whole course of Austro-Serbian relations, right down to 1914, was determined by policies laid down in the late 1860s and the 1870s; and that these policies bore a distinctly Hungarian stamp. Their essential feature, as evolved by 1881, was the imposition on Serbia of a straitjacket of economic and political controls, which were designed to nullify Serbian nationalism, to ensure Serbia’s availability as a source of foodstuffs and a market for manufactures, and to do all this without the necessity of annexing the country and thus further complicating the nationalities question inside the Habsburg Monarchy. In addition, Austro-Hungarian policymakers recognized by the mid-1870s that the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by the Monarchy was a likely concomitant of this approach, since on no account should Serbia be allowed to annex Bosnia for itself and thus form a large South Slav state on the Monarchy’s border.

Until the crisis of 1875–78 shattered the status quo in the Balkans, this policy remained hypothetical. Serbian isolation at the end of the Russo-Turkish War,
however, offered Austria-Hungary the chance of imposing the straitjacket, while simultaneously resolving the Bosnian question to its own satisfaction. Serbia was secured territorial gains to the southeast, at the price of a close economic and political alliance concluded in 1880–81, and for the next generation remained effectively a protectorate of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Benjámin Kállay’s part in all this was central. He was a driving force behind the treaties of 1880–81. Subsequently, as the Monarchy’s joint finance minister (1882–1903), responsible for the administration of Bosnia-Hercegovina, he labored to make Habsburg rule popular there, and to negate the aspirations of Serbian nationalists for a South Slav state.

Kállay failed, and his Serbian policy was an unmitigated disaster. The Austrians, and the Hungarians, remained as unpopular in Serbia as they had always been since the early nineteenth century, and the blatant subordination of Serbian interests to those of the Monarchy produced a fierce nationalist resentment. Austria-Hungary’s administration of Bosnia-Hercegovina added insult to injury; and the sense of humiliation in Serbia was crowned by the widespread perception that King Milan Obrenović and his son and successor, Alexander, were the willing guarantors of Austro-Hungarian hegemony. In 1903, Alexander’s unpopularity and unconstitutional rule provoked an army coup in which he was assassinated, and the rival Karađorđević dynasty was called to the throne. This meant a return to constitutional politics in Serbia, and hence the ascendancy of the nationalist Radical Party. Serbian governments finally broke the economic stranglehold which Austria-Hungary had exerted since 1881, and with this loosening of economic ties came a corresponding license in the expression of nationalist aims. After 1903, relations between the Monarchy and Serbia deteriorated rapidly, until by 1914 the stage was set for the confrontation which led to the First World War. There is a certain symbolism in the fact that Kállay, whose policy of economic and political domination started to unravel with the 1903 revolution, died within a few weeks of it.

The point here is the futility of the whole edifice of control which was the principal result of Hungarian influence in Habsburg policy toward Serbia. Serb nationalism, on both sides, ensured that relations between the Monarchy and Serbia were never likely to be cordial; but the policy of domination, while typical of a great power’s attitude toward its chosen client state, could only exacerbate matters. Austro-Hungarian domination simply highlighted the fact that Serbia was weak, and could not achieve national unity on its own terms. It fatally embittered an already problematical relationship, and it was inherently likely to fail because of the extra hostility it generated.

This being the case, it becomes a matter of some interest to determine how this policy became the stock-in-trade of Habsburg diplomacy vis-à-vis Serbia in the period 1867–81. There were two phases in its evolution. The first phase, from
1867 to late 1871, coincides with the period when Andrásy was Hungarian minister president, and Count Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust the Monarchy’s chancellor and joint foreign minister. While Beust pursued a policy of preserving the status quo in the Balkans, Andrásy and his man in Belgrade, Kállay, promoted their own policy with regard to Serbia. This Hungarian shadow policy sought to neutralize Serbia and bind it to the Monarchy by a variety of minor concessions and services, and by one large territorial inducement: the suggestion that Austro-Hungarian intercession might induce the Ottomans to hand over the administration of at least part of Bosnia-Hercegovina to Serbia. The Bosnian scheme was inherently improbable, and by 1871 the Serbian Regents could see as much, and were turning back to Russia for diplomatic support. By the time Andrásy succeeded Beust as foreign minister, in November 1871, he was convinced the Serbs were not worth winning over with these tactics, and Kállay, the erstwhile proponent of Serbo-Hungarian “friendship,” was beginning to experience the sharp end of deteriorating relations in Belgrade. It was in the second phase, from 1871 to 1881, that the new, “hard” policy, aiming at economic and political control, was gradually elaborated.

There are a number of aspects of this story which deserve especial attention. There is the way in which the Hungarian factor began, as soon as Andrásy’s constitutional government was in power, to cut across the official policy of Beust in Vienna. Andrásy’s role in bedeviling Habsburg foreign policy toward Serbia was a large one; and the saga of his essentially impracticable Bosnian scheme, and its effect on relations with Serbia, will be an important theme in this study. Additionally, there is the fascinating personality of Benjámin Kállay, whose combination of self-deluding idealism and ruthless duplicity did much to defeat his own objects, and whose voice throughout this period was virtually the only authoritative guide the Monarchy had to what was happening in Serbia.

The theme which emerges most strikingly from the study of this period is the way those Hungarians, like Andrásy and Kállay, who gained a say in foreign policy, quickly developed a mentality which seems peculiar to the ruling classes of great powers. The Austrians, accustomed to think of themselves as the representatives of a great power, had always looked down upon the Balkan peoples, while at the same time fearing their manipulation by Russia. The Hungarians, by contrast, were merely aping the role of a great power; but in so doing they also absorbed the same attitude, a blend of arrogance and fear—with the difference that their arrogance was heightened by their own sense of inferiority to the Austrians, and their fear doubly sharpened by memories of the Russian invader of 1849. The basic mentality was as old as the idea of empire itself; but the Hungarian factor added a new virulence to the malady by insisting on control, on an unattainable security. It was this inflexibility which was to doom Austro-Serbian relations before the Ausgleich was a decade old.
The middle and the end of this story—the long Austro-Hungarian hegemony, followed by the breakdown of relations after 1903—have always been known. Equally familiar, at least in its main lineaments, is the Near Eastern crisis of 1875–78 and its aftermath. It is the interval between the Ausgleich and the beginning of the crisis of 1875–78 which looks obscure by comparison. This is not to say that the period has not been covered in numerous general and specialist works. But no one has produced an overall survey of Austro-Serbian relations which gives due weight to this initial phase; nor has the Hungarian factor been addressed in its own right as an influence on the Monarchy’s foreign policy toward Serbia in more than a scattering of publications.1

The earliest accounts, some of them by participants in the events of 1867–75, were predictably partial.2 By 1914, a number of surveys of Austrian foreign policy had appeared, but most of these were general in tone. None paid much attention to the period before 1875; and the existence of a Hungarian perspective is not so much as hinted at, despite the presence of a Hungarian as foreign minister from 1871 to 1879. Rather, it seems to be assumed that, merely by virtue of his arrival as foreign minister, Andrássy too became a sort of honorary Austrian.3

There is one outstanding exception to this pattern prior to 1914—significantly, by a Hungarian. Eduard von Wertheimer’s massive life of Andrássy remains to this day one of the principal sources for the period in general, and has a variety of interesting things to say about Andrássy’s views on the South Slav question, his interventions in Beust’s foreign policy, and his own policy upon becoming foreign minister himself.4 Because Wertheimer had access to the Andrássy family archives and other papers, such as the diary of Count Béla Orczy, which have since been destroyed, and which are frequently quoted by him, his account constitutes a form of primary source in its own right.5 It also, however, poses one of the major obstacles to a balanced assessment of Austria-Hungary’s Serbian policy. Wertheimer’s hagiographical approach to his subject, coupled with the fact that so much of his documentary evidence can no longer be questioned by other historians, has encouraged various myths about Austro-Hungarian foreign policy in this period, which even today still find champions.6

It is not true, for instance, to say that Andrássy prevented Beust from intervening in the Franco-Prussian War; or that Beust “showed no particular interest in the Near East.”7 In fact, Andrássy’s whole approach to foreign policy issues while he was still Hungarian premier seems remarkably naïve and ill-informed, as evidenced by his apparent conviction, as early as 1868, that war with Russia was not only inevitable but, in the long run, positively to be welcomed—a far cry from the statesmanship of Wertheimer’s portrait. And with regard to Serbia, the Wertheimer version shows very much the limitations of a pre-1914, Hungarian national liberal perspective. The Bosnian scheme is explained as a momentary aberration in Andrássy’s otherwise far-sighted vision, whereby he toyed with the
idea of creating a large South Slav bloc on the Monarchy’s southern frontier, which would somehow be firmly under Austro-Hungarian influence. Andrássy’s Serbian policy is presented as truly wise only when, in Wertheimer’s view, he gave up the “delusion” of Serbo-Hungarian friendship and fell back on the supposedly more realistic policy of economic and diplomatic coercion.

After the First World War, and the publication of primary sources relating to this period, we start getting something like objective scholarship on the subject of Austro-Serbian relations, although naturally sentiments either for or against the vanished Habsburg Monarchy, for or against Serbian nationalism, continued to affect the work produced. This is particularly the case among Yugoslav historians, especially Serbs, where the tendency to see the whole question in adversarial terms, and to ascribe the worst motivation to Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, was clearly hard to overcome. A study in 1925 by Vasilije Popović, for instance, found no real difference between the goals of Beust and Andrássy in the period 1868–71. A similar confusion is discernible in a general study by Ilija Pržić, where the Bosnian scheme is assumed to have been made with the knowledge and approval of both Beust and Francis Joseph.

More encouraging is the balanced analysis by one of the greatest of Yugoslav historians. In his work on the regime of Miloš and Michael Obrenović, Slobodan Jovanović initially (1923) seemed unclear as to whether the Bosnian plan originated with the imperial government or not. In an appendix to his second edition, however (1933), Jovanović made good use of material published in the interval to conclude that Austro-Hungarian policy was in fact both “Austrian” and “Hungarian”: that Beust clearly opposed the Bosnian scheme and that Andrássy was not only for it, but was building on a proposal made by Prince Michael himself in early 1867. Everything about the Monarchy’s relationship with Serbia after 1867, in Jovanović’s revised view, hinged upon the fact that there had, in that year, been an Ausgleich, and that “Beust was not the only maker of Austrian foreign policy.” The Bosnian plan was the expression of the institutional schizophrenia which afflicted the Habsburg Monarchy’s diplomacy between 1867 and 1871, and which only ceased to be a factor when Andrássy took over the Ballhaus—by which time his disposition toward Serbia had come full circle.

One of the sources for Jovanović’s revision was R. W. Seton-Watson’s three-part article in *Le Monde slave* on Kállay in Belgrade, the first serious appreciation of his importance since the hagiographical introduction to Kállay’s own *History of the Serbian Uprising* by Lajos Thallóczy in 1909. Seton-Watson’s study was based exclusively on the despatches from Kállay to Beust and later Andrássy preserved in the Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, which was valuable in itself but which naturally only gave half the picture. Without having looked at Kállay’s private papers in Budapest, Seton-Watson could not begin to realize the literally dual nature of the Monarchy’s representation in Belgrade from 1868 to 1871.
One other notable contribution of the inter-war years was J. A. von Reiswitz’s history of Serbia’s relations with Prussia down to the end of the Franco-Prussian conflict. This threw some light on Austria-Hungary’s role in Serbia, for although unable to explain the workings of Austrian and Hungarian policy toward Serbia in detail, the reports of Rosen, the Prussian consul in Belgrade, nevertheless offer independent confirmation that there was a difference. It was Rosen who on occasion referred to Kállay as the “Hungarian consul.”

The post-1945 period has seen the appearance of a number of detailed monographs, all of which, however, skirt the subject of Austrian versus Hungarian policy vis-à-vis Serbia, and the eventual direction Austro-Hungarian policy (in the joint sense) took after 1871. Ljiljana Aleksić touched briefly on the role of Napoleon III in putting the Bosnian question on the agenda in 1866–67. Her main contribution was to show the extent to which Napoleon was willing to use the offer of Bosnia to the Monarchy as a means of winning an alliance partner against Prussia. Of Andrásy’s counter-proposal, and the effect the cleft between Austria and Hungary had on grand policy, Aleksić had not much to say.

A similarly detailed study, but which again stops short at 1868, was brought out by Grgur Jakšić and Vojislav J. Vučković in 1963. Here, at least, a whole chapter is devoted to “Michael’s U-Turn” in 1867, with Andrásy’s contribution to the change in Serbian policy duly assessed; and in their final chapter the authors debate the significance of Kállay’s appointment to the Belgrade consulate in early 1868. Jakšić and Vučković offer a more complicated version than most previous accounts, in that, while appreciating the new Hungarian influence, they also drop the old myths about Beust’s revanchism, and his disinterest in the Eastern question. The fact that they did not have access to Hungarian sources, however, meant that Jakšić and Vučković saw the whole Bosnian imbroglio as a joint Austro-Hungarian exercise in deception: while Beust told the Serbian government that Austria-Hungary firmly opposed any Serbian role in Bosnia, Andrásy and Kállay, with Beust’s agreement, gave Belgrade the precisely opposite impression. The point of this Macchiavellian intrigue, Jakšić and Vučković imply, was to paralyze Serbia’s own preparations for action in the Balkans and discredit Serbia in the rest of the South Slav world. They do not, however, adduce more than circumstantial evidence for this conclusion; whereas sources they were not able to consult, such as the Kállay diary, give quite a different picture.

The first major monograph to make use of the Hungarian archives for the study of Austria-Hungary’s eastern policy in this period was published by István Diószegi in 1965. Diószegi, however, was mainly concerned with the diplomatic maneuverings around the Franco-Prussian War, and explored policy toward Russia, not to mention Serbia, only tangentially. His principal contribution was to refine further our understanding of the policies of both Beust and Andrásy. Beust, in Diószegi’s view, had a level-headed conception of the Monarchy’s position,
and certainly saw the threat posed by Russia. But Diószegi also maintains that Andrássy’s thinking on foreign policy, while he was still Hungarian minister president, was equally wide-ranging, and in support of this Diószegi cites not only Kállay’s diary but the correspondence between him and Andrássy. Of particular interest is the sheer intensity of Andrássy’s preoccupation with Russia; in this sense his priorities were indeed radically different from Beust’s, and it was inevitable that this would influence his attitude toward Serbia, although on this aspect of policy Diószegi was mostly silent. What is peculiar about Diószegi’s approach is that, while admitting the complicated and often contradictory nature of Andrássy’s ideas on foreign policy, he nevertheless concludes that the centrality of the “Russo-Slav question” in Andrássy’s world-view somehow made his strategy “more realistic” than that of Beust. One of the central themes of this book, by contrast, will be that, whatever the reality of the threat posed to the Monarchy by the “Russo-Slav question,” Andrássy’s chosen methods of countering this threat with regard to Serbia were anything but realistic.

Another balanced appraisal of Beust’s policy was provided by Heinrich Potthoff in 1968; but, again, this was primarily a study of Habsburg policy in western Europe. Potthoff did consider the effect on Beust’s policy of events in the East; but of how Beust saw relations with Serbia there is little. Of greatest interest is Potthoff’s demonstration of how much Beust saw relations with Russia as determining his policy in the West; for Beust was willing at least to contemplate a war with Russia, if by doing so he could bring France in as Austria-Hungary’s ally, to protect the Monarchy against simultaneous Prussian attack. The French would thus do Austria-Hungary’s work for it in breaking the threat of Prussian hegemony in Germany, but without Vienna having itself initiated an unpopular war of German against German. Beust, then, like Andrássy, had his own vision of the “Russo-Slav question”; but for Beust any such project must always depend upon certain preconditions, such as the reform and strengthening of the Ottoman Empire.

One Yugoslav historian who did consult the Budapest archives was Vasilije Krestić, whose study of the Hungarian-Croatian Nagodba of 1868 also devoted a chapter to Serbia, based in part on the Kállay diary and the Kállay-Andrássy correspondence. For Krestić, none of Andrássy’s dealings with the Serbian government from February 1867 on were anything other than deceitful, and his promises with regard to Serbia were “completely insincere.” What is more, Krestić argued, this strategy of deliberately misleading the Serbian government about Bosnia in order to blunt its interest in stirring up trouble in the Balkans was agreed upon in advance by Andrássy with Beust. Whereas Beust’s opposition to a Serbian take-over of Bosnia was well-known, said Krestić, Andrássy’s position was not; Andrássy therefore, through Kállay in Belgrade, repeatedly held out the prospect of a share in the administration of the two provinces, and made
deceptive comments about Hungary’s inability to absorb more Slavs, while being convinced all the while that “sooner or later,” in Kállay’s words, Austria-Hungary would have to occupy Bosnia itself.29 The evidence for these assertions, however, is questionable: for some of his claims Krestić did not specify his sources; for others he relied on Serbian documents whose views on Andrássy’s motives are hardly impartial; and on one crucial point, the question of Beust’s complicity in this deception, the only evidence is a somewhat ambiguous reference from Wertheimer. Just how much of Krestić’s viewpoint can be accepted will be dealt with in detail below; here, suffice it to say that Andrássy’s policy seems at least as much the product of confusion and naïveté as of Macchiavellian duplicity.

A much more center-line interpretation of policy toward Serbia was provided by F. R. Bridge’s general study, which reaffirmed the essential differences between Beust and Andrássy, especially as regards Bosnia, and which, even when based largely on sources in western languages, substantially reinforced a picture of Andrássy as startlingly unbalanced in his judgment of foreign policy issues while still Hungarian premier.30 Beust’s direction of foreign affairs is given its due as relatively realistic, and more hindered than helped by Hungarian interventions; and on the course of Austro-Serbian relations after Andrássy took over in 1871, Bridge even wrote of the “bitter fruit” borne by “Andrássy’s exaggerated cultivation of Belgrade in 1869–70.”31

Andrássy, however, still had a latter-day champion in János Decsy, whose extensively researched but curiously lopsided study of the Hungarian minister president’s influence appeared in 1979. Decsy was primarily concerned with the question of Austro-Hungarian neutrality in the Franco-Prussian War, although even here his approach was relentlessly anti-Beust and pro-Andrássy. He was meticulous in documenting the importance of the Russian-Slav question in Andrássy’s thinking, and showed convincingly that for Andrássy this was a problem of European significance.32 It was what Decsy left out that distorted his picture. He paid little attention to the nuances which proceeded from Andrássy’s view of the Slav world, such as his Serbian policy.33 If he had, his extraordinarily adulatory portrait of Andrássy as the statesman who could do virtually no wrong, essentially no different from Wertheimer’s, might have undergone serious modification. As it is, Decsy quoted most of Andrássy’s more egregious ideas, such as the belief in the need for a war against Russia, with apparent equanimity, his admiration for Andrássy’s statesmanship undiminished.34 In so far as the present study sheds light on the Serbian policy of Andrássy and Kállay, then, it can be considered a much-needed corrective to this attempt at an exhumation of Wertheimer’s Andrássy.

The same year saw the appearance of two further studies which explored Austro-Serbian relations from peripheral angles. Ljiljana Aleksić-Pejković, on Italy’s policy toward Serbia, made use of the Italian archives down to 1870. The
Balkans, and especially Serbia, figured in Italian calculations largely as a diversionary element in successive confrontations with the Habsburg Monarchy. Most of this story is clearly outside the scope of the present study; but the reports of Italian representatives in the years 1867–70 at least give an extra dimension to the new role of the Hungarian government in the Monarchy’s foreign policy. It is worth noting that Aleksić-Pejković was one of the first scholars to make use of the published version of Kállay’s diary.35

The much more wide-ranging account, by the late Heinrich Lutz, of Austria-Hungary and the foundation of the German Empire, placed policy toward Serbia, and the Hungarian factor, in the broadest possible context, and made use of some sources not often found in the bibliographies of mainstream western diplomatic historians. Lutz was excellent on the general importance of the Eastern question in Austro-Hungarian foreign policy, and even discerned “eine ungarische Sonderpolitik” in the Balkans;36 but beyond alluding to Andrássy’s Bosnian scheme, and the alliance proposal of 1870, he did not make clear how this Hungarian policy differed, if at all, from the official policy of Beust. Despite citing evidence that Beust was initially opposed to the Bosnian scheme, Lutz in fact concludes, without benefit of Hungarian sources such as Kállay’s diary, that Beust’s position in the matter by early 1869 was “not clear.”37 He was inclined, like Yugoslav historians before him, to regard both the Bosnian scheme and the alliance offer of 1870 as a joint Austro-Hungarian effort, concerted between Beust and Andrássy to “neutralize” Serbia at a time when war with Russia was regarded by both as imminent, instead of an independent Hungarian initiative outside of Vienna’s control.38 In view of this (understandable) confusion, it is not surprising that Lutz should have felt that the formal say in foreign policy assured to Hungarian governments by Article 8 of the Compromise Law did not facilitate effective influence.39 This is not a position that can be sustained in the light of the evidence now available. Andrássy not only pursued his own foreign policy goals, by a variety of means, but, with regard to Serbia, he exerted considerable influence, even if this was largely a negative influence.

Among western scholars only Franz-Josef Kos, in a study of the Near Eastern crisis of 1875–78, published in 1984, made detailed use not only of selected Hungarian sources but of the available documentation in Serbo-Croat, including the published version of Kállay’s diary. The virtue of Kos’s account of Austro-Hungarian policy in the run-up to 1875 was to show how Andrássy’s thinking on the question of relations with Serbia, and above all his stance vis-à-vis a possible partition of Bosnia, shifted over time. Andrássy, according to Kos, always envisaged a partition, as opposed to ceding the whole of Bosnia to Serbia, on the grounds that such an enlarged Serbia would be too dangerous, that the portion to be taken by the Monarchy would include the more assimilable Catholic Croat population, and that, crucially, only by holding out the prospect of territorial
acquisitions could the project be sold to the Emperor Francis Joseph. Only after 1871 did Andrássy swing round to the conviction that the Monarchy had to take over the whole of Bosnia.

Significantly, the most serious recent contributions to the debate over Hungarian influence in Habsburg foreign policy have been made by Hungarians. József Galántai’s 1985 study included a section on foreign policy in which, for the first time, the Kállay diary and other relevant sources were used systematically to chart the course of the Monarchy’s relations with Serbia for the first few years after the Ausgleich. Galántai pointed out that it was Balkan policy which produced the first clash between Beust and the Hungarian government, with Andrássy the proponent of a much more active attempt to bind Serbia to Austria-Hungary. The Bosnian scheme, on which Galántai shed most light, was the key to this whole strategy. Galántai made clear the extent to which Beust was not in on many of the various Bosnian initiatives, the extent to which Andrássy (through Kállay) was acting quite independently, a situation not envisaged by Article 8 of the Settlement Law, but which Galántai, echoing Wertheimer, seemed to regard as unexceptionable.

On the implications of this for good relations between the Monarchy and Serbia, Galántai was non-committal, a reflection of the lack of attention devoted to the Serbian side of the equation. In this respect Galántai’s account suffered from its unfamiliarity with Serbian sources in the same way that previous accounts have suffered through ignorance of the Hungarian sources.

Additional coverage of policy in this period has come from István Diószegi’s study of Andrássy in 1871–77. This work was again mainly concerned with grand policy; the nuances of Andrássy’s new attitude toward Serbia after 1871 received only incidental treatment. Any subsequent analysis of relations with Serbia, however, must benefit from the spotlight Diószegi threw on Austro-Hungarian policy in general. In particular, Diószegi provided the clearest possible account to date of the change in Andrássy’s approach to the Eastern Question after 1871. He accepted that Andrássy’s intentions with regard to Serbia in 1868–71, including the offer of a part of Bosnia, were honest, in so far as Andrássy believed this to be a legitimate means of weaning Serbia from Russian influence. He also showed how this was a natural consequence of Andrássy’s overall outlook, which regarded Russia as the principal threat to the Monarchy. Hence Andrássy’s new disillusionment with Serbia, which coincided roughly with his arrival at the foreign
ministry, fitted in with this outlook more easily than did his previous readiness to entrust Ottoman provinces to Belgrade.46

By 1873, Andrássy’s thinking had undergone important changes. For one thing, he was no longer convinced that the Ottoman Empire was necessarily the only means of resisting Russia, and at least toyed with the idea that the Balkan nations themselves might form the same sort of barrier.47 But most important, Andrássy’s attitude toward Russia had altered. As a result of the Three Emperors’ Agreement of 1873, and the discovery that one could do business with the Russians, Andrássy insensibly adopted a de facto policy of détente in the Balkans, a more traditional and recurrent feature of Austro-Russian relations right down to 1907.48 This was an essential precondition of that diplomatic understanding between Austria-Hungary and Russia which led to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 and finally to Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The diplomatic understanding, in turn, helped seal Serbia’s fate as Austria-Hungary’s reluctant vassal state, for the Russian government was just as happy to engage in this sort of horse-trading as the Austro-Hungarian. Once Andrássy had accepted the necessity of occupying Bosnia, then, and had learned to work with the Russians, great power interest politics could rule supreme in the Balkans.49

One of the most recent developments in the historiography of Austro-Serbian relations has been a small but interesting literature touching on what has been termed Hungarian imperialism. The pioneer in this recondite subject is Robin Okey, one of the few western specialists with a command of both the Hungarian and the ex-Yugoslav sources, and whose work in this area goes back decades, even if its fruits have only appeared comparatively recently. Certainly, as Okey demonstrates, some Hungarian politicians from the 1850s onward expressed a sense of Hungary’s peculiar role between East and West, and of Hungary’s mission to defend western Europe against Russia, while exercising a tutelary role among the supposedly less civilized peoples of the Danubian basin. In this scenario, Hungarians like Andrássy and Kállay recognized that Hungary needed to be part of the Habsburg Monarchy precisely in order to fulfil this mission, rather like a hermit-crab uses the carapace of another animal in order to move about.50 In Okey’s view, “Far from reflecting expansionist designs, Kállay’s motivation [in administering Bosnia] was the double defensiveness of the agent of a conservative Monarchy and of a Magyar outnumbered in his own country.”51 It is interesting, however, that some of the younger generation of Hungarian historians, one at least with close connections to the current (2014) Fidesz government, have no problem in designating this as an imperialist agenda of sorts on the part of Hungarian statesmen.52 At any rate this is an ongoing debate within the literature, to which the present study forms its own distinct contribution.

The story told here starts with a brief survey of the pivotal year 1867, when the Ausgleich brought a constitutional Hungarian government, with a say in foreign
policy, onto the scene. In 1868, Kállay goes to Belgrade, the designated apostle of Serbo-Hungarian friendship; and his arrival coincides with the death of Prince Michael Obrenović and the installation of a Regency even more disposed to take the idea seriously. The next three years see the gradual souring of the relationship, mainly as a result of the Bosnian question, the Hungarian government’s attempted prosecution of ex-Prince Alexander Karadorđević for Prince Michael’s murder, and constant attempts by the Hungarians to divide Serbia from the South Slavs of the Monarchy. The Serbian government’s development of a Russian orientation in 1871 was followed by a return, in Vienna, and ironically under the leadership of Andrássy as joint foreign minister, to the more traditional policy of trying to bind Serbia to the Monarchy by coercion. For several years after 1871 Serbia remained on the whole in the Russian camp, despite a brief pro-Habsburg interlude in 1873–74. In this period Andrássy, acting through Kállay, increasingly relied for influence on the person of Prince Milan; but this trend was rudely interrupted by the Near Eastern crisis of 1875–78, which swept Serbia into two disastrous wars with the Ottomans under Russian tutelage. In the same period Andrássy came to accept the necessity of occupying Bosnia, precisely to deny this province to Serbia. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Serbia found itself abandoned by Russia and obliged to cut a deal with the Monarchy: in return for the Monarchy’s support for Serbian independence and a limited territorial enlargement to the southeast, Serbia agreed to a series of economic and political treaties, signed in 1880–81, which reduced it to satellite status. Kállay, the principal architect of this structure, went on to become the Austro-Hungarian common finance minister, and as such was responsible for the administration of Bosnia.

This project draws from a wide variety of primary sources, printed as well as archival. The greatest single source is the Political Archive in the Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna. This contains the papers of the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry which necessarily constitute the backbone of such a study, including correspondence with the Belgrade consulate, with the embassy in Constantinople (to which, because of Serbia’s vassal status, the Belgrade consulate was formally subordinate), and inter-departmental exchanges of relevance to Serbian affairs. Also of use, in Vienna, were the files of the Austro-Hungarian army’s intelligence section, the Evidenzbüro, in the War Archive.

Second in order of importance are the Hungarian archival sources. The Hungarian National Archive contains the Kállay Papers, including Kállay’s Belgrade diary; while the National Széchenyi Library has the extensive Andrássy-Kállay correspondence, and the biographical material on Kállay compiled by Lajos Thallóczy.

There is also a wealth of printed primary material in this area. Not only are multi-volume collections of diplomatic documents available from the Prussian, Italian and French archives; but historians of the former Yugoslavia have long
had a convenient habit of publishing primary sources not only from their own national archives, but from those of other countries as well. What is more, such documents are usually reproduced in their language of origin. Thus, Vojislav J. Vučković’s collection on Serbian policy toward the Habsburg Monarchy’s South Slav provinces has material from Austrian, French and even British archives as well as Yugoslav ones. Nikola Petrović’s two-volume collection on the Hungarian Serb politician Svetozar Miletić provides a vast amount of Hungarian documentation, including items from the Andrássy-Kállay correspondence. Exhaustive selections from the papers of Serbian politicians like Ilija Garašanin and Jovan Ristić have been available in published form in the former Yugoslavia for decades.

In addition, one quite unique printed primary source has been essential. The original Kállay diary, in Hungarian, is preserved in the National Archive in Budapest, but has never been published in its original form. To remedy this deficiency, the Yugoslav historian Andrija Radenić brought out in 1976 his own Serbo-Croat translation of this massive source. Radenić’s edition is almost as valuable as the original, in that it contains a staggering apparatus of notes in which Radenić summarizes, and often quotes verbatim, reports, letters and even newspaper articles mentioned in the text of the diary itself. Despite being in a language to which, in the West, only the fortunate few have access, the published Kállay diary is necessarily the single most important source for this period of Austro-Serbian relations.

Notes


Wertheimer, *Graf Julius Andrásy*, 1:241; ch. 14; and 457.

Ibid., 459–63.

Ibid., 461; also vol. 2:42–46.

The War itself saw the appearance of the first serious *History of Serbia* in English, by H. W. V. Temperley (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1917); see 256–64.


Slobodan Jovanović, * Druga vlada Miloša i Mihaila* [The Second Government of Miloš and Michael] (Belgrade: Geze Kona, 1933 [1923]), 370–75; and Appendix I, “Prince Michael and Austria,” 471–81. Jovanović’s subsequent study of the reign of Prince (later King) Milan, published in 1926, still reflects this confusion, stating that the plan was hatched by the Hungarian government, but with the knowledge of Beust and Francis Joseph: *Vlada Milana Obrenović* [The Government of Milan Obrenović], vol. 1, 1868–1878 (Belgrade: Geze Kona, 1926), 114.

Jovanović, *Drugva vlada Miloša i Mihaila*, 474.

Jovanović, *Vlada Milana Obrenović*, 1:118. The *Ballhaus* was the seat of the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry in this period.


20 Grigor Jakšić & Vojislav J. Vučković, *Spoljna politika Srbije za vlade Kneza Mihaila (Prvi Balkanski savez)* [Serbia’s Foreign Policy under the Government of Prince Michael (The First Balkan Alliance)] (Belgrade: Istorijški Institut, 1963), 2, ch. 4, especially 396–403, and ch. 5, 460–64.

21 Ibid., 396–97.

22 Ibid., 461–63.

23 See below, note 61.


25 Ibid., 65.


29 Ibid., 366–67, 368–69. A more recent work in English by Krestić, *History of the Serbs in Croatia and Slavonia 1848–1914* (Belgrade: Beogradski Izdavačko-Grafički Zavod, 1997), adds little to this picture, although it does make reference to the published version of Kállay’s diary (see below, note 61), as well as the Kállay-Andrássy correspondence in the Hungarian archives.


32 Décshy, *Prime Minister Gyula Andrássy’s Influence*, 33–34.

33 See, for instance, ibid., 55.

34 Ibid., 35–36.

35 Ljiljana Aleksić-Pejković, *Politika Italije prema Srbiji do 1870. godine* [The Policy of Italy towards Serbia down to 1870] (Belgrade: Narodna Knjiga/Istorijski Institut, 1979), 326.


37 Ibid., 182.


Ibid., 233–38. On the Settlement Law, Galántai is clear (230) that “the Hungarian government counted in the ranks of the legal formulators of foreign policy. Without its consent the foreign minister could pursue no foreign policy initiative to its conclusion.”

Ibid., 234–30.


Ibid., 52–53.

Ibid., 74; also 76: “All in all Andrássy’s Balkan policy did not differ much from the practice of the Ballhausplatz over many years.”


Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, 57–58.


Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Ministerium des Äussern, Politisches Archiv (henceforward HHS, PA), including Administrative Registratur (AR); Abteilung XXXVIII (consular correspondence); XII (Turkey); XL (Interna); etc.

Kriegenarchiv (henceforward KA); all references are to *Evidenzbüro* papers, citing Faszikel number.

Magyar Országos Levéltár (henceforward MOL), Kállay Béni iratai (P344).

Országos Széchenyi Könyvtár (henceforward OSZK), Kézirattár (Manuscript Archive), Fol. Hung. (henceforward FH) 1649, 1689, 1732–33.

*Die auswärtige Politik Preußens 1858–1871: Diplomatische Aktenstücke*, ed. Erich Brandenburg et al. (Oldenburg: Reichsinstitut für Geschichte des neuen Deutschlands, 1933–39), henceforward *APP*;


Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Les

58 Politička akcija Srbije u južnoslovenskim pokrajinama Habsburške monarhije 1859–1874 [The Political Activity of Serbia in the South Slav Provinces of the Habsburg Monarchy], ed. Vojislav J. Vučković (Belgrade: Srpska Adademija Nauka i Umetnosti, 1965); henceforward Vučković.

59 Politička akcija Srbije u južnoslovenskim pokrajinama Habsburške monarhije 1859–1874 [The Political Activity of Serbia in the South Slav Provinces of the Habsburg Monarchy], ed. Vojislav J. Vučković (Belgrade: Srpska Adademija Nauka i Umetnosti, 1965); henceforward Vučković.


61 Dnevnik Benjamina Kalaja 1868–1875 [The Diary of Benjámin Kállay], ed. Andrija Radenić (Belgrade: Istorijiski Institut/Institut za Istoriju Vojvodine, 1976); henceforward Dnevnik. Where passages from the diary are quoted they are of course from the Hungarian original (henceforward Kállay Diary); but it should be pointed out that the quality of the Radenić translation is generally high, and those in a position to consult the Serbo-Croat edition can do so with confidence in its accuracy.
This page intentionally left blank
Chapter 1

Austria, Hungary, and Serbia in 1867

The Habsburg Monarchy in the year of the Ausgleich was still, in terms of territory and population, a great power. By commercial, financial and industrial standards, however, it was weak. Most debilitating of all, with its eleven different ethnic groups, the Monarchy faced a dilemma far more complex than that confronting other multinational empires. No other state in Europe found its foreign policy options so severely limited by nationality problems.

It was precisely this question of nationality, at least in its Hungarian form, which demonstrated the need for some lasting constitutional settlement. Constantly obliged to guard against a renewed revolt in Hungary during the absolutist period, the Monarchy could not pursue an effective foreign policy. Even during the Austro-Prussian War, when negotiations between the Emperor Francis Joseph and the Hungarian leadership were already under way, this interconnectedness of foreign and domestic policy was illustrated anew. Forced to cede Venetia to Italy, and to abandon the leadership of Germany to Prussia, Francis Joseph was finally brought to see the necessity of Hungarian cooperation, if he was to recoup these losses. Exclusion from Germany also meant that the position of the German element within the Monarchy was bound to be reduced substantially, while the position of the Hungarians was correspondingly enhanced. Hungarian leaders like Deák and Andrassy, for their part, knew all along that Hungary was too weak to stand on its own, and had to be part of a great power in order to have any influence over its own fate at all.

As far as foreign policy was concerned, the provisions made by the Ausgleich were straightforward. It was the differing emphasis on them subsequently by particular statesmen which produced much of the ambiguity in Habsburg foreign policy toward Serbia, as well as in other areas. As Louis Eisenmann pointed out,
strictly speaking there was no text of the Settlement: “Dualism is regulated by two laws, analogous or identical in content.”¹ The Hungarian Law XII of 1867, as the senior of these two laws by some six months, deserves to be regarded as the original version, the model of the subsequent Austrian law, and, on the subject of foreign affairs, the more unambiguous. Paragraph 8 stated that

The effective conduct of foreign affairs is one of the instruments of the common and joint defence which derives from the pragmatic sanction. The effectiveness of such conduct demands common treatment in respect of those foreign affairs which concern jointly all the lands under the rule of His Majesty. For this reason, the diplomatic and commercial representation of the empire abroad, and the measures that may arise as regards international treaties, shall be part of the tasks of the common minister for foreign affairs, [acting] in agreement with the ministries of both parties and with their consent. Each ministry shall inform its own legislature of the international treaties. Hungary, too, therefore considers these foreign affairs to be common. . . .²

This seemed at least to guarantee the right of the Hungarian government to be consulted in the formulation of foreign policy. Andrássy, as Hungarian minister president between 1867 and 1871, certainly believed in his right to be consulted, and even, on the evidence available, to make initiatives in foreign policy on his own.³
Chapter 1

The Austrian Statute 146 of 21 December 1867, by contrast, made no mention of the common foreign minister’s obligation to consult with the ministries of the two halves of the Monarchy. Article 1(a) stated to be “common”

Foreign affairs, including diplomatic and commercial representation abroad, as well as measures relating to international treaties, reserving the right of the representative bodies of both parts of the empire to approve such treaties, in so far as such approval is required by the Constitution.4

The discrepancy between the Hungarian Law XII and the Austrian Statute 146 in fact had little significance. “In practice, this omission [in the Austrian version] was disregarded, and the Ministers Presidents of both halves of the Monarchy were consulted equally.”5

In both the Hungarian and the Austrian laws the dominant role of the Emperor in foreign affairs was indisputable. Francis Joseph’s conception of his duty and prerogatives as a monarch was based on his position as supreme commander of the armed forces and overseer of the Monarchy’s relations with foreign powers. Control over both these spheres was regarded by him as the raison d’être of the 1867 Settlement in the first place. Thus whoever the common foreign minister might be, his appointment as well as his continuance in office remained absolutely a matter for the Emperor’s judgment, and in this

Map 2. Nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy
sence both Beust and, after him, Andrásy were executing the Emperor’s personal policy.

In practice, however, Francis Joseph was bound to rely to a considerable extent on the advice of his foreign minister, and both Beust and Andrásy were generally intelligent and adroit enough to tailor their policies in such a way as to ensure the Emperor’s endorsement. What was more, the situation after the Ausgleich meant that a forceful personality as either Austrian or Hungarian minister president was equally capable of exerting an influence over the Emperor. Andrásy, in the period 1867–71, made full use of this opportunity in matters relating to Serbia, as in other, larger foreign policy issues. The Hungarian minister president could, and did, raise foreign policy in private audience with the Emperor, and in the so-called crown council (the common ministerial council).

The crown council was where, if anywhere, influences outside the foreign ministry might be brought to bear on foreign policy. This body, however, met only on an ad hoc basis, and its agenda was variable, often not even touching on external affairs. And although, in addition to the Emperor and the common ministers, the army chief of staff, the Austrian and Hungarian ministers president and, as occasion required, ministers from their governments could all attend such councils if invited, a great deal once again depended on how forcefully they presented their case against this or that policy. In practice, there was little active interference in foreign policy from this quarter. “It was exceedingly rare that a foreign minister found himself overruled and forced to accept a particular positive policy.” Even here, the Emperor and foreign minister were free to ignore the council if they so chose, because it was a consultative body only.

The overall authority in foreign affairs remained the Emperor, and the common minister for foreign affairs was largely responsible to him. Parliamentary control over the policy of Emperor and foreign minister, in the sense of direct answerability to the Delegations, or indirectly to the Austrian or Hungarian parliaments, was notable by its absence. The principal task of the Delegations, elected by the two parliaments, was to vote the budget for the ministry of foreign affairs, and they had the right to discuss foreign policy. In practice this did not amount to anything, since delegation debates “were usually retrospective, and could in no way be said to determine foreign policy.” On occasion a delegation or parliament could give a foreign minister such a rough ride as to provoke his resignation, or cause the Emperor to dismiss him as an embarrassment. This was still a far cry from full public accountability in foreign affairs, and in the early years of the Dualist period what little outside influence was brought to bear on Francis Joseph and his foreign minister came almost exclusively from the office of the Hungarian minister president.

Any consideration of Francis Joseph’s personal role in foreign affairs has to take account of the fundamental change in his attitudes wrought by the defeat of
1866. However much he might have burned privately to avenge the humiliation of Sadowa, Francis Joseph made it clear to his ministers, at least, “it is Austria’s duty, for a long time to come, to renounce any idea of war.” The Habsburg Monarchy’s task for the immediate future must be to rebuild its shattered prestige and to hinder, by every peaceful means, the further aggrandizement of Prussia. In western Europe this meant a close relationship with France. In the Balkans it meant détente with Russia, reform in the Ottoman Empire, good relations with the Balkan principalities and vigilance against the spread from Serbia into the Monarchy of what Francis Joseph himself referred to as “Slavic agitation,” which “must be carefully watched.” It was a conservative policy, for which the Emperor found the ideal advocate in Beust.

The one area where Francis Joseph showed any inclination to abandon his new-found quietism was the question of territorial expansion. For the dynast’s wounded self-esteem the acquisition of new provinces, if this could be accomplished without war, offered important psychological compensation for 1859 and 1866. This had its bearing on relations with Serbia, since the only direction in which the Monarchy could hope to expand, after 1866, was southeast; and the main candidates for takeover were Bosnia and the Hercegovina. As we shall see, Francis Joseph, in common with many of the army leadership, was interested in the acquisition of Bosnia-Hercegovina from an early date, even if the
idea was not a policy agreed on with the foreign minister. Instead, the Emperor was encouraged to think along these lines not by Beust but by Andrássy, whose dabbling in the Bosnian question served to keep it at the forefront of the agenda throughout 1867–71.

Beust came to office with the same policy priorities as Francis Joseph. As he was at pains to stress to the rest of the ministerial council the day before his appointment, “The possibility of getting involved in a war must be avoided.” To some extent this renunciation of a war of revenge, reiterated in public, was tactical, since it is clear from subsequent events that both Beust and his master were counting on a French victory over Prussia in 1870, and would probably have been glad to reassert Austrian primacy in Germany in this case. But for the present, as was only sensible in view of Austria’s defeat, peace must be the first priority. The object of Beust’s German policy, therefore, was to hold Prussia on the Main.

Beust’s policy toward Russia and the Balkans was conditioned from the start by this imperative. Indeed it would not be too much to say that his first major initiative in the Eastern Question was an attempt to open doors in western Europe. In an effort to win French support he decided to propose a major reevaluation of the status quo in the Near East.

In a dispatch to his ambassador in Paris on 1 January 1867, Beust gave expression to concerns which had already begun to affect Austrian foreign policy before his accession to office. What gave Beust’s démarche point was the revival of the Eastern Question in acute form with the uprising in Crete, which raised once again the issue of the Ottoman Empire’s viability. If there were a general revolt against Ottoman rule in the Balkans, involving the great powers, the Monarchy could hardly afford to defend its interests by military means, since it was in the midst of reorganizing itself. On the other hand, the Monarchy’s interests as a great power made it impossible to contemplate a reordering of the power balance in southeastern Europe from which it was excluded, particularly if such an upheaval resulted in a Russian preponderance.

It was essential, therefore, to forestall an explosion by improving the lot of the Balkan Christian...
population, without at the same time impairing the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman administration would have to be reformed, and certain long overdue tactical concessions made, such as the evacuation of Ottoman garrisons from Serbia in May 1867. For this, however, it was equally essential for the powers to act in concert, as they were entitled to by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and since the Ottoman government was unlikely to respond to anything but collective pressure. Here, Beust reasoned, was the ideal occasion for the Austrian government to win some sort of control over Russian policy in the region, by inducing the Russians to work with the other powers; here, too, was the opportunity to associate France with Austria in a common diplomatic objective.

As far as the Eastern Question was concerned, the significance of the Beust démarche of January 1867 lay not in the fact that Napoleon III, for a variety of reasons, turned it down.16 What was revealing was Beust’s readiness to revise the Treaty of Paris in order to secure Russian cooperation, in particular to free Russia from the clauses which forbade it a military and naval establishment in the Black Sea.

Certainly one should not make too much of Beust’s apparent willingness to work with the Russians in the Near East, and to buy their collaboration by a revision of the Treaty of Paris. The Russians had already, late in 1866, noted with approval what Beust himself saw as a “new era” in Austria’s eastern policy, by which was meant the understanding of the Balkan Christians’ predicament, and the readiness to seek reforms in Ottoman administration.17 But this was not some attempt on Beust’s part to resuscitate the old conservative community of interests between the Russian and Habsburg courts. Beust, like Francis Joseph, was far too suspicious of Russia’s suspected role in stoking the fires of Balkan discontent to envisage Russia as a close working partner. Rather, his initiative showed an awareness of both the limitations and the possibilities open to Austria. If the Monarchy were to realize any of the potential which southeastern Europe offered for a great power role, including the possibility of territorial expansion, then this could only be done in agreement with Russia.

In the event, the Beust initiative came to nothing, because both France and Britain, as signatory powers, flatly vetoed the idea. Yet the thinking behind it shows the essential pragmatism of Beust’s diplomacy. The Habsburg Monarchy needed friends in Europe. It did not necessarily need military alliances, since it had no interest, in its weakened state, in provoking a war. Thus the suggestion of the Near East, as a field where France and Austria could work together, was a reasonable one. By the same token Russia, because of its community of interest with the Slavs, could never be an entirely reliable alliance partner, nor did Beust envisage it as such. Yet there existed a sufficient conservative identity of interests between Vienna and St. Petersburg for a loose working partnership in the Balkans to be a possibility. Beust, in short, was from the start a proponent of
the traditional Habsburg policy of remaining vigilant against Russian encroach-
ments, while seeking agreement where possible, as the likeliest means of averting
conflict between the two empires.19

Beust’s policy on one other matter was also affected by a traditional, cab-
inet-style outlook. This was the Bosnian question. Here Austrian policy had al-
ways been divided, with a minority opinion opposed to the Metternich principle
of preserving the status quo in the Balkans at all costs.20 The minority group,
which included Field Marshal Radetzky and the internuncio (ambassador) in
Constantinople from 1855 to 1871, Baron Anton von Prokesch-Osten, argued
that the Monarchy should pursue a more forceful line in southeastern Europe if
it wanted to counter Russian influence. Their advocacy of territorial expansion
was strategic: the Monarchy’s long strip of Croatian and Dalmatian territory was
regarded as militarily untenable, as long as its hinterland, Bosnia-Hercegovina,
was in foreign hands.21

What gave these annexationist projects an additional importance, after 1848,
was the presence of Francis Joseph on the throne. The fact that the young Em-
peror habitually surrounded himself with military advisers undoubtedly gave him
his subsequent interest in this particular idea. His belief in its feasibility can only
have been enhanced, in the early 1850s, by the fact that most of his conservative
advisers, such as the foreign minister, Buol, the ambassador to Paris, Hübner,
and the interior minister, Bach, were not only anti-Russian but firm advocates of
Austria’s expansion into the Balkans.22 The territorial losses of 1859 and 1866
only confirmed Francis Joseph’s inclination to look upon Bosnia as a field for
compensation. In February 1861, foreign minister Rechberg reemphasized this
aspect of Austria’s eastern policy:

It is of the greatest urgency to form, through satisfaction of the Slav population
of Dalmatia, a point of attraction for the Christian population of these hinter-
lands, which will make possible and facilitate Austria’s old policy with regard to
this part of the Near East.23

Francis Joseph may not have believed annexation of Bosnia was an urgent neces-
sity, but there can be little doubt that he would welcome annexation if it should
prove politically practicable.

Beust’s own policy with regard to Bosnia was flexible, and the fact that it
could be so proves that the Emperor, too, was not committed to any one option.
Beust’s views differed from the military, in that he was not of the opinion that the
Monarchy needed Bosnia for its own sake; the military usefulness of having the
provinces could not justify upsetting the precarious status quo in the Balkans. On
the other hand, on no account could the Monarchy tolerate an occupation of Bosnia
by Serbia. What had hitherto been a relatively weak principality would double in
size and resources, and could with time pose a real threat to the Monarchy.
The strength of Beust’s opinion in this matter is worth considering, in view of subsequent claims, from Wertheimer on, that Beust and Andrássy were essentially in agreement on the Bosnian question, or that Beust had no clear-cut ideas on eastern policy and weakly followed Andrássy’s lead. The subject was given renewed life in the fall of 1866, when a French memorandum openly suggested that the Monarchy should pursue its destiny in eastern Europe.

Not surprisingly, this document, communicated to all the chancelleries of Europe, gave the South Slav principalities of Serbia and Montenegro the impression that an Austrian move in the Balkans was imminent. In October 1866 the French consul in Belgrade reported that to the Serbian government this seemed “an invitation for Austria to seize provinces belonging to Turkey, and Bosnia and the Hercegovina have seemed especially threatened.” Serbian suspicions were just as strong by January 1867, when French as well as Austrian “representatives reported a sudden build-up in military preparations.

Beust’s principal reason for espousing the cession of the fortresses to Serbia in 1867 was to forestall an explosion in the European provinces of Turkey and the consequent disturbance of the status quo in the Near East, which would lead to unwelcome Russian interference and an active Austro-Russian clash of interests. Allied to these calculations, however, was the additional hope that, if the Monarchy helped procure a settlement of the fortress question, Serbia’s sensitivities on the subject of Bosnia might be blunted, if not ignored. For in the matter of Bosnia, Beust had no intention whatsoever of yielding to Serbian sensitivities.

Beust believed that, even if Serbia did win cession of the fortresses, such a settlement would probably have only a provisional value for the Serbian government. On the other hand, he had indications in December 1866 that Prince Michael might pursue a more moderate policy if he could point to tangible success in the fortress question.

With this, Beust contended, the Serbian government would have to be content; there could be no question of the Monarchy tolerating Serbian expansion into Bosnia. As the French ambassador to Vienna reported on 2 March 1867,

M. de Beust observed to me that the independence of Bosnia and the Hercegovina could only be the prelude to their annexation by Serbia. . . .

Now, this aggrandizement of Serbia would constitute a real danger for Austria, and it was easy to foresee that a Serbian state, thus enlarged by two important provinces, would not be slow to draw into its orbit Dalmatia, the Austrian Serbs of the Border included in the military districts, and Slavonia.

Austria had lost too much up to now for it to be possible for her to allow a source of permanent danger to be established in her neighbourhood, and a state of affairs which must fatally and necessarily lead to new conflicts and new sacrifices for her.

Bosnia and the Hercegovina must therefore stay with Turkey or belong to Austria.
Furthermore, Beust concluded, “if Bosnia and the Hercegovina ceased to belong to the Porte, Austria would soon take the necessary military measures to ensure that these provinces did not belong to anyone else.”

The extraordinary thing about the constitutional settlement being reached within the Monarchy, however, was that even as Beust stated his Balkan policy in such uncompromising fashion, his efforts were being undermined by the dynasty’s new partner in foreign policy, the Hungarian government. Even before the Ausgleich was concluded, contacts between Serbia and Hungary’s political leaders were tending in quite a different direction from that conceived in the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry.

Within Hungary, the way in which the Hungarian political elite handled the nationalities question acquired a wider significance once Hungary achieved self-government. Relations between the Magyars and the other nationalities threatened to deteriorate, as the realization sank in that the Monarchy and Hungarian leaders had made a deal at the expense of the nationalities. After 1867, as far as the nationalities were concerned, there was no longer anyone else to blame for their problems but the Hungarian government. For the latter it became more than ever important to acquire an influence over those aspects of foreign policy—in particular relations with Serbia and Romania—which might affect nationality issues within the Kingdom of Hungary.

The new leader of the Deákists, in 1867, shared the attitudes toward nationality issues of his senior colleagues, Deák and Eötvös; he also brought to the job an interest in foreign policy which was something unusual in Hungarian politics. Andrássy was a good example of the liberal aristocrat: cosmopolitan, politically adroit, genuinely broad-minded in matters of religion, a sincere, even pedantic champion of the Rechtsstaat, who nevertheless despised what he termed “the ideal” in politics and vaunted his sense of the art of the possible.

By 1867, Andrássy was, more than ever, obsessed with the danger to Hungary from Pan-
Slavism, and considered it vital for Hungary to be part of a great power which could resist this pressure. The installation of constitutional government in both halves of the Monarchy, coupled with the means of influencing foreign policy, were essential prerequisites for Hungarian security. Once in place, the 1867 settlement would enable Austria to fulfil its mission as “a bulwark against Russia.”

The sheer strength of Andrássy’s preoccupation with the threat of Russia and Pan-Slavism is hard to ignore. Throughout the period in which he was minister president he made this clear to all and sundry. In August 1868 Andrássy considered “a triumphant war necessary for the empire; we cannot wage this war against anyone but Russia.” Later that year he expressed his conviction that an active German policy was futile, “when we are threatened in the East.” In April 1869, he wanted “to turn the Empire’s whole attention towards the East.” The Italian embassy in Vienna, when the Franco-Prussian War began, reported Andrassy’s fear of Russia’s “secret dealings among the Slav populations of the Danube,” and that the Monarchy faced dying “like a scorpion surrounded by glowing coals.” That fall, Italy’s consul in Pest recorded Andrássy’s reaction to the Russian renunciation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris. Andrássy, the consul said, considered Serbia “the center of vast and formidable intrigues”; but “What seemed to me to upset my interlocutor most was fear of Russia.” Ten days later, the Italian summed up the mood of both Andrássy and his countrymen:

> Russia has always been, and is, the obsession, the bugbear, of the Hungarians. They . . . fear that Russia, relying on the Slav populations in Hungary, is trying to annihilate the Hungarian nation and to pass over its body in order to take possession of Serbia and Croatia and secure itself the domination of the Danube.

A year later, the Prussian consul commented of the new foreign minister, “Russia is on his mind day and night.”

It is not difficult to see how this Russophobia shaped Andrássy’s domestic policy as well as his attempts to influence Habsburg foreign policy. The Slav and Romanian populations of Hungary were treated from the start as subversives, disaffected by the propaganda of the power Andrássy habitually referred to as “Muscovy” (Muszka), as if to emphasize Russian barbarism. The Military Border in Croatia and southern Hungary, still under the direct control of the common war ministry in Vienna, was regarded as a standing threat to Dualism, a willing (because largely Croat and Serb) tool in the hands of what Kállay called “the Vienna reaction.” In the Balkans, Andrássy began his minister presidency determined somehow to bind Serbia to the Monarchy, or at least to Hungary, and thus neutralize the threat he considered it to pose.

Andrássy and the Deákists represented mainstream opinion as far as the treatment of Hungary’s nationalities was concerned. They rejected the idea of a Danubian confederation, which Kossuth eventually accepted in exile.
importance of schemes for confederation was rather in the reactions they elicited. The news of Kossuth’s conversion in 1862 seems to have convinced Deák of the need to make the final concessions required to reach a compromise with the Monarchy. More intangible is the legacy such projects seem to have left in the minds of the younger generation: as late as 1868 Kállay could refer to confederation as “the only possibility for us and for the Christian nations in Turkey.” In view of Kállay’s subsequent career it can only be assumed that his conception of confederation involved an unequivocal Hungarian, or rather Austro-Hungarian hegemony. This was also the position of Zsigmond Kemény, a leading Deákist who, in a pamphlet of 1851, recommended the Monarchy’s abandonment of its pretensions in Italy and Germany. Strengthened by accommodation with Hungary, Kemény argued, the Monarchy had to pursue outright hegemony in southeastern Europe. This would fulfil the dual function of frustrating South Slav and Romanian nationalism, and preventing Russian domination of the Balkans.

Kemény appears to have been unique in putting forward these ideas so early, and so frankly. Virtually all Hungarian politicians took it for granted that Balkan nationalism constituted a threat to Hungary and the Monarchy, and that Russian hegemony in the Balkans must somehow be prevented. Yet even Andrássy, at the outset of the Dualist era, still thought that these goals could be reached without the territorial involvement Kemény implied was necessary. Austria-Hungary’s mission was certainly in the East, but its security there could be assured by the creation of client states, by a possible territorial douceur to one of these states, Serbia, in the shape of Bosnia, and by political and economic domination of the area. It is a measure of the distance Andrássy had traveled that, by 1875, he was disposed to accept the Kemény thesis in its entirety. In this process of conversion Kállay, in Belgrade, played a vital role.

Hungary’s Croats and Serbs were naturally of importance in the context of relations between the Habsburg Monarchy and Serbia. The Croats in particular were a potential disruptive element since, in addition to the ethnic affinity between Croat and Serb, their open disaffection from both Vienna and Pest seemed to make them natural allies of Serbia.

In fact the reverse was the case after 1867. The Ausgleich, and the Croat-Hungarian compromise or Nagodba which sprang from it the next year, put the Hungarians between Croatia and the dynasty in a way that had not been possible before. Croatia retained its own administration and diet, or Sabor, but control of the provincial executive was firmly in the hands of the Hungarian government. With the exception of the so-called Unionists, whose manufactured majority in the Sabor ensured the passage of the Nagodba, virtually all shades of political opinion in Croatia rejected this state of affairs.

The most extreme of the political movements which existed in Croatia was the Party of Rights, which was not only anti-dynastic and anti-Hungarian, but
also virulently anti-Serb, claiming that the Serbs were nothing more than degenerate Croats who had embraced Orthodoxy. More complex was the movement known as Yugoslavism. Largely the inspiration of Franjo Rački, with the Bishop of Đakovo, Josip Juri Strossmayer, acting as political standard bearer, Yugoslavism aimed at an independent South Slav state, and at its most ambitious called for the union of all South Slavs, from the Slovenes in the north to the Bulgars in the south. It sought to bridge the vast differences which existed, and saw Croatia merely as part of a larger, federal state.

In the context of the 1860s, Yugoslavism had little chance of practical realization. Those of its advocates, like Strossmayer, who hoped to achieve anything in the shorter term joined the Croatian National Party. The National Party had its origin in the opposition to the Nagodba, and continued to press for greater substantive Croatian autonomy as well as the union of Dalmatia, which was still administered from Vienna, with the main body of Croatia-Slavonia. In doing so, however, the National Party never entirely shut the door on good relations with either the Hungarian government or the imperial authorities in Vienna. By the same token its leaders showed considerable interest, in the period immediately preceding the Ausgleich, in cultivating links with Serbia. Strossmayer, in particular, was of the opinion that the creation of any form of South Slav state inevitably involved the use of force, and that the role of “Piedmont” for the South Slavs could only be filled by Serbia.

All these visions of Serbo-Croat cooperation, however, ignored a fundamental reality. This was the enduring antagonism which historically divided the South Slav world. Moreover, the Serbo-Croat antagonism was reflected in two questions which both the Habsburg Monarchy and the new Hungarian government knew all too well how to exploit. One was the status of the Military Border in Croatia and southern Hungary. The other was the Bosnian question.

The Border was divided into territorially based regiments, the so-called Grenzer, and was populated by both Croats and Serbs. Its dissolution was one of the principal objectives of the Andrassy government, and was also desired by Croat nationalists, since the territories in question, apart from those in southern Hungary, would augment Croatia-Slavonia. In their attitude toward the substantial Serb minority within the Border, however, some Croat leaders betrayed an insensitivity that played right into the hands of successive Hungarian governments. In the years immediately after the Ausgleich, with dissolution clearly on the agenda in Budapest, the general mood among the Serb Grenzer was one of disillusionment and resentment that the Emperor should have handed them over in this fashion to a Croat administration in Zagreb. The whole issue was one that naturally divided Croats from Serbs.

Bosnia-Hercegovina was an even more divisive issue. Both Croats and Serbs laid claim to these Ottoman provinces; each side was represented there
by a sizeable minority; and each side ignored the fact that there was also a large Bosnian Muslim population. There was, however, no easy way of disentangling these groups from one another for the purpose of territorial division; yet neither Croat nor Serb nationalists would admit of any concession. The exception in this respect was Strossmayer, who reasoned that, if Serbia were to act as the Piedmont of the South Slavs, it made little sense for the rest of the South Slav world to dispute its claim to Bosnia. In the summer of 1866, with the agreement of his principal associates in the National Party, Strossmayer assured Prince Michael of his commitment to “common action between the Triune Kingdom [Croatia] and Serbia for the foundation of a Yugoslav state independent of both Austria and Turkey.” The Bishop even offered to serve Michael as a minister in such a state.

The negotiations between Strossmayer and Garašanin which resulted got as far as a draft agreement, in March 1867, on a “Programme of Yugoslav Policy.” This made clear that the initial purpose of Serbo-Croat cooperation was to free the South Slavs still under direct Turkish rule, but ultimately to prepare the ground “for the unification of all Yugoslav peoples [plemena] in a single federal state.” Liberation was to be pursued gradually as circumstances permitted, but at all times Belgrade and Zagreb would be the twin “poles” (stožera) of the movement, and complete agreement between them was essential. “The Croatian and the Serbian nationality is one, Yugoslav.” A rising in Bosnia would be instigated jointly by the Croats and Serbia in the summer of 1867, but the latter would not openly intervene for fear of great power intervention, especially by Austria. Instead, the insurgents would form a provisional government, call an assembly, and demand administration by Serbia under the suzerainty of the Sultan.

There could be little doubt that the leadership of the National Party, at this point, were prepared to concede Bosnia to Serbia, in the expectation that the unification of all South Slav lands would follow. The Sabor adopted a resolution, in May 1867, that “the Triune Kingdom recognizes the Serbian nation, which exists within it as a nation identical with and enjoying the same rights as the Croatian nation.” In reality this accord was far more fragile than its authors suspected. The single most important reason for this was the fact that Prince Michael was on the verge of changing his entire strategy in the Balkans and in particular with regard to Bosnia. The political will to work with the Croats over Bosnia was fading.

It should also be stressed, however, that the accord would probably have run into difficulties even if the Serbian government had not abandoned it. The leaders of the National Party were sincere in their goal of Serbo-Croat cooperation, but this goal was not shared by political opinion outside the Party. Even the National Party showed a certain nervousness at the idea of entrusting the Bosnian Croats to Serbia once it became apparent, in the course of 1867, that the Serbian government was seriously interested in doing a deal with the Hungarians.
Bosnian initiative, when it came, was a classic case of divide and rule, because it exploited the mutual suspicions of Croats and Serbs.

Among the Hungarian and Croatian Serbs, spread across the Military Border, Slavonia and southern Hungary, the Hungarian Serbs in particular had a prosperous middle class, which by 1867 had become the bearer of national consciousness in this part of the Monarchy. Their leaders were united in rejecting direct rule from either Vienna or Pest, and demanding some form of local autonomy. The Orthodox clergy, together with state employees and officers of the Military Border regiments, represented the conservative line, which placed its trust in accommodation with Vienna, and based its claim to an autonomous Vojvodina on the ancient privileges of the Serbs. The liberal middle class and intellectuals, led by Svetozar Miletic, argued not only for a Serbian-controlled Vojvodina, but also for a redefinition of the Vojvodina itself to reduce the numbers of the other nationalities in it. Miletic’s emphasis was less on historic rights and more on democratic self-government which, to be truly democratic, had to include self-government by all nationalities. The Vojvodina liberals were convinced that cooperation with the Hungarians, not the imperial government, offered better chances for the Serbs to attain their goal. In reality the majority of the Hungarian political leadership were opposed to autonomy within Hungary for any of the nationalities. From 1859 to the Ausgleich Hungarian politicians reciprocated Serb expressions of good will, but they did precious little else.

Miletic in February 1866 founded a newspaper, Zastava (The Standard), which rapidly became, in the words of one authority, “the most powerful voice of Serbian liberalism in the Balkans.” He was assisted in his work by Vladimir Jovanovic, a leading liberal exile from the Principality of Serbia; and it was Jovanovic, with Miletic’s backing, who was the driving force behind the foundation in August 1866 of the Ujedinjena Srpska Omladina or United Serbian Youth. This was more than just a student society. Jovanovic and Miletic specifically saw it as a broad-based cultural organization for “every Serb who felt himself young in heart.” In their view the political division of the Serbian nation between several separate states made it essential to have a society which would raise national consciousness; once this was done, political unification would inevitably follow.

Both Zastava and the Omladina brought the liberals among the Hungarian Serbs into conflict with Prince Michael’s government in Serbia. Michael and the liberals were at one over the need for an autonomous Vojvodina; they were even, until the Ausgleich disillusioned the Hungarian Serbs, united in wishing to cooperate with the Hungarians. But whatever its nationalist credentials, the Obrenovic regime was not noted for its liberalism, and after the summer of 1866 there was another reason for bad blood. Prince Michael was reproached in all quarters of the South Slav world for not taking advantage of Austria’s defeat to launch the great
war of liberation on behalf of the Balkan Christians; and Zastava was among the bitterest of these critics. There was considerable injustice in this: Michael was only too aware that Serbia’s real military potential was far less than its strength on paper would suggest. None of this, however, was known outside of Serbian government circles, and the problem was compounded by the events of 1867, when the Prince, at the very time the Hungarian government was abandoning its Serb minority, showed every sign of having done a deal with Budapest. The Vojvodina became, more than ever, the center of agitation against the Serbian government.70

Serbia, in 1867, posed more of a theoretical threat to peace in the Balkans than a real one. It was small, about a thousand square kilometres, and would have
fitted tidily into the Habsburg Monarchy a score of times. Its population still numbered only a million, the vast majority of whom made their living off the land in a country with virtually no modern infrastructure. Its official military strength was a sham, rather like the frog that inflates itself to twice its size to impress its enemies. Though autonomous, its Prince was still a vassal of the Sultan.

Yet the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires feared what Serbia might yet become. A greater Serbia would be a power to reckon with, particularly since it could only aggrandize at the expense of its neighbors to north and south. Even if its expansion were prevented, Serbia's importance from the strategic and communications point of view could only grow. Both the intended regulation of the Danube as an international waterway, and the pressure to complete a rail link between central Europe and Constantinople, made the powers all the more anxious to secure some influence over Serbia. The political and economic interests involved made Belgrade one of the diplomatic listening posts of Europe.

The country's political institutions remained basically autocratic with a constitutional gloss. In the 1860s the practice of government under the Obrenović was laid down by a number of organic laws passed by the Skupština, or national assembly, at the behest of Prince Miloš and his son Michael. By these, effective power resided solely with the Prince and the executive agents of his power, the ministers. The Prince could select whom he pleased as his ministers, and did so. Each minister, moreover, was responsible directly to the Prince, not the minister president, who was more a coordinator of ministerial activity than a prime minister.
in the modern sense. Civil servants owed their jobs entirely to the favor of the Prince, and substantial inroads were made on local self-government by giving the state a greater say in the election of local officials.\textsuperscript{74}

The \textit{Skupština} remained the one relatively unfettered institution in Serbia, because it was more an open debating society than a genuine parliament with effective control of the executive. As a purely consultative assembly it could neither initiate legislation nor amend it. The franchise amounted to universal adult male suffrage, but since the ballot was open the government was free to use corruption and intimidation at elections. Yet the \textit{Skupština} could still produce an opposition, as in 1867 when thirty deputies opposed to the government were returned. Their importance lay not in what they could do, but in their freedom, once elected, to speak against the government. The single most powerful domestic constraint on the Prince was the fear of an upsurge of popular opinion against him. In times of national emergency the \textit{Skupština} was the one obvious channel for this, and the Serbian government ignored it at its peril. Both Michael, and the Regency which followed him, were acutely conscious of the need for national legitimacy, and this continued to shape their foreign policy in particular.\textsuperscript{75}

The Austro-Hungarian \textit{Ausgleich} began within months to exert an influence over Serbian foreign policy which was, as always, heavily constrained by the relations of the great powers to one another. In 1867 the European scene was already dominated by the Franco-Prussian antagonism, and a natural result of this was that France began seriously to explore the possibility of alliance with Austria. In the Balkans the insurrection in Crete rumbled on, raising tension among all the other Balkan Christians. Yet for Serbia the decisive factor was the arrival of a Hungarian government on the scene.

Prince Michael was personally more inclined than most of his countrymen to respond favorably to Hungarian overtures. He had spent most of his exile in either Hungary or Vienna, had married a Hungarian countess, and was the owner of an estate in northern Hungary. Unlike his father, Michael had absorbed much of the culture and outlook of a westernized central European aristocrat.\textsuperscript{76}

There was more to this, however, than personal sentiment. In 1861 and 1866 Michael’s government attempted to help improve relations between the Hungarian leadership and Hungary’s Serbs. Michael saw the Habsburg Monarchy as the single most steadfast and dangerous opponent of his plans for the liberation of the Balkan Christians and the formation of a greater Serbia. It was fundamental to his conception of things that, in this struggle against Austrian interference, the Hungarians were the natural allies of the Serbs. The two peoples, in his opinion, had a mutual interest, within the Monarchy, in working together to counteract the centralizing tendencies of Vienna.\textsuperscript{77}

In March 1861, talks in Pest between representatives of the Serbian government and the leading Deákists made clear enough the two sides were poles apart.
“The Serbs brought up the question of the Vojvodina restoration,” recalled Jovan Ristić in his memoirs, “but the Hungarians at once declared that there could be no talk of ‘the state within the state.’” This was not, however, the end of the story. The Serbian judge, Nikola Krstić, suggested to the government that he go to Pest and try again to bridge the gap. Krstić was to remain in Pest until August 1861, and had a number of remarkable exchanges with the Hungarian leaders.

On 25 April he was warmly received by Eötvös who, he found, feared the Serbs’ secession, and also that “then the Vlachs [Roumanians], Slovaks and Ruthenes . . . will all demand territory.” This response was representative of most of Krstić’s subsequent contacts with the Hungarians, both in its willingness to seek some form of accommodation, and in its determination to preserve the unity of the Hungarian state. Deák, in June, said that it was “not possible to concede the political and territorial dismemberment of the country or support the demand to create even now a federal state.” At the root of the Hungarians’ response, Krstić felt, was their “terror of Pan-Slavism.” Most susceptible to this vision was Andrássy, whom Krstić met early in July:

Eötvös and Szálay have scared this man, representing to him the danger which threatens the Hungarians if they satisfy all the nationalities. He is against regrouping the counties according to nationality, and wants to put off the Serbian question to some other time. . . .

Krstić thought Andrássy “an honourable man,” but “his arguments are not strong enough.”

In 1866, Austria’s defeat at Sadowa raised anew the possibility of the Monarchy’s disintegration. Prince Michael felt that Sadowa offered an opportunity to explore once more the idea of Serbo-Hungarian cooperation, and he sent Krstić back, this time with a letter to László Hunyadi, the Prince’s brother-in-law, proposing a “pact” between Serbia and Hungary. Krstić’s detailed report on the Hungarian response contains some radical suggestions which, if sincere, throw a strange light on Andrássy’s conception of Hungary’s future role in the Monarchy.

By this time it was clear that a major restructuring of the Habsburg Monarchy was imminent. An autonomous Hungarian government was in the offing, and Andrássy was certain to lead it. Prince Michael, Hunyadi told Krstić, could rest assured that in this case the interests of Hungary’s Serbs would be safeguarded. As for Serbia itself, a Hungarian government would assist it in gaining the cession of the Ottoman-held fortresses, by blocking the flow of supplies from Austrian territory for the Ottoman garrisons. In return, Serbia would be expected to maintain an army brigade on the Austro-Serbian frontier, ready to march into Hungary should the Hungarian government require assistance. Above all, there must be “an alliance for mutual defense and mutual offense,” formally concluded between the two governments.
Even today it is difficult to know how seriously to take these proposals. Jakšić and Vučković flatly deny the Hungarians’ sincerity. Whatever the emerging constitutional settlement, they observe, the Hungarian government would still not be empowered to conclude treaties and conduct a foreign policy. They suggest the entire incident was a ruse to keep Serbia from starting any trouble in the Balkans while the Dualist settlement was being agreed upon.87

Yet it is conceivable that Andrásy genuinely believed an alliance was practicable. Andrásy was not noted for his consistency, and in 1866 he may have ignored the necessary limitations which the Dualist settlement would impose on any Hungarian government.88 In fact the subsequent history of relations with Serbia demonstrates amply that, at least as Hungarian minister president, Andrásy continued to behave as if Hungary could pursue its own foreign policy. What is beyond doubt is the Hungarian leadership’s conviction that the Serbian connection would be an invaluable means of putting pressure on Vienna. Hunyadi made it clear to Krstić that “we [the Hungarians] have to take care that Austria is preserved as a great state.”89 But at the same time it was essential that Francis Joseph be shown the limitations of his power. “The Hungarian statesmen have in mind the idea of Dualism for present-day Austria, and by this treaty with Serbia they would show in which direction it was necessary to conduct the policy which affects Hungary.”90 As Hunyadi put it to Prince Michael himself, if the affair was kept secret until the treaty was concluded Andrásy could present Vienna with a “fait accompli.”91

True to his word, Andrásy had no sooner been appointed minister president than he invited Prince Michael, through Hunyadi, to send an emissary to Pest. This, Hunyadi intimated, would be to Serbia’s advantage, “because now the Hungarians are going to have an influence even on Austria’s foreign policy.”92 Garašanin, briefing Krstić for his third foray into Hungary, was suspicious. He wanted Krstić to impress two things on Andrásy. First, “the Hungarians must make their peace with the Serbs and Croats.”93 Second, the thing Serbia and Hungary had most in common was that they were threatened not only by the Russians but by the Germans.94

It is important to bear in mind the background to Krstić’s arrival in Pest on 28 February. The winter of 1866–67 had been dominated, as far as Serbia was concerned, by the issue of the fortresses, and by the first signs of a breakthrough in Michael’s plans for a Balkan alliance. The time, at least to Garašanin, seemed increasingly to favor action. Beust, however, lost no time in making clear to the Serbian government that under no circumstances would the Monarchy tolerate Serbia’s presence in Bosnia. At the same time, he supported Serbia’s request that the Turks evacuate the last of their troops from Serbian soil, and the need for reform in the Ottoman Empire.

This is where the role of the new Hungarian government becomes a matter for debate. What precisely, at the very moment Beust was reining in the Serbian government, was Andrásy up to with his invitation to Prince Michael? Was he
trying to exert some not so subtle pressure on Vienna, by demonstrating Hungary’s influence in Belgrade? Was he acting in collusion with Beust, in a Machiavellian bid to distract Serbia from its Balkan program?95 Or was he playing a game of his own, exploring the relationship with Serbia in the hope of ameliorating the situation inside Hungary, by securing Serbia’s non-involvement with Hungary’s South Slavs, and at the same time tying Serbia somehow to Hungary’s side and negating Russian influence? The evidence suggests the third of these explanations.

Hunyadi, who first saw Krstić, told him that “Andrássy wants to conclude a treaty with Serbia,” but was not forthcoming about the details. If Austria disintegrated, said Hunyadi, it would be necessary “to found a new state,” in which the interests of both Serbia and Hungary would be safeguarded.96 The interview with Andrássy himself was even more peculiar. Krstić was bluntly asked, “What were Serbia’s intentions and what was to be done with us?” He was told that Andrássy now had the personal confidence of the Emperor, and “was in a position to effect something with Beust via the Emperor himself.”97 Krstić replied that Serbia’s only goals were the evacuation of the fortresses, and the liberation of the Serbs under direct Ottoman rule. Andrássy “recognized the reasonableness and justification of the Serbian demands,” but held that “it would be a bad thing if Serbia . . . provoked by force a war over this matter.”98 He then warmed to his favorite theme:

“both we and you have to guard against one and the same danger . . . from Russia. In order to block Russia’s path . . . there must be a strong state in the middle of Europe. That state is ourselves—Hungary. . . . Hungary . . . must be like a wall between Serbia and the Serbian lands and Russia, on the one hand, and the Germans, on the other.”99

Andrássy made a couple of promises, which are crucial to an understanding of how relations developed in the period between the Ausgleich and 1871. They also provide a fairly clear idea of what Andrássy was trying to do. The first concerned the Monarchy’s position vis-à-vis Bosnia:

Andrássy said to me . . . that Serbia had nothing to fear from any other quarter than Russia. . . . the former Austria . . . might perhaps even have had the wish to annex lands beyond the Danube. . . . But for Austria to do anything in this direction, apart from or without Hungary, to annex these lands, was not to be thought of, nor would Hungary permit it.100

Krstić elicited the second promise, when he ventured the opinion that the only way to avert an uprising of the Balkan Christians would be to entrust the administration of Bosnia, the Hercegovina and Old Serbia to Prince Michael. The Sultan would continue as suzerain, and as such would receive tribute; but otherwise Serbian national aspirations would be satisfied. “Andrássy approved this, remarking that . . . Turkey cannot last, but . . . that it would be well to arrange this by peaceful means.”101
Krstić received the impression that Andrásy’s overriding interest in sounding the Serbian government in this way was his fear of a Serbo-Turkish war, and the repercussions this would have in Hungary. But there was something else that proved Andrásy was acting on his own initiative and not in concert with Beust. This was the definite offer of assistance in securing the administration of Bosnia-Hercegovina for Serbia, coupled with a denial of the Monarchy’s own interest in these provinces. As we have seen, this flew in the face of Beust’s clearly expressed policy opposing a Serbian takeover, and moreover ignored the influential voices in Vienna which were anything but disinterested in Bosnia. More important, by dangling the Bosnian carrot before the Serbs’ eyes Andrásy was opening a Pandora’s box of nationalist aspirations, one that neither he nor his successors as foreign minister ever succeeded entirely in shutting again. For the carrot worked, in the short term: it induced Prince Michael virtually to abandon his Balkan program in the course of 1867, and it kept him and the Regency which succeeded him on a pro-Hungarian course for several years. At the end of this period, however, the scales fell from the Serbians’ eyes, and the resulting bitterness remained the dominant note in Serbo-Hungarian relations from then on. By then Andrásy had completely reversed his policy concerning Bosnia; but the Monarchy was to pay dearly for the thoughtlessness with which, as Hungarian minister president, he had made his first foray into the realm of foreign policy.

The immediate consequences, though, were gratifying. Prince Michael was already conscious of being torn between two policies. A sombre, brooding personality, agonisingly indecisive beneath his autocratic exterior, Michael could see the advantages of heeding Beust’s advice, which would secure cession of the fortresses, at least, without a shot being fired. He could also see the disadvantage in pursuing an aggressive policy which might lose Serbia everything. Now the Hungarian government, in seeming contradiction to Vienna, held out the possibility of acquiring Bosnia. It must have seemed to Michael too good an opportunity to leave unexplored.

There were other inducements to quietism. At the beginning of March 1867, in response to the rumors about Serbian designs on Bosnia, the Austrian government ordered the concentration of troops along its southern frontier. Beust followed this up with a more diplomatic warning, and in this he was careful to involve the new Hungarian government. In agreement with Andrásy, he sent another personal friend of Michael, Count Edmund Zichy, to Belgrade in March with a letter from Francis Joseph. The idea was to warn Michael against any disturbance of the status quo, but to do so in a way that would show him that the Monarchy was not otherwise ill-disposed to him.102

Michael was ready to respond to these overtures. At the same time he stressed that the maladministration of the Ottoman Empire’s Christian provinces
remained a constant source of trouble, and brought up again the idea mooted by Krstić in Pest, that Serbia be given the administrative responsibility for Bosnia. Michael represented the project as his own, and asked Beust to treat it in strictest confidence; but it is hard not to believe that he was encouraged to make the proposal by Andrássy’s prior espousal of it. The final warning, however, came from outside, and may have been in the end the most convincing. None of the great powers was prepared to countenance Serbia’s expansion into Bosnia, not even Russia. The most decisive put-down, however, came from Paris: as far as the French government was concerned, Serbia had no business in Bosnia, and the Habsburg Monarchy had the right to make sure things stayed that way.103

The reason for this veiled threat lay in the diplomatic manoeuvring of the powers in 1867, the principal feature of which was France’s search for partners against Prussia. Napoleon III was perfectly prepared not to oppose the Monarchy’s occupation of Bosnia, in return for a firm commitment to France. Beust, however, argued in favor of an alliance directed against Russia. It was to explore this counter-proposal that Francis Joseph and Napoleon, attended by their foreign ministers, met at Salzburg between 18 and 23 August 1867.104

As a chapter in the story of Franco-Austrian alliance negotiations, Salzburg was a failure: the only formal result of the talks was an anodyne protocol on the Eastern Question, in which both states agreed to work for the preservation of the status quo.105 In view of what had gone before, however, it is unlikely that Napoleon III did not raise the subject of Bosnia again, if only to make it clear that, should circumstances one day permit it, the French government would not object to the Monarchy’s presence there. Serbia, too, was undoubtedly on the agenda, since the summer had seen a steady trickle of reports from the Balkans about the Serbian armaments program, the activities of the Bulgarian revolutionary committees, and Russia’s presumed role in directing preparations for revolt.106 As Beust put it in a memorandum for Francis Joseph, “The most imminent danger to Austria threatens from Russia.”107

Andrássy also attended the talks in Salzburg. There is little record of his contribution, but it would have been natural for him to express his opinion on the subject of Serbia and Bosnia. In view of his statements subsequently, this opinion can only have been one hostile to an annexation of Bosnia, and in favor of winning Serbia away from its supposed thraldom to Russia.108 What is really at issue, as far as Salzburg is concerned, is just how far, if at all, Andrássy was in agreement with Beust and Francis Joseph for what he did next. For Andrássy went from Salzburg direct to visit Prince Michael Obrenović at the latter’s country estate of Ivánka in northern Hungary, arriving there on the twenty-fourth or twenty-fifth of August.

The literature on what happened at Ivánka is contradictory, depending on who had access to which sources.109 Basically Andrássy’s purpose was to discuss with Michael face to face the project floated in March 1867, of Serbian cooperation
with Hungary in return for a helping hand over Bosnia. The documentary evidence for this, however, is problematical, since neither of the two participants left any written account of their meeting. The accounts which do survive are all second hand, and historians have been divided ever since as to what they signify.

The first record we have is a memorandum begun, but not completed, by Garašanin in December 1867, after his dismissal by Michael. To this we owe our knowledge of most of the circumstances surrounding the meeting: that Andrássy arrived direct from Salzburg; that he was closeted for five hours with the Prince and left immediately after dinner to return, not to Pest, but to Vienna; that Garašanin was excluded from the conversations entirely, though he remained a guest at Ivánka throughout Michael’s stay there.

Unfortunately Garašanin stopped short of recording whatever he might have learned subsequently of what was actually discussed. He knew that some inducement had been offered Michael, the proofs of which were Michael’s change of course and Garašanin’s own fall from power. He also reiterated his firm conviction that Hungary will never be a sincere ally of Serbia. No matter what promises she makes to Serbia, and no matter what dazzling prospects she holds before her eyes, all that must never be believed.

But beyond these general fulminations all Garašanin could add was the surmise that Andrássy must have concerted his démarche with Beust at Salzburg, “not to mention Napoleon,” otherwise he would not have gone back to Vienna upon leaving Ivánka.

Subsequent evidence comes from a letter to Prince Michael from László Hunyadi in the spring of 1868. The Prince’s brother-in-law sent him a geographical description of Bosnia, since “if we should ever have serious talks about these provinces, it will be good to have good and precise maps, on which we can easily arrange an eventual partition.” Much more explicit is a lengthy report to the Serbian government in July 1868 by Colonel Orešković, who was sent to confer with Andrássy by Prince Michael but only finished the talks after the Prince’s assassination. According to Orešković, Andrássy told him that an uprising in Turkey could only be dangerous if Serbia helped it, but Serbia will not help it because the Serbian government will not allow this, especially the Prince, who told him in a conversation which he had with him last year that it would by no means permit Serbia to get involved in a war.

In return, Andrássy at least claimed that he favored a Serbian takeover of Bosnia, despite the “strong military party” in Vienna which clamored for the provinces on Austria’s behalf. Orešković quoted him as saying “we have too many Slavs in Hungary. . . . I would prefer you to take Bosnia and the Hercegovina than for them to be annexed by us.” And again:
take Bosnia and the Hercegovina; we won't intervene, and we won't allow anyone else to intervene. If Russia gets involved in the least bit, you know that all Europe will be against you.\textsuperscript{118}

Much later, the picture was complicated by Jovan Ristić and Milan Piroćanac, respectively Serbian representative at Constantinople and head of the Serbian foreign ministry at the time. Ristić claimed that Michael had often discussed with Andrássy at Ivánka. The latter had apparently given Michael an account of Salzburg, in particular of how he, Andrássy, had opposed Napoleon III’s suggestion that the Monarchy occupy Bosnia. This was the source for Andrássy’s famous statement that “The Hungarian ship is so full that it would only need one more weight to sink it.”\textsuperscript{119} Andrássy had also warned Michael of the dangers of Russian “Pan-Slavist” policy, and complained of the anti-Hungarian attitude of leading Serbians like Garašanin. But Ristić denied that Michael had ever talked about being offered Bosnia. All Andrássy wanted, Ristić believed, was for Serbia to avoid stirring up the Hungarian Serbs.\textsuperscript{120}

In 1867 Piroćanac worked closely with Garašanin. He too regarded Andrássy’s appearance at Ivánka as “sufficient proof that the Emperors, at their [Salzburg] meeting, had turned their attention seriously to the situation in the East.”\textsuperscript{121} It was essential for the Monarchy to cover its back in the event of European war, hence the Andrássy mission. And Piroćanac was in no doubt that “Prince Michael must have been promised at Ivánka that France and Austria, in the event of the victory of French arms, would really help him to acquire Bosnia and the Hercegovina.”\textsuperscript{122} Piroćanac’ most interesting detail was the assertion that Michael could never really have believed in these promises, coming as they did from such a quarter, and in such a way; he therefore can have committed himself to nothing at Ivánka.\textsuperscript{123}

There are practical objections to virtually all these accounts of Ivánka. It seems easiest to dismiss Ristić’s belief that no offer of Bosnia was ever made: the evidence for the existence of such an offer, in the Hunyadi and Orešković documents, is hard to ignore, and a similar offer had been made to Krstić in March 1867.

Yet is is equally hard to believe that the Austrian chancellor, let alone the Emperor, can have been associated with such an offer, which contradicted both traditional Habsburg opposition to the expansion of Serbia, and the interest of the Emperor and the military in acquiring Bosnia themselves. Even for the Hungarians the offer only made sense on the basis of a close Serbian association with the Monarchy, which as it turns out is what Andrássy had in mind. And in any case the Hungarian government was not in a position to conclude foreign treaties of this nature on its own, and Andrássy was undoubtedly aware of this. For him to have assumed otherwise would have been remarkably naive. So in view of the fact that the authorities in Vienna were unlikely to have
supported such a project, and that the Hungarian government could not go ahead on its own, can the offer have been sincere, and how much did Beust and the Emperor know about it?

The second of these questions is the easier to answer, yet even here the evidence is inconclusive. Beust undoubtedly knew of such a plan: he even says in his memoirs that “it was communicated to me early in 1867,” which would have been at the time of the Krstić mission. There is, however, no direct or indirect record of what either Beust or Francis Joseph thought of the project, or whether they were even consulted. Yet the sheer improbability of Andrassy traveling hot-foot from Salzburg, where he had been an important participant, to the private estate of the Prince of Serbia, and then back to Vienna, and all without discussing his actions at some point with the two figures responsible for foreign policy, has only to be stated to be dismissed.

Even so, Beust at least may well have known all about the plan without approving it and, even more important, without feeling he could do anything to stop Andrassy putting it to the test. Andrassy was a personable and eloquent politician and courtier: on more than one occasion, over the four years of his minister presidency, he was quite capable of steering around Beust by confronting the Emperor personally. And Beust, for all the clarity of his thinking on the issues which faced the Monarchy, could on occasion show irresolution and a reluctance to meet opponents head-on, particularly in the case of Andrassy. There is, however, another possibility: Andrassy could conceivably have undertaken the trip to Ivánka on his own, and then reported back to Vienna with another fait accompli. He had, after all, talked of just such a coup back in 1866.

Much of the above must remain speculation. Historical opinion on the matter has tended to divide into three categories. Yugoslav historians have been apt to characterize the entire Bosnian scheme as an elaborate and unscrupulous hoax, concerted between Beust and Andrassy, whose sole object was to induce Serbia to cease its preparations for insurrection in the Balkans, thus destroying Serbia’s moral leadership of the Balkan Christian nationalities and weaning it away from Russian influence.

Vasilije Krstić is one such voice, but cites no clear evidence for his conclusions. The evidence for collusion between Beust and Andrassy, for instance, is entirely circumstantial, apart from the claim made by Garašanin in December 1867 that Andrassy’s initiative was “arranged with Beust.” On the basis of this alone Krstić concludes that “The Austrian chancellor [Beust] could not, in this regard, promise anything, because his position vis-à-vis Bosnia was well known. . . . The Hungarian viewpoint in connection with Bosnia was not known.” Krstić continues, “As far as Andrassy’s promises with regard to Bosnia were concerned, they were completely insincere.” The only real evidence cited for this, however, consists, first, of a remark supposed to have been
made by Andrássy to the Austrian ambassador to Constantinople, in the sum-
mer of 1867, that if the Serbs were to invade Bosnia, the Monarchy would be
obliged to invade Serbia itself.128 The second proof Krestić offers of Hungarian
perfidy is the guarded opinion of Benjámin Kállay in May 1868, who thought
it “very probable that sooner or later Bosnia . . . will become part of our terri-
tory.” Yet even Krestić includes Kállay’s next sentence, which concludes “But
the time for this has still not come.”129 Both sources merely confirm what has
long needed emphasis: that Hungarian politicians were not inexorably opposed,
in all circumstances, to any extension whatsoever of the Monarchy’s (including
Hungary’s) Slav-populated territories.

A more subtle analysis is offered by the earlier work of Jakšić and
Vučković. They rightly mention the constitutional constraints on Andrássy’s
actions, as well as the absolutely essential condition of the Bosnian offer, in his
eyes: that Serbia could only be allowed to take over Bosnia if it were firmly in
the Monarchy’s orbit.130 Nevertheless, Jakšić and Vučković also conclude that
Andrássy may well have been insincere; but all they adduce is a letter from him
to Count Lajos Batthyány in 1849, in which the twenty-six year old Andrássy
seemed to imply that promises made to the Slavs could be changed if Hungary
emerged victorious.131

A second, more restrained line of interpretation stresses the extent to which
the idea of a Serbia closely bound to the Monarchy was at least feasible politi-
cally, and thus a sort of legitimation of the Bosnian scheme. Because of this it was
something that Beust and Francis Joseph might have thought worth investigat-
ing, even if they had their doubts; and Andrássy was accordingly unleashed, on a
sort of freelance diplomatic mission. This appears to be the position reached by
Heinrich Lutz, for whom Beust’s position in the matter was “not clear.” The result
was “a separate Hungarian policy” which nevertheless, Lutz argues, remained
semi-officially linked to that of the joint foreign ministry. As evidence for this
Lutz cited not only the Bosnian scheme but the later proposal in 1870 of an alli-
ance, which was cooked up in the joint ministerial council in order to “neutralize”
Serbia during the Franco-Prussian War.132

Neither of these interpretations, however, seems entirely to fit the facts. In-
stead, the argument intuited over fifty years ago by Slobodan Jovanović, on the
basis of the Serbian archives and scanty memoir literature, and only recently
buttressed by József Galántai’s and Imre Ress’s studies of Hungarian archival
material, makes more sense.

Jovanović, in his revised study of Prince Michael’s regime, correctly per-
cieved the genuine duality of foreign policy in the Monarchy, from the moment
the Andrássy government was appointed: “Beust was not the only maker of for-
eign policy.”133 Certainly Andrássy, on the basis of the known documentation,
held out the hope of acquiring Bosnia to Prince Michael. With little hard evidence
to back up his interpretation, Jovanović nevertheless outlined what he thought must have been Andrásy’s motives:

According to his [Andrássy’s] plans, Bosnia had to be the baksheesh which would be given Michael for sacrificing Hungarian Serbdom to the Magyars, and which would finally detach him from Russia and bind him to Austria.\footnote{134}

It would have the additional advantages of driving a wedge between Serbia and Croatia, both of whom claimed Bosnia, and destroying Serbia’s role as the Balkan Piedmont. This meant Russia, which relied primarily on Serbia as a stalking horse, in Andrássy’s eyes, would be unable to reopen the Eastern Question.

Jovanović made some other observations which, in the light of subsequent developments, seem apt. Benjámin Kállay was selected by Andrássy as his candidate for Belgrade consul because, among other attributes, he was “Feuer und Flamme” (in Wertheimer’s phrase) for the Bosnian scheme.\footnote{135} Beust, by contrast, was most definitely against the scheme, as his official instructions to Kállay at the start of the latter’s consulship, in April 1868, amply demonstrate.\footnote{136} Andrássy, however, “probably hoped that, with time, his influence would triumph over Beust’s.” Thus, “alongside Beust’s foreign policy, he conducted in secret his own, ‘reconnoitering the terrain’ for those of his plans which Beust didn’t approve.”\footnote{137} And so it proved: what amounted to a Hungarian shadow foreign policy emerged, with Kállay as its exponent in Belgrade. For the moment, in view of Beust’s obduracy, Andrássy could only ask Prince Michael to cooperate over the Hungarian Serbs, to keep the peace in the Balkans, and steer clear of the Russians. In return, Andrásy would do his level best to prevent any Austrian occupation of Bosnia.\footnote{138}

Galántai’s recent research bears out this interpretation, despite taking up the story only after June 1868. He stresses the constitutional importance of Hungary in foreign policy after the Ausgleich.\footnote{139} That Andrásy wished to influence policy is beyond doubt, and Galántai’s summation of his motives and goals with regard to Serbia closely resembles Jovanović’s. Andrásy’s principal object was to bind Serbia to the Monarchy, since in his view the Ottoman Empire was doomed to collapse, and in this case it was essential for the Monarchy to get in ahead of Russia. “This was feasible, if Serbia received a large part of Bosnia and [the] Hercegovina with the Monarchy’s help.”\footnote{140} Most important, Galántai makes clear that, despite the vague approval attributed to Beust by Baron Orczy in 1869, “Andrássy did not prosper with his plan as far as Beust was concerned.”\footnote{141} If that was the case after June 1868, it is hard to believe the plan would have found any greater favor in 1867.

Finally, Imre Ress, in the only full-length study to date of Andrásy’s Serbian policy, makes clear just how much it differed from Beust’s. Whereas the chancellor was not averse to the idea of territorial expansion in cooperation with
Russia, Andrásy aimed to recruit Serbia into an “anti-Russian coalition”; indeed, to “torpedo” Beust’s allegedly Russophile Eastern policy.\footnote{142}

It remains, briefly, to record the effect the Hungarian minister president’s initiative had on Serbian foreign policy. For Andrásy’s scheme paid off, at least in the short term. Prince Michael, as Piroćanac maintains, may never have completely abandoned his previous strategy of Balkan alliance and insurrection.\footnote{143} But the effect was the same as if he had.

Michael’s policy differences with Garašanin were already becoming obvious, and in November 1867 the latter was abruptly dismissed. His departure was perhaps the single most decisive signal that could have been made that the Serbian government was no longer in the business of fomenting rebellion in the Sultan’s domains. Michael was keeping his side of the bargain.

Other earnest of what Jakšić and Vučković call “Michael’s U-turn”\footnote{144} were already to hand. Relations with the Balkan states, and with the Bulgarian Committee in Bucharest, went into decline. Michael issued specific instructions, upon his return from Ivánka, for the cultivation of better relations with the Ottomans; by contrast, relations with Russia worsened. The war minister, Milivoj Blaznavac, who was well known for his anti-Russian politics, seemed increasingly the coming man, while Garašanin’s dismissal was widely perceived as a defeat for the Russian party.

In Serbia, Michael’s new policy meant an increased hostility toward the liberals and the newly founded Omladina, both of which groups were in close contact with the liberal Hungarian Serbs. The liberals, in turn, were not slow to spread the suspicion that the Prince had sold out both the Balkan Christians and the Monarchy’s Slavs at Ivánka.

Within the Monarchy, Andrásy reaped his reward in the breakdown of the relations between the Serbian government and Strossmayer’s Croatian National Party. At the time of Ivánka, Garašanin was conducting talks with the Croats on securing Prussian support for the acquisition of Bosnia for a future South Slav state.\footnote{145} In addition the Croats hoped to receive some form of monetary assistance from Belgrade for the upcoming elections to the Sabor. A delegation from Zagreb actually arrived in Belgrade shortly after Garašanin’s dismissal. They were bluntly told that the ex-minister’s policy was discontinued, and returned empty-handed to Croatia, and a heavy defeat in the Sabor elections.\footnote{146} More important, Croat political opinion was given a decided impression that Serbia had come to its own arrangement with Pest regarding Bosnia. It was more than enough to poison relations.

At one blow, it seemed, Andrásy had achieved everything a Hungarian minister president could wish for. Serbia’s preparations for war in the Balkans appeared to have slackened, if not ceased completely. Russia was alienated. The relations between Belgrade on the one hand, and Zagreb and Novi Sad on the other, were embittered. To consolidate these gains, however, it would be useful to establish a
permanent link between the Hungarian and the Serbian governments, a person, moreover, who could be trusted to tell the Serbs what Pest, rather than Vienna, wanted them to hear. The roots of Benjámin Kállay’s appointment as Austro-Hungarian consul-general in Belgrade lay in this outcome to the events of 1867.

Notes

8. Bridge, *Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 17, and 207–8, 288.
13. Ibid., 48–49.


Botmillau to Moustier, 1 Oct. 1866, ibid., no. 3645, 351.


Beust to Metternich, 10 Nov. 1866; and Stackelberg to Gorchakov, 18 Nov. 1866; both quoted by Adolf Beer, *Die orientalische Politik Österreichs seit 1774* (Prague & Leipzig:
F. Tempsky & G. Freytag, 1883), 591, note 1 and 592, note 1 respectively. See also Beust to Prokesch-Osten, 27 Jan. 1867, HHSA, PA XII/90.

30 Novak to Beust, 1 Dec. 1866, in Vučković, no. 123, 239.


33 There is a useful character sketch of Andrássy in Decsy, Prime Minister Gyula Andrássy’s Influence, 15–20, which, however, needs to be disentangled from the author’s enthusiasm for his subject.
34 Common Ministerial Council of 22 July 1870, quoted ibid., 33; original quoted in Diószegi, Österreich-Ungarn und der französisch-preussische Krieg, 42–43.
35 Kállay Diary, 19 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 78).
36 Orczy Diary, 31 Oct. 1868, quoted Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrássy, 1:469.
37 Kállay Diary, 4 Apr. 1869 (Dnevnik, 169).
39 Salvini to Visconti Venosta, 3 Nov. 1870, ibid., 2nd ser., vol. 1, no. 460, 382–83.
40 Salvini to Visconti Venosta, 13 Nov. 1870, ibid., no. 524, 441–42.
41 Wäcker-Gotter to Bismarck, 23 Nov. 1871; quoted Descy, Prime Minister Gyula Andrássy’s Influence, 32.
43 Kállay Diary, 5 June 1869 (Dnevnik, 187).

Kállay Diary, 12 May 1868 (*Dnevnik*, 18).


Text ibid., App. 9, 494–504; see also 361–63; Vučković, no. 144, 273–83.

Jakšić & Vučković, *Spoljna politika Srbije*, App. 9, 495: “radi sajedinjenja sviju jugoslovenskih plemena u jednu saveznu državu.” The adjective savezni, in this context, is rather ambiguous, since it can mean both “federal” and simply “united.”

Ibid., 495–96.

Ibid., 496; italics in original.

Ibid., 496–97; Orešković Plan for Preparations of Action in Bosnia, n.d. [March 1867], in Vučković, no. 143, 260–73.

Jakšić & Vučković, *Spoljna politika Srbije*, 361; Ciliga, “Narodna Stranka i južnoslovensko pitanje (1866–70),” 86.

Quoted, *Spoljna politika Srbije*, 362; also Andrija Torkvat Brlić to Orešković, 8 June 1867, in Vučković, no. 157, 297.


Wagner to Beust, 8 Aug. 1869, HHSA, PA XL/129, reporting on the alarm of Matija Mrazović, a National Party leader, at the suggestion that Serbia might acquire Bosnia-Hercegovina: “we would then have no choice, but to go in there ourselves.”


67 Ibid., 75 ff.

68 Zastava, 26 June/8 July 1866, quoted ibid., 83.


74 Ibid., 302, 305; Dragnich, Development of Parliamentary Government in Serbia, 42; Kanitz, Serbien, 552–54.


80 Krstić Diary, 16/28 Apr. 1861, in Vučković, no. 28, 41.

81 Krstić Diary, 8/20 June 1861, ibid., no. 31, 46.

82 Krstić Diary, 25 June/7 July 1861, ibid., no. 35, 49–50. László Szálay was an historian and confidant of Eötvös.

83 Ibid., 50.

85 Krstić to Garašanin, 27 July/8 Aug. 1866, ibid., no. 96, 187.
86 Ibid., 188.
89 Krstić to Garašanin, 31 July/12 Aug. 1866, in Vučković, no. 106, 206; italics in original.
90 Krstić to Garašanin, 27 July/8 Aug. 1866, ibid., no. 96, 188.
91 Hunyadi to Michael, 7 Aug. 1866, ibid., no. 95, 186; Ress, *Kállay Béni*, 63–65.
92 Krstić Diary, 10/22 Feb. 1867, in Vučković, no. 131, 244, summarising Hunyadi’s letter.
93 Ibid., 244.
94 Ibid., 245.
95 Jakšić & Vučković, *Spoljna politika Srbije*, 351–52; Krstić, *Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba*, 363. There is, however, nothing in either the Austrian or Hungarian archives suggesting a preconcerted plan between Vienna and Pest, a point confirmed by Ress, *Kapcsolatok és keresztutak*, 190–91.
96 Krstić Diary, 16/28 Feb. 1867, in Vučković, no. 134, 247.
97 Krstić Diary, 19 Feb./3 Mar. 1867, ibid., no. 137, 248.
98 Ibid., 249.
99 Ibid.
110 Ibid., 323.
111 Ibid., 322.
112 Ibid., 323.


116 Ibid., 360.

117 Ibid., 364.

118 Ibid., 365.

119 Ristić, Poslednja godina, 61. Also quoted in Jakšić & Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije, 399; MacKenzie, Ilija Garašanin, 335.

120 Ristić, Poslednja godina, 61–62.

121 Piroćanac, Knez Mihailo, 78.

122 Ibid., 80.

123 Ibid., 79, 80.


125 Krestić, Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba, 368, citing Garašanin memorandum, [December 1867], in Vučković, no. 183, 323.

126 Krestić, Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba, 368.

127 Ibid., 367.

128 Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 6 Dec. 1867, HHSA, PA XII/89; Jakšić & Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije, 398, cite this document wrongly as ‘PA XII/86’.

129 Kállay to Andrásy, 31 May 1868, OSZK, FH 1733. Quoted Krestić, Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba, 367.

130 Jakšić & Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije, 401–3.


133 Jovanović, Druga vlada Miloša i Mihaila, 474.

134 Ibid., 476; ee also 373.

135 Ibid., 476; Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrásy, 1:461.


137 Jovanović, Druga vlada Miloša i Mihaila, 477.

138 Ibid.


140 Ibid., 235.

141 Ibid. Cf. Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrásy, 1:461; according to Orczy’s diary, Beust said, upon being informed of Andrassy’s scheme, “Cette idée me sourit.” All the works which take Beust’s collusion for granted have been based upon this single, non-committal remark. Kállay, however, recording a conversation with Orczy, confirms the incident; Kállay Diary, 5 Feb. 1869 (Dnevnik, 151).


143 Piroćanac, Knez Mihailo, 80–82.

144 “Mihailov preokret”: Jakšić & Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije, 377.


146 Krestić, Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba, 369–70.
In the summer of 1867, Baron Prokesch-Osten, Francis Joseph’s ambassador to the Sultan, expressed his dissatisfaction with the quality of the Monarchy’s diplomatic representation in Belgrade. It was necessary, he wrote Beust, to convince the Ottoman government that the Habsburg Monarchy was making a serious effort to restrain Prince Michael Obrenović. This required a politically and socially competent agent . . . to work against Russian influence and keep the Prince on the right path. We would thereby steal a march on Russian efforts in Constantinople.¹

Prokesch-Osten, an advocate by December 1867 of a provisional occupation of Serbia, as “act de pouvoir,” was not the only influential voice raised in favor of some more forceful presence in Belgrade, at a time when Prince Michael’s policy in the Balkans still seemed alarmingly warlike. That Prince Michael still needed restraining seemed to be the general opinion among imperial officials.²

In his desire for a stronger voice in Belgrade, however, Prokesch-Osten was to get rather more than he bargained for. The Hungarian government wanted the same thing, but for quite different reasons. Andrássy, as we have seen, had a variety of urgent motives for wishing to maintain the hold he believed he had established over Prince Michael at Ivánka. Serbia’s non-involvement with the Hungarian Serbs and the Croats; the cessation of preparations for war in the Balkans; the weaning away of Serbia from Russian influence: all these influenced the Hungarian premier. The fear of Russian incitement of the Hungarian South Slavs, in the event of a European war, was particularly prominent in Hungarian political circles that autumn, as foreign observers could not fail to notice.³ In view of Serbia’s strategic importance on Hungary’s frontier, and the insufficient importance
attached by Beust, in Andrásy’s opinion, to the Russian threat, it was imperative to have someone appointed to Belgrade who would represent Hungarian interests there as well as Habsburg ones, and on whom Andrásy could rely to keep him informed as to Beust’s eastern policy in general.

To these considerations was added the conviction that Prince Michael, autocrat and Hungarian landowner that he was, would be more influenced in his pro-Hungarian policy by someone comparable to him in social status. Someone who was noble, conversant with South Slav affairs and the Serbian language, but above all Hungarian: such a combination of qualities was a rarity in Hungarian politics, and virtually unheard of in the Habsburg diplomatic service. Andrásy’s choice fell on the young politician, Benjámin Kállay.

Kállay’s appointment on 2 February 1868 was generally seen as evidence of the Hungarian government’s influence under the new system. While a seemingly ideal choice from the point of view of the Hungarian government, and with much to recommend it as far as winning over Prince Michael was concerned, it was not necessarily agreeable to Beust. Beust was also obliged to accept the nomination by Andrásy, in March 1868, of another Hungarian, Count Béla Orczy, as one of his department heads within the foreign ministry. This was specifically so that Andrásy might be kept informed of important developments in foreign policy. The unspoken truth was that Orczy was there to act in Andrásy’s name and restrain Beust from what Andrásy considered to be an irresponsible adventurism.

Kállay’s appointment was thus part of this same process of securing guarantees for the Hungarian government’s constitutional entitlement, under paragraph 8 of the Settlement Law, to be consulted over foreign policy. Both appointments, moreover, were the result of Andrásy’s personal application to the Emperor Francis Joseph. And to heighten the impression on Prince Michael of the new importance attached to the Monarchy’s representative in Belgrade, Kállay’s post was upgraded from that of consul-general to “diplomatic agent and consul-general.”

The man thus elevated to one of the most sensitive postings in the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic service was not yet twenty-nine years old. Kállay was born in Pest on 22 December 1839, the son of the successful administrator István Kállay, who died when Benjámin was only five, and Amália Blaskovich. On his father’s side Kállay more than met the requirement of noble blood, since the Kállays were one of the oldest noble families in Hungary. The family was, however, comparatively

![Figure 4. Benjámin Kállay](image)
poor, and the young Kállay was one of the many Hungarian nobles who had to work to make ends meet. Privately schooled under the supervision of his mother, a strong-minded woman and fervent patriot, Kállay attended the University of Pest, where he studied law, physics, chemistry and mathematics. He had long since manifested an extreme precocity, especially in mathematics, although as he confessed at one point, he did not feel that he brought a particularly original talent to the subject. When asked his true talent, he replied: “I only have one, and I hate it: it’s politics.”

Benjámin Kállay’s chosen means for exercising his political talent were, in Hungarian terms, unusual. By the end of the 1850s he was already turning his attention to the acquisition of foreign languages, especially Near Eastern ones. He learned Russian and modern Greek; sat under the famous Orientalist, Armin Vámbéry, to study Turkish; and, most remarkably in a young Hungarian nobleman, set himself to learn Serbo-Croat, and began cultivating links with the Hungarian Serb community in Pest and nearby Szentendre.

Such an orientation could only have been with some sort of career in the diplomatic service in mind, or as a political voice on nationalities within Hungary, or as a scholarly authority on Near Eastern affairs. The roots of Kállay’s decision, however, remain a mystery. His mother’s family name was Croat or Serb in origin, but this did not mean much in a country like Hungary where the same could be said of many other families. More likely as an explanation is the general political situation in which Hungary found itself at the outbreak of the 1860s, when a satisfactory settlement of Hungarian differences with the Habsburg dynasty seemed so hard to attain.

Perhaps the most important influence on Kállay’s choice, in his early twenties, was his acquaintance with Baron József Eötvös, a leading liberal politician as well as the foremost Hungarian authority on the nationalities question. At the National Casino, the most prestigious club in the country, Kállay attracted the attention of Eötvös, who was impressed by his obvious ability and seriousness, and prophesied a brilliant future. And it was about this time, too, that Kállay began to take an interest in the South Slavs, “recognizing,” in Thallóczy’s words, “the great importance of the Balkan peoples, especially the Serbs, as far as Hungary was concerned.” The acquaintance with Eötvös encouraged Kállay to make his journalistic début with a number of articles, in Serbian, published in the Hungarian Serb press, and extolling Serbo-Hungarian friendship. The response both in Hungary and in Serbia was apparently a favorable one.

Another important contact for Kállay was Count Gyula Andrássy, who despite the sixteen year difference in age appears to have regarded the younger man very much as a personal friend. What remains unknown, however, is to what extent Andrássy influenced Kállay, or Kállay Andrássy, on the subject of relations with the South Slavs. In view of Andrássy’s known position, and Kállay’s
later correspondence with him while at Belgrade, this is perhaps something of a chicken-and-egg argument: the two men obviously influenced one another, although they did not always see eye to eye on individual subjects.

In his search for a political role Kállay at first concentrated on the domestic scene. Despite his good relations with the leading Deákists he was not, even at the outset of his career, a strict party follower, in so far as such a thing even existed in Hungary in this period. He also cultivated links with Baron Pál 'Sennyey, who was appointed lord high treasurer in July 1865 and was thus, until the formation of the Andrássy government in February 1867, effectively in charge of internal government affairs in Hungary. In 1865, therefore, 'Sennyey had his hands firmly on the levers of power, a crude but compelling reason for an ambitious young politician to hedge his bets by voicing some support for him. Nevertheless Kállay’s motives were unlikely to have been purely opportunistic. For one thing his own austere principles, which he modeled on those of his father, made such manoeuvring for personal advantage out of character. Equally important might have been 'Sennyey’s own reputation as a man, in many people’s eyes, too willing to serve “Vienna.” This would have done 'Sennyey no disservice in Kállay’s view. Later in his career, Kállay was to become one of the most prominent representatives of “Viennese” Hungarian nationalism, which regarded close cooperation with the Habsburg Monarchy as vital to Hungary’s interests, since only by such cooperation could those interests adequately be safeguarded.

It is not surprising that, when Kállay stood for election to the diet in the November 1865 elections, he was repudiated by the Deákists. He claimed to be standing on a Deákist platform, but lost the election anyway. The seat he contested was the Serb-populated constituency of Szentendre; and a fragment in the Kállay papers gives some idea of how he courted the Szentendre electors. Kállay paid fulsome tribute to the Serbs’ heroic past and present aspirations. The Hungarians could only count on a happy future “if we progress along the glorious path of civilization hand in hand with the Slavs.” Discussing Eötvös’s recent work on the nationality question, Kállay attempted to damp the expectations this had raised among Hungarian Slavs by pointing out that Eötvös’s purpose was to establish the general principles of the question, not specific solutions. He assured his audience, however, that “complete equality before the law will constitute the basis of our agreement, [and it will be] extended in the same way to languages as well, which is one of the most essential elements of nationality aspirations.”

The nationalities would thus be guaranteed “their greatest treasure . . . their individuality” and, this being the case, would have no further objections to remaining in “the common homeland.”

His attempt to get into parliament having failed, Kállay continued to cultivate his image as a friend of the Slavs, and went on a round tour of the Balkans
in 1866.\textsuperscript{22} His major achievement between 1865 and 1868, however, was an excursion into the realm of political philosophy. Kállay undoubtedly saw himself as a liberal, and to prove it he introduced to the Hungarian public in 1867 one of the classic texts of nineteenth-century liberalism, John Stuart Mill’s \textit{On Liberty}.

In a lengthy introduction, Kállay nailed his flag firmly to the mast of liberty, the desire for which “is deeply rooted in human nature.”\textsuperscript{23} Individuality, and the freedom to express it, was for Kállay the litmus test of a liberal society, although he specifically denied that this had come about through some inevitable progressive tendency in human history. Kállay also examined the relationship between individuality and the force of most natural interest to a Hungarian politician, nationality.\textsuperscript{24} The most distinctive part of Kállay’s reflections on nationality is also the one of most interest in view of his subsequent career. For Kállay most “nation-individualities” (p. lx: “nép-egyéniségek”), as he called them, were too weak to stand on their own. To protect themselves they had to unite in ad hoc defensive alliances, which could be dissolved when no longer needed. The “basic principle of the balance of power,” in future, had to be based on the self-interest of nations. Just as individuals in society had to unite to resist the tyranny of state and society, so, on the international level, nations could best preserve their individuality in this kind of “free union” (p. lxi: “szabad egyesülés”).

The relevance of these passages lies in Kállay’s professed faith in the idea of a Danubian confederation, however vaguely worded. For Kállay interest in such schemes may well have waned, once the essential stability of the Dualist settlement became apparent. Yet at the outset of his Belgrade posting Kállay still seemed to cherish what he referred to as “my dear old ideas” of confederation, and duly made note of similarly minded people he encountered in Serbia.\textsuperscript{25} In the first months of his appointment he certainly discussed the concept with leading Serbs, including Michael’s war minister, Milivoj Blaznavac.\textsuperscript{26} For the Serbs, the fact that a rising Hungarian politician could discuss such things at all was remarkable. However, Kállay’s federalism gave way rapidly to the conviction that the interests of Hungary were best served within the Habsburg Monarchy, and by ensuring that the latter, with Hungary’s assistance, dominated the Balkan Peninsula. Like Andrásy, too, Kállay remained convinced there could be no South Slav state unless it was firmly under Austro-Hungarian control.\textsuperscript{27}

Personally Kállay was well equipped for his new career in Belgrade. He was familiar with French, German and English, had studied Russian and Turkish and, as Andrásy rather floridly informed Prince Michael, “has made a profound study of the Serbian language—and speaks it very fluently.”\textsuperscript{28} In addition to his reputation as an intellectual, he was accustomed to move in the first circles in both Pest and Vienna. “A little bit cold in outward manner,” Andrásy advised Michael, “you will find him very confident, and a complete gentleman.”\textsuperscript{29}
The chilly exterior was less a pose than many assumed. For Kállay was a man of vaulting ambition, with a lonely sense of his own destiny. A year after his appointment to Belgrade he confided in his diary that “I won’t give up the hope that one day yet I shall govern some nation.” Imre Halász, who ran Andrássy’s press office after the latter became foreign minister in 1871, and who in the mid-1870s worked closely with Kállay, described him as “a rather withdrawn man, serious, sober, soft-spoken, a model of Stoic calm.” Halász also knew Kállay well enough to be convinced that he was “a complete freethinker of the most decided and intransigent type,” who regarded religion “purely as a factor of practical politics, almost as a different political tool.” What was even more remarkable about Kállay was the cold-blooded calculation he brought to everything he did. Repeatedly, in his Belgrade diary, he describes how this or that person “may be of use” to him, a criterion he applied as coolly to a succession of female conquests as to more professional contacts. Kállay seems to have regarded most of humanity, in fact, as so many tools to be manipulated. The result was a ruthlessness of approach which could on occasion contemplate even the most extreme measures, inclusive of murder, and which contrasted oddly with his view of himself as a liberal.

But for the moment Kállay seemed the right man for the job. In Serbia the rumor that a Hungarian was about to be made the Monarchy’s representative had at first aroused “great consternation”; but this changed to general satisfaction when it was learned that Kállay, the well-known Serbophile, was the choice. Prince Michael, according to the British consul, “does not disguise his satisfaction.” Prince Michael, according to the British consul, “does not disguise his satisfaction.” The Prussian consul, Rosen, saw a little deeper, especially the essentially Hungarian nature of this new development:

As far as his mission is concerned, the latter . . . has been summed up by a leading article in Pester Lloyd, which advises . . . the Serbs to seek support among the Hungarians for the resolution of the political mission incumbent upon them. The article . . . completely ignores the existence of an Austrian imperial state.

Implicit in Rosen’s remarks was the central fact about Kállay’s presence in Belgrade, which was the literally dual nature of his role there. Officially he was the representative of the Habsburg Monarchy. Unofficially, however, Kállay was Andrássy’s man, as everybody knew even before he went to Belgrade. The extent to which this became a commonplace was revealed in the (perhaps unwitting) references Rosen was making, within the year, to “the representative of Hungary-Austria.”

Kállay had no excuse for pleading ignorance of Beust’s Balkan policy, since the latter provided him with copious instructions prior to sending him off to Belgrade. In his despatch of 5 April 1868, Beust showed himself considerably more inclined to reform in the Ottoman Empire than Prokesch-Osten, but nevertheless firm in drawing limits to Serbian expansion.
It was obvious to Beust that the Serbian government’s assurances that it had no further demands on the Porte, in the wake of the fortress settlement, did not count for much. On the contrary, Serbia still seemed to want complete independence as a state, territorial enlargement at Turkey’s expense, and probably after that at its northern neighbour’s too, in the final analysis foundation of a realm including all South Slavs.

The powers had been obliged as recently as December 1867 to remonstrate with Prince Michael about the level of Serbian armaments. For Austria-Hungary this aspect of Serbian policy was all the more worrying, given reports that Prussia was ready to sell a large surplus stock of rifles to the Serbs. Now, in April 1868, intelligence indicated that a secret treaty of some sort had been concluded between Serbia and Romania. Without detailed knowledge of the treaty’s contents Beust was apt to regard it as yet another purposeful weapon against Ottoman integrity, rather than the last, rather futile, element in Prince Michael’s Balkan alliance strategy that it was. It would be a great mistake, Beust advised, to regard Serbian plans for a war of liberation as abandoned. Kállay’s first task was to learn as much as possible about Serbia’s Balkan alliances. In addition, he must warn Belgrade emphatically against “risks . . . to which she might be tempted by an unreflective urge to action or through incitements from abroad.” Beust’s assessment of the balance of forces in the Balkans made sense, and was anything but superficial. In his opinion it would be dangerous to underestimate the Ottoman Empire’s powers of resistance. Serbia would be unwise to provoke a general conflict, since its Balkan allies were likely to be unreliable, and even Russian help was a questionable safeguard against defeat.

Beust put his finger on another verity when he expressed the conviction that “Russia on its own, without an understanding with Austria, is not in a position to conduct a war of aggression against Turkey.” The clear implication of these remarks was that it would be Austria-Hungary and Russia who regulated affairs in the Balkans, and not Serbia. The Treaty of Paris, which placed Serbia under the collective protection of the signatory powers, was a perfectly adequate guarantee of the Principality’s constitutional autonomy; to attack the Ottomans would be to infringe the Treaty, and the powers would be justified in abandoning Serbia to its fate in that case.

On the subject of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Beust was categorical. It is hard to square his robust rejection of a Serbian administration in these two provinces with the assertions of his critics that he was somehow in favor of such a scheme, or at least undecided. Beust described it as an idea . . . which aimed at securing satisfaction for Serbia’s expansionist ambitions by peaceful means, but whose realization for all that would have dealt a palpable blow to the political order on our own southeastern borders.
In the year since the plan first surfaced, Beust observed, nothing seemed to have come of it. Nevertheless, “Were it ever to come to the fore again, your honor would have to make it your business to counteract it to the utmost of your ability.” Beust might have been pardoned for assuming that Kállay, as a Hungarian, agreed with the need to oppose the emergence of a greater Serbian state. He was to be rudely disillusioned within the year.

Beust did what he could to dispel the Serbian conviction that Austria-Hungary was only interested in preserving the Ottoman imperium, and indifferent to the plight of the Ottoman Empire’s Christian population. He wanted Kállay to combat this “completely baseless belief . . . most categorically.” There was also a purely practical consideration at work: “the preservation of the sympathies of our Slav and Romanian peoples’ foreign relatives. . . . This interest in our view has no less weight than that of Turkey’s survival.” Somewhat less plausibly, Beust claimed that it was precisely because the Porte regarded Austria-Hungary as its well-wisher that the latter was in a unique position to influence Ottoman policy in a sense favorable to the Balkan Christians. Kállay was also expected to counter Serbian suspicion that Austria-Hungary itself aimed at annexing Bosnia: “The imp. roy. Government will certainly be the last to undermine in any way whatsoever territorial boundaries agreed by treaty.” Beust must have realized that the value of this last assurance was strictly conditional. But there can be equally little doubt that his preferred option was to keep Austria-Hungary out of Bosnia. He was thus unlikely easily to be converted to the sort of scheme hatched by Andrássy for a Serbian presence there, and with these general guidelines in his pocket Kállay, as he departed for Belgrade, must have realized this.

Kállay arrived in Belgrade on 19 April 1868, and presented his credentials the same day. Commenting on Michael’s formal speech of welcome, which praised the Emperor’s choice of diplomatic representative, Kállay noted that “They always praise a newcomer. I believe, however, they will praise me even more on the occasion of my departure.” Kállay’s determination to make his mark would have been the greater had he realized just how tenuous Austria-Hungary’s, or rather Hungary’s, influence in Serbia really was. For Prince Michael, at the time of Kállay’s arrival, was actively playing the Prussian card. The interest shown by Bismarck, earlier in the year, in supplying Serbia with arms was hardly philanthropic. It showed rather the Prussian minister president’s keen awareness, as in 1866, of Serbia’s potential use as a distraction in the event of the widely expected Franco-Prussian conflict, which could so easily degenerate into a general European war, with Austria-Hungary siding with France. Now, late in April, Prince Michael put out his own feelers in response.

The Prince sent the diplomat Jovan Ristić on a mission to the capitals of the great powers. Ristić’s purpose was to sound Bismarck as to the role the latter envisaged for Serbia in the event of a European war. “Serbia has to follow the...
lead of those who make it rain and shine,’” Rosen reported the Prince as saying. Michael clearly had not completely abandoned his thoughts of a Balkan uprising and attack on the Ottoman Empire, despite the negative policies he had pursued in this regard since meeting Andrássy at Ivánka in August 1867. He was as convinced as ever that “Attempts at reform are not going to solve the Eastern Question.” The deciding factor in his mind seems to have been the possibility of Prussian support against Austro-Hungarian intervention, as well as the fact that nothing concrete had come of Andrássy’s promises at Ivánka.59

Ristić, however, drew a blank when he reached Berlin in May 1868. Bismarck was taking the cure, and later fell sick for several months. Ristić settled down to await Bismarck’s return to the direction of Prussian policy; he was still waiting when, on 10 June, Prince Michael’s murder made the question academic.60 The fact that such contacts were being sought, however, enables us to put Prince Michael’s expressions of gratitude for Austro-Hungarian attentions in their proper light. Michael could appreciate the upgrading of the Monarchy’s diplomatic representation in Serbia, and he was undoubtedly interested in whatever the new Hungarian presence in Belgrade had to offer. This did not prevent him from keeping his options open. Blaznavac, who succeeded Michael when he took over as first Regent, was to accept Hungarian assurances more unreservedly.

Kállay’s first contacts with Prince Michael concentrated on railways and Russian influence. It was the first of these which bulked largest in Michael’s mind. The Prince’s anxiety to link his country by rail to the outside world, after all, had been one of his principal reasons for seeking the cooperation of Austria and Hungary the previous year. Michael was particularly worried at the activities of a financial consortium investigating the construction of a line through Bosnia and the Sancak of Novi Pazar, rather than Serbia, a prospect which spelled economic disaster for the latter.61 Kállay assured Michael, in Andrássy’s name, that the Hungarian government strongly favored a Serbian route.62 The Prince even harked back to a remark made by Andrássy at Ivánka, to the effect that “the basis of a truly reasonable eastern policy is represented by that which alone is capable of establishing harmony among the different nationalities,” and that the railway was an excellent practical means to this end.63 He ended by giving what Kállay most wanted to hear, a promise to decide on the railway question soon. In return, Kállay offered a fresh hostage to fortune by linking
construction of the railway to the Bosnian scheme. When the Prince expressed
the hope that the railway would be a firm tie between Serbia and its northern
neighbor, Kállay replied: “I hope so too, but only if Bosnia remains remote
forever, at least from us.”

On Pan-Slavism, Michael confessed to puzzlement as to why the great pow-
er, Austria-Hungary to the fore, persisted in regarding it as anything other than
“an incorporeal ghost.” Obviously the Balkan Slavs were bound to Russia by
ethnic and religious ties, but there could be no question of their giving up their
separate identities. Michael argued that as long as the Slav nations retained their
languages, they could not be assimilated by anyone. He did, however, accept Kál-
lay’s thesis that it was not Pan-Slavism, but “Pan-Russianism,” which constituted
the real danger: the threat to subordinate every Slav people to Russian interests.
Even then, Michael claimed, no one in Serbia wanted Russian domination. It
was the same disclaimer that leading Serbs had been making for years, but Kál-
lay showed no more sign of having taken the point than any of his predecessors.

From the moment he arrived in Belgrade, Kállay pursued a number of ob-
jects with a view to establishing Hungarian influence on a firmer basis. He lob-
bied hard with Vienna for concessions such as the speedy conclusion of a postal
convention between the Monarchy and Serbia, and the renunciation by the Mon-
archy of its right to exercise consular jurisdiction on behalf of Habsburg subjects
within Serbia, both much-resented legacies of Ottoman rule. He also built up a
network of contacts and more surreptitious means of control. In immediate terms
this consisted of cultivating high-level sources of information, in the recruitment
of agents, and the buying of newspaper influence.

For much of his intelligence, Kállay relied on the experience of his vice-
consul Svetozar Theodorovics, a Hungarian Serb from Szentendre, and on the
Habsburg army officer in charge of the Monarchy’s postal station in southern
Serbia, a Captain Emil Čučković. He also depended heavily on the advice of the
Hungarian ministry of the interior in monitoring traffic between Serbia and
the Monarchy’s Slavs. Here the interests of the Monarchy and the Hungarian
government often marched together; but at other points they clashed directly,
especially where the Austrian military was involved. Kállay had some reason for
regarding the military with exasperation. According to Theodorovics,

They talk so indiscretely and arrogantly about a takeover of Bosnia, that after-
wards, of course, it’s hard to convince the Serbian government of the sincerity of
our government’s opposite viewpoint, even with the greatest of efforts.

Kállay accordingly took steps, through Beust, to exclude the Austro-Hungarian
military from intelligence activities in Serbia itself, which may have produced
more balanced reporting of events there, but which also ensured that what got
reported back to Vienna was largely a matter of Kállay’s choosing.
In his purchase of newspaper influence, Kállay made two contacts who were to serve him well throughout his stay in Belgrade. These were the journalists Rosen and Popović. Miloš Popović was the editor of the conservative, semi-official *Vidovdan*, had done much to introduce Eötvös’s views on the nationality question to the South Slav world, and was typical of the sort of Serb Kállay hoped to work with in Belgrade. Later that same year Kállay was to find an opportunity to subsidize *Vidovdan* directly; but in the meantime he acquired another ally in the person of Popović’s assistant editor, Dr. Michael Rosen, who also worked in the press bureau of the Serbian government. Rosen, like Popović, but for more crudely financial reasons, was interested in promoting Serbo-Hungarian friendship. In addition to writing pro-Hungarian articles in *Vidovdan*, and pro-Serbian articles in the Hungarian press, he also became, next to Captain Čučković, Kállay’s most prolific source of information.

“Personal contacts” assumed a literal meaning where Kállay’s relations with women were concerned. This is not to say that his numerous affairs while in Belgrade were undertaken specifically for intelligence purposes—far from it. There is no evidence, in a diary which records a singularly cold-blooded promiscuity, that Kállay seduced the wife of the Italian vice-consul, or took advantage of a traveling female acquaintance from Budapest, or dallied cynically with the pregnant wife of the British legation secretary at St. Petersburg, *en route* to join her husband, or maintained until 1870 an opera singer in Vienna, all in the interests of the Habsburg Monarchy, or even the Hungarian state. But here was no careless philanderer. Kállay was fully alive to the possible opportunities such adventures might present, as well as the dangers. When the wife of the rising opposition politician, Aćim Ćumić, sent a note to Kállay in early 1871, informing him that she was in love with him, Kállay was naturally suspicious, since he had only met the woman once. He got his deputy consul to find out more about her, “because I don’t know whether there isn’t some other intrigue hidden behind this affair.” In the event, Mrs. Ćumić’s interest turned out to be purely carnal, and since her husband did not enjoy access to government circles, the affair began without political overtones. Toward the end of 1871, however, Aćim Ćumić’s potential as member of a possible alternative government went up, and Kállay found that intimacy with the man’s wife paid intelligence dividends. Mrs. Ćumić was quite happy to keep her lover posted on all the goings-on in the anti-government camp throughout 1872. At the end of that year, however, Kállay unceremoniously dumped her, having become engaged in the meantime. Two years later there is a laconic entry in the diary: “Ćumić has driven his wife out.”

Even more brutally calculating was Kállay’s exploitation of a Mrs. Ivanović, a well-connected Belgrade lady. When, in October 1869, he first recorded that “Ivanovicska . . . is behaving as if she is terribly in love with me,” Kállay’s first thought was that this too might be a plot, since he had met members of the Russian
consulate at her place before. But, “if it is true, I shall by all means make use of this love, because she could be of service to me with her knowledge of the country.” In the course of a rapid conquest, Kállay made clear the purely utilitarian nature of the affair: “Even though she doesn’t take my fancy, I will continue with this fairy tale, it will possibly be of use to me.” Kállay had the first fruits of persistence even before seduction: on 7 November, “after a little dalliance,” the infatuated woman had volunteered the information that the Russian consul had just received a courier from his country’s representative in Habsburg Ragusa.

More detailed information, from then on, was Kállay’s for the asking. When he heard from Vienna that two Serbian officers had appeared in Montenegro, and were training Montenegrin troops, Kállay could secure their names from Mrs. Ivanović. He could confirm through her whether, and when, this or that Serbian minister was passing through Constantinople, and what his mission was; or learn that a Serbian agent, name supplied, had been sent secretly into Croatia, and had reported back to the Serbian Regents. Mrs. Ivanović even passed on details of troop movements, and discontent in the army over government spying on its officers, garnered from her soldier brother. In 1872 she was able to keep Kállay informed on the movements of a messenger between the Serbian government and the Croatian National Party, a matter of high concern to the Hungarians. In return for these services, Mrs. Ivanović received a venereal infection, a pregnancy scare and—one must be fair!—the means to combat both. None of this appears to have troubled Kállay unduly, although he did worry about the danger of being blackmailed. Fortunately for him, the lady seems not to have been vindictive, since she decided to leave Belgrade in December 1873, some six months after Kállay’s marriage.

While Kállay was busy extending his contacts in Belgrade, Andrássy’s last major initiative during Prince Michael’s reign was being discussed in Pest. This was the outcome of an approach made by General István Türr to Colonel Orešković at the beginning of May: would Orešković meet him in Pest for talks? Having obtained permission from his superior, Blaznavac, Orešković traveled up to Pest toward the end of the month. Behind this lay an invitation to acquaint Orešković with Andrássy. The object was the further discussion of the Bosnian question.

The pre-history of Andrássy’s intervention in the Bosnian question, in particular the question of his objectives in offering even a part of Bosnia-Hercegovina to the Serbian government, has already been discussed. It seems incontestable that the offer made at Ivánka, in August 1867, was a sincere one, as long as Andrássy’s essential condition is borne in mind, the close association of such an enlarged Serbia with the Habsburg Monarchy. Equally certain, in view of Beust’s recent instructions to Kállay, is the essential independence of the offer which Andrássy now repeated to Orešković, that is, its independence of any control or approval on the part of the Austro-Hungarian chancellor.
Andrássy began by expressing his conviction that, in an age of railways and telegraphs, close links between states were unavoidable, especially for small states like Serbia which hoped to avoid impoverishment. The implication was that close relations with Austria-Hungary, as opposed to Russia, were to be desired. Orešković replied that, on the contrary, “only a strong and independent Serbia would dare enter into close relations with Hungary,” because it “would not have to fear that a Hungary equal to her would place her individuality as a nation and state in question.” There could be no firm basis for Serbo-Hungarian friendship, in his opinion, until Serbia had been strengthened by the acquisition of not only Bosnia-Hercegovina but “Old Serbia” (the area around Niš) as well.

This gave Andrássy the opportunity to say that he did not have anything against such a merger, but that the time was not yet ripe. Hungary needed time to “consolidate itself,” in order to fulfil its task of “protecting a free Europe from Russian barbarism. ““First of all,”” he told Orešković, “Russia must be driven back, and when this has been achieved then the time will have come for you South Slavs to free yourselves and unite.” Only then could the Hungarians dare to abandon the Ottoman Empire, without fearing the latter’s immediate absorption by Russia.

Orešković in an extraordinary exchange showed his weakness as a negotiator. The South Slavs of the Ottoman Empire, he told Andrássy, were waiting because they had to; but even if, as Andrássy said, Austria-Hungary “needed” the Ottomans, the time would come when the Slavs could dispense with their northern neighbor’s permission to rise up. In any general war Austria-Hungary would have to deal with Russia, and the Balkan Slavs would not have to fear Austro-Hungarian intervention then. Instead, they would make their own contribution to the Monarchy’s discomfiture, for the Slav regiments of the Military Border would also rise up. In a general war, he insisted, Austria-Hungary’s chances would not be good, and it was obvious which side Serbia would be on.

Andrássy tried a different tack, reminding Orešković that he had already admitted the Ottoman Empire was not sustainable in the long run: “at the moment we are only propping it up until we have beaten back Russia; when that is done then we will abandon it and will raise you [the South Slavs] up.” All Serbia would have to do, he added, would be to refrain from attacking the Ottomans. To this, however, Orešković raised one of the principal objections to such a strategy from the Serbian government’s point of view, an objection moreover that was to recur again and again in Kállay’s own reports from Belgrade. In any general upheaval, regardless of how Serbia conducted itself, there was always the likelihood of a spontaneous uprising, especially in Bosnia; and in this case any Serbian government would find it impossible not to join in. Orešković, for all his foolishness, had articulated a central truth about the South Slav question in the 1860s and 1870s, a truth that became apparent in 1875 when the Hercegovinian
and Bosnian revolts sparked one of the great diplomatic crises of the century. To Andrássy’s revelation that Prince Michael, at Ivánka, had said he would not allow Serbia to become involved in an Austro-Russian conflict, Orešković simply reiterated that “A government in Serbia which, in these circumstances, opposed the national will and its deepest feelings, would fall the same day that it showed this, and the Prince himself would be driven out of the country.” It was a precise forecast of the situation in which Michael’s successor, Prince Milan, found himself in 1876.98

Things would be different, Orešković assured Andrássy, if the Serbs could be united in their own state. Hungary would not be strong enough to threaten such a union; the only danger would be from Germany and Russia, and this could be dealt with by a defensive alliance of the southeast European nations, especially one that included Hungary.99 In a remark that echoes Kállay’s reflections of 1867 on the “free union” of nationalities, Orešković said “We want a strong and even more independent Hungary, because only in alliance with such are we secure and capable of preserving our freedom against a third, stronger power.”100 And Serbia, he reminded Andrássy, would be all the more bündnisfähig if it included Bosnia.

It was at this point that the two men began to grope toward what appeared to be common ground. Andrássy reminded Orešković of the Croats, who not only had their own claim to part of Bosnia, but were supported by the “strong military party . . . who work in Vienna so that Bosnia and the Hercegovina can be annexed.”101 Andrássy stressed that he would prefer Serbia to take Bosnia and the Hercegovina than for them to be annexed by the Monarchy.102 However,

it is to be feared that if you were to try to annex Bosnia, you would get into a struggle with the Croats who, from the other side, would invade it. Such a struggle . . . would oblige us to intervene; and if we intervened, a third party would intervene, and so on, so that would bring a European war down on our heads.103

Orešković responded that the Hungarians need not intervene. All they had to do was to restrain Austria from intervening, and to mediate between Serbia and the Croats. Serbia was not aiming to destroy the Ottoman Empire; it just wanted to unite all the Ottoman Serbs in one administrative unit. The Croats could be placated by letting them have “Turkish Croatia,” that is, the Bosnian district of Bosna Krajina.104

Andrássy seized upon this, with the remarks quoted in the previous chapter.105 The Serbs could take Bosnia, he said, and Hungary would not intervene; it would even try to help behind the scenes. But Serbia would have to act soon, if possible by the next spring, because if circumstances arose in which Austria-Hungary found itself at war with Russia, “then you don’t dare attack Turkey in any way, and we, cost what it may, would have to be against you.”106 And when Orešković asked if he could repeat all this to his own government, Andrássy assured him that he could.
Before Orešković returned to Belgrade he was made an additional offer, this time in great secrecy via General György Klapka. According to Klapka, Andrássy was “ready to conclude a treaty with Serbia, by which Serbia would annex Bosnia and the Hercegovina, while the Crown of St. Stephen, that is, Croatia, would annex Turkish Croatia.” In compensation for renouncing this part of Bosnia, Serbia would also annex the pašalik of Niš. The treaty would be a strictly secret one between Serbia and Hungary, but in order to implement it the approval of France, which Andrássy engaged himself to obtain, would be desirable. Serbia’s main obligation, in the event of its takeover of the territories in question, was to conclude a further treaty with Hungary based on the principle of mutual defense.

The idea of a Serbo-Hungarian alliance was to be shunted back and forth for the next two years: as late as the autumn of 1870 Kállay submitted a similar proposal to Belgrade in Andrássy’s name. But was Andrássy serious? On the face of it the proposal was ludicrous. Neither Andrássy nor the Hungarian government was in a position to conclude foreign treaties of this nature; and even if they were, it is hard to see how Andrássy can have expected such a treaty to have binding force, if it were to remain secret from everyone except, egregiously, the French Emperor. To the Yugoslav historians who have touched on the subject, both the alliance and the proposals about Bosnia were attempts to draw the teeth of Serb nationalism by keeping the Serbian government waiting for something that would never come.

Yet it is hard to doubt the sincerity of Andrássy’s denial of an interest in acquiring any part of Bosnia in 1868, however much he may have modified his position over the next three years. Assuming that Andrássy was telling the truth in this respect, and that Serbia could somehow be won over from Russian influence, there is a certain fractured logic to the idea of allowing Serbia to take over Bosnia, as long as such an enlarged Serbian state were firmly under Hungarian control. One would like to know more about what Andrássy thought, if anything, of the ideas on the association of nation-states, propounded by Kállay in his introduction to John Stuart Mill, and echoed in May 1868 by Orešković. Unfortunately neither the Kállay-Andrássy correspondence nor Kállay’s diary throws much light on this; yet it seems likely that Kállay would have discussed such a solution with Andrássy at some time or other. With the Ausgleich barely a year old, could Andrássy have been toying with the possibility of a Danubian confederation, in case this constitutional arrangement with the Habsburg Monarchy did not work out?

If Andrássy’s sincerity is to be questioned, it is also necessary to accept that he deliberately deceived his chosen man in Belgrade, Kállay. For Andrássy, who had a capacity for appearing all things to all men, this is a possible explanation, but in this case ultimately unconvincing. Certainly Kállay himself believed in the Bosnian scheme. As he expressed it to Andrássy on 31 May, the latter “sent me
here so that I could expressly declare that we harbor no desire to conquer Bosnia-Hercegovina.”112 All the subsequent references to the plan in Kállay’s diary attest that he was indeed, in Wertheimer’s phrase, “Feuer und Flamme” for it.113

What Kállay, and above him Andrássy, hoped to gain by dangling the prize of Bosnia before the Serbian government is another matter. A possible answer is the Croatian question. For Andrássy’s government, in the year when they had to conclude the Nagodba with the Croats, the urge to divide the nationalities facing them must have been strong. Kállay expressed this with simple force later in the year. “It would really be a beautiful result,” he wrote, “if I could alienate the Croats and Serbs from one another.” And the ideal “apple of discord” was the Bosnian question.114 Late in May 1868 this need to keep Croats and Serbs apart constituted one of the themes of Kállay’s last letter to Andrássy before Prince Michael’s death. This makes clear his concern that recent Croatian claims to Bosnia were a threat to the goodwill he had recently built up.115

At the heart of Andrássy’s and Kállay’s strategy regarding Bosnia was an ambiguity that was not resolved until both men finally accepted the inevitability of annexing the province to Austria-Hungary. In 1868 they would rather have avoided such an acquisition. But even in 1868 Kállay, at least, could envisage an eventual annexation, and could put it in Andrássy’s head, if it was not already there to begin with:

I think it . . . very probable, that Bosnia . . . will sooner or later become part of our territory. . . . But the time for this has still not come; now we must at all costs convince the Serbs that we don’t intend starting anything with regard to these provinces.116

Kállay had reason to think his mission successful after a couple of months in Belgrade. He had the goodwill of Prince Michael who, according to Orešković, was quite pleased with the news from Pest,117 and the Hungarian government appeared to hold all the threads in its hands for further improvement. Then an event occurred which seemed to undo everything that Kállay and Andrássy had achieved up to that point, and to put their whole policy of binding Serbia to Hungary once more in question.

Notes
1 Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 25 July 1867 (private), HHSA, PA XII/88; cited incorrectly by Grgur Jakšić & Vojislav J. Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije za vlade Kneza Mihaila (Prvi Balkanski saves) (Belgrade: Istorijski Institut, 1963), 461, as ‘PA XII/85, 25 June 1867’.


9 Kállay kept a diary in 1863–65 which is largely a record of financial dealings: MOL, P344, 40.cs. E/b; see also Kállay Diary, 15 & 16 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik), 100, 101.


12 Thallóczy introduction to Kállay, Geschichte des serbischen Aufstandes, vii, ix; Vámbéry to Kállay, 20 Mar. 1902, MOL,P344,Bb/519; Ress, Kállay Béni, 101–2. For an example of Kállay’s fluency in Greek, see Spuridon N. Basileiades, Galátea: Dráma öt felvonásban. Új-görögölt fordította Kállay Béni [Galatea: Drama in Five Acts. Translated from Modern Greek by Béni Kállay] (Budapest: Olsós Könyvtár, 1875).


17 “Glas o pitanju narodnosti iz Ugarske” [*A Voice on the Question of Nationality from Hungary*], 4 Aug. 1865, MOL, P344, 44.cs. E/f8; title in Serbian, text in Hungarian.

18 Ibid.


25 Kállay Diary, 3, 6 & 12 May 1868, 26 June 1868 (*Dnevnik*, 13, 15, 18, 44). On the latter date Kállay wrote about “My dear old ideas!” and the concepts of confederation “over which as a youth in my lonely little room I brooded so much.” The translation in *Dnevnik* (44) is faulty.

26 Kállay Diary, 6 May 1868, (*Dnevnik*, 15).


29 Ibid.

30 Kállay Diary, 29 Apr. 1869 (*Dnevnik*, 175).


32 Ibid.


34 On the Miletić murder plot, see below, Chapter 6.


36 Longworth to Stanley, 21 Feb. 1868, PRO, FO 78/2033 (no. 12).


38 *E.g.*, Rosen to Bismarck, 5 Jan. 1869, *APP*, X, no. 408, p. 427; cf. Decsy, *Prime Minister Gyula Andrásy’s Influence*, 55, who finds the Hungarian flavor of Kállay’s appointment entirely natural: “It was Kállay’s duty . . . to prepare the ground for Serbia’s removal from Russian influence, and to learn the real motives behind Beust’s Balkan policy.”

Beust to Kállay, 5 Apr. 1868, in Vučković, no. 195, 349.


Beust to Kállay, 5 Apr. 1868, in Vučković, no. 195, 350.

Ibid., 350–51.


Beust to Kállay, 5 Apr. 1868, in Vučković, no. 195, 352.

Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrassy, 1:461; Jakšić & Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije, 483; Vasilije Krestić, Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba 1868. godine (Belgrade: Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti, 1969), 367–69; Decsy, Prime Minister Gyula Andrâssy’s Influence, 55.

Beust to Kállay, 5 Apr. 1868, in Vučković, no. 195, 352.

Ibid., 353; italics added.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. Vučković (355, note 3) correctly points out, apropos of this passage, that it does not agree with Andrássy’s suggestion to Serbia in March 1867 of a partition of Bosnia. That is precisely the point.


Kállay to Beust, 21 Apr. 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.

Kállay Diary, 20 Apr. 1868 (Dnevnik, 5).

Reiswitz, Belgrad-Berlin, Berlin-Belgrad, 100–1, and 121, quoting Bismarck to Werther, 17 Mar. 1868, in GW, vol. 6a, no. 1103, 313.


Ibid., 459–60; cf. Kállay Diary, 21 & 24 Apr. 1868 and 8 May 1868 (Dnevnik, 6, 7, 17).

Kállay to Beust, 28 Apr. 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay to Andrássy, 29 Apr. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/79–80; Kállay Diary, 28 Apr. 1868 (Dnevnik, 8–9).


Ibid. Cf. Kállay to Beust, 28 Apr. 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay Diary, 24 Apr. 1868 (Dnevnik, 7).

Ibid. (Dnevnik, 10). Kállay also noted how, in his reports to Vienna, he deliberately left out “that I talked about the railways in Andrássy’s name.”


Kállay Diary, 3 May 1868 (*Dnevnik*, 13).

Kállay to Beust, 18 May 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177, and minute. There is no record of this exchange in KA 5409, the Evidenzbüro file for this year. See also Ian D. Armour, “Austro-Hungarian Covert Activity in Belgrade 1868–1875,” *The South Slav Journal* 26, no. 1–2 (2005): 1–4.


Kállay Diary, 3 May 1868 (*Dnevnik*, 13).

Kállay to Beust, 18 May 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177, and minute. There is no record of this exchange in KA 5409, the Evidenzbüro file for this year. See also Ian D. Armour, “Austro-Hungarian Covert Activity in Belgrade 1868–1875,” *The South Slav Journal* 26, no. 1–2 (2005): 1–4.


Kállay Diary, 2 Mar. 1871 (*Dnevnik*, 365).
76 Ibid., 23 Dec. 1871 (Dnevnik, 427).
Kállay Diary, 3 Dec. 1874 (Dnevnik, 618).
79 Ibid., 26 Oct. 1869 (Dnevnik, 238).
80 Ibid., 4 Nov. 1869 (Dnevnik, 242).
81 Ibid., 7 Nov. 1869 (Dnevnik, 242).
82 Ibid., 2 and 4 Dec. 1869 (Dnevnik, 249, 249–50).
83 Ibid., 25 Aug. 1870 (Dnevnik, 324).
84 Ibid., 1 & 28 Aug., 4 Sept. 1871 (Dnevnik, 396, 400, 401).
86 Ibid., 3 May 1872 (Dnevnik, 466).
87 Ibid., 12–13 Feb. 1870 (Dnevnik, 269).
88 Ibid., 13 Nov. 1873 (Dnevnik, 568).
89 Jakšić & Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije, 363–64.
Orešković Memorandum, 16/28 July 1868, in Vučković, no. 198, 356–82.
91 Ibid., 357.
92 Ibid., 357–58.
93 Ibid., 358.
94 Ibid., 358–59
95 Ibid., 359–60.
96 Ibid., 360.
97 Ibid.
100 Ibid., 362.
101 Ibid., 364.
102 Ibid., 365.
103 Ibid., 364–65.
104 Ibid., 365.
105 Ibid. See Chapter 1; note 118 refers.
107 Ibid., 367.
108 Ibid; also Jakšić & Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije, 464.
112 Kállay to Andrássy, 31 May 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/92.
113 Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrássy, 1:461.
114 Kállay Diary, 19 Nov. 1868 (Dnevnik, 116).
115 Kállay to Andrássy, 31 May 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/91–92.
116 Ibid., ff. 92–93.
Chapter 3

The Obrenović Assassination

In the early evening of 10 June, Kállay went for a drive with the Romanian consul in Topčider Park, on the outskirts of Belgrade. His account of what followed is one of the most graphic to have survived. It is also correct in most of its details, although Kállay was not an eyewitness to the central events he describes:

As soon as we had left the town, we saw old Garašanin, who was tearing along towards us at top speed in a carriage. He only gave a wave of the hand. Not knowing how to account for this, we proceeded to go further, when we came upon Mrs. Marinović who called to us from her carriage that the Prince was murdered. We stopped the carriage and, having stopped a horseman who was in full gallop, asked him what had happened. This person, in a great hurry, told us only that persons unknown had killed the Prince and his kinswoman, who was with him, with revolvers in Topčider. At this news we at once raced back to town and went to the central government offices, where all the ministers were already gathered. They were extremely alarmed and it seems that they didn’t know what to do. Only Garašanin had not lost his presence of mind, although, according to the reports which had been brought in, his own son was killed. Soon the Prince’s servant Mita arrived, with a shattered arm, and related what had happened.

The Prince with Anka and Katarina [Konstantinović] had gone on ahead, with Tomanija [Obrenović, Anka’s mother], on the arm of young Garašanin [the Prince’s aide-de-camp], some 20 yards behind them. The servant Mita accompanied them as well. The other attendants, as usual, had spread out and been left behind. The company was strolling along the Košutnjak and had already passed the Hajduk fountain. All at once, they saw ahead of them 3 men sitting among the trees. Tomanija asked who these people might be. Garašanin replied, promenaders. Suddenly these persons jumped up; two started to run towards the Prince, one towards Garašanin. They fired on the Prince. Garašanin tried to draw his saber but
a bullet smashed his right arm and he dropped to the ground. Tomanija started to run as well as the servant, Mita, who had taken a bullet in the arm. He saw them riddle the Prince with bullets, and the latter fall to the ground. Two bullets hit Anka, who was trying to help the Prince, and she fell. Katarina remained on her feet, but two bullets hit her in the back and she threw herself on the ground and played dead. The murderers completely mangled the Prince’s face and head with cutlasses. The Prince and Anka were already dead, but Garašanin and Katarina were still alive. I also went along with Ionescu, through the horrified, silent multitude to Topčider, and viewed the corpses laid out in Miloš’s old palace. The mangled head of the Prince was terrible. They had riddled his breast with 4 bullets. . . . The murderers have fled and are being hunted high and low. The town is completely quiet, there is not the slightest noise or disturbance; after 8 o’clock the streets were just as deserted as they usually are.¹

The government declared a state of emergency and wheeled its troops into place to protect itself. For this ministers had Garašanin to thank, who was not even in the government but whose sense of public duty prompted him to swift action in defense of it. The conspirators had in fact planned to slaughter leading ministers and officials and place their own friends in power. Garašanin not only got back into town ahead of them, but by sheer force of personality dragooned the panic-stricken ministers into standing firm. Faced with this solid front, the conspirators’ ramshackle plot simply collapsed. They were rounded up by the authorities within a couple of days, and most of them met the firing squad a few weeks later.²

Garašanin, though the savior of the situation, nevertheless did not take over the direction of affairs. Instead, the war minister Milivoj Blaznavac, once he recovered his nerve, acted swiftly to establish his own ascendancy. In accordance with the Constitution of 1838, the automatic head of the provisional government was the president of the Council, Jovan Marinović, who also happened to be a member of Garašanin’s conservative faction.³ This provisional government decreed the convocation of a Skupština to elect a permanent Regency, and an Extraordinary Skupština to choose Michael’s successor.⁴ The Garašanin faction would in all probability have favored Nikola of Montenegro as Prince, the latter being a candidate considered acceptable to Russia.⁵ Blaznavac, however, summoned the officers of the army the day after Michael’s assassination, and proclaimed an oath of allegiance to the dead Prince’s cousin, fourteen year old Milan Obrenović.⁶ Having appointed himself first Regent for the duration of Milan’s minority, Blaznavac then despatched one of Serbia’s leading politicians, Jovan Ristić, to bring the young Prince back to Belgrade. At five in the morning on 23 June, Milan arrived by Danube steamer, to be greeted by Blaznavac and the roar of saluting cannon. Despite the hour there was a huge crowd present, who acclaimed Milan with enthusiastic shouts of “Živio!” (Long life).⁷

Blaznavac’s move was one that the Hungarian government had every reason to welcome. The war minister counted as a “Hungarophile,” or at least a man
opposed to Russian influence in Serbia. The proclamation of allegiance to Milan, whose title to succeed was unimpeachable, thus shrewdly steered around the threat of a Russophile head of state, and at the same time put Blaznavac in a position to influence affairs during the inevitable period of minority rule.\(^8\)

Kállay, who considered Michael’s death “a great calamity for us,” was at first inclined to despair. “Now I have to start all over again, only there’s nothing to start with,” he lamented in his diary.\(^9\) He soon realized, however, that Blaznavac would in many ways be just as suitable. Apart from anything else, Blaznavac himself made the first move to reassure the Hungarians, by sending Orešković, on 12 June, to make clear to Kállay what his position was, and to ask Kállay to come and see him. Blaznavac also wanted to know if he could send Orešković up to Pest again, for further talks with Andrássy, since Orešković had told him of the Bosnian negotiations which had been going on up to the time of Michael’s assassination.\(^10\)

Kállay came away convinced that, as he put it to Andrássy, the war minister was “a clever, cunning, bold, energetic man.”\(^11\) Blaznavac wanted to have the deciding voice in government by having himself appointed de facto head of the three-man Regency. “From our point of view,” wrote Kállay,

\[\ldots\text{the main thing is that the tripartite government should follow policies which are in harmony with our own.}\ldots\text{Milivoj [Blaznavac] offers us more guarantees than anyone else. He is an enemy of Russian influence and is looking to Hungary’s help for the prosperity of Serbia.}\(^12\)

To underline the fact that the interests under discussion were first and foremost Hungarian ones, Kállay also pointed out the “peculiar circumstance” that

\[\ldots\text{towards Austria the greatest antipathy prevails, whereas towards constitutional Hungary there is much sympathy, and everything which Serbia hopes for from Austria’s support is attributed solely to Your Excellency’s influence.}\(^13\)\]
To Beust Kállay merely repeated the fact that Blaznavac had emerged as a strongman in his own right. Kállay offered Beust no advice whatsoever as to who he thought should succeed Michael. Nor did he make any allusion to Blaznavac’ explicitly pro-Hungarian attitude. Instead, he explained the provisional government’s anxiety to proclaim Milan Prince as due to their fear of Ottoman interference in the succession. Blaznavac, in fact, had specifically requested Austria-Hungary’s assistance in preventing this, a request which Kállay endorsed. Kállay might also have calculated that, for the moment, Andrássy could be relied upon to promote Milan as Austria-Hungary’s choice at the highest levels. In this, Kállay’s confidence was perfectly justified, even if Andrássy did not have everything his own way.

Prokesch-Osten, for instance, Kállay’s immediate superior at Constantinople, argued that Austria-Hungary should support the claims of Serbia’s ex-Prince Alexander Karadorđević. For Prokesch, viewing the situation through the eyes of a professional, habsburgtreu diplomat, the primary interest to be safeguarded was that of the Habsburg Monarchy. Prince Michael, who until recently had pursued policies detrimental to the status quo, was not necessarily to be mourned; Alexander Karadorđević, by contrast, had a proven history of amenability to Habsburg influence. That Prokesch’s views did not prevail was partly due to the energetic intervention of Andrássy.

From the moment Kállay wired the news of Prince Michael’s murder a lively tussle had been going on between Beust and Andrássy as to what attitude Austria-Hungary should take in the question of the succession and how far, if at all, the Monarchy should try to influence the results. The fact that Andrássy immediately entered the lists, with the suspicion that not only the Karadorđević family, but also the Hungarian Serbs under Miletić, were implicated in the assassination, might have given pause to any thoughts Beust may have had of supporting the rival dynasty. Andrássy claimed to have information, from a source in Paris, that “Karađorđević has been in contact with the Miletić party and with Moscow,” and called on Beust to have both Prince Alexander and his son Peter shadowed. Andrássy was not alone in his suspicions: it turned out that the Emperor himself was reluctant to endorse Karadorđević, another factor which would have influenced Beust. In the circumstances, Andrássy’s fears that the ex-Prince had “friends in the foreign ministry,” because of his compliant role during the 1848–49 revolution, might have been true, but did not count for much in view of the general assumption of his guilt.

The real conflict of views between Vienna and Pest was over how the Monarchy could ensure that its preferred candidate, Milan, was chosen. On 12 June, Andrássy staked out the high ground for a policy of intervention and control. He informed Beust that, the day before Michael’s murder, warning of a plot against the Serbian government had been received from the deputy lord-lieutenant of Bács-Bodrog county. According to Andrássy’s information, this conspiracy was known
to both Karadördövić and Miletić. Since Miletić was, in Andrásy’s words, “well
known to be completely under Russian influences,” the fact that Karadördövić was
much influenced by him made a Karadördövić restoration highly inadvisable.\(^\text{21}\)

In a revealing passage Andrásy spelt out why the way the choice was made
was almost as important as the choice itself:

> Above all I am convinced, that a Prince of Serbia has to be chosen by the Emperor
> of Austria and King of Hungary just like the lord-lieutenant of a county. . . .
> A weak Prince would be little inclined to precipitate the resolution of the Eastern Question through adventurous undertakings.\(^\text{22}\)

The Monarchy’s influence would be further consolidated, Andrásy felt, by the
deployment of a couple of armored warships on the Danube, a move which he
had been urging on Beust since the previous year.\(^\text{23}\) It would help, too, if troops
could be moved into Syrmia, and if Kállay could be instructed to ask the provi-
sional government in Belgrade not to issue passes to Serbian subjects wishing to
attend a forthcoming nationalist festival in Austro-Hungarian territory.\(^\text{24}\)

Beust’s answer showed how much more aware he was than Andrásy of the
wider implications of Austro-Hungarian involvement. He had already received a
fairly clear intimation from the Prussian embassy that, in view of the alarm any
unilateral action would cause in Russia, the Monarchy would do well to maintain
a neutral attitude and do nothing without consulting the other signatories to the
Treaty of Paris.\(^\text{25}\) Since the French and British governments shared this view,
Beust knew that his hands were tied.

The chancellor agreed with the desirability of Milan as Prince. The accep-
tance of Milan would solve the question of the succession, and would clearly not be
a triumph for Russian influence. But Beust was convinced that a completely pas-
sive attitude, in the period leading up to the meeting of the Skupština, was Austria-
Hungary’s only feasible option. He made it clear he believed the principle of non-
intervention applied to the Ottomans as well, and he had instructed Prokesch-
Osten to make representations to this effect.\(^\text{26}\) It was equally important, however,
to avoid anything, “that, in the present situation, could be construed as provocation
or interference and, as such, exploited against us.” In line with this resolution, he
would not risk moving more troops into Syrmia, and he would ask the Serbian
government simply to exercise caution as to whom they issued passes to.\(^\text{27}\)

The larger view of the affair was for Beust decisive. The Monarchy, two
years after Sadowa, simply could not afford to indulge in provocative gestures
like troop movements or sending gunboats to breathe down the neck of the new
regime. Beust’s reference to the “sensitivities of the Serbs” reveals, on the con-
trary, his awareness that such heavy-handedness might actually make things
worse.\(^\text{28}\) In the question of who became Prince of Serbia in 1868, the Ballhaus
could afford to sit back and let the Serbian scenery sort itself out.
Andrássy, however, confided to Kállay that “I cannot share this view and hope that I can induce Beust to drop it, by means of His Majesty if by no other.”

He left Kállay in no doubt that some sort of positive intervention on the side of Milan’s candidacy was preferable to inaction. “Your task,” he wrote on 14 June, “will be to judge how far you can step into the foreground. . . . If you are sure that Milan’s party really has as much chance as you report, then I shall assume responsibility in advance for any and all activity.” Andrássy claimed that the foreign ministry would “later reconcile itself to success” in the matter; but there was no indication that this was likely in the letter he received from the Emperor that same day. Francis Joseph, on the contrary, showed no deviation from Beust’s already expressed policy.

To this Andrássy replied that he still thought the Monarchy should exercise its influence on the elections “in decisive fashion.” He also renewed his assault on Beust, pointing out that “history” showed how the influence of France in the Danubian Principalities dated from its active role in elections there. The same involvement in princely elections explained Russian influence in Serbia, in Andrássy’s eyes. And in a frank evaluation of Serbian autonomy, he pointed out that “History demonstrates, furthermore, that the right to elect one’s own Prince has shown itself to be just as disadvantageous for the country in question, as it is advantageous for neighbouring states.”

For Andrássy, of course, there was an additional reason for treating Serbia as if it were already a province of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Exerting an influence on the election of the Prince is to be judged, in my opinion, not only from the standpoint of advantage, but also of necessity, with regard to the effect on the nationalities within the Monarchy, . . . the sole means of counteracting Serbia’s influence on our own Serbs consists of exercising our own influence over Serbia.

For this purpose a Regency would be ideal, “because its members . . . will have no time to concoct plans against us.” Finally, helping the side most likely to win the election in any case would give Austria-Hungary a leverage it had not previously possessed.

From the Emperor, all this won Andrássy was a terse reiteration of what he had already been told: “a real influence” in the choice of Serbia’s next Prince was not to be thought of. From Beust, Andrássy received a further patient exposé of the arguments in favor of neutrality. Beust pointed out that, while the Monarchy was in a unique position to influence events, it was also uniquely exposed to Prussian and Russian insinuations that it was aiming to annex Serbia. Non-involvement did not mean indifference to the results. The Monarchy could do no less than voice its “open sympathy” for Milan; but it dare not do more without endangering what influence it already possessed, or hoped to possess, and might in fact harm Milan’s chances.
Kállay’s official instructions reflected this balance to a nicety, enjoining him to endorse Milan by all means, but “not to go beyond those boundaries, where our partisanship for the candidate’s cause . . . easily makes him appear as an especially Austrian candidate.” They can have given no comfort to Kállay himself, who had done what he could to convince the chancellor to deploy all means to ensure that, if Milan should be elected, Regents should be chosen who intended continuing Serbia’s foreign policy in the spirit of the late Prince Michael.

In a parallel letter to Andrássy, Kállay was even more explicit: “We can perhaps take the fate of Serbia and the East into our hands if we are capable of making financial sacrifices.” He had mentioned the matter to Beust, he confided, but “not so explicitly.” For Andrássy, Kállay was prepared to fill in the blanks: “Who knows, the question perhaps turns on only a couple of 100,000 forints, and perhaps only because of this Russian influence will triumph.”

The clearly expressed desire of both the Emperor and Beust to remain on the sidelines, however, did not prevent Andrássy and Kállay from trying to put some of their ideas into practice. Indeed, they appear to have made ready to do so in open disregard of the official foreign policy laid down by Beust, as if confident that the latter’s objections could be overturned, if not simply ignored. The result, before the end of June, was an ignominious climb-down by the chancellor.

The crucial role here was played by Andrássy, who went up to Vienna in person to pursue the matter. It is not clear whether Andrássy also appealed to Francis Joseph although, in view of his earlier threat to involve the Emperor if necessary, this seems more than likely. What is clear is that, face to face with Andrássy, Beust’s reasoned opposition crumbled:

... after I had later contacted him personally in Vienna, he changed his point of view, and himself admitted that, in the present circumstances, he would bear the responsibility for the loss of the initiative.

Beust, for his part, had some success in persuading Andrássy that money was perhaps not the only way to influence the election result.

I received the answer that I should find out from you [Kállay] roughly what sort of sum would be needed, and whether it would not be possible to achieve the same sort of success by handing out orders and decorations.

For Andrássy this had a certain appeal: his earlier proposal to deploy monitors on the Danube had been just such an attempt to exert influence on the cheap. Beust did not mention any figures, but Andrássy was aware that “under the present set-up, there cannot be a great amount at his disposal.” Since Kállay obviously trusted Blaznavac, Andrássy suggested, “perhaps through him you
can get some idea of what sort of sum might be effective in the last moments of the election.”

Kállay, however, already knew of Beust’s climb-down, and might even have made his own contribution to resolving the argument. He did this not just by reiterating his belief that the Monarchy might have to pay for the success of its preferred candidate, but also by putting forward an idea which complemented Andrássy’s views on the desirability of a Regency in Serbia.

Andrássy’s conviction was that a Regency would be too preoccupied with its own domestic vulnerability to take an active role in foreign affairs, particularly the fomentation of further unrest among the Balkan Christians. Kállay’s idea was in some respects more subtle, and occurred to him on 19 June after a conversation with his Romanian colleague, Ionescu. The latter informed him that the Omladina and Serbian liberals preferred Jovan Ristić over Garašanin as a member of the Regency. Some form of constitutional and political reform was at least a possibility with Ristić, whereas Garašanin was notoriously authoritarian. As Kállay recorded that evening,

This gave me an idea: we must try to get the new government to embark on a course of liberalism and constitutionality. In consequence of this would come the formation of parties in the country, and such a country cannot be very strong as far as foreign affairs are concerned. A state can be strong in foreign affairs only under an absolutist concentration of powers. With this alone we would put a stop to [their] expansionist aims.

In a report to Beust on 22 June, Kállay developed this theme in a way that would make the idea of flooding the Serbian election with cash more acceptable. Serbia’s government was essentially autocratic, and public opinion, unable to concern itself with domestic affairs, was all the easier to inveigle into nationalist frenzy and foreign wars. The introduction of “progressive institutions” would change all this.

. . . thus the plans for conquest of the Greater Serbs would be, in not completely annihilated, nevertheless pushed into the background. I have spoken with several Greater Serbs. . . . They all perceive that a more liberal system of government would restrict Serbia’s power to act to a large degree.

Of the two chief rivals for the post of Regent, Garašanin and Blaznavac, it was the latter, Kállay told Beust, who was the more likely to make this sort of development possible, because he had expressed a wish to have Ristić as his principal associate. It was only at this point that Kállay plainly stated that “a considerable sum” would be a good way of setting Serbia on its liberal course.

Beust never replied directly to this, so it is impossible to say whether Kállay’s appeal fell on fertile ground. Yet not only the subsequent course of liberal nationalism in Serbia, but also its previous history, shows how flawed was
Kállay’s analysis. Serbian liberalism was by definition strongly nationalist, and notoriously committed to the cause of national liberation. The bitterest criticism of Prince Michael by the Omladina and Miletić was that in 1866 he had not involved Serbia in war; and it was under a succession of Liberal cabinets that Serbia stampeded into war against the Turks in 1876. Neither the unpreparedness of the country for any sort of sustained hostilities, nor the acerbity of political life in the period following the introduction of Serbia’s liberal constitution of 1869, offered any impediment to this Gadarene plunge. A Serbia with more liberal institutions was, if anything, more likely to be a firebrand of nationalist emotions.

Whatever the reasons for Beust’s change of tack, Kállay received a telegram on 25 June, asking him what sort of sum he thought would be necessary for “secret expenditure.” By this time, however, the situation had changed so much that Kállay no longer saw the need for direct intervention. Blaznavac was so clearly the only serious contender for power that “Now any expenditure . . . would be a waste of money.” Kállay was at pains to point out that the situation might change once Blaznavac was firmly in the saddle. Then he might be exposed to temptations from “various sides,” and Austria-Hungary might be obliged “to preserve his friendship in a palpable fashion as well.” And to make sure Blaznavac knew who his real benefactors were, Kállay informed him personally that “if he should need money after the election, I will be able to dispose of certain sums.”

When Kállay assured Beust that Blaznavac “wants not only to preserve the friendly relations achieved with Austria up to now, but to consolidate them even further,” he of course meant Hungary rather than Austria, as his correspondence with Andrássy attests. Kállay’s diary also shows how much of an anti-Austrian tinge this collaboration with Blaznavac could assume:

He [Blaznavac] claimed that he wants to conduct the friendliest possible policy towards Hungary, and in such a way that there develops between the Hungarian nation and the South Slavs the most intimate alliance, so that if need be each would defend the others, on the one side, from Russian and Turkish influence, and one the other against Austria.

Other subjects discussed between Kállay and Blaznavac were equally unlikely to find their way into the dispatches Beust received. Blaznavac claimed to want to preserve the Ottoman imperium, but was naturally interested in assuming control of Bosnia. In this case he was willing to concede some territory to the Monarchy “in the interest of rounding out our Croatia.” Once Serbo-Hungarian friendship was on a firm footing, he thought customs barriers between the two countries should be abolished. Blaznavac even, much to Kállay’s delight, expressed an interest in some form of larger southeast European union, either “a great republic or a monarchical confederation of small states,” which would embrace the Hungarians, South Slavs, Greeks, and Romanians.
Kállay was quite excited at this reappearance of his “dear old ideas,” or what he described as

The great Danubian confederation on democratic foundations, which unites the different but roughly equal nations, each of whom has reason to fear that foreign powers will repress its nationality and individuality. However, gathered together in amicable alliance they can all preserve their individuality and protect one another from any and all foreign influence.64

“It would,” he concluded, “be a strange twist of fate if I were able to contribute to the realization of this idea.”65

In the end Beust’s initial assumption, that there was no need to intervene in support of a faction which already held all the cards in its favor, was justified by events. The Serbian Skupština convened on 2 July, and acclaimed Milan as hereditary Prince the same day.66 The deputies also had to decide which team to approve as Regents, but the result was a foregone conclusion. Blaznavac was elected first Regent by an overwhelming majority. As co-Regents he had already announced he would choose Jovan Ristić, the diplomat and vaguely Liberal politician, and the colorless Jovan Gavrilović.67

The Skupština might have been content to rubber-stamp both Milan’s succession and a Blaznavac Regency, because these appeared to be popular choices. It was, however, more than just a rubber stamp. Michael’s assassination had undoubtedly encouraged expectations, at least among the Liberal intelligentsia and what little urban middle class there was in Serbia, that his repressive police state would now be dismantled. The Liberal element of the Skupština were also eager to see the blame for Michael’s death fixed firmly on the Karadorđevići, but were just as insistent on constitutional reform.68 The Blaznavac Regency appealed to both these factions: both Blaznavac and Ristić found it politically convenient to use Alexander Karadorđević as a scapegoat, and each, for his own reasons, could see advantages in a limited liberalization of the regime.

Even after the Skupština’s public endorsement of Milan and his Regents, there was still uncertainty as to whether the Sultan’s government would ratify the assembly’s acclamation of Milan as hereditary Prince of Serbia. Milan was undoubtedly Prince Michael’s closest surviving male relative, which satisfied the requirements of the Serbian law of 1859. He was not, however, the “direct male heir” specified by the hatti şerif of 1830; and it was the latter which, in the Porte’s eyes, was the legitimate instrument of succession in Serbia. By sticking to the letter of the hatti şerif, the Turks might seek to maintain that Milan had merely been elected, which implied that any other Serbian subject might conceivably be put in his place, whereas the Serbian government wished above all to establish the Obrenović family as the sole dynastic line.69 Resolving this arcane but important difference gave the Habsburg Monarchy a renewed opportunity to demonstrate its support for the Blaznavac regime.
On 8 July Kállay saw Ristić, who formally requested Austro-Hungarian help in securing a berat, or imperial decree, from Constantinople which explicitly recognized the Obrenovići as hereditary rulers. Failing this, he told Kállay, it would be better to have a berat which simply recognized Milan as Prince, rather than one which included the word “elected.”

Kállay threw his weight behind the request, but Beust did not need persuading of its merits. He immediately instructed Prokesch-Osten to back the efforts of Serbia’s agent in Constantinople to obtain the desired berat. Blaznavac, he told Prokesch, “inspires our confidence”; furthermore, he would serve as a useful brake on the more overtly nationalist Ristić. Refusing the Serbian government’s request would create bad feeling; granting it “could produce considerable advantages.” And in view of Kállay’s apparent enthusiasm for Danubian confederation (of which Beust was quite unaware), the main advantage adduced by the chancellor was an interesting one:

We ought to attach a high price, and the Ottoman government’s interest seems to us as identical to our own in this regard, to the countries bordering our Empire not being able to merge into a single political unit, whose existence obviously would constitute a permanent threat to us. Now, by rendering the principality hereditary in the Obrenović family, the Sultan would establish a barrier well-designed to prevent for all time the union of Serbia with Moldavia-Wallachia. . . .

Beust also pointed out that both the Viceroy of Egypt and the Prince of Romania enjoyed hereditary status, and that the Porte could maintain it was simply reaffirming the spirit of the 1830 hatti şerif.

This at least was language that Prokesch-Osten could understand, both in its cold consideration of the Monarchy’s own interest and in its use of legalistic loopholes. The ambassador reported by 14 July that the Grand Vezir had been won over. The Sultan’s chief minister had to agree that the principle of hereditary succession had already been effectively conceded by the Porte. Even more decisive was the consideration that an undisputed succession offered the best chances of stability in Serbia, and hence the Ottoman Empire. A berat was subsequently issued in accordance with the Serbian request.

Kállay, upon receiving Prokesch-Osten’s news, could not resist claiming this as a triumph for Austro-Hungarian influence in Serbia. The Serbian government was all the more thankful, Kállay claimed, because it knew the Russian and Italian agents in Constantinople had done what they could to hinder the Sultan’s recognition. As a consequence, and bearing in mind the markedly anti-Russian tendencies of Blaznavac, Kállay felt that Russian policy in Serbia had suffered a considerable setback. The Monarchy should hasten to express its support for the Regents’ reform plans, in order not to lose this advantage.
Political reform in Serbia, however, was intimately bound up with the question of complicity in Prince Michael’s murder, for many of the people who came to prominence under the Regency were tainted by, if not directly involved in, the June conspiracy. In backing the cause of reform, therefore, Kállay, and behind him the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry, were inevitably drawn into supporting the cover-up over who was responsible for the assassination. The Hungarian government went even further: by helping the Serbian Regents in their attempt to fasten the blame for Prince Michael’s death exclusively on Alexander Karađorđević, the Andrássy cabinet exposed itself to a moral ambiguity which was to rebound on it in the end.

There was no problem as to who had committed the actual murders of 10 June. It was Pavle Radovanović, a Belgrade lawyer of frustrated political ambition, who organized the killing, carried out by one of his brothers and two associates. What the conspirators steadfastly denied, however (except under torture which, to the consternation of Kállay and other diplomatic representatives, the Serbian authorities proved all too willing to employ), was any involvement by the Karađorđević family or leading Liberal politicians. Pavle Radovanović went to the firing squad repudiating these charges.78

Yet the evidence for the involvement of the Karađorđevići and the Liberals was considerable. With regard to Alexander Karađorđević and his followers, not only the Serbian government, which had a vested interest in blaming them, but also foreign observers like Kállay, were convinced of their guilt.79 Despite the conspirators’ denials, it was easily proved that Alexander’s secretary and relative, Pavle Tripković, had met them on various occasions and had supplied them with arms and money.80 Karađorđević, who lived in exile in Pest but who still had property interests in Serbia, paid Radovanović a retainer to act as his lawyer. The chief beneficiary of a revolution, however, was to be not Alexander but his son Peter. The Karađorđević family were the likely replacement for Prince Michael’s dynasty, and they must have known a revolution was in the offing, if not an assassination.81

The extent to which Serbian Liberals were privy to Prince Michael’s murder, by contrast, was never satisfactorily cleared up. This was for mainly political reasons, not for lack of at least circumstantial evidence. The Liberals, in fact, because of their opposition to Prince Michael and the latter’s repression of the Omladina, had every reason to hope for a change of regime.82 What saved the Liberals was the purely political need which the new Regents had of their cooperation. For Blaznavac in particular it was essential to have the support of more than just the army, and since the conservatives would not work with him, the alternative had to be the Liberals. Hence Blaznavac’s insistence on choosing Ristić as a partner. Ristić, though hardly a Liberal by conviction, had earned himself something of a reputation as a constitutionalist, and was thus the link between Blaznavac and the Liberals.83
Essentially, Blaznavac and Ristić did a deal with the leading Liberals. The Liberals’ blatant foreknowledge of the assassination was to be skated over, and the Regents would take steps to introduce a constitution. In return, the Liberals would give the government their support, and some of them would even join government service. After first pressing for Liberals on Habsburg soil to be prosecuted or extradited, therefore, the Serbian government quietly let its own investigations drop. The Andrássy government, which had responded willingly by rounding up Vladimir Jovanović and the Bulgarian nationalist Ljuben Karavelov, in Novi Sad, found itself acting alone. In the end Jovanović and Karavelov had to be released for want of evidence, not least because the originators of the action against them, the Serbian government, would not pursue the matter. There was also the ticklish question of whether such persons, charged with what could be described as political crimes, could legally be extradited to Serbia. As Kállay reminded Andrássy on 10 July, there was no treaty of extradition between the Monarchy and Serbia, and in any case if the offenses were to be regarded as political, then Jovanović and Karavelov could not be prosecuted for them under Hungarian law.

There remains the possibility of foreign involvement in Michael’s assassination. Suspicion was inevitably directed at Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire.

The Russian government might have been thought to have a reason for wanting Michael removed, since it thoroughly disapproved of his dismissal of Garašanin, in late 1867, and the turn toward Austria-Hungary. Andrássy certainly thought a link existed. So did the Prussian consul in Belgrade, although the Prussian government was not convinced by this. But despite the bad feeling which still prevailed between Belgrade and St. Petersburg no one else seriously considered the idea of Russian responsibility, nor did any evidence emerge at the trial of the murderers to suggest it.

The charge against Austria-Hungary is also easily disproven, and had its origins in the generally bad relations between the Monarchy and Serbia for most of the nineteenth century. In support of the suspicion of Austro-Hungarian involvement, however, there are only three considerations worth citing. One was the fact, generally known, that the Monarchy opposed Prince Michael’s plans for a Balkan alliance and general uprising against Ottoman rule. Another was the past willingness of the Monarchy to intervene in Serbian affairs and to influence the choice of Prince. The Monarchy’s record in this type of interference was irregular; but the willingness was there, and was alive and well in 1868, as Andrássy’s correspondence with Beust demonstrates. Third, there was the initial enthusiasm of Prokesch-Osten, the ambassador in Constantinople, for a Karadordević candidacy in 1868.

Against these points must be ranged the whole trend of Austro-Serbian relations in the year leading up to Prince Michael’s murder. Naturally Beust opposed
Michael’s Balkan alliance schemes; but for both him and Andrásy this was if anything an additional reason for trying to improve relations with Serbia, the better to exercise a restraining influence. Beust differed from Andrásy as to the means to be employed. But there can be no doubt that in Vienna, as much as in Pest, Michael was by and large regarded as an asset, whose replacement would have been not only fraught with risk but unnecessary.93

Another proof of the Monarchy’s non-involvement was the zeal with which the Hungarian government, with the tacit approval of the Ballhaus, pursued Alexander Karadžorđević through the Hungarian courts in the course of the next three years. On Kállay’s recommendation, and after a formal request by the Serbian Regency, the Hungarian authorities placed Karadžorđević under arrest on 8 August.94 At the special request of Belgrade, the Hungarian government arranged for this part of Alexander’s arraignment to be held in public.95 The saga of the Karadžorđević trial, and the way in which it became the litmus test of Serbo-Hungarian relations, will be treated at length later. Here it is worth pointing out that, if either the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry or the Hungarian government had been behind a conspiracy designed to put Alexander Karadžorđević on the Serbian throne, then Andrásy would never have put so much time and energy into this prosecution. On Andrásy’s behalf Kállay, over the next few years, was repeatedly to protest the government’s determination to secure a conviction to the increasingly sceptical Regents.

Finally there is the conclusive evidence of Kállay’s own diary and his correspondence with Andrásy. Kállay’s expressions of regret at the passing of someone he had personally liked, as well as found useful in furthering Hungarian interests, are too numerous and unqualified to be feigned.96 Andrásy, too, confessed himself “shaken” by the news.97 It was only in the weeks following the assassination that Andrásy and Kállay began to appreciate unforeseen advantages in the new situation.

In the case of the Ottomans, by contrast, a number of clues point to some form of involvement, although in view of the paucity of evidence it is unlikely that these will ever be substantiated. Of all the powers only the Ottoman government had the sort of motivation that would have made an incitement to murder explicable. Prince Michael had been a thorn in its side throughout the 1860s. Far more than Austria-Hungary, the Porte had reason to fear Michael’s activity, which was aimed directly at Ottoman rule in the Balkans. The recent reconciliation between Prince Michael and Ilija Garašanin may also have caused alarm in the Ottoman government.98

An important domestic consequence of the Obrenović assassination for the Hungarian government was that it provided the pretext for moving against the Serbian nationalist movement in the Vojvodina. Unfortunately for the cause of Serbo-Hungarian friendship, the practical results of this purge were nugatory, in
that no evidence of serious involvement by Svetozar Miletić and his supporters was ever uncovered. Instead, the Hungarian Serbs were even further alienated from their government; and in Serbia, although the action taken was not unwelcome to the Blaznavac regime, among the population as a whole the persecution of Hungary’s Serbs was not easily forgotten.

Andrássy started from the assumption that Miletić was not only hand in glove with the Karadordević conspiracy, but backed by Moscow as well. The first part of this assumption, if not the second, was one that Kállay shared, although he revealed an additional calculation behind it when he wrote that “It would be very much in our interest if we could render the incorrigible agitator Miletić harmless so neatly.” This would also, he added, be agreeable to Blaznavac. The problem was proving Miletić’s connection with the assassination.

To gather the necessary evidence the Andrássy government on 20 June appointed as royal commissioner Nándor Ast, with sweeping powers of investigation. The interior minister, Béla Wenckheim, advised the commissioner to suspend Miletić from his post as mayor of Novi Sad, but leave the rest of the administration and council in place if possible.

Ast arrived in Novi Sad on 26 June, and proceeded to put these instructions into effect. The royal commissioner soon discovered, however, that his task was a fruitless one. His early prediction that Miletić’s suspension would provoke “mass resignations” was proven wrong; but in the crucial matter of evidence Ast was on a hiding to nothing. By 3 July all Ast could relay to Pest was the opinion of some of his witnesses that “Miletić as mayor . . . exercises complete absolutism in administrative matters . . . and practices a genuine terrorism on the peace-loving Novi Sad community.”

Wenckheim, in reply, conveyed his wholehearted approval of Ast’s measures, and recommended suspending from office any councillors who gave him difficulties. On the basis of the material Ast had collected on Miletić, Wenckheim wrote, he too came to the same conclusions “with regard to his [Miletić’s] political character and activities.” There was nevertheless a snag:

I do not . . . consider this evidence sufficient to undertake legal proceedings against him [Miletić], . . . and for this reason I request Your Honor to carry on with your investigation against him.

By 8 July, however, Ast was compelled to admit he could find no hard evidence for a couple of secret meetings Miletić was supposed to have had, with Pavle Radovanović and his associates, prior to the assassination.

Long before that the government’s strategy for prosecuting Miletić had unraveled completely. On 15 July, justice minister Boldizsár Horvát informed Wenckheim that, on the available evidence, a case against Miletić could not be sustained. The lack of evidence did not prevent Horvát from recommending
that Miletić be kept out of office anyway. The latter, Horvát wrote, had shown “such vehement hatred of the government and such anti-constitutional tendencies,” that “in the interests of public order” he should not be allowed to resume the post of mayor. But the idea of a criminal prosecution remained untenable, and Ast formally advised Wenckheim to drop the case on 9 September.

Miletić was never reinstated as mayor of Novi Sad, and it was not until May 1869 that the constitutional administration of the town was restored. Jovanović and Karavelov, despite the failure of the Serbian Regency to pursue them, were allowed to languish in Hungarian prisons for months, and the government ignored Miletić’s parliamentary interpellation in November, demanding to know under what law they were being held. In fact the whole campaign against Miletić, as well as the studied neglect of Jovanović and Karavelov, was due to more than just the desire of the Andrássy government to remove these domestic thorns from its side. Action against Serbian liberal nationalism within Hungary also tied in with the Hungarian government’s policy toward the Serbian Regency.

The Regents’ need for an accommodation with the Serbian Liberals did not mean they were any more well-disposed toward the liberal movement among the Hungarian Serbs. On the contrary, the Regents feared all the more the criticism which Miletić, through his journal *Zastava*, had for years directed against Belgrade governments. Blaznavac regarded Miletić with particular animosity, and was of the opinion that the Hungarian authorities should simply “string him up.” Ristić had hardly less reason to fear Miletić, being frequently attacked for the insincerity of his commitment to national liberation and constitutional reform. So in the aftermath of the assassination, Miletić and *Zastava* were openly accused by the Regency of complicity or at the very least foreknowledge, and the Hungarian government did its best to give substance to the accusation. Miletić, however, not only sailed through the storm unscathed, but fought back. *Zastava* raised the suspicion that the Regents themselves might have been implicated in the assassination, especially Blaznavac, who was a member of Michael’s government. Despite a truce of sorts in the months following the assassination, Miletić eventually concluded that the new regime was likely to prove as authoritarian as its predecessor, albeit hidden under a constitutional veneer; nor did the Regency show any interest in cooperating with the Novi Sad liberals.

The Hungarian government was thoroughly alive to the credit it could earn with the Regents by acting against Miletić. At the same time, Andrássy had his suspicions that the Serbian government was secretly cultivating links with Novi Sad, in a bid to raise its stock in the South Slav world generally. Kállay, therefore, was set a dual task, which became a regular feature of the Hungarian relationship with Belgrade for the next two years. He was expected to encourage the Regents, especially Blaznavac, in their apprehension of Miletić as their blackest enemy, and to keep them grateful by promising constant vigilance on the part of the Hungarian
government against the Novi Sad “Greater Serbs.” He had also to keep on the alert for any signs of a rapprochement between Miletić and the Regents, which might signify a renewal of Serbian support for subversive nationalism in Hungary itself. Any such development was to be discouraged as strongly as possible.

This process of mutual reassurance and continual probing was one that enabled Kállay, in the months following Michael’s death, to consolidate his hold on the Prince’s successors. Each side was anxious to convince the other of its good faith. When Andrásy, for instance, telegraphed Kállay that the Hungarian authorities could prove Miletić’s guilt, if they arrested Jovanović, Karavelov and other intimates, and were willing to do so if Belgrade wished it, the provisional government replied with a formal request to that effect.\(^{117}\)

The question of whether the Serbian government should allow Serbian citizens to attend the third Congress of the \textit{Omladina} in Hungary, in September, prompted further manoeuvrings. The Regents, in Stokes’ words, “were well aware that the main tenet of the \textit{Omladina} constitution . . . implied opposition to the Regency’s policy of friendship with Hungary.”\(^{118}\) At the same time, the Regents were reluctant to impugn their own nationalist credentials by identifying with the Hungarian government’s repressive policy toward the \textit{Omladina}. Thus, when Kállay intimated to Blaznavac, on 14 August, that “now is the time to show that they [the Regents] are our true friends and not to permit demonstrations against the Hungarian government,”\(^{119}\) Blaznavac wriggled. He assured Kállay that the government would do its best to moderate the tone of the Congress, but that the Omladinists were in any case more concerned with literature than politics.\(^{120}\)

Otherwise the Serbian government did its utmost to distance itself from Miletić, in a clear attempt to please the Hungarians. In the autumn, as the pact with the Liberals started to take effect and prominent Liberals joined government service, rumors reached Kállay that the Regents were consulting Miletić himself on these changes. Both Blaznavac and Ristić strongly denied this, the former “adding that they don’t need Miletić’s wisdom.”\(^{121}\) The rumors, however, persisted, and Kállay’s confidant Dr. Rosen, at least, was convinced that a “secret correspondence” was going on. “By means of this correspondence,” Kállay gathered from Rosen, “the government is courting the Omladina.”\(^{122}\) As long as the Regents continued to deny these allegations, though, the Hungarians continued to profess to believe them.

The opportunity to harass Miletić and his party at home, coupled with the Serbian government’s public disavowal of the Hungarian Serb nationalists, were purely domestic political advantages wrested from the seeming catastrophe of Prince Michael’s assassination. On the broader front, there was perhaps reason to be thankful at the way things had turned out.

Serbia was now governed by a Regency, committed to internal reform and concerned more for its internal stability than for a dangerous adventurism in foreign
policy. By restraining the Porte from intervening in the succession and the choice of Regents, Austro-Hungarian diplomacy had done Serbia a real service. Then, by inducing the Ottomans to accept the hereditary right of the Obrenović family, the Monarchy earned the future loyalty of Prince Milan, arguably a factor of greater importance in Austro-Serbian relations for the next quarter century than all the schemes hatched in Pest in the period 1867–71. In the place of the potentially formidable combination of Prince Michael and Garašanin, there was now the fourteen-year-old Milan, surrounded by men whose avowed purpose was friendship with Austria-Hungary, or rather Hungary, and the repudiation of Russian influence.

Kállay was inclined to be optimistic, although he stressed the pitfalls in his reports to both Beust and Andrásy. Kállay warned Beust, in August, that the expansionist policies of the previous regime were not entirely abandoned. This was not because of a natural belligerence or overwhelming sense of grievance among the Balkan peoples. On the contrary, the Balkan peoples, in Kállay’s opinion, were simply not capable of united action, because of their differences of language, religion and culture, and would not be for a long time to come. The real threat was that one of the insurrections which occasionally broke out in the Balkans, again “for the most part due to foreign influence,” would force the Regency’s hand.

For Serbia however . . . to cleave to this prudent policy, and not let itself be swept away in the end, we must . . . offer everything we can to accustom the Serbs to seek support from us, and to see their aspirations realized through our help.

For the moment, as far as Beust was concerned, Kállay confined himself to the postal convention, and a settlement of the consular jurisdiction question, as means of attaining this goal. Behind this unobjectionable advice, however, lay the Bosnian scheme, which in the course of the autumn came out into the open.

With Andrásy Kállay could be more direct. Negotiations about Bosnia between Andrásy and the new rulers in Belgrade had been going on since June. In the context of Prince Michael’s murder, and the necessity of establishing with his successors the same good relationship that the Hungarian government had enjoyed with him, the Bosnian question was to remain of central importance. It was a question, moreover, where the recipient of Serbian gratitude was intended to be Hungary, not the Monarchy as a whole. Andrásy set the agenda, and attempted to carry it out through Kállay. The nominal shapers of Austro-Hungarian policy toward Serbia, Beust and Prőkesch-Osten, were at first bypassed completely and then, when their discovery of the negotiations became inevitable, expected to acquiesce. One of the reasons this was possible at all was the ambiguous position of the Emperor Francis Joseph.

The other issue, which exercised Andrásy and Kállay far more than Vienna, was a direct consequence of the Obrenović assassination. This was the undertak-
ing to prosecute ex-Prince Alexander Karadordević for Michael’s murder, and see him convicted. At the end of July 1868, Kállay was confident about the good effect which prosecuting Alexander would have on relations with Serbia. He also made clear what a harmful effect it would have on our, up to now, steadily improving relations with Serbia, if those detained [in Pest] were . . . not to be convicted. . . . This . . . would be capable of once again opening the way for Russian influence, which is now completely displaced here. . . . I cannot recommend sufficiently strongly . . . that Your Excellency . . . should be so good as to ensure that the persons in question are in any case convicted, the more easily . . . because their guilt is beyond doubt.¹²⁵

Nevertheless this was a disastrous miscalculation. The Pest courts were eventually to decide otherwise; but in the meantime Kállay had, with Andrásy’s support, staked the Hungarian government’s prestige in Serbia on Alexander’s conviction. The result was to convince the Serbian Regents that a conviction was inevitable, and the failure to deliver was thus attributed to Hungarian ill will and deception. The relative goodwill, and the readiness to cooperate, which characterized Serbo-Hungarian relations in the aftermath of Prince Michael’s assassination, was to be dissipated as if it had never existed.

Notes


5 Stokes, *Legitimacy through Liberalism*, 132, and note 3; Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 16 June 1868 (no. 35B), HHSA, PA XII/91.


7 Ibid., 2:362; Kállay Diary, 23 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 41–42).

8 Kállay to Beust, 13 June 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
Kállay Diary, 10 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 31).


Kállay to Andrásy, 12 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/95.

Ibid. Cf. Kállay Diary, s.d. (Dnevnik, 32–33).

Kállay to Andrásy, 12 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/96.

Kállay to Beust, 13 June 1868, HHS, PA XXXVIII/177.

Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 12 & 16 June, both in HHS, PA XII/91.

Andrássy to Beust (telegram), 11 June 1868, HHS, PA XL/13.


Andrássy to Beust, 12 June 1868, HHS, PA XL/128. Three paragraphs of this letter are reproduced, in German, in Andrássy to Kállay, 14 June 1868, in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 196, 455.

Andrássy to Beust, 12 June 1868, HHS, PA XL/128.

Ibid; also in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 196, 455.

Andrássy to Beust, 12 June 1868, HHS, PA XL/128.

Ibid.

Goltz to Bismarck, 12 June 1868, in Die auswärtige Politik Preußens 1858–1871: Diplomatische Aktenstücke, ed. Erich Brandenburg et al. (Oldenburg: Reichsinstitut für Geschichte des neuen Deutschlands, 1933–39), vol. 10, no. 63, 78; Thile to Werther, 13 June 1868, ibid., no. 68, 81–82.

Beust to Andrásy, 14 June 1868, HHS, PA XL/128; cf. Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 12 June 1868 (no. 34B), HHS, PA XII/91.

Beust to Andrásy, 14 June 1868, HHS, PA XL/128; Beust to Metternich, 16 June 1868, HHS, PA XII/93.

Beust to Andrásy, 14 June 1868, HHS, PA XL/128; cf. Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 19 June 1868, PA XI/93.

Andrássy to Kállay, 14 June 1868, in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 196, 456.

Ibid.

Francis Joseph to Andrásy, 14 June 1868, HHS, PA XL/13.

Andrássy to Francis Joseph, 15 June 1868, HHS, PA XL/13.

Andrássy to Beust, 15 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/183–85 (copy); original in HHS, PA XL/13.


Andrássy to Beust, 15 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/183–85 (copy); original in HHS, PA XL/13.

Francis Joseph to Andrásy, 17 June 1868, HHS, PA XL/13.

Beust to Andrásy, 17 June 1868, MOL, P344, 17.k., Cc/10 (copy); original in HHS, PA XL/128.

Beust to Kállay, 18 June 1868, HHS, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay Diary, 21 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 41).
Kállay to Beust, 18 June 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
Kállay to Andrásy, 18 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/103–4. Two paragraphs from this letter, dealing with the Hungarian Serb politician Stratimirović, are reproduced in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 198, 460.
Kállay to Andrásy, 18 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/104.
Andrássy to Kállay, 28 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/113. This letter is reproduced in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 206, 473–77, but without the first paragraph.
See Andrásy to Kállay, 14 June 1868, in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 196, 456.
Andrássy to Kállay, 28 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/113.
Kállay to Beust, 19 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 40).
Kállay Diary, 19 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 40).
Kállay to Beust, 22 June 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
Kállay Diary, 26 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 43). Not preserved in HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
Kállay to Beust, 26 June 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; also Kállay to Beust, s.d. (telegram).
Kállay to Beust, 26 June 1868 (despatch), HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; cf. Kállay to Andrásy, 27 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/111–12.
Kállay Diary, 26 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 45).
Kállay to Beust, 26 June 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
E.g., Kállay to Andrásy, 25 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/109.
Kállay Diary, 26 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 44).
Kállay Diary, 26 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 44).
Kállay Diary, 26 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 44).
Kállay Diary, 26 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 44).
Kállay to Beust, 5 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay to Andrásy, 7 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/118–19.
Petrovich, History of Modern Serbia, 2:363–64; Ćučković to Kállay, 5 July 1868, MOL, P344, 17.k., Cc/18; Kállay to Beust, 10 Aug. 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, 1:49–50.
Petrovich, History of Modern Serbia, 2:362
Kállay Diary, 8 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 53); Kállay to Beust, 5 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
Kállay to Beust, 8 July 1868 (telegram and despatch no. 43), HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay to Andrásy, 8 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/189.
Beust to Prokesch-Osten, 9 July 1868 (telegram); and Weisung of 12 July 1868, both HHSA, PA XII/93; passages quoted are from the latter.
Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 14 July 1868, HHSA, PA XII/93.
Kállay Diary, 18 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 59); Kállay to Beust, 30 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
Apple of Discord

75 Kállay to Beust, 20 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay Diary, 19 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 59).


77 Kállay to Beust, 20 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.

78 Jovanović, Druga vlada Miloša i Mihaila, pp. 434–36; Duškanović, Ubistvo Kneza Mihaila, 1:53–57, 125–28; Stokes, Legitimacy through Liberalism, 144, and note 56, citing Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, 1:44; Kállay to Andrássy, 23 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/108; Kállay Diary, 26 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 45).

79 Kállay to Andrássy, 31 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/133; Kállay to Beust, 13 Oct. 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.


81 Ibid., 1:32, 35–36, 37; Petrovich, History of Modern Serbia, 2:365, echoing Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, 1:37; Stokes, Legitimacy through Liberalism, 141–43.

82 Ibid., 133–34, 141–45.


84 Stokes, Legitimacy through Liberalism, 135, 138.

85 Simits to Ast, 28 June 1868 (Serbian translation from the Hungarian, found in Serbian archives), in Petrovich, vol. 1, no. 204, 467; Kállay Diary, 8 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 52).

86 Stokes, Legitimacy through Liberalism, 138–41.

87 Kállay to Andrássy, 10 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/121.

88 Andrássy to Kállay, 14 June 1868, in Petrovich, vol. 1, no. 196, 455.


90 Kállay Diary, 12 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 32).

91 Grgur Jakšić & Vojislav J. Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije za vlade Kneza Mihaila (Prvi Balkanski savez) (Belgrade: Istoriski Institut, 1963), 465.

92 Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 12 June 1868, HHSA, PA XII/91; cf. Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 24 Feb. 1871, HHSA, PA XII/98.

93 Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, 1:46.


95 Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, 1:47.

96 Kállay Diary, 10 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 31); Kállay to Andrássy, 12 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/94.

97 Andrássy to Beust, 11 June 1868 (telegram), HHSA, PA XL/13.


99 Andrássy to Beust, 11 June 1868, HHSA, PA XL/13; Andrássy to Kállay, 14 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/98.

100 Kállay to Andrássy, 25 June 1868, in Petrovich, vol. 1, no. 199, 461.
Béla Wenckheim to Ast, 20 June 1868, in Dokumenti za b’lgarskata i sr’bskata istoria iz madžarskite dr’zavni arhivi [Documents for Bulgarian and Serbian History from the Hungarian State Archives], ed. Pet’r Miiatev (Sofia: I.B.A.N., 1966), no. 2, 15–16 (henceforward Dokumenti); not in Petrović.

Wenckheim to Ast, 24 June 1868, in Dokumenti, no. 4, 23; not in Petrovic.

Ast to Wenckheim, [27–29] June 1868, in Dokumenti, no. 6, 25; not in Petrović.

Ast to Wenckheim, 3 July 1868, in Dokumenti, no. 211, 487.

Wenckheim to Ast, 6 July 1868, in Dokumenti, no. 213, 495.

Ibid., 496.

Ibid.

Ast to Wenckheim, 8 July 1868, in Dokumenti, no. 215, 497–99.

Rath to Horvát, 12 July 1868, in Dokumenti, no. 221, 504–7; Horvát to Wenckheim, 15 July 1868, in Dokumenti, no. 223, 513.

Ibid.

Ast to Wenckheim, 9 Sept. 1868, in Dokumenti, no. 246, 557–59.

Interpellation by S. Miletić of Minister of Justice, 19 Nov. 1868, in Dokumenti, no. 251, 564–65; Stokes, Legitimacy through Liberalism, 140–41.

Kállay to Andrássy, 9 May 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/81.

Kállay Diary, 13 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 34).


Ibid., 1:135; Radenić, “Vojvodanska štampa,” 88; Stokes, Legitimacy through Liberalism, 149–50; also Kállay Diary, 21 Dec. 1868 (Dnevnik, 132–33); Kállay to Andrássy, 23 Dec. 1868, in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 254, 569–70.

Kállay Diary, 17 and 25 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 39, 42).

Stokes, Legitimacy through Liberalism, 166.

Kállay Diary, 14 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 75).

Ibid.

Ibid., 2 Nov. 1868 (Dnevnik, 109), and 24 Nov. 1868 (118).

Kállay Diary, 22 Dec. 1868 (Dnevnik, 133); Kállay to Andréassy, 23 Dec. 1868, in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 254, 569–70.


Kállay to Beust, 10 Aug. 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; cf. Čučković to Kállay, 2 Aug. 1868, MOL, P344, 17.k., Cc/29; Kállay to Beust, 20 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.

This page intentionally left blank
Chapter 4

The Karađorđević Prosecution 1868–70

The period between the establishment of Prince Milan’s Regency, in July 1868, and the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, in July 1870, was when the ambiguity of Austro-Hungarian policy toward Serbia was greatest. For two years, Andrásy and Kállay exploited that legacy of the 1867 settlement: the ability of a Hungarian minister president, with strong views on foreign policy, to pursue his own agenda contrary to the wishes, and to some extent without the knowledge, of the Emperor and the chancellor. The Hungarian goal was to persuade the Serbian Regents of the benefit to Serbia in keeping close to the Habsburg Monarchy. This in itself was broadly in line with Beust’s own policy toward Serbia, but Hungarian policy differed from that of the Ballhaus in two respects.

First, the emphasis in everything Andrásy and Kállay said to the Serbian government was firmly on the closeness of relations with Hungary, rather than Austria-Hungary, and whatever advantage Serbia derived from the relationship was claimed to be the result of Hungarian friendship. It was an essential part of this stratagem to maintain that it was the Hungarian government alone which protected Serbia from the nastier elements in the Monarchy, particularly the Vienna military.

Second, the means by which the Hungarian government sought to exert this control were seriously at variance with traditional Habsburg policy toward Serbia. Whereas Vienna relied on straightforward diplomatic and military pressure to keep Serbia in line, Andrásy and Kállay intervened in detail in Serbian domestic affairs, or tried to. They took sides in obvious fashion by trying to secure the conviction of Prince Alexander Karađorđević. Most drastically, Andrásy’s Bosnian scheme stood the Monarchy’s proclaimed policy on its head, and introduced an unrealistic note into relations with Serbia. But it still took two years for the illusions fostered by this Hungarian foreign policy to break down.
Blaznavac was the key to this exercise in mutual self-deception. For an ambitious political soldier like Blaznavac to have come out so openly against the Russians was akin to burning his boats behind him, and Kállay was particularly conscious of the need to safeguard this rarity on the Serbian scene. He kept in close touch with Blaznavac, and continued to promote him, to Beust, as the man most likely to keep Serbia on a peaceful course, favorable to Austro-Hungarian influence and the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans. To Andrásy, he reported gleefully on Blaznavac’s interest in the Bosnian scheme and his professions of solidarity with the Hungarians. The more Kállay saw of the first Regent, the deeper grew his conviction that, barring the sort of nationalist upheaval in the Balkans which would compel any Serbian politician to commit himself, Blaznavac was the ideal instrument for attaining Hungarian aims in Serbia.

How real this picture was, however, is a different matter. In the aftermath of Prince Michael’s assassination, Blaznavac’s attitude may well have owed more to an opportunistic disposition to see how far the pro-Hungarian line took him, and what profit it brought Serbia, than Kállay in his enthusiasm was willing to admit. The little that can be gleaned on Blaznavac’s thinking, from sources other than Kállay’s own records, suggests both a cynical readiness to gamble, and a man doing his best to persuade himself that the Hungarian assurances, especially in the crucial matter of Bosnia, were really worth something.

The Italian consul in Belgrade found Blaznavac’s estimation of the entente with the Hungarians less than convincing:

As for me I doubt whether the cause of the Slavs is so far advanced, and especially, that the Magyars and the Croats have so easily adopted the position of leaving the Serbs free to annex the provinces in question [Bosnia-Hercegovina] and even to assist in this annexation.

The whole thing, Scovasso suggested, was a ruse by the Hungarians to keep the Serbian government quiet. Blaznavac, however, devoted considerable effort to convincing the Italian that the Hungarians’ friendship must be genuine. According to Blaznavac, it was in Hungary’s interests to see the creation of a greater South Slav state, especially if such a conglomeration were still formally within the Ottoman Empire. Linked to Hungary by a treaty of alliance, the Ottoman Slavs would be a barrier to Russia, which would thus be excluded forever from the Near East.

Blaznavac may have believed this improbable scenario at the time, but his later willingness to turn against the Hungarians suggests he was simply exploring the possibilities. The Prussian consul, while sympathetic to Blaznavac’s anti-Russian stance, was sure that it did not correspond to popular sentiment in Serbia. Blaznavac himself was well aware of this. The question, from the Hungarian point of view, was how far he would be able to take Serbia on a course so
contrary to the natural tendency of Serbian national feeling.

The answer to this question depended to a great extent on Jovan Ristić, the enigmatic second Regent. Ristić, as a champion of constitutional reform, and committed to the cause of national liberation, inclined personally more toward Russia than Austria-Hungary. The exigencies of the situation which caused Blaznavac to seek him as a partner demanded that Ristić play down his Russophilia. Nevertheless the suspicion remained that his heart was not in the pro-Hungarian policy adopted by Blaznavac. He was especially cautious, Kállay discovered by the beginning of September, about clever schemes like Andrássy’s Bosnian plan, and doubted whether Andrássy could deliver, given Beust’s known opposition. “I don’t know what to think of Ristić,” Kállay complained; “he is very suspicious.”

With both the prosecution of Alexander Karađorđević and the Bosnian question Andrássy and Kállay were pursuing objectives which were questionable, if not downright irresponsible. There is thus a certain irony in the fact that it was the Hungarians’ failure, in each case, to make good their promises which hastened the end of Serbo-Hungarian friendship in 1870–71. Both questions kept popping up throughout the period 1868–70. Each was a product of the attempt to bind Serbia firmly to the destinies of the Monarchy, especially its Hungarian half; each was characteristic of the essential futility of such an enterprise, at least as conceived by Andrássy and Kállay.

The Karađorđević case started with the issue of whether Serbia’s ex-Prince, who had been living in Pest since his deposition in 1858, should be extradited to Belgrade to stand trial for Prince Michael’s murder. Blaznavac and Ristić realized that by concentrating on Alexander, they could divert attention from the role of the Liberals, whose support they needed. At the same time the destruction of the Karađorđević family (it was assumed that Alexander’s son Peter was equally involved) would also eliminate the only serious rival of the Obrenović dynasty.

Throughout the summer of 1868, the evidence against Karađorđević accumulated. The documents found on Pavle Radovanović implicated two of the ex-Prince’s closest associates, Pavle Tripković and Filip Stanković. Other seemingly damning evidence continued to emerge, to the point where Kállay felt sure that Karađorđević “not only knew about the murder but also planned it.” On 13 July Ristić formally notified Kállay that the Serbian authorities had issued a
summons to Karadorđević, requesting him to appear at the trial of the conspirators in Belgrade later that month, or name his defense counsel.\textsuperscript{16}

By the time of Ristić’s request Kállay and Andrássy were already debating the pros and cons of extraditing not only Tripković and Stanković, but also Karadorđević. The Serbian government applied for the extradition of the first two at the end of June, but it was clear that a similar application for Karadorđević himself was only a matter of time.\textsuperscript{17} The Hungarian government, upon Prince Michael’s assassination, placed Prince Alexander under police surveillance, and at Andrássy’s request the foreign ministry started monitoring the movements of Peter Karadorđević.\textsuperscript{18} It was one thing, though, to take these elementary precautions against the charge of having harbored a conspiracy against the Serbian government on Austro-Hungarian soil. It was quite another to hand over the former ruler of Serbia, with his associates, to the uncertain justice of a Serbian court.

Kállay was acutely aware of the political capital the Hungarian government stood to gain in Serbia by acceding to this request.\textsuperscript{19} The awkward truth, however, was that no treaty of extradition existed between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and in the absence of such an agreement the Hungarian government could only be guided by its own laws and whatever precedents the Habsburg Monarchy had already set by diplomatic practice. But established practice, Kállay pointed out, was clear only in cases involving common criminals.\textsuperscript{20}

The question immediately arose of whether the murder of Prince Michael was to be regarded as a criminal matter, or whether it was political. “It must be noted,” Kállay reminded Andrássy, “that nobody has been extradited for political offenses on either side, although up to now no political offenders have committed murder.”\textsuperscript{21} And even if the murder itself was purely a criminal matter, could the same be said of its planning, by individuals who had no physical hand in it, but whose motives were more likely to have been political? Kállay concluded:

\begin{quote}
if the persons in question can be proven to have any hand at all in Prince Michael’s murder, and our laws can brand them as common criminals, then they should not be judged by us, but extradited to Serbia. Conversely, if their complicity is not completely proven, or if our courts pronounce the deed as only a political offense, then extradition is impossible, because in this case, according to our laws, they would not be punishable.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

A few days before, when asked by Blaznavac whether the Monarchy would extradite Karadorđević, Kállay had gone so far as to assure him “that it would probably do so if his participation could be proven.”\textsuperscript{23} Within days of making this remark, however, Kállay was obliged to admit that, according to what he was reading in the Pest newspapers, “the Hungarian government will not extradite the person in question, but has already delegated the Pest civil court to try him.”\textsuperscript{24} Blaznavac might claim to be satisfied, as long as Karadorđević was convicted somewhere,\textsuperscript{25}
but in view of the Regents’ anxiety to ensure that the political threat he posed was eliminated, it is hard to believe they would not have preferred to have the ex-Prince safely in Serbian, rather than Hungarian, custody. Kállay’s initial blithe assurance that extradition was a possibility sowed the seeds of future mistrust: it suggested to the Regents that the Hungarian government had an ulterior motive in promising what it patently had no intention of delivering.

Formal confirmation of what Kállay already knew arrived on 17 July, in a despatch from Andrássy setting out the arguments against extraditing Karadórdévić and his associates. Andrássy’s letter showed the extent to which the whole question had become a matter simply between Hungary and Serbia, with the imperial foreign ministry effectively sidelined. Andrássy had as a matter of course consulted Beust for the foreign ministry’s expert opinion on extradition, but under the 1867 settlement any prosecution on Hungarian soil was strictly a Hungarian affair, and appears to have been treated as such by Beust, provided there were no serious diplomatic repercussions.

Enclosing a copy of Beust’s reply, Andrássy informed Kállay that, according to international law, political offenders were not normally extraditable. Since it was “undeniable” that the involvement of Karadórdévić and his associates was for political reasons, it followed that they were political offenders, and “their extradition . . . cannot be regarded as practicable.” All of them, however, could reasonably be suspected of having known of the plan to commit the outrage. They could thus be regarded as having committed a crime in Hungary, “hence their extradition for this reason would not be justifiable.”

The Hungarian government, Andrássy protested, would like nothing better than to comply with the Serbian request, and

it is with genuine regret forced to report that it cannot carry out the extradition of the individuals in question. . . . It has however seen to it that the said individuals should not remain without a deserved punishment.

Kállay was accordingly authorized to inform the Regents that the minister of justice, Horvát, had already instructed the Pest civil court to start collecting evidence. Horvát also asked for a Serbian official to be sent up from Belgrade to assist in the investigation. It would help if the subjects of the Hungarian investigation could at some stage be confronted with those already charged in Serbia; and any executions, upon conviction in Belgrade, should be delayed until this standard element of Hungarian justice had been completed.

Kállay hastened to carry out his instructions, but the response his news elicited, and his own expressed opinion, give some idea of how he and Andrássy were to get themselves into such difficulties over the Karadórdévić prosecution. Ristić was visibly annoyed. Kállay explained the difficulties faced by a responsible government, obliged to respect the rule of law, but although Ristić admitted
the justice of these objections, and readily agreed to send an official to Pest to assist in the investigations, he adamantly refused to put off the trial of those held in Belgrade, or the executions which were likely to follow. “Because of the indignation of the people,” the trial of the Belgrade conspirators would go ahead, and Ristić expected it to be over by 27 July.34

It must remain a moot point whether the Regents’ determination to press on with the Belgrade trial was due to a genuine respect for “the indignation of the people,” or a baser desire to put Radovanović and his cronies safely underground before they produced any more evidence implicating the Regents’ new Liberal allies. Ristić himself showed some awareness of the obstacles such haste would put in the way of convicting Karadorđević.35 But Kállay was so convinced of the guilt of Karadorđević and his associates as to discount the importance of this consideration. It is clear from his correspondence with Andrássy that, for Kállay, the political utility of conviction obscured the need for elementary justice.

With regard to Stanković and Tripković, for instance, Kállay thought their complicity “beyond doubt.” He implored Andrássy to

be so kind as to exert your influence so that a really harsh punishment be meted out to them. I can strongly recommend this proceeding from the viewpoint of maintaining the good relations which are being strengthened more and more between us and Serbia.36

The complicity of Karadorđević, too, “can scarcely be doubted.”37 In a revealing passage, Kállay set forth what were for him the overriding considerations:

there are convincing reasons why we should make him [Karadorđević] feel the rigour of the law. . . . If we don't do this we expose ourselves to the suspicion that we are showing a partiality for him. We would only have to spare him if any political reason required it; but our interest, from the point of view of maintaining peace and consolidating the Obrenović dynasty lies in making Karadorđević as harmless as the boundaries of the law permit.38

Enough evidence was already to hand to make Karadorđević’s involvement seem a foregone conclusion, but this was not the verdict eventually reached by the Hungarian courts. Kállay was assuming Karadorđević’s conviction before he had even been interrogated, let alone tried.

The result was to make Kállay apparently indifferent to the dangers of letting the Serbian government go ahead with the trial and subsequent execution of the Belgrade conspirators, in late July. The trial began on 23 July and concluded the next day; on the 28th Radovanović and thirteen others were executed.39 They had already made depositions, copies of which were duly forwarded to the Hungarian authorities. Most of the conspirators, however, stubbornly refused to admit Karadorđević’s involvement; while the depositions of those who did incriminate him were suspected all along of having been extorted. A face to face confronta-
tion between these individuals and Karadorđević, at a later date, and in the relatively less constrained atmosphere of a Hungarian court, might conceivably have consolidated the case against the ex-Prince beyond all reasonable doubt. Instead, the possibility of such confrontation was let slip.

Kállay, through his preoccupation with the political aspects of prosecuting Karadorđević, was imperilling the very outcome he considered most essential. The importance of a painstaking accumulation of evidence was perhaps better appreciated by the justice minister in Pest, who telegraphed on 28 July asking Kállay to get the executions postponed. Kállay could only reply that the accused had been executed that same day. In any case, he argued, Belgrade had already provided ample evidence; the vital thing now was to make sure Karadorđević was convicted, lest “Russian influence” in Serbia recover the ground it had lost.

The proceedings in Belgrade on 23–24 July were also a trial in absentia of Karadorđević, Tripković, and Stanković. Kállay, however, took steps to ensure that Karadorđević’s legal counsel was prevented from attending the trial. As a result, Karadorđević’s counsel was nominated by the Belgrade court, and then promptly withdrew from the case; his telegraphed challenge of their right to represent him was ignored. The ex-Prince’s chances of receiving a fair trial in Belgrade were slim to begin with; Kállay’s intervention reduced them still further. Karadorđević and Tripković were each sentenced to twenty years in prison; Stanković to twenty years with hard labor. On 4 August the Serbian government formally applied for Karadorđević’s extradition, although resigned to the fact that the Austro-Hungarian authorities were bound to refuse. Karadorđević was duly taken into custody in Pest on 8 August.

The day Karadorđević was arrested by the Pest police, Kállay received another intimation of the difficulties he and Andrássy were preparing for themselves by undertaking to prosecute Karadorđević at all. Kállay’s assurances to the Regents had clearly created the impression in Belgrade that Karadorđević’s conviction was a certainty. From a conversation with Colonel Orešković, Kállay learned that Blaznavac thought “it would be a bad thing if those arrested by us [the Hungarians] were not convicted, this would do a lot of damage to his efforts to achieve friendly relations.” Orešković himself thought this “stupid, because he [Blaznavac] knows that the government can’t influence the verdict”; and Kállay urged Orešković to keep stressing this to the Regents. How much impression such caveats were likely to make, however, was another matter. Ristić at least could appreciate Kállay’s points about the importance of “the rule of law”; to the soldier Blaznavac, by contrast, this apparently meant very little.

Kállay himself contradicted his own warnings about the need to follow due process, by the zeal with which he threw himself into the job of ensuring that Karadorđević really was convicted. In response to the accusations in the Vienna
newspapers that torture had been employed in interrogating the Belgrade conspirators, he inspired a number of démentis which appeared anonymously in the Austrian and Hungarian press. Kállay hoped these would convince the Regents that the Hungarian government, unlike the Vienna establishment, did not question the validity of the judicial findings in Belgrade; and that they would dispel any idea that such findings might not be admissible in the Hungarian courts.

Most striking were Kállay’s efforts behind the scenes to ensure that the Hungarian judicial system delivered the kind of verdict he, and the Serbian Regents, wanted. This went beyond mere exhortation: from first to last Kállay displayed a reluctance to let judicial officials make up their own minds, reflecting a recurrent fear that, without constant reminders of the political importance of securing a conviction, the courts would let Karadorđević slip through their fingers.

Kállay’s first exercise in judicial wirepulling came with the preliminary hearing of the case against Karadorđević in October 1868. This involved the confrontation of Karadorđević with both the evidence collected at the Belgrade trial in July, and the witnesses held in Serbia. Proceedings were to be held on Hungarian territory at Zemun, across the Danube from Belgrade. Well before the confrontation Kállay was trying to influence the way it was conducted. He had hoped to give evidence in person at the hearing, but De Pont, head of the political section of the foreign ministry, thought it “inadvisable.” Instead Kállay was allowed to make a written deposition. In Pest, at the end of August, he made a call on the chief public prosecutor, who told him that “in his opinion, the delegated court is in favor of Karadorđević.” Kállay at once hurried to the ministerial councillor in the ministry of justice and asked him “to stop this prejudice, because if as a result of it Karadorđević is freed, it would have very bad consequences. He promised he would investigate this.” Back in Belgrade, Kállay did what he could to reassure the Regents, who had already got wind of the rumored predisposition toward Karadorđević on the part of the Pest judiciary.

When Karadorđević, Tripković and Stanković were eventually brought down to Zemun on 9 October, on board the steamship Maximilian, Kállay immediately repaired on board to see the presiding judge, Titusz Pajor. Kállay found his worst fears confirmed. Pajor raised objections to the presence of both the Serbian public prosecutor and Kállay himself. The chief prosecutor, Sztrokay, by contrast, turned out to be an ally: he “strongly” approved Kállay’s presence, since Pajor was “extraordinarily prejudiced with regard to Karadorđević, because of this he might be more restrained.”

The hearing took place on 10–13 October. Kállay remained personally convinced of Karadorđević’s role as the instigator of the whole conspiracy, although, given the steadfast denials of the three accused, even Kállay had to admit in his report to Beust that he could not swear to the factual value of such a confrontation. What caused Kállay most concern was the attitude shown by the presi-
dent of the court. During the interrogation of Filip Stanković, for instance, Pajor “clearly tried to help the accused and he grasped with great enthusiasm at every circumstance which worked in his favor.” Kállay could not let Pajor’s conduct go unchallenged. On a flying visit to Pest after the hearing, he made a point of visiting the ministry of justice again, and saw Horvát himself:

I called his especial attention to the bias of Titusz Pajor, asked him to ensure, if it is possible, that Karadordević is convicted. He promised he would do everything in his power.

It was the first of a number of direct appeals Kállay was to make to Horvát and his officials over the next two years.

Bringing Karadordević to trial at all was in fact a matter of years, not months. This was a circumstance which caused Kállay repeated embarrassment with the Regents. If, as Kállay kept telling them, Karadordević’s conviction was virtually certain, then why should trying him take so long to arrange? And might not the Hungarian government’s delay in doing so be due to a desire to retain Karadordević and his family as potential tools against the Obrenović dynasty? The longer Karadordević’s prosecution dragged on, the harder it became for Kállay to counter these suspicions.

Simply assessing the evidence, and deciding whether to commit Karadordević for trial, took several months. The trial began on 8 February 1869, but within ten days had run into difficulties with the evidence supplied from Belgrade. Proceedings had to be halted completely while the Serbian authorities were asked for fuller details.60 There was then a lengthy dispute over whether the ex-Prince should be granted bail or not. The formal indictment was not renewed until November, and appointing a new judge took another nine months. It was not until July 1870 that Karadordević, together with Tripković and Stanković, was finally put on trial again.

The longer the whole process lasted, the greater was the nervousness on each side as to whether the other side could be trusted. The Serbian Regents, for example, wanted Karadordević to be tried in public, so that maximum damage should be done to his public image in Serbia. Kállay duly wrote to Sztrokay, the Pest public prosecutor, and to justice minister Horvát, urging a public trial. On the Monarchy’s side, there were signs by early 1869 of a certain impatience with Serbian demands, not just in Vienna, where such a reaction was to be expected, but in Pest as well. This emerges from the somewhat defensive tone of Kállay’s letter to Andrássy of 24 January, which sought to explain the attitude behind a recent article in the Serbian semi-official Jedinstvo.

The Jedinstvo article, which bore all the hallmarks of Ristić’s authorship, was largely concerned with the idea of a Serbian administration of Bosnia and, as such, was the direct result of Andrássy’s and Kállay’s own activity. It was
attacked by the Neue Freie Presse, which took its lead from Beust, for even suggesting such a scheme. As Kállay put it, the Presse

has taken in very bad part the passage [in Jedinstvo] on how the Serbs are anxious to see positive signs of friendship from Hungary, and against this alludes to the cession of the fortresses and the Karadordević affair.65

Kállay attempted to deal with Beust by pointing out that Jedinstvo was only saying what he, Kállay, had been reporting to Beust ever since his arrival in Belgrade.66 To Andrásy, Kállay complained that

In Vienna . . . they are always forgetting that we are dealing here with a very small nation, and that in this regard we cannot be the sensitive ones. Furthermore they don't want to see that the Serbs’ principal aspirations are directed towards Bosnia, and that in comparison with this everything else is pushed into the background. . . . The Karadordević affair falls rather under the heading of provision of justice.67

He concluded with a reminder that “we are acting not in Serbia’s interests but for our own purposes.”68

It would not have been surprising for Andrásy, even at this early stage, to be showing signs of impatience with his own policy of cultivating good relations with Serbia. The changeability of Andrásy’s ideas was always remarkable, and with regard to Serbia he had hoped for quicker results, and was correspondingly annoyed at the time it was taking to get them. Kállay received a clear indication of Andrásy’s disquiet in May 1869:

He [Andrásy] advised me especially to try to induce the Serbs at long last to declare decisively whether they are to be openly on our side or not, because they only want to derive advantage from our friendship, but not to do anything for it.69

This may have been an accurate description of Serbian policy, but it was also a classic example of the pot calling the kettle black.

When at length the Karadordević trial opened in February 1869, only to collapse almost immediately, it was an ominous sign of the difficulties ahead. The evidence collected from the Serbian authorities, it was found, was critically patchy.70 It has been suggested that the Serbian government, well aware of the damage a full revelation might do them politically, deliberately withheld evidence.71 This did not necessarily mean Karadordević was innocent; but it did mean that the Hungarian authorities were likely to have a hard time trying to prove otherwise. The Regents were definitely defeating their own object of eliminating Karadordević. They also, however, continued to urge a speedy and unambiguous conviction, which in view of this non-cooperation seems disingenuous at the very least.

The Karadordević prosecution then produced yet another reason for the Serbian government, as it thought, to mistrust Hungarian motives. Late in May the
Royal Hungarian Court of Justice decided that Karadžorđević was eligible for bail, to the consternation of the Regents. Kállay was told that Blaznavac “regards it as all the more alarming, because it only serves to bolster the intrigues against the good relations which exist between us.” Kállay accordingly wrote to Horvát on the 28th, pleading that he “try to ensure that the High Court of Justice doesn’t uphold the verdict of the Royal Court of Justice, by which Karadžorđević is permitted to defend himself in freedom.”

He followed this up with a further appeal to Horvát’s ministerial councillor, Dezső Szilágyi, in June. By now, Kállay must have wished very much indeed that the affair would lose its significance, but instead it threatened to become more and more of a liability. When the news of Karadžorđević’s definitive release on bail reached Belgrade in September, Kállay learned that Ristić “very much regrets that Karadžorđević has been set free. I tried to explain to him that this is bound up with the forms of our judicial system.”

Matters improved slightly in November 1869, when Karadžorđević was again formally indicted. According to Kállay, the wording of the indictment by the Pest public prosecutor, Sztrokay, “in which he asks for the head of Karadžorđević, has created a very good impression here.” Kállay promptly renewed his assault on the Hungarian ministry of justice, imploring Szilágyi “to throw all his influence into the balance to get Karadžorđević convicted, we now need this very much as one of the conditions of Serbian friendship.”

Even as Kállay stepped up his efforts to harness the judicial process to his political agenda, however, he began to receive the disquieting impression that Karadžorđević and his supporters were pulling just as hard in the opposite direction. Blaznavac, in a conversation with Kállay at the end of November, told him that “Karadžorđević has promised someone in Pest 1,000,000 piastres if he is acquitted.” Kállay learned nothing further about this; but the suspicion now became rooted in his mind that the Hungarian judiciary was not only biased but corruptible. Kállay’s suspicions might have been unjust, although he was not the only observer to conclude, when Karadžorđević was finally cleared, that money had been at work behind the scenes. The possibility that it was the paucity of evidence supplied by Belgrade, which prevented the courts from convicting, does not appear to have suggested itself to Kállay.

In the months that elapsed between Karadžorđević’s indictment and the appointment of a new judge, Kállay maintained his vigil against what he perceived as the laxity and possible venality of the courts. In May 1870 he started making what he believed was headway against the inertia of the system. During an interview with Andrássy,

I . . . mentioned that the judges, it seems, have been bribed. . . . He [Andrássy] promised he would have Sztrokay in and confer with him on the state of affairs and the modalities by which it might be possible to ensure the bringing in of a conviction.
This at least appears to indicate that Andrásy, too, thought that somehow a verdict acceptable to the Serbian government could be guaranteed. That at any rate was the impression Kállay relayed to Blaznavac, when he told him “that now Andrásy himself is going to interest himself in this affair.” And late in June Kállay saw Sztrokay once more, who informed him that “he hopes they will convict him, the government takes a great interest in this respect.” It was a message, as usual, which Kállay made sure was conveyed to Blaznavac, who received it “with great satisfaction.”

As the Karađorđević trial finally got under way again in July 1870, the authorities on both sides, Hungarian and Serbian, seemed to succumb to a wave of self-deluding optimism, despite the straws in the wind which indicated a different outcome. Kállay was told by Blaznavac on 22 July that if Karađorđević were convicted, “the Hungary can count on Serbia unconditionally and we can make a stand together even against Russia.” This was a statement which only made sense in a larger context, since the Franco-Prussian War had just broken out and the Monarchy, at that point, was still pursuing a policy of “expectant neutrality.” War was considered to be a serious option by both Beust and Andrásy, given the right conditions; but it was Andrásy who was most convinced of the inevitability, indeed the necessity, of a war with Russia. It says volumes for the sort of expectations Andrásy and Kállay had raised, to say nothing of the attractions of a Karađorđević conviction, that Blaznavac was capable of even making such a remark.

The optimism was all of a sudden equally strong in Pest, where Kállay was told by Sztrokay that the case had been entrusted to Chief Justice Bogisics, and that “The minister has had a word with him and since then even the judges, it seems, are for a conviction.” Horvát, when Kállay saw him, confirmed that he had indeed spoken with Bogisics. Kállay himself met with Bogisics and Horvát on 30 July and got the impression that they shared his viewpoint. Back in Belgrade by early August, Kállay assured Blaznavac “that they will probably convict Karađorđević.”

It was a disastrous prediction. Before the month was out Kállay began to receive disturbing news from his confidant, Dr. Rosen. On 16 August Rosen had just seen both Blaznavac and Ristić, and noticed a great change in them. Blaznavac especially declared that he didn't believe the Hungarians and it may be that now they are going to turn towards Prussia and Russia. He especially mentioned . . . Karadordević. . . . Ristić talked in a similar sense.
according to Hungarian law, he [Karadordević] can’t be convicted.”92 Behind the scenes Shishkin, the Russian consul, was busy capitalizing on the resentment this news was bound to stir up. As Kállay glumly recorded that evening, Blaznavac was saying that

he doesn’t believe the Hungarians anymore, because for two years we have kept on deluding him with fine words but in fact we don’t do anything, and he says Ristić was right when he always expressed himself in this vein.93

The final indignity, for Kállay, was to learn that the newspaper *Srpski narod* had published an article “in which it is asserted that I myself have secretly had a hand in ensuring that Karadordević is not convicted.”94 Shishkin was distributing copies of the issue personally. A week later Blaznavac had cooled down sufficiently, according to Dr. Rosen, to protest his goodwill toward Hungary, but mentioned “that he would like to see some action on our part, . . . otherwise and much against his will he will be forced to make a bargain with the Russians.”95 Clearly Kállay was being subjected to a form of diplomatic arm-twisting which he had so far not encountered in his dealings with the Serbian government. All he could reply, however, was the Pest public prosecutor’s recent assurance that sentence was now due to be passed between the nineteenth and twentieth of September.96 To this Blaznavac suavely replied that news of a conviction would coincide nicely with the opening of the *Skupština* on the twenty-sixth: “he would be able to make very good use of it and then there would be no fears for the Hungarian-Serbian alliance, which in his opinion has to be all the closer.”97 The latter was a reference to the offer made by Andrássy, that summer, of an offensive-defensive alliance, which had in fact been made with the object of neutralizing Serbia for the duration of the Franco-Prussian War.98 An inherently improbable project, it was another reason why Blaznavac felt he had been deluded “with fine words.” At any rate Kállay passed Blaznavac’ appeal directly on to Andrássy, with a final plea of his own that Andrássy “should be so kind as to ensure that the verdict is a condemnatory one.”99

Kállay finally learned on 6 October that Karadordević and his associates had all been acquitted: “This news had an extremely unpleasant effect on me, since I can see evil consequences ahead.”100 The acquittal was specifically because of the inadequacy of the evidence, and the government immediately served notice of its intention to appeal. Kállay at once mobilized the journalist Miksa Falk to tell *Pester Lloyd*’s readership that “Hungarian public opinion is not satisfied” with the verdict, and Popović “to mitigate the bad effect” in Serbia;101 but privately he must have been deeply cast down. Something of Kállay’s dejection can be gleaned from the letter he sent Falk, railing against the authorities in Pest: the judgment, in his opinion, bore witness to the fact that “if it had come from a higher level, with more chances of success and less timidity, a completely
different result might have been attained.”\footnote{102} Despite the fact that a conviction was obviously in the interests of good Serbo-Hungarian relations, at least to Kál- lay, the court had ignored this. Falk was asked to impress upon his readers that “the acquittal has caused great scandal” among them.\footnote{103}

Even to Beust Kállay did not conceal his alarm. This in itself was unusual, since the common foreign ministry had not been involved in the legal battle being fought in Pest, and Beust could hardly be shouldered with responsibility for the fiasco. But in so far as Kállay saw the failure to convict Karađorđević as primarily a foreign policy problem, he in effect dumped the “evil consequences” of his and Andrássy’s miscalculations squarely on Beust’s doorstep. He warned the chancellor that there would shortly be “an unfavorable revolu- tion” in relations with Serbia. It was also probable that Prince Alexander’s supporters in Serbia would now come out in the open in agitation against the Obrenović regime. In this they would be able to count on the backing of both the Omladina and Russia.

Kállay was possibly overestimating the level of popular support for the Karadžorđevići. He had a point, however, when he cited Serbian history as a reminder of how ruthless contenders for the throne could be. His conclusion painted a gloomy picture of the problems now facing the Monarchy. The Serbian government,

\begin{quote}
 in order not to see so many enemies united against it, will endeavor to enter into closer relations with the Omladina and Russia. In the first case we must be ready for a lively agitation, beginning among the Austro-Hungarian Serbs, and supported by Serbia; in the second case however the Slavic Near East might fall completely under Russian influence.\footnote{104}
\end{quote}

It was a far cry from 1868, when Kállay had prophesied the “elimination” of Russian influence.

Some of the consequences of the Karadžorđević business for Kállay personally became apparent from the reaction in Serbia to his inspired article in Pester Lloyd. On 25 October Jedinstvo, Ristić’s mouthpiece, published a leader which “thunders against Hungary, has caused a great sensation here and extinguished even the little sympathy towards us which existed.”\footnote{105} In reply to Pester Lloyd, Jedinstvo countered that

\begin{quote}
 Serbia . . . has not sought, nor seeks, in your long lawsuits, and even less in your judgments, proofs of a “good neighborly disposition.” There can be no such proof as long as the murderers of Prince Michael walk freely on Austro-Hungarian soil.\footnote{106}
\end{quote}

Closer to home, Srpski narod started a rumor that Kállay was to be transferred from Belgrade. The writer professed not to know
how he [Kállay] can look our gentlemen in the eye, when a Hungarian court hands down a completely different judgment and when the Hungarian government adopts a position completely different from the assurances this consul was giving in the name of his government in authoritative places.107

Here, in fact, was the crux of the matter. What Kállay had promised, and what his master in Pest could deliver, were two quite different things. Yet Andrásy, if he had not shown the same single-minded commitment to Karadordević’s conviction as Kállay, had nevertheless allowed Kállay to mortgage his government’s good name in the eyes of the Serbs. Kállay had kept Andrásy regularly posted on all his communications to the Regents in the Karadordević affair, and at no stage had Andrásy indicated specific disapproval. He must, therefore, be accorded a major share of the responsibility for what suddenly turned out to be a serious chill in relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

To be fair, it has to be admitted that the international climate was conducive to such a drop in temperature. The decisive factor here was undoubtedly the Franco-Prussian War. By swiftly eliminating France as a serious voice in Near Eastern affairs, by exposing the essential isolation and vulnerability of the Habsburg Monarchy, and by facilitating the return of Russia as a strong regional power, the War made a volte-face on the part of whoever led Serbia quite likely. Even Blaznavac, as it turned out, was prepared to abandon his vaunted Russophobia if it seemed the Monarchy was on the way down, and Russia in the ascendant. In these circumstances the Karadordević prosecution ceased to be something the Regents needed from the Hungarian government, and became instead yet another stick with which they could beat Serbia’s traditional enemies. But here, again, it also must be admitted that the weapon would not have been ready to hand if Kállay, with Andrásy’s implicit support, had not made such a parade of Hungary’s willingness to prosecute, and virtually promised a conviction.

The Karadordević saga was not yet over in the fall of 1870. The government appealed; and in late October Andrásy seemed hardly to appreciate the gravity of the problem. He could not understand, he wrote Kállay, how the Serbian government could possibly treat Karadordević’s acquittal as a “pretext” for rushing into the arms of the Russians. In view of the dangers posed by the Franco-Prussian conflict, he considered it “unavoidable” that the Serbs stop seeing things “in inappropriate colors.”108 In short, Andrásy was still relatively sanguine about Serbo-Hungarian relations, and went on to develop at great length his views on the continuing potential of the Bosnian question.

Kállay must have had some bitter reflections. He had been aware for some months of a growing divergence of views between himself and Andrásy with regard to South Slav affairs generally, and thought that Andrásy saw things habitually “through rose-colored spectacles.”109 He was particularly sceptical as to how far the Bosnian scheme could be pursued, when the Karadordević affair
looked set to poison relations for the foreseeable future.110 The events of the next year were to confirm his worst fears.

Notes

1 Kállay to Beust, 18 June 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay to Andrássy, 12 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/95.
2 Kállay to Beust, 20 July 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
3 Kállay to Andrássy, 7 Sept. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/136; Kállay to Andrássy, 30 Oct. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/148–49.
4 Kállay to Andrássy, 7 Sept., 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/136.
7 Ibid., 323, citing Scovasso to Menabrea, 20 July 1868.
8 Ibid., 323–24, 325–26, citing Scovasso to Menabrea, 19 Aug. 1868; not in DDI.
9 Reiswitz, Belgrad-Berlin, Berlin-Belgrad, 147.
12 Kállay Diary, 1 Sept. 1868 (Dnevnik, 83).
14 Kállay to Andrássy, 18 June 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/102; Kállay Diary, 28 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 45).
15 Ibid., 6 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 50–51).
16 Ibid., 13 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 55).
17 Ibid., 30 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 47); Kállay to Andrássy, 7 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/119.
19 Kállay to Andrássy, 10 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/120.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., f. 121.
22 Ibid.
23 Kállay Diary, 6 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 51).
24 Ibid., 13 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 55).
25 Ibid., 16 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 56).
26 Andrásy to Kállay, 13 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/122–25; cf. Kállay Diary, 17 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 58).
27 Beust to Andrásy, 3 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/193, referring to a letter from Andrásy dated 29 June (not found).
28 Andrásy to Kállay, 13 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/122.
29 Ibid., f. 123.
30 Ibid., f. 124.
31 Ibid.
32 Kállay to Andrásy, 17 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/126; Kállay Diary, 17 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 58).
33 Ibid.
34 Kállay to Andrásy, 17 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/126–27; cf. Kállay Diary, 17 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 58).
35 Kállay to Andrásy, 17 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/126.
36 Ibid., f. 127.
37 Kállay to Andrásy, 20 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/129.
38 Ibid.
39 Kállay Diary, 23–24 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 61–63, 64–65).
40 Kállay to Andrásy, 31 July 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/132, paraphrasing a telegram from Horvát. It is a measure of the lack of urgency Kállay attached to Horvát’s response that, unusually, no mention is made of it in his diary.
41 Ibid., f. 133.
42 Kállay Diary, 22 July 1868, 23–24 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 61, 62–63); also note 72 by Radenić, 670.
44 Kállay Diary, 9 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 73).
45 Ibid., 8 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 71).
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 4–5 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 68–69, 69–70), and note 81 by Radenić, 674; Kállay to Andrásy, 4 Aug. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/135.
48 Kállay to Andrásy, 7 Sept. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/142.
49 Kállay Diary, 23 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 80).
50 Ibid., 28 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 82).
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., 1 Sept. 1868 (Dnevnik, 84).
54 Ibid., 9 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, 96).
55 Ibid.
57 Kállay Diary, 10 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, 98).
58 Ibid., 16 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, 101–2).
59 Ibid., 28 and 31 Jan. 1869 (Dnevnik, 149–50).
61 Kállay Diary, 26 May, 9 Sept., 2 Nov. 1869, and 26 July 1870 (Dnevnik, 182, 217, 240, 316).
62 Ibid., 15 Dec. 1868 (Dnevnik, 129).
63  Ibid., 17 and 31 Dec. 1868, 12–13 Jan. 1869 (Dnevnik, 130, 137, 143).
64  Ibid., 16 Jan. 1869 (Dnevnik, 145), and note 153 by Radenić, 696–97, summarizing the
Jedinstvo article. Radenić’s attribution of the article to Vidovdan appears to be a mistake,
borne out by neither the text of the diary nor the note itself.
65  Kállay to Andrásy, 24 Jan. 1869, OSZK, FH 1733/174.
66  Kállay to Beust, 23 Jan. 1869, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/183.
68  Ibid.
69  Kállay Diary, 20 May 1869 (Dnevnik, 181).
receipt of “Austrian Consulate R No. 44,” 20 Mar. 1869, quoted (in Serbo-Croat transla-
tion) by Đukanović, Ubistvo Kneza Mihaila, 1:215.
71  Ibid., 1:216–17.
72  Kállay Diary, 26 May 1869 (Dnevnik, 182).
73  Ibid., 28 May 1869 (Dnevnik, 183).
74  Ibid., 6 June 1869 (Dnevnik, 187).
75  Ibid., 13 Sept. 1869 (Dnevnik, 219).
76  Ibid., 14 Sept. 1869 (Dnevnik, 220).
77  Ibid., 2 Nov. 1869 (Dnevnik, 240).
78  Ibid., 3 Nov. 1869 (Dnevnik, 241).
79  Ibid., 30 Nov. 1869 (Dnevnik, 248). Radenić’s translation mistakenly has “100,000.”
80  Kállay Diary, 5 Jan., 4 Mar., 9 May 1870 (Dnevnik, 259, 276, 297).
81  Ibid., 9 May 1870 (Dnevnik, 298).
82  Ibid., 13 May 1870 (Dnevnik, 299).
83  Ibid., 28 June 1870 (Dnevnik, 310).
84  Ibid., 1 July 1870 (Dnevnik, 311). See also Kállay to Andrásy, 11 Aug. 1870, OSZK, FH
1733/191–92.
85  Kállay Diary, 22 July 1870 (Dnevnik, 315). The verb used (harcolni) is ambiguous, and can
mean either “to fight” in a physical sense, or the less aggressive “to make a stand against.”
86  István Diószegi, “The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in International Affairs of the Last
Third of the 19th Century,” in his Hungarians in the Ballhausplatz: Studies on the Austro-
Hungarian Common Foreign Policy (Budapest: Corvina, 1983), 34.
87  Kállay Diary, 26 July 1870 (Dnevnik, 316).
88  Ibid.
89  Ibid., 30 July 1870 (Dnevnik, 317).
90  Ibid., 5 Aug. 1870 (Dnevnik, 318).
91  Ibid., 16 Aug. 1870 (Dnevnik, 320).
92  Ibid., 20 Aug. 1870 (Dnevnik, 321).
93  Ibid.
94  Ibid. (Dnevnik, 322).
95  Ibid., 27 Aug. 1870 (Dnevnik, 324).
96  Ibid., 3 Sept. 1870 (Dnevnik, 326).
97  Ibid., 5 Sept. 1870 (Dnevnik, 327).
98  On the alliance offer of 1870, see below, Chapter 8.
99  Kállay to Andrásy, 5 Sept. 1870, OSZK, FH 1733/200.
100  Kállay Diary, 6 Oct. 1870 (Dnevnik, 332).
101  Ibid., 1 Oct. 1870 (Dnevnik, 332). See also Kállay to Falk, 6 Oct. 1870, OSZK, FOND
IV/442.
102  Ibid.
103  Ibid.

105 Kállay Diary, 26 Oct. 1870 (Dnevnik, 335).


107 Srpski narod, 9[21] Oct. 1870, quoted in Dnevnik, note 256 by Radenić, 731; also Kállay Diary, 5 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 337).


109 Kállay Diary, 28 June 1870 (Dnevnik, 310).

110 Ibid., 5 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 337).
This page intentionally left blank
Chapter 5

The Bosnian Question 1868–70

The Bosnian question was at the very center of what Andrásy and Kállay hoped to achieve in Serbia. It was the douceur intended to entice Serbia into the Monarchy’s sphere of interest; it played a role in the Hungarian government’s management of Croatia and the Military Border; and it figured in the diverse railway schemes being promoted at the time as a means of economic manipulation. Only the judicial pursuit of Alexander Karadžorđević, as an issue affecting the goodwill of the Serbian Regents, possessed an urgency of its own entirely independent of the scheming over Bosnia.

The Hungarian objective in broaching the Bosnian question with the Serbian government seems fairly clear. A Serbia enlarged by the acquisition of Bosnia could only be contemplated in return for the complete elimination of Russian influence in the Principality, and its unequivocal adherence to the Monarchy. In this scheme of political allegiance, moreover, Andrásy and Kállay regarded closer relations with Hungary as the main attraction for Serbia, with the Austrian half of the Monarchy at best an involuntary partner, at worst an irritating marplot. At all times the Austrian military, with their scarcely concealed interest in annexing Bosnia to the Monarchy, were perceived in Pest as a threat to this objective.

What complicates this picture is the role of the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry and of the Emperor himself. It is hard to imagine how Andrásy could have thought to implement his Serbian policy without beforehand securing the approval of either Beust or the Emperor; nevertheless, the evidence suggests that the Bosnian initiative began, in 1867, as a purely Hungarian one, made without the specific authority of either monarch or foreign minister. As such it remained for the first few months following the arrival in Belgrade of Kállay, who carefully
shrouded from Beust any inkling of his discussions about Bosnia with either Prince Michael or the Regents.

By the end of 1868, however, it was becoming obvious to both Beust and Prokesch-Osten, at Constantinople, that something was afoot. But whereas Prokesch’s reaction was one of unambiguous dismay, whatever chagrin Beust might have experienced at this clear flouting of his instructions to Kállay the previous April seems to have been succeeded by a paralyzed astonishment at what the Hungarians were doing. Beust’s indecision was perhaps understandable, for in an attempt to expedite the Bosnian scheme Andrássy took the matter directly to the Emperor in September 1868. The result, for reasons still obscure, appears to have been a qualified approval by Francis Joseph.

From then on responsibility for promotion of the scheme appears to have been lodged exclusively with the Hungarian government and the representative of “Hungary-Austria” in Belgrade. Apart from an inconclusive tête-à-tête with Beust in April 1869, Kállay was left to do more or less what he liked, which amounts to saying that he was free to carry out Andrássy’s policy in the matter. No subsequent evidence suggests that either Beust, or even Francis Joseph, ever actively intervened. Nowhere was the pursuit of a distinctly Hungarian “foreign policy” more glaringly obvious than in the Bosnian question.

The problem was that even with this bait on their hook Andrássy and Kállay failed to get a convincing bite from the Serbian Regents. Here the practical difficulties in the way of delivering what was being promised proved insuperable. The Regents hesitated to come out in the open with proposals which would, on any calculation, provoke a major diplomatic crisis, with no more than the assurances of the Hungarian government as surety. Hungary, it turned out, could no more speak on behalf of the entire Monarchy than the Monarchy could act without taking Hungarian views into consideration. A separate Hungarian “foreign policy” was a contradiction in terms.

Andrássy did not see the matter in this light. Increasingly, as 1869 wore on with no agreement reached, he came to see the Regents’ reluctance to move as evidence of their essential untrustworthiness. To Kállay’s dismay, Andrássy’s enthusiasm for the Serbian connection began to wane.

At the same time, and with perhaps more reason, the Regents’ suspicion of Hungarian motives waxed with every month that the question remained unresolved. The Regents naturally asked themselves how the Hungarians proposed to deliver. They saw no evidence that the traditional interest of the Austrian military in Bosnia had subsided, or that Andrássy had demonstrably reversed decades of Habsburg policy in the Balkans. They suspected Andrássy of acting in collusion with the foreign ministry in an attempt to deflect Serbia from what the Regents, like all Serbs, regarded as the ultimate national aspiration of eventually raising revolt against the Ottomans. Kállay found himself discussing the issue in an atmosphere of polite but increasing scepticism.
The use that Andrássy, this time in agreement with Beust, made of the Bosnian question in July 1870, to keep Serbia quiet at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, shows how cynically he had come to regard the whole issue. Kállay persisted a little longer with his belief in the scheme, but it was in any case dead before the middle of that year. Although it was some time before Serbo-Hungarian relations degenerated once more into expressions of outright hostility, the damage was done.

Andrássy’s brain-wave of 1867 had encouraged the Serbs in the one aim which it had been the earnest endeavor of Austrian foreign ministers for decades past to thwart, the possession of Bosnia. The gradual realization that these promises were hollow did much to ruin the relations of the Monarchy as a whole with Serbia. And when Bosnia was eventually appropriated by the Monarchy itself in 1878, under the aegis, moreover, of Andrássy as foreign minister, the embitterment was complete. The Bosnian question showed both the scope and the limitations of Hungarian influence on Habsburg foreign policy; but its most important effect was in needlessly exacerbating an already existing conflict of interest, between Habsburg dynastic interest on the one hand, and Serbian nationalism on the other.

The Regents, once Colonel Orešković apprised them of his mission to Pest in June 1868, were no less interested in following it up than Prince Michael had been. The idea of securing the administration of even a part of Bosnia, without a general uprising and war against the Ottomans, had appeal for a régime as unsure of its hold on power as the new Regency. The problem for Andrássy and Kállay, however, was that the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry was still in the dark as to what was being contemplated. For several months after the Obrenović assassination, the Bosnian plan remained in the diplomatic twilight while Andrássy and Kállay discussed it themselves and with the Regents, without bothering to inform Beust. Nevertheless, rumors of some sort of initiative by Serbia reached Beust, although there is no indication that he realized its origins.

As early as 11 August, Beust queried Prokesch over a rumor that “Serbia is negotiating with [the] Porte over the cession of a certain Turkish-Slav border strip to the former while preserving Turkish sovereign rights.” The purpose of entering into these supposed negotiations, according to Beust’s information, was to make of Serbia “in addition to a loyal ally, also a dam against Hungarian-Austrian designs.” Clearly Beust’s source quite failed to perceive that the threads of these negotiations went back far beyond the Serbian government. As yet no one in the imperial camp realized that there was a Hungarian dimension.

Prokesch was adamant that the Ottoman government was not involved in such negotiations. The Ottomans had decisively rejected a similar plan originated by Prince Michael in 1867, so why should they be any more favorably disposed now? The Porte’s object, moreover, “is to deprive Serbia of the opportunity of
realising these plans. The inclination to entrust it [Serbia] with bits of Bosnia hardly fits in with this aim.” Instead, Prokesch was inclined to blame the Russians for the rumors:

Convincing everyone of Hungary’s intention of gaining possession of Serbia and Bosnia, little by little, is the zealous object of the Russian embassy to the Porte.7

What Prokesch took to be the imaginary expansionism, attributed to Hungary by the Russians, was probably a distorted echo of the real scheme being pursued by Andrásy and Kállay.

The Russians, or at least the Pan-Slav enthusiasts among them, took these aspersions against the Hungarians seriously. At all times the Russian government suspected the Habsburg Monarchy of designs on the Ottoman Empire, just as Habsburg diplomats automatically assumed the worst about Russian intentions. Fears with regard to Bosnia-Hercegovina were particularly frequent.8 In May 1868, for instance, Count Nikolai Ignatiev, Russia’s ambassador to Constantinople, was convinced that Austria-Hungary was ready to pour thousands of troops into the provinces on the slightest pretext.9 Kállay’s arrival in Belgrade redoubled Russian suspicions and shifted them noticeably toward the Hungarian half of the Monarchy.

By October 1868 Gorchakov, the Russian chancellor, was accusing the “hot-blooded” Andrásy of “ambitious plans for erecting a Slavo-Magyar Empire,” which would please the Russians “just as little as it would Baron Beust.”10 Nor were the Russians alone in misinterpreting this new Hungarian activity. Italy’s minister president, Count Menabrea, was equally convinced there were “ever more obvious tendencies on the part of the Pest government to make itself the center of a great eastern empire.”11 This was hardly the case, but Menabrea might be pardoned for thinking it was, since Scovasso, his consul in Belgrade, believed the Hungarians could not seriously intend letting Serbia take over Bosnia. Scovasso had been informed of the recent talks in Pest by Orešković himself, but thought the latter had been taken in.12 In reality Kállay, in his unofficial capacity as the representative of the Hungarian government, was doing his utmost to convince Blaznavac and Ristić of Hungarian good faith. Kállay’s own record shows that he was perfectly sincere in his espousal of the Bosnian scheme, even if, as he had confided to Andrásy in May, he thought that “sooner or later” the provinces would have to be subjected to some form of Austro-Hungarian administration.13

By the end of June, Kállay learned from Blaznavac that even Ristić was now convinced “that Russia will not help Serbia to take over Bosnia. It only wants to incite the nationalities against the Turks so it can then fish in troubled waters.”14 Mistrust of Russia, however, did not necessarily mean that Ristić accepted the Hungarian proposals at face value. Of the two, Ristić remained throughout more
sceptical than Blaznavac, as Kállay discovered when he got down to serious discus-
sions with both in September.

It was Blaznavac on whom, more than anyone else, Andrássy and Kállay
pinned their hopes. For a Serbian politician, even one with the army at his back,
Blaznavac was unusual in that his hostility to Russian influence was a matter of
public record. Kállay, after he had been treated to an exposé of Blaznavac’ views
on the possibility of a federated southeastern Europe on 26 June, felt sure he was
dealing with a sympathizer.

I have no reason to doubt Milivoj’s [Blaznavac’] sincerity, especially since he has
even revealed his plans for Bosnia. . . . He passed over in silence only the fact
that in this vision of the future he has assigned the main role to Serbia, just as I
didn’t mention that I assign it, once again, to Hungary.15

To paper over this difference, Kállay assured Blaznavac that realization of
the Bosnian plan would make the Regent “one of the greatest men of modern
times.”16 It was at this meeting that the basic details of the plan were sketched
out, details that were to form the topic of much fruitless discussion over the
next three years. Blaznavac repudiated any desire to infringe the sovereignty
of the Sultan. Instead, Serbia would simply be entrusted with the administration
of the province, and in return would pay tribute to the Porte. The Habsburg
Monarchy, or rather its Hungarian half, would also gain from the deal, since
Blaznavac said he “would be ready to abandon some Bosnian territory in order
to round off our Croatia.”17

Going over these points a month later, Blaznavac expressed to Kállay his
belief that implementing the Bosnian plan was the key to resolving the entire
Eastern Question: “Russia would not be able to come forward as a protector and
savior, because it would have nobody it could rescue.”18 Kállay voiced his delight
at Blaznavac’ adoption of the plan, “since the provinces could never be danger-
ous for us, and if united, they could constitute the strongest barrier against Rus-
sia.”19 Kállay then promised to “support this plan in Buda and Vienna with all my
might” when he went home on leave in August.20

Mentioning Vienna in the same breath as Buda was less than straightforward,
since Kállay had no intention of broaching the Bosnian plan with anyone
other than Andrássy at this point. Blaznavac was thus acting under a delusion
when he informed Kállay on 10 August that “for the realization of these goals of
theirs they [the Regents] are counting especially on the help of Austria, but most
of all on Hungary.”21 It was one thing for the Serbian Regents to assume, on the
basis of assurances given them by Kállay, that the Hungarian tail would somehow
be able to wag the Austrian dog. It was quite another for the Hungarians deliber-
ately to give the impression that Vienna was being consulted in the matter, when
the reverse was actually the case.
Nevertheless even at this early stage there was a certain realism in the Hungarian offer to mediate, which the Regents clearly understood. In an exchange with Orešković on 8 August, Kállay voiced his own belief in the need for “a great South Slav empire” which would “paralyze Russian influence.”

He qualified this, however, in unmistakable fashion:

it is really all the same whether Serbia or Croatia plays the chief role in this. At the moment Serbia would possibly be better, because if Bosnia were attached to Croatia this would give rise to certain ill consequences for the Crown of St. Stephen and dualism. . . .

To Blaznavac, two days later, Kállay was equally blunt:

I . . . regarded it in Hungary’s interests to set up a great South Slav country in this region. . . . Serbian hegemony could possibly be more convenient, but if the Serbs aren’t going to go along with us we will support the Croats. Milivoj understood the threat and said that they want an alliance with us above all else, but since this couldn’t be public either on our part or theirs, but only a secret [one] between Hungary and Serbia, they simply want the Hungarian government to use its influence on Vienna so that Beust in his dealings with the Porte supports the handover of Bosnia.

That getting Beust to endorse such a policy might be easier said than done was not a consideration Kállay wanted to obtrude upon Blaznavac’ notice. In fact, the closest Kállay came at this stage to preparing Beust was in his despatch of the same day, when he suggested the Monarchy “offer anything” to keep Serbia under its influence.

For Kállay the key to the success of the Bosnian plan was not his nominal master, Beust, but his real one, Andrássy, whom he accordingly visited on the latter’s estate at Terebes in late August. The Terebes meeting provides a very clear example of the extent to which Andrássy was trying to promote a foreign policy objective independently of both the Emperor and Beust, although Andrássy did accept that their involvement would be inevitable at some later stage. The meeting also reveals the wide-ranging nature of Andrássy’s interest in foreign policy issues, the very obvious linkage, in his mind, between the Bosnian scheme and how he thought the Monarchy’s relationship with other European powers, particularly Russia, should be conducted. Most arresting of all, however, is the fundamental irresponsibility of much of Andrássy’s thinking on foreign affairs.

According to Kállay’s account, Andrássy was highly pleased at Blaznavac’ desire for closer relations with Hungary, as opposed to Austria. In response to the Regent’s query as to what Serbia should do if revolution suddenly broke out in the Ottoman Empire, Andrássy made it clear the best policy was to keep the peace. With regard to Bosnia, Kállay received an equally clear impression that Andrássy “likes the plan.” Andrássy went on to remark, however,
that it would encounter great difficulties, principally on our side. The military party has not ceased regarding Bosnia as compensation for all the losses up to now, and is certainly counting on taking it over, and in this way it is striving to win over the Emperor as well. Beust, however, is afraid of such a daring policy. The Emperor could, perhaps, be won over for this plan only if we could annex part of Turkish Croatia up to the Vrbas.28

Additional problems would be posed by the reluctance of the Ottoman government, “in its irrational obduracy,”29 to cede the territory; and by the need to absorb the western strip of “Turkish Croatia” into the Monarchy. “In spite of these great difficulties,” Kállay recorded, “he will give it a try, but until then I shall not mention it to Beust.”30

Here already was an admission by Andrássy that the scheme was unlikely to get very far, in Vienna, unless it involved some acquisition of territory by the Monarchy itself. From being a mere rearrangement of administrative boundaries within the Ottoman Empire, it now envisaged a de facto partition of Ottoman territory by a signatory power to the Treaty of Paris, a circumstance bound to drag in the other signatories, especially Russia. The willingness to contemplate an increase in territory, moreover, throws a questionable light on Andrássy’s oft-repeated assurances that the Monarchy could not afford to take more Slavs on board.

For Andrássy and Kállay one of the chief attractions of the Bosnian plan was that it would deal “a palpable blow to Russia.”31 This was no mere metaphor. Andrássy was not only convinced the Emperor wanted “war to make up for Königgrätz,” but himself thought “the Empire needs a victorious war,” which would “break Russian power.”32 He went on to tell Kállay that, in June, he had advised the Emperor Napoleon to “attack Russia together with Austria on the pretext of liberating Poland.”33 The Bosnian scheme was a prop in this improbable scenario:

. . . to carry out this plan it is necessary for Russia to start the war, and for this he thinks advisable the support of the plan about Bosnia, to the implementation of which Russia will not agree, because of which it can then come to war.34

The South Slavs could perhaps be bound “by secret treaty” to provide regular troops, but speed was essential, since according to Andrássy the plan was only likely to succeed while the ailing Napoleon III was still alive.35

As to practical implementation, Kállay was specifically authorized to express to the Regents Andrássy’s support; but beyond that there was little of substance. Instead, Andrássy wanted the Serbian government to submit a memorandum on the subject to him, setting forth the general need for cession and how it might be achieved. The memorandum should affirm a commitment to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, as well as specifying what contribution of regular troops Serbia could make in time of war.36
The ball was thus firmly lobbed back into the Serbian government’s court: it was up to the Regents, Andrássy seemed to be saying, to outline ways and means. This may have been yet another example of Andrássy’s inveterate habit of postponing decisions, yet it introduced a fatal note of tergiversation into the subsequent negotiations. Either Andrássy was sincerely interested in pursuing the Bosnian scheme, or he was not; if he was, then the details could have been left for later discussion, while acceptance of the basic proposition was secured in Vienna and Constantinople. The fact that this acceptance had not yet been won was undoubtedly the reason why Andrássy was content to refer the matter back to Belgrade. He simply could not initiate anything serious without the involvement of at least the Emperor, if not Beust, and despite his determination to influence policy toward Serbia. Yet the very fact of postponement was apt to create in suspicious minds, such as Ristić’s, the fear that Serbia was being led up the garden path.

This was precisely what happened, although to begin with it was Ristić alone who expressed reservations. In an interview with both Regents on 1 September, Kállay was nettled to see that the mere mention of Bosnia caused Ristić to smile. To the assurance that Andrássy approved the plan, Ristić’s immediate response was, “You do, but what about Beust?” Kállay could only affirm his own belief that “Andrássy will win over both him and the Emperor for this plan.” When Kállay mentioned the need for a Serbian memorandum on the subject, Ristić voiced the ultimate practical objection to the scheme:

He [Ristić] doesn’t believe that the Porte will give way peacefully . . . he thinks that the Porte will only give way if it is forced to do so by a general uprising of the Christian peoples. And if, on the occasion of some war in the West, this revolt broke out, Serbia would not be able to remain on the sidelines.

Kállay countered with the logical reply that since the Monarchy’s Slavs “would also probably be affected by this uprising, we would have to station an army on the frontier, which would possibly even intervene.” He also deployed the most lethal weapon in his armoury of scare tactics:

I stressed that the Croats too want to occupy Bosnia and that only a hint from Buda is needed in order for there to be 60,000 Croats in Bosnia one day. However, as long as the Serbs can acquire Bosnia by peaceful means, we don’t want it for ourselves.

Ristić insisted, however, that if peaceful means were to work they would have to be rapid. The Regents agreed to the cession of a border strip to Croatia, but on the subject of a military, defensive-offensive alliance they asked for more details. Kállay got the impression that “they are afraid that we will exploit them for the purposes of a renewed conquest of Germany.” He noted privately that “I still haven’t told them that this alliance would really be directed against Russia.” The discussions ended in stalemate: the Regents agreed to “think it over.”
It was clear from this that the Regents were divided on the issue. Blaznavac assured Kállay that Hungary could count “not only on Serbia’s friendship but on its armed forces as well.” That Blaznavac genuinely wanted to believe the Hungarian assurances is borne out by an interview with the Italian consul, in which the Regent appeared to be trying to convince himself that the Hungarians had every interest in furthering a greater South Slav state. Linked by treaty to Hungary, he assured Scovasso, it would constitute a barrier against Russia.

In the meantime Andrássy had confronted Francis Joseph and Beust on the issue. Andrássy appears to have had more success with Francis Joseph, although he admitted that the discussion, which took place during a hunt, did not go into details. “His Majesty,” he wrote, “didn’t receive the idea in general badly, as described by me.” Andrássy resolved to give the Emperor a more detailed view soon. “Only after this did I speak with Beust, but with him quite comprehensively.” But the chancellor, though he listened to Andrássy “with great interest,” was openly sceptical. According to Andrássy, Beust “has no great objection to the idea, except that he doesn’t consider it realisable.” Beust thought the Serbs “will promise everything with regard to [Ottoman] integrity, but will nevertheless exploit the first opportunity and, having allied themselves with the Bulgarians, they will turn against the Turks.” Moreover, the British government was certain to advise the Porte against the scheme, and “on this the matter will suffer shipwreck.”

Beust’s quandary may readily be imagined. In a constitution where the final say in foreign affairs clearly rested with the Emperor, the chancellor could hardly object when his master chose to listen to Andrássy’s ideas. The fact that the Bosnian scheme flatly contradicted Habsburg policy in the Balkans hitherto was irrelevant: it was something that could be discussed. This would explain the extraordinary claim that Beust had “no great objection to the idea,” which suggests that Beust was merely putting a brave face on what he could not alter. Where he could make a difference, however, was in pouring cold water on the whole scheme, casting doubts on its practicality and pointing out, with perfect truth, that it would in any case encounter the opposition of at least one of the signatory great powers.

Andrássy was not deterred. He still, he assured Kállay, thought the plan “very suitable, indeed I think it not only possible but necessary as well.” Three conditions, however, were essential. It must remain a close secret until it could be discussed openly, and ideally only one of the Regents should be in the know. The Ottoman Empire’s territorial integrity must be guaranteed by some formal instrument, which should have the endorsement of the Skupština. Finally, Serbia would have to commit itself to some border alteration in the Monarchy’s favor.

Andrássy’s reasons for endorsing the Monarchy’s acquisition of territory make interesting reading, in view of the fact that it was under his aegis, in 1878–79,
that Bosnia was eventually occupied by Austria-Hungary. Even in 1868, when he was prepared to promote an enlarged Serbia, Andrássy was still bound to recognize that certain factors made the Monarchy’s participation in the deal inevitable:

I don’t attach the least importance to this [border alteration], indeed I would much prefer the matter without it, but it is unfortunately a condition without which, I have to confess, implementation is impossible. The reason for this is that the military party within, and some foreign powers without, have for a long time never stopped holding out the prospect of the provinces in question as possessions of Austria.  

Andrássy obviously had France in mind; but other powers such as Britain clearly preferred the preservation of Ottoman integrity. Should that prove impossible, Andrássy admitted, these supporters of the status quo were far more likely to back an Austro-Hungarian presence in Bosnia than a Serbian one.

Kállay’s first contact with the Regents after this, on 2 October, was with Ristić, to whom he made it clear that the plan had now been raised by Andrássy at the highest levels, although “only superficially,” and that “there would unavoidably be greater difficulties.” As to the Monarchy’s annexation of a part of Bosnia, “which I showed was necessary because of the Croats,” Ristić “had nothing against this.” Kállay encouraged the Regents to start drafting a memorandum for Andrássy, which the latter could then use to press for acceptance of the plan.

Given Andrássy’s professed belief in the urgency of the Bosnian plan, it is remarkable that by 15 October, when Kállay next visited him in Pest, he had still not managed to discuss it again with either the Emperor or Beust. He nevertheless still favored the plan, and saw it in the context of grand policy:

It is a dangerous business because, apart from how we could win the assent of the Turks, we will thereby incite the Russians against us, which still wouldn’t be such a great evil if we were quite clear with regard to our western policy.

Andrássy had in mind the Franco-Prussian antagonism, in the face of which, he was sure, the only safe policy was a strict neutrality. Unfortunately, in Andrássy’s view, “Beust has recently begun to flirt with France. . . . We must dissuade him from this course and secure ourselves in the east.” The Bosnian question clearly fitted in with this strategy of security in the East. One can only wonder, however, how Andrássy could with one breath denounce the supposed frivolity of Beust’s western policy, and with the next calmly contemplate a reckoning with Russia in the East.

On the question of an alliance with the Serbs, Andrássy informed Kállay that he had been getting assurances that the Serbian government genuinely desired such a connection. Serbia “would be more than happy to help Hungary in the event of any war it might conduct against Austria,” although this was an assistance which, Andrássy stressed, was not needed. Kállay used the opportunity to
point out once again that this animus against Vienna was grounded in the Serbs’ fears for Bosnia, and was primarily due to the noises made by the Austrian military. This was why the Serbian government now saw its only hope in “an Austria in which Hungary would play the main role.”

It is clear too that Kállay already had to devote some energy to combating “Andrássy’s fear that the Serbs only want to reach their own objective, and afterwards turn against us.” Kállay’s view was that Serbian self-interest, if nothing else, bound Serbia to Hungary. If the Serbs could be secured the administration of Bosnia, “they would be so preoccupied with internal organization that they wouldn’t have much time to concern themselves with further expansion.” Kállay got the impression that his reply reassured Andrássy; but the suspicion on both sides was evidently strong right from the start.

Both Regents, moreover, had reservations about committing themselves to paper over the plan, and Kállay spent much of the next few months simply trying to prize out of them the memorandum desired by Andrássy. In answer to a comment by Orešković, in October, on the desirability of an alliance between Serbia and Hungary, Kállay produced a rule of thumb which can only have increased the Regents’ doubts:

the form in general wasn’t important and would come to the same thing even if Serbia concluded an alliance with Austria, as long as what is realized is what Andrássy wants.

In other words, the eventual alliance would probably have to be with the Austro-Hungarian government, but this did not matter as long as the Hungarian government was satisfied with the details. The bland assumption, that Vienna would be content to rubber-stamp any bargain driven by the Hungarians with Serbia, did not augur well for the future of the plan.

The reality was that, while Beust may not have felt strong enough to oppose Andrássy’s plan, he was less than enthusiastic for it. At the heart of imperial policy regarding to Bosnia there was now a confusion for which the two-headed eagle seems an all too appropriate symbol.

Beust did not, and perhaps felt he could not, come out with a clear denunciation of the Bosnian scheme. Prokesch-Osten, however, was under no such constraints. He was by now aware that the Hungarians were prosecuting something unusual, and for this soldier turned diplomat, who was known to be “très Turc,” the implications of the Bosnian plan were disturbing. In October he sought clarification as to how Kállay thought Austria-Hungary should go about winning “the complete dependency of Serbia.” Kállay argued that the Monarchy must convince the Serbs that it wished them well and did not oppose their interests. However, in Prokesch’s view, “we first have to know what Serbia then understands by its own interests.” In reply, Kállay gave the strongest hint to date as to his real
views on the Bosnian question. He dwelt on the strong bonds between Serbia and Bosnia, making the remarkable claim that “Serbia is the only country in which the Christians of Bosnia joyfully, and under whose rule even the Muslim there of Slavic origins...would feel content.” More subtly, Kállay attempted to show that the old Serbian mistrust of Austria was now on the wane, but was easily aroused over Bosnia, and kept alive most of all by the authorities in the Military Border.\(^6\)

By this time, Prokesch knew where the principal threat to the status quo was coming from. On 27 October he warned Beust “against the illusion... which seems to me widespread in Pest, that we can attract Romania and Serbia to us.”\(^6\)

Early in November he and Beust received a despatch from Kállay which made clear the extent of Kállay’s commitment to change. Kállay denied yet again the rumors that Serbia intended a forceful occupation of neighboring provinces. The Regents’ aspirations toward Bosnia were long-term:

\[
\text{At some rather distant point in time the Regency perhaps believes, with Austria’s agreement and help, it will be able to realize even its aspirations with regard to Bosnia.}
\]

Kállay nevertheless was of the opinion that it was in the Monarchy’s own interests to encourage these hopes, since “if they [the Serbs] hope for the realization of this combination from us, ... we can thereby permanently control them.” The alternative, he warned, was to run the risk that, in the absence of any effort to alter the status quo, an uprising would eventually sweep Serbia into conflict with the Turks regardless.\(^6\)

The suggestion that Austria-Hungary ought actively to promote Serbia’s Bosnian ambitions broke new ground as far as the Ballhaus was concerned. Kállay already knew that Andrássy had briefed Beust and the Emperor about the Bosnian plan, and that there had been, if not energetic approval, at least tacit acceptance of it.\(^7\) He evidently judged it time to reveal where he stood himself on the issue.

This was enough to provoke Prokesch, on 10 November, to a response which articulated all the objections of traditional Habsburg policy to the Hungarian plan. First of all was the point that, if Serbia did win control over Bosnia, “this newly formed Greater Serbia would be bound to exercise an ever greater attractive power over our South Slavs, and the latter would meet her half-way.” For the Monarchy, in the past, to have striven against these aspirations was understandable; just as understandable was that Russia, for reasons which had very little to do with Serbia, supported them. The core of Prokesch’s counter-argument was based on the irreducible self-interest of a multinational, dynastic state like Austria-Hungary:

\[
\text{I leave to your judgment whether Serbia’s sympathies would not be too dearly bought, at the cost of disintegration of Turkey, the European war which would}
\]
result from this, and the serious embarrassments which would then arise for us.

... Austro-Hungarian policy cannot go so far as to play into the hands of the swindle of a national unification, and thereby the loss of our South Slavs.

The current moderation of the Serbian Regents, he concluded, was welcome and, because it suited Austro-Hungarian interests, deserved support. It would be dangerous, however, to rely on such moderation continuing.

To Beust, Prokesch expressed his disquiet at what Kállay was saying to the Regents. Kállay was deluding himself, Prokesch suggested, if he thought concessions to Serbia on any front would secure the Monarchy a decisive influence. Kállay was especially in error if he thought Austro-Hungarian policy was inclined to countenance Serbian national aspirations. Prokesch left to Beust the task of bringing Kállay back into line with what, after all, were Beust’s own guidelines.

Prokesch’s confidence in Beust was somewhat misplaced, for as we have seen Beust appears to have tolerated if not encouraged Andrássy’s experiments in diplomacy. There was no rebuke meted out to Kállay from Vienna for what was, by now, an obvious departure from both the spirit and the letter of his original instructions. Nor did Kállay show any sign of being intimidated by Prokesch’s open disapproval. On the contrary, he continued to press Andrássy about the need to resolve the issue speedily.

Kállay informed Andrássy at the end of October that he had raised the Bosnian question with Beust “in muffled fashion.” He felt emboldened to do so, he explained, because the current situation was so threatening. Romanian support for nationalist movements, seconded by Russian and Prussian agents, Kállay claimed, increased the danger of a general uprising; and the Serbian government, however desirous of staying out, would not be able to “if the East goes up in flames.”

“All this,” he continued,

we can avert by the cession of Bosnia; only it must happen soon. If this plan is implemented not only will these peoples remain quiet, but they will even be of use to us in a war against Russia, and we can maintain our borders in peace.

In Kállay’s opinion it would be enough to come out openly with the plan in order to win Britain and France over on its behalf; the precise details could be settled later.

The problem from the Hungarian point of view was not in Pest but in Vienna, where Beust seemed wilfully disinclined to expedite the idea, thus necessitating further time-consuming maneuvers by Andrássy to get the ear of the Emperor. The crucial phase of the Bosnian question, by comparison with which the long negotiations that followed were an anti-climax, took place between November 1868 and April 1869.

In a despatch to Beust of 17 December, Kállay made his most explicit plea yet for the cession of Bosnia. He warned that, in any great crisis involving the
Balkan Christians, the popular pressure on the Serbian government to act would be irresistible. In these circumstances the Ottoman Empire would probably not survive, and Austria-Hungary would be a helpless spectator, while “the Eastern Question will be resolved without our leadership, perhaps even against our interests.” The only means of averting catastrophe, Kállay argued, was the “neutralization of Serbia,” for in any uprising not much would happen if the Serbian element in the Balkans could be kept in check. And the neutralization of Serbia was only conceivable if its Bosnian aspirations were to some extent satisfied.78

Informing Andrássy a few days later that he had done his best, Kállay reiterated the need for a “decisive move” to counter the Russian threat.79 The Bosnian scheme would give the pro-Hungarian Regency a much needed boost in popular esteem. There was also the important consideration, which Kállay had been mulling over for some months, that Bosnia was the ideal “apple of discord” for alienating Serbs from Croats. “A successful solution to the Bosnian question and the complete exclusion of Croatia from Serb interests could secure our future.”80

December passed, however, without any discernible effect on Beust. The chancellor, as Andrássy complained on 27 December, “won’t make up his mind to act decisively in this regard, however much he (Andrássy) urges him.”81 Andrássy was glad Kállay was at last tackling Beust openly on the subject, since it was vital to maintain the initiative. Nevertheless,

> all my efforts to date have failed in face of vis inertiae. My old friend [Beust] sits at the piano—I push the tune towards him in vain—he keeps on playing something else.82

Beust was evidently stalling, but Andrássy intended making a determined effort after New Year’s, “and I have His Majesty’s promise that now we must resolve things once and for all.”83 Andrássy stressed to Kállay that the Regents must make their move: a memorandum to the foreign ministry in Vienna, submitted “in such a way that it should not be suspected that you had any advance knowledge of it.”84 In this document the Regents should affirm their commitment to the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, but hint at the difficulty any Serbian government would have in restraining its people in the event of a general uprising.85

Why Andrássy thought the Regents should pretend to be the authors of the proposal, when Beust already knew that the whole scheme was the pet project of Andrássy and Kállay, remains a mystery, especially in view of Andrássy’s insistence on secrecy. In any event Kállay himself was in some doubt as to what exactly Andrássy intended, and held up a detailed discussion with the Regents while he sought clarification from Pest.86 On 6 January he informed Andrássy that the Bosnian plan represented an opportunity “to neutralize the greater part of the Christian peoples of Turkey and thereby to obstruct any outbreak of movement in the Eastern Question.”87 On 17 January Kállay prodded Andrássy again. Since
he had not received further instructions, he pointed out, he had not been able to raise the question in detail with the Regents. Kállay implored Andrássy to use his influence to induce the government to act decisively. “The time is short, the danger great, and unfortunately this danger is going to hit Hungary first of all.”88

Kállay knew perfectly well what the Regents thought. His account of a conversation with Blaznavac on 15 January highlights the Serbian government’s dilemma, as well as Kállay’s relative indifference to the predicament in which Andrássy’s offer of help placed the Serbs. Blaznavac expressed what appears to have been a sincere conviction that war with the Ottomans over the Balkan Christians, and whatever the outcome, would be a terrible misfortune for Serbia. Even if Serbia were victorious it would suffer from the effects of such a struggle for years to come. Because of this, Blaznavac told Kállay, he wanted peace, not war, and accordingly he favored laying the whole Serbian question before the European powers.89

This was in fact an unexceptionable proposal. The position of Serbia within the Ottoman Empire was, after all, guaranteed by the powers. To suggest submission of the Bosnian plan to a European tribunal was obviously in Blaznavac’s eyes a reasonable, and much safer, way of proceeding. Kállay, however, could only reply that “if the Vienna government didn’t want to approve the Bosnian plan, the Hungarian government would secretly help Serbia.”90 He did not intimate what shape this help would take, and Blaznavac’s response suggests his unease at such vagueness. The Regent “would prefer it for this to be public, because in this case he could prove to the people that the friendship of the Hungarians was the most profitable for Serbia.”91

As for Ristić, there was a characteristic indication of his thinking on the matter the same day, in the newspaper Jedinstvo. In a leader which Ristić had written himself, the need for Hungary’s friendship was acknowledged. However, “if the Hungarians are only trying to keep Serbia quiet, and are not supporting the aspirations of the Serbs towards Bosnia, then there can be no true friendship.”92 Kállay responded by inspiring a leader in Pester Lloyd, which took the view that “Hungary would always look with sympathy on the legitimate expansionist aspirations of the Serbs in the Balkan Peninsula.”93

The sense of an opportunity slipping away was by now beginning to dominate Kállay’s respectful but clearly frustrated correspondence with Andrássy. Late in January, he reiterated his fear of impending calamity if the Bosnian question were not resolved soon.94 He was particularly discouraged by the critical comment in the Neue Freie Presse, which was Beust’s preferred vehicle, on the recent leader in Jedinstvo. Not only did Jedinstvo come in for sarcastic treatment, as evidence that the Serbs were once again dreaming of dividing up an Ottoman Empire which was not even dead yet. In a direct attack on Pester Lloyd, the Presse denounced the naïveté of the Hungarian press. Policy, the Presse insisted,
was made not in Pest, but in Vienna, and was moreover “absolutely not Serbo-
phile but Turcophile.” It was crass to expect an enlarged Serbia to remain an ally
of Hungary, with its large South Slav minorities.95

“This article in the Presse has disturbed me,” Kállay noted; “I can see from
it that they have not reconciled themselves to this plan.”96 Worse was to come.
Early in February Kállay learned from Orczy that Andrássy had once again spoken
with Francis Joseph and Beust on the subject. In a remark made much of by
Wertheimer, Beust apparently went so far as to say that “cette idée me sourit.”97
In Kállay’s account of the Orczy letter, however, this apparent concession was
immediately followed by the rider, “but because of this both he [Beust] and the
others see very considerable difficulties too.”98 For Kállay, the hidden message
was clear: “Of course, the fact that they see difficulties amounts to saying they
aren’t going to do a thing.”99 And in fact nothing further happened on the Bosnian
issue for another two months.

For all Beust’s vacillation on the subject, a number of documents from early
1869 show that Austro-Hungarian policy regarding Bosnia was still guided by tra-
ditional consideratons. Memoranda produced in January 1869 by Colonel Fried-
rich Beck, chief of the Emperor’s military chancellery, and his subordinate Captain
Gustav Thoemmel, while not in themselves guidelines for foreign policy, repre-
sent a significant counter-weight to Andrássy’s and Kállay’s Bosnian project, since
Francis Joseph was bound to take seriously the opinion of his military experts.100

For Thoemmel the bottom line for the Monarchy was clear:

Austria must at any price prevent Serbia becoming master of Bosnia, because
our possession of Dalmatia would thereby be much endangered, and Serbia’s
already noticeable moral influence over the Greek Orthodox population of the
Military Border could become considerable.

This did not rule out a partition between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and Thoem-
mel suggested possible lines of division which ensured that none of the Catholic
population, and only a minority of the Muslims, went to Serbia. Just as important
was to secure for the Monarchy the most mineral-rich valleys, which were also
the easiest trade routes. Failing to do so, and above all letting Serbia take over
the Hercegovina, meant giving it control of these trade routes and permitting it
access to the Adriatic.101

Beck roundly described a forcible entry by Serbia and Montenegro into
Bosnia-Hercegovina as “intimately bound up with the vital interests of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.” It could have disastrous consequences for the
latter’s internal stability. Any indication that Bosnia was about to slip from the
Porte’s control demanded an end to the Monarchy’s conservative policy, and an
active push to secure “a strategically and commercially essential limited share
of territory.” Serbia would probably have to be bought off, but the military were
under no illusions as to who the enemy was: “Anything it [Austria] does not receive in the first partition of Bosnia will be lost forever, and will only benefit our enemies.”

There is no documentation of Francis Joseph’s reaction to these memoranda, but the thinking which informs both of them might explain the Emperor’s otherwise surprising assent to the Andrásy scheme. The Hungarian plan clearly involved a disturbance of the status quo in the Balkans, and for radical reasons in diplomatic terms. Andrásy and Kállay aimed to win the Serbs over with concessions, on condition that Serbia bound itself unequivocally to the Monarchy, or at least its Hungarian half. The military advanced more conventional arguments of strategic and commercial advantage, as a justification for ending the status quo, and stressed the imperative need to assure the Monarchy a share in the spoils. Although the Emperor was in no way committed to a partition of the Ottoman Empire, territorial gains of the sort entertained by Beck and Thoemmel may well have been his own condition for letting Andrásy go ahead. More than one authority, with only a sketchy knowledge of the Hungarian scheme, has pointed to the psychological appeal, for Francis Joseph, of gaining territory rather than losing it as a motive inclining him to occupy Bosnia. The compromise partition envisaged in the late 1860s, therefore, can be seen as a staging-post on the way to sole occupation by Austria-Hungary in the late 1870s.

Beust’s position is better documented. The chancellor saw the question in terms of its possible effect on the broader scene, and shrank from violent change. In a memorandum of 3 February, Beust started from the truism, ignored by Andrásy, that since “the maintenance of peace is still essential for us,” the Monarchy had perforce to reserve “all our means in order to paralyse any eventual action by Russia.” War was simply not an option. Alluding to his proposals of 1867, Beust insisted that the Monarchy’s policy remained the same: to contain Greece, Romania and Serbia, while at the same time striving to better the position of the Balkan Christians generally.

Beust conceded that Serbia was still least overtly hostile to the Ottomans. Hence, “If, at the cost of a few concessions, the Porte were able to relieve itself of all insecurity on the Serbian frontier, it would not regret this sacrifice.” The intriguing question here is the nature of the concessions Beust had in mind. Was he resigned to letting the Hungarian initiative run its course, aware that he could do little to obstruct it? Was he hoping that, against all his expectations, something would come of it, that the Porte would see reason in the Hungarian plan and acquiesce? What seems certain is that Beust did not, like the military, favor annexation of Bosnia for its own sake; nor did he really believe in the Hungarian policy of winning Serbia over by concessions.

The real priority for the imperial government, in Beust’s view, as well as the only hope of ameliorating the lot of the Balkan Christians, was to open up
Turkey-in-Europe to economic development, and thus stabilize the situation in the Near East. This could only be done by hurrying ahead with the railway between Vienna and Constantinople. As far as Beust was concerned, it was essential that construction of such a strategic link should be concerted solely between the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary. Any other power dominant in this area “would dispose, so to speak, of the keys to our Empire and would have the power to close at will the natural outlets for our peoples’ industrial and commercial activity.”

So important did Beust consider this that he raised it at the common ministerial council on 9 February 1869, discussing railways in Dalmatia. In a clear reference to both the Andrássy plan and the Beck and Thoemmel memoranda, Beust mentioned “the supposition, still within the realm of the possible, of acquiring further stretches of the hinterland.” Bosnia was an obvious means of safeguarding the Vienna-Constantinople route, and it was vital, whether there was a partition or not, that the province not fall into the wrong hands. As for the Balkan states themselves, Serbia included, Beust was determined to keep them small, divided and dependent. So, despite Beust’s seeming acquiescence in the Andrássy plan, and despite the justice of the remark by one historian that the chancellor’s stance on the Bosnian question remained unclear, certain conclusions are in order.

Beust’s preference was for the status quo, but he was not above contemplating at least partial occupation of Bosnia by the Monarchy. This, if it had to happen at all, would in his eyes be for purely defensive, strategic reasons. Beust cannot have regarded as desirable even the partial expansion of Serbia as envisaged by the Andrássy plan, although he might have resigned himself to accepting it, if the Emperor persisted in giving Andrássy his support in the matter. What is most likely is that Beust was resolved to resist the plan as far as he practically could without distancing himself too much from the Emperor. Kállay was right in anticipating further delaying tactics from Vienna.

There was a natural tendency, however, among foreign diplomats to assume that the Bosnian plan was a truly Austro-Hungarian initiative. No one could realize just how fractured was the process whereby the plan was eventually agreed upon. That it was primarily Hungarian in origin was generally appreciated; that Beust was a reluctant spectator, rather than a determined advocate, was at first missed.

Meanwhile Beust’s reservations had received reinforcement from Prokesch-Osten, who reacted to the latest rumors of Austro-Hungarian approval of the plan by flatly denying it. There was a sting in Prokesch’s remark that,

I credit him [Kállay], because of his Hungarian origins, with too much perspicacity to believe him capable of supporting a project whose success would threaten Hungary with serious difficulties in its South Slav provinces.

By late March, however, Prokesch could no longer deny that the policy he represented in Constantinople was not that pursued by Kállay. To the British am-
bassador, he expressed “in the strongest manner” his disapproval of Kállay’s “short-sightedness” in encouraging the Serbs. Confronted by the Grand Vizier with clear evidence of Kállay’s support for ceding Bosnia to Serbia, and reminded how incompatible this was with traditional Austrian policy, Prokesch sought refuge in equivocation. To attribute to Hungary’s leaders such a “disavowal of imperial policy” would be to believe them capable of a course which, “however they might seek to disguise it, would be handyman’s work for Russia.”

Everything in the tone of Prokesch’s reports to Beust indicates that he expected the chancellor to back him and not Kállay.

As of the end of March 1869, moreover, Beust still seemed to be in agreement with Prokesch, endorsing his view that “no encouragement” should be given the Serbs. To the British ambassador, Beust admitted that Kállay had been under the influence of the Hungarian Government, who were in the habit of communicating directly with him upon various local affairs. The ideas which formed the subject of our Conversation had issued from Pesth and not from Vienna, but we should hear no more about them and Mr. Kellay [sic] would abstain from giving encouragement to the ambitions of the Servians to look to any annexation of the Sclave Districts of Turkey.

In the light of what Beust was about to concede, this was a particularly vain assertion.

At the beginning of April 1869 Kállay traveled up to Pest for leave, in the course of which he finally had the Bosnian matter out with Beust. Andrássy informed Kállay on 4 April that he had broached the subject “several times” with both Francis Joseph and Beust, but the latter was still preoccupied with German affairs, and as Kállay recorded in his diary, “in the eastern question, it seems, he is only inclined to give way when Andrássy, for his part, gives way with regard to Germany policy.” Andrássy therefore had a plan, by which we offer the Turks effective help in the event of a war with Russia, but on condition that they agree to carry out the Bosnian plan. Beust to begin with was scared even by this, saying that before the Crimean War Austria concluded a secret alliance with Russia to the effect that in the event of Turkey’s disintegration the two of them would divide up the remains, this treaty would now be more suitable for Austria than an alliance with Turkey.

Beust was clearly making yet another plea for a policy of cautious cooperation with Russia in the Balkans. Andrássy, however, “energetically and efficaciously explained to him the danger of friendship with Russia.”

Faced with Andrássy’s persistence, Beust appears again to have concluded that direct opposition was futile. When Kállay saw him in Buda on 6 April, the chancellor made a remarkable admission. As expected, he stressed that “the matter is not an easy one, indeed is surrounded by great difficulties.” However,
although the idea did not originate with him, nevertheless he is not against it, he even authorized me in this connection to announce to the Serbian government that we will not hinder its aspirations.\textsuperscript{122}

In response to Kállay’s enquiry as to what he should do if the Serbs took further measures, Beust simply told him to report it to those above him.

To Andrássy, this meant that “we can now be satisfied with what we have achieved so far.”\textsuperscript{123} Convinced that he had a free hand, he told Kállay that the Serbian Regents could once again be urged to submit their memorandum, “which we will then support.”\textsuperscript{124} Yet Beust, when Kállay saw him again on 7 April, was adamant that the strictest secrecy must be preserved. Kállay could confide only in the French consul at Belgrade, Beust said, since France was already apprised of the plan and, it was hoped, this time would act in concert with the Monarchy.\textsuperscript{125}

Beust’s concern for secrecy is explicable on two counts. For one, he was undoubtedly anxious to allay the disquiet that rumors of the Bosnian scheme had already aroused abroad. For another, by keeping everything as far as possible under wraps he may have sought to conceal from the Hungarians the extent to which he had been trying to dissociate himself from the plan and discredit it.

It is hard not to conclude that Beust had no clear alternative to Andrássy’s Bosnian project, or rather, had not the stomach to defend the only obvious alternative. This was the policy outlined by Beust himself on several occasions, namely, defense of the territorial status quo in the Ottoman Empire, but linked to reforms designed to defuse the potentially explosive situation in the Balkans.

The charge of supine acquiescence, moreover, makes more sense of Beust’s policy than previous interpretations. Those historians, primarily Yugoslav, who have seen, in every Bosnian initiative from 1867 on, a cleverly thought out dual strategy by Beust and Andrássy, ignore the very real antagonism between the two men.\textsuperscript{126} The summer before there had been a damaging public brawl over policy toward Germany.\textsuperscript{127} The turn of the year 1868–69 was marked by further ructions, conducted in the Vienna and Pest press, over the question of the Monarchy’s ability to wage war without Hungary’s consent.\textsuperscript{128} By June 1869, apropos of the conflict between eastern and western priorities, Beust was complaining that “Certainly no minister of foreign affairs can be more obstructed in his actions vis-à-vis another minister than I am by Count Andrássy.”\textsuperscript{129}

In view of Beust’s known views on the Eastern Question, the conspiracy theory simply does not add up. Far more likely is that Beust, seeing that he could not control Andrássy, decided to let him field his ideas, which Beust could then disavow, and see how far they went. If they worked, which Beust cannot have believed they would, fine; if not, Beust could shrug his shoulders and claim, as he was to complain about Andrássy in 1870, that he “was obliged to bear much from him.”\textsuperscript{130} It was a peculiar way to conduct foreign policy; but then, the Dual Monarchy was a peculiar institution.
Kállay was quick to perceive the lack of enthusiasm for the project in Vienna. At the beginning of May he and counsellor De Pont, of the foreign ministry, discussed the plan. De Pont, doubtless echoing Beust, was “afraid that Serbia, if it acquires Bosnia will want still more, and sooner or later will attract to itself both Dalmatia and Croatia.” Kállay replied that the antagonism between Serbs and Croats over Bosnia was so strong that

if we were to strengthen both (Croatia by the annexation of Dalmatia and the Border and Serbia by the cession of Bosnia), we can only increase this antagonism, so we could even in the given circumstances by means of Croatia, acquire Bosnia.

Kállay had to conclude that “We weren’t able, however, to convince one another of our points of view.”

Even before Kállay returned to Belgrade, he received the clear impression that Beust was in no hurry to see the plan implemented. On 18 May the chancellor “expressed himself very vaguely, said that it is necessary to act reassuringly.” Back in Belgrade, all Kállay heard, from both Vienna and Constantinople, was of the need “to proceed with the Bosnian question with caution.” The Porte, according to Prokesch, was seriously alarmed at Kállay’s activities. Garbled reports coming in to both Vienna and Constantinople testified to how quickly the plan was becoming common knowledge. Beust and Prokesch can hardly have wanted the Ottomans to believe that Vienna supported the plan as wholeheartedly as Pest.

In any case there was little Kállay could do to hurry things along, since the Serbian government in the summer of 1869 was completely taken up with the elections to the Constituent Skupština, and the deliberations on the new Constitution. Until mid-September Kállay had no opportunity to discuss the Bosnian question with anyone on the Serbian side. About the only person he did discuss it with was the Italian consul, Joannini, with whom Kállay raised the idea of the Balkan peoples bound together in “an immense Near Eastern Switzerland.” But the Italian also pointed out the oddity of the enterprise:

I observed to my interlocutor [Kállay] that he happened for the first time to be assisting in a diplomatic action exclusively directed by Hungarian interests, without seeing placed in the balance the interests, perhaps in some quarter diverse, of the rest of the Monarchy.

The Ballhaus itself could not have put it more neatly. Kállay’s assurances to Joannini that “Count Beust shares the ideas of Count Andrassy,” must have rung hollow even in his own ears.

Kállay, however, remained anxious to get the Bosnian plan moving again, conscious that Andrássy himself was beginning to get impatient with the Serbs; as early as May Andrássy accused them of wanting “to derive advantage from
our friendship, but not to do anything for it.”142 By September 1869 Andrásy was even more insistent. He was convinced that the Monarchy was in imminent danger of being attacked as soon as Russia completed its current railway building program, and the security aspect of the Bosnian question was increasingly uppermost in his mind.143 To secure both the Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire against attack from the rear, from the South Slavs, was essential.

Because of this we must win the Serbs over completely. They can only be won completely over by the cession of Bosnia. Its cession is the cornerstone of our South Slav policy, without it we are building on sand.144

The issue simply must be raised again; “regardless of what they think of it in Vienna and Constantinople, he [Andrássy] will try however to win the upper hand in both places.”145 But in return the Regents had to act on their own behalf; and there was an open threat in the next remark: they should “be warned that, in the event that Austria wins, and they have been on Russia’s side, an extremely melancholy fate would await them.”146 In response to Kállay’s query about the possibility of a defensive-offensive alliance with Serbia, which after all was still a vassal state of the Sultan, “Andrássy replied that he would achieve this.”147 He would even agree to Blaznavac’s election as Prince, if this facilitated the overall goal.

On 14 September Kállay finally managed to have a serious discussion of the matter with Blaznavac, and stressed that “the time was nearing when something would have to be done in this regard.”148 The answer he got, however, reflected the hesitancy which had dogged the issue on the Serbian side from the beginning. If the Regents were “sure of Andrássy’s moral support, they would be willing to turn to Bosnia at once and take it over, preserving of course the Sultan’s sovereignty.”149 There was “a certain guardedness” in Blaznavac’s general demeanor, moreover, that disturbed Kállay.150

A lengthier discussion, on the 17th, gave Kállay the opportunity to employ the strong-arm tactics hinted at by Andrásy. He told Blaznavac that “Russia is going to attack us sooner or later, because she can only break through into the Balkans by going through us.”151 Nevertheless,

there could hardly be any doubt as to our victory. I pointed out that Serbia could expect no good to come out of it if it were not on our side during this war, and we won.152

What sort of policy, then, did Blaznavac intend to pursue? Blaznavac claimed that, “if Hungary and Austria find themselves at war, Serbia will at once declare war on Turkey and annex Bosnia, the Hercegovina and Old Serbia and form a single state.”153 Kállay, however, stamped on this idea as hard as he could: Austria-Hungary was not looking for Serbia’s practical assistance in a war, he
Austria would support, or, if this wasn’t enough, covertly to activate the movements in Bosnia and exploit them to demand from the Porte the handing over of Bosnia. Blaznavac naturally listened to this unexpected advocacy of Balkan insurrection “with great attention” but, beyond suggesting that a petition to Belgrade by the Bosnians themselves was another option, he had no practical alternatives for the moment. All Kállay could extract from him was the promise that “he would have a good think about the matter.”

When Blaznavac returned to the subject two weeks later, there was a marked change in tone and emphasis. The Regent now thought it necessary “to employ the most pacific methods possible.” Perhaps, he suggested, it would be best to start with some less controversial request. For instance, Serbia could ask for jurisdiction over the Orthodox population of Bosnia to be transferred from the Patriarchate of Constantinople to the Metropolitan of Belgrade. If that were successful, it might then be possible to broach the idea of a share in the political administration.

The switch in Blaznavac’ tactics mystified Kállay. On 5 October, he asked Blaznavac point-blank: why the sudden retreat from the idea of an administrative cession? Did the Regents no longer think the sympathies of the Bosnians could be relied on? Blaznavac denied this, “but he didn’t see any possibility of action this winter, it could perhaps be started as soon as spring arrived.” He assured Kállay that, in any Austro-Russian war, Serbia would remain on the sidelines if guaranteed the administration of Bosnia. Kállay could only report back to Andrásy, urging further measures.

It was perhaps at this juncture that the seeds of irreparable suspicion were sown on both sides. Kállay remained baffled by Blaznavac’ continuing air of reserve. Were the Regents developing a case of cold feet? Worse, were they making preparations to go their own way, if not throw themselves once more into the arms of the Russians?

One can only wonder at the effect of a casual enquiry made by Kállay on 5 October: “I mentioned to him [Blaznavac] the cession of a corner of Bosnia to Croatia, he didn’t see any difficulties in this regard.” Blaznavac might well have had no objections at this point. Nevertheless he and Ristić were to hold this
remark against Kállay, as the Bosnian question dragged on into 1870 with even less likelihood of a breakthrough in sight. The lack of a solution in turn disinclined the Regents to any sort of compromise in favor of the Croats. Then, in the New Year, the revelation of talks between General Wagner, governor of Dalmatia, and the Croatian National Party, coupled with Wagner’s subsequent elevation to ministerial rank, may have aroused all over again the suspicion that some sort of Austro-Hungarian confidence trick was being played on Serbia.\textsuperscript{164}

To be fair, Ristić in his memoirs made it clear that he regarded the Wagner affair as a case of Vienna trying to set Slavs against Hungarians. Ristić saw in this a preparation for the Monarchy’s annexation of Bosnia, and a means of keeping the Military Border intact as a weapon against Hungary. Vienna, he claimed, was acting on the time-honored principle “that it had to incite one nation against the other, in order to draw its own strength from their dissension. \textit{Divide et impera}.”\textsuperscript{165} However, Ristić wrote these words in 1874. In the murkier circumstances of the winter of 1869–70, neither he nor Blaznavac can have been so sure what to believe.

There was then a break in negotiations for several months, when Francis Joseph, Beust and Andrássy departed to attend the opening of the Suez Canal.\textsuperscript{166} Kállay’s political mentor was effectively out of touch until December and, left to their own devices, Kállay and the Serbian Regents quietly shelved the whole issue.\textsuperscript{167} It was only upon Andrássy’s return that the Bosnian plan was revived. In Andrássy’s opinion “the Serbian government could now apply directly to the Porte.”\textsuperscript{168} He had enjoyed a long talk with Ali Pasha in Constantinople, “and from a distance mentioned this matter as well.”\textsuperscript{169} In any case the stay of the Emperor’s party in Constantinople gave rise to all sorts of speculation, including the suspicion that an Austro-Turkish alliance was concluded or in the offing, provoking interpellations in the Hungarian parliament from Svetozar Miletić and others.\textsuperscript{170} Both Kállay and Andrássy felt a renewed sense of urgency about exploiting what they saw as a sudden vulnerability to pressure on the part of the Porte.

Kállay saw both Regents on 5 January. To Blaznavac he argued that now was the moment to submit a memorandum to the Porte. With sublime disregard for the facts of the international situation, Kállay claimed that “Soon every European great power would be seeking Austria’s friendship,” which put the latter in a unique position to do something about the Eastern Question.\textsuperscript{171} At the same time, “Turkey was afraid of the movement which could break out this spring and thus would perhaps be more accommodating.”\textsuperscript{172} Everything, Kállay urged, depended on using this favorable combination, and quickly:

\begin{quote}
On our side . . . the greatest influence was possessed by Andrássy. . . . Now, it could happen that the great powers will combine amongst themselves, the spring might pass without an uprising and the Porte’s fears might dissipate, An-
\end{quote}
drássy might die—he might even fall from office—or we might get involved in a
war which would take up all our attention, and then we would have thrown up
a good opportunity for a long time to come or even, perhaps, forever.173

It was Kállay’s most determined plea yet for action, but it ran immediately into
the Regents’ doubts and suspicions.

Blaznavac agreed with Kállay, but was disturbed by one thing. The Serbian
government had a long-standing policy of trying to establish an influence in Bos-
nia, and to counteract that of Russia.

Although this had been a success up to a point, it was not completely so and he
was afraid that if they take this step Russia will provoke a premature Russian-
oriented uprising in these provinces, by which they would be forced to take part
in this, and that they wouldn't be able to take the lead in it.174

This was a crucial objection from the Serbian point of view, and one moreover
which had an arresting effect on Andrássy too, when he learned of it. For the mo-
moment, however, Blaznavac again promised that he would think the matter over.

Ristić had an even more fundamental objection. He simply did not think
the Porte would ever give way over Bosnia. “That’s what I think as well,” Kál-
lay confided to his diary, somewhat perversely, “but we really want to exert
pressure on it [the Porte].”175 After discussing the matter with Ristić, Blaznavac’
reservations were only strengthened. He now considered the idea of a formal
proposal to the Porte, which could unleash a Russian reaction and a series of
events over which Serbia would have no control, as too dangerous. Blaznavac
was particularly apprehensive about the situation, not in Bosnia, but in Bul-
garia. Here revolution was being promoted, he claimed, by the Russians and the
Liberal government in Romania. Blaznavac insisted that “as long as all these
threads were not in his hands it would be dangerous to undertake a step which
Russia could use against them.”176

Another divisive issue was raised when Kállay again mentioned the need to
cede a corner of Bosnia to the Monarchy. Kállay emphasized “that we didn’t want
it, but want it only in case the Croats, who also yearn for Bosnia, were to make a
lot of fuss.”177 Blaznavac, however, in contrast to his acquiescence the previous
October, was put out. He nevertheless, as before, accepted this as part of the price
Serbia would have to pay.

The rubbishing Ristić gave the idea of a memorandum had a certain weight
of experience behind it. A memorandum could even, Ristić suggested, be danger-
ous in itself. The Porte would reject it,

and since the other powers would never support it the Porte, even if it didn't
attack Serbia, would nonetheless send an observation corps to the frontier, with
which the Serbian government would then have to fight or, if it didn’t do so, this
climb-down would be for it the greatest moral blow.178
Instead, Ristić had an alternative plan. This was for the Serbs to stir up a revolt in Bosnia, and then “exploit the situation by writing to the Porte in such a way as to offer their services” in controlling it.\textsuperscript{179} As a reward, Serbia could then ask for the administration of the provinces. At this point, “both we [i.e., Austria-Hungary] and the other powers could get involved.”\textsuperscript{180}

Kállay was stymied. He tried to show the superior advantages of trying diplomacy first, “but I didn’t try too much, not knowing whether Andrássy would share his [Ristić’s] viewpoint.”\textsuperscript{181} In fact, in reply to Ristić’s questions Kállay was obliged to assure him that not only Andrássy, but also Beust and the Emperor, were involved in the process, an admission that somewhat dimmed the image of the all-encompassing Hungarian government. At the back of Kállay’s mind, too, there may have been the uneasy awareness that he was in a bad position to disapprove of instigating revolt, when only the previous September he had advocated precisely that. Ristić’s counter-proposal, though not without its perils, could at least claim to be aiming to avoid a general conflagration rather than provoke one.

The negotiations were now so clearly in confusion that Kállay again repaired to Pest to consult with Andrássy. This is one of the turning-points in the Bosnian question, when Andrássy at last began to realize the difficulties and dangers of what he had been proposing. He might also have become suddenly so exasperated by the lack of progress that he lost interest in the matter.

On 11 January Kállay gave Andrássy a detailed account of the recent talks, “attaching especial importance to the view according to which, if we now want to resolve this question peacefully Russia might foment an uprising which would snatch from our hands the leadership in these matters.”\textsuperscript{182} The effect on Andrássy, in the light of all the arguments deployed against the Bosnian scheme in the past by people like Beust and Prokesch, has a certain ironic aptness: “He was impressed by this angle, which he hadn’t thought of.”\textsuperscript{183} So impressed, indeed, was Andrássy that he decided that the Serbian government, while continuing its activity in Bosnia, should rather hold itself in readiness to act “the moment it might be necessary.”\textsuperscript{184}

There then ensued, through pure happenstance, another one of those long gaps in the Bosnian question in which nothing actually happened. Kállay was away from Belgrade for two months, ostensibly sorting out consular business in Vienna, but in reality embroiled in the dying stages of his affair with the opera singer Marie Rabatinsky.\textsuperscript{185} At the end of this period, in March 1870, the first communication made to the Regents by Kállay was to repeat Andrássy’s advice to postpone any action. Evidently not much had occurred to change Andrássy’s thinking in the course of the last two months. Nor would Kállay accede to a request by Blaznavac for some form of public statement that the Hungarian government “regarded Bosnia as a sister-state of Serbia,” and would not impede the
Chapter 5 ♦ 147

amalgamation of the two.\textsuperscript{186} Such a statement, Kállay said, could hardly be made in a time of peace.

This was just as much of a turning point for the Serbian government as Andrássy’s conversion to caution had been for the Hungarian government in January. After years of talk and exhortation from Pest on the subject of Bosnia, the message now coming through was one of delay. It was one thing for the Regents themselves to raise objections and foresee pitfalls; they could hardly be accused of not wanting eventual Serbian control of Bosnia. But when Andrássy started doing the same, any number of ulterior motives might be imagined by minds traditionally suspicious of all things Hungarian.

And at the very time this news reached the Regents, they were still getting conflicting reports about the significance of the Wagner affair. Wagner’s involvement with the Croatian Nationalists, and his subsequent appointment as Austrian defense minister, was proof to the Regents of continuing Austrian, if not Hungarian, designs on Bosnia.\textsuperscript{187} Then there was the rumor that an Austro-Turkish alliance had been signed the previous November, and had been the real purpose of Francis Joseph’s Suez trip. According to this, Austria-Hungary would receive Bosnia in return for guaranteeing the rest of the Ottoman Empire’s European provinces.\textsuperscript{188} The rumor was groundless, but it put Andrássy’s \textit{arrières-pensées} about the Bosnian plan in a suspicious light.

There seems no reason to doubt the sincerity, however self-interested, with which Andrássy promoted the Bosnian scheme up to the beginning of 1870. The Regents, moreover, probably appreciated this, since the differences between Beust and Andrássy were too obvious for them to be cooperating in such a way, on such an issue. Yet if the end result of all the Hungarian proposals was stalemate, what more could the Regents hope for from Andrássy? More important, Beust’s reluctance, the prominence of Wagner in Vienna, the putative treaty with the Ottomans, all seemed to indicate that Hungarian influence was not as great as all that. Andrássy could initiate debate, but without the wholehearted cooperation of Vienna his promises stood revealed as empty.

Nobody said as much, on either side, but the Bosnian question was effectively dead. Talk about it between Kállay and the Regents continued for the next few months, until the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War gave it a whole new complexion. In April, Blaznavac floated once again the idea of soliciting the opinion of the European powers, but did not get much further than that.\textsuperscript{189}

It was Longworth, the British consul, who provided one of the sharpest criticisms of Kállay’s handling of the issue. Kállay, he wrote on 20 June, was

too intent . . . on exciting rivalry between the Austro-Hungarian Slavs and those of the Principality, and too glad to avail himself of Bosnia, as a bone of contention, to widen the breach between them, to care much about other consequences: it is nothing to him, who may have that province, provided it be not
those, whose territory and numerical preponderance are already inconsistent with the safety of the kingdom and the Empire.  

There was a rough justice in Longworth’s description of Kállay’s divide and rule tactics, yet when all is said and done Kállay was merely an instrument of his political master. By the spring of 1870, however, Kállay found himself increasingly at odds with Andrássy over the policy to be pursued toward the South Slavs generally. Kállay’s account of two separate interviews with Andrássy, in May and June, make it clear why nothing more was happening with the Bosnian question.

As with Hungarian domestic policy, so with the Bosnian question. Having suddenly given up on the need for a speedy solution to the problem, in January, Andrássy by 9 May seemed almost oblivious to it. He was as concerned as ever about the threat posed the Monarchy by Russia; indeed, he told Kállay that he considered a Russian war “unavoidable,” even imminent. But with regard to the Bosnian question, Kállay commented sourly, “I noticed that he doesn’t really have a firm, decided viewpoint, he would like the matter to drag on [forever].” Kállay came away from the conversation “as usual without result.”

Their meeting on 28 June, which brought Kállay’s sense of helplessness to a head, did not even raise the Bosnian question. Instead, Andrássy expressed his sense of the general manageability of the South Slavs. There was clearly not much interest in the project which had preoccupied both men for the last two years.

The Bosnian plan was briefly reactivated in the summer of 1870. The occasion this time was the outbreak of war in the West, which raised for the first time the possibility of war in the East as well. The Bosnian plan in its second incarnation, however, had no more chance of success than before, and the Regents’ reluctance to commit themselves was correspondingly greater. Before the end of 1871, as a result, the traditional Serbo-Hungarian antagonism had once again become a feature of the political landscape.

Notes


4 One of the few studies to acknowledge this clearly is Franz-Josef Kos, Die Politik Österreich-Ungarns während der Orientkrise 1874/75–1879 (Cologne & Vienna: Böhlau, 1984), who concludes (57) that Andrássy, through Kállay, “tried to pursue his own Hungarian Near Eastern policy.”
Chapter 5

5 Orešković memorandum for Serbian Regents, 16/28 July 1868, in Vučković, no. 198, 368 ff. See also the discussion in Chapter 1, above.

6 Beust to Prokesch-Osten, 11 Aug. 1868, HHSA, PA XII/93; this is obviously based, even down to the language used, on an Evidenz-Rapport by Colonel Pelikan (head of the Evidenzbüro or military intelligence service), 3 Aug. 1868, KA, Fasz. 5408/1, no. 385/EB.

7 Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 14 Aug. 1868, HHSA, PA XII/92; italics in original.


9 Ignatiev to Gorchakov, 30 Apr./12 May 1868, ibid., no. 68, especially 114.


13 Kállay to Andrassy, 31 May 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/92.

14 Kállay Diary, 25 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 42).

15 Kállay Diary, 26 June 1868 (Dnevnik, 44).

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., 22 July 1868 (Dnevnik, 60).

19 Ibid. (60–61).

20 Ibid. (61).

21 Ibid., 10 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 73).

22 Ibid., 8 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 72).

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., 10 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 73).

25 Kállay to Beust, 10 Aug. 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.

26 Cf. János Decsy, Prime Minister Gyula Andrássy’s Influence on Habsburg Foreign Policy during the Franco-German War of 1870–1871 (Boulder, CO, & New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 55, with Kállay Diary, 19 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 78). There is a much more nuanced analysis of Andrássy’s calculations in Kos, Die Politik Österreich-Ungarns, 54–65, who points out (59–61) that for Andrássy the Bosnian plan was always conditional on the Monarchy receiving about one third of the province, and on Serbia becoming unequivocally subordinate to the Monarchy’s influence.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid. The Vrbas is a tributary of the Sava, which it enters between Bosanska Gradiška and Bosanski Bord. At issue for annexation by the Monarchy was the north-western corner of Bosnia; see map in Peter F. Sugar, Industrialization of Bosnia-Hercegovina 1878–1918 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963), 20; Kos, Die Politik Österreich-Ungarns, 59.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 1 Sept. 1868 (Dnevnik, 83).
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
45 Scovasso to Menabrea, 31 Aug. 1868, summarized in Aleksić-Pejković, Politika Italije prema Srbiji, 323–24; not in DDI.
46 “Sándor” [Andrássy to Kállay], 8 Sept. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/143. This document is in Hungarian, interspersed with four-digit cipher numbers, a partial key to which is also in the Kállay Papers; words in cipher are shown here and in following references in italics. The document’s location, as well its subject matter, make clear that this is from Andrássy to Kállay. The latter did not receive it until 27 September, having been on a tour of the Serbian interior for two weeks; see Kállay Diary, 27 Sept. 1868 (Dnevnik, 91); also “Utazás a bolgár-szerb határokon 1868-ik évi szeptember 14–27,” [Journey along the Bulgarian-Serb Borders 14–27 September] a record not printed in Dnevnik, but published separately in Benjámin Kállay, A szerb felkelés története 1807–10 [History of the Serbian Uprising] (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1909), Appendix B.1, 247–310, and not included in the German edition of 1910. The original is in MOL, P344, 44.cs./E6.
47 “Sándor” [Andrássy to Kállay], 8 Sept. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/143.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., ff. 143–44.
53 Ibid., f. 144.
54 Ibid., ff. 144–45.
55 Ibid., f. 145.
56 Kállay Diary, 2 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, 92).
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 15 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, 100).
59 Ibid. Quoted in Decsy, Prime Minister Gyula Andrássy’s Influence, 59.
60 Kállay Diary, 15 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, 101).
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., 23 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, 104).
66 Prokesch-Osten to Kállay, 6 Oct. 1868, MOL, P344, 17. k., Cc/55, replying to a copy of Kállay to Beust, 29 Sept. 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177.
67 Kállay to Beust, 5 Oct. 1868, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay Diary, 5 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, 93).
68 Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 27 Oct. 1868, HHSA, PA XII/93.
Kállay to Beust, 29 Oct. 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay Diary, 29 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, 106).

“Sándor” [Andrássy to Kállay], 8 Sept. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/143–44.

Prokesch-Osten to Kállay, 10 Nov. 1868, HHSA, PA XII/92.


Kállay Diary, 16 Nov. 1868 (Dnevnik, 115).

Kállay to Andrássy, 30 Oct. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/148.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Kállay to Beust, 17 Dec. 1868, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/177; Kállay Diary, 15–16 Dec. 1868 (Dnevnik, 129).


Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid; Kállay Diary, 30 Dec. 1868 (Dnevnik, 136).

Ibid., 31 Dec. 1868 (Dnevnik, 136).

Kállay to Andrássy, 6 Jan. 1869, OSZK, FH 1733/167; also in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 258, 579, who however mistranslates “neutralize” as “centralize.”

Kállay to Andrássy, 17 Jan. 1869, OSZK, FH 1733/170.

Kállay Diary, 15 Jan. 1869 (Dnevnik, 144).

Ibid. (Dnevnik, 145).

Ibid.

Ibid., 16 Jan. 1869 (Dnevnik, 145).

Ibid., 23 Jan. 1869 (Dnevnik, 147).

Kállay to Andrássy, 23 and 24 Jan. 1869, OSZK, FH 1733/171–73, 174–75.

Kállay Diary, 23 Jan. 1869 (Dnevnik, 147), and note 156 by Radenić, 697–98, summarizing the Neue Freie Presse article.


Kállay Diary, 5 Feb. 1869, paraphrasing Orczy’s letter, and in French in the manuscript (Dnevnik, 151). Cf. Eduard von Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrásy: Sein Leben und seine Zeit (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1910–13), vol. 1, Bis zur Ernennung zum Minister des Äussern, 461.

Kállay Diary, 5 Feb. 1869 (Dnevnik, 151).

Ibid.


Thoemmel memorandum, 28 Jan. 1869, HHSA, PA XII/95.


105 “Note annexée à la lettre particulière à Mr. le Prince de Metternich du 3 février 1869,” ibid., 104.

106 Ibid., 105.

107 Beust to Haymerle, 27 Jan. 1869, HHSA, PA XII/96.


110 Ibid., 182.


112 Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 5 Mar. 1869, HHSA, PA XII/94.

113 Clarendon to Longworth, 23 Mar. 1869, PRO, FO 78/2088; Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 19 Mar. 1869, HHSA, PA XII/94.

114 Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 26 Mar. 1869, HHSA, PA XII/94.

115 Bloomfield to Clarendon, 29 Mar. 1869, PRO, FO 78/750.


117 Ibid., 4 Apr. 1869 (*Dnevnik*, 168).

118 Ibid. (*Dnevnik*, 168–69).


120 Kállay Diary, 4 Apr. 1869 (*Dnevnik*, 169).

121 Ibid., 6 Apr. 1869 (*Dnevnik*, 169).

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid., 7 Apr. 1869 (*Dnevnik*, 170).

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid.


128 Ibid., 63–66.
129 Beust to Metternich, 9 June 1869, in Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleon III., vol. 3, no. 707, 201; quoted inaccurately by Decsy, Prime Minister Gyula Andrásy’s Influence, 69, note 158 (page 152).

130 Bloomfield to Granville, 13 Oct. 1870; quoted in Bridge, Sadowa to Sarajevo, 46.

131 Kállay Diary, 1 May 1869 (Dnevnik, 176).

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid.

134 Ibid., 18 May 1869 (Dnevnik, 180).

135 Ibid., 17 June 1869 (Dnevnik, 192).

136 Ibid; also 12 July 1869 (Dnevnik, 199).

137 Wohlfarth (Rushchuk) to Kállay, 3 July 1869, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/183; Wohlfarth to Prokesch-Osten, 3 July 1869, HHSA, PA XII/95; Beust to Kállay, 3 Aug. 1869, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/183; Čučković to Kállay, 22 Aug. 1869, MOL, P344, 4. k., Cb/161.


139 Kállay Diary, 20 June 1869 (Dnevnik, 193).

140 Joannini to Menabrea, 20 June 1869, DDI, 1st series, vol. 11, no. 420, 419.

141 Ibid., 420 (both quotes).

142 Kállay Diary, 20 May 1869 (Dnevnik, 181).

143 Ibid., 1 Sept. 1869 (Dnevnik, 216).


145 Kállay Diary, 7 Sept. 1869 (Dnevnik, 216).

146 Ibid.

147 Ibid.

148 Ibid., 14 Sept. 1869 (Dnevnik, 220).

149 Ibid.

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid., 17 Sept. 1869 (Dnevnik, 221).

152 Ibid.

153 Ibid.

154 Ibid.

155 Ibid.

156 Ibid. (Dnevnik, 222).

157 Ibid., 2 Oct. 1869 (Dnevnik, 228).

158 Ibid.

159 Ibid., 5 Oct. 1869 (Dnevnik, 229).

160 Ibid.

161 Ibid., 11 Oct. 1869 (Dnevnik, 231); cf. Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrásy, 1:466–68.

162 Kállay Diary, 5 Oct. 1869 (Dnevnik, 229).

163 Ibid.

164 On this murky episode, in which Beust appears to have authorised Wagner to discuss the possible partition of Bosnia with the Croats, only to repudiate Wagner when the news leaked, see Vojislav J. Vučković, “Ristić, Strossmayer i Wagnerova afera (1870),” [Ristić,

165 Ristić, Spoljašnji odnošaji Srbije, 3:125.


168 Kállay Diary, 15 Dec. 1869 (Dnevnik, 252).

169 Ibid. For Ali Pasha’s view of this talk (“the Porte . . . is not willing to make any concessions”) see Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 1 Aug. 1870, HHSA, PA XII/96; Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 5 Aug. 1870, HHSA, PA XII/97.


171 Kállay Diary, 5 Jan. 1870 (Dnevnik, 260).

172 Ibid.

173 Ibid.


175 Kállay Diary, 5 Jan. 1870 (Dnevnik, 260).


177 Kállay Diary, 8 Jan. 1870 (Dnevnik, 263).

178 Ibid. (Dnevnik, 262).

179 Ibid.

180 Ibid.

181 Ibid.

182 Ibid., 11 Jan. 1870 (Dnevnik, 263).

183 Ibid.

184 Ibid.

185 Ibid., 9 Jan.–8 Mar. 1870 (Dnevnik, 263–77) is largely taken up with the conclusion of this relationship, which dated from 1865 and had produced an illegitimate son, Stephan Ladislaus Groman, born in 1866; see Kövér, “A magánelet titkai és a napló,” 86–89.

186 Kállay Diary, 11 Mar. 1870 (Dnevnik, 277–78, 278).

187 Theodorovics (Belgrade) to Beust, 12 Feb. 1870, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/187.


189 Kállay Diary, 11 Apr. 1870 (Dnevnik, 290).

190 Longworth to Elliot, 20 June 1870, PRO, FO 78/2135.

191 Kállay Diary, 9 May 1870 (Dnevnik, 298).

192 Ibid.

193 Ibid.

194 Ibid., 28 June 1870 (Dnevnik, 310).
Part of the problem confronting the Habsburg Monarchy, in its relations with Serbia, was that the Principality could never be dealt with in isolation from the South Slav minorities in either the Monarchy or the Ottoman Empire. What affected Serbia tended to affect other South Slavs, and vice versa; at least, this was the assumption in Vienna, borne out by years of experience.

By extension this problem also confronted the Hungarian government in its attempts to influence policy toward Serbia after 1867. If anything, Hungarians like Andrássy and Kállay were even more aware of the nexus, since most of the Monarchy’s South Slavs were Hungarian subjects. It would not be too much to say that the principal reason for intervening in Serbian affairs, for the Hungarians, was precisely to mediate between Serbia and other South Slavs, to control the relationship and rob it of what, from the Hungarian point of view, appeared to be its menace.

The nature of the Regency regime in Serbia, which turned out to be only notionally less authoritarian than that of Prince Michael, meant that relations between the Principality and the rest of the South Slav world continued to be troubled. After an initial period of confusion following the Topčider assassination and the Regents’ marriage of convenience with the Serbian Liberals, it became apparent that the new government intended pursuing the same quietist, and pro-Hungarian, course. This had an inevitable negative effect on relations with both the Serb and Croat nationalists in the Habsburg Monarchy, with the various nationalist movements in the Balkans, and with Montenegro, Greece and Romania.

This, of course, was precisely what Andrássy and Kállay wanted. In their scheme of things, the different communities of the South Slav world were to be kept as isolated from one another as possible, their contacts monitored by
the Hungarian government. A total, hermetic quarantine was, however, scarcely feasible. Instead, Kállay maintained a sedulous watch over the movements of key individuals where he could, and reported in detail to Andrásy as the situation warranted. The irony of this vigilance was that, for all their proclaimed satisfaction with the loyal attitude of the Serbian government, both Kállay and Andrásy reacted with immediate suspicion to any and all contacts between Serbia and the outside world. It may be argued that such unremitting vigilance was at best unnecessary, at worst self-defeating.

Where Serbia’s relations with the Croat nationalists were concerned, the measures taken by the Hungarian government to guard against Yugoslavism seem out of all proportion to the reality behind the rhetoric of individual Serbs and Croats. When, in the autumn of 1868, Kállay learned from Blaznavac that Bishop Strossmayer intended visiting Belgrade, his outward reaction was that he “didn’t have anything against him.” Behind the scenes, however, the Strossmayer visit played a significant role in hardening Kállay’s views on how Croats and Serbs could be played off against one another.

In Hungarian-Croatian affairs 1868 had been dominated by the negotiations for a constitutional settlement, and much ill will had been generated among the Croats by the methods employed on the Hungarian side. Rigged elections to the Croatian Sabor, in December 1867, returned a Unionist majority of fifty-two deputies favorable to Hungarian terms, as opposed to a mere fourteen from Strossmayer’s National Party. This packed Sabor duly sent its delegation to the negotiations in Pest which hammered out the details of a compromise. The agreement, or Nagodba, eventually passed by both parliaments in September 1868, was, in the words of one authority, “more favorable to Croatians than is generally assumed.” It recognized Croatia as a “political nation possessing a separate territory,” with legislative and governmental autonomy as far as its “internal affairs” were concerned. It conceded that Dalmatia and the Military Border in Croatia-Slavonia should be part of Croatia proper, and confirmed Croatian as the language of administration. Yet the grip on the office of governor, or Ban, and the final say in finances, which the Hungarian government reserved for itself, remained outstanding grievances for Croat nationalists. Even after a partial revision of the Nagodba in 1873, Croatian autonomy seemed more a pious aspiration than a reality; in 1868 the Andrásy government appeared determined to keep overall control of the Kingdom firmly in its hands.

For a leading figure of the Croatian opposition to visit Belgrade was therefore a political event. Strossmayer was preceded, early in September, by Jovan Subotić, whom the Croatian National Party sent down to sound the Regents on their attitude toward the Nagodba. Was it really true, Subotić asked Blaznavac, that the Serbian government enjoyed a friendly relationship with the Hungarian? And if this was the case, what did Blaznavac advise with regard to the Nagodba?
Blaznavac’ reaction was revealing. He defended the connection with Hungary as advantageous to both countries, especially since “Serbia doesn’t want to be used as a tool by Russia, indeed it will serve as a dyke for Hungary against the encroachments of Russian influence.” With regard to the Nagodba, the Regent told Subotić the only course available was to negotiate openly with the Hungarians; a strong Hungary, he claimed, was a necessity, since “it [Hungary] protects the Slavs from German expansion.” Significantly, Blaznavac immediately turned to Kállay for assurance that he had said the right thing. And Kállay, while endorsing Blaznavac’ language, thought he should see Subotić for himself.

Subotić called on Kállay on 7 September, and as a result Kállay was able to inform Andrássy that “the Croatian national party seriously and sincerely wants to negotiate.” Subotić was evidently deputed to open a channel to Andrássy via Kállay. “There is no doubt,” Kállay wrote, “that the attitude of the Serbian government has had a great influence on the tractability of Subotić and his party.”

This did not, however, mean that the Hungarian government could afford to ignore the “undeniable” fellow-feeling which persisted among the South Slav peoples. Kállay was convinced that the so-called national party . . . is in a decisive and overwhelming majority in Croatia. . . . On the other hand, if the plans of the, in my present view, fictitious majority go through, the national party will form the opposition at once, and they will try to cause disturbances by every possible means. . . . an appeal to the oppressed Slav nationality would still meet with the sort of sympathy beyond our borders, especially here in Serbia, which the present Serbian government, for all its good intentions, would perhaps be unable, or would not dare, to get the better of.

Here was the worst nightmare of the Hungarian political class, and Kállay evidently thought Andrássy should make a push to avoid it by building a bridge to the Croat nationalists.

The silence from Pest on this issue, over the next couple of months, was deafening. This may simply have reflected the genuine obstacles to agreement between the Andrássy government and the Croatian Nationalists. The government hardly needed the Nationalists’ support, and the latter were unlikely to make demands acceptable to Pest. It was evident that, much as he valued having Kállay in Belgrade, Andrássy did not always see eye to eye with him. Their differences over Hungarian domestic political affairs were to surface increasingly over the next two years.

When he arrived on 30 October for what was ostensibly a pastoral visit to the Catholic community in Serbia, Bishop Strossmayer was thus still very much the unreconciled bogeyman of the Hungarian government, and it was as such that Kállay, for all his outward courtesies, treated him. Kállay spent much of his time during Strossmayer’s visit working to prevent a torch-lit procession in the
Bishop’s honor, a prospect which, since Strossmayer was to be the guest of the Austro-Hungarian consulate, filled Kállay with consternation. He lobbied with Blaznavac to have any such demonstration banned, and suggested to Strossmayer that the Bishop spend the night across the river at Zemun. In his interview with Blaznavac on the 31st, Strossmayer openly reproached the Regents “for concurring an alliance with the Hungarians at the expense of the Croats”; and although Blaznavac was able to deny such a link with perfect truth, he made no secret of his desire for good relations with Pest.12

Kállay’s efforts to muzzle Strossmayer in Belgrade were not, however, wholly successful. Strossmayer delivered a sermon on 1 November, in which he predicted peace and understanding between nations, “not with some over others but happily alongside one another, and the strong will try to help the weak.”13 A demonstration was held in front of the Metropolitan’s palace that evening, and in a speech made the next morning Strossmayer’s most daring utterance was to declare himself “ready to sacrifice the last drop of his blood for the mission of the Serbs in the East.”14 Rhetoric though this was, both Kállay and the Regents felt obliged to take it seriously. Ristić went out of his way to assure Kállay that, although “a lot of people are trying to cloud the friendship which exists between us . . . they will not succeed in this.”15

Behind this petty manoeuvring there was undoubtedly a deeper purpose, which Kállay only intermittently committed to paper but which was dimly perceived by at least some outside observers. The Strossmayer visit was followed with interest in the Slav press of the Habsburg Monarchy, and one organ, the Correspondenz of Prague, openly denounced Kállay for his part in it. Kállay, said Correspondenz, although a young “homo novus” with no diplomatic experience, had already contributed to the Karadorđević trial, to the suppression of the Om-ladina, to the estrangement of Serbia from the nationalities on either side, to the involvement of Hungary in the Eastern Question. The motive could only be that the Hungarian government feared any closer development of Serbo-Croat relations on the eve of the Nagodba.16

The chief significance of Strossmayer’s visit to Belgrade, however, was that as far as Serbo-Croat cooperation was concerned, the Bishop came away emphatically empty-handed. It was clear Strossmayer had no hope of winning the Regents from their pro-Hungarian policy. This was due partly to the Hungarian courtship of the Serbian government, but partly also to the continuing mutual suspicion of Serbs and Croats, which Kállay saw and was determined to exploit.

This suspicion was easily aroused. It was typified on the Serbian side by Ristić’s comment in November that

The Croats have not wanted to recognize their antecedents or that there are Serbs in Croatia, and when the Hungarians have forced them to compromise, then they start showing affection for the Serbs. And they have wanted to draw
us into their struggle with the Hungarians so that when, with our help, they save themselves, the Serbs will continue to be sacrificed even further. . . . 17

Strossmayer, by contrast, had a very different viewpoint in January 1869:

The Serbian government prefers the Hungarians and Turkey to us. . . . In Serbia it is believed that Serbia profits from our being downtrodden and powerless. How blind, what Byzantine wickedness and envy! But let us not give up hope.18

Strossmayer’s followers were even less inclined to exercise the Christian virtues, and it was with them that Kállay saw his opportunity to sow further dissension among the South Slavs.

A couple of weeks after Strossmayer’s departure Kállay received a visit from Orešković, who made no secret of both his and the Bishop’s dissatisfaction with the Serbian government. The two discussed Orešković’s plan for achieving South Slav unity by annexing Bosnia to Croatia, after which, he insisted, Serbia would inevitably be drawn into a voluntary association under Hungarian auspices.19 Kállay’s solitary reflections that evening were revealing:

This conversation has strengthened the conviction I have had for years that in these provinces [Bosnia-Hercegovina] we can achieve a lot by making use of the jealousy which the Serbs and the Croats feel against one another. We must exploit this skilfully on one side and the other.20

Four days later, Kállay called on Ristić, who launched into a bitter tirade against Orešković. Kállay did not neglect this opportunity to encourage these signs of rancor between the government and their Croat adviser:

I mentioned that in Hungary we were very well aware of the aspirations of the Croatian so-called national party, [which are] directed at nothing less than the takeover of Bosnia and the foundation of a Greater Croatia, to which Serbia would have to be annexed later.21

This exchange gave rise to further nocturnal musings by Kállay, which provide one of the clearest possible illustrations of the principle of “divide and rule”:

It really would be a beautiful result if I could alienate the Croats and Serbs from one another. . . . It is my old idea that these two nations can’t be friends; both are striving for hegemony, especially with regard to Bosnia. The Bosnian question, consequently, is an apple of discord which, thrown in between them skilfully and at the right time, can naturally alienate them from one another.22

The Bosnian question, then, was not just a device for winning Serbia over to the Habsburg Monarchy; it was envisaged as playing a key role in managing the nationalities within the Monarchy itself.

Kállay developed this theme in a letter to Andrássy in mid-December. At a time when the Hungarian parliament had just passed the Nationalities Law, he
argued, it was more essential than ever to maintain the present Serbian regime’s indifference to nationality questions to the north. Blaznavac, Kállay reported, had reiterated that the Regents “don’t care even if the nationalities in Hungary are oppressed forever, Serbia’s mission is in the Balkan Peninsula and not north of the Danube.” This had an obvious application to the situation in Croatia and southern Hungary. By supporting Serbia’s aspirations in the Balkans and ensuring the goodwill of Belgrade, “not only would the nations be completely preoccupied with their own affairs, but our nationalities too, seeing that nothing was to be expected henceforward, would finally settle down.” Serbia, which Kállay considered “the focal point of the Eastern Question,” would be won over completely if the Monarchy could guarantee it possession of Bosnia, while the very fact that Serbia had Bosnia would suffice to enrage the Croats and divide them permanently from the Serbs.

Andrássy appears implicitly to have approved this scenario when, in his reply of 27 December, he endorsed the “soundness” of Kállay’s views. In the meantime, Kállay was also encouraging Croatian ambitions in another direction. Orešković, whom he saw on 20 December, declared that “the Croats can be completely satisfied if they really get Dalmatia and the [Military] Border.” In the following months Kállay went out of his way to support this solution. What he seems to have envisaged was a species of enforced trade-off: Serbia, whether the Croats liked it or not, would be awarded Bosnia, or at least the lion’s share of it; the Croats would regain control of the Military Border and Dalmatia. The Bosnian issue would ensure, when all the territories in question had been parcelled out, that neither side would ever be able to cooperate with the other against the center.

The Hungarian aim was plainly to keep Serbia and Civil Croatia divided. In the Military Border, by contrast, the objective was more negative: simply to exclude Serbian influence and encourage the Regency’s professed indifference to what happened there.

The whole question of the Border’s dissolution was acute by the beginning of 1869. Andrássy was determined to abolish this institution which, in the past, had served the absolutist Monarchy against Hungary and which, even after the Ausgleich, was considered to be, in Wertheimer’s words, “a constant threat to Hungary, which saw in the Border an unshakeable pillar of the reactionary circle ranged against it in Vienna.” In addition to being what Kállay was apt to refer to as “the den of reaction,” the Border also appeared to Hungary’s leaders as a seed-bed of South Slav nationalism. From the Hungarian point of view this was all the more dangerous because the traditional hostility of Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs was not maintained in the Grenzer regiments, whose shared role engendered “a good deal of common feeling.” Here was a Slav population, trained to bear arms, where the policy of divide and rule faced unusual solidarity, and which constitutionally remained the exclusive domain of the Emperor and
the military. It is hardly surprising that the continued existence of the Border worried the Hungarian government.

On the other hand, it is possible to see how exaggerated these fears were when one considers the extent to which the Border was regarded as a liability even in Vienna. The wars of 1859 and 1866 had demonstrated the waning military effectiveness of the *Grenzer* troops and, what was more important, their unreliability. In an age of nationalism the *Grenzer* were no more immune than any other of the Monarchy’s ethnic groups, and the Austrian government was well aware that the Border figured largely in past plans by the Serbian government for a rising in Bosnia; indeed, the staunchest advocate of such plans was the ex-*Grenzer* officer, Orešković. This not only gave rise, in the general staff, to counter-plans for a preventive occupation of Bosnia, but also made the imperial government all the more ready to compromise with the Hungarian leadership.32

There is no convincing evidence that the Austrian military consciously entertained the designs attributed to them, by Hungarians like Andrásy and Kállay, with regard to the Military Border. Apart from anything else, the determination of the Emperor himself to adhere to the deal struck with the Hungarians in 1867 would have made using the Border as a springboard for reaction almost unthinkable; and where the Emperor did not lead, his generals were unlikely to initiate their own action.33 The chief argument against dissolving the Border, for the generals as for Francis Joseph, was the fact that it constituted a preserve of military power, free from civilian control, and thus desirable in itself.34

The debate on the future of the Border swayed back and forth in the first half of 1869, but the Hungarian viewpoint finally prevailed in the common ministerial councils of 26 May and 1 July. For the Emperor the decisive point was when Andrásy convinced him of the reality of the South Slav nationalist threat. Feeling in the *Grenzer* regiments against the Hungarian government was by now running high, and found expression in a spate of violently anti-Hungarian pamphlets; the fact that the Croatian National Party sided with the *Grenzer* against Pest only served to reinforce the impression of a Border succumbing to the virus of nationalism. On 13 August 1869 Francis Joseph approved a gradual dissolution of the Border.35

It is difficult to distinguish fact from fiction in some of the Hungarian arguments deployed against the Border’s continued existence. Kállay, in particular, seems to have been ready to believe almost anything about the doings of the “Vienna military reaction”; yet the sources for some of his alarms suggest that he was better at scaring himself than others on this subject. It was Blaznavac, for instance, who told him in August 1868 of a communication received from a *Grenzer* officer, to the effect that “the Border can still be used by the Austrian reaction as an instrument against Hungary, but Serbia can exercise a great influence on it.”36 Kállay warned that “neither Vienna nor Buda can rely on the Border, only Serbia,” and that “the military party, despite the unfavorable situation, fan the
flames with hints of an annexation of Bosnia.” To Beust Kállay painted the situation in the Border “in very dark colors.” To Andrásy he reported “revolutionary agitation,” and on the basis of reports from contacts in Hungary concluded that “there is a disposition against us so hostile that at the given signal the scenes of 1848 could be repeated any time.”

In reality the Hungarians held all the best cards in this tug-of-war with the military. They could make any number of allegations against the generals’ loyalty to the Dualist settlement, lend credence to every rumor branding the military as incompetent dabblers in politics, and cap all this with the undoubted fact that the Border was clearly past its heyday as a military asset. The military, by contrast, could appeal only to the Emperor’s sense of tradition and the agreeable freedom from civilian control which the Border offered. The growing Croat and Serb agitation against the government in the Border thus had three results. It played the decisive role in convincing Francis Joseph of the justice of the Hungarian case against the Border. It convinced Kállay, if not Andrásy, of the existence of an alliance between the Croats and the military. Finally, it confirmed Andrásy and his government in their view that no compromise was possible with either nationalist movement, and created the climate of opinion in which Kállay could seriously contemplate assassination as a means of resolving political difficulties.

Kállay was glad to encourage Croats like Orešković to think that Dalmatia and the bulk of the Border would eventually be reincorporated into Croatia. In the case of the Serbs in the Border it was Kállay’s object to demonstrate the inevitability of their reincorporation into either Civil Croatia or Hungary itself. This, however, was a goal which clearly clashed with the demand, newly formulated by Miletić in January 1869, for a Serbian autonomous region within Hungary.

Kállay’s immediate preoccupation was to steer the Serbian government clear of this domestic Austro-Hungarian controversy. As a conversation with the British consul in the spring of 1869 reveals, he encouraged the equivocal attitude of the Serbian government toward the Grenzer: “The truth is the Government here [i.e., in Pest] looks upon the whole Grenzer system with ill-disguised fear and suspicion.” Grenzer officers like Orešković were better trained and educated than the average Serbian officer; but as former servants of the Habsburgs no Serbian government could ever completely trust them.

These are weaknesses and peculiarities of character, which Mr. Kallay has studied, and knows very well to turn to the best account, if by working on a common sense of danger, he could evoke a common feeling of antagonism to the Grenzers, he would undoubtedly render a good service to the Hungarian, whatever he might to the Austrian Government.

The irony was that, while seeking to arouse this antagonism, Kállay was also busily promoting the Bosnian scheme, which was bound to increase the Serbian
government’s reliance on the training and administrative experience which the *Grenzer* alone could offer.

Kállay and, through him, Andrásy certainly knew about the various secret but ultimately abortive contacts between Vienna and the Croats in the course of 1869.\(^{42}\) The conclusions that they drew from the evidence available, however, were unduly alarmist. Kállay read the worst into Orešković’s meetings with General Wagner, military governor of Dalmatia.\(^{43}\) “Since these plans are not being conceived in either the foreign ministry or the Hungarian ministry,” he wrote Andrásy on 28 July, “their seat cannot be other than the . . . military party.”\(^{44}\) The mere fact of meetings between Strossmayer’s confidant, Matija Mrazović, and someone like Wagner, in mid-summer 1869, indicated to Kállay that something is being matured behind the scenes, which is directed principally against Hungary. . . . The plans recently prepared for the reform of the Border appear to prove this. They give a degree of autonomy to the Border communities which they could scarcely enjoy once they were joined to Hungary.\(^{45}\)

At the very time when the Delegations were debating the Border question, Kállay suggested, “it is perhaps being relied upon that the population of the Border will not see any advantages in union with Hungary and Croatia and will thus resist it.”\(^{46}\)

Here was the nub of Hungarian concern about the Border: the situation, at least in Kállay’s opinion, could conceivably lead to armed revolt. He repeated his warning about an alliance between the Croats and the military early in September, by which time the activities of Miletić, on behalf of the Serbian *Grenzer*, were also troubling him.\(^{47}\) His general foreboding was only deepened when, in Pest a few days later, he discussed the Border and the general situation with Andrásy. The latter especially voiced the certainty that Russia will fall upon us as soon as she completes her railways. The important thing, in the struggle, is that our back, as well as that of the Turks, should be protected against the South Slavs. Because of this we must win the Serbs over completely.\(^{48}\)

The Bosnian question was the specific reference for this policy, but it would be equally essential, if war really were imminent, to head off any unrest in the Border.

The Dalmatian revolt, which broke out in the Cattaro region in mid-September 1869, set these Hungarian alarm bells ringing all the more urgently. Originating as a purely local dispute over the application of the Austrian military service law of December 1868, the revolt proved difficult to suppress and dragged on until January 1870.\(^{49}\) Apart from being an embarrassing revelation of the Monarchy’s weakness, it quickly became a focus for South Slav nationalist discontents, and consequently a natural source of apprehension in both Vienna and Pest. The fear was, first, that the insurgents might attract the armed support of Montenegro,
which adjoined Dalmatia, and the material and financial support of Slavs everywhere else, including Serbia. Second, and this was a particularly Hungarian preoccupation, it was thought the Dalmatian example might prompt a similar explosion in the Border.

Ironically, one effect of the Dalmatian revolt was to scupper once and for all any real likelihood of cooperation between Croat nationalists and the Austrian military along the lines feared by Kállay. General Wagner, in particular, whose ineffective efforts to repress the uprising led to his replacement as governor of Dalmatia in December, became the object of universal obloquy among the Slavs inside and outside the Monarchy. Conversely, the reaction of government circles to the revolt, especially the military authorities, was immediately to suspect the Croatian National Party of being its instigator.

Kállay, however, remained convinced of the existence of a Croat-military combination. His apprehensions were increased late in September when his deputy Theodorovics reported, after a visit to Pančevo across the river, that “in the people a great fear of the Hungarians prevails and a great irritation, and it would only need instigators for a rebellion like 1848 to break out.” Articles in the military-inspired Border paper Zukunft, in Kállay’s opinion, constituted a call to the Border to rise up in arms, which “again shows that the military reaction and Croatian national party are in agreement.” Reporting to Beust in November, on the sympathy for the Cattaro insurgents in the Border, Kállay pointed out that the longer the revolt dragged on, the livelier the interest with which the Serbs followed it, and the higher their hopes that something might happen to make Serbia’s own aspirations realizable. It was yet another opportunity for Kállay to reiterate his thesis that Serbia was the linchpin of peace in the Balkans, and that “If Serbia moves, however, then all of a sudden the whole Eastern Question comes to the forefront.”

In fact the behavior of the Serbian government was something from which Kállay could derive some comfort. On the Border, both Blaznavac and Ristić stressed their disinterest in the fate of the Grenzer, to the point even of informing Kállay of the movements of nationalists there and warning against the machinations of the military. The fact that Miletić was a supporter of the Serbian Grenzers’ claim to an autonomous territory disinclined the Regents from sympathizing with the Grenzer cause.

On Dalmatia, an even more inflammatory issue in that actual fighting between the Austro-Hungarian army and Slavs was involved, the determination of the Serbian government not to get involved was all the more remarkable. The fact that the revolt lasted as long as it did, and that in the end the imperial government was forced to accept a humiliating failure and suspend the application of the military service law in the Cattaro region, was a source of tremendous excitation in the South Slav world and was seen as a great moral triumph.
the Regents, despite face-saving allegations by the Austrian authorities that the insurgents were inspired from Belgrade as well as Cetinje, had no hand in this and could take none of the credit. Why?

The principal explanation must be Kállay’s success in convincing them that, as he put it to Blaznavac on 4 November, the revolt itself “was in reality called forth by the Vienna military reaction.” Kállay appears to have believed this himself. The imputation was that Dalmatia was a pretext for intervening in force in Bosnia, an interpretation reinforced by what Kállay knew by now of military plans for an occupation, and by the suspected links with the Croats. Dalmatia thus highlighted the differences between Vienna and Pest over the Monarchy’s goals in the Balkans. Whereas Hungary still opposed an Austro-Hungarian presence in Bosnia, and indeed sought to help Serbia to the administration of the province, Austria was at least toying with the idea, perhaps as a means of redressing the balance of nationalities struck by the Ausgleich to Hungary’s disadvantage. Hungary could thus be presented as the only force preventing the Monarchy’s annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Not only did Blaznavac respond to this reasoning, with “a categorical assurance in favor of Hungary, and against Austria,” but a couple of weeks later he told Kállay he would be glad if the Dalmatian rising were crushed, so that Russian influence in the region would be checked. Kállay, reporting officially to Beust, naturally did not mention the first of these sentiments. Beust, as might have been expected, replied expressing the Austro-Hungarian government’s warm appreciation of the Serbian stance.

Kállay’s success in immobilizing the Regents was recognized by his fellow diplomats. The British consul got the clear impression that Blaznavac accepted there was a link between Cattaro and the Austrian military, a belief due to Kállay’s activity: “Able, astute and versatile, Mr. Kallay has perfectly succeeded in persuading the Servians, that their best, if not only allies are the Hungarians.” The Prussian consul reached identical conclusions: “Hungarian policy . . . does not want to let any powerfully organized Serbia arise as crystallization point for a future Yugoslav empire.” Yet Kállay, Rosen added, constantly praised things Serbian and flattered the national sense of importance, by encouraging the Serbs to think their territorial aspirations “justified, indeed attainable.”

Thus Mr. Kállay has undoubtedly succeeded, on the one hand in isolating the Principality of Serbia within the general Slavic movement, and on the other hand in cutting off the ties between the Serbs of the Vojvodina, the most difficult faction among the Hungarian Slavs, the mainspring of their agitation, and their independent brethren south of the river.

The extent of the Regents’ psychological dependence on the Hungarian link can be judged by Blaznavac’ admission to Rosen, in January 1870, that it had been a
mistake to fight Hungary in 1848–49, and that “Hungary’s friendship is one of our principal necessities.”

There was, however, a growing divergence of views between Kállay and Andrássy as to the proper handling of the South Slav question. Andrássy, while yielding to no one in his determination to triumph over nationalist subversion in Hungary, evidently did not share Kállay’s sense of impending crisis. Though aware of the danger of a rising in the Border (which in fact happened in October 1871), he was probably more confident of his ability to suppress it than Kállay. Then again, Andrássy was already showing signs of impatience with the Serbian policy, which he had been trying to implement before Kállay had even gone to Belgrade. The result was an increasing disinclination to take Kállay’s advice, particularly when this bore on Hungarian domestic affairs with which, in any case, Kállay had nothing to do officially.

This became painfully apparent in the spring of 1870, when Kállay, in response to an initiative from the ever-active Orešković, took up the idea of a propaganda campaign in the Border in favor of a rapid dissolution. Kállay was perfectly aware, by this stage, that Orešković was playing a tortuous double game between Vienna and Pest, and had conducted talks with both Wagner and Beust. The upshot of this, according to the report which Orešković filed with the Regents on his return, was that Beust had proposed a formal agreement between Vienna and Serbia which endorsed Serbia’s “legitimate aspirations,” bound the Monarchy to stay out of Ottoman domestic affairs, and would be kept secret from the Hungarians. No record of these talks survives in the Vienna archives, and it is probable, given what we know of Beust’s views, that the talks were a diversionary tactic on his part. Kállay, moreover, got the gist of Orešković’s report courtesy of Blaznavac, so he knew what Orešković had been up to; yet he clearly was so convinced of the need to win hearts and minds in the Military Border that he preferred adopting Orešković’s propaganda plan to doing nothing.

Orešković’s conditions, for persuading his fellow Grenzers that dissolution was inevitable, included a number of points which Kállay knew would be unacceptable to Andrássy, such as Strossmayer’s appointment as archbishop of Zagreb, and the removal of the unpopular Baron Levin Rauch as Ban of Croatia. Kállay, however, was destined to receive a rude shock when he eventually talked the matter over with Andrássy in Pest on 9 May. To Orešković’s demands regarding Strossmayer and Rauch, Andrássy gave short shrift:

He would never consent to Strossmayer being appointed Archbishop of Zagreb, because he is an unreliable person, very deeply sunk in the South Slav agitation which the Russians support. . . . In the same way he can’t promise Rauch’s removal, as he had been such an exponent of the union [of Croatia with Hungary]. . . . And as far as financial assistance is concerned, he will be glad to give it to Orešković’s people, if they want to agitate in a unionist spirit. However, if he should act in a
contrary sense, then he [Andrássy] will oppose him energetically and if necessary he will order the agitators to be imprisoned, and even hanged. . . . 72

To reinforce this uncompromising stance, Andrássy mentioned that a general was now being sent to take command in the Border who would act “in a completely Hungarian spirit.” 73

Kállay accordingly made no attempt to talk Andrássy over, “since our views have completely diverged.” 74 In Belgrade, he did what he could to soften the harsh tone of Andrássy’s answer to Orešković, although he could do little to alter the substance. Orešković, however, showed himself the eternal optimist. The Croatian National Party, despite their recent feelers toward Vienna, and even Moscow, still regarded “reconciliation with Hungary as a matter of life and death.” 75 Orešković was thus still prepared to sound the mood in the Military Border. Kállay felt obliged to stress that any agitation should be conducted along the lines laid down by Andrássy, and on this basis the two tentatively worked out a program for joint action. Orešković was eventually to get the promise of “some privileges” for the Border, and an offer of 10,000 forints toward the cost of the agitation, when he met Andrássy again in July, although Andrássy made no concessions on the substantive issues. 76

In the meantime, Kállay had sustained yet another blow to his hopes of influencing events from Belgrade. By late June 1870 he had become seriously alarmed at developments among the Monarchy’s South Slavs. The situation in the Border, the wrangling between Croat nationalists and Rauch in Zagreb, and the increasing opposition to the Hungarian government among the Vojvodina Serbs all contributed to Kállay’s sense of unease. Some of this nationalist ferment had communicated itself to what passed for public opinion in Serbia, and was causing the Serbian government concern. 77 Kállay thus traveled to Pest on 28 June anxious to impress on Andrássy the full gravity of what he saw as a crisis in Hungarian domestic affairs, as well as a hazard to good relations with Serbia.

His interview with Andrássy confirmed his worst fears. Kállay set forth his belief that “the Újvidék [Novi Sad] agitation is reaching huge proportions,” and that “behind all this agitation is lurking the Archduke Albrecht”; but Andrássy was unconvinced. 78 The minister president felt sure that Albrecht had reconciled himself to the Ausgleich and was not involved in any agitation; it was far more likely, he suggested, that some individual general officer was acting on his own. To this not unreasonable interpretation, Kállay could only reflect bitterly “I fear that these fine illusions of Andrássy’s are soon going to be dispelled very unpleasantly.” 79 Andrássy clearly thought that matters in the Border and Croatia were now better, with the popular mood already swinging around in favor of incorporation.

Kállay gave up. “Seeing that Andrássy is again seeing everything through rose-tinted spectacles,” 80 he decamped for Belgrade the next day, but not before
his long conversation with Andrássy on Serbian affairs in general had convinced him that

in our way of thinking . . . we differ from one another so much, especially as regards the relations of Hungary with the South Slavs, that it’s not worth my wasting any more words on it at all . . . I shall . . . in my reports confine myself exclusively to the affairs of the Principality.81

It is hard not to conclude that Kállay was led astray by having only a worm’s eye view of the nationalities problems in Hungary, Croatia, and the Military Border. Based as he was at Belgrade, he simply did not have all the facts at his fingertips. Andrássy, too, thought the military dangerous, especially because of their power-base in the Border; but being at the hub of things he tended to have a more just appreciation of the extent of the threat, if any.

Judged in the short term, Andrássy was right to take a more relaxed view. The Military Border by 1870 was an institution on the way out. With regard to the nationalist movements in Croatia and the Vojvodina, Andrássy had even less intention of compromising in his defense of historic Hungary. He saw no need to make concessions to Strossmayer’s party on the issue of greater autonomy for Croatia; and he was ready to resort to judicial repression as a weapon against the obstreperous Miletić. Andrássy, in fact, was demonstrating the fundamental paradox of Hungarian liberal nationalism in the nineteenth century: as its hold on power was consolidated, so it increasingly paid only lip service to its liberalism, whenever the nationalism of others reared its head. There seemed very little room here for Kállay’s youthful vision of a federalist southeastern Europe.

In the long term, Andrássy’s approach to the problems that beset the Kingdom of Hungary on its southern border seems unimaginative and ultimately disastrous. It was precisely this refusal of leaders like him to budge on the nationalities issue which sowed dragon’s teeth for the future, and helped make non-Magyar nationalists even less ready to compromise than they were already.

Kállay’s vision of things was not necessarily more accurate. He could accommodate the idea of territorial enlargement for Croatia as well as Serbia; he was possibly in favor of a greater measure of Croatian autonomy;82 he could envisage, however vaguely, a federalist solution. The prerequisite for these solutions, however, was always that Hungary should have the deciding voice, that it should exert the ultimate control. And in the way he went about trying to shape events in the South Slav world, Kállay, like Andrássy, was manipulative and divisive. It never seems to have occurred to him that, although his opponents were no less devious, such methods were hardly a recommendation for Hungarian hegemony in a reshaped southeastern Europe. On occasion, this tactical myopia could blind Kállay to the most basic ethical considerations, and lead him into actions quite startling in their ruthlessness.
As a coda to Kállay’s involvement in the politics of the Monarchy’s South Slavs, therefore, it remains to record his part in the plot to assassinate Svetozar Miletic in 1869–70. That Kállay should have regarded this as necessary at all seems bizarre; but his candid references to it in his diary convey the impression that eliminating a major political figure in this way was the most logical thing imaginable.

Miletic, though deposed as mayor of Novi Sad, continued to sit in the Hungarian parliament as the town’s representative, and his interpellations of Andrássy’s government were a source of chronic annoyance. His National Party demanded the establishment of an autonomous Serbian territory, carved out of the Hungarian part of the Military Border and the Banat, a solution viewed with anathema by Hungarian politicians. He was also a supporter of the Serbian Omladina. Miletich was thus a thorn in the side of the Hungarian government, and feared by the Serbian Regents, who were vulnerable to his charge that they had sold out Serbian national interests to the Hungarians.

Kállay had been aware since his arrival in Belgrade that Blaznavac, in particular, thought Miletich should be “strung up.” In the summer of 1869 he received renewed evidence that Blaznavac thought no differently: “About Miletich and his friends he declared that they [the Serbian government] couldn’t, admittedly, hang them, but if we Hungarians hang them not one voice would be raised against it in Serbia.” Kállay was in any event disposed to take this seriously. He knew as well as the Regents that the upcoming Omladina congress would be yet another occasion for attacks on the Serbian régime.

On 14 August Kállay was visited by Miloš Popović, his newspaper hack, who was “terribly depressed” over Miletich’s activities, and feared “some sort of outbreak soon.” Popović thought some sort of action necessary, “especially at the Omladina congress . . . some sort of scandal has to be cooked up.” Popović already had a suitable agent for such an operation in the shape of Stevo Mirković, a Belgrade innkeeper; and in the event the Serbian government acted on its own, sending four agents to spy on the Omladina proceedings.

The next step appears to have involved the Hungarian government itself, or at least junior officials of it. On 13 September Kállay received a visit from Gyula-Károly Mayerffy, the Hungarian interior ministry’s agent in Novi Sad. Mayerffy turned out to be in contact with Mirković, who was definitely on Blaznavac’s payroll. Mayerffy believed Mirković would be “the best individual to use for Miletich’s murder, especially if Milivoj [Blaznavac] entrusted him with it, so he asked my help in the matter.” Kállay accordingly sounded Blaznavac the next day, and learned that “Even now he expresses himself about them [Miletich and the Omladina] just as he has up to now.”

Nothing seems to have come of this first initiative, however, nor does Kállay appear to have mentioned it to Andrássy on paper. The matter rested there until the following summer. Kállay, on a visit to Novi Sad in June 1870, was warned
by Mayerffy and another Hungarian official, Kormos, about the level of nationalist agitation there. 92 Three days later, Mayerffy appeared in Belgrade, informing Kállay that he had come to discuss Miletić with Mirković, “whom Milivoj sent to Kikinda last year to kill Miletic.” 93 The next day, the 20th, Mayerffy was able to announce that Mirković

gave his word that if he can get the necessary money Miletić won’t exist any more after 5 weeks, since he has 3 safe people through whom he can have him done away with. He will need 300 ducats. . . . Mayerffy promised him he would get it. . . . I handed over 50 ducats to him at once. 94

Apart from the fee, all Mirković wanted, for what he seemed to regard as an act of patriotism, was a commission in the Hungarian home guard for his son, “which Mayerffy (at my suggestion) promised him.” 95

Kállay, by now, had been called to Pest for talks with Andrássy, but preparations for the murder went ahead as planned. A disagreeable surprise, however, awaited Kállay. The interview on 28 June was where Kállay received such unequivocal evidence of what he saw as Andrássy’s fatal complacency on the South Slav question. More important, Andrássy, though the subject was not discussed, did not give the impression of a man who would welcome the assassination of even the obnoxious Miletić for the mere political éclat of the thing. Kállay therefore, on his return to Belgrade, sent for Mayerffy with the reflection that, since “in Buda they once again see everything rosily, I think that Miletić’s destruction would not yield the expected result, so I want to discontinue this business.” 96 Mirković and his cronies were accordingly called off, and no more was undertaken in this direction. 97

One could say that Kállay’s approach to the Miletić problem betrayed the crudity of youth; there were in fact more sophisticated ways of dealing with nationalist politicians. In October 1870 the Andrássy government managed to get Miletić condemned to a year in prison for alleged violation of the Hungarian press law. It was to prove a favorite stratagem thereafter against Miletić, whose health and reason were eventually broken by prolonged incarceration, most of it before any trial, in the late 1870s. 98 The story of the Miletić assassination plot, however, has remained firmly bound in Kállay’s diary ever since. Although many harsh things had been said of Kállay by the time he left Belgrade in 1875, this was one tidbit that escaped public knowledge. It seems doubtful that John Stuart Mill would have approved.

Notes


2 Kállay Diary, 6 Sept. 1868 (Dnevnik, 86).


4 Jelavich, “The Croatian Problem,” 100. As Law XXX (1868) in Hungary and Law I in Hungary the Nagodba received royal assent on 17 November (Magyarország története 1848–1890, 2:1515).

5 Kolossa, “A Dualizmus rendszerének kialakulása,” 801, quoting the text.

6 Ibid; see also Kállay to Andrássy, 7 Sept. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/136–39.

7 Ibid., f. 136.

8 Kállay Diary, 6 Sept. 1868 (Dnevnik, 86).

9 Kállay to Andrássy, 7 Sept. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/137.

10 Ibid., f. 138.

11 Kállay Diary, 19, 22–23 and 30–31 Oct. 1868 (Dnevnik, 103–5, 106–7); Kállay to Andrássy, 30 Oct. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/149; Kállay to Andrássy, 4 Nov. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/151.


13 Kállay Diary, 1 Nov. 1868 (Dnevnik, 108).

14 Kállay to Andrássy, 4 Nov. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/152. Cf. Kállay Diary, 2 and 3 Nov. 1868 (Dnevnik, 109, 110).

15 Ibid., 2 Nov. 1868 (Dnevnik, 109).

16 “The Serbian Regency and the Bulgarian Uprising,” Correspondenz, 10 Oct. 1868; and “The National Question in Hungary,” ibid., 6 Nov. 1868; both articles summarized by Radenić in Dnevnik, 685, note 122.

17 Ristić to Bogićević, 30 Oct./11 Nov. 1868, in Vučković, no. 201, 391.


19 Kállay Diary, 15 Nov. 1868 (Dnevnik, 114); J.A. von Reiswitz, Belgrad-Berlin, Berlin-Belgrad 1866–1871 (Munich & Berlin: Oldenbourg, 1936), 64, note 47.

20 Kállay Diary, 15 Nov. 1868 (Dnevnik, 114–15).

21 Ibid., 19 Nov. 1868 (Dnevnik, 116).

22 Ibid.

23 Kállay to Andrássy, 12 Dec. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/156–57.

24 Ibid., f. 157.
25  Ibid.
27  Kállay Diary, 20 Dec. 1868 (Dnevnik, 131).
28  Ibid., 22 Apr. 1869 (Dnevnik, 173).
30  Kállay to Andrássy, 7 Sept. 1868, OSZK, FH 1733/139.
34  Rothenberg, The Military Border in Croatia, 168–70.
36  Kállay Diary, 14 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 75).
37  Ibid., 23 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 80).
38  Ibid., 25 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 81).
39  Kállay to Andrássy, 7 Sept. 1868, in Petrović, vol. 1, no. 245, 556; Kállay Diary, 11 Nov. 1868 (Dnevnik, 113).
41  Longworth to Clarendon, 1 Apr. 1869, PRO, FO 78/2088.
42  Vojislav J. Vučković, “Ristić, Strossmayer i Wagnerova afera (1870),” Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo, no. 1 (1955): 24–48; Krestić, “Vojna granica u nacionalno-oslobodilačkim planovima Srba i Hrvata,” 256–57; Memorandum by General Wagner, 14 May 1869, HHSA, PA XL (Interna)/14; Wagner to Beust, 8 Aug. 1869, HHSA, PA XL/129; “Programme politique rédigé par le Général Wagner pour être executé en Bosnie, Herzégovine, etc., adressé par lui à Monsieur Mrazovitz Chef du Parti Yugo Slave en Croatie en automne 1869,” enclosed in Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 10 May 1870, HHSA, PA XII/97; Kállay Diary, 5 June & 27 July 1869 (Dnevnik, 187, 204); Kállay to Andrásy, 28 July 1869, OSZK, FH 1733/183–84.
43  Kállay Diary, 27 July 1869 (Dnevnik, 204).
44 Kállay to Andrásy, 28 July 1869, OSZK, FH 1733/183–84.
46 Kállay to Andrásy, 28 July 1869, OSZK, FH 1733/184. See Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrásy, 1:395–97; Kállay Diary, 15 Aug. 1869 (Dnevnik, 209).
47 Kállay to Andrásy, 2 Sept. 1869, OSZK, FH 1733/235; Kállay Diary, 2 Sept. 1869 (Dnevnik, 214).
48 Ibid., 7 Sept. 1869 (Dnevnik, 216).
50 Ibid., 28.
51 Vončina to Orešković, 10/22 Nov. 1869, in Vučković, no. 213, 407.
52 Kállay Diary, 21 Sept. 1869 (Dnevnik, 224).
53 Ibid., 21 Nov. 1869 (Dnevnik, 246); see also Radenić’s note 207, 717–18, which points out that Kállay exaggerated the implications of the Zukunft articles, which made no explicit call for an uprising, but rather defended the Grenzers’ right to self-determination. Cf. Rothenberg, The Military Border in Croatia, 171; Krestić, “Vojna granica u nacionalno-oslobodilačkim planovima Srba i Hrvata,” 258; Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrásy, 1:406.
54 Kállay to Beust, 30 Nov. 1869, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/183.
55 Kállay Diary, 14 Aug. 1868 (Dnevnik, 73); 30 July 1869 (Dnevnik, 206).
56 Reiswitz, Belgrad-Berlin, Berlin-Belgrad, 175–76.
57 Kállay Diary, 4 Nov. 1869 (Dnevnik, 241).
58 Reiswitz, Belgrad-Berlin, Berlin-Belgrad, 176. It is interesting how the Kállay diary, published forty years later, confirms Reiswitz’s analysis, which is in turn based on the reports of the Prussian consul, Rosen. On the military, see also Kos, Die Politik Österreich-Ungarns, 41–42, 49–51.
59 Kállay Diary, 4 Nov. 1869 (Dnevnik, 241).
60 Ibid., 16 Nov. 1869 (Dnevnik, 245).
61 Kállay to Beust, 5 Nov. 1869, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/183.
62 Beust to Kállay, 15 Nov. 1869, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/183.
63 Longworth to Clarendon, 29 Nov. 1869, PRO, FO 78/2088.
64 Rosen to Bismarck, 4 Dec. 1869, quoted in Reiswitz, Belgrad-Berlin, Berlin-Belgrad, 176–77.
65 Rosen to Bismarck, 17 Jan. 1870, quoted ibid., 178.
66 Kállay Diary, 20 May 1869 (Dnevnik, 181).
67 Ibid., 26 Mar. 1870 (Dnevnik, 285); and Kállay to Andrásy, 29 Mar. 1870, OSZK, FH 1733/185–87, both reporting that Orešković had been to Vienna early in March.
69 Orešković to Ristić, 9/21 Mar. 1870, in Vučković, no. 218, note 3 by Vučković, 422.
70 Kállay Diary, 26 Apr. 1869 (Dnevnik, 294).
72 Kállay Diary, 9 May 1870 (Dnevnik, 297).
73 Ibid.
Ibid.

Ibid., 16 May 1870 (Dnevnik, 300–1, 301).

Ibid., 13 and 22 June, 10 July 1870 (Dnevnik, 304, 308, 313).

Ibid., 28 June 1870 (Dnevnik, 309).

Ibid.

Ibid. (Dnevnik, 310).

Ibid.

Kállay Diary, 24 Oct. 1872 (Dnevnik, 502).


Kállay Diary, 7 May 1868 (Dnevnik, 16).

Ibid., 28 July 1869 (Dnevnik, 205).

Ibid., 14 Aug. 1869 (Dnevnik, 209).

Ibid., 2 Sept. 1869 (Dnevnik, 214).

Ibid., 13 Sept. 1869 (Dnevnik, 218).

Ibid. (Dnevnik, 219).

Ibid., 14 Sept. 1869 (Dnevnik, 220).

Ibid., 16 June 1870 (Dnevnik, 305).

Ibid., 19 June 1870 (Dnevnik, 305).

Ibid., 20 June 1870 (Dnevnik, 306).

Ibid.

Ibid., 2 July 1870 (Dnevnik, 311–12).

Ibid., 10 July 1870 (Dnevnik, 313).

Chapter 7

Effect of the Franco-Prussian War

The Franco-Prussian War had several immediate results affecting Austro-Hungarian policy toward Serbia. Beyond this, however, the conflict in the West had a profound effect on the balance of power in the East. With the collapse of Napoleon III’s regime in September, the Habsburg Monarchy lost its only potential ally against not only Prussia, but Russia as well. This in turn facilitated the re-emergence of Russia as a serious rival in the Balkans, when the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris were renounced at the end of October 1870. Within a few months, the Monarchy found itself once again isolated and, in the eyes of its statesmen, exposed to extreme risk of attack. There was little the Monarchy could do to alter these twin calamities; and an international conference on the Black Sea issue, at the beginning of 1871, merely set the seal on this demonstration of Austro-Hungarian weakness. In the short term, the Monarchy’s Serbian policy was shaped more than ever by security considerations.

On 18 July 1870, the day before France declared war on Prussia, the Emperor Francis Joseph held a crown council in Vienna, with Beust and Andrássy present. The purpose was to agree on a policy for the Monarchy during the European crisis.

As far as the War was concerned, it is clear that, on the essential issue of whether the Monarchy should get involved, Beust and Andrássy were not at odds. Where they differed was over how neutrality should be announced, and whether the Monarchy should mobilize. Even on the question of how to deal with a possible Russian intervention, the chancellor and the Hungarian minister president showed a rare unanimity. Each appeared ready to contemplate the inevitability of war with Russia in certain circumstances and, in such an event, accepted the need for counter-measures in the Balkans.
It was in their reasons for accepting the idea of a war in the East, predictably, that Beust and Andrássy really differed. Andrássy saw it as an end in itself, an essential defensive measure to remove a standing threat to the Monarchy’s, and Hungary’s, security. Beust, by contrast, had his sights fixed firmly in both directions: the Monarchy had the chance both to reorder Germany more to its liking, and at the same time to solve the Eastern Question.\(^3\)

The key to understanding the decisions taken at this crucial council is that the Monarchy was effectively paralyzed, and could, by the very nature of its position between East and West, take only temporizing measures to meet the crisis. At the same time, however, all the participants in the council, without exception, were hoping for a French victory, which would then open up the prospect of exploiting the situation in the Monarchy’s own interests.\(^4\)

There were three factors which tied the Monarchy’s hands. One was the popularity of the war against France in the German-speaking world. Another was the Monarchy’s poor state of military preparedness. By far the most important consideration, however, was the threat from Russia: Russian intervention in the event of a Prussian defeat, or any hostile move by Austria-Hungary, could be taken as given.\(^5\) The practical results of the council of 18 July, then, were dictated by this danger. It was resolved to adopt a “wait and see” neutrality; to announce

---

Map 5. Europe at the Conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War, 1871

It was in their reasons for accepting the idea of a war in the East, predictably, that Beust and Andrássy really differed. Andrássy saw it as an end in itself, an essential defensive measure to remove a standing threat to the Monarchy’s, and Hungary’s, security. Beust, by contrast, had his sights fixed firmly in both directions: the Monarchy had the chance both to reorder Germany more to its liking, and at the same time to solve the Eastern Question.\(^3\)

The key to understanding the decisions taken at this crucial council is that the Monarchy was effectively paralyzed, and could, by the very nature of its position between East and West, take only temporizing measures to meet the crisis. At the same time, however, all the participants in the council, without exception, were hoping for a French victory, which would then open up the prospect of exploiting the situation in the Monarchy’s own interests.\(^4\)

There were three factors which tied the Monarchy’s hands. One was the popularity of the war against France in the German-speaking world. Another was the Monarchy’s poor state of military preparedness. By far the most important consideration, however, was the threat from Russia: Russian intervention in the event of a Prussian defeat, or any hostile move by Austria-Hungary, could be taken as given.\(^5\) The practical results of the council of 18 July, then, were dictated by this danger. It was resolved to adopt a “wait and see” neutrality; to announce

---

Map 5. Europe at the Conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War, 1871

It was in their reasons for accepting the idea of a war in the East, predictably, that Beust and Andrássy really differed. Andrássy saw it as an end in itself, an essential defensive measure to remove a standing threat to the Monarchy’s, and Hungary’s, security. Beust, by contrast, had his sights fixed firmly in both directions: the Monarchy had the chance both to reorder Germany more to its liking, and at the same time to solve the Eastern Question.\(^3\)

The key to understanding the decisions taken at this crucial council is that the Monarchy was effectively paralyzed, and could, by the very nature of its position between East and West, take only temporizing measures to meet the crisis. At the same time, however, all the participants in the council, without exception, were hoping for a French victory, which would then open up the prospect of exploiting the situation in the Monarchy’s own interests.\(^4\)

There were three factors which tied the Monarchy’s hands. One was the popularity of the war against France in the German-speaking world. Another was the Monarchy’s poor state of military preparedness. By far the most important consideration, however, was the threat from Russia: Russian intervention in the event of a Prussian defeat, or any hostile move by Austria-Hungary, could be taken as given.\(^5\) The practical results of the council of 18 July, then, were dictated by this danger. It was resolved to adopt a “wait and see” neutrality; to announce

---

Map 5. Europe at the Conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War, 1871

It was in their reasons for accepting the idea of a war in the East, predictably, that Beust and Andrássy really differed. Andrássy saw it as an end in itself, an essential defensive measure to remove a standing threat to the Monarchy’s, and Hungary’s, security. Beust, by contrast, had his sights fixed firmly in both directions: the Monarchy had the chance both to reorder Germany more to its liking, and at the same time to solve the Eastern Question.\(^3\)

The key to understanding the decisions taken at this crucial council is that the Monarchy was effectively paralyzed, and could, by the very nature of its position between East and West, take only temporizing measures to meet the crisis. At the same time, however, all the participants in the council, without exception, were hoping for a French victory, which would then open up the prospect of exploiting the situation in the Monarchy’s own interests.\(^4\)

There were three factors which tied the Monarchy’s hands. One was the popularity of the war against France in the German-speaking world. Another was the Monarchy’s poor state of military preparedness. By far the most important consideration, however, was the threat from Russia: Russian intervention in the event of a Prussian defeat, or any hostile move by Austria-Hungary, could be taken as given.\(^5\) The practical results of the council of 18 July, then, were dictated by this danger. It was resolved to adopt a “wait and see” neutrality; to announce
the Monarchy’s neutrality; and to make military preparations. Nevertheless, the language employed by both Beust and Andrássy during the council made clear that, if events in the West unfolded differently, they were prepared to open up the whole Eastern Question by laying down a challenge to Russia.

Beust, normally so cautious on the subject of Russia, seemed positively to court hostilities in the East at this early stage. It was Russia’s attitude, he told the council, which made mobilization necessary, in order “to put ourselves on such a footing that developments do not find us unprepared, if they overtake us.” One passage outdid even Andrássy in its air of belligerence: neutrality would “not prevent us... from casting our eyes towards Russia, which becomes more dangerous from day to day, and here we could in case of a war count on the popularity of the war domestically.” Behind this, as with Andrássy, was the assumption that a French victory over Prussia, by dragging Russia into the hostilities, would thereby legitimize the Monarchy’s own involvement. Beust’s announcement that the Ottoman Empire had expressed an interest in joining forces with the Monarchy evidently fitted in with this scenario.

Andrássy’s vision of the Eastern Question was more predictable, and showed no sign of having changed since his discussions with Kállay in August 1868. While Andrássy was not averse to exploiting the conflict in the West to the Monarchy’s advantage, it was clear that for him the main point of remaining neutral, and of military preparation, was “only because of eventualities in the Near East.” There was, in his opinion, only one circumstance which justified, or rather demanded, a resort to arms: “Only if Russia intervenes, we have no choice.” The language of defensive reaction employed here was doubtless euphemistic for, as we have seen, Andrássy had fairly aggressive ideas on how to handle Russia.

With regard to the Balkans, Andrássy felt that a “wait and see” neutrality would give the Monarchy time to ascertain what sort of assistance the Ottoman Empire could provide “in case of a war with Russia.” It would help forestall what Andrássy appeared to regard as the imminent proclamation of a red republic in Romania. Most significantly, “we could use the time to neutralize Serbia, whose position in the war with Russia would be of great importance.”

None of the points raised by Beust and Andrássy, regarding the Balkans, was made the subject of any practical action by the council of 18 July. Nevertheless, they formed the basis of certain steps taken by the Ballhaus and the Hungarian government almost immediately after. Beust appears to have sounded the Ottomans with a view to concluding a defensive-offensive alliance in the event of war with Russia. Andrássy, via Kállay, again took up the Bosnian question with the Serbian government, this time with a clear strategic purpose in mind, clearly argued before a joint, Austro-Hungarian forum: this time the overriding aim was to prevent any untimely Serbian attack on the Ottomans while the war in the West lasted, and war in the East threatened.
In this sense, it might seem appropriate to conclude that the subsequent history of the Bosnian question, before it finally petered out again in mutual recriminations between Pest and Belgrade in late 1871, was the product of a genuine, Austro-Hungarian diplomatic initiative. The execution of Andrásy’s proposals, however, quickly became an essentially Hungarian sideshow once more. Beust, who certainly knew, and presumably accepted the need for, this new initiative, was left in the dark as to its results, and Kállay’s diary shows that subsequent efforts to keep the issue alive, extending well into 1871, were actually undertaken without the chancellor’s knowledge. Andrásy’s “foreign policy” was no more successful in this instance than it had been before; on the contrary, its principal effect was to create even more confusion and ill will in relations with Serbia than already existed.

The hasty moves concerted between Beust and Andrásy in the next three weeks, to cover the Monarchy’s Balkan flank, were undertaken with the clear possibility of war with Russia in mind. That even the normally cautious Beust could regard such a development with equanimity is a reflection of the general belief in a French victory. The evidence suggests that Beust wanted to be able to point to Russia’s threatening behavior as an excuse for the outbreak of hostilities. The Ballhaus maintained this tough stance right down to the end of the first week of August. On 1 August Beust made an unmistakable hint to the Ottoman government of the need for some form of military alliance. He also rejected the report from his ambassador in St. Petersburg that the Tsar was genuinely interested in an Austro-Russian entente, as a means of holding the ring.

Andrásy was even more forthright. Even while pouring cold water on the French ambassador’s hope that the Monarchy might come to France’s assistance, Andrásy nevertheless accepted that war might be “rendered national” by Russian involvement. Whatever the likelihood of the Monarchy’s other nationalities regarding the matter in this light, it was clear that Andrásy felt he could speak for Hungary. The Hungarian press reflected this, as in the statement by the Pester Correspondenz, on 20 July, that “Hungary has only one natural enemy and that is Russia. We will fight her, wherever we find her, and whomever she is with, and we will welcome with open arms whomever wishes to unite with us against Russia.”

To Kállay, the change from Andrásy’s relaxed attitude a month before must have been striking. In conversation with Andrásy on 29 July,

He [Andrásy] mentioned to me that he doesn’t want war, but it can hardly be avoided with Russia. . . . In this regard his plan is to conclude an offensive-defensive treaty of alliance with Turkey and as a reward for our defending it to demand from the Porte that it cede Bosnia to Serbia, since only in this way can both we and the Turks secure ourselves on that side, and only in this case can we deploy all our strength against Russia.
Andrássy added that he had gone so far as to write the Ottoman government, through its ambassador in Vienna, asking them to despatch someone “with whom it is possible to negotiate.” Kállay’s main task in all this would be to sound the Serbian government as to its intentions. In conclusion, Andrássy said that “if the constellation should prove to be suitable then we will provoke Russia until she attacks us.”

Despite this warlike talk, Kállay treated Andrássy’s revelations with a certain scepticism. He found his instructions on sounding the Regents, for instance, “so imprecise that I really hardly know how to carry them out.” More interestingly, Kállay got the impression “that Andrássy would indeed prefer a war, but that he doesn’t have sufficient resolution to start it energetically.” It was a perceptive insight, even if Kállay’s unspoken assumption, that Andrássy was somehow in a position to bring about hostilities single-handed, was equally revealing.

Something even more perplexing was to follow. In Vienna, Kállay was told by Béla Orczy that “in connection with Andrássy’s plan” he [Orczy] had talked with the British ambassador and “tried to get him to agree that England too should join us and that together we should try to win over the Porte for the Bosnian plan.” This, on the face of it, improbable scenario was to resurface a few weeks later, much to Kállay’s consternation. At the time, he made no private comment on Orczy’s communication, which leaves some doubt at least as to the accuracy of Diószegi’s claim that this proved the joint nature of the new initiative.

The British sources contain no confirmation of Orczy’s approach to Bloomfield. Beust of course knew that Andrássy intended taking action to “neutralize” Serbia; and it seems unlikely that Orczy would have broached such a matter with a foreign representative without the chancellor’s authority. The same could be said, for that matter, of Andrássy’s approaches to the Porte via the Turkish ambassador. Nevertheless, Orczy was essentially Andrássy’s man, not Beust’s; and one only has to think of what Kállay got up to at Andrássy’s behest to realize that the Bosnian question was already falling prey, once again, to the literal duality of the Monarchy’s foreign policy process.

Kállay was decidedly against British involvement in the plan, since he believed this would negate whatever advantage the Monarchy stood to gain in Serbia. Orczy might have been acting on Beust’s instructions; but in view of Beust’s later expressed opposition to the scheme this raises the possibility that the chancellor was deliberately sabotaging it by alerting the British to what was being contemplated. Then again, Orczy might have been acting on Andrássy’s orders, with Beust either unwilling to endorse such a step or even unaware of it. If this were the case, it speaks volumes for the continuing naïveté of Andrássy’s diplomacy. As Kállay correctly saw, the British were traditionally the staunchest defenders of Ottoman integrity; and to reveal to them what their ambassador was later to describe as this “insane project” was to risk an international storm.
These uncomfortable truths were for the future. When Kállay returned to Belgrade to execute his somewhat ambiguous instructions, he found himself confronted once again with the familiar problem of how to overcome the Regents’ reluctance to commit themselves.

Kállay had already received Blaznavac’ assurances that, as long as the war was confined to western Europe, the Serbs would stay neutral. Only if Russia occupied Wallachia, said Blaznavac, would Serbia march into Bosnia, ostensibly in the Sultan’s name. This was the crux of the matter: it was not in the Monarchy’s interests to see this happen under any power’s sponsorship but its own, or, even worse, as an independent Serbian coup de main. Since Austria-Hungary itself was hardly likely to remain passive in the face of Russian involvement, it was really up to the Monarchy to give Serbia’s action a direction favorable to Habsburg interests.

On 5 August Kállay asked Blaznavac point-blank, “if, as a result of certain circumstances arising, we were able to help them enter into possession of Bosnia, would they be in a position to maintain peace and stability.” Blaznavac claimed that he was ready “at any moment” to throw 30,000 men into Bosnia, while repeating the standard assurance that the Sultan’s sovereignty and right to tribute would be preserved. Ristić, a couple of days later, was even more affable, and told Kállay that “we will win eternal sympathy if we help them gain possession of Bosnia.”

None of this, however, amounted to anything practical. The Regents were acutely aware of the dilemma with which the revived plan confronted them. Reports from Serbian agents in Bosnia stressed the discontent of the population and the resentment aroused by Ottoman repression. By the middle of the year this had caused a considerable number of the inhabitants to flee into Austro-Hungarian and Serbian territory; and the Regents were receiving bitter reproaches from their contacts for Serbia’s failure to take action.

The Franco-Prussian War increased the pressure on the Regents to take advantage of the situation, since they had long counselled their agents in Bosnia to wait until a major European conflict arose. “If this opportunity . . . were to be abandoned, then a lot of people are going to think Serbia will lose . . . all hope of ever being able to annex Bosnia,” wrote one such confidant on 21 July. The same agent estimated that Serbia could easily overcome the resistance of the four to five thousand Turkish regulars in Bosnia, while Montenegro would overrun Hercegovina.

In view of Serbia’s lamentable performance against the Ottomans in 1876, this was an optimistic assessment. Such sober considerations were not, however, common among Serb nationalists. Miletić’s Zastava was already warning, by early August 1870, that the European crisis was Serbia’s last chance to preserve its leadership of the South Slavs. “Bosnia,” Zastava editorialized, “is the key to the west-
ern side of the Balkans; it is the geographical core of the Serbian lands; whoever acquires Bosnia separately from Serbia, having cut off Serbia’s vital artery, will sooner or later become master of Serbia. Even the Croats, Miletić somewhat implausibly claimed, would rather see Bosnia joined to Serbia than abandoned, especially since the province would then act as a “buffer” between Croatia and Serbia. In Serbia itself, there was widespread expectation that the government would seize the opportunity, and puzzlement at the lack of military preparation.

The truth was that the Regents were unable to act, and knew it. Heading a provisional regime for the duration of Prince Milan’s minority only, Blaznavac and Ristić naturally shrank from a war, which would entail a major commitment of resources and, if unsuccessful, could even imperil the dynasty and Serbia itself. Added to this fundamental constraint were others. The Ottoman authorities in Bosnia, in anticipation of just such an attack as the nationalists demanded, started feverish military preparations, and clearly would not be caught unawares. Serbia’s own military preparedness was still painfully inadequate, as both domestic and foreign observers acknowledged. The links with other Balkan states, and with revolutionary organizations throughout the Ottoman provinces, had been allowed to atrophy where they had not been openly abandoned. Of crucial importance also was the fact that the Russian government advised strongly against any precipitate moves against the Ottomans. This Russian caution became even more pronounced in the fall, when Russia committed itself to the renunciation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris.

Finally there was the compromising position in which the Regents found themselves as a result of their links with Austria-Hungary. In today’s political parlance, Blaznavac and Ristić suffered from a “credibility gap,” not only with Pan-Slavists like Ignatiev, but among the Balkan peoples generally. The relatively long period of good relations with the Monarchy had weakened the links with the Balkans and diminished Serbian prestige there. The despatches of Serbia’s representative in Constantinople are full of reproaches by Ignatiev against the Regents for being “instruments” of Austro-Hungarian policy, for having “sold out” Serbia’s national interests. In the Vojvodina, Serbian newspapers regularly made the same accusations. If the Regents had wished to make a move in the summer of 1870, they would have had an uphill task re-establishing themselves as the natural leaders of the nationalist movement.

These restraints on the Serbian government, and especially the discouraging attitude adopted by Russia toward any provocative action in the Balkans, make a mockery of Andrássy’s urge to “neutralize” Serbia. Had Andrássy been less inclined to assume the worst about Russian policy, and readier to explore contacts with the Russians, he might have perceived that Serbia had little need of neutralizing in the first place. On the contrary, the only threat to the status quo in the Balkans was that introduced by Andrássy himself, in the shape of the Bosnian...
plan. Andrásy in fact was ill-informed. His chosen man in Belgrade, Kállay, in his eagerness to see a Pan-Slav intrigue under every bush, exaggerated the dangers of Russia suddenly gaining the upper hand in Belgrade.

By 7 August, the overall strategic situation facing Austria-Hungary had been drastically transformed. With one crushing French defeat following another, the Monarchy’s whole policy in both West and East obviously needed urgent reconsideration.

This was nowhere more apparent than in Beust’s attitude toward relations with Russia. After several weeks brushing aside the Tsar’s feelers regarding a joint Austro-Russian mediation, Beust suddenly discovered a statesmanlike interest in the idea, which formed the basis for the common ministerial council of 22 August.46

Beust had at least abandoned his dangerous flirtation with the idea of a war in the East, and was forced to admit that there might be something in the Tsar’s overtures. He now laid before the council an entirely new approach, which entailed working with the Russians to limit the effects of Prussia’s victory in the West.47

The Tsar stressed his belief in the need for Austria-Hungary in the overall balance of power in Europe, and gave his word of honor that Russia had no plans for attacking the Monarchy.48 He also reiterated the line Russia had been following for some years: Russia no more wanted the break-up of the Ottoman Empire than Austria-Hungary, since anything else would be, in the Tsar’s own words, “un chiffre inconnu.”49 In a clear suggestion that Russia and Austria-Hungary revert to the old conservative policy of seeking agreement where possible, the Tsar pointed out that it was in their interests to work together, rather than against one another.

Here, should the Habsburg Monarchy choose to respond to it, was a classic articulation of the alternative to that policy of watchful Russophobia, which had been the mot d’ordre in the Ballhaus ever since the Crimean War, and which the Hungarian factor had so much strengthened since 1867. The subsequent history of Austro-Russian relations, down to 1914, suggests that the Monarchy would have done well to react swiftly and favorably to the Tsar’s overtures. Austro-Hungarian security was generally greatest in periods of détente with the Russians, and least when tsarist policy was ill-disposed or unpredictable. There was a decided logic, for a multinational dynastic state with interests in the stability of the Balkans, in trying to cooperate with the other major dynasty involved there.50 Certainly such a policy ran completely counter to that which Andrásy had been promoting for the last four years, which accepted the virtual inevitability of conflict with Russia, and sought to prepare for this by securing control over countries like Serbia. The Andrásy policy sought hegemony in the Balkans as a weapon against Russia; dynastic conservatism would gain this hegemony, in the western half of the Peninsula at least, as part of the deal.

Beust was not only prepared to take the Russian offer, but he came to the crown council of 22 August with the consciousness of powerful forces within the
Monarchy on his side. The most important of these was the Emperor himself: Francis Joseph might be expected to rally to the cause of dynastic solidarity. The Austrian minister president and the common war minister both welcomed the Russian offer. There were even sections of opinion within Hungary which inclined toward Russia, at least on the issue of mediation in the Franco-Prussian War. While much of the Hungarian press reacted with unease to the mere rumor of Austro-Russian rapprochement, the influential Pesti napló warned that the differences between the two empires did not mean that Austria-Hungary could or should avoid all contacts when vital state interests were at stake.51

Beust’s recommendation to the council, that the Monarchy respond positively to the Tsar, thus met with no opposition to speak of. Even Andrássy had nothing to say against exploring the Russian offer, for the general purpose of securing a prop against the consequences of Prussia’s victory. Andrássy was convinced, however, that Russia was only waiting for the completion of its railway network and armaments program before falling upon the Monarchy, and sounded a familiar note with his statement that “Austria’s task still remains as before, to form a bulwark against Russia, and as long as it fulfils this task, its survival is a European necessity.”52 The council in short empowered Beust to follow up the Russian lead.

The answer, however, came quicker than anyone could have expected; and although the reason for the reversal of Russian policy remained unclear for another couple of months, the general effect was to vindicate every reservation Andrássy had entered against supping with the Russian devil. Basically what happened was that Bismarck, alerted to the moves toward Austro-Russian détente, had acted immediately to head off this danger to Prussian policy in the West. The inducement he held out to the Russians, moreover, had been sufficient to sink the whole idea of mediation: in return for Russian acquiescence in the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, Prussia would back Russia to the hilt if it unilaterally repudiated the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris.53

If it had not been for the Prussian intervention, itself only made necessary by Prussia’s annexationist war aims, there were still no insuperable obstacles to an Austro-Russian entente at this point. The identity of interests which produced the Three Emperors’ League later in the 1870s, and again in the 1880s, was already present at the outset of the Franco-Prussian War.54 From the Habsburg Monarchy’s point of view, and whatever the apprehensions of the Hungarian leadership, it was a major policy failure not to have exploited this.

On the face of it, however, the volte-face in Russian policy justified Hungarian scepticism. This in turn had practical consequences in the realm of relations between the Habsburg Monarchy and Serbia. The immediate result was to give a further, if unwarranted, lease of life to the futile Bosnian plan, and other aspects of Andrássy’s and Kállay’s strategy of tying Serbia to the Monarchy by
judicious concessions. Whereas détente with Russia, as in the past, would have given Austria-Hungary undisputed sway over the western Balkans, including Serbia, the Hungarian policy meant that Serbia’s goodwill had to be bought, while at the same time desperately fending off real or imagined Russian influence in the Principality.

Another consequence of the failure to reach agreement with Russia was the re-emergence of the dualism which had bedeviled Austro-Hungarian policy toward Serbia ever since 1867, but which the crisis of July 1870 had temporarily overcome. Beust, and traditionalists like Prokesch-Osten, soon abandoned what little interest they had ever shown in accommodating Serbia, and reverted to a policy of general indifference, interspersed with intimidation. Andrássy and Kállay, by contrast, once more struck out on their own, and for another year conducted negotiations with the Serbian government very much as they saw fit, and in certain notable particulars without the knowledge of the foreign ministry. In the process they completed the sense of disillusionment on both the Serbian and the Hungarian side.

At the end of August, just when Kállay might reasonably have expected to see the talks on Bosnia resume course, a chasm suddenly opened up at his feet, in the shape of what appeared to be British involvement in the plan. This turned out to be a mirage, although there can be no doubt that Longworth, the British consul in Belgrade, made serious proposals to the Regents, telling them that “his government is willing to act as a mediator in the Bosnian question.” Quickly disavowed by London, this initiative by Longworth remains a mystery, but had Kállay in despair. From the Hungarians’ point of view it was dangerous, because “the initiative would thereby be taken out of our hands, and we would not be able to enjoy the fruits of this great project even though it concerns us most nearly.” Over the next few weeks, conflicting evidence emerged as to what the British were up to; but before September was out the issue was dead, quashed by a vigorous British denial that any such initiative had ever been contemplated. It is possible that the Gladstone administration, no longer convinced of the necessity of maintaining the Ottoman Empire, was conducting a clumsy sondage about changing the status quo; but if this was the case the astonished reaction from the other great powers sufficed to kill the idea, and the evidence even for this remains inconclusive.

For Kállay, however, the mere rumor of British involvement was exasperating. “The raising of the Bosnian question,” he told himself,

> the English efforts in this affair and our complete inactivity and silence raise in me the fear that we are going to let slip this opportunity and that somebody else is going to gather up before us the fruits of the Bosnian question, [which is] so pressing.

Such a result, Kállay reflected, would force him to resign, “because I really have no desire to serve a policy which is so inactive and does not grasp, and isn’t able to
realize, its own interests.” As for Blaznavac, “The genuineness of his friendship towards us... depends solely on our energetic proceeding in the Bosnian question, and if this is not forthcoming all the fine words and support are in vain.”

Equally discouraging for Kállay was the emphatic rejection of the Bosnian plan which the British incident elicited from the Ottoman authorities. Had there been a genuine willingness on the part of one or more of the great powers to contemplate change, of course, Ottoman intransigence might not have mattered all that much: the powers were accustomed to bullying the “sick man of Europe” when it suited them. But once reassured of British support, the Ottomans displayed all their usual obstinacy. The language of their ambassador to London, as relayed by Beust to Kállay on 11 October, was representative, and had a certain force of its own:

> it was absolutely impossible that the Porte should ever decide to lend an ear to this dream of Serbia’s, whose realization would be impracticable not only because of the Muslim element, which constitutes the most considerable part of Bosnia’s population, but above all because this project would have subversive and disastrous results for the security and integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Worse still, from Kállay’s point of view, was the clear implication that Beust, in passing on these sentiments, tacitly shared them. To the British ambassador, in fact, Beust had already distanced himself from the Bosnian plan, albeit somewhat cravenly. As Lord Bloomfield reported on 27 September,

> Count Beust said to me in strict confidence, that he was well pleased to learn of the disavowal of any participation of her Majesty’s Government in this affair, and their entire disapproval of it, as the Hungarian Government had evinced considerable anxiety respecting it, and Count Andrássy especially was under a false impression regarding the whole question.

Britain’s démenti, Beust continued,

> had been useful to him in awaking Count Andrássy from his dreams about the Slave Provinces of Turkey. Count Andrássy he observed was inclined to be too active in Eastern affairs, and especially to meddle too much with the Consulate in Servia. . . .

Evidently oblivious to the irony of being reliant on foreign governments to rein in Andrássy’s wilder flights of fancy, Beust went on to make a remark which highlights admirably the fundamental differences between Vienna and Pest over Eastern policy. Andrássy, according to Beust, was

> anxious . . . to extend the influence of Austria amongst the Slaves, imagining that some day he will be able to compete with Russia in these districts. Count Beust . . . feels in regard to the project of establishing a joint system of administration in Servia, Bosnia and the Herzegovina that if carried into effect it would
be simply advancing the great object Russia has in view, of extending her power towards the Adriatic, and thus inflicting a serious Injury on the Interests of Austria.\textsuperscript{62}

In little more than a year’s time Andrássy would be using similar language; but in the fall of 1870 the gap between his thinking and Beust’s was still a sizeable one. What is even more striking, however, is the extent to which Beust felt constrained to combat Hungarian influence in secret. Again, this was a result of the ambiguities of the 1867 settlement with regard to foreign policy. Beust knew perfectly well that Andrássy had the ear of the Emperor, but evidently did not feel sure enough of his own position to fight Andrássy in the open. Yet it has to be said that the Dualist system encouraged this behind the scenes tussling. Beust was like the helmsman of a ship, with the Hungarians below decks in the steerage flat, trying to alter his course by occasional tugs at the tiller-ropes.

The theme of Hungarian interference was one that Beust returned to in mid-October, but again only confidentially with Bloomfield. Apropos of rumored negotiations for an alliance between Austria-Hungary and Turkey, the chancellor denied ever having endorsed such a project, and portrayed it to Bloomfield instead as yet another of Andrássy’s tiresome initiatives.\textsuperscript{63} Since the alliance proposals, as reported, included further mention of a cession of Bosnia to Serbia, in return for territorial compensation for the Porte in Asia, it was relatively easy for Beust to saddle Andrássy and Kállay with the entire responsibility. Beust claimed that Andrássy “ought to know full well that the Porte would never agree to the cession in question.” Beust himself “had nothing to do with the affair”; moreover,

these attempts of Count Andrassy to meddle in the Administration of the Foreign Affairs of the Empire, caused him [Beust] at times much trouble and annoyance; but Count Andrassy was an essential element of the Government, and in Hungary, and . . . he was obliged to bear much from him.\textsuperscript{64}

In a private letter the same day, Bloomfield reported that Beust “lays on Andrássy’s shoulders all the blame of the insane project” concerning Bosnia. “His [Andrássy’s] notions, he says, are plausible at times, but perfectly impracticable.”\textsuperscript{65}

By his supine behavior Beust had done much to give Andrássy’s Bosnian scheme a new lease of life; as Bloomfield warned him, “he will get into endless trouble if he cannot stop this meddling in Eastern affairs.”\textsuperscript{66} When the British foreign secretary, Lord Granville, at the beginning of November, claimed to have heard “on excellent authority” that Beust, not Andrássy, was the prime mover in all the recent troublemaking,\textsuperscript{67} Bloomfield was politely sceptical, and put his finger on the real problem: Beust might have been the instigator, “but both are equally to blame & the Chancellor had no business to admit of Hungary’s interference in the Department of Foreign Affairs in the irresponsible way in which it has been carried on in the East.”\textsuperscript{68} It was a just criticism. Unfortunately for
Beust, however, Andrássy had no intention of limiting his involvement in the Monarchy’s Serbian policy. On the contrary, over the next couple of months he and Kállay intensified their efforts in this direction, fortified by the consciousness of having the direct endorsement of the monarch himself for their actions.

On 24 October Andrássy wrote one of his increasingly rare despatches to Kállay. It was a long, rambling disquisition, which Kállay found so perplexing that he asked for clarification before acting on it. Nevertheless, as a detailed exposition of Andrássy’s Serbian policy, by late 1870, the despatch shows that even at this stage Andrássy continued to believe in the possibility of buying Serbia’s allegiance by means of the Bosnian plan, and the prosecution of Alexander Karadőrđević. It also shows, however, the growth of Andrássy’s impatience, as well as his tendency to interpret the Regents’ reticence as ill will and conspiracy.

Andrássy was irritated by the Serbian reaction to Karadőrđević’s release in early October. The Hungarian government would of course continue to press for Karadőrđević’s conviction, but his case hardly warranted a Serbian turn toward Russia: “this can never be anything but a pretext from the point of view of Serbia’s foreign policy, not a deciding factor.” In Andrássy’s view the changes wrought by the Franco-Prussian War were fundamental, and perhaps not what the Regents had expected. Despite the tactical cooperation of Prussia and Russia at the outset of hostilities, Andrássy warned, it would be a mistake to imagine that this had survived the by now obvious French defeat. Russia could see that it was no longer needed by the new Germany; and Germany, for its part, was unlikely “to gamble away the mouth of the Danube or the shores of the Adriatic into the hands of Russia or some other, smaller state.” His next assertion, in view of the storm about to break out over the Black Sea clauses, was glaringly abroad:

already it is undoubtedly a fact that in the East Prussia will under no circumstances offer the Russians a helping hand. Prussia would regard any action, taken by Austria-Hungary against Russian influence in the East, with complete complaisance.

In short, it was “now more than ever in Serbia’s interest to seek an alliance with us.” Andrássy pointed out that Germany could easily expand to the Adriatic if it so wished, and would have no difficulty in assimilating five or six million Slavs. Austria-Hungary, by contrast, made a less threatening neighbor for Serbia. Neither Austria nor Hungary wanted more Slavs. On the contrary, Hungary in particular wanted nothing more than good relations with the South Slavs, and to see the Balkans free of Russian influence. “Serbia thus has and can have no more natural and reliable ally than the Austro-Hungarian empire, as it is presently constituted.”

When it came to specifying how an alliance was to be achieved, however, Andrássy was vague. The cession of Bosnia to Serbia continued to be the centerpiece of his Serbian policy, but in return for this “all misunderstanding between
Serbia and us must be made impossible.” Andrássy insisted that neither Russia nor Britain could be involved in this process. Russia in any case was not interested in Bosnia but in revising the Crimean settlement.

The problem was rather in making use of the opportunity presented, and here by his own admission Andrássy had failed to make any headway with the people who mattered most, the Ottomans.

Up to now this question has not been raised by anyone at all apart from me, so if it has been aired in Constantinople, this is due to the fact that I have spoken of it, not in the name of but with the knowledge of the Foreign Ministry, with Hajder Effendi [the Turkish ambassador to Vienna] and his successor Halil Bey, openly and decisively.

Despite using “every possible argument,” however, “The result for the time being has been a decided ‘non possumus’, and considerable Turkish coldness toward us.”

In short, there was still no prospect of gaining the administration of Bosnia for Serbia, which Andrássy himself held out as the chief inducement for an alliance. Instead, he returned to his initial theme of how Austria-Hungary had to be able to rely on Serbia, of how Serbia must guarantee that it would hold Russia at arm’s length. Bosnia, from being the occasion of closer ties, began to appear more a possible reward for good behavior:

Once everybody is persuaded that the successor to Turkish rule will not be Russia, then it will no longer be in either our or the other European powers’ interests to hinder the natural transformation of the East; then we can boldly entrust the fate of the East to its own peoples.

Andrássy concluded by reminding Kállay of all that the Monarchy had done for Serbia in the past three years. The corollary of this was a veiled threat. The Regents must not assume that, because Austria-Hungary sought an alliance, it did so from weakness, or a fear of Serbia. On the contrary:

It would be a good idea to draw Serbia’s attention to the fact that at present, not counting the home guard, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy disposes of 840,000 soldiers.

The Regents would doubtless find this consideration of use in combating popular enthusiasm for Russia, and in proving that “Serbia can easily safeguard its future with us, but never against us.” None of this in any case amounted to a firm, detailed alliance proposal, but some form of draft alliance was the topic of negotiations between Kállay and Ristić at the turn of the year, so it is clear Andrássy intended there to be a follow-up.

It is striking how Andrássy spoke more and more the language of empire in his dealings with Serbia. From being the zealous spokesman of Serbo-Hungarian

Apple of Discord
friendship, Serbia’s defender against the machinations of Vienna, Andrásy wrote increasingly in terms of the Monarchy’s interests, rather than Hungary’s. One can see the transformation from the national politician, preoccupied with essentially national affairs, to the international statesman, conscious of broader issues. Andrásy in his attitude toward the Serbs became concomitantly more peremptory and, in the process, changed from someone whose words had some hold on Serbia’s leaders, to someone who spoke the language they were accustomed to hear from the Monarchy.

Before any action was taken in the matter, however, international affairs were once again thrown into uproar by the news of Russia’s repudiation of the Black Sea clauses at the end of October 1870. It was in Vienna and Pest that the shock waves of the Russian action were felt most acutely. Beust was in the awkward position of having publicly advocated a revision of the Treaty of Paris as far back as 1867, but had no difficulty in condemning Russia’s move, since the whole point of the 1856 settlement lay in its internationally agreed regulation of the Eastern Question, and its restraints on Russian power.84

Andrássy’s reaction was more intemperate. From the reports of foreign representatives, it appears that Andrássy was once more convinced that now was the time to settle accounts with Russia. The Italian chargé d’affaires found Andrássy “quite beside himself. . . . I was very much struck by the violence of his language.” The Saxon envoy in Vienna noted how pleased the Ottoman ambassador was with Andrássy’s attitude. “Above all it can be expected of the Hungarian Hotspurs that they will use this opportunity for extremely unequivocal demonstrations against Russia.” And the Italian ambassador reported, on his return to his post, that Andrássy was of the opinion that “if we do not oppose Russia squarely she will henceforth be mistress of the Near East. A war would be inevitable later, in unfavorable conditions.”

The common ministerial council of 14 November was consequently the sharpest confrontation yet between Beust and Andrássy on the subject of Russia. The chancellor was all too aware that his own policy lay in ruins. With the prospect of German unity looming, he had failed to prevent the nullification of the Treaty of Prague. Now Russia had burst the bonds imposed by the Treaty of Paris, a move to which Beust personally had no absolute objection, but which threatened the Monarchy’s prestige in the Balkans and, at the same time, increased Hungarian dissatisfaction with the policy laid down by the Ballhaus.88

Nevertheless, Beust was in a position of some strength to resist what everyone present knew would be a frontal assault by Andrássy. For a start, Francis Joseph himself appeared to have taken the Russian circular calmly; and neither the Austrian minister president nor the common war minister was interested in picking a quarrel with Russia. Even more encouraging was the neutrality of Lónyay, the new common finance minister but still a leading Déákist, who had only recently reacted favorably to the idea of cooperation with Russia.89
Above all Beust had the sheer logic of the international situation on his side. Quite apart from the case for revising the Treaty of Paris, to which Beust’s own proposals of 1867 bore witness, how was the Monarchy to reverse Russia’s action? Britain’s resolve was still a matter for conjecture, and without British support any sort of collective resistance was clearly pointless. In contrast to the policy toyed with in July 1870, any risk of war was out of the question.

Andrássy made it clear that his principal fear was of the domestic repercussions: “If we calmly accept this provocation, then the Slavs will draw conclusions out of it for the future.” He went well beyond Beust in demanding approaches to Britain and other powers in preparation for a collective diplomatic offensive.

Diószegi rightly points out that Andrássy wanted to force a Russian climb-down, “even at the risk of a war.” This in itself was to be expected of Andrássy. What is astonishing is his conviction that not only Britain, but Italy, France and even Prussia would not be averse from associating themselves with a collective remonstrance. Now, Andrássy informed the council, it was impossible for Prussia, “despite all the intimacy of its relations with Russia,” to endorse a breach of treaty like the Gorchakov circular. In fact, the Black Sea issue offered in Andrássy’s view a glittering opportunity: “A simple separation of Prussia from Russia in this question would already be a big result, which could have the most far-reaching consequences in the near future, and we should try resolutely to achieve this.” Well in advance of the reality, Andrássy was anticipating that Austro-German (or perhaps one should say German-Hungarian) axis which was to be a feature of the diplomatic landscape from the late 1870s to 1918.

For once, however, Beust rebutted Andrássy’s arguments with unwonted firmness. It was essential, he replied, not to go further than the other powers; the Monarchy’s interests lay rather in keeping options open than in cutting them off by hasty action. Suggesting even a collective note, at this stage, would be overstepping the bounds of the feasible; all that ought to be attempted was to sound the British as to how firmly they meant to react, if at all. With Andrássy quite isolated, the council was therefore content to give Beust a free hand in this regard.

For all his tough words on 14 November, Beust was in fact at the mercy of domestic political factors. He was aware that he could count on no support from the German liberals, and was considered by the military to have bungled the Monarchy’s chances in July 1870. The conservative federalists who were shortly to form the Hohenwart-Schäffle government in Austria inclined toward Russia, not Germany, in foreign policy terms. And now, as a result of the Gorchakov circular, the violent reaction of much of the Deák party threatened to lose Beust what little support he had for his foreign policy in Hungary. Pesti napló, for instance, the tone-setting flagship of the Deákists, spoke darkly on 17 November of the “ultima ratio,” of submitting the Black Sea affair to “the arbitrament of the sword,” of a “holy war” against Russia. Beust was singled out for especial
blame, accused of a naïve trust in Russia, which had only encouraged the latter
to encroach the more. Pester Lloyd went so far as to report, inaccurately but to
great sensation, that Andrássy had already been appointed Beust’s successor as
foreign minister.96

Beust was also uncomfortably aware that behind the uproar in the Hungarian
press stood Andrássy himself. The Hungarian minister president was clearly
growing impatient with his inability to control foreign policy, and despite his
defeat in council was still determined to promote a firmer anti-Russian line. The
British ambassador, late in November, reported that Andrássy was still in “con-
siderable excitement” about the Russian move, and “but little disposed to discuss
it calmly, having made up his own mind that war must inevitably result sooner
or later from the proceedings of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.” To Bloomfield’s
appeals for calm, Andrássy reiterated his naïve belief that Prussia would side with
Austria-Hungary. Bloomfield concluded that “at the present moment a war cry
would be loudly responded to in Hungary by the great majority of the members
of the Diet.”97 Privately, Bloomfield described Andrássy as “quite wild for war.”98

The evidence of Kállay’s diary also shows that Andrássy was counting
on the imminent meeting of the Hungarian Delegation to orchestrate a call for
Beust’s resignation. A week after the Delegation had convened on 24 November,
Kállay openly urged Andrássy to bring down Beust and take his place, “because
only he (Andrássy) is in a position to save the empire.”99 Andrássy replied that he
could easily do so by going before the Delegation “with the facts,” but would not
“because he wouldn’t have it said that he forced Beust out of office.”100 It would
be a different matter, however, if the Delegation in fact brought about Beust’s
departure. That Andrássy hoped his party colleagues in the Delegation would do
so can be inferred from his remark to Kállay that, if they did not, “then he (An-
drássy) would probably tender his resignation, because he will not be responsible
for Beust’s policy.”101

Under this pressure of Hungarian public opinion, and bereft of any domestic
base of his own, Beust accordingly ate his words and started lobbying the British
for a firm lead. In the two months leading up to the opening session of the Lon-
don Conference, called to negotiate a settlement of the Black Sea dispute, Beust
associated himself explicitly with the lost cause of a collective note.102 Andrássy
could thus be said to have had his way at the council of 14 November, despite his
isolation on the day itself. Yet the immediate effect of the setback he experienced
at that point had far-reaching consequences for relations with Serbia.

Convinced by the cold reception accorded his views on the Russian peril,
Andrássy resolved to continue his attempts to influence policy behind the scenes.
The result was another series of initiatives by Kállay in Belgrade, designed to
inject new life into the Bosnian proposals and, at the same time, to explore the
possibilities of an alliance or, at the very least, an entente between the Monarchy
and Serbia. As a direct consequence of Andrássy’s frustration in council, however, these pourparlers with the Serbian Regents were carefully kept secret from Beust although, as we shall see, Andrássy had the guile to secure the Emperor’s sanction at a later stage. The contacts made brought the Bosnian question to its furthest and most detailed stage of development, but in the process they also made it clear just how pointless the whole exercise was in reality. For no treaty or even understanding with Serbia was possible without the involvement of the Monarchy’s foreign minister, yet it was the decided object of the Hungarian minister president to keep his rival out of the business for as long as possible. With or without the approval of Francis Joseph, Andrássy’s attempt to guide the Monarchy’s Serbian policy at one remove in this fashion was nonsense, and was shortly to be proved such.

Notes

4 Decsy, Prime Minister Gyula Andrásy’s Influence, 102–3; Lutz, Österreich-Ungarn, 208; Diószegi, Österreich-Ungarn und der französisch-preussische Krieg, 40–43. According to the British consul in Belgrade, Kállay was also hoping for a French victory; Longworth to Granville, 28 July 1870, PRO, FO 78/2135.
7 Common Ministerial Council, 18 July 1870, in Diószegi, Österreich-Ungarn und der französisch-preussische Krieg, 298.
8 Ibid., 293; Lutz, Österreich-Ungarn, 214.
10  Ibid., 289
11  Ibid., 294.
12  Kállay Diary, 21 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, 347–48).
14  Beust to Prokesch-Osten, 1 Aug. 1870, HHSA, PA XII/96; quoted in Diószegi, Österreich-Ungarn und der französisch-preußische Krieg, 88, note 35.
15  Beust to Chotek, 27 July 1870, cited ibid., 91, note 45, a reply to Chotek to Beust, 23 July 1870, ibid., 134–35, and notes 17, 19, 20–21; Beust to Chotek, 4 Aug. 1870, HHSA, PA X/63; also cited by Lutz, Österreich-Ungarn, 541, note 23.
17  Quoted in Manó Kónyi, Beust és Andrássy 1870 és 1871-ben [Beust and Andrássy in 1870 and 1871] (Budapest: Olcsó Könyvtár, 1890), 21.
18  Kállay Diary, 29 July 1870 (Dnevnik, 316).
19  Ibid. (Dnevnik, 317).
20  Ibid.
21  Ibid.
22  Ibid.
23  Ibid., 1 Aug. 1870 (Dnevnik, 317).
24  Diószegi, Österreich-Ungarn und der französisch-preußische Krieg, 89, quoting the above entry, but mistakenly dating it 29 July. This entry, according to Diószegi (89–90), “shows that these steps were not just the personal actions of the Hungarian minister president, but were also simultaneously steps of Austrian foreign policy.”
25  Neither the correspondence between the Foreign Office and the Vienna embassy, nor the private papers of the new British foreign secretary, Lord Granville, throws any light on this. PRO, FO 7/767; and FO 362/2–3 (Granville private papers).
26  Kállay Diary, 4 Sept. 1870 (Dnevnik, 326).
27  Bloomfield to Granville, 27 Sept. 1870, no. 119, PRO, FO 7/768.
28  Bloomfield to Granville, 13 Oct. 1870 (private), PRO, FO 362/3.
29  Kállay Diary, 22 July 1870 (Dnevnik, 315).
30  Kállay to Beust, 23 July 1870, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/187.
31  Kállay Diary, 5 Aug. 1870 (Dnevnik, 318).
32  Ibid.
33  Ibid., 7 Aug. 1870 (Dnevnik, 319).
36  Ibid.
37  Zastava, 7 Aug. 1870; quoted ibid., 37.
38  Quoted, ibid: “Bosnia would also be at the appropriate moment a ‘buffer’ of the links between the two peoples.”
39  Ibid., 36.


[43] E.g., Hristić to Ristić, 2/14 Dec. 1870; and Hristić to Ristić, 13/25 Jan. 1871, both in *Hristić Letters*, no. 21, 26–27, and no. 28, 35.


[56] Ibid., f. 196.


58 Kállay Diary, 4 Sept. 1870 (Dnevnik, 326).
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 5 Sept. 1870 (Dnevnik, 327).
61 Beust to Kállay, 11 Oct. 1870, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/187.
62 Bloomfield to Granville, 27 Sept. 1870 (no. 119), PRO, FO 7/768.
64 Bloomfield to Granville, 13 Oct. 1870 (no. 149), ibid; quoted in Bridge, Sadowa to Sarajevo, 46.
65 Bloomfield to Granville, 13 Oct. 1870 (private), PRO, FO 362/3 (microfilm).
66 Ibid.
67 Granville to Bloomfield, 2 Nov. 1870 (private), PRO, FO 362/2 (microfilm).
68 Bloomfield to Granville, 10 Nov. 1870, PRO, FO 362/3 (microfilm).
70 Kállay Diary, 5 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 337).
71 Andrásy to Kállay, 24 Oct. 1870, OSZK, FH 1733/66.
72 Ibid., f. 67.
74 Andrásy to Kállay, 24 Oct. 1870, OSZK, FH 1733/68.
75 Ibid., f. 69.
76 Ibid., f. 70.
77 Ibid., ff. 71–72; Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 320.
78 Andrásy to Kállay, 24 Oct. 1870, OSZK, FH 1733/72.
79 Ibid., f. 73. On the Ottoman reaction to Andrásy’s overtures, see Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 1 Aug. 1870, HHSA, PA XII/96, and Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 5 Aug. 1870, HHSA, PA XII/97.
80 Andrásy to Kállay, 24 Oct. 1870, OSZK, FH 1733/73–74.
81 Ibid., ff. 77–78.
82 Ibid., f. 78.

Ibid., 182.

Curtopassi to Visconti Venosta, 13 Nov. 1870, DDI, 2nd series, vol. 1, no. 522, 440; Salvini to Visconti Venosta, 13 Nov. 1870, ibid., no. 524, 441–42; Diószegi, Österreich-Ungarn und der französisch-preußische Krieg, 183.

Bose to Friesen, 13 Nov. 1870, quoted ibid.


Diószegi, Österreich-Ungarn und der französisch-preußische Krieg, 188–89.

Ibid., 184–85.

Ibid., 190–91; on British reluctance to risk war over the Treaty of Paris, see Mosse, “The End of the Crimean System,” 169.

Diószegi, Österreich-Ungarn und der französisch-preußische Krieg, 191, quoting from the protocol of the Common Ministerial Council of 14 Nov. 1870.

Ibid., 191–92.

Ibid., 192.

Quoted, ibid., 193–94.

Pesti napló, 17 Nov. 1870, quoted ibid., 202.

Peter Lloyd, 18 Nov. 1870, cited ibid., 203; Kállay Diary, 18 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 341).

Bloomfield to Granville, 23 Nov. 1870, PRO, FO 7/769.

Bloomfield to Granville, 24 Nov. 1870, PRO, FO 362/3 (microfilm).

Kállay Diary, 3 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, 345).

Ibid.

Ibid. Quoted in Diószegi, Österreich-Ungarn und der französisch-preußische Krieg, 204.

Ibid., 199–202, 204–6, 206 ff.

Ibid., 203–4; Kállay Diary, 21 and 27 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, 347, 348).
It is ironic that the Hungarian attempt to revive the Bosnian question should have been launched on 23 November, for the same day saw the dispatch of Beust’s circular to the Monarchy’s representatives in Belgrade and Bucharest.\(^1\) This was to prove the time bomb which, two months later, brought the fragile edifice built by Andrássy and Kállay crashing to the ground.

In late November, Beust was faced with the need to react somehow to Russia’s unilateral renunciation of the Black Sea clauses. He associated himself with a number of proposals for discussion at the forthcoming international conference at London, which had their origin in Andrássy’s fertile brain but which were illusory to say the least.\(^2\) On a simpler level, however, Beust needed to convince the Russians that he meant business, an ultimately fruitless exercise in view of the Monarchy’s essential powerlessness. Part of this exercise involved squashing any ideas of trouble-making in the Balkans. The Beust circular was designed as a direct admonition to what the Ballhaus considered the two most likely sources of unrest in the Peninsula, the Serbian and Romanian governments.

To Beust the connection between the Russian declaration and a threat to the status quo in the Balkans was self-evident. “The Russian move,” he wrote to his consuls in Belgrade and Bucharest, “is . . . all too well suited to put feelings in the lands directly or indirectly belonging to the Ottoman Empire in a considerable state of excitement,” and this might create a sense that the status quo in the Balkans was no longer tenable. Beust expressed the hope that neither the Romanian nor the Serbian government would be lured into taking steps “which would conjure up unforeseeable disaster for their country.” The passage which was to cause all the trouble,
when it became public two months later, was not at first sight controversial. Serbia and Romania, Beust wrote, must be under no illusions that Austria-Hungary’s leaders were resolved to preserve the 1856 settlement, and “for its preservation to deploy the whole force of the Monarchy in case of necessity.” In Beust’s view this determination on the part of the Monarchy happened also to serve the interests of both Serbia and Romania, and should be accepted in this sense.3

Just when Andrásy, through Kállay, was attempting to breathe new life into the Bosnian plan, with the added bait of an alliance or entente of sorts between Serbia and the Monarchy, Beust’s circular introduced a decidedly jarring note. Far from encouraging Belgrade to look upon a division of Bosnia as possible, it invoked the Treaty of Paris and the status quo, and virtually threatened the vassal states with war if they endangered either. Beust had not always made his unease at Andrásy’s schemes as clear as he might have done; in fact his acquiescence in Hungarian meddling at times amounted to a weak-minded acceptance. The circular of 23 November was a substantial corrective to this tendency, and indeed might well have been conceived as a well-placed torpedoing of whatever it was Beust suspected Andrásy of contemplating in relations with Serbia.

That being so, and given the ambiguity of Kállay’s position between Vienna and Pest, it is perhaps not surprising that the Beust circular at first vanished without trace. There is no mention of the circular in Kállay’s diary,4 nor does the original survive in the files of the Belgrade consulate.5 Nor did Kállay raise the matter with the Regents, as the circular clearly enjoined him to do.6 The evidence, or rather lack of evidence, suggests that Kállay quietly consigned his unwelcome instructions to the fire.

Quite apart from the possibility that Beust might easily query whether the contents of the circular had been communicated to the Regents, Kállay was gambling against the odds. Since 1868 the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry had been in the habit of publishing selected documents on foreign affairs, and it was entirely conceivable that the circular of 23 November, which usefully demonstrated the Monarchy’s support for the status quo, would find its way into one of these so-called Rotbücher. But Kállay, at the end of 1870, was convinced he was on the verge of a breakthrough with the Bosnian plan. His determination to ignore Beust’s instructions so blatantly was undoubtedly due to his awareness of something which remained hidden to the chancellor. Not for the first time, Andrásy had secured the highest possible authority for new overtures to the Regents. The Emperor Francis Joseph himself was involved; and for a tantalizing few weeks it seemed as if, at long last, Serbia might be drawn securely into the Monarchy’s orbit.

The final stage of the Bosnian negotiations, in the winter of 1870–71, was a Hungarian-led and executed affair, even when the assent of the monarch is allowed for. For one thing, Beust and the foreign ministry were, with the Emperor’s agreement, deliberately kept in the dark. In their approaches to the Serbian gov-
ernment, Andrássy and Kállay were once again pursuing their own “foreign policy,” in blithe disregard of the practical obstacles to its realization. Beust might still have enjoyed the Emperor’s overall confidence, but as far as relations with Serbia were concerned Andrássy increasingly behaved as if his views, rather than Beust’s, were the ones that mattered.7

Andrássy’s fresh approach to Belgrade owed much to his sense of isolation at the crown council of 14 November, convened to discuss the Black Sea crisis. If, as Andrássy at first feared, Beust and the Emperor refused to take the threat from Russia seriously, then it was all the more important for Andrássy to do what he could in the one quarter, Serbia, where through Kállay he had a direct influence. As far as the Bosnian question was concerned, Andrássy must have realized, by now, that Beust was not really in favor of the scheme. The chancellor had certainly shown no signs of disappointment when, in the autumn of 1870, the British government so emphatically disavowed any involvement in such a project. Andrássy’s proposed carve-up of Bosnia, in return for Serbia’s unequivocal alliance with the Monarchy, thus paradoxically had to be put to the Serbian Regents without Beust’s knowledge. What was even more paradoxical, as Andrássy admitted to Kállay in late October, the Ottoman government, another key factor in the equation, still refused to have anything to do with the Bosnian plan.8

Kállay, because of the vague nature of his brief from Andrássy, and because the recent acquittal of Alexander Karađorđević had seriously soured his relations with the Regents, felt his way carefully at first. His chosen instrument was Colonel Orešković, the (frequently self-appointed) mediator between Belgrade, Pest and the Croatian nationalists in Zagreb. As it happened, Orešković returned to Belgrade from talks with Andrássy, on the subject of his proposed propaganda campaign in the Military Border, at the end of the first week in November.9

Orešković expressed his support for the Bosnian project, although for this Croat exile Croatia’s interest in the division of Bosnia was never far from his mind. He promised to talk to the Regents and “seriously propose an alliance with Hungary, however, if they should incline towards Russia. . .in Bosnia he will start such an agitation in favor of Croatia that Serbia will never be able to acquire Bosnia.”10 As usual with Orešković, much of this was bombast, since he hardly possessed the full confidence of the Croat nationalist leadership.11

Over the next few days, Kállay employed Orešković as a species of Trojan horse for ascertaining the Regents’ receptivity to Andrássy’s proposals. With Kállay’s approval, Orešković played the “Vienna military reaction” card when he told the Regents, on 13 November, that the military party aims to acquire Bosnia and because of this wants to prevent the dissolution of the Border as well, that Andrássy, of course, is against this plan and wants to get Bosnia for Serbia, so it would be good if the Regents would come to an agreement with Andrássy.12
The Regents ought “to come out once and for all on this,” Orešković urged, since he was shortly to see Strossmayer in order to agree on “the position Croatia has to take up towards the Hungarians.”13 Implied was the suggestion that it might be the Croats, and not Serbia, who benefited most from any opening up of the Bosnian question.

Orešković also echoed Andrássy’s extraordinary claim that Prussia was prepared to tolerate “any action . . . by Austria-Hungary against Russian influence in the East.”14 As the Colonel described it to the Regents, a treaty had been concluded between Austria-Hungary and Prussia, and “in the East Austria is being guaranteed a free hand.”15 Serbia would be foolish to range itself on the wrong side in any impending conflict. Even allowing for Orešković’s tendency to exaggerate, however, this was a serious claim to be making, on the basis of nothing more substantial than Andrássy’s assumptions about the future community of interests between Germany and the Monarchy. Yet Kállay’s private record shows no qualms about backing a statement which could so easily be proved false.

If Kállay required fresh evidence of how low Hungarian stock had sunk in Belgrade, he had it in Blaznavac’ assertion to Orešković that “an agreement is possible, only because of the Karadordević business they now can’t have much trust in Hungary.”16 Despite the rather unsubtle pressure brought to bear by Orešković, both Regents remained stubbornly ill-disposed. On 17 November, for example, Kállay learned that Ristić “doesn’t want to know about an alliance with Austria.”17 The attitude of both Regents might also have been affected by the news of Russia’s renunciation of the Black Sea clauses, only a few days before.18

Kállay made his own approach to the Regents on 17 November. He had to spend much of the interview reassuring them that the Hungarian government intended taking the Karadordević case to a higher court. The Black Sea crisis, too, had had its effect. Blaznavac was particularly apprehensive, and made the connection Kállay doubtless dreaded. If the powers did not pull Russia up for its unilateral action, “it will thereby establish its prestige in the East and in this case it will be difficult to struggle against it.”19

On the Bosnian question, Kállay pretended to be acting on his own initiative, but that “in so far as I am acquainted with Andrássy’s intentions, I believe that something could be done and that seriously.”20 The time for talk, in other words, was past. In a couple of days, Kállay would lay before the Regents “his” (in reality Andrássy’s) plan, and would hope for a clear answer. To heighten the Regents’ sense of being surrounded by unreliable elements, by comparison with which Hungary must appear a rock of salvation, Kállay even described Orešković as “an agent of the military party,” a slander agreed on by prior arrangement with Orešković himself.21 These scare tactics appeared to work. Two days later Kállay had the satisfaction of learning that Blaznavac and Ristić were “already much more inclined to negotiate with us. They recognize that Serbia’s situation is critical.”22
Yet the Regents’ attitude on matters of detail seemed if anything to be hardening. Orešković who, despite his new stigma as a supposed creature of the Vienna military, still had the Regents’ ear, reported on 20 November that they “would not possibly agree, in case they acquire Bosnia, to cede to the Croats the Croatian part of Turkey [i.e. of Bosnia] as far as the Vrbas.”

Or rather, they would, if the Monarchy were to cede its own southern tip of Dalmatia to Serbia, and with it access to the Adriatic. Since the Vrbas River bounds the entire northwest corner of Bosnia, this sudden caprice seemingly ruled out any sort of division.

On 23 November, when Kállay finally set forth his formal plan to Blaznavac, this fresh obstacle soon reared its head. Kállay started by outlining the basic deal:

...in case of war with Russia, either they [the Serbian government] would occupy Bosnia, or, if the Porte protested against this, we would guarantee that, upon conclusion of the war, we would, if necessary by force, get Bosnia for them.

Blaznavac preferred the first option. At the back of his mind, undoubtedly, was the fear that, once in Bosnia, the Monarchy might not be so keen to pull out again. Kállay, however, warned Blaznavac that a Serbian occupation of Bosnia could have a bad effect on the Croats, “who would probably provoke an uprising in the Turkish part of Croatia, in their interest and to Serbia’s detriment, and we didn’t want the expansion of Croatia.”

This did not impress Blaznavac. Serbia, he said, would cede northwest Bosnia “up to the Vrbas” [a Vrbaszig] in order to placate the Croats; but in return it wanted “some insignificant territory” on the southern frontier of Montenegro, “and on the other side of the Boccha di Cattaro.” The rationale for this, it emerged, was that by this the principle of compensation [i.e., to the Sultan] for Turkish Croatia would still be reached; on the other hand they would completely encircle Montenegro, which was nothing but a tool in the hands of Russia.

In effect, Austria-Hungary was being asked to exchange its naval base at Cattaro for the northwest corner of Bosnia, while the Ottoman Empire made an additional, internal border adjustment in Serbia’s favor.

Kállay, not for the first time, found himself at something of a loss. He reiterated his conviction that allowing the Monarchy to annex northwest Bosnia was “the sole means which might satisfy the Croats.” The reciprocal cession of Cattaro, however, was a new idea and, although Kállay liked it, he would have to refer the matter back to Andrássy. As for the general feasibility of the scheme,

The greatest difficulty would arise if it didn’t come to war [i.e., with Russia] because it would then be hard to persuade Turkey to cede Bosnia. With regard to this I said that Andrássy had already taken steps and that they hadn’t found a favorable reception with the Porte.
In the face of Serbian suspicion, these were embarrassing admissions to be forced to make. The Porte was forewarned and obdurate; and the entire plan was virtually impracticable without the outbreak of war and upheaval.

Undoubtedly one of the factors which kept the Serbian government interested in the Bosnian plan, despite their growing scepticism about Andrássy’s ability to make good his promises, was their consciousness that Russia was unlikely to be of assistance. On the contrary: the renunciation of the Black Sea clauses paradoxically made the Russian government an even firmer supporter of the Balkan status quo than it had been hitherto. In return for the Porte’s acquiescence on the Black Sea issue, the Russians were willing to offer the Ottoman Empire a renewed guarantee of its territorial integrity, and thus gain a tactical ally at the projected international conference. In November 1870 rumors about this guarantee, which implied there could be no change in the status of Bosnia, were already reaching the Serbian Regents; as Dr. Rosen reported to Kállay on the twenty-fourth, “Even Ristić is against the Russians.”

The obvious annoyance in Belgrade with Russia caused Kállay to claim to Beust, somewhat implausibly, that any Serbo-Russian understanding was out of the question. The realization was gaining ground in Serbia, according to Kállay, that Austria-Hungary was the only power from which it could hope for anything, as well as the only power which could seriously threaten it. Kállay concluded that “Serbia honestly desires the preservation of the Turkish Empire; this is indeed the best guarantee for its own survival.” Naturally, the Serbian government had not given up its hopes of taking over the administration of Bosnia; but they knew full well that this could only take place, Kállay stressed, “with the help of the Western powers, but especially of Austria-Hungary, and under the suzerainty of the Porte.”

At no point did Kállay do more than hint to Vienna at what was really being negotiated. Beust might well have gathered from the above that his subordinate was still encouraging the Regents to dream of a Serbian share in Bosnia, but the details of what Andrássy and Kállay hoped to spring upon him as a fait accompli remained hidden from him.

In fact the Hungarian initiative appeared on the verge of a breakthrough. Four days after the despatch just mentioned, on 28 November, Kállay had a meeting with all three of Serbia’s Regents. Jovan Gavrilović, the shadowy third Regent, was no more than a political makeweight, but his presence at this stage of the negotiations seemed to indicate a symbolic commitment to act on the part of the real men of power, Blaznavac and Ristić.

This meeting was held specifically to discuss the Bosnian plan and the question of a formal agreement on the matter between Serbia and the Monarchy. For the benefit of Gavrilović, Kállay began by rehearsing, as if it were his own plan, everything so far discussed with the other two Regents. The Regents agreed with the following summary:
as long as there is no war they [the Regents] would like diplomatic activity which would prepare the terrain, and when that was completed, the takeover of Bosnia by the Serbian army, in which case we would proclaim our intention not to intervene, while secretly we would help them with money and arms. With regard to this I expressed my opinion that this would not pose any great difficulty. In case war breaks out between us and Russia, let Serbia take over Bosnia, and we would guarantee its possession after the war; they, however, must assure us of their friendly neutrality.\textsuperscript{34}

Kállay added that, in the event of an Austro-Russian conflict, it would be inadvisable for Serbia to march into Bosnia at once, since at this point the Ottomans could still be expected to have substantial numbers of troops stationed there. However, “once the Turkish army was already preoccupied, and the excuse existed they could provoke an uprising in Bosnia and go in under the pretext of maintaining order on the Porte’s behalf.”\textsuperscript{35}

The Regents appeared to have no difficulty in accepting this scenario. What should have caused Kállay concern, however, was a detail he set down in his diary that evening. Despite Ristić’s reservations about a formal agreement, the Regents said “they would accept it if the minister of foreign affairs signed it.”\textsuperscript{36} It was a crucial proviso, which threatened the whole basis of the projected understanding. Short of a change of foreign minister, it is hard to see how it could be complied with; but then Kállay in late November was hoping for precisely such a change at the \textit{Ballhaus}.

Another indication of future difficulties was the reaction to Kállay’s proposed division of Bosnia along the River Vrbas. It was clear that this also found little favor with Ristić, who preferred not to discuss such details. Instead, said Ristić, the Serbian government would negotiate directly with the Croatian National Party on the territorial division, and in the event of a partition along the Vrbas line would be looking for compensation in the shape of Cattaro. To this, Kállay merely replied that “we at least didn’t want the aggrandizement of Croatia, but this would be in their [the Serbs’] interest, because otherwise they would have trouble with the Croats.”\textsuperscript{37}

Kállay was enough of a realist to see that all was not yet clear sailing, and as he prepared to leave for Pest he was in sombre mood. He pondered whether he should resign his post, “if I don’t find that Andrássy is pursuing a more energetic policy.”\textsuperscript{38} Much of Kállay’s pessimism was due to the unpromising international scene, since he had gathered from the press that “we are going to give way in the Black Sea question.”\textsuperscript{39} He would see what Andrássy said to the latest proposals from the Regents, but “I fear I am right, and that the time for energy from his point of view has still not come.”\textsuperscript{40}

The remarkable thing about Kállay’s despondency was the degree to which he associated success or failure in his Belgrade mission with Andrássy’s policy,
rather than Beust’s. In actual fact a great deal depended on whether, in the end, the foreign policy establishment of the Monarchy as a whole could be induced to back the Bosnian plan. Possibly this essential backing would be secured by a change in personnel, an event which, given the Emperor’s personal interest in Andrássy’s scheme, was at least conceivable in November 1870. Nevertheless Andrássy was not yet foreign minister, and the Serbian Regents showed every awareness of this awkward fact.

Between 1 and 23 December, Kállay saw Andrássy a total of five times in Pest. Andrássy was less than pleased with the failure to secure a firm acceptance of the Monarchy’s right to northwest Bosnia. He remained optimistic, however, and, on the basis of an ambiguous enquiry by the Ottoman ambassador, believed that “the Turks are beginning to become friends with this idea.” Such an assumption, for which no other evidence exists, was on a par with Andrássy’s belief in the Monarchy’s “free hand” for action against Russia. Deciding on the precise limits of the territory Austria-Hungary should claim, in fact, appeared to Andrássy the main problem in the Bosnian question, far transcending the matter of Ottoman cooperation. At Kállay’s second interview with him, on 8 December, Andrássy still had to “think this over a bit more, and will also speak to the Emperor.”

On 11 December, Kállay handed over to Andrássy “a list, in which I have noted down the principal points of the agreement to be concluded with the Serbian government.” This document, which as it turned out represented the closest the Hungarians ever got to finalizing the negotiations over Bosnia, has not survived in its original form. Instead, the points drafted by Kállay resurfaced later in three separate versions.

One, in Kállay’s hand but fragmentary and of questionable provenance, cannot even be dated with certainty. Nevertheless it clearly planned for a secret treaty with Serbia, and obliged the Monarchy, in case of a war with Russia in which Serbia was either an Austrian ally or a benevolent neutral, to permit a Serbian occupation of Bosnia “even during the war.” Even if Ottoman protests made this impossible during hostilities, Austria-Hungary engaged to detach the provinces afterwards from the Ottoman Empire, “which would be compensated for this in Asia.” If Serbia managed to secure the Porte’s agreement to a handover in time of peace, “then we would be obliged to claim for ourselves the part roughly up to the line Narenta [Neretva]-Verbas [Vrbas] as frontier rectification.” This, incidentally, was the first mention of the Neretva River as a further delineation of Austria-Hungary’s share, and made it clear that what the Hungarians had in mind was the entire western third of Bosnia, as far south as Metković on the Dalmatian frontier.

The other two surviving versions of the draft treaty are the virtually identical notes preserved by Jovan Ristić, on the basis of his interview with Kállay at the end of December, to be dealt with shortly. Ristić’s posthumously published third volume of memoirs contained a translation of his original notes of the in-
terview, which he wrote down in French at the time and, according to his own account, “in his [Kállay’s] presence, [and] at his dictation.” In their published, Serbian form these notes differ from the French notes taken at the time only in minor details. The sole significant inaccuracy is that Ristić in his memoirs describes the interview as having taken place in the autumn of 1870, an error repeated by Vojislav J. Vučković when he published the French text in 1963.

The Kállay diary, however, makes it clear that the only draft treaty set down on paper in this fashion, between Kállay and the Regents, was that discussed on 27 December. It also seems probable, in the light of the above evidence, that what Kállay read out to Ristić was the final form of the list he submitted to Andrásy in Pest on 11 December.

On 15 December Kállay saw Andrásy again, and learned that he was now backing away from the idea of a formal treaty at all. From being bent on war, as late as 24 November, Andrásy had apparently calmed down considerably, claiming that “since war with Russia, it seems, has been averted, we don’t have to conclude a treaty with the Serbian government, but just give one another a verbal guarantee.” Nevertheless Andrásy announced that he was to see the Emperor personally the next day. “With Beust, however, he can’t speak about this.”

Map 6. Plan for the Partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1870–71
Renouncing a formal agreement did not, however, in Andrásy’s eyes, mean renouncing Austria-Hungary’s claim to northwest Bosnia. In return, Andrásy was prepared to guarantee that, if a dispute between Serbia and the Porte should flare up in time of peace elsewhere in Europe, the Monarchy would not only adopt a policy of non-intervention, but would prevent the intervention of other parties. Andrásy also stressed, on 21 December, that he had indeed discussed the whole matter with the Emperor, “who has accepted it.”51 Kállay was authorized to “communicate His Majesty’s assent with regard to the Bosnian affair. But Beust must know nothing about the whole thing.” 52 Clearly this state of affairs would not continue indefinitely. Andrásy’s sudden reluctance to contemplate a formal treaty, despite Francis Joseph’s personal involvement, actually reduced the chances of getting Blaznavac and Ristić to commit themselves.

The terms which Kállay laid before Ristić, on 27 December, were concrete enough. In the absence of Blaznavac, who was sick, Kállay informed Ristić of the Emperor’s approval of the conditions proposed. He also claimed, with more presumption than accuracy, that “the minister for foreign affairs would sign the eventual treaty.” 53 On the ticklish question of why a formal treaty was no longer required, Kállay fell back on the fact that the threat of war had receded, hence “we had to reach agreement only with regard to those elements on which we could later conclude a treaty.” 54

The points which Ristić then jotted down, in Kállay’s presence, covered a wide variety of possibilities. In any Serbo-Turkish conflict, for instance, the Monarchy would not intervene, and would ensure that no other power did so either. If Serbia provoked a conflict, it undertook to let the Austro-Hungarian government know of its intentions in advance. If the Porte started hostilities, or if it was uncertain which side had initiated them, Serbia would still be bound to warn Austria-Hungary before deploying any Serbian forces in Ottoman territory. In each eventuality, Austria-Hungary engaged to preserve a benevolent neutrality vis-à-vis Serbia. In the event of Austria-Hungary’s direct involvement in war with “a foreign Power”—in plain parlance Russia—Serbia would preserve a friendly neutrality. In return, the Monarchy

engages after the war to procure for Serbia Bosnia, the Herc[egovina]. and Old Serbia (boundaries to be determined) in such a fashion as to have these provinces annexed to Serbia, with which they would form a state placed under the suzerainty of the Porte, in the current conditions of Serbia.

The Monarchy moreover undertook to enforce this occupation “if necessary by war.” The inevitable quid pro quo for this was northwest Bosnia: “As soon as Serbia has annexed these provinces Austria will occupy, for its part, the part of Bosnia up to the Verbas and Narenta.” Should trouble break out in Bosnia while Austria-Hungary was still at war, then both parties would consult with one an-
other “in order to enter into the countries, which, in the cases provided for, would form the integral part of their states.”

As Kállay recorded that evening, this was where his own draft ended. Ristić, however, tacked on a final clause. According to this, if the Ottomans actively resisted this joint Austro-Serbian intervention, either on Serbian soil or on their own territory, “the condition of maintaining the suzerainty of the Porte lapses, and Austria engages to recognize Serbia as an independent State, and to work in this sense with the other Powers.” Kállay sensibly pointed out that he could make no comment on this addendum, and on that point the two wound up their discussion.

Ristić was a notoriously cautious and suspicious individual. Nevertheless, if his memoirs are to be believed, he personally accepted that the Hungarian initiative with regard to Bosnia was sincerely intended. Ristić at least in retrospect made a clear distinction between the traditional machinations of Vienna, after 1867, and the policies pursued by the Hungarian government, which “entered on to a completely different track and showed a friendlier disposition towards Serbia.” Ever since Andrássy’s rencontre with Prince Michael at Ivánka, Ristić conceded, the Hungarian government had demonstrated its desire for good relations. There was, to be sure, a certain sting in Ristić’s remark that Andrássy, as minister president, had tried “to attach the neighbouring Balkan nations, and especially Serbia, to Hungary—but for as cheap a price as possible.” But Ristić had to recognize the encouragement Andrássy had given Serbia’s national aspirations, even if he “shrank from the very thought of changing the shape of the Ottoman Empire.”

Ristić saw the contradictions inherent in Andrássy’s policy between 1867 and 1871. The Hungarian was a politician whose country found itself “in an insufficiently consolidated monarchy,” and whose domestic policies were often dominated by nationality issues. As Ristić asked himself, “how could he dare even to think of inspiring and strengthening those nationalities on Hungary’s borders?” Was this not playing with fire, “which could easily spread to his own premises?” Ristić explained this paradox, accurately enough, with reference to the overriding Hungarian concern with Russia, and the need, in the event of an Austro-Russian struggle, to ensure that Hungary was not caught between two fires.

According to Ristić’s account, Kállay deployed some powerful arguments in his attempt to gain the Regents’ confidence. A comparison with Kállay’s own personal record reveals that some of the things he told Ristić were true, while others were not the whole of the matter, or were simply false; but Ristić naturally could not know this. On the crucial issue of Francis Joseph’s involvement, for instance, Kállay said “that the Emperor had informed him in brief, that he would receive orders to work for the joining of Bosnia to Serbia.” Beust, moreover,
had not only accepted the project; he had, claimed Kállay, “instructed Kállay
that he could start work on the business which Count Andrásy had advised.”66
Finally, Kállay revealed that Andrásy had already sounded the Ottoman ambas-
sador in Vienna on the subject, a detail which, as it happened, Ristić was able to
verify from his own sources.67

Ristić thus did not share the conviction expressed to him by Bishop Stross-
mayer, at the start of 1871, that the entire scheme was “a Hungarian swindle.”68
On the contrary: in a passage written admittedly in the mid-1870s, at a time when
Andrássy was in a powerful position, Ristić insisted that Andrássy “meant hon-
estly by us with his proposal.”69 Such recognition did not, however, preclude a
thoroughgoing skepticism as to Andrássy’s ability to work miracles. Ristić was
just as conscious as Strossmayer of the basic objection to the Bosnian plan: that
it did not square with the well-known views of Beust on the Eastern Question.
Ristić knew well enough by early January what stand Beust meant to take at the
London Conference on the question of the Black Sea clauses. He could hardly
dispute Strossmayer’s reminder that Beust would stress “above all the integrity
of Turkey.”70

The assumptions behind the proposals, in Ristić’s judgment, were all too
questionable. For instance, Serbia was bound to observe a friendly neutrality to-
ward Austria-Hungary in the event of the latter going to war; but since the likeli-
est opponent in such a conflict was Russia, would Serbian neutrality really be
possible? Nor was Ristić happy at the prospect of handing over to the Monarchy,
in the event of a Habsburg victory, what he revealingly described as “a third of
these Serbian lands.”71 Rightly or wrongly, Ristić feared the consequences for the
Regency of accepting two such positions: “Would we not . . . enter into conflict
with the feelings and interests of all Slavs, not to mention our own people?”72

Just as worrisome for Ristić was the clause which provided for the occupa-
tion by the Monarchy and Serbia of their respective shares of Bosnia, in the event
of disorders breaking out there. For Ristić this was one of the points which made
the whole plan unacceptable. He evidently hoped that Austria-Hungary’s occupa-
tion of the northwest corner of Bosnia would be only temporary. However,

it could happen that Austria would maintain its occupation, but that we would
not be in a position to do this with ours. What a miserable result that would
be! We would have put ourselves under Austria’s thumb, while she occupied our
Serbian lands!73

And in the event of such a catastrophe, from the Serbian point of view, who
would guarantee that Andrássy, whom the Regents could trust, would remain
at Hungary’s helm? Who would wager that, in return for Serbia’s neutrality, the
perfidious Monarchy would not in fact occupy Serbia itself? In short, too much in
the plan hinged upon Andrássy’s continuing presence and influence.
Chapter 8

The scenario would be worst of all if the Monarchy suffered defeat in a war against Russia, in which Serbia had sat on the sidelines as a supposedly friendly neutral. Serbia would be exposed to the rancor of Russia and the Slav world for its support for the Habsburg Monarchy, hence “we would share its destruction, without even firing a shot.” Since Ristić considered an Austro-Hungarian defeat the most likely outcome, it is not surprising that in the light of all these reasons he preferred to wait upon events. Nor is it any wonder that Blaznavac too increasingly found the Bosnian plan “full of dangers.”

It was to be some time before Kállay realized it, but he was to advance the Bosnian question no further. As on previous occasions, the Regents made repeated promises, over the next few weeks, that they would give their answer soon; but this receded, mirage-like, continually into the future. Matters were to continue in this fashion for several more months, with the Regents assuring Kállay that a detailed reply to the alliance proposals was imminent, and Kállay besieging Andrássy for some fresh instructions, on the strength of which he could put the negotiations back on the agenda. Noticeable, too, was a further stiffening in the Serbian conditions: by late March 1871, the Regents were suggesting that Austria-Hungary’s share in any partition of Bosnia should not extend beyond the River Una, a considerable reduction.

In reality, however, there was very little to negotiate. On 24 January, Kállay learned for the first time that the Regents knew about what Ristić, in his memoirs, called “The first bomb, which exploded over this confidential relationship.” The supplementary volume of the Austro-Hungarian Rotbuch had finally reached Belgrade, and in it was published Beust’s circular of 23 November. As Ristić complained to Kállay, the explicit threat to Serbia and Romania, the circular, was an affront to “their national self-esteem”; certainly it had created “an extremely bad impression” in Belgrade. To this, Kállay’s attempt to demonstrate that the circular “didn’t have any significance and that because of this I hadn’t mentioned it to them [the Regents],” must have sounded lame even in his own ears.

Ristić, by his own account, accepted Kállay’s explanation, and even describes Kállay as being “so much wiser than his chief [Beust] that he did not make any use whatsoever of this note with the Serbian government.” What Ristić forebore to mention, but which both men knew perfectly well, was that there was a glaring contradiction between the policy avowed by Andrássy, and that which Beust continued to represent. While Andrássy promoted a plan which had as its centerpiece a reordering of the status quo in the Balkans, Beust was still, it seemed, prepared to threaten Serbia with condign punishment if it disturbed that status quo. The alleged assent of the monarch himself to Andrássy’s scheme, one must remember, was as far as the Regents were concerned just that: they only had Kállay’s word for it. An inherently improbable plan, given the obstacles in the way, appeared to be opposed by one of the key figures in the Monarchy’s foreign
policy establishment. Unless the Hungarians’ vaunted endorsement from the Emperor was made obvious, moreover, it looked as though Beust’s opposition to the plan would be decisive.

Beust’s November circular was certainly a more realistic appraisal of the relationship between Serbia and the Monarchy than that which Kállay had been promoting for the past three years. Its revelation at a time when the Monarchy was confidently claiming Serbian support at the London Conference, however, had a devastating effect. There was no disguising the leverage that the circular gave the Regents, in citing Austrian, if not Hungarian, malevolence as an excuse for non-cooperation over issues raised at the London Conference, such as the regulation of the Danube. The official press in Serbia immediately echoed this tone of outrage, and there was a sudden rash of leading articles complaining about Austrian arrogance and insensitivity.

Kállay at first made no mention of these reactions to Beust, as if he hoped against hope that the issue would die away. In a despatch to Andrássy on 28 January, however, Kállay did not conceal his alarm at the possible consequences of “this tactless telegram,” which he saw as the culminating point in a long series of “blunders by Austrian statesmen.” Beust’s stress on the inviolability of the 1856 treaties, and his slighting references to Balkan national aspirations, had created such a bad impression, Kállay wrote,

the first because it diametrically contradicts the well-meaning proposals expressed by Your Excellency in the interests of these provinces, the second because small, backward nations, which have nothing else but the concept of a future national greatness, are apt to be sensitive on this point.

Noting the hostile replies in newspapers like Jedinstvo and even Vidovdan, Kállay drew some comfort from the fact that the Vidovdan leader “is laying great stress on the differences which exist between the policy of Count Beust and Hungarian policy,” a line which was apparently dictated by Blaznavac himself. Kállay expressed the conviction that Andrássy’s standing in the Balkans, by contrast to that of Beust, had if anything increased by comparison. However, “since the common foreign minister is still Count Beust, the bad effect will sooner or later extend to the policy of the entire Monarchy.”

The discomfiture of both Andrássy and Kállay can only have been heightened by the news that General Stratimirović, the Hungarian Serb politician, had tabled an interpellation of Andrássy on the subject in the Hungarian parliament on 1 February. Stratimirović pointedly asked whether the Hungarian government was in agreement with the policy set forth in the November circular; whether in fact the Monarchy should not be following “a liberal policy of support for the emancipation of the Christians” in the Balkans; and why the same neutrality, observed so strictly in the West, was not also applied to the East.
For Andrássy, who had spent the last four years trying to implement a policy favorable to Serbian, if not Romanian aspirations, to be arraigned publicly in this fashion for Beust’s sins must have been galling. In the meantime, Kállay attempted to enlighten Beust as to the effect of the circular. Something clearly had to be reported officially to Vienna, since Kállay had only just seen Blaznavac who, as Kállay recorded privately, made no secret of the fact that the circular’s effect was “extraordinarily unpleasant for him personally.”90 The Regent complained that the circular “made difficult if not impossible the work of consolidating good relations with us. . . . The Russians could never have done anything so useful to their interests as Beust’s telegram.”91 To this Kállay made the bold assertion that “although Beust even wrote telegrams in the matter what he wanted wasn’t happening, the Emperor was completely won over to a policy which assigned Bosnia to Serbia.”92 However necessary to placate Blaznavac, such language clearly would not be acceptable in Kállay’s dispatch to Vienna.

Kállay at first tried the tactic of recalling Beust’s past expressions of goodwill toward the Balkan Christians. The frequency of these, Kállay claimed, had gradually created in Serbia the conviction that its welfare was “most securely to be achieved for the most part through a closer association with the policy of its mighty neighbor Austria-Hungary.” For “Austria-Hungary,” here, it was of course really “Hungary” which Kállay had in mind. His next observation, though, was a more straightforward reflection of his priorities. This Serbian loyalty was important, he wrote, because of that “extremely damaging influence which a Serbia hostile to us could exercise among the South Slav populations of our Monarchy, especially on the occasion of a foreign war.” This ultimate disaster had so far been avoided. Not only had Russian influence waned, but “Serbia’s relations with our South Slavs can, on the contrary, be termed rather hostile than friendly.”

The circular of 23 November, however, was perceived as a threat, and “a threat on the part of mighty Austria can inspire all the more apprehension here, because the danger for little Serbia in this case would be imminent.” Making the same point he had made to Andrássy, about the touchiness of Serbian national feeling, Kállay went so far as to claim that Beust’s own instructions had consistently ordered him, Kállay, “not to confront Serbian national aspirations abruptly.” Since Beust’s circular appeared to do precisely that, Kállay feared for the results: “Every step which estranges Serbia from us has, necessarily, a gravitation towards Russian policy as a consequence.”93 And so indeed it proved, although Kállay completely ignored the extent to which his own and Andrássy’s dabbling in secret diplomacy had contributed, and was still contributing, to this result.

To Andrássy, on 6 February, Kállay held to it that the Regents continued to look to Pest: “all their trust centers on Your Excellency alone.”94 In view of what both Regents were now openly saying about Serbia’s relationship with the Monarchy, however, Kállay’s belief in their loyalty to Andrássy seems increasingly like
whistling in the dark. It was significant that Blaznavac, especially, made a direct, if unsubtle, link between the maintenance of good relations and the Monarchy’s good offices for Serbia. As for Ristić, Kállay was fully aware that the second Regent had always been more sceptical of the benefits to Serbia of a close association with the Monarchy, even under Andrássy’s aegis. Kállay would hardly have been surprised at the scornful tone of Ristić’s comments, in December 1870, to Serbia’s representative in Constantinople: “Who is going to give us Bosnia over the diplomatic table? For that we need a different time and circumstances.”

By early February 1871, with Serbia being upbraided by Vienna for its position on the Danube question, the revelation of the Beust circular had clearly hardened Ristić’s attitude still further. Replying to General Ignatiev’s taunt that Serbia had abandoned its leadership of the Balkan Christians, Ristić informed Hristić on 7 February that “When the moment comes to act, then the impatience will disperse like mist and all minds will be with us.” He dismissed as nonsense a report, attributed to Ottoman sources, that Serbia intended lobbying for the administration of Bosnia at the London Conference: “We know perfectly well that we can’t request Bosnia from anyone, so we shan’t be asking it from the conference either.” If that “anyone” is to be taken literally, Ristić evidently no longer set much store by Andrássy’s Bosnian plan, assuming that he had ever done so.

In mid-February, and with the London Conference entering its final stage, Kállay received a lengthy justification from Beust for the publication of his November circular. It was clear Beust was in no mood to accept the strictures of the Serbian press and government circles. Instead, he went on the offensive, listing all the benefits Serbia had derived from the Monarchy in recent years. These included the evacuation of the fortresses in 1867; securing the recognition of the hereditary nature of the Obrenović succession; and sponsoring the 1869 Constitution. The Regents, Beust insisted, were completely misinterpreting the circular if they saw in it evidence of a new, anti-Serbian policy on the part of the Ballhaus. “Far from pursuing thereby views hostile to Serbia, . . . the only cause that I have devoted myself to pleading is that of the maintenance of the treaties guaranteeing the rights of the Principalities.” Beust followed this up with a second despatch the same day, making yet another appeal for Serbia’s support over the question of regulating the Danube.

Kállay went to see Ristić on 17 February. He started by reading out Beust’s dispatch of 12 February, justifying the November circular, and got the impression that Ristić was “extremely pleased with it.” On the subject of the Danube, however, and despite deploying every possible reason why Serbia should support Austria-Hungary, Kállay ran into a brick wall:

Although he [Ristić] didn’t say so outright, I could already see that they aren’t going to do so. I mentioned that if they maintain their opposition this is nothing other than mistrust of us.
With Blaznavac, whom he saw the same day, Kállay received an identical re-
response: emollient assurances that Beust’s explanations more than made up for
the November circular; prevarication and a promise to think it over with regard
to the Danube.\textsuperscript{102}

Whatever protestations of satisfaction Kállay received from the Regents,
their subsequent refusal to give way over the Danube was probably reinforced
by the ill will which Beust’s circular had generated. The Regents had received
a sharp reminder that the Austria they were most familiar with, the Austria that
threatened, and took Serbian insignificance for granted, still existed. Not only did
this cast a questionable light on Hungarian assurances of friendship, it clashed
with any attempt by Vienna to play down the original intent of the November
circular. Ristić, admittedly in retrospect, claimed that Beust’s reluctance to see
his February dispatch published, as the Regents suggested, proved that the No-
vember circular “could not have any other meaning than that which we had given
it, and in addition to us everyone else who read it.”\textsuperscript{103}

Most important from Kállay’s point of view, his credibility as a negotiator
was fatally undermined. By February 1871 there was no lack of reasons for the
Regents to treat his interpretations of either Austrian or Hungarian policies with
scepticism. The Karađorđević case remained in limbo, and Ristić at least was
increasingly dismissive of the Bosnian scheme. The need to smooth over Beust’s
circular appears to have taxed Kállay’s powers of explanation to the limit. Filip
Hristić informed Ristić from Constantinople that, according to the reports the
Italian embassy there was receiving from its consulate in Belgrade, “Kállay’s
position . . . has become untenable.”\textsuperscript{104} The Regents, Joannini was supposed to
have informed his superior in Constantinople,

have perceived now that all Kállay’s fine words have been words only and noth-
ing else . . . Kállay has . . . been so compromised and shamed before the Serbian
government, that he can’t go out of his house.\textsuperscript{105}

Kállay’s own record does not quite bear out this highly colored report; but what
he did set down is evidence enough that things had gone seriously wrong.

On 20 February Andrássy rose in the Hungarian parliament to answer the
Stratimirović interpellation. In a reply concerted with Beust, Andrássy denied ut-
terly that the chancellor had threatened Serbia and Romania with armed interven-
tion. Beust’s intentions had been, on the contrary, to emphasize just how much
the 1856 settlement guaranteed “the contemporary international position and
rights” of the vassal principalities.\textsuperscript{106} Stratimirović’s concerns were thus “com-
pletely groundless.”\textsuperscript{107}

The statement was an anodyne account, which quite ignored the unmistak-
able note of menace in the November circular’s promise to deploy “the whole
force of the Monarchy” against any threat to the status quo. Andrássy’s reply
also studiously sidestepped the real point of the circular, which was not aimed at developments within the principalities themselves, but rather at their possible provocation of revolt in neighboring Ottoman provinces. Such a warning had especial relevance for Serbia’s known aspiration to gain control of Bosnia, an aspiration which Andrásy and Kállay had of course been encouraging for the past three years. Neither Kállay’s diary nor the relevant Serbian sources comment on the reception Andrásy’s statement got in Belgrade, but it is hard to imagine how it could have failed to remind the Regents of the dichotomy afflicting “Austro-Hungarian” foreign policy.

Notes


4  Kállay Diary, 24 Nov.–1 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, 343–44).
5  HHSA, PA XXXVIII/187.
6  Kállay Diary, 23 Dec. 1870 et seq. (Dnevnik, 348 ff.)
9  Kállay Diary, 10 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 338).
10  Ibid.
Chapter 8

12 Kállay Diary, 13 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 338–39).
13 Ibid. (Dnevnik, 339).
15 Kállay Diary, 13 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 339).
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 17 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 340).
18 Ibid., 13 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 339).
19 Ibid., 17 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 340).
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid. (Dnevnik, 341).
22 Ibid., 19 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 341).
23 Ibid., 20 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 341).
24 Ibid., 23 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 342).
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid. (Dnevnik, 342–43).
29 Ibid. (Dnevnik, 343).
31 Kállay Diary, 24 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 343).
32 Kállay to Beust, 24 Nov. 1870, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/187.
34 Kállay Diary, 28 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 343–44).
35 Ibid. (Dnevnik, 344).
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 29 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 344).
39 Ibid; in the Hungarian original, “hogy a Pontus kérdésben engedni fogunk.” This is one of the rare passages where Šaralić’s translation in Dnevnik falls victim to Kállay’s miniscule handwriting. The Serbo-Croat version is “će oni popustiti u važnoj stvari” (they are going to give way in the important question), which is an understandable misreading of “fognak” for “fogunk” and of “fontos” for “Pontus.”
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 3 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, 345). For the dismissive view which the Ottoman government, in reality, took of the Bosnian plan, see Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 1 Aug. 1870, HHSA, PA XII/96; Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 5 Aug. 1870, HHSA, PA XII/97; and the discussion in Chapter 5, above.
42 Kállay Diary, 8 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, 346).
43 Ibid., 11 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, 346).
44 Draft treaty with Serbia, no date (although a reference to the Regency dates it to before August 1872), MOL, P344, 44. cs., F/b.1, written by Kállay. There is also a copy of this in the Andrásy family papers: MOL, P4; see Franz-Josef Kos, Die Politik Österreich-Ungarns während der Orientkrise 1874/75–1879 (Cologne & Vienna: Böhlau, 1984), 61–62.
45 Draft treaty with Serbia, no date (although a reference to the Regency dates it to before August 1872), MOL, P344, 44. cs., F/b.1.
216 ♦ Apple of Discord

47 Ibid., 3:140; “Austro-Hungarian proposal of a treaty with Serbia, which Kállay dictated to Jovan Ristić [Austro-ugarski predlog ugovora sa Srbijom, koji je Kalaj izdiktirao Jovanu Ristiću], [Belgrade, autumn 1870],” in Vučković, no. 222, 428–29. The original is in the Ristić papers, now in the Serbian State Archive. See also the detailed discussion by Radenić in his introduction (Dnevnik, xviii–xix), as well as his Nachwort (822), and in note 261 (733) to Kállay’s entry for 27 Dec. 1870.

48 Kállay Diary, 27 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, 348–49).

49 Ibid., 15 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, 347).

50 Ibid. József Galántai, A Habsburg-Monarchia alkonya: Osztrák-magyar dualizmus 1867–1918 (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1985), 239, who quotes the passage from Ristić’s memoirs cited in note 46 above, neglects to point out that the question was being raised in Belgrade without Beust’s knowledge.

51 Kállay Diary, 21 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, 348).

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid., 27 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, 348).

54 Ibid.


56 Kállay Diary, 27 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, 349).


58 Kállay Diary, 27 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, 349). Ristić, Spoljašnji odnošaji Srbije, 3:142, makes no mention of adding a final clause, or of Kállay’s reservation.

59 Ibid., 3:134.

60 Ibid., 3:138.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid., 3:139.

64 Ibid.


66 Ristić, Spoljašnji odnošaji Srbije, 3:143.

67 Ibid. Cf. Kállay Diary, 23 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 343).


69 Ristić, Spoljašnji odnošaji Srbije, 3:143.


71 Ristić, Spoljašnji odnošaji Srbije, 3:144–45.

72 Ibid., 3:144.

73 Ibid., 3:145; see also Kállay Diary, 24 Jan. 1871 (Dnevnik, 357–58).

74 Ristić, Spoljašnji odnošaji Srbije, 3:146.

75 Ibid.

76 E.g., Kállay Diary, 4 Mar. 1871 (Dnevnik, 365); Kállay to Andrássy, 4 Mar. 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/212–13; Kállay Diary, 16 Mar. 1871 (Dnevnik, 367); Kállay to Andrássy, 16 Mar. 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/214

77 Kállay Diary, 28 Mar. 1871 (Dnevnik, 371); Kállay to Andrássy, 29 Mar. 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/217–18.

78 Ristić, Spoljašnji odnošaji Srbije, 3:146

79 Kállay Diary, 24 Jan. 1871 (Dnevnik, 357–58).

80 Ibid. (Dnevnik, 358).

81 Ristić, Spoljašnji odnošaji Srbije, 3:147.

83 Ristić, *Spoljašnji odnošaji Srbije*, 3:147–48, 148, where one such passage, probably from *Jedinstvo*, is quoted.

84 Kállay to Andrássy, 28 Jan. 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/206, 204.

85 Ibid., ff. 204–5.

86 Ibid.


89 Ibid; the passage quoted is on 424.

90 Kállay Diary, 4 Feb. 1871 (*Dnevnik*, 359).

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

93 Kállay to Beust, 4 Feb. 1871, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191.

94 Kállay to Andrássy, 6 Feb. 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/208.


97 Ibid.

98 Beust to Kállay, 12 Feb. 1871, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191.


101 Kállay Diary, 17 Feb. 1871 (*Dnevnik*, 361).

102 Ibid. See also Kállay to Beust, 18 Feb. 1871 (no. 7), HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191.


105 Ibid.


This page intentionally left blank
Chapter 9

The Karađorđević Fiasco 1870–71

The story of the Karadorđević prosecution has been taken down to October 1870, when the ex-Prince of Serbia was acquitted in the Pest county court of conspiring to murder Prince Michael Obrenović. Kállay, no less than the Regents, regarded this with consternation, since his repeated assurances of a conviction had tied the Hungarian government’s reputation to the outcome. Both Kállay and Andrásy were very much in a dilemma of their own making here. On the one hand, they knew perfectly well that no Hungarian government could literally guarantee a guilty verdict. On the other hand, Kállay, with Andrásy’s support, had so often said it could, that the Regents were bound to interpret Karadorđević’s acquittal as a sign of Hungarian double-dealing. This in turn gave the Regents every excuse for delay in the Bosnian negotiations; later they were to apply the same principle to the Danube question.¹

For a full month after Karadorđević’s acquittal, the Regents remained preoccupied with the current Skupština at Kragujevac, and were not even in Belgrade. This gave Kállay a chance to weather the storm in the press, most of which, he was only too aware, was whipped up at the direct behest of the Regents.² He kept himself informed as to the government’s doings through Dr. Rosen, and in this way knew that one of the most personal attacks on him, which suggested he leave his post, was almost certainly penned “on Ristić’s orders.”³ Andrásy’s Bosnian plan, in the circumstances, struck Kállay as increasingly academic, since “as a result of this outcome to the Karadorđević trial we will hardly be able to negotiate with the Regents about such matters.”⁴

It was not until 17 November that Kállay first called on Blaznavac and Ristić. He already knew, from Dr. Rosen, that Blaznavac “has become mistrustful of Hungary and Rosen believes that he will now draw nearer to Russia.”⁵ Ristić,
predictably, was even more hostile.6 Kállay’s only consolation was the knowledge that the Hungarian government had immediately appealed to the higher court, the King’s Bench. He was uncomfortably aware, however, that the Regents still seemed to think, despite the evidence so far, that a conviction could be had in the Hungarian courts for the asking. Dr. Rosen, for instance, plainly acting on instructions from the Regents in advance of the meeting on the seventeenth, asked Kállay whether he could “promise that the higher court will convict him [Karađorđević].”7 As Kállay noted that evening, “I simply replied that I couldn’t promise anything so foolish.”8 It was a belated and, in view of Kállay’s own conduct, a rather futile protestation.

In an interview entirely taken up with the Karađorđević affair and the Bosnian question, and which took place moreover in the shadow of the Black Sea crisis, Kállay nevertheless found the Regents affable enough. He stressed that, whatever the outcome with Karađorđević, it was “only an unimportant personal question,” and “cannot possibly prevent good relations between us, seeing as how Serbia has much more important interests in the furtherance of which we can help.”9 He had a veiled riposte to this straight away, when both Regents expressed the view that Karađorđević’s acquittal “has made it more difficult to work for a better understanding with us.”10 Both Blaznavac and Ristić showed “showed great confidence in Andrássy and me personally,” but Kállay was unlikely to have been deceived by this geniality.11

To Beust and Andrássy, on 24 November, Kállay put a brave face on things. Indeed, he played down the effect, not only of Karađorđević’s acquittal, but of the Russian action over the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris, on the ground that there was no real possibility of an understanding between Russia and the present Serbian leadership. This, Kállay told Beust, was despite the release of Karađorđević.12 In fact Kállay was anything but optimistic. He had just quietly filed Beust’s peremptory circular of 23 November, which he instinctively realized would raise hackles in Belgrade, and in his private view both Beust and Andrássy were part of the problem. On the eve of further talks in Pest about the Bosnian plan, Kállay contemplated resigning, since neither in Vienna nor in Pest did there appear to be the will to pursue what he considered to be an “energetic policy.”13

Yet Kállay, too, was part of the problem. When, before his departure from Belgrade, he met all three Regents for a formal consideration of the Bosnian question, Kállay felt obliged to offer yet more placatory words with regard to Karađorđević: “I promised that we will do everything in our power to get him convicted.”14 This, as in the past, was fatally misleading language in the mouth of a diplomat. What Kállay undoubtedly meant was that he would leave no stone unturned in order to see that justice was done. What the Regents understood by this, or purported to understand, was that the Hungarian government had it in its power to guarantee conviction.
Once in Pest, moreover, Kállay immediately set about pulling every wire he could reach to produce precisely this result. As during the first trial, he had no hesitation in pressing the political merits of the case upon key officials in the bureaucracy and the judiciary itself. He called on Dezső Szilágyi, under secretary in the ministry of justice, to find out more about the composition of the court which would be handling the government’s appeal. Szilágyi revealed to Kállay that the president of the King’s Bench, Judge Miklós Szabó, would himself head the panel, and urged Kállay to visit Szabó personally.15

On 9 December Kállay did just that. He made it abundantly clear that a conviction was of overriding importance. Indeed, he was so worried at the possible consequences of the October acquittal being upheld that he asked Szabó bluntly to postpone judgment, if conviction seemed impossible. To make sure Szabó appreciated the weight of political interest in the case, Kállay also dropped the biggest name at his disposal. “I mentioned that Andrássy would like to talk with him,” Kállay noted that evening, adding, “he will go as soon as he has studied the problem.”16 There is no subsequent record of Szabó’s interview with the minister president, but Kállay had certainly done his best to drop a hint in the right direction.

Back in Belgrade before Christmas, Kállay was soon immersed in the crucial negotiations with the Regency over Bosnia, which reached their most intensive stage about this time.17 His final attempt to influence the result of the appeal was in mid-January, when he learned from the newspapers that the King’s Bench had convened. Kállay promptly telegraphed Andrássy, “asking him to keep a watchful eye on the affair.”18

It is impossible to say how decisive Kállay’s lobbying might or might not have been, although if the King’s Bench verdict was free of bias this was hardly Kállay’s fault. In the event the judgment handed down on 14 January reversed that of October 1870. The Szabó court found Karađorđević, and his associates Pavle Tripković and Filip Stanković, guilty of conspiracy to murder; Karađorđević was condemned to eight years hard labor, Tripković and Stanković to four years each.19

A key element in the verdict of January 1871 appears to have been the evidence of one Dimitrije Kuzmanović, a fellow suspect in the murder conspiracy who was nevertheless released by the Serbian court in November 1868.20 The circumstances of his acquittal were somewhat suspicious, and at the first Pest trial, in February 1869, Karađorđević in fact accused Kuzmanović of being a police spy, adding for good measure that it was Kuzmanović’s grandfather who, back in 1817, had beheaded the ex-Prince’s father, Karadorde, at the behest of Miloš Obrenović.21 Despite these objections, and the still unremedied inadequacies of the evidence supplied by the Belgrade prosecuting authorities, the King’s Bench evidently felt that the testimony of such as Kuzmanović was sufficient.22
It must have seemed to Kállay that one of his principal burdens had been lifted from his shoulders. Blaznavac was all thankfulness and cordiality, and gave what Kállay took to be “a convincing assurance that they will now act wholeheartedly on behalf of Hungarian policy, since the necessary basis for this exists.”23 In Dr. Rosen’s opinion, as Kállay recorded, “I now dominate the situation.”24 Only Ristić held aloof, a stance which Kállay put down to sour grapes: “Perhaps he is displeased by the judgment, since now he can’t reproach Hungary.”25

Kállay’s triumph was short-lived. It soon emerged that Karadorđević, Tripković and Stanković had appealed, and that the right to appeal had been granted. This meant that the case would be heard in the Hungarian Supreme Court, whose decision would be final. In a flash the situation was as before, with Kállay anxiously, but with increasing irritation, defending the good intentions of the Hungarian government, and the Regents gloomily withholding their favors. The fact that news of the appeal coincided with publication of the Austro-Hungarian Rotbuch, containing Beust’s November circular, cannot have improved matters.

By late March both sides were getting nervous. Colonel Orešković reported on the twenty-second that the Regents were alarmed by rumors that

the [Hungarian] minister of justice has allegedly announced that the Hungarian courts cannot pass judgment in this case, and that Karadorđević moreover has set aside 30,000 forints for bribing the court.26

To compound these fears Karadorđević had now taken up residence in Vienna. The Regents, said Orešković, were “afraid that the Viennese reaction is going to adopt the matter as its own and work upon Andrássy not to oppose acquittal.”27 They wanted Orešković to go up to Pest and lobby Andrássy in person.

Kállay’s response showed how little concerned he now was to conceal his own exasperation. He pointed out that Vilmos Tóth, the current justice minister, was hardly likely to have made the remark attributed to him, since it was the minister of justice who was responsible for bringing the prosecution in the first place. “Bribery I didn’t regard as possible, otherwise let the Regents try it themselves from their side.”28 Nor did he encourage Orešković to plague Andrássy. As for Kállay himself,

as far as my intervention in this regard is concerned I now couldn’t say anything, because after the attitude which the Serbian government adopted in the Danube question I wouldn’t dare take any steps in their interest with my own government.29

It was precisely the Danube question which, at this very juncture, produced some of the most acrimonious exchanges between Kállay and the Regents to date. After Orešković had promised to explain Kállay’s position to Blaznavac and Ristić, Kállay reflected: “let them get a little alarmed.”30
This stone-faced treatment seemed at first to produce results. Blaznavac, whom Kállay saw on 24 March, visibly shared Orešković’s alarm, but Kállay by his own account remained “very cold and reserved.” He poured scorn on the Regents’ notion that the Viennese military reaction was somehow capable of dictating policy to Andrásy in the matter of Karadordević. When Blaznavac protested that “against the reaction they are ready to do anything possible to support Hungary, because they won’t allow themselves to be exploited as in 1848,” Kállay replied “that we in Hungary weren’t afraid of the reaction and that we would defend ourselves on our own.” Ristić got similarly short shrift.

Kállay did not doubt, any more than he had in January, that the Supreme Court would find for the prosecution. Nevertheless he thought it would be a good thing if the Supreme Court verdict could be postponed for another couple of months. Uncertainty over the outcome, he told Andrásy on 24 March, would make them more flexible on issues like the Danube and the railway franchise; or, as he put it in his diary that evening, “let this sword of Damocles hang over the Regents’ heads.” If postponement proved impossible, of course, then “we, who have already done so much in this affair, must in any case press for conviction.” Kállay followed this up with a letter to Szilágyi, enquiring “whether he has hopes of [Karadordević] being convicted.”

On 28 March, Orešković informed Kállay that, at the Regents’ request, he intended visiting Andrásy in Pest after all. As Kállay reported to Andrásy the next day, it would be advisable to let the Regents know “that they can count on Your Excellency’s influence in this matter.” In the end a conviction was just as important for the Hungarian as for the Serbian government, since Karadordević’s definitive acquittal would perhaps have as a consequence the fall of the present Regency, but from the point of view of our interests we can’t wish for a better government than the present one in Serbia, for all its faults and vacillation.

As further evidence of this, Kállay revealed that the Regents had also entrusted Orešković with a letter for Bishop Strossmayer, in which they apparently urged the Croat leader to make his peace with the Hungarian government.

The authorities in Pest clearly appreciated the seriousness of the matter, and were doing what they could to ensure conviction. Early in April Kállay learned from Dezső Szilágyi that the Lord Chief Justice Fábry was to preside over the case, “and he has promised that he will possibly be able to postpone the case until July.” On 10 April Orešković reappeared, with the news that he had seen Andrásy, “who promised to do everything he could to get Karadordević convicted.” A month later, Kállay assured Blaznavac that the Hungarian government “will do everything in its power” to secure the desired verdict.

Kállay was doomed to bitter disappointment. The Supreme Court assembled to hear the case on 31 May; on 3 June the judges found by a majority of four
to three that the King’s Bench ruling of the previous January was unsound.\textsuperscript{42} Karadorđević, Tripković and Stanković walked out of court free men, beyond further judicial appeal.

The Hungarian judges’ reasons for accepting the Karadorđević appeal were threefold, according to the report in the Hungarian journal \textit{Hon}. First, they agreed with the defendants’ argument that “in the international convention existing between the Hungarian and the Serbian governments Hungary is not entitled to pass judgment on the succession to the throne and especially the political movements of Serbia.”\textsuperscript{43} In other words, the case was essentially a political one, a view that Andrássy and Kállay had considered, and rejected, as far back as June 1868. Second, the Supreme Court concurred with the court of first instance, that the testimony and background of Dimitrije Kuzmanović, on which so much of the King’s Bench conviction had been based, were deeply suspect. Finally, the argument advanced in January 1871, to the effect that Karadorđević’s links with the Ottoman embassy in Vienna proved the existence of an anti-Obrenović plot, was rejected on the rather curious ground that “it was the Porte itself which confirmed Obrenović on the throne.”\textsuperscript{44}

Suspicions of corruption arose almost immediately, as they had after Karadorđević’s initial acquittal in October 1870. The evidence that the defense actually bribed one or more members of the Hungarian Supreme Court was circumstantial, anecdotal, and quite impossible to verify, although it has to be admitted that some of the accusations originated on the Hungarian, and not just the Serbian side.\textsuperscript{45}

It was clear that Andrássy was both surprised and annoyed by what he regarded as a sudden shift in the scales of justice.\textsuperscript{46} This gives at least some credibility to remarks attributed to him in mid-July, to the effect that the judges “must have been bribed, only he didn’t do it, Karad[orđević]. did it!”\textsuperscript{47} The assumption remained general in Belgrade that the court had been bribed, or in some way or other subverted. In Pest itself, Prince Michael’s widow appealed to Andrássy against the verdict, and her brothers, Kálmán and László Hunyadi, resigned their commissions in the \textit{honvéd} (Hungary’s militia) in protest.\textsuperscript{48} There was even a popular rumor current, shortly after the news from Pest reached the Serbian press, that the Emperor Francis Joseph himself had ordered the court to release Karadorđević, a theory which was discounted in political circles, at least, as being beyond the bounds of possibility.\textsuperscript{49}

Longworth, the British consul, evidently believed the charge of corruption. Writing in mid-June, he reported that “There can be no matter of mutual concernment demanding negociation or explanation, which will be untainted hereafter by the suspicions these proceeding have engendered.”\textsuperscript{50} A week later, Longworth described the Regents as “thoroughly convinced that the Austro-Hungarian Governments have connived at the corruption of the judges.” Blaznavac, alluding to his
exchanges with Kállay, claimed not only to have warned Andrásy, but to have received the latter’s confirmation of, the judges’ venality: Andrásy, “while admitting the worst that could be alleged against the Hungarian Tribunals, pledged his word of honor that justice in this case should be done.” Colored as it was by Blaznavac’ imagination, this nonetheless argued an ambiguity in Hungarian assurances on the subject, which had by now fatally compromised Hungarian credibility. Indeed, according to Longworth the Regents believed

> that Hungary can no longer boast a paramount or independent action in her foreign policy, and that Austria which could always reckon on the subservience of the Cara-Georgevitches . . . has merely sought to rehabilitate her instruments, with felons and bandits for their associates.

Here was the real importance of the Karadžorđević prosecution for the Serbian Regency, an importance which far outweighed mere considerations of justice.

Kállay appears to have broken the news of the acquittal to Blaznavac personally, on 4 June. “The news produced an extraordinary effect on Blaznavac,” Kállay recorded. “His expression changed completely.” As Kállay fully expected, Blaznavac’ immediate response was to deplore the verdict, “because the enemies of Serbo-Hungarian friendship have thereby received a powerful weapon.”

The one concrete proposal that emerged at this meeting was Blaznavac’ enquiry as to the possibility of deporting Karadžorđević from Austro-Hungarian soil. Kállay jumped at this chance of making good the damage done by Karadžorđević’s acquittal, and telegraphed Andrásy to this effect the same day. Deportation, he suggested, was “the only way of avoiding extremely unpleasant consequences.”

The idea of deporting Karadžorđević in the end produced only further disappointment and annoyance. As with the prosecution, each side now made cooperation conditional upon concessions, which neither side was minded to make. By the time a provisional compromise was reached, at the end of July 1871, it was abundantly clear to Kállay, at least, that even if Karadžorđević were expelled, it would make very little difference. The suspicion and hostility, with which Serbian politicians traditionally regarded both Austria and Hungary, once more appeared to have the upper hand. What was more, these were sentiments which were in a fair way to being reciprocated.

Kállay does not seem to have expected much from the deportation project. When Ristić assured him, on 5 June, that Karadžorđević’s expulsion would be announced with gratitude by the government in the Skupština, Kállay noted privately, “I don’t believe Ristić’s promises.” He would have been strengthened in his scepticism had he heard of Ristić’s own private reaction to the news of the acquittal. “We didn’t even ask for this trial,” the Regent complained to Hristić, with the implication that, if the Hungarian government had handed Karadžorđević over to the Serbian authorities in 1868, none of this bad feeling would have arisen.
That caution was advisable became obvious the next day, when Andrásy’s reply came back. Andrásy informed Kállay that “according to our laws it is not possible to effect deportation after an acquittal, unless the Serbian government finds new evidence on the basis of which a new charge could be framed.” This harked back to the difficulties the Hungarian government had experienced in prosecuting: the evidence supplied by the Belgrade authorities was decidedly inadequate, and had already led to much acrimonious correspondence on the subject. Kállay nevertheless professed to see “some hope in the fact that the acquittal was the consequence of an inadequate prosecution,” and went to tell Blaznavac of Andrásy’s position. He was ready, he told Blaznavac, to go up to Pest in person to do his all for Karadórdović’s deportation.

Despite this show of optimism, Kállay’s underlying mood was sombre. The real problem lay on the Serbian side. On a visit to Blaznavac, prior to leaving for Pest, Kállay was told that “there were indeed new facts, on the basis of which the Serbian government might seek deportation, but it can’t verify them, because it cannot compromise the people in question.” This was probably an allusion to the government’s evidence that the Ottoman embassy in Vienna was implicated; as Blaznavac said to Nikola Krstić a couple of days before, they had a statement to that effect, “but they can’t make use of it.” Given what he had heard, Kállay began to despond: “unfortunately, there’s no hope that I shall be able to get a deportation.”

Once in Pest, Kállay began to discover, as he had feared, that this issue of fresh evidence was really the crux of the matter. Andrásy was in uncompromising vein. His annoyance with the Serbs, and his disinclination to exert himself further in the Karadórdović affair, were apparent in the setting of a second condition. Andrásy would approve Karadórdović’s deportation, Kállay noted on 16 June, “only if the Serbian government requests it and to this end submits new evidence of instigation to revolt or hatching a conspiracy.” That, for the moment, was all Kállay could get from him. It was, however, a slight improvement on Andrásy’s position on the 8th, when he had informed Kállay that deportation was “an absolute impossibility.” His despatch of that date, which finally reached Kállay in Vienna shortly after he had seen Andrásy in person, was all in all a discouraging sign of his state of mind.

After expressing his surprise at the Supreme Court verdict, and emphasizing all he had done to avert this calamity, Andrásy effectively put the matter behind him, and concentrated on the continuing failure of the Regents to commit Serbia firmly to the Monarchy. He was addressing here a point raised a few weeks before by Kállay, on the Serbian government’s attitude toward the Hungarian Serbs. Although the Regency, as Kállay put it, “wants nothing more ardently than the suppression of the Serbian agitation prevailing in Southern Hungary,” it was extremely reluctant publicly to attack its critics there, since this laid it open to the
charge of having sold out to the Monarchy. Of late, the official and semi-official press in Belgrade had even appeared openly sympathetic to Serb nationalist aspirations in Hungary.65

Andrássy admitted the awkward position in which the Regents found themselves, and he promised that any conspiracy against the established order in Serbia, by either the Karadorđević camp or the Omladina, would be ruthlessly suppressed “even with armed force.” He further acknowledged that the rumored rapprochement between Russia and the Porte was a fact. What was more, the reason for this was Hungary’s friendship with Serbia, and the support “which we . . . bestowed upon Serbian plans regarding Bosnia and the Hercegovina.” The only way of averting the consequences of the Russo-Turkish rapprochement, Andrássy continued, was by giving up this support for Serbia and the Balkan Christians, “which, however, we have no thought of doing.”

The inference for the Regents, in Andrássy’s eyes, was clear: “In such circumstances we can no longer remain in uncertainty in relation to the Serbian government, if we do not want to fall between two stools.” The Regents simply must come off the fence; yet their attitude of recent months, as revealed during the London Conference, and in the Serbian press, was hardly conducive to good relations. Nor ought they to think they could flirt with the Novi Sad Serbs and at the same time cultivate anything like good relations with the Hungarian government. “This policy,” Andrássy warned, “could produce a fateful result for Serbia.” What if the Omladina came to power in Serbia? Would they not either restore the Karadordevići, or “install Miletić as dictator in Belgrade”? If such an awful scenario even threatened, Serbia’s present rulers must remember that they could hardly turn to Russia, which would never forgive them their independent policy of the last few years.66

Where this left the question of Karadordević’s deportation remained unclear, but late in June a decision was actually reached at the highest levels. Andrássy explained to Kállay on 24 June that, whatever fresh evidence the Serbian authorities came up with, it would not have to be proved; “as long as it is probable,” this would serve as an adequate pretext for expelling Karadordević.67 And the very next day Andrássy raised the Serbian government’s request at a meeting of the Hungarian council of ministers.

Andrássy began by giving his colleagues a rather curious account of the cause of the problem, the recent verdict of the Supreme Court. This had not only made an extremely bad impression on the Serbian government but had also, he claimed, given rise to the suspicion that the judges “had been influenced by the Hungarian government.”68 (As we have seen, the Regents’ real grievance was that the judges had not been influenced nearly enough by the Hungarian government, and all too effectively, as they thought, by the defendants.) With a fine disregard for uncomfortable reality, Andrássy told the council that the anxiety in
Belgrade had been allayed, “by stressing on the one hand the continuing friendly relations between the Serbian Principality and Hungary, and on the other the independence of the judicial system in Hungary.”

With regard to the request to deport Karadžorđević, Andrássy put on record his confidential advice to both the foreign ministry and the Belgrade consulate, that deportation as things stood was impossible, “since in the face of the aforementioned Supreme Court judgment it would run clean counter to the sanctity of the judicature.” However, if the Serbian government could submit anything new, demonstrating that Karadžorđević continued to maintain conspiratorial contacts, or inspired agitation, within Serbia, then the Hungarian authorities would be only too happy to expel him. This was not only for the sake of Serbo-Hungarian friendship, but also because any disturbances caused by the Karadžorđević faction in Serbia might well spill over the frontier into Hungary. Andrássy revealed that Beust shared his viewpoint, after which the council agreed that deportation could be arranged, provided the conditions stipulated were fulfilled.

Since Kállay knew that the Regents were unlikely to come up with anything new against Karadžorđević, he was not much cheered by this decision. The disillusionment on both sides, by this stage, undoubtedly played a part in the unsatisfactory negotiations which followed Kállay’s return to his post on 6 July. It was not until 14 July that Kállay at last had a thoroughgoing discussion with the Regents about the Karadžorđević affair. The meeting, lasting some six hours, ranged over all the issues which, in the past half year or so, had become so contentious. Kállay took as his general text Andrássy’s letter of 8 June, which he read out to Blaznavac and Ristić. In this, as we have seen, Andrássy’s growing suspicion of Serbian policy was the main theme, virtually crowding out the ostensible reason for the discussion.

Kállay started by commenting on the gradual change for the worse in relations, a change which appeared to be accompanied by friendly advances by the Regents toward the Monarchy’s South Slavs. This raised the involuntary question of whether good relations depended all that much on the prosecution of Alexander Karadžorđević. The Regents knew perfectly well how hard Andrássy and Kállay had striven to ensure a satisfactory outcome, and how much they regretted their failure. They also knew how many advantages they had derived from the association with Hungary.

Blaznavac and Ristić pointed out that their pro-Hungarian policy had, from the beginning, exposed them to abuse in and out of Serbia. Nor, they claimed, could they point to any practical advantage which had flowed from the relationship. They cited the lack of progress in ending the Monarchy’s consular jurisdiction in Serbia, and in concluding a trade convention. Not only had the relationship done little to further Serbia’s interests, but certain developments seemed rather to justify those who reviled the Regents for pursuing such a policy. There was
the matter of Beust’s November circular, which appeared expressly designed to deny that Austria “was following a policy sympathetic to the Christian peoples of Turkey.” There was Karadorđević, whose acquittal, whatever Pest’s intentions, was taken by public opinion in Serbia as proof of the Hungarian government’s ill will. The Regents insisted they wished to maintain the relationship, but because of public opinion they could no longer afford to avow this openly.

Kállay had heard these arguments before, and he treated himself to an extended refutation of them. In detail he undoubtedly was in the right of it, and one can understand the tone of exasperation in his account, at having to deal yet again with the same old evasions and half-truths. It is striking, however, how hectoring his language had by now become, how absolute the choice he posed the Regents. Ostensibly still the spokesman for a Hungarian policy toward Serbia, Kállay had insensibly donned the garb of a Prokesch-Osten. Every word he spoke breathed the stern admonition of a great power addressing its satellite.

The Regents, Kállay claimed, had certainly maintained a friendly attitude toward Hungary since 1868, but this in his opinion “was a constantly negative one.” They had held aloof from the Novi Sad Omladina and the Croatian National Party for the wrong reason: not because this was in Serbia’s interests, but in order to cultivate good relations with Hungary. They should rather have realized, Kállay continued, that “The tendencies of the Omladina are in themselves destructive,” while the party of Milić was a force for anarchy and revolution, with which Milan’s Regents flirted at their peril. As for Croatia, the Regents should know that they “cannot reckon on any genuine friendship there. The aspirations of both countries (Croatia and Serbia), precisely because of their identical nature, stand in flagrant opposition to one another.” Kállay could cite here no less an authority than Ristić himself, who had in the past “described the Croats very aptly as the rivals of the Serbs.” Such a state of affairs, Kállay implied, was as it should be; moreover, the Regents’ readiness to hold aloof from Hungary’s national minorities happened to coincide with the Hungarian national interest. “This, however, is all that we can boast of from the Serbian government on our own account.” It seemed a poor return for all that Hungary, and the Monarchy, had done for Serbia.

Among these services, Kállay listed the jurisdiction question, which he claimed was held up solely by the Serbian government’s insistence on innumerable amendments to the original, Austro-Hungarian proposals. The trade treaty, similarly, had been waiting two years for a Serbian reply. With regard to the Regents’ principal grievances: the Beust circular had been adequately explained, and the readiness with which this was done was even “a new proof of the sincerity of our friendly intentions.” Regarding Karadorđević, Kállay had little to add, although he insisted that “This affair has caused no one so many vexations as it has us.” Proposals had been laid before the Regents, and the latter could be sure that the Hungarian government would abide by them, if Belgrade responded.
Kállay concluded that there was in the end only one thing that the Habsburg Monarchy wanted from Serbia: “that the Serbian government should not interfere in our affairs.” Of late, however, the Regents had appeared to flout this unwritten rule: their pet journal *Jedinstvo* was running daily articles which not only sympathized with the Croatian opposition, but positively encouraged its resistance to Pest. Kállay put it to the Regents firmly,

that we could not be satisfied with such an equivocal attitude. We would in fact like to clarify whether the Regency was genuinely friendly to us or was hostile. We have always placed a great value on Serbia’s friendship, . . . because we consider a strong, well-developed Serbia a political necessity for our own sakes.

The Regents must make up their minds; and if they opted for Hungary, their commitment must this time be unmistakable.77

The reply Kállay got to all this eloquence was terse and ultimately uncompromising.78 It suggested that, for reasons of their own, the Regents no longer cared very much whether they remained on friendly terms with the Monarchy at all. They flatly denied courting either the Novi Sad Serbs or the Croat nationalists, an assertion which hardly squared with recent correspondence between Ristić and Bishop Strossmayer, or with a forthcoming visit to Miletic, in Vác prison, by the Serbian archimandrite Dučić, at Ristić’s behest.79 The vital questions were still Bosnia, and the expulsion of Karadordević. With regard to the first, the Regents anticipated that it “might perhaps soon reach a settlement.” In that case, they would be satisfied if, when the moment arrived, Andrássy would “henceforth both respect non-intervention and ensure that it was respected by others.” As for Karadordević, his deportation would be the final proof needed, after which Hungary would be left in no doubt as to the positive nature of Serbian friendship.

Kállay’s riposte showed how little this convinced him. The initiative as far as Karadordević was concerned, he repeated, lay with the Regents. His references to the (by now long dead) Bosnian question, however, are of interest as yet another indication of how seriously he and Andrássy had viewed its success, and why its failure drove a stake through the heart of what was left of Serbo-Hungarian cooperation. Andrássy’s Balkan policy, Kállay claimed, demanded that “an ever stronger state should develop, so that a period might finally be put to continuing unrest. Our interests also demand, in other respects, that the Serbian race living in Turkey should be united and form a state.” Nor had Andrássy abandoned this objective, as Kállay had recently confirmed. Yet if, despite this, Serbia drifted into a hostile or even merely insufficiently friendly attitude,

then no one of a sound understanding could demand of us, however, that we should help our outright enemies, or even dubious friends, to build a strong fortress in our rear. Already there are certainly others to be found, who, in order to take possession of Bosnia, would transform themselves from enemies into our warmest friends.80
And with this unmistakable reference to the Croats, Kállay retired from the lists. Whether he had retarded or accelerated the deterioration of relations with Serbia was not yet clear.

In fact from this point the signs of decisive alienation on the Serbian side began to multiply. It was early September before it became obvious that the Serbian government had no new charge to prefer against Karadorđević. Long before that, however, Kállay could feel the chill, in the length of time it took the Regents to respond.81

In a despatch to Beust, on 14 August, Kállay offered a somewhat different explanation for Serbia’s estrangement than he gave Andrássy. It would not do, for instance, to cite Hungary’s failure to deliver on the Bosnian question, in a letter to Beust of all people. Rather, Kállay sought to explain the recent shift in Serbian policy with reference to the domestic front. The Regents, with Skupština elections due in a few days, were obsessed with countering the apparent popular appeal of the opposition and the Omladina, an appeal which, in Kállay’s opinion, they overestimated. Nevertheless, what Kállay termed the Regents’ “excessive straining after popularity” was at the bottom of their reluctance to be seen truckling to the Habsburg Monarchy.

On the international scene, Russia’s action over the Black Sea had made a deep impression in Belgrade, and indeed was taken “as the most striking proof of Russia’s power.” The current rapprochement between Russia and the Porte, moreover, created a fear of being on the wrong side of Russia which was having its inevitable effect. Hence the renewed sensitivity to the views of the Monarchy’s own South Slavs, a concern which the Regents felt obliged to express regardless of the ire this aroused in Vienna and Pest. Most damaging of all, however, had been the acquittal of Karadorđević. As with Andrássy, Kállay assured Beust that this was taken by the Regents to show that “no practical advantage can grow out of our friendship for Serbia and the Regency.” It was the immediate cause of “a certain reticence towards us.”82

This was somewhat to underestimate the matter, since there were certainly other factors at work on the Serbian side. Among these was the desire of the Regents to raise their standing among the South Slavs by more active means, such as the publication of a pamphlet inciting the population of the Military Border to revolt. According to Andrássy’s intelligence sources, the pamphlet, though privately printed, had been prepared in the Serbian government’s press office.83 Blaznavac, however, claimed to know nothing of the pamphlet, and said that in any case he could not order its confiscation, “because that would be such a friendly service to the Hungarian government, to whom he doesn’t feel obliged since the judicial release of Karadorđević.”84

Karađorđević’s deportation, like Bosnia, had become a dead issue, which provided the Regents with a convenient stick with which to belabor the Hungarian
government. That no serious movement was contemplated by the Regents was clear by 7 September, when Blaznavac told Dr. Rosen, for Kállay’s benefit, that he would prefer it if the Hungarian government deported Karađorđević without any formal request from Belgrade. Coupled with the lack of new evidence, this ensured that neither of Andrássy’s two conditions would be met. And matters remained at that stage, awaiting a formal response from Pest, when the whole problem was rendered redundant by the Regents’ next move.

Notes

2 Kállay Diary, 5 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 337, and note 256, 731).
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 15 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 339).
6 Ibid., 17 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 340).
7 Ibid., 17 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 340).
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Kállay to Beust, 24 Nov. 1870, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/187. Kállay Diary, 25 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 343), records writing to Andrássy, but there is no trace of this in the Andrássy-Kállay correspondence in OSZK.
13 Ibid., 29 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 344).
14 Ibid., 28 Nov. 1870 (Dnevnik, 344).
15 Ibid., 6 and 7 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, 345–46).
16 Ibid., 9 Dec. 1870 (Dnevnik, 346).
17 See above, Chapter 8.
18 Ibid., 14 Jan. 1871 (Dnevnik, 355).
20 Ibid., 9 Nov. 1868 (Dnevnik, 112); Pester Lloyd, 3 June 1871, quoted in Dukanović, Ubistvo Kneza Mihaila, 1:250.
22 Pester Lloyd, 3 June 1871, quoted in Đukanović, Ubistvo Kneza Mihaila, 1:250.
23 Kállay Diary, 16 Jan. 1871 (Dnevnik, 355).
24 Ibid., 17 Jan. 1871 (Dnevnik, 355).
25 Ibid., 19 Jan. 1871 (Dnevnik, 356); see also Kállay to Andrássy, 28 Jan. 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/204.
26 Kállay Diary, 22 Mar. 1871 (Dnevnik, 368).
27 Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. On the Danube question, see Ian D. Armour, “The Sensitivities of ‘Small, Backward Nations’: Austria-Hungary, Serbia and the Regulation of the Danube 1870–71,” Canadian Journal of History 47, no. 3 (2012): 513–43. At issue at the London conference, called to ratify Russia’s renunciation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris, but at which the Habsburg Monarchy also sought agreement from other Danubian states for rendering the Danube navigable, was whether Serbia would support the Monarchy’s proposals. To the considerable annoyance of both Vienna and Pest, the Serbian government sided with the Ottomans, who opposed a deal.
Kállay Diary, 24 Mar. 1871 (Dnevnik, 370).
Ibid.
Kállay to Andrásy, 24 Mar. 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/215.
Kállay Diary, 24 Mar. 1871 (Dnevnik, 370).
Kállay to Andrásy, 24 Mar. 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/216.
Kállay Diary, 24 Mar. 1871 (Dnevnik, 370).
Ibid., 28 Mar. 1871 (Dnevnik, 371); Kállay to Andrásy, 29 Mar. 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/218.
Ibid.
Kállay Diary, 2 Apr. 1871 (Dnevnik, 372).
Ibid., 10 Apr. 1871 (Dnevnik, 373).
Ibid., 8 May 1871 (Dnevnik, 380); see also 28 May 1871 (Dnevnik, 384).
Pester Lloyd, 3 June 1871, quoting Hon, 3 June 1871, both in Đukanović, Ubistvo Kneza Mihaila, 1:249–50; Vidovdan, 21 May/2 June 1871, citing a report from Pest of 19/31 May, ibid., 1:263, note 1; and Krstić Diary, 26 May/7 June 1871, quoted ibid., 2:206–7.
Hon, 3 June 1871, as quoted by Pester Lloyd, 3 June 1871; both in Dukanović, Ubistvo Kneza Mihaila, 1:250.
Hon, 3 June 1871, quoted ibid.
Andrássy to Kállay, 8 June 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/275–80.
Krstić Diary, 23 Aug./4 Sept. 1871, quoted Đukanović, Ubistvo Kneza Mihaila, 2:207.
Đukanović, Ubistvo Kneza Mihaila, 1:263.
Longworth to Granville, 15 June 1871, PRO, FO 78/2185.
Longworth to Granville, 24 June 1871, PRO, FO 78/2185. Cf. Kállay Diary, 22 Mar. 1871 (Dnevnik, 368).
Longworth to Granville, 24 June 1871, PRO, FO 78/2185.
Kállay Diary, 4 June 1871 (Dnevnik, 385). This entry happens to be incomplete, following the one unnatural break in Kállay’s diary, where a page has been ripped out (MOL, P344, 32. k., ff. 229–30, covering entries from 30 May to 4 June 1871). Under “4 June” the text resumes at the end of a sentence with the words “his release,” evidently a reference to Karadordević, who is discussed in the following passage. The missing page was removed by Kállay’s widow, according to a note dated 28 Dec. 1924, which she left in the gap, addressed to her daughters. After stating that the excision was made “to satisfy my conscience, on the decided advice of ‘Uncle Drechsler’,” Vilma Kállay (née Bethlen) concludes, “You can be assured that I am sparing you a great deal of sorrow by this.” See also Dnevnik, note
Kállay did not marry until 1873, but his widow retained the diary for twenty years after his death in 1903. In a record which coolly relates, among other things, Kállay’s premarital sexual conquests (which included other men’s wives), his venereal infections, espionage activities, railway speculations, and plots to murder Miletić, it is hard to imagine what else there was to have excited Vilma Kállay’s concern. Cf. György Kövér, “A magánélet titkai és a napló: Nők, szerelem, házasság Kállay Béni életében,” Aetas, 23:3 (2008): 99.

54 Kállay Diary, 4 June 1871 (Dnevnik, 385).
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., 5 June 1871 (Dnevnik, 385).
57 Ristić to Hristić, 24 May/5 June 1871, in Srpska Kraljevskaa Akademija, Pisma Jovana Ristića Filipu Hristiću od 1870 do 1873 i od 1877 do 1880 (Belgrade: Narodna Štamparija, 1931), no. 27, 56.
58 Kállay Diary, 6 June 1871 (Dnevnik, 385).
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 8 June 1871 (Dnevnik, 386).
61 Krstić Diary, 26 May/7 June 1871, quoted in Dukanović, Ubitstvo Kneza Mihaila, 2:207.
62 Kállay Diary, 8 June 1871 (Dnevnik, 386).
63 Ibid., 16 June 1871 (Dnevnik, 387).
64 Andrássy to Kállay, 8 June 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/275–80; Kállay Diary, 16 June 1871 (Dnevnik, 387).
66 Andrássy to Kállay, 8 June 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/275–80.
67 Kállay Diary, 24 June 1871 (Dnevnik, 389).
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid. The protocol was countersigned by the Emperor on 10 September.
72 Kállay Diary, 14 July 1871 (Dnevnik, 392–93); a further account of this and subsequent meetings, on 24 and 27 July, is in Kállay to Andrássy, no date [19 Aug. 1871], OSZK, FH 1733/120–33.
73 Ibid., f. 121
74 Ibid., f. 122.
75 Ibid., ff. 123–30.
76 Ibid., f. 124.
78 Ibid., ff. 130–32.
79 See, for example, the correspondence between Croat nationalist leaders and Belgrade in the winter of 1870–71 and spring of 1871, printed in Vučković, notably nos. 224–28, 232–38 and 241.
80 Kállay to Andrássy, [19 Aug. 1871], OSZK, FH 1733/132–33.
81 Kállay Diary, 20, 24 and 27 July 1871, and 19 Aug. 1871 (Dnevnik, 393, 395, 398).
82 Kállay to Beust, 14 Aug. 1871, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191; Kállay to Andrssy, 19 Aug. 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/54–56.
83 Kállay Diary, 4 Sept. 1871 (Dnevnik, 401); Vasilije Krestić, “Vojna granica u nacionalnooslobodilačkim planova Srba i Hrvata,” in his Srpsko-hrvatski odnosi i jugoslov-

84 Kállay Diary, 7 Sept. 1871 (*Dnevnik*, 402).

85 Ibid.
This page intentionally left blank
Chapter 10

Serbia’s Swing Toward Russia
1870–71

Kállay had long predicted to Andrássy and Beust, as if appealing to one of the laws of nature, that a Serbia disappointed in, or, as it thought, repulsed by the Habsburg Monarchy, would automatically scuttle in the opposite direction. If Serbia were not under Austro-Hungarian influence, Kállay consistently argued, it must infallibly fall under Russian influence.¹ In the event this is precisely what happened, at least for a time. Whether it was as inevitable as Kállay maintained, however, is another matter. Kállay also ignored the extent to which Hungarian promises, and the shortfall between those promises and reality, had undermined his and Andrássy’s objective of creating a South Slav satellite, tied to the Monarchy by economic and political interest.

Of the two Regents, Ristić’s position vis-à-vis Austria-Hungary and Russia is by far the easier to analyze. Ristić had always been suspicious of the link with Hungary and the benefits which might spring from it. His politician’s mind logically asked, how was the traditional opposition of the Habsburg Monarchy to the creation of an enlarged South Slav state to be overcome? And as a supreme tactician on the domestic political front, Ristić was concerned to safeguard his reputation as a liberal nationalist, albeit a rather authoritarian one.² This meant that too great a subordination to Austro-Hungarian policy was political death; obeisances in the direction of a more distant Russia, by contrast, were politically much safer.

Even when relations with the Monarchy, through the mediation of the Hungarians, were at their closest, Ristić never entirely cut himself off from Russia. Not for Ristić the outspoken aversion to Russia expressed by Blaznavac. On the contrary, Ristić appears to have believed in the innate strength of Russia’s position.
At the height of the Black Sea crisis in 1870, for instance, he remained convinced that no one, not even the Hungarian government, was really willing to challenge Russia militarily. Especially after Filip Hristić arrived in Constantinople in 1870, Ristić kept a fine ear tuned for whatever General Ignatiev had to say about Serbia. The “friend,” as Ristić and Hristić both referred to Ignatiev, was an old acquaintance; and although Ristić frequently rebutted Ignatiev’s charge of having become an “instrument” of Austria-Hungary, this diplomatic channel was always kept open. Hristić, advised Ristić in September, should try to show the Regents’ desire for better relations with Russia.

Blaznavac’ motivation is harder to fathom, in part because, unlike Ristić, he left so little written record behind. Nevertheless one overriding reason for Blaznavac’ pro-Hungarian policy in the past, as for his obstinate and frequently voiced fear of Russia, is plain. As the soldier who had staked his career and possibly his life on ensuring the succession of an Obrenović to the throne in 1868, Blaznavac had far more cause than Ristić to regard his fate as bound to the dynastic question. The Monarchy, at the instigation of Andrássy, had endorsed Prince Milan; therefore Blaznavac was willing to hail the Hungarians, if not the Austrians, as friends. Russia had not only backed Nikola of Montenegro for the Serbian throne, but ever since had used the Montenegrin rivalry as an unsubtle threat in its relations with the Regency.

Blaznavac may also have been temperamentally less inclined than Ristić to look Hungarian gift-horses, such as the Bosnian plan, in the mouth. Far more important for him than the prize of Bosnia, however, was the desire to see Alexander Karađorđević put away by the Hungarian courts. Since Blaznavac, and not Ristić, was the strongman of the Regency, this interest in Karađorđević’s conviction was probably the decisive factor in keeping Serbia within Austria-Hungary’s orbit. After June 1871, with the prospect of any solution to the Karađorđević threat receding, Blaznavac was in a bitter frame of mind, and willing at least to consider other policy options. The extent of his disillusionment was recorded late in July by the German consul. Apropos of the Beust circular, the Danube and Karađorđević, Blaznavac was quoted as asking: “what answer can we make to Russia, ...when it reproaches us for our philomagyarism with reference to these three open acts of hostility?” Blaznavac clearly felt he had been led up the garden path, and in a sense he was right.

The reference to Russia is significant because, bereft of the Monarchy’s practical support, and despite his view, expressed as late as June 1871, that “Russia’s goal is domination,” Blaznavac was increasingly aware of a need to make his peace with the Tsar’s government. Neither Regent, however, had any clear idea of how to escape their isolation. That they urgently desired to do so, by the autumn of 1871, was due to one circumstance above all which motivated them both. Throughout that year, momentum was building up for revolt in the Otto-
man provinces, and the preparations for it were, from the viewpoint of Belgrade, unofficial and quite unauthorized. Leaders of opinion like Miletč, and activists on the ground like the Bosnian priest Vaso Pelagić, were increasingly determined to act on their own. Miletč, for example, helped coordinate the plans despite his incarceration in Vác prison; and in late July Pelagić went so far as to inform the Serbian minister president, Milojković, that the revolt would break out that autumn, or at the latest in the spring of 1872.8

Such activity put enormous pressure on the Serbian government to act, since it lost what little prestige it had left among the Balkan Christians if it did not. Blaznavac and Ristić did respond, with token encouragement and time-consuming organization, but also with secret trepidation. Far more than the nationalists pushing them in this direction, they were aware of the risk for Serbia. “God alone knows what will come of this,” Ristić complained to Hristić early in August.9 The Regents feared the uprising getting out of hand, and being led by more radical elements like the Omladina. It was at their request that the Hungarian government closed down the sixth, and last, Omladina Congress at Vršac on 29 August, because it belligerently elected the firebrand Pelagić as president.10 On the public stage, however, the Regents were more reluctant than ever to be seen as the playthings of Austria-Hungary, on the one hand, and the scorn of Slav Russia, on the other. It was therefore domestic concerns which moved the Regents to take seriously the first olive branch held out by Russia.

The resolution of the problem was achieved with considerable speed. On 5 September Hristić reported that General Ignatiev, in Constantinople, proposed using his personal influence with the Tsar to arrange a visit by Prince Milan. The Prince would of course have to be accompanied by one or more of the Regents, which would afford an opportunity for a face-to-face exchange of views. To make things less Canossa-like for the Regents, Ignatiev suggested timing the visit with the Tsar’s tour of the Caucasus.11

On 12 September, Hristić reported that Ignatiev was pressing for an answer. The Tsar in the meantime had left the Caucasus, which made the next likeliest venue for a meeting the imperial summer palace at Livadia, in the Crimea. If, as Ignatiev had already suggested, some location outside St. Petersburg was to be preferred, then the Regents must act soon if they wished to meet on relatively neutral ground. Once the Tsar had returned to the capital, any decision to accompany Milan, the Sultan’s vassal, to a foreign court would assume far greater, and hence more daunting, proportions.12

Ignatiev’s proposal produced something like a crise de nerfs, not only in the Regents but in young Milan as well. According to Ristić’s later account, both Blaznavac and Milan, upon reading Hristić’s despatch of 5 September, exclaimed that “this can’t be true.”13 After years of abuse from the Russians for Serbia’s pro-Hungarian policy, after Russia’s consistent cultivation of Prince
Nikola of Montenegro, and the coldness of the Russian consul’s personal rela-
tions with Ristić and especially Blaznavac, the proposal seemed incredible
indeed. Blaznavac, especially, had reason to be sceptical, finding it difficult to
believe that his anti-Russian stance of the last four years would be forgiven.14

Ristić had most title to welcome the Russian initiative, since he had al-
ways been less committed to the Hungarian orientation, and more concerned
with maintaining reasonably good relations with Russia. In his opinion, Ignat-
tiev’s proposal was a genuine attempt to bridge differences, and not a demand for
unconditional submission to Russian interests. And if it was Blaznavac who, in
the past, had most identified himself with an anti-Russian policy, then Blaznavac
should be the Regent who accompanied Milan to Livadia. He would then be able
to explain his and Ristić’s policy to the Tsar in person.15

On 22 September, the Regents telegraphed Constantinople, enquiring whether
Ignatiev would agree to clear the visit with the Tsar personally, and obtain some
assurance that Milan would be accorded a dignified reception.16 Ignatiev complied
with this request a couple of days later and, in agreement with Hristić, worded his
telegram to Alexander II in such a way as to suggest a certain diffidence on the
part of the Serbian government. This, as Hristić explained, was in case the Tsar,
for whatever reason, was inclined to put off the visit: postponement in response to
such a hypothetical enquiry would not give the appearance of a personal rebuff to
Milan.17 After that, another nervous week was spent waiting for a reply.

Eventually the Russian embassy in Constantinople received a telegram from
Count Shuvalov, the Tsar’s aide-de-camp and minister attendant. The Tsar, Shu-
valov confirmed, would receive Prince Milan “avec plaisir à Livadia.”18 Hristić,
informing Ristić of this on 3 October, passed on Ignatiev’s recommendation that
Milan, accompanied by one Regent, should travel incognito, so as not to give un-
necessary offense to the Ottomans. He would be met at Odessa by a steamer spe-
cially sent by the Tsar. Ignatiev engaged to apprise Shishkin, his subordinate, since
for reasons of protocol it would be advisable if the latter went with Milan as well.19

A few difficulties remained to sort out. The Regents insisted that Milan be
met at Galatz on the lower Danube, rather than Odessa. They were also concerned
at the request for incognito. According to Ristić, writing on 6 October, both the
Skupština and the public would have to be notified of the intended journey, since
an unheralded departure by the Prince might give rise to destabilizing rumors.20
Hristić, who was also to meet the Prince en route, was able to report on 10 Octo-
ber that Ignatiev had agreed to place a Russian naval vessel at Milan’s disposal at
Galatz. The ambassador still favored incognito, but at length accepted Hristić’s
claim that “our world doesn’t understand that,” and that it would create a bad
impression in Serbia if Milan appeared to be going “furtively” to see the Tsar.21

It was not until 14 October that the formal communication the Regents had
been waiting for arrived.22 The next day being a Sunday, the members of the
Skupština were convened for a special session in Kragujevac, and informed of Milan’s imminent departure. After a church service and blessings by the Metropolitan Michael, Milan and Blaznavac left the same afternoon. If Ristić’s account is to be believed, both the Skupština and the citizens of Kragujevac were delighted at the new development. As the Prince and the Regent set off, Ristić says, many of the deputies threw their caps into the air, and “It seemed as if the shouts of joy would never end.”

Ristić was probably right in interpreting such scenes, even retrospectively, as proof that a rapprochement with Russia would be popular. Nevertheless his mood at the time continued to be one of foreboding. He confided to Hristić, on 15 October, that

Now the West is going to turn against us and especially Austria or rather Hungary. Kállay has already begun to campaign against me both publicly and in secret even before this, and now he will do so even more.24

Hristić must work closely with Ignatiev at Livadia, and draw Blaznavac’ attention to the need to say or do nothing that might create a bad impression. Above all, Hristić should convince Ignatiev that Ristić was “as little a German (which he accuses me of) as little as I am a Turk, a Hungarian or anything else, which is not a Serb. And that I deserve his confidence, the proof is this trip of the Prince to the Crimea.”25 In return for the risk of Austro-Hungarian displeasure, in short, it would be useful to have some proof of Russian confidence in Serbia.

In the event, Prince Milan’s visit to Livadia went off very well from the Serbian point of view. On 20 October Milan was received by Alexander and the Tsaritsa en famille. After a two day stay, the Prince and his retinue were back in Kragujevac by 1 November.26

What was most important about the Livadia visit was the chance Blaznavac had to discuss Serbian policy face to face with the Tsar, Ignatiev, and others. Our main source for these encounters is Ristić who, while admittedly writing after Blaznavac’ death in 1873, had in this instance no particular reason for blackening the latter’s memory, nor for praising him unduly.27 It was more than probable, as Ristić claims, that “The prejudice against Milivoje Blaznavac in the circle of the imperial family was great,” since he had been consistently portrayed as an enemy of Russia by the foreign ministry, and had been content to describe himself as such in the past.28 Yet the mere fact that it was Blaznavac, rather than the more acceptable Ristić, who accompanied Milan to Livadia spoke for itself. Under the encouraging influence of Ignatiev and Hristić, Blaznavac rapidly made the right impression.29

Alexander II, once assured of Blaznavac’ willingness to please, appeared content to confine himself to diplomatic generalities. In line with his policy in the Eastern Question since the Crimean War, the Tsar assured Serbia of future
“good prospects” [dobre izglede], but “recommended patience.” Ignatiev, in the meantime, was skilfully showing the Tsar how much his view of Serbia, especially since the fall of Garašanin in 1867, had been colored by the reports of Garašanin’s partisans in the Russian foreign ministry. Such was the revolution in Alexander’s attitude toward the Regents that he promised Blaznavac, “My government will not intervene in your domestic affairs, and I am amazed that such a thing could have happened.”

In the light of Russian policy toward Serbia, both past and future, one should not attach too much weight to this sort of language. True, the Emperor Alexander was well-known for setting great store by his pledged word, but Russian governments had browbeaten Serbian ones in the past, and would continue to do so in the years to come. Nor were the Tsar’s expressions of Slav solidarity proof against Russian self-interest and shifting international circumstances, as Alexander’s treatment of Serbia in 1876–78 was to demonstrate. Serbia, as Ristić and Blaznavac well knew, was apt to be handled by both great powers, Russia and Austria-Hungary, in much the same way. Which of the two was least likely to impede, and more likely to advance Serbian interests, at any given point, was always a question requiring fine judgment.

Nevertheless the immediate result of the Livadia visit was to improve, at least on the surface, relations between Russia and Serbia. In Serbia itself, which was of most concern to the Regents, the effect was also encouraging. While Milan was out of the country, the Skupština had remained in session; a few days after his return, the Prince closed the proceedings with an address in which he spoke of the warm reception he had been given by the Tsar. The deputies greeted this announcement with cries of acclamation for both the Tsar and Milan. Ristić, summing up the popular mood for Hristić, claimed that the news of Milan’s reception in the Crimea “has electrified both the Skupština and the entire country and has routed our opponents.” On the whole, Ristić had reason to be pleased with the effect the trip had produced.

Milan’s departure for Livadia had caused something of a diplomatic sensation, since the Regents’ refusal to accept an incognito visit meant the news was in the Belgrade press on the morning of 16 October. Kállay’s only way of reacting, for the moment, was to inform Vienna by telegram. He then had nothing else to do but sit down and try to draft an official explanation for this stunning reverse. Although he was well aware that the good understanding between Belgrade and Pest was at an end, he was clearly as surprised as everyone else by the Livadia visit, not least because he assumed Blaznavac’ fear of Russia was insuperable.

Kállay’s report of 16 October to Beust was, in its way, a masterpiece of plausible analysis. It managed to suggest an air of inevitability in Serbia’s swing toward Russia, with the implied conclusion that there was nothing the Monarchy, let alone Kállay, could have done to prevent it. Although he had to admit, like
everyone else, being completely surprised by the move, Kállay avoided anything that might recall his confident assertions, in the past, that Russian influence in Serbia was totally eliminated.

Instead he represented the trip as the natural consequence of the change in Serbian policy which, he now claimed, had set in up to a year ago. To some extent, this was a reasonable enough, if retrospective, conclusion. The sea-change in international relations produced by the Prussian victory over France in 1870, which Kállay cited first of all, was indeed a factor which was bound to have repercussions in eastern Europe. Russia’s support for Prussia naturally raised the likelihood of a quid pro quo in the Eastern Question. As a direct result, there was the Black Sea question and its successful resolution for Russia, “and Russia’s prestige in the Balkans arising out of this.” The Russo-Ottoman entente, which had accompanied this, had an even more direct effect on the mood in Belgrade. Then, Karađorđević had been acquitted; and finally, the Regents had been influenced by “the ever increasing ferment among the Austro-Hungarian Slavs, especially in Croatia and the Military Border.”

Kállay also attributed the sudden decision over Livadia to domestic considerations. Pointing out how often he had reminded Beust of “the discontent rapidly gaining ground in the country,” Kállay cited as evidence the growing political opposition to the Regents. Hence the idea of disarming this opposition by the trip to Russia. Serbia had “until the next about-face—once again become the blind tool of Russian policy, and must be counted as such from now on in all political combinations.” For the man who had set out for Belgrade, in 1868, as the “friend of the Serbs,” this was a bitter admission indeed.

To Andrássy, the same day, Kállay displayed an even franker fatalism, as if he too had decided that Serbia had swung hopelessly beyond the control of either Hungary or the Monarchy. Serbia on its own, Kállay wrote, and even one which was the “blind instrument” of Russian policy,

\[
\text{can't be a danger to us, only at the worst more or less of an inconvenience, as long as we can confidently rely on Germany's support in the struggle which, sooner or later, is going to take place between us and Russia.} \]

Here was the entire international strategy of the Hungarian political elite for the next forty-seven years, sketched out in a sentence. Kállay had his doubts about German support, since he found it difficult to believe the Serbian government would have taken such a step, “had it not been convinced, that Germany was standing behind Russia.” Nevertheless, if the Monarchy could really count on Germany, then “for Serbia this step [Livadia] can lead to dissolution.”

Other observers confirmed Kállay’s estimate of the seriousness of the setback to Austro-Hungarian influence in Serbia, although not all of them saw Kállay as entirely blameless. The embassy in Constantinople reported merely, at
first, that Milan’s departure to visit a foreign sovereign, without consulting his suzerain, had considerably annoyed the Porte. It was not long, however, before Prokesch-Osten himself weighed in with the observation that the grand vizier “deceives himself . . . over Serbia’s tendencies as little as his predecessors in the office,” adding the waspish rider that “even the belief of our agent in Belgrade in his victory over Russian influence in Serbia has suffered a certain diminution.” For Prokesch-Osten, the trip to Livadia had “only the value of a symptom.”

The shrewdest observations on Hungarian diplomacy in the light of Livadia, however, were made by Germany’s ambassador to Vienna, General Hans Lothar von Schweinitz, and by Bismarck himself. Schweinitz saw beyond the activities of Kállay, who was after all only the chosen instrument of Andrássy. Writing to Bismarck first on 21 October, the ambassador simply recorded Andrássy’s discomfiture at the news of Livadia. A week later, Schweinitz recalled how, for the past four years, Andrássy had striven to convince both the South Slavs and the Romanians that “their salvation was to be sought with him, not with Russia.” Anderson was building here, in Schweinitz’s opinion, on “the Serbophile policy of Baron Beust,” who had after all begun his period in office by persuading the Turks to evacuate the Serbian fortresses. Kállay’s appointment had been part of this policy; and ever since Kállay had toiled, “not without success,” to win the Serbs over in matters like the railway question, and above all the Bosnian question. “In return he [Kállay] demanded, and ensured, that the Serbs on the right bank of the Danube did not support the agitation of their national brethren on the left bank.”

Schweinitz singled out the Karadordević débâcle, and the dispute over the regulation of the Danube, as the two issues which had done most to endanger the influence over Serbian policy thus built up by the Hungarian government. In Schweinitz’s view, however, what had really dealt the death blow to Andrássy’s project was the recent strengthening of the Slav element in Austria, as represented by the appointment of the Hohenwart-Schäffle ministry the previous February. No matter that, by the time Schweinitz was writing this, the great experiment with the Monarchy’s Slavs had already collapsed; its very existence “called forth tremors from the sources of the Sava to the mouth of the Danube.” Despite Andrássy’s efforts, all peoples in this region regarded the Hungarians as a common enemy, and Serbia as “their strongest, because state-based support.” Consequently,

order was assured, as long as the Serbian Regency went hand in hand with the Hungarian government, and now, in the very moment when Austria’s Slavs, first triumphant, then disappointed and indignant, turn their eyes towards Russia, Mr. Blaznavac travels to Livadia with young Milan.

The Livadia trip, trivial in itself, was “perhaps the biggest setback that Count Andrássy has suffered in a period in office otherwise so successful.” Yet the Hun-
garian minister president persisted in believing, Schweinitz thought, that deals could still be done with the governments of both Serbia and Romania, whereby the latter would not encourage their co-nationals within Hungary.46

Bismarck, who had recently discussed high policy with Andrássy at the Salzburg meeting between Francis Joseph and William I, agreed with this analysis. He thought Andrássy attached too much importance to Livadia, and that this was due to a lack of perspective.

Bismarck’s point here was that neither Serbia nor Romania was in a position to withstand serious pressure from Russia: “they will never survive a serious test of strength.” The Slav sympathies of Serbia’s population, and Romania’s physical proximity to the Russian Empire, would always outweigh anything Hungary had to offer. In these circumstances, confronted with the united hostility of the East, “Hungary will always be obliged to rely upon the German alliance.”47 Bismarck touched here upon a profound truth about Hungary’s position. He was shrewd enough also to spot the inherent contradiction in Hungarian policy since 1867, a contradiction of which Andrássy seemed so far still unaware:

Bismarck’s assessment of Andrássy’s South Slav policy came at a particularly interesting juncture, since it was shortly after this that Andrássy finally took over the direction of the Monarchy’s foreign policy, on 14 November.

The supreme irony of Andrássy’s appointment as foreign minister was that, after four years promoting the cause of Serbo-Hungarian friendship, he was now thoroughly disillusioned with the Serbs. Beyond that, however, Andrássy also came to office following a major change in the Monarchy’s diplomatic relations, a change initiated by Andrássy’s great rival, Beust, and which Andrássy merely
furthered and consolidated. This was the switch from hostility toward Prussian expansionism, the legacy of 1866, to acceptance of the new Germany as the Monarchy’s most logical partner. The prospect of Austro-German partnership, in addition, opened up the question of an entente with Russia on conservative, counter-revolutionary and dynastic grounds. Andrásy, for whom the inevitability of war with Russia was axiomatic, did not at first accept this conclusion, but eventually found it forced on him as the price of German cooperation.49

On 18 May 1871, Beust had submitted a lengthy memorandum to Francis Joseph.50 Effectively, it proposed a realignment of the Monarchy with Germany. The entente was given practical point that summer, with the meetings of the two emperors at Ischl and Salzburg. More important, Bismarck and Beust also met at Bad Gastein, then, in the company of Hohenwart and Andrásy, at Salzburg where, on 28 August, a general agreement was reached. Without seeing the need for a formal alliance, the two powers nevertheless recognized that there were no longer any vital interests dividing them.51

The significance of the Austro-German rapprochement, in the context of the present study, lies in its effect on the Monarchy’s eastern policy. Specifically, the two principles which Beust laid down in May 1871, and which Andrásy was obliged to accept later, if not in November 1871, involved an improved relationship with Russia, and the possibility of territorial gains for the Monarchy at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.

Beust and the Emperor accepted that better relations with Russia were a necessary condition of the new cordiality with Germany. Yet as Beust had pointed out in May, opinion in Hungary labored under the false impression that reconciliation between Austria-Hungary and Germany would somehow divide the latter from Russia, and might even make possible an Austro-German coalition against Russia. This attitude in Hungary had not only made difficulties for the Monarchy at the London Conference; it made it “almost impossible . . . to open up better relations with Russia directly, without giving rise to foolish shrieks that a second Holy Alliance is in train, aimed specifically against Hungary, etc.” Undeterred, Beust recommended that the only solution was “to look for the path to Petersburg via Berlin and in this fashion reach a modus vivendi.”52

There were other reasons for this de facto revival of the old axis between the three northern courts. One of the most prominent, in 1871, was the spectre of revolution raised by the Paris Commune, a danger which virtually all the Monarchy’s leaders, Andrásy included, took very seriously indeed.53 Regarding relations with Serbia, however, the most significant thing about the shift in Austro-Hungarian policy was the recognition that the Monarchy still had certain interests in common with Russia. This in turn made it possible to envisage a return to the practice of tacitly accepting the predominating interests of each power in different parts of the Balkans. At the time of his appointment as foreign
minister, Andrássy might not yet have accepted this premise; but the Emperor implicitly had.

The second principle regarding Balkan policy, set forth in Beust’s May memorandum, was that of a general disinterest in the future integrity of Turkey-in-Europe. With fine impartiality, Beust observed that “We have no interest in, and no inclination towards, bringing about Turkey’s downfall, but also no very good reason . . . to contribute to its protection with expensive exertions and artificial means.” As a corollary, which he knew would not displease the Emperor, Beust now felt able to declare the Monarchy’s own interest in expanding in this area. Designs which had hitherto been confined to the planning of the war ministry and the military chancery could now be elevated to the level of raison d’état, since every assumption has to be that Austria’s expansion in future can only take place in the Near East, and this would be especially desirable in the direction of strengthening our possession of Dalmatia by means of a corresponding hinterland.

In addition, and without actively working for the Ottoman Empire’s dissolution, the Monarchy would need to sponsor the welfare of the Balkan Christians, lest these in despair sought salvation in Russia’s arms. Equally undisputable was the fact that the Monarchy could not plan the occupation of Bosnia, and at the same time continue Andrássy’s policy of offering this territory to Serbia.

Andrássy as foreign minister would thus have found it difficult, not to say impossible, to reconcile his new duties with the keystone of his Serbian policy while Hungarian minister president. It is admittedly not clear, from Beust’s memorandum, whether the chancellor envisaged taking over only a portion of Bosnia, as had been discussed by Kállay with the Regents, or whether the new strategy reckoned on acquiring the whole of the province. Beust’s memorandum is silent on the subject of Serbia, although he had long known the outlines of Andrássy’s Bosnian project, if not the details. Nor is it clear whether, by May 1871, Francis Joseph had revealed to Beust the initiative undertaken by the Hungarians, without Beust’s knowledge, in December 1870 and January 1871. What is clear is that the Monarchy’s foreign policy establishment had already, long before Andrássy became foreign minister, come out in favor of expansion into Bosnia. It seems unlikely that the foreign ministry, any more than the military, would have welcomed a condominium arrangement with Serbia.

That the Emperor should have approved Beust’s program in May did not, of course, mean that Andrássy was somehow bound to adopt it in its entirety in November. On the contrary: while Andrássy naturally would have to tailor his views to those of his master, Francis Joseph to a certain extent was also obliged to take Andrássy as he found him. Despite the Beust memorandum, for instance, the Emperor knew that Andrássy could be relied on to take an anti-Russian stance; only with time and circumstance was this to be modified. Equally obvious, though
in this case in line with Beust’s legacy, was Andrássy’s willingness to cultivate the friendship of Germany. It was precisely with regard to the Eastern Question, however, that Andrássy’s views had undergone a transformation. From being an advocate of sacrificing the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in the cause of binding Serbia to the Monarchy, Andrássy by November 1871 had swung full circle in the opposite direction.

For Kállay there was, at first, no indication of just how far Andrássy’s thinking on the subject had changed, although Kállay knew that Andrássy had long ago lost patience with the Regency. He knew, also, that the Regents had heard the rumors of Andrássy’s appointment, “and fear his decisiveness.”

Kállay’s first encounter with Blaznavac and Ristić after their return to the capital was on 10 November. From the reception Kállay got, it was clear that the Regents were extremely nervous about the Monarchy’s response to Livadia, and Kállay did nothing to allay their qualms. Ristić claimed that he and Blaznavac were morally bound to hand over to Milan, when he came of age, a country strong internally and on good terms with all the powers. To this, Kállay returned only a classic piece of diplomatic double-talk: “since we were on good terms with Russia, we could not take it amiss if Serbia entered into good relations with a country with whom we were friends.” Decoded, the message was clear: the Monarchy’s leaders were taking it very much amiss.

Blaznavac was even less able to conceal his unease, emphasizing how much, in the past, he had been “singled out as an enemy of Russian policy, so that Slavs from all countries were attacking him as such.” If there were no improvement in this situation, Blaznavac claimed, he would be forced to step down once Milan attained his majority next year, and to watch helplessly from the sidelines as someone else pursued a policy directly opposed to his own. As a result of Livadia, however, Blaznavac now hoped to maintain his influence over Prince Milan, and gave Kállay to understand that, as long as this was the case, “he would continue with his anti-Russian policy.”

The following day the Regents supplied further anxious testimony that their policy toward Austria-Hungary had not changed. Blaznavac, Dr. Rosen told Kállay, stressed that an explicitly anti-Austrian policy would not be practical, and repeated his assurances that the Serbian government had no intention of stirring up trouble in Hungary. There was, however, an important quid pro quo: “The Serbian government hasn’t become Russian, so it wouldn’t be right for the Hungarians now to agitate against Serbia, because precisely by this means they would drive the Serbs into the arms of the Russians.” Serbia’s chief needs, Blaznavac stressed, were peace and internal development.

Both Regents knew that in speaking to Dr. Rosen they were indirectly addressing Kállay. This makes the unconcealed rancor with which Ristić expressed himself, later in the day, all the more remarkable. Ristić, as Rosen reported, had
never intended to perform this about-turn, only the Hungarians, who could have done a lot in the Bosnian business, had forced him to it by their behavior. Their hypocrisy had been seen through before the end of his life by Prince Michael too, whom they had promised Bosnia but, when the opportunity offered, drew back.63

Inevitably, Ristić also dredged up the Beust circular, and Karadordević, as additional reasons. It was clear that, despite their surface determination to maintain normal links with the Monarchy, both Regents were not only apprehensive but at the same time in rather bullish mood.

Kállay’s suspicions were only heightened by the rest of Rosen’s report on 11 November. According to Rosen, Ristić had just had a long conversation with Milan Kujundžić, a civil servant in the ministry of the interior. Kujundžić, who evidently had no doubts about the Regents’ wholehearted support for the cause of national revolt in the Ottoman provinces, allegedly urged the mounting of agitation within the Monarchy, in order to distract the latter from any eventual uprising. Coming a mere few weeks after the abortive attempt by Serb nationalists to raise a revolt at Rakovica, in the Military Border, this was disturbing news. Rosen, like many other observers, believed the government intended acting on Kujundžić’s advice.64

Kállay was therefore all the chillier in manner when, on 21 November, he took leave of Blaznavac prior to going up to Pest. With more prescience than he realized, Kállay made a point of stressing especially, that I believed Andrássy would try to establish a better relationship with Russia. To this he [Blaznavac] asked: didn't we perhaps intend effecting a partition of the Turkish provinces. He asked this, to be sure, in a joking tone, but despite this he couldn't conceal his deep apprehension.65

Having thus stirred the pot, Kállay proceeded to deny any such intention on the part of the Monarchy. In any case, he concluded, he did not really know what Andrássy’s policy would be.

In fact Kállay must have had a fair idea of what Andrássy’s position was by now, with regard to Serbia, and his own was one of near total disillusionment. If Ristić is to be believed, Kállay’s rage at Livadia was far greater than he indicated even in his private diary. According to Ristić, “Kállay especially arrived beside himself, saying, ‘This is now a Russian province!’”66 Commenting on the uproar in the Austrian and Hungarian press over Livadia, Ristić ventured the (erroneous) opinion that Andrássy’s appointment as foreign minister might even be a reaction to Livadia, or at least that Livadia had provided the final justification for entrusting the direction of foreign affairs to so notorious a Russophobe.67

Ristić had his own theory about the significance of Andrássy’s appointment. Andrássy, he claimed, “thought to surround Hungary with a Slavonic league, but
he fears the Slavs, and especially the Russians, as the greatest danger. . . . Now Austria really is in the hands of the Hungarians, who are going to be our open enemies.”68 As a result, Ristić concluded, Serbia’s position after Livadia was undoubtedly weaker diplomatically, but the Regency had made things easier for itself at home and among the Slavs generally, “and that’s the main thing.”69

There was certainly no mistaking the shock to public opinion in both halves of the Monarchy. For some time, relations with Serbia had been perceived as satisfactory at least; now, according to Ristić, “The attacks in the Vienna, and especially the Pest press, exceeded every bound of decency.”70 Some of this invective, as might be expected, was directly inspired. Two articles in the Hungarian Reform, in particular, were written by Dr. Rosen, clearly with Kállay’s approval, and threatened Serbia with dire consequences. The first of these suggested that the plans which had surfaced since Livadia for betrothing Prince Milan to the Grand Duchess Vera would not get very far. Such a marriage would make Serbia little more than a province of Russia, and the Monarchy would not permit this.71

The second article was even more vituperative, especially where Ristić was concerned. The latter was accused of being prepared to do anything to stay in power, and knew that he could only do so by carrying out Russia’s orders. Since these entailed creating unrest among the Monarchy’s Slavs, such a situation was not to be endured, and Austria-Hungary would react accordingly. Ristić was warned of personal risks in his pro-Russian policy: “even he has to await the day of reckoning.”72

The Reform articles cost Dr. Rosen his job as a Serbian civil servant, since the Regents knew perfectly well that he was one of Kállay’s hirelings.73 Nor was all the mudslinging on one side: Kállay had been singled out for particular attack in mid-November by the semi-official Jedinstvo, in a leading article which mocked his naiveté in thinking Russian influence in Serbia vanquished, and for talking of the Regents as if they were “in his pocket.”74 The point about the mutual newspaper fusillades is that they marked a deep antagonism on both sides, an antagonism all the more bitter because both Kállay and the Regents knew just how much such tirades were the result of official inspiration.

Kállay’s first official report to Andrássy as foreign minister, on 19 November, reflected this breakdown in relations. Kállay concluded that Livadia was simply “the public, demonstrative final act of a revolution in Serbian policy which had been impending for some time.” This of course ignored all the evidence, repeatedly offered by the Regents, that it was no part of their ambition to be subservient adjuncts to Russia. Since, however, as Kállay claimed, the Regency had so demonstrably been “taken in tow by Russian policy,” it followed that the watchwords for Austro-Hungarian policy toward Serbia from now on must be caution and suspicion. All the Regents’ explanations for Livadia were calculated to lull the Monarchy into a false sense of security. In reality, Kállay believed,
the Serbian government “will seize every opportunity by which they can embarrass us without compromising themselves.” To judge by these words, the many expressions of friendship and mutual interest of the last four years might never have been uttered.\textsuperscript{75}

Andrássy was in a similarly intransigent mood. Only days before Kállay arrived in Pest for talks, the foreign minister spoke his mind to Lord Lytton, of the British embassy. Considering that only the previous June Andrássy had still been preaching the compelling logic of Serbo-Hungarian cooperation, the change in attitude was startling. He now professed himself “entirely converted” to the cause of propping up the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In such a scheme the Serbian government, which had proved itself a willing conduit for Pan-Slav propaganda aimed at the Monarchy’s Slavs, could have no share. On the contrary, by the trip to Livadia the Serbian Regents had revealed themselves for what they were. Both the Monarchy and the Ottomans must keep a sharp eye on Serbia “and crush her the moment she moves.”\textsuperscript{76}

To Kállay, on 28 November, Andrássy explained why the Serbian government was no longer to be trusted. As a consequence, Andrássy concluded that the Serbian government

\begin{quote}
doesn’t want our friendship, so . . . from now on he [Andrássy] will adopt a position of expectancy, taking care only to safeguard the political and material interests of the Empire. If, however, the Serbian government believes it to be in its interests to win our friendship, let it turn to him, but in any event only if it is able to offer proofs of its sincerity.\textsuperscript{77}
\end{quote}

In diplomatic terms, this was the equivalent of cold war. Serbia could expect no more favors unless it publicly allied itself with Austria-Hungary. The special relationship to which Andrássy and Kállay had devoted so much thought and rhetoric was dead.

Kállay, in return, had some suggestions to make which are of considerable interest, in view of the Monarchy’s subsequent strategy in dealing with Serbia and the Balkan Slavs, a strategy which Kállay for many years to come was to help in shaping. First, he wanted Andrássy to replace the present Austro-Hungarian consul in Sarajevo with Kállay’s own Belgrade deputy, Theodorovics. The latter, in addition to being a Hungarian Serb, was a man Andrássy would be able to trust in carrying out whatever policy he now intended pursuing vis-à-vis Bosnia.\textsuperscript{78}

Most practical, and in the event most effective, was Kállay’s suggestion that, in response to a recent increase in Serbia’s protective tariffs, the Monarchy should retaliate by raising its own tariff on swine imported from Serbia. Andrássy asked for a detailed set of proposals on this last, and one of the principal instruments of the Monarchy’s economic control of Serbia for the last quarter of the nineteenth century was conceived.\textsuperscript{79}
At this and a subsequent meeting on 17 December, Andrássy enjoined Kállay to lay particular emphasis in dealing with the Regents on the Monarchy’s supposedly excellent relations with Russia. In the meantime Kállay also had a couple of interviews with Menyhért Lónyay, the new Hungarian minister president. Lónyay too responded favorably to the idea of a ban on Serbian swine imports. He also was inclined to press ahead with a new Hungarian rail link on the Danube below Belgrade, which would act as a warning to Belgrade that the Monarchy was capable of bypassing Serbia completely in its pursuit of a Vienna-Constantinople railway.

Andrássy’s vaunting of good relations with Russia was, in fact, an elaborate blind, since the foreign minister had no intention of building a lasting bridge to St. Petersburg. Andrássy was actually intent on preparing the Monarchy for war with Russia, which he still estimated was likely in another two years. A top-level council on 17–19 February 1872, held in conditions of strict secrecy, was to lay the Monarchy’s own plans for rearmament and fortification in preparation for this conflict. In the end, of course, Andrássy’s feigned rapprochement with Russia turned into something like a real one, though this was against Andrássy’s better judgment. As a means of worrying the Serbian Regents, however, it proved convincing. Certainly Kállay himself seems to have had no inkling of just how far-reaching Andrássy’s plans were.

Kállay finally returned to Belgrade on 21 December in the midst of a severe blizzard, prompting speculation in the diplomatic community that his determination to reach the capital, in the face of such conditions, heralded some important new initiative. In reality his mission had an air of hopelessness about it, rather than of urgency. Primarily it consisted simply of delivering Andrássy’s adamantine “either-or,” and leaving the Regents to make what they would of it.

Blaznavac received him on Christmas Day, after Kállay had first been briefed by Dr. Rosen on the government’s position. As Rosen put it, the Regents’ attitude was almost a mirror image of Andrássy’s: “If Andrássy would do something openly which would show that he favors Serbian [interests], the mood would change in his favor in 24 hours.” Kállay, however, was having none of this. To Blaznavac, he enumerated the issues which had fallen victim to Serbian obstruction and ill will. The Danube; the railway question; the raising of customs duties on certain Austro-Hungarian goods; and most seriously the suspected agitation by Serbian agents in Croatia and the Military Border, and the distribution of the Grenzer pamphlet the previous autumn: all these, he insisted, were hardly the signs of a friendly disposition. In view of the numerous “services of friendship” which the Monarchy, largely through Andrássy’s agency, had shown Serbia, Andrássy could only conclude that he was wasting his time. The Regents could return to the fold anytime but, Kállay warned, this time they would have to furnish “convincing proofs of their sincerity.”
Both Regents denied utterly any interference in the Monarchy’s internal affairs. Both, as so often before, returned to the Beust circular and the acquittal of Karadzordević. Kállay, again, rejected the continued reference to these two factors as a justification. Thus, although the Regents protested that they wished to remain on good terms with the Monarchy, Kállay stuck to his original position that the Monarchy’s confidence in Serbia “is with some reason shaken.” The Monarchy, in short, would remain the judge of what constituted “convincing proofs.”

Kállay remained of the opinion that, of the two Regents, Blaznavac “would gladly be able to return to more intimate relations with us.” This, however, was for the moment impossible, since Blaznavac had committed himself publicly too far, and would have to reckon with the political capital Ristić would make out of any recantation. The best option for the Monarchy, therefore, was to wait for the Serbian government to seek a rapprochement, but in the meantime to take “energetic measures” to safeguard the Monarchy’s material interests. Kállay did not specify what the energetic measures were to be, but it seems fair to assume that in any arising diplomatic negotiations he meant the Monarchy to drive a hard bargain. Protecting the Monarchy’s material interests also entailed keeping a strict watch on any subversive links between Serbia and the Monarchy’s South Slavs.

Subsequent events were to show that Kállay was deluding himself. The combination of intransigence on both sides ensured that relations did not just remain static, but went steadily downhill thereafter. Less than three months after these exchanges, it was the normally emollient Blaznavac, rather than Ristić, who was openly threatening Hungary with a revival of the nationalities issue. “Wherever Hungary has the slightest wound on her body, (Blaznavac shouted) I will do my best where possible to inflame it.” Any thought of a closer understanding between Serbia and Hungary, according to Blaznavac, was an impossibility.

To a certain extent, such hysterical reactions were prompted by an underlying consciousness that, whatever Andrássy’s reputation as a Russophobe, the rumored Austro-Russian entente was showing increasing signs of becoming reality. This naturally made the Serbian government fearful of being caught in the middle, its interests in national liberation and territorial expansion squashed by a division of the Balkans into great power spheres of influence. Nor, as the subsequent history of the Eastern Question demonstrates, were such fears completely unfounded.

Beyond this, however, lay another reason for the Regents’ instinctive distrust of Andrássy as the new Habsburg foreign minister. It was not a reason which either Andrássy or Kállay appeared to appreciate, or were even aware of; but the British vice-consul, with whom Blaznavac discussed the matter, correctly reported it. As Blaznavac told Captain Watson,

he knew better than to believe Count Andrassy, when the latter says, that he wishes to see Servia prosperous and strong and become a center for the Slavs of Turkey, for that was not the Magyars’ programme; Count Andrassy, he said,
knew the danger which might accrue to Hungary, if Servia really should consolidate herself, for the Slavs of Hungary would then perhaps look to Belgrade as a capital.89

Here, indeed, was the crux of the matter as far as the Serbs were concerned: Andrásy, as a Hungarian, simply ought to have known better. The fact that, by the time of his installation in the Ballhaus, Andrásy had come full circle and had concluded that the Serbs were untrustworthy after all, made all the protestations of the preceding four years seem like an elaborate confidence trick.

For four years, the relationship between the Habsburg Monarchy and Serbia had been distorted by the Hungarian factor. Whereas the traditional policy of the Monarchy had sought always to curb Serbian aspirations, especially with regard to Bosnia, Andrásy from the moment of his appointment as Hungarian minister president pursued goals which flatly contradicted this policy. By the beginning of 1872, however, relations between Serbia and the Monarchy might be said to have returned to something like normal. Hostility and tension reigned, interspersed with occasional threats on both sides. In the coming years, Kállay in Belgrade, and Andrásy in Vienna, were to evolve a number of different stratagems for bending the Serbian government to their will. The most effective, as well as ultimately the most self-defeating, was to involve securing a personal hold over Serbia’s head of state, Prince Milan, and reinforcing this hold through the political and commercial treaties of 1880–81. Thus the failure of the attempt at Serbo-Hungarian “friendship,” and the increased bad feeling it engendered, were to determine the Monarchy’s policy toward Serbia for the next generation. It is in this sense that 1867–71 deserves to be regarded as the formative period for relations between the Monarchy and its troublesome neighbor.

Notes

1 E.g., Kállay to Beust, 14 Sept. 1871, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191.
3 Ristić to Hristić, 10/22 Nov. 1870, in Srpska Kraljevska Akademija, Pisma Jovana Ristića Filipu Hristiću od 1870 do 1873 i od 1877 do 1880 (Belgrade: Narodna Štamparija, 1931), no. 2, 3; Ristić to Hristić, 17/29 Nov. 1870, ibid., no. 3, 8; and Ristić to Hristić, 8/20 Dec. 1870, ibid., no. 6, 15.
4 See, inter alia, Hristić to Ristić, 2/14 Dec. 1870, in Pisma Filipa Hrističa Jovanu Ristiću, ed. Grgur Jakić (Belgrade: Srpska Akademija Nauka, 1953), no. 20, 26–27; Hristić to Ristić, 24 Feb./8 Mar. 1871, ibid., no. 36, 44–45; Hristić to Ristić, 18/30 May 1871, ibid., no. 55, 68.
5 Ristić to Hristić, 24 July/5 Aug. 1871, in Ristić Letters, no. 31, 65.
7 Rosen to Bismarck, 4 June 1871, quoted ibid.


12  Hristić to Ristić, 31 Aug./12 Sept. 1871, ibid., no. 77, 85.


14  Ibid., 208–9.

15  Ibid., 210.

16  Ibid.

17  Hristić to Ristić, 14/26 Sept. 1871, *Hristić Letters*, no. 82, 89.


23  Ibid., 3:213.


25  Ibid.


29  Ibid; cf. the account Blaznavac later gave the Prussian consul, in Rosen to Bismarck, 10 Nov. 1871, cited in Reiswitz, *Belgrad-Berlin, Berlin-Belgrad*, 204–5.


31  Quoted, ibid., 3:217.

32  The text is given, ibid., 3:218–19.

33  Ristić to Hristić, 4/16 Nov. 1871, in *Ristić Letters*, no. 37, 75.

34  Kállay to Beust, 16 Oct. 1871 (telegram), HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191; Kállay Diary, 16 Oct. 1871 (*Dnevnik*, 408); Kállay to Beust, 16 Oct. 1871, no. 35, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191.

35  E.g., Kállay to Andrássy, 9 Sept. 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/60–61; Rosen to Thile, 14 Sept. 1871, quoted in Reiswitz, *Belgrad-Berlin, Berlin-Belgrad*, 202; Kállay to Beust, 14 Sept.
1871, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191; a copy of this was enclosed in Kállay to Andrásy, 16 Oct. 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/62.

36 Kállay to Beust, 16 Oct. 1871, no. 35, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191; Stokes, Politics as Development, 17.

37 Kállay to Beust, 16 Oct. 1871, no. 35, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191.

38 Kállay to Andrásy, 16 Oct. 1871, OSZK, FH 1733/62.

Ibid.

Ibid.

41 Mayr (chargé d'affaires) to Beust, 17 Oct. 1871, HHSA, PA XII/98.

42 Prokesch-Osten to Beust, 24 Oct. 1871, HHSA, PA XII/98. See also Longworth to Elliot, 18 Oct. 1871, PRO, FO 78/2185.


44 Schweinitz to Bismarck, 27 Oct. 1871, quoted ibid., 208–9; italics in original.


46 Schweinitz to Bismarck, 27 Oct. 1871, quoted ibid., 208–9. On the Hohenwart-Schäffle ministry of 1870–71, and the failed attempt at a “Czech compromise,” see Arthur J. May, The Hapsburg Monarchy 1867–1914 (New York: Norton, 1968 [1951]), 59–61; C.A. Macartney, The Habsburg Empire 1790–1918 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969), 579–85. The Hohenwart government tendered its resignation on 27 October 1871, a week after the crucial common ministerial council which persuaded the Emperor that the Czech compromise proposals would be impossible to implement. Beust’s intervention against the proposals, with explicit Hungarian support, was one of his greatest successes; it was also, however, an intervention in internal politics which Francis Joseph considered unwarrantable, and which prompted him to dismiss Beust on 1 November. See the excerpt from the common ministerial council, 20 Oct. 1871, in which Beust argued against the Czech compromise on foreign policy grounds; quoted verbatim in István Diószegi, Die Außenpolitik der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie 1871–1877 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1985), note 11, 43–44.

47 Bismarck to Schweinitz, 2 Nov. 1871, quoted Reiswitz, Belgrad-Berlin, Berlin-Belgrad, 210–11.

48 Ibid.


55 Ibid.

56 Diószegi, *Die Außenpolitik*, especially chapters 2 and 3.

57 Kállay Diary, 8 Nov. 1871 (Dnevnik, 412).

58 Ibid., 10 Nov. 1871 (Dnevnik, 413–14; Kállay to Andrássy, 19 Nov. 1871, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191.

59 Kállay Diary, 10 Nov. 1871 (Dnevnik, 414); see also Ristić, *Spoljašnji odnosa Srbije*, 3:227; and Kállay to Andrássy, 19 Nov. 1871, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191.

60 Ibid.


62 Kállay Diary, 11 Nov. 1871 (Dnevnik, 416).

63 Ibid.


65 Kállay Diary, 21 Nov. 1871 (Dnevnik, 420).

66 Ristić to Hristić, 4/16 Nov. 1871, *Ristić Letters*, no. 37, 75. Cf., however, Kállay Diary, 10 Nov. 1871 (Dnevnik, pp. 413–15).


68 Ristić to Hristić, 4/16 Nov. 1871, *Ristić Letters*, no. 37, 75.

69 Ibid., 76.


71 Reform, 28 Nov. 1871, summarized by Radenić in *Dnevnik*, note 304, 762.

72 Reform, 10 Dec. 1871, quoted in Serbo-Croat translation by Radenić, ibid.

73 Kállay Diary, 21 Dec. 1871 (Dnevnik, 426–27).

74 Jedinstvo, 3/15 Nov. 1871, quoted in *Dnevnik*, note 302, 761–62. See also Kállay Diary, 18 Nov. 1871 (Dnevnik, 419).

75 Kállay to Andrássy, 19 Nov. 1871, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/191.

76 Lytton to Granville, 23 Nov. 1871, PRO, FO 7/791, quoted in Bridge, *Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 62–63.

77 Kállay Diary, 28 Nov. 1871 (Dnevnik, 422).

78 Ibid. Theodorovics was appointed to the Sarajevo consulate in March 1872. For his devotion to Hungarian interests, see Watson (vice-consul, Belgrade) to Rumbold (Constantinople), 18 Mar. 1872, enclosed in Watson to Granville, 20 Mar. 1872, PRO, FO 78/2227; also Kállay Diary, 30 Dec. 1871 and 26 Jan. 1872 (Dnevnik, 429, 438).

79 Kállay Diary, 28 Nov. 1871 (Dnevnik, 423).

80 Ibid., 28 Nov. and 17 Dec. 1871 (Dnevnik, 422, 426).

81 Ibid., 1 and 4 Dec. 1871 (Dnevnik, 423).

Kállay Diary, 28 Nov. and 17 Dec. 1871 (Dnevnik, 423, 426).

Ibid., 21 Dec. 1871 (Dnevnik, 426); Watson to Elliot, 1 Jan. 1872, enclosed in Watson to Granville, 2 Jan. 1872, PRO, FO 78/2227.

Kállay Diary, 25 Dec. 1871 (Dnevnik, 427).


Kállay to Andrássy, 18 Mar. 1872, OSZK, FH 1733/3. Kállay had this account, in quotes, from Dr. Rosen the previous day; Kállay Diary, 17 Mar. 1872 (Dnevnik, 451).

Watson to Elliot, 1 Jan. 1872, PRO, FO 78/2227.
The acrimonious exchanges over the Livadia trip, at the end of December 1871, closed a peculiar chapter in relations between the Habsburg Monarchy and Serbia. For four years the Hungarian minister president, an influential new force in the shaping of the Monarchy’s foreign policy, tried to exert control over Serbia, using tactics which, whatever their shortcomings, were based on a genuine desire for political cooperation. But Andrássy alone could not determine foreign policy toward Serbia, and the inevitable result was simply to muddy the waters and create further confusion and suspicion. With Andrássy’s abandonment of this strategy, Austro-Serbian relations could return to what passed for normality.

Yet the Andrássy experiment left its mark on subsequent policy, if only in a negative sense. In the four decades remaining before the Monarchy committed the supreme blunder of attacking Serbia in 1914, a policy was pursued which sprang directly from the experiences of 1867–71, and which owed much to the fact that those experiences were largely Hungarian ones. The fundamental tenet of this policy was that if Serbia would not willingly be tied to the Monarchy, then it must be forced to accept satellite status. It took a decade for this policy to be implemented; the final touches were completed in 1881.

It is not the purpose here to analyze Austro-Hungarian policy toward Serbia after 1881; a follow-up volume, currently in preparation, will cover the period of full economic and political domination down to 1903. What is intended rather is to summarize the fateful policies adopted after 1871, and which culminated in the treaties of 1880–81. The effect of this settlement, in which Andrássy’s policies were brought to fruition by, among others, Kállay, can hardly be exaggerated.
There is a direct connection between the relationship forced on Serbia in 1881, and the breakdown in relations which set in after 1903, events which in turn had a direct bearing on the outbreak of the First World War. After 1871 the Monarchy reverted to a more traditional policy of trying to control Serbia by outright coercion. It took another decade for the necessary apparatus to be locked into place, but by 1881 Austro-Hungarian control over Serbia’s economic and political development seemed as absolute as could be wished for. By coercion is not implied military force, even if that was the ultimate sanction. Rather, control over Serbia was achieved through a combination of personal diplomacy and treaty obligation. Specifically, the personal influence was exercised by means of Prince, later King Milan Obrenović; the treaties in question were the commercial and railway conventions of 1880–81, and the secret political alliance of 1881. For the next twenty-five years Serbia remained a satellite of the Monarchy.\(^1\)

Andrássy, as foreign minister from 1871 to 1879, was chiefly responsible for laying down the Monarchy’s new policy toward Serbia. All his utterances with regard to Serbia, in the first few months after taking over at the Ballhaus, indicated that he had completely abandoned his four years’ patronage of Belgrade, and swung over to an exaggerated supportiveness for the Ottoman Empire. If Serbia should threaten Ottoman rule, Andrássy told the British ambassador on taking office, the Ottomans should “crush her the moment she moves.”\(^2\) At a secret military planning conference in February 1872, far from airing his previous plans for handing Bosnia over to Serbia, Andrássy actually conceded that the annexation of the province by the Monarchy would be desirable, even if current conditions made it impracticable. The only objection raised to annexation by Andrássy, at this February conference, was that it would needlessly unite the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and Serbia against the Monarchy. Instead, he continued, it must be Austria-Hungary’s principal object in the Balkans to divide the smaller states from one another, and prop up Ottoman rule. The main danger, as always, was from Russia, and in this, Andrássy stressed, the Monarchy must now reckon with the hostility of both Serbia and Romania as well.\(^3\)

Andrássy’s attitude toward Serbia was part of an important shift in his views generally by 1871, one of those occasions where a politician implicitly acknowledges that he has changed his mind. In the period between 1867 and 1871, the Hungarian minister president had agreed with neither of the two main, but competing, traditions in Habsburg policy in the Balkans. He rejected both the dynastic standpoint, which saw the Balkans as a suitable field for expansion, preferably with the cooperation of Russia, and the conservative belief, inherited from Metternich, that only a rigid adherence to the status quo could preserve the Monarchy from the dangers of nationalism and Russian interference in the region. Against these views, Andrássy had opposed a distinctly Hungarian preference.
He stressed the paramount threat from Russia, resisted the idea of incorporating extra nationalities, especially Slavs, into the Monarchy, and took a relatively liberal attitude toward the national development of the Balkan peoples. The Bosnian plan had represented this Hungarian approach to relations with the South Slav world quite accurately.

Now, at the conference of February 1872, it was clear that Andrássy had finally adapted his thinking to what was in essence the dynastic tradition: the Balkans were a legitimate, indeed a vital concern of the Monarchy, and one where expansion could not be ruled out. Far from accepting that the corollary of this might have to be collaboration with Russia, however, Andrássy laid greatest emphasis on the need to combat Russian influence and to prepare for conflict with Russia. It was to this end, and to safeguard the Monarchy’s own expansionist goals, that the Ottoman Empire was to be revived and the Balkan nationalities divided and weakened. As Diószegi remarks, this constituted “a peculiar interweaving of Austrian dynastic traditions and Hungarian national aspirations, in which the Hungarian component was undoubtedly the stronger.”

Nor did Andrássy make any secret of his change of mind as far as Serbia was concerned. When a dispute developed between Serbia and the Porte over possession of Mali Zvornik, an Ottoman-held enclave on the Serbian side of the border with Bosnia, Andrássy made clear his lack of sympathy with the Serbian side of the argument. Writing in April 1872 to the new Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Constantinople, Count Ludolf, Andrássy announced that “we do not perceive, in our current relations with the Serbs, any reason which might cause us to support their interests.” At a common ministerial council in mid-May, Andrássy described the Ottoman Empire as the Monarchy’s “strongest and most reliable ally” in the region, an opinion he repeated to Kállay a few days later. In August, Andrássy told the British ambassador that the Ottomans should be left by the powers to crush any uprising of the Balkan Christians, and indeed, that Austria-Hungary supported a policy of “holding the ring” while this was done. As late as November 1872 he was advising the Ottoman government that maintaining the divisions among the Balkan peoples offered the Porte “its safest and cheapest protection.”

Kállay, too, determined to escape to the more promising world of Hungarian domestic politics, made his disdain for the Serbian government fairly obvious. The British consul in Belgrade was undoubtedly carrying coals to Newcastle when, in February 1872, he warned the Serbs that Hungary had flattered us [the Serbs] with tall stories and strung us along with promises that it would gladly agree to Bosnia and the Hercegovina falling to Serbia, but in the recent past had changed its policy, and now makes the same promises to the Croatian aristocracy, doubtless to bind it closer to itself. Ristić himself acknowledged, in March, that Kállay hardly ever visited now.
A few weeks later, the Regent put his finger on an important element in the new Austro-Hungarian policy toward Serbia. He knew for a fact, he told Hristić, that Kállay’s instructions were to show indifference toward Serbia’s improved relationship with Russia, and to wait until Prince Milan attained his majority that summer. The Monarchy’s future attitude toward Serbia, Ristić believed, would depend very much on what line Milan took. That this was no fantasy on Ristić’s part emerges from Andrássy’s instructions to Kállay in August, on the occasion of Milan’s coming of age. Kállay was to show “neither a demonstrative reticence nor the opposite,” and to let it be known thereby that

just as our relationship with Serbia was conditioned hitherto by the attitude of the Regency, so our future relations will be conditioned by that of the Prince.

In other words the Prince, who occupied such a crucial position in the Serbian political world, was potentially an equally important figure in the development of Austria-Hungary’s future relationship with Serbia. It was a trite observation, but one which foreshadowed much of subsequent policy.

Relations sank to a new low in the summer of 1872, precisely because of the celebrations in Belgrade of Milan’s majority. The city of Belgrade sent out invitations to South Slavs within the Monarchy, an act to which the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry took exception but which, since the invitations were not made by the Serbian government, Andrássy decided to ignore. The Hungarian government, however, took a different view, and promptly banned Hungarian subjects from attending the festivities, a measure which Andrássy undoubtedly welcomed.

The subsequent junketings in Belgrade were likely from the start to be an occasion for nationalist oratory and demonstrations and, given the current state of relations, it was all too likely that the Monarchy would be criticized both by Serbian citizens and by its own subjects. The visa ban, however, imposed at short notice and with limited effect, only exacerbated relations and led to fresh abuse. According to the British consul, the Austro-Hungarian government as a whole was deemed to have sought to prevent a Pan-Slav demonstration, and to have failed miserably. Visitors from the Monarchy were estimated to have exceeded six thousand, although Kállay disputed this. “Nothing in short could be more ill judged and untimely than this attempt to interfere with what was felt to be a national holiday.” Matters came to a climax on the night of 26 August, when a torchlight procession attempted to parade outside the Austro-Hungarian consulate: “the police interfered with a strong hand in dispersing the mob, which had assembled for the purpose of insulting Mr. Kallay.”

Another indication of the extent to which Andrássy and Kállay had abandoned their policy of courting Serbian goodwill, and were capable of envisaging an expansionist policy in the Balkans, was the journey through Bosnia which Kállay made in the summer of 1872, shortly before the celebrations of Milan’s
majority.\textsuperscript{19} Traveling up the Sava as far as Bosanski Brod, he then struck inland, up the Bosna River valley, to the heart of the province, arriving at Sarajevo on 16 July. Here his former deputy, Theodorovics, gave Kállay a thoroughgoing introduction to the complexities of the Bosnian scene, with visits to leading figures in the Ottoman administration, the consular corps, and all three communities. Of particular significance were the visits Kállay paid to the Catholic monasteries in and around Sarajevo, since the existence of a sizeable Catholic minority in Bosnia-Hercegovina was later to be one of the pretexts for the Monarchy’s intervention in 1878.\textsuperscript{20}

Leaving Sarajevo on 3 August, Kállay returned via the Vrbas River valley in western Bosnia, emerging on the Sava once more at Bosanska Gradiška on the twelfth. He had thus inspected the main river axes of the country and, especially by his contacts with the Catholic community, sent out a strong signal that the Habsburg Monarchy had interests of its own in Bosnia. At the monastery of Fojnica, for instance, Kállay assured the gratified Franciscans that “our All-Highest Master [Francis Joseph] will protect and defend their interests in future, as he has up to now.”\textsuperscript{21} Kállay’s biographer, writing thirty-seven years later, was even more forthright. The Bosnian journey, Thallóczy believed, was “the starting point of the policy which took shape seven [sic] years later, which drew Bosnia and the Hercegovina into the Monarchy’s immediate sphere of interest.”\textsuperscript{22} It was not a gesture which passed unnoticed in Belgrade.

Matters remained at this level of scarcely veiled hostility for much of the next year. Early in 1873, for example, the Austro-Hungarian government banned the Danube Steamship Company from calling at Serbian ports, a practical annoyance which the Serbian government felt keenly.\textsuperscript{23} By the end of 1873, however, an alternative strategy for relations with Serbia had emerged. Andrásy and Kállay both, on the basis of their increased contacts with young Prince Milan, had come to the conclusion that he was someone with whom they could do business. For one thing, Milan himself clearly wished for a better relationship. As Kállay reported, after his first serious conversation with Milan since his majority, the Prince “declared quite frankly, that Austria’s good will was an absolute necessity for Serbia, since the country’s material prosperity was to a large extent dependent on its neighbor state.”\textsuperscript{24} This was no less than the truth, and for the rest of his life Milan was to remain consistent in this belief.

The problem with relying on Milan for the implementation of the Monarchy’s policy, however, was that the very fact of his personal preference for the Monarchy distanced the Prince from the Serbian political world and Serbian public opinion. To begin with, Milan was happy to continue, after August 1872, with Blaznavac as his minister president and Ristić as foreign minister. Blaznavac died suddenly in April 1873, and Ristić took over; at this stage Ristić, no less than Milan, was concerned with repairing the breach with Austria-Hungary, for
practical reasons if nothing else. More important was the clash of temperament and underlying objectives between the Prince and Ristić. Ristić, though authoritarian by nature, wished to govern with the aid largely of the Liberals, which meant a constitutionally elected Skupština. Milan, like his cousin Prince Michael essentially an autocrat, resented being saddled with this relatively mild constitution while still a minor. From an early point in his reign he aimed at building up a professional army with an officer corps which would owe its loyalty primarily to him, its commander-in-chief. In the long term, Ristić’s insistence on governing by parliamentary means, however rigged, made him less than welcome from the Monarchy’s point of view. His nationalist sympathies, as well as those of successive Skupštinas, were well known; certainly neither Andrássy nor Kállay trusted Ristić to maintain an Austrophile course, if public opinion in Serbia seemed against it.

By the time of a much publicized visit by Milan to Vienna in the autumn of 1873, and which, ironically, Ristić had done much to promote, the division between the Prince and Ristić was obvious. Andrássy, who had lengthy talks with the Prince, and confirmed the sincerity of his desire for better relations, could see the difficulty himself. As he put it to Kállay,

> Whether he [Prince Milan], in view of the low level of popularity which he appears to enjoy in the country, and in view of his apparently more indolent than energetic nature, will be able to maintain his position for long, I would not like to hazard an opinion.

Milan, contrary to these expectations, remained on the scene for some time to come. Despite the risks attendant on putting all their eggs into one basket, therefore, the Monarchy’s policy makers continued thereafter to place much of their reliance in the Prince personally. This obvious identification of Milan with Austro-Hungarian interests, in turn, contributed substantially to his general unpopularity in Serbia.

There was another problem with relying so much on the ruler, and this was Milan’s personality. Milan was very much the product of a broken marriage, and his behavior even before attaining his majority reflected this. His parents, Miloš Obrenović and Maria Catargiu, had split up even before Milan was born in 1854, largely because of the father’s spendthrift and philandering ways; Milan’s mother, however, then went on to become the mistress of Prince Alexander Cuza of Romania, and until his ninth year Milan “grew up in the shadow of one of the most corrupt courts of Europe.” Although Prince Michael then removed his heir from Maria’s control and sent him to school in Paris, Milan’s character was already largely shaped. The Regents, Blaznavac and Ristić, continued his education, but failed to provide him with suitable companions or role models; instead, they saw fit to “complete” this education by providing him with another
man’s wife as a mistress. Emotionally neglected and solitary as a child, Milan grew up with an inbred mistrust of human nature and a cynical and self-indulgent outlook on the world generally. Highly intelligent, he was also manipulative and temperamental. Even before Milan’s majority, Kállay noted in March 1872, the Prince was noted for his boorish manners, fondness for gambling, and a tendency to drink more than was good for him, even though he was also already attending cabinet meetings regularly. It was a pattern that Milan exhibited throughout his life, a combination of shrewdness and immaturity.

For a brief period, in 1873–74, it appeared as if the presence of Milan alone would return Serbia to the Monarchy’s sphere of influence. The rift between the Prince and Ristić led to the latter’s dismissal in November 1873, and his replacement by Jovan Marinović, close associate of Garašanin and one of those reviled by Kállay back in the 1860s as the “Russian party.” By late 1873, however, Kállay had come to appreciate Marinović for what he was: a conservative patriot who was essentially above, not to say indifferent to, party politics. Cultured, rich, and reasonable, Marinović deplored the dismantling of the old oligarchical system by Ristić in 1869, but was not reactionary or aggressive enough to wish to turn the clock back. Instead, as Milan’s closest adviser, he represented a belief in the need for government above party factionalism, and in pursuit of consensus secured the appointment of several Liberals to his administration. In foreign affairs, too, all Marinović’s instincts were conciliatory: he wished to see Serbia on good terms with all the powers, including even the Porte. Kállay already counted Marinović as a personal friend, and while Marinović remained in power the Austro-Hungarian consul was once again a frequent visitor at the minister president’s office. Unfortunately for the Monarchy’s cause, however, Marinović’s style of government, on both the domestic and the foreign fronts, soon got him into difficulties.

The early 1870s in Serbia, as Gale Stokes has shown, were a period of genuine political development. Despite the restrictive terms of the 1869 Constitution, political debate was gradually widening and deepening, with the emergence of rudimentary party organization. Above all, elections and regular Skupština sessions were becoming a forum for real political controversy, which even the masterful Ristić had found hard to manage. Where Ristić had dominated the Skupština, Marinović permitted it far more freedom to discuss and criticize than it had ever exercised. The result was constant opposition and disruption, which brought Marinović down in December 1874.

Even Marinović’s accommodating approach to foreign affairs, which Andrássy and Kállay so much welcomed, proved to be a liability, since it created the impression in Serbia of a weak government, truckling to the country’s enemies. The intimacy with Kállay, for a start, did Marinović no service in the nationalist press and opposition. Worse was the effect produced by the decision, in June 1874, for Milan finally to journey to Constantinople and pay formal homage to
the Sultan. Done reluctantly, under the joint pressure of Austria-Hungary and Russia, this was inevitably unpopular, and the fact that Marinović in return secured nothing by way of concessions over the Mali Zvornik and railway questions did not improve matters. Shortly after, Marinović let Milan talk him into an extended three-month tour of Europe, with the minister president in tow, an indulgence which confirmed the reputation of Milan as a spendthrift idler, and heightened the sense of a government out of touch with public opinion.36

Long before the Marinović government was replaced by an even more unstable one under Aćim Čumić, then, it was clear to Andrássy and Kállay that their hopes of maintaining a friendly regime in Belgrade were misplaced.37 On the contrary, the opposition to Marinović assumed an ominous form from the Monarchy’s point of view when, in mid-1874, Ristić put himself at the head of what he claimed would be a “national-liberal party.” Through a new journal, Istok, Ristić started agitating for Serbia to assume once more the role of Balkan Piedmont. He explicitly criticized the government’s failure to promote revolution in the Ottoman provinces, and its excessive willingness to do Austria-Hungary’s bidding.38

For Andrássy and Kállay this only confirmed all their suspicions of Ristić; it also made their dilemma the more acute. If Prince Milan’s goodwill alone was not sufficient to ensure a reliable Serbia, or if those leaders, like Marinović, who were well-disposed toward the Monarchy, were too weak, then some other means of securing the Monarchy’s interests in Serbia was essential.

As it happened, Andrássy had one instrument ready to hand, in the shape of the Three Emperors’ League, even before the formation of Marinović’s government. In the great irony of his tenure as foreign minister, Andrássy found himself driven by the logic of grand policy toward a détente with Russia, which took its first tentative form in 1872, and was then formalized by the Schönbrunn Convention between the two empires in June 1873. With Germany’s accession to the pact in October, the conservative alliance of earlier in the century was partially restored. The result was the first of several periods of wary, but nonetheless basically effective Austro-Russian cooperation in the Balkans, in the interests of stability and the sharing of influence. A natural consequence of the League was that Serbia’s interests were among the first to be set aside, by Russia no less than by Austria-Hungary.39

The other, increasingly apparent, means open to the Monarchy of controlling Serbia was the economic one. If the Monarchy could only impose on Serbia the sort of economic discipline which Andrássy and Kállay had dreamed of for so long, then surely the Principality would prove more biddable politically as well. Serbia must be drawn into the Monarchy’s railway network; a satisfactory trade relationship must be achieved; and some form of treaty assurance of all this must be reached.40 The difficulty, however, lay in finding a Serbian government
which would be willing to agree to such a program in the face of the *Skupština* and public opinion.

Serbia’s domestic political situation at the start of 1875 made this unlikely. Čumić’s government lasted a mere two months, largely because the egregious Čumić soon antagonized everyone, including the Prince, his cabinet colleagues, the *Skupština*, and the Austro-Hungarian government. Andrássy was so alarmed at the growth of nationalist agitation in Serbia that, in mid-January 1875, he issued a not-so-veiled warning to Milan. If the Prince could not keep a ministry about him which refrained from encouraging such agitation, Andrássy wrote, “we would reach a point where we would have to consider protecting our interests unilaterally.” When Čumić resigned in a huff early in February, Milan seized the opportunity to appoint a ministry of faceless bureaucrats headed by Danilo Stefanović. In as much as most of Stefanović’s colleagues were allies of Jovan Marinović, who continued to advise Prince Milan, the new government was at least marginally more acceptable to the Monarchy. It still, however, had to contend with a *Skupština* which was increasingly vocal and self-confident, and with the presence of Ristić in the background.

Faced with the prospect of continuing uncertainty on the Serbian scene, by 1875 Andrássy was in no mood to rely on any Serbian government. It was in January 1875, for instance, that the foreign minister made his most explicit statement yet as to the need for the Monarchy eventually to take over Bosnia-Hercegovina. As the protocol of a secret council of the Emperor’s military chancellery, held on 29 January, shows, Andrássy by now was clearly for a takeover, given certain conditions, although the precise reasons for his conversion are not obvious. On no account, at any rate, could Austria-Hungary tolerate the occupation of any part of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Serbia or Montenegro. The mere threat of this, Andrássy assured the council, would justify the Monarchy in sending in its own troops. It was the final proof that Andrássy had quite abandoned the views he held up until late 1871 and, in part, for some time after that.

The inability of Serbian governments to control nationalist agitation was underlined in the most unmistakable way in July 1875, when a revolt against Ottoman rule broke out in the Hercegovina. The Near Eastern crisis which developed out of this, and which occupied the attention of the great powers for the next three years, showed the truth of Kállay’s repeated warnings since 1868. Confronted with a genuine uprising in the Balkans, no Serbian government could afford to ignore popular sentiment in favor of war with the Turks. The first proof of this was the collapse of the rootless Stefanović ministry in August 1875, and the appointment by Milan of a government under Stevča Mihailović, based on popular support in a newly elected *Skupština*, and with Jovan Ristić as foreign minister and dominant personality.

That the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in the person of the Emperor Francis Joseph and his military advisers, shared some of the responsibility for the
insurrection in the Hercegovina now seems a reasonable proposition. Francis Joseph’s tour of the Monarchy’s Dalmatian coastline, in the spring of 1875, and during which he gave a sympathetic reception to delegations of Bosnians and Hercegovinians claiming his protection, appears to have contributed substantially to the readiness of the Christian population to rise up. Andrásy was not in favor of the decision to make the tour at that point, and was in fact enraged at its diplomatic repercussions, but nevertheless had to accept it as a fait accompli. Nor could the foreign minister complain if the Emperor sought to accelerate a scheme propounded by Andrásy only the previous January, by which the Monarchy could look forward to taking responsibility for Bosnia-Hercegovina.

In the meantime the crisis in the Balkans had to be managed with due attention to the Monarchy’s interests, and Andrásy found that the surest way to achieve this was to come to a practical understanding with Russia. Despite the effect of the uprising in Pan-Slav circles, the Three Emperors’ League was still alive and well. When, shortly after the outbreak of the revolt, Prince Milan journeyed to Vienna to seek the advice of the powers, both Andrásy and the Russian ambassador, Novikov, cautioned him against any armed involvement by Serbia. Indeed, the Russians seemed even less concerned about South Slav sensibilities than Andrásy himself. Novikov immediately proposed a joint démarche by the League in Belgrade; and Baron Jomini, of the Russian foreign ministry, described a possible Ottoman occupation of Serbia as “a punishment deserved.” “During the Turkish occupation,” he continued, “the country might be relieved of its republican socialist element.”

The Tsar’s government, as always, was in fact divided between an official policy toward the Balkans and an unofficial one. The official line sought to preserve the status quo as far as practicable, while providing for an amicable division of the region into Russian and Austro-Hungarian spheres of interest in the event of a general breakdown of Ottoman rule. The unofficial Pan-Slav line wanted a Russian-imposed settlement which secured Russian influence over the Balkan Slavs to the exclusion of all else. As the crisis unfolded, public opinion in Russia did for the first time begin to have an effect on government policy, in that some concessions were felt necessary to Pan-Slav and especially Orthodox sentiments. This pressure was increased when Russian officers, headed by the military hero General Cherniaiev, volunteered for service with the Serbian army in anticipation of war. The overall ambition of the Russian government, however, remained to secure Russia’s interests as a great power, rather than to gratify the instincts of Russian, let alone Balkan, nationalists.

For this reason Andrásy, despite his chronic suspicion of Russian motives, was able to do a deal with St. Petersburg which promised to secure Austria-Hungary’s interests too. The two powers pursued roughly parallel policies throughout the next year, discouraging active Serbian or Montenegrin involve-
ment in the spreading revolt, tabling one ineffective scheme of reform for the Ottoman Empire after another and, in general, as Andrásy had described his own favored approach back in 1871, “holding the ring.”

In Belgrade, however, Prince Milan was fighting a losing battle against the popular clamor for war. It is impossible not to conclude that, caught between the minatory attitude of the powers, and rising nationalist hysteria at home, Milan nevertheless judged the situation more realistically than the majority of Serbian politicians. Whether from his oft-expressed contempt for the Serbian people, with whom he felt little in common, or from that shrewd instinct for his own interests which distinguished him, Milan was convinced that war would be a disaster. “If you win, glory; if you lose, disgrace,” was his pithy summary of the dilemma facing him. Yet Milan could not ignore the possibility of deposition or assassination if he failed to reflect the popular mood. Kállay’s successor as consul in Belgrade, Prince Wrede, shared this gloomy outlook. “Whatever course events take,” he informed Vienna at the end of August, “it is very probable that the result will be fatal to the house of Obrenovitch.”

Despairing of the openly warlike measures proposed by the Mihailović-Ristić government, Milan forced their resignation early in October by making explicit his disagreement with such tactics. The Prince hoped that the new minister president, Ljubomir Kaljević, although a Liberal, would support him in a policy of moderation. Before long, however, the Kaljević ministry too felt itself obliged to bend under the pressure building up for action. The formation of volunteer units, many of whom flooded in from Austria-Hungary, to fight on the side of the insurgents, had been halted at the insistence of the powers; but the Serbian government continued to supply the revolt with funds, supplies, and arms. Nor did Milan’s high-handed methods heighten his popularity in the country.

Milan’s quandary was worsened by the fact that the policy jointly pursued by Austria-Hungary and Russia, while sternly discouraging action by Serbia, patiently held out no prospect of resolving the crisis. Andrásy’s first significant proposal for ending the revolt was the so-called Andrásy Note of 30 December. This document, drafted in consultation with the Russian ambassador, Novikov, confined itself to suggesting internal Ottoman reforms, none of which were to be enforced by the powers. Accepted by the Porte, but rejected by the insurgents and unlikely from the start to win the endorsement of Great Britain, the Note was essentially a pious exercise in window-dressing, incapable of realization. Rejection by the powers and the insurgents, on the one hand, left the Porte free to crush the revolt if it could. That the Note stemmed from the Monarchy, on the other hand, established that power in Andrásy’s eyes as the protector of the Balkan Christians and, in Wertheimer’s words, “was designed eventually to smooth the way for the future acquisition of both Turkish provinces by Austria-Hungary.”
Since the revolt continued, so did the pressure on Milan. In March 1876 he responded to more Austro-Russian remonstrance, and issued a declaration in which his government promised not to attack the Ottomans, or impede great power mediation. This only increased the Prince’s isolation in Belgrade, as Pan-Slavists here and in Russia stepped up their demands for action. The ambiguity between official and unofficial Russian policy here began to tell, as many of those Russians with whom Milan had dealings were only too eager to assure him that a war policy would have Russia’s full backing. Early in May, Milan finally decided that his personal position was too dangerous, and he resolved to lead from the front rather than risk being left behind. He dismissed Kaljević, and brought back the Mihailović-Ristić team.

From that point, events spiralled rapidly beyond the control not just of Belgrade, but of the powers themselves. In May revolt broke out in Bulgaria. On the twelfth of that month, Austria-Hungary and Russia issued from a meeting of the three Emperors in Berlin yet another anodyne proposal for reform, which this time hinted at the possibility of naval demonstrations by the powers to “enforce” Ottoman compliance. At the end of the month, however, this Berlin memorandum was rendered irrelevant by a palace revolution in Constantinople and the deposition of Sultan Abdül Aziz. The resulting power vacuum gave the powers further excuse for inaction, and at the same time tempted the Serbian and Montenegrin governments to think they could take advantage of the situation. On 30 June, Prince Milan formally declared war on the new Sultan, Murad V, and General Cherniaiev, now a commander in the Serbian army, called upon the Balkan Christians to join in the struggle. It was the confident expectation of Cherniaiev, Ristić, and others that once battle was joined Russia would have no choice but to come to Serbia’s rescue.

The gap between Serbia’s nationalist pretensions and its practical abilities proved pitiful. Within a month the ill-prepared and incompetently commanded Serbian army, supplemented by a host of Russian volunteers, had been shown up by the Turks and compelled to sue for an armistice in August. Hostilities were resumed in September but, after a decisive encounter at Đunis on 29 October, a second, definitive armistice was arranged, upon the unilateral insistence of Russia. At no stage had Serbian troops achieved any significant advantage over the enemy, nor had the fighting ever left Serbian territory for long.

Just as significant for Serbia’s future relationship with Austria-Hungary was the fact that the campaign had been conducted almost exclusively on the Principality’s southern and eastern frontiers. For all the vaunted claims to Bosnia, not even a Serbian government and high command in the grip of war fever had dreamed of sending more than a token force across the Drina to the west. True, Milan’s declaration of war had been accompanied by a letter from Ristić to the grand vizier, informing him that Serbia intended entering Bosnia to restore peace
there. This revival of the Bosnian plan, however, was dependent on the success of the Serbian government’s entire war gamble. Only if Russia had intervened wholeheartedly, as expected, could the Habsburg Monarchy’s own increasingly obvious pretensions to Bosnia have been set at nought.61

Here was one of the key paradoxes of Serbia’s situation between Austria-Hungary and Russia in the 1870s. Bosnia was a principal Serbian war aim, but its acquisition depended on the armed support of Russia. And Russia, however much the Tsar and his government were spurred to action by the Pan-Slav sympathy for Serbia engendered by the 1876 war, could not intervene unless the Habsburg Monarchy were squared. The price of intervention, however, was an agreement between the two empires on their respective roles in the Balkans, and which clearly assigned Bosnia to that of the Monarchy. This, moreover, is precisely what happened, for, despite the urgings of the Pan-Slavists, Alexander II and Gorchakov were still committed to the Three Emperors’ League. Serbia had no sooner declared war on the Porte when, on 8 July 1876, the Monarchy and Russia hastened to come to an agreement at Reichstadt which was intended to safeguard their respective interests in the Balkans.62

In essence, Reichstadt made three main provisions. First, the two powers undertook to preserve their own neutrality in the Serbo-Ottoman conflict. In the event of an Ottoman victory, matters would return to the status quo ante, although the powers proposed then trying to induce the Porte to accept the reforms originally suggested in the Andrássy Note, and the Berlin Memorandum. In the event of an Ottoman defeat, the two powers would intervene to regulate the peace settlement to their own satisfaction.

The details of this Austro-Russian settlement, should Serbia and Montenegro prevail, are of interest in view of Serbia’s later total exclusion from Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1878. It was agreed that there would be no large South Slav state permitted. Instead, Serbia would be allowed part of Bosnia, and Montenegro, part of the Hercegovina, and the two principalities might divide the Sancak of Novi Pazar between them. Austria-Hungary, however, was to take over the remainder of Bosnia and the Hercegovina, while Russia would re-annex Bessarabia from Romania, and seek further compensation in the Turkish Caucasus.63

Andrássy evidently felt obliged to make some provision here for Serbia’s Bosnian ambitions; to this extent the Reichstadt agreement retained the ghost of the old Bosnian plan of 1867–71. What motivated Austro-Hungarian policy by July 1876, however, was the need to buy off Russia, rather than Serbia. Andrássy, the eternal Russophobe, was now supping with the devil, while Serbia could look forward to, at best, certain scraps from the table. If the need to placate Russia disappeared, moreover, Serbia presumably could look forward to nothing at all.

The fact that Serbia lost its brief war with the Ottomans, in fact, only served to reinforce the Austro-Russian entente. Both powers now clearly understood
that they needed each other. The Tsar, pushed toward war by Pan-Slav frenzy and the patent inability of the Balkan Christians to save themselves, had to secure Austria-Hungary’s benevolent neutrality if he was to fight the Ottomans himself, and at the same time fend off intervention by Great Britain. The Monarchy was compelled to accept the logic of war, and its lack of effective allies for any policy which might oppose Russian action. Making a virtue of necessity, Andrássy sold the Monarchy’s neutrality at the best price he could get, which was a substantial share in the spoils.

Before the end of 1876 it was clear that no efforts on the part of the European powers were capable of improving the situation in the Ottoman Empire, and that Russia was bound to declare war. The formal pact between the Monarchy and Russia, governing Russian intervention, was therefore signed in Budapest on 15 January 1877. This Budapest Convention clarified some of the ambiguities in the Reichstadt agreement. Austria-Hungary promised not only to preserve a benevolent neutrality, but actively to impede the collective mediation of other powers in a Russo-Turkish conflict. Andrássy also reluctantly accepted that Serbia and Montenegro could be called on by Russia to assist in the campaign if necessary. In return, the Monarchy was to be free to decide on when, and how, it occupied both Bosnia and the Hercegovina in their entirety. There was no mention now of any territorial acquisitions by Serbia or Montenegro. Even in the Sancak of Novi Pazar, Andrássy held out for the Monarchy’s right to free communications through this narrow corridor between Serbia and Montenegro. Ostensibly this was to safeguard Austro-Hungarian trade via the southern Balkans, but securing communications in such terrain naturally implied the right to maintain garrisons there too.64 With the groundwork thus laid, Russia declared war on the Porte on 24 April.

Serbia’s role in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 was confined to a late intervention, at the belated request of St. Petersburg, and only after a good deal of argument over the need for a subsidy to finance this renewed effort. The Principality had suffered severely from the first war, since most of the fighting had been on its own territory, and the resources of the country had been strained to the utmost.65 In the circumstances, Russia’s initial rejection of Serbian assistance, followed by imperious demands for it as the siege of Plevna lengthened, showed how indifferent Russia, no less than Austria-Hungary, was to Serbian interests.

There had been a considerable change in Russian attitudes toward Serbia. The experiences of Russian volunteers in 1876, the lamentable performance of Serbian forces, the general failure of Serbia to make good its former claims to leadership of the Balkan Christians, induced something like contempt for the Principality in Pan-Slav circles and at the Tsar’s headquarters. The Bulgarians, it was increasingly felt, were more deserving of Russia’s support.66 Moreover the Habsburg Monarchy, on whose complaisance the success of Russia’s war effort hung, clearly regarded Serbia as properly within its own sphere of influ-
ence. A great shock was in the making for Serbian self-esteem and Serbian territorial aspirations.

In January 1878, the stubborn Ottoman resistance to Russia’s advance down the Balkan Peninsula finally collapsed. With Russian troops on the point of investing Constantinople itself, an armistice was concluded on the thirty-first. The peace treaty of San Stefano, which followed on 3 March, threw the chancelleries of Europe into turmoil.

The terms of San Stefano, negotiated with the Porte by a triumphant General Ignatiev, flatly contradicted the conditions agreed upon between Russia and Austria-Hungary, and which had served as the basis for the war in the first place. First of all the Russians radically redrew the map of the Balkans, creating a new autonomous Principality of Bulgaria which stretched almost to the Adriatic and was clearly intended as a Russian client state. This “big Bulgaria” was bound to unite the other powers in demanding revision of the Treaty. Foremost among them, inevitably, was Austria-Hungary, which San Stefano almost excluded from influence in the region. Even more crassly, San Stefano completely ignored the Monarchy’s hitherto admitted claims in Bosnia-Hercegovina; instead, autonomy and administrative reforms were envisaged.

Whereas the Monarchy’s interests were blithely ignored by San Stefano, Serbia was cast off like a poor relation. In the final stages of the War, and taking advantage of the general Ottoman retreat, Serbia had made limited territorial gains to its southeast and southwest, taking Niš and advancing into Kosovo before the armistice. Now, at San Stefano, the Russians transferred most of these conquests to the new Bulgaria, which was also assigned territory further to the south, including Pirot, Vranje and Üsküb (Skopje), which Serbian nationalists had regarded as Serbia’s by right. In return, Serbia was to be proclaimed independent.

The effect San Stefano had on political opinion in Serbia, and above all on Prince Milan and his ministers, can scarcely be exaggerated. Despite his leaning toward Austria-Hungary, Milan had been transformed by the war into an ardent Russophile, proud to consider himself the Tsar’s ally. Overnight, San Stefano reversed this sentiment all over again and convinced Milan once and for all that his own best interests, if not Serbia’s, lay in the closest possible association with the Monarchy. Milan’s embittered, and henceforward unwavering commitment to this line was the first, essential ingredient in the settlement which followed.

For Ristić, and other Serbs who had been accustomed to place their trust in Russia, the sense of disillusionment was no less profound, even if the conclusions drawn were for the most part not so extreme as Milan’s. There was even wild talk of preparing for war against Russia, although, as Wrede cautioned Andrássy from Belgrade in February, too much reliance should not be placed on such posturings. The revulsion against Russia was nevertheless strong, and in Wrede’s opinion the Monarchy was well placed to take advantage of this, since “it would
need only a very small advance on our part in order completely to win over to
us, above all, the reasonable and thinking part of the population here.” 71 Ristić
certainly recognized at once that, if Serbia was to salvage anything from the
events of the last three years, it would have to seek some form of accommodation
with Austria-Hungary. Policy, not sentiment, dictated a deal. 72 Given Andrássy’s
determination since 1871 to impose binding controls on Serbian policy, however,
the bargain was likely to be a hard one. “They are awaiting developments,” re-
ported Wrede in April, “and contemplate only with a shudder the possible arising
of a situation where they would be forced to show their colors.” 73

That the Serbian government had no choice in the matter was demonstrated
beyond doubt by the Russians themselves in the months preceding the Congress
of Berlin, which was called to negotiate a revision of the San Stefano treaty. Ever since Serbia’s failure of 1876, the Russians had made little secret of their
preference for the Bulgarians; San Stefano only gave concrete, painful expres-
sion to this. 74 The envoy who was sent to St. Petersburg, in January 1878, to
present Serbia’s claims during the armistice negotiations, was told by the foreign
ministry official, N. K. Giers, that “the interests of Russia came first, then came
those of Bulgaria, and only after them came Serbia’s.” 75 In these circumstances, it
was a relief to hear from Vienna that the Monarchy not only had no objections to
Serbian independence, but would not oppose moderate Serbian territorial gains,
provided these were to the southeast. 76

Faced with determined opposition from Britain and Austria-Hungary, the
Russian government knew it had to make concessions to both powers if it at-
tended an international conference, since it was not in a position to defend its
terms by force. Well before the Congress of Berlin met on 13 June, therefore,
Russia had agreed with Britain to reduce the size of the big Bulgaria, and con-
ceded the Monarchy’s claim to Bosnia in accordance with the spirit, if not the
strict letter, of the Budapest Convention. The concession with regard to Bosnia
was crucial for Serbia’s position: Russia thereby effectively assigned Serbia to
the Monarchy’s sphere of influence in the Balkans.

Ristić, arriving in Berlin in June 1878 to shadow the Congress, had the
Russian abandonment of Serbia impressed upon him in unmistakable form. The
Russian plenipotentiary, Shuvalov, as Ristić reported back to Belgrade, “advises
me to come to an understanding by any means with Austria-Hungary.” 77 Dur-
ing the Congress the Russian delegation even tried to prevent the cession of
further territories to Serbia than those already offered it under the terms of San
Stefano. 78 The stage was set for the imposition of satellite status on Serbia by the
Habsburg Monarchy.
Notes


2 Lytton to Granville, 23 Nov. 1871, PRO, FO 7/791; quoted in Bridge, Sadowa to Sarajevo, 62–63.


7 The Mali Zvornik question had been an issue between Serbia and the Porte since the final expansion of the Principality under Prince Miloš in 1831–33. At that time an enclave on the right bank of the Drina, opposite Zvornik, was ceded to Serbia, but the Ottomans remained in occupation of the villages of Mali Zvornik and Sakar, on the right bank, despite Serbian protests. The matter was still unresolved by 1872, when the Regents decided to seek a confrontation on the subject. The villages were finally awarded to Serbia at the Congress of Berlin. See Petrovich, *History of Modern Serbia*, 1:399, and the map on 400. On the revival of the dispute in 1872: Kállay to Andrassy, 8 and 19 Mar. 1872; also 5 June 1872, which provides a long history of the question; all in HHSA, PA XXXVIII/195.

8 Andrassy to Ludolf, 26 Apr. 1872, HHSA, PA XI/99; quoted by Diószegi, *Die Außenpolitik*, 67, note 17. Emanuel Count von Ludolf, who took over from Prokesch-Osten at the turn of the year, was known for his Polish sympathies, another subtle indication of Andrassy’s indifference to a genuine improvement in relations with Russia at this time; ibid., 27.


10 Buchanan to Granville, 29 Aug. 1872; quoted in Bridge, *Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 63.

11 Andrassy to Ludolf, 14 Nov. 1872, HHSA, PA XII/99; quoted by Diószegi, *Die Außenpolitik*, 67, note 16.


15 Andrassy to Kállay, 17 Aug. 1872, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/195.

16 Andrassy to Kállay, 22 July 1872, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/195. The invitation, Andrassy wrote, “violates international customs just as much as the simplest demands of propriety. If it had issued from the Serbian government itself, we would not hesitate to reject in appropriate terms so striking a disregard for the mutual consideration owed between states.” See also the initial report on the matter from Kállay’s deputy, who suggested that the seamliest policy was to ignore the affront. A ban “which was not respected would give the matter a significance which it scarcely merits.” Cingria to Andrassy, 9 July 1872, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/195.

17 Kállay to Andrassy, 16 Aug. 1872, reporting the Hungarian government’s visa ban of 12 August; and Andrassy to Kállay, 17 Aug. 1872; both HHSA, PA XXXVIII/195.

18 Longworth to Elliot, 26 Aug. 1872, PRO, FO 78/2227. Cf. Kállay Diary, 26 Aug. 1872 (*Dnevnik*, 490), which however makes no mention of this incident. Kállay, like Longworth, refers to the procession which accompanied a distinguished Russian visitor, Prince Dolgoruki, back to his ship; according to Longworth, it was this assembly which then tried to demonstrate outside the Austro-Hungarian consulate.

19 Lajos Thallóczy, who reproduces the diary Kállay kept of this journey, as an appendix to the latter’s posthumously published *A szerb felkelés története* [History of the Serbian Uprising]
“Kállay Béni naplójegyzetei első boszniai útjáról,” 27–29 July [1872], 328–36. The extent to which a desire to protect Bosnian Catholics influenced Austro-Hungarian policy is hard to define. It might have been a consideration with the Emperor, and undoubtedly was so for those of his generals, such as the Starthalter of Zara, Baron Rodich, who were Catholic Croats, in many cases from the Military Border. See, on this, Alexander Novotny, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Berliner Kongresses 1878, vol. 1, Österreich, die Türkei und das Balkanproblem im Jahre des Berliner Kongresses (Graz & Cologne: Böhlau, 1957), 16–18; C.A. Macartney, The Habsburg Empire 1780–1918 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969), 588–89; Diószegi, Die Außenpolitik, 84–87, 104 (for exchanges between Andrásy and Rodich in 1875–76); and Helmut Rumpler, “Die Dalmatienreise Kaiser Franz Josephs 1875 im Kontext der politischen Richtungsentscheidungen der Habsburgermonarchie am Vorabend der orientalischen Krise,” in A Living Anachronism? European Diplomacy and the Habsburg Monarchy; Festschrift für Francis Roy Bridge zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Lothar Höbelt & T.G. Otte (Vienna, Cologne & Weimar: Böhlau, 2010), 158–62. It is significant that Kállay undertook his Bosnian journey only some months after Andrásy, at a secret conference of the Monarchy’s military leaders on 17–19 Feb. 1872, accepted for the first time the possible necessity of occupying Bosnia; Kos, Die Politik Österreich-Ungarns, 62–65.

21 “Kállay Béni naplójegyzetei első boszniai útjáról,” 27 July [1872], 333.

22 Ibid., introductory passage by Thallóczy, 310. Kállay himself, albeit retrospectively, admitted to the British consul in Budapest, in 1875, that he went to Bosnia at Andrásy’s behest “with the object of putting matters in train in view of an eventual ebullition such as has recently occurred [i.e., the rising which started in July 1875]. His dealings were exclusively with the Bosniac Catholics, who, in spite of their numerical weakness, are a not uninfluential element.” Kállay also claimed that 500,000 florins of secret service money “passed, as he declares, through his hands as subventions to the Catholics of Bosnia, and he was able to report that everything was matured, as far as he could effect it, for a demonstration in favour of annexation to this Empire whenever the favourable opportunity should arise.” Monson to Buchanan (Vienna), no. 127 (confidential), 13 Oct. 1875, PRO, FO 7/858.


24 Kállay to Andrásy, 30 May 1873, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/199; see also a similar, extensive report about Milan in Kállay to Andrásy, no. 27, 29 Mar. 1874, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/202.


26 Stokes, Politics as Development, 16–18, 109–10 (on Milan’s plans for the army); also Petrovich, History of Modern Serbia, 2:372–75.

27 Andrásy to Kállay, 11 Sept. 1873, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/199.

28 Kállay to Andrásy, no. 27, 29 Mar. 1874, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/202. Milan, except during the wars of 1876–78, was never a popular ruler, but his reputation sank to a new low in the late 1880s because of his highly public rows with his wife, Queen Natalia, and reached its nadir after 1891, when the details of the secret treaty of 1881 with the Monarchy gradually became public knowledge. On this, see Petrovich, History of Modern Serbia, 2:433–40, 452–57; Stokes, Politics as Development, 191.
30 Ibid., 421–22.
31 Kállay Diary, 11 Mar. 1872 (Dnevnik, 448).
32 There is a good sketch of Marinović by Stokes, *Politics as Development*, 21–22, and his government is discussed 22–39. On Marinović’s wish for improved relations, not only with Austria-Hungary, but with the Porte and Russia, see Kállay to Andrásy, no. 51, 9 Nov. 1873, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/199; and Cingria to Andrásy, 16 Feb. 1874, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/202.
33 See, for example, Kállay to Andrásy, 16 Apr. 1873, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/199, where Kállay reports Marinović’s advice to Prince Milan, that Livadia had been a mistake, and that without German and especially Austro-Hungarian friendship, “we [the Serbs] risk everything.” Kállay’s diary attests to the frequency with which Kállay cultivated Marinović after 1868, both for political inside information and for genuine friendship.
34 Stokes, *Politics as Development*, chap. 1, *passim*, is best on this subject; as he points out (23), “the introduction of a Western constitution had created a logic of its own that implied the expansion of the space in which political life occurred.”
35 Ibid., 22 ff. As Stokes remarks (41), “The skupština of 1874 was the first to bring down a government.”
36 On foreign affairs, see Trivanovitch, “Serbia, Russia and Austria-Hungary,” 423–26; Stokes, *Politics as Development*, 30–33. By late July 1874 Kállay was warning Vienna of Marinović’s possible fall; Kállay to Andrásy, 26 July 1874, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/202.
37 The Ćumić government only lasted until early February 1875: Trivanovitch, “Serbia, Russia and Austria-Hungary,” 426; Stokes, *Politics as Development*, 23, 39–40, 63–64; also Kállay to Andrásy, 5 Dec. 1874, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/202. Ćumić was undoubtedly one of the stranger figures on the scene in the mid–1870s. On Kállay’s long-running affair with Ćumić’s wife, see above, Chapter 2.
39 Among standard works on the ‘Three Emperors’ League, see Bridge, *Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 66–68; Diószegi, *Die Außenpolitik*, 36–40, 49–54. For an example of the consciousness with which Austria-Hungary and Russia worked together, see Gorchakov to Novikov, 20 Feb./2 Mar. 1874, quoted ibid., note 31 (68): “Nous travaillons alors [in Serbia] viribus unitis.” For Serbian awareness of this Austro-Russian cooperation, see Kállay to Andrásy, 29 Mar. 1874 (no. 28), and 31 July 1874; both HHSA, PA XXXVIII/202.
40 This economic programme, which was well formulated by the beginning of 1878, seems to have been still ill thought out in the early 1870s. Andrásy and Kállay, like Beust, wanted to see railways built; they also wished to preserve the favorable terms on which the Monarchy traded in Serbia. It was not until the crisis of 1875–78 had created the circumstances in which Serbia could be pressured on these points, however, that a coherent strategy for exerting such pressure was drafted. On this, see Palotás, *Az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia balkáni politikája*, 16–23; also idem, “Die wirtschaftlichen Aspekte in der Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns um 1878,” 275–80.
41 Stokes, *Politics as Development*, 62–64. Kállay actually suggested deploying artillery on the Austro-Hungarian side of the Sava, opposite Belgrade, in case there were serious disturbances there in January 1875: Kállay to Andrásy, 9 Jan. 1875, OSZK, FH 1733/40. This private letter is summarized by Radenić in *Dnevnik*, note 444a, 804–5, which in turn is cited by Stokes, *Politics as Development*, 63.
42 Andrássy to Kállay, 12 Jan. 1875, HHSA, PA XXXVIII/205. Another cause for alarm, which the Hungarian authorities believed was linked to the situation in Belgrade, was the growth in electoral support of Miletic’s National Party in Novi Sad; see Flattt (főispán [lord lieutenant] in Novi Sad) to Szapáry (Hungarian minister of the interior), 1 Jan. 1875, in Svetozar Miletic i Narodna Stranka: Grada 1860–1885, vol. 2, 1870–1875, ed. Nikola Petrovic (Sremski Karlovci: Istorijski Arhiv Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine, 1969), no. 571, 603–4.

43 Stokes, Politics as Development, 63–64; Trivanovitch, “Serbia, Russia and Austria-Hungary,” 426.

44 Stokes, Politics as Development, 64–74.

45 Diószegi, Die Außenpolitik, 76–81, discusses this important council, and also reproduces its protocol as Appendix 1, 321–32. With regard to Andrássy’s conversion, by 1875, to the traditional Habsburg policy of opposing the creation of a large South Slav state on the Monarchy’s borders, Diószegi makes the perceptive comment (77) that “if the Monarchy was able to bear on its borders the German national state with its forty millions and the Italian with its thirty millions, then it would also have been able to accept the eight million South Slavs of a national state.” See also Kos, Die Politik Österreich-Ungarns, 70–78.

46 Stokes, Politics as Development, 76–77. The Stefanovic government in fact resigned precisely because it would not abate its support for the revolt, after Prince Milan had been warned that such a policy was unacceptable to both Austria-Hungary and Russia. Milan’s hope was that the Mihailovic ministry, with greater public support, would be able to resist the pressure to act, a hope which soon proved to be misplaced. See also Trivanovitch, “Serbia, Russia and Austria-Hungary,” 426–28.

47 Rumpler, “Die Dalmatienreise Kaiser Franz Josephs,” 175–76; also Diószegi, Die Außenpolitik, 82–83, who also quotes (note 11, 94) from Novikov to Gorchakov, 30 June/12 July 1875, on Andrássy’s annoyance with General Rodich and “the ultra-Slav politics of this functionary.” A later report from Novikov, on 9/21 July 1875, pointed out that “The crude conduct of Baron Rodich, more or less sympathetic to the insurgents, has later been disavowed by his government”; quoted ibid. Compare this evidence, however, with the remarks attributed to Kállay by the British consul in Budapest, and which suggests that the Bosnian Catholics at least were primed to demonstrate in favor of Austro-Hungarian intervention as far back as 1872 (Monson to Buchanan, no. 127, 13 Oct. 1875, PRO, FO 7/858, quoted above, note 22 refers); and with Stojanovic, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 26–27. Bridge, Sadowa to Sarajevo, 70, concludes that “A direct connexion between the visit [to Dalmatia] and the Bosnian revolt . . . is difficult to prove,” which is not quite what was claimed then or later. It is worth citing the opinion of a much older, but still perceptive authority: Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 71, writes that “The effect of such a demonstration [Francis Joseph’s tour] was perfectly clear to anyone acquainted with the complicated conditions in the Balkans. Austrian historians themselves admit that in all likelihood the Emperor’s visit to Dalmatia set the spark that led to the conflagration in Herzegovina.” Alan Palmer, by contrast, in The Chancelleries of Europe (London, Boston & Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), 153, specifically states that “The flame of revolt was kindled not by the Russians but by the Austrian military party [sic] who were anxious to acquire Bosnia-Herzegovina”; but cites only secondary sources for the assertion. Since Palmer, again on the basis solely of well-worn secondary sources, also repeats the standard view that Andrássy consistently opposed an increase in the Monarchy’s Slav population, as well as other interpretations no longer tenable, Langer’s more subtle judgment still seems preferable. Apart from Kállay’s earlier foray of 1872, however, the precise involvement in the revolt of Austro-Hungarian agencies, whether diplomatic or military, remains unclear.
Doria (British chargé d'affaires in St. Petersburg) to Derby, 29 Sept. 1875; quoted in Stojanović, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, 22; see also 22–25, on joint pressure by Russia and Austria-Hungary on Serbia.


Diószegi, *Die Außenpolitik*, 91–92, is best on this; also Bridge, *Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 74. For an example of Andrásy's first, suspicious reaction to Russian proposals for joint action, see Andrásy to Francis Joseph, 30 Aug. 1875, quoted at length in Diószegi, *Die Außenpolitik*, note 35, 96–97.


Quoted, ibid., 81, and referring to the situation in October 1875.

Wrede to Andrásy, 24 Aug. 1875, quoted in Stojanović, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, 17. Kállay had resigned the Belgrade consulship in January 1875, citing the alarming effect of the Belgrade climate on his wife’s health as an excuse; Kállay to Andrásy, 21 Jan. 1875, HHS, A[dmisterative]  R[egistratur] F4/156. In reality, as his diary shows, Kállay’s negotiations with the faction of Baron Pál ’Sennyey, for a chance to run for parliament in the next Hungarian elections, were already well advanced; Kállay Diary, 18 Jan. 1875 (*Dnevnik*, 632–33), recording conversations with ’Sennyey in Pest. Kállay eventually left Belgrade for good on 31 May, after being appointed by Andrásy en disponibilité within the diplomatic service. This meant he agreed to respond if his help were required for special missions; Andrásy to Francis Joseph, 6 May 1875; Andrásy to Kállay, 16 May 1875, both HHS, AR F4/156; also Kállay Diary, 28–31 May 1875 (*Dnevnik*, 654). According to Imre Halász, former head of Andrásy’s press bureau and also a ’Sennyey supporter, Kállay at first ran in his old 1865 constituency of Szent Endre during the elections of July-August 1875, but was rejected by the voters; he then accepted Halász’ offer of Szászsebes in Transylvania, which was a corrupt borough effectively in the latter’s gift. Imre Halász, *Egy letűnt nemzedék: Emlékezések a magyar állam kialakulásának újabb korszakából* (Budapest: Nyugat, 1911), 487.


62 It should be stressed that the Reichstadt agreement, for all its importance, was a purely verbal one, which both sides only later set down on paper, but in slightly different versions. On the first published accounts of each, see ibid., 74–77, and note 1, 75. There is a résumé of the agreement’s main points in *Key Treaties of the Great Powers 1815–1914*, ed. Michael Hurst (Newton Abbott: David & Charles, 1972), vol. 2, no. 103, 509–11.

63 Ibid., 2:510–11; Stojanović, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, 75–77; Bridge, *Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 77–78; Kos, *Die Politik Österreich-Ungarns*, 141–46. One of the principal differences between the Austro-Hungarian and Russian interpretations was in fact over what the Monarchy’s share of Bosnia should be. Andrásy’s version mentioned simply “the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” whereas Gorchakov’s specified “Turkish Croatia,” and left further boundary drawing “to be agreed upon”; Stojanović, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, 76.


66 Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, chaps. 5 and 6, especially 193, 215; and the speech by the Tsar on 11 Nov. 1876, quoted 227. See also MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism*, 190–93, on the deterioration of the Russo-Serbian relationship.

67 The text of the treaty is in *Key Treaties of the Great Powers*, vol. 2, no. 108, 528–46; on Bosnia-Hercegovina, see Article XIV, p. 537. Bridge, *Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 85, points out that Ignatiev was actually unaware of the existence of the Budapest Convention at the time of the negotiations.


Wrede to Andrássy, 10 Apr. 1878, quoted in Hauptmann, “Österreich-Ungarns Werben um Serbien 1878–1881,” note 20 refers.

Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, 193, quoting a letter by the Pan-Slav publicist, I.S. Aksakov, in December 1876; and 413–15, on the negotiations of January 1878.


Ibid., citing a despatch from Cukić (Vienna) of 8/20 Mar. 1878.

Ristić to Grujić, 7/19 June 1878 (telegram), ibid., no. 5, 334. For a fuller account of this, see Ristić to Grujić, 8/20 June 1878, ibid., no. 6, 334–36.

The essentials of the deal between the Monarchy and Serbia had been agreed upon well in advance of the Congress of Berlin, although the formal instrument, whereby Serbia engaged to accept the Monarchy’s economic control in future, was not signed until 8 July, toward the close of the deliberations in Berlin. Early in June, Ristić stopped off at Vienna on his way to Berlin. He carried with him a letter from Milan to Andrássy, in which the Prince requested Austro-Hungarian support “in order to assure my country, at the same time as its independence, the territorial extension demanded by the conditions indispensable for its prosperity.” At a meeting with Andrássy on 7 June, Ristić was able to confirm that the Monarchy would indeed help Serbia achieve both its independence and a territorial revision of San Stefano in its favor. In return, however, Andrássy was determined to secure what, in one way or another, the Monarchy had been seeking in Serbia ever since 1871.

Andrássy rubbed in the strength of his negotiating position by pointing out that the Monarchy had no reason for helping Serbia at all, since the latter had consistently ignored Austro-Hungarian advice in the past. He squashed the idea that Serbia could have any legitimate interest in the Sancak of Novi Pazar, whatever other territorial compensation it might receive. Above all, he made it clear that Austro-Hungarian support at the Congress of Berlin was conditional upon conclusion of a trade treaty and a railway convention. The former was to establish the closest possible economic links between the countries, although Ristić baulked at the idea of a customs union, and Andrássy seemed disinclined to press the point. The railway convention was to bind Serbia to build its link with Salonica and
Constantinople within three years. For the detailed discussion of these instruments, Ristić was referred to the foreign ministry’s expert in such matters, Baron Schwegel, the next day.²

Ristić was not averse to promising compliance with these conditions verbally, but he immediately found that Andrásy was one step ahead of him. The Monarchy must receive formal confirmation of the agreement before conclusion of the Congress, otherwise it would drop Serbia’s case. In the end, therefore,
Ristić put his signature to a convention concerning railways, trade, and navigation in Berlin on 8 July. This document bound Serbia in general terms to build its railway link, to conclude a trade treaty which would favor “the uninterrupted development of intimate and stable relations between the two countries,” and to cooperate with the Monarchy in its regulation of the Danube, especially the Iron Gates. It was agreed to study the question of a customs union, “in so far as it might be found in the interests of the two parties.” The groundwork was thus laid for the treaties of 1880–81.

Serbia had its reward at the Congress of Berlin, but if Ristić had thought to evade the obligations he had undertaken, he was to be disillusioned. The Treaty of Berlin itself, whereby Serbia was granted formal independence of the Ottoman Empire, and an extension of its territory beyond Niš, also incorporated certain contractual advantages for Austria-Hungary, in its future relationship with the new state. The most obvious of these were the articles assigning Bosnia-Hercegovina to the Monarchy, as well as the right to garrison its troops in the Sancak of Novi Pazar. In a purely physical sense, this meant that the Monarchy now surrounded Serbia on three sides, looming over it even more than it had always done.

Article XXXVII of the Treaty, in addition, stipulated that Serbia would remain bound by its existing commercial obligations until such time as it concluded its first independent trade treaty with another country. Since the obligations in force were those treaties concluded on Serbia’s behalf by its former suzerain, the Porte, the Principality was still tied to an economic regime going back to the early eighteenth century. Ever since the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718, for instance, Serbia had been a low tariff market for Austrian goods. Even after the achievement of Serbian autonomy, the Monarchy had for years opposed a separate Serbian tariff, and as recently as 1862 an Austro-Ottoman accord had specifically excluded Serbia and the other Balkan principalities from a protective tariff introduced in the rest of the Ottoman domains. It was only in 1864 that Prince Michael’s government, availing itself of Article XXVIII of the Treaty of Paris, finally legislated an autonomous tariff, which gave Serbia the right, if it dared, to levy prohibitive duties on imports from the Austrian Empire. Now, by the Treaty of Berlin, Serbia’s own tariffs were to stay frozen at the existing rate of three percent; countries trading with Serbia, by contrast, were not bound by these conditions in the slightest.

In practice, Serbian governments were reluctant to use their own autonomous tariff, because they knew all too well what the consequences might be. Serbian trade with the outside world was still, in the 1870s, conducted predominantly through the Monarchy and, more importantly, with the Monarchy. Still an almost exclusively agrarian economy, with an exiguous infrastructure, Serbia was dependent on the Austro-Hungarian market. All Vienna had to do, in any trade dispute, was to close its frontier to Serbian livestock, and Serbian merchants and
farmers immediately felt the pinch. The Monarchy had resorted to this weapon in the early 1870s; in November 1878 Andrásy used it again, banning livestock imports on suspicion of disease, in order to show Serbia how much it needed a new regulation of the trade relationship. For good measure, from the beginning of 1879, the tariff on swine imports was also raised, and Danube steamships were again forbidden to stop at Belgrade.¹¹

Ristić, however, who took over from Mihailović as minister president in September 1878, knew that what was on offer would only serve to perpetuate Serbia’s economic dependency on the Monarchy. He had signed the Convention of 8 July in the knowledge that all the details of the treaties envisaged by Andrásy and his advisers were still to be negotiated, and over the next two years he exploited this leeway to the full. Such was Ristić’s tenacity in negotiations, and his resourcefulness in delaying tactics, that the Austro-Hungarian envoy in Belgrade at one point suggested that the Monarchy should offer Ristić a decoration for bringing one such instrument, the railway convention, to a conclusion at all.¹²

The blame for the lengthy period between the agreement to negotiate the trade and railways treaties, and their eventual signature and ratification in 1880–81, was by no means all on the Serbian side. On the contrary, the inability of the Austrian and Hungarian governments to agree on the overall objectives of the settlement with Serbia was a principal obstacle, which had to be overcome before anything could even be negotiated. Here the sheer awkwardness of the Dualist system, with its need for the reconciliation of conflicting Austrian and Hungarian interests, worked against speed. Whereas the Austrian half of the Monarchy was primarily interested in the Balkans as a market for manufactured goods, Hungarian landowners had a natural interest in limiting agricultural imports from the south, a tendency which only increased in the coming decades. To complicate matters, the late 1870s were a time when governments across Europe, led by Germany, turned to protectionist trade policies, a fact which had a direct bearing on the Monarchy’s economic relationship with Serbia. The introduction of the new German tariff in 1879, which discriminated against agricultural produce from the Monarchy, naturally increased the pressure on Hungarian governments to demand a trade treaty with Serbia which would offer Hungarian producers a secure market within the Monarchy if needed. This of course meant a rigorous mechanism for excluding Serbian produce at will.¹³

The Austro-Hungarian government itself thus breached one deadline after another for the start of negotiations with Serbia. It was not until March 1879 that the Austrian and Hungarian ministers responsible even sat down for a joint conference on what sort of tariffs would be appropriate, a process only completed in May that year. Then there was a dispute to be settled over who would construct the spur line linking the Hungarian railway network to the Serbian frontier. Ristić, observing these internal squabbles, and impressed by the Monarchy’s difficulties
in occupying Bosnia in the winter of 1878–79, had some reason for thinking that
Austria-Hungary was not as strong as it had appeared the year before, and that
further delays might bring valuable concessions.\textsuperscript{14}

When Andrássy finally issued a formal invitation to negotiate the railway
convention in June 1879, therefore, Ristić’s response was to hold out for the in-
clusion of the Ottoman Empire and the new Bulgaria in the process. The Serbian
government did not even reply to the invitation until October 1879, by which time
Andrássy himself had just stepped down as foreign minister.\textsuperscript{15} Another couple of
months went by while the new foreign minister, Baron Heinrich von Haymerle,
wore down Serbian resistance on this point.

Behind Ristić’s tactics was a very real apprehension, not only about the
terms Austria-Hungary might impose on Serbia with both treaties, but also about
the order in which obligations were undertaken. Ristić, like many of the opposi-
tion in the \textit{Skupština} and his own Liberal supporters, would have preferred to
settle the tariff question first, by concluding the trade treaty, and only then, with
the most favorable conditions for trade in place, to negotiate the railway infra-
structure. It was clear, however, that the \textit{Ballhaus} was intent on exactly the oppo-
site, since the maintenance of the existing trade conditions, with the Monarchy’s
tariffs capable of being raised at will and Serbia’s frozen at three percent, gave
Vienna considerable negotiating advantage. The railway treaty therefore had to
come first, a point Ristić finally conceded in the spring of 1880.\textsuperscript{16} Before then,
however, he had wrung substantial concessions out of Haymerle as to the rail-
ways themselves.

The Serbian government and opposition both feared that, without extra rail-
way routes out of the country, the construction of a rail link with the Monarchy
would place Serbia in an impossible position economically. Until it was known
whether, and when, the Ottomans and Bulgaria intended building their sections
of the proposed network, Ristić argued, the Monarchy’s demand that Serbia forge
ahead with its share was unrealistic. At issue was the construction of three sepa-
rate lines within Serbia. The main track, connecting with the Hungarian system
at Belgrade, would run from there to Niš; while two spur lines were envisaged
between Niš and Vranje, in the extreme south of the new territory, and Niš and
Pirot, to the east. According to the convention of 8 July 1878, all three lines were
to be completed within three years of signing the definitive treaty. Financing such
a project, for a country like Serbia, still recovering from the wars of 1876–78,
was a major headache for the government, and the latter had already run into
a storm in the \textit{Skupština} over its attempt to implement a tax on traders, the so-
called \textit{patentarina}, specifically to fund this sort of expenditure.\textsuperscript{17}

To these considerations Haymerle in Vienna appeared indifferent. He had al-
ready, in December 1879, adopted a threatening tone to induce Ristić to drop the
idea of including the Ottomans and Bulgarian in the negotiations, and to appoint
negotiators forthwith. On the question of the three lines to be built, however, Haymerle found Ristić even more obdurate. For Ristić the financial and political cost of trying to build all three was unacceptable, and in the face of repeated proddings from Haymerle he threatened to resign. As the Austro-Hungarian envoy, Baron Herbert, reported Ristić as saying, in February 1880:

What can you do to us? You can occupy Serbia; that would be a political misfortune. If, however, we accept a clause which entails our financial ruin, we would be pushing the country into a far greater economic catastrophe.

In the end, therefore, the two sides compromised: Serbia committed itself to build only the Belgrade-Niš and Niš-Vranje lines.

The railway treaty itself was finally signed on 9 April 1880, but Ristić then had the additional chore of getting it ratified by the Skupština, which in May was convened in extraordinary session for this purpose. That ratification was no foregone conclusion was shown by the vocal opposition the terms aroused. Deputies attacked not only the commitment to build without the surety of an Ottoman or Bulgarian link to the outside world, but also the fact that the railway question had preceded negotiation of the trade treaty. To these criticisms, Ristić pointed out that the country faced a trade war if the treaty were not ratified, since Austria-Hungary would not even negotiate the trade treaty, without prior acceptance of the deal on railways. He also made a virtue out of necessity, representing the additional line from Niš to Vranje as the first practical step toward achieving an economic outlet for Serbia to the south. With Ristić’s peroration of “Salonika! to Salonika!” in their ears, the Skupština passed the railway treaty by a majority of three to one.

Another indication of the uncertainty surrounding Serbian ratification was the apprehension of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Belgrade, Anger, who suspected Ristić of conducting “an undignified game” with Austria-Hungary. If Ristić personally did not want to force the railway treaty through, Anger wrote Vienna in May 1880, the Skupština could well reject it. Ristić could then resign and watch the Monarchy struggle to get the treaty accepted with the help of some far less stable Serbian coalition government. Most revealing of all, however, was the assumption Anger confided to the Ballhaus:

I console myself nevertheless with the thought that a takeover of Serbia is not forbidden us, nor is expansion towards Salonika, and then we will build the railway ourselves.

Ristić’s taunt to Herbert, the previous January, was thus more pertinent than he perhaps realized. Clearly some Austro-Hungarian officials were prepared to contemplate occupying Serbia, to achieve the twin aim of economic and political domination.

In this context, it is instructive to note the change of personnel at the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry which occurred in the fall of 1879. For Consul Anger’s
correspondent was none other than Benjámin Kállay, who had been appointed *Sektionschef* on 30 September 1879, and was thus effectively “the right-hand man of the imperial foreign minister.” 22 Not only was Haymerle himself, a colorless career diplomat who fully shared Andrássy’s views on the danger from Russia, at the helm; at his side he had the Hungarian who, for the past decade and more, had been a major voice in shaping the Monarchy’s policy toward the South Slavs and, indeed, regarded himself as peculiarly fitted to do so. 23 Anger had been one of Kállay’s consulate staff back in the 1860s. The odds are, then, that what Anger was saying came as no surprise to Kállay, and reflected the latter’s own thinking on the matter.

Kállay, after his departure from Belgrade, had entered the Hungarian parliament in the elections of 1875, but had never strayed very far from his involvement with the Monarchy’s Serbian policy. Andrássy, despite their differences on the domestic political scene, so valued Kállay’s abilities that he prevailed upon Francis Joseph to keep him as a foreign ministry official *en disponibilité*. In the course of what proved a not terribly effective parliamentary career, therefore, Kállay was liable to be “called up,” should the foreign minister feel his services necessary. 24 For three years Kállay toiled on the backbenches of the Hungarian parliament, calling most attention to himself when, in the face of mounting criticism of Andrássy’s foreign policy and his eastern policy in particular, he frequently rose to defend his mentor. Kállay also dabbled in journalism, becoming editor of the journal *Kelet népe* [People of the East], a position where, according to one observer, he was more of a figurehead, the contributor of occasional glittering leaders on the Eastern Question, than an everyday working editor. 25 The connection with *Kelet népe* lapsed in May 1876, and thereafter Kállay experimented with his own paper, *Ebredés* [Awakening], which quickly folded. He also published, in 1877, the first volume of his projected *History of the Serbs*, which was greeted with general critical acclaim. 26 By early 1878, isolated politically and conscious that he “had really stepped out of one cul-de-sac and into another,” Kállay had already resolved to resign his seat and return to diplomacy, when Andrássy offered him the first of a series of important jobs. 27

In March 1878, Kállay was sent to Constantinople on an especially delicate mission. He had the ticklish task of explaining to the Ottoman government why the Habsburg Monarchy should take over the administration of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Austro-Hungarian motives here were transparently self-interested: the Monarchy could not tolerate autonomy for the province, as contemplated by the Treaty of San Stefano; nor was it prepared to accept a partition by Serbia and Montenegro. The Ottomans, however, were far from happy at Andrássy’s proposed solution, and that they acceded in the end, however unwillingly, to what was essentially diplomatic blackmail, was due in large part to Kállay’s talents in persuasion. 28
Kállay surrendered his parliamentary seat with the elections of August 1878, and returned to the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry. In 1878–79 he was entrusted with another demanding task, as the Monarchy’s representative on the international commission for the creation of Eastern Roumelia, the semi-autonomous part of the new Bulgaria set up by the Treaty of Berlin. Chairing the commission in Philippopolis (Plovdiv), Kállay clearly saw himself as bringing “really modern and civilizing institutions” to this part of the Balkans, proof that his liberal inclinations were neither dead nor insincere. He was also, however, with Andrássy, conscious that the Monarchy’s main purpose in setting up Eastern Roumelia was to ensure the exclusion of Russian influence, and to establish a viable province unlikely to unite with Bulgaria proper. In this, as subsequent events were to demonstrate, Austro-Hungarian policy was an almost total failure. As a pamphlet Kállay published in this period on Russia’s Balkan policy illustrates, Kállay was convinced that the Balkans were central to Russia’s foreign policy, and that this was due to Russia’s sympathy for its fellow Slavs in the region. However inaccurate an interpretation of tsarist policy, this Russophobia was all the excuse Kállay felt was needed for the Habsburg Monarchy to adopt a more assertive posture.

Appointed Sektionschef, Kállay was finally in a key position to implement his thinking on the question which had preoccupied him most of his career: what to do with Serbia. Moreover, although Andrássy had departed the stage, his successor as foreign minister, Haymerle, shared his views not only on wider issues but also on the need to bind Serbia firmly to the Monarchy. The Haymerle-Kállay team thus continued where Andrássy had left off. One might even surmise that Kállay, under Haymerle, had a freer hand than he might have had under Andrássy, since the new minister was naturally inclined to rely on Kállay’s special knowledge of the issues.

The negotiation of the Austro-Serbian trade treaty, which got under way once the railway treaty was ratified, in June 1880, therefore followed an already established pattern. The Monarchy, negotiating from strength, made a series of demands which the Serbian government sought to resist, caught between opposition at home and a justified fear of the consequences for Serbia if a settlement were not reached. This time, however, the terms laid down by the Monarchy were too much for even the flexible and devious Ristić to accept or to argue away. It took a change of government in Belgrade, and the personal involvement of Prince Milan, before the treaty became reality.

Throughout 1879 and the first half of 1880, the two governments were deadlocked over the very basis for negotiations, which hung on the interpretation of the phrase “conditions actuelles” in the Treaty of Berlin. The position of the Austro-Hungarian government was that this meant the 1862 Austro-Ottoman trade treaty, while Serbia held out in defense of its autonomous tariff of 1864. At stake for
Ristić was not so much whether the Serbian tariff was more or less favorable to Serbian trade than the 1862 treaty, but the fact that the latter was a remnant of Ottoman rule, and hence unacceptable to an independent state as the basis for its future trading relations. To render Article XXXVII of the Berlin Treaty void, the Serbian government concluded a series of purely formal trade treaties with other foreign powers early in 1879, to establish a “most favored nation” precedent to which Austria-Hungary, like it or not, would have to agree.

The Austrian and Hungarian governments, however, chose to insist on the validity of the 1862 treaty, by which Austria-Hungary already enjoyed most favored nation status; and Haymerle formally claimed this in July 1880. Ristić’s response was to reject this and, when the claim was repeated, simply to ignore it. Despite the clear threat of trade reprisals in early August, Ristić went so far as to interrupt the negotiations by recalling the Serbian delegates from Vienna, and as late as mid-July he still appeared to have the support of Prince Milan for the course he had chosen. The matter had become a test of strength between the Monarchy and its troublesome neighbor.

Developments on both sides were already outflanking Ristić and making his resistance hopeless. Prince Milan in the summer of 1880 undertook an extended tour of the European courts, and was especially feted and made much of by the Emperor William I at Ems, and Francis Joseph at Ischl. In a letter to Ristić on 16 July, Milan defended a policy of maintaining good relations with both Germany and Austria-Hungary, especially in view of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire; both powers, Milan warned, could hinder Serbia from exploiting Turkish weakness if they wished. By mid-August the swing in Milan’s attitude was even more noticeable. He confessed to Ristić he could not bring up the trade treaty problem with Francis Joseph, at a time when so much honor was being done him. Moreover, Milan wrote, any trade treaty would be better than none, indeed could be “like some sort of California for Serbia, while an economic war with her I consider our economic and political ruin.”

In the meantime the Monarchy itself was compelled, by the exigencies of grand policy, to step up the pressure on Serbia. Early in September, Haymerle visited Bismarck at the latter’s estate at Friedrichsruh, where the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister came under renewed urging to help Bismarck revive the Three Emperors’ League of the mid-1870s. Bismarck was intent on promoting an Austro-Russian division of the Balkans into spheres of interest: it was precisely this demarcation of influence, the German chancellor implied, which had preserved the peace in the past and would continue to do so. Faced with such reasoning from the Monarchy’s new ally, Haymerle, like Andrásy before him, knew himself bound to respond. He also, however, was driven more than ever to force a conclusion of the trade treaty on the Serbian government, in order to consolidate the Monarchy’s position in the western Balkans in advance of any entente with Russia.
Summing up his talks at Friedrichsruh for the benefit of Francis Joseph, Haymerle made it clear that if Russia were to secure a dominant influence over Bulgaria by such an understanding, then Austria-Hungary must do the same in Serbia:

We require a free hand regarding Serbia, in case the latter’s continuing hostile attitude should compel us to act against her with more energetic measures than purely commercial ones, in which case however we are not intending conquest, but have as our sole aim turning a bad neighbour into a good one. Russia could easily guard against this possibility if it would induce Serbia to adopt a friendly attitude.39

For Haymerle, whose mistrust of Russia despite Bismarck’s assurances was deep-rooted, domination of Serbia was therefore an essential precondition for a new Three Emperors’ League. It also coincided with the long-standing preoccupations of Haymerle’s Hungarian predecessor as foreign minister, Andrásy, and his Hungarian Sektionschef, Kállay.

Haymerle’s thinking received powerful support at this point from Count Gustav von Kálnoky, ambassador to St. Petersburg and one of the coming men of the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic corps. In a letter to the foreign minister on 7 September, Kálnoky expressed the conviction that

the pivot of our political power in the south-east is Belgrade. As long as we do not have a firm footing there either directly or indirectly, we will remain in a permanently defensive position on the Danube, the Lim and even the Sava. Once we have by whatever means subjected Serbia to our influence or, even better, are masters in Serbia, only then can we be completely assured of the possession of Bosnia and its appendages, and of our influence on the lower Danube and over Romania; only then will our sphere of power in the Balkan Peninsula have a firm foundation, which corresponds to the great interests of our Monarchy, and only then can we look the further development of affairs in the Near East in the face with a sense of security.40

Kálnoky was already noted for calling a spade a spade, but it is noteworthy that his views not only echoed Haymerle’s, but also met with the full support of Benjamin Kállay.41 From the Emperor down, there thus appeared to be unanimity that Serbia must be controlled by one means or another.

Confronted with the continuing obduracy of Ristić over the tariff, therefore, Haymerle resorted to outright ultimatum. At a meeting with Prince Milan in mid-September 1880, Haymerle insisted on the validity of the 1862 treaty, failing which the Monarchy would have to close its borders with Serbia. Furthermore, he told the Prince, “our policy has reached a critical point, and we must finally know whether we have to deal with a friendly or a hostile neighbour.”42 From Haymerle’s account, Milan needed no convincing by this point: he promised “to do everything possible to sort the matter out, and indeed by every means, either with Mr. Ristić or against him.”43 By 6 October, Ristić was obliged to admit to
his cabinet colleagues that the Prince and he were poles apart of the issue; on 17 October, he was handed a final ultimatum by the Austro-Hungarian envoy.

For Ristić, who defended his trade policy to Milan in a dispatch of 21 October, it had come down to a question of whether the Monarchy or the Serbian government ordered Serbia’s economy. Acceptance of the Austro-Hungarian position, Ristić warned, would “deal a heavy blow to Serbia’s youthful independence and its material interests.” The end result would be the exclusion of virtually all outside trade from Serbia, and “a legalized Austro-Hungarian economic monopoly in Serbia.” Any concessions made now, moreover, would not be the last: “the appetite of the neighbouring Monarchy towards the East is growing. . . . Sooner or later Serbia must adopt a policy of resistance, of defense.” Ristić in short seemed resigned to the prospect of a trade war after all. Milan, however, was not; and on 26 October the Ristić government made way for one prepared to negotiate a trade treaty on the Monarchy’s terms.

The new government, under Milan Piroćanac, was broadly drawn from the political grouping known as the Young Conservatives, who, as party organization in Serbia gathered pace at the start of the 1880s, began to call themselves Progressives. Educated, intellectual and, like Prince Milan, thoroughly westernized, the Progressives believed that Serbia’s future lay in adapting itself to the norms of western culture and material prosperity as soon as possible. They were not admirers of the Serbian peasantry, nor were they Russophiles. Most importantly for the achievement of the Monarchy’s aims in Serbia, the Progressives were economic liberals, who would not be inclined to a tariff war even if they thought Serbia could survive it. Certainly Čedomilj Mijatović, who became both foreign and finance minister under Piroćanac and was an old friend of Kállay’s, did not think such a course feasible. Whereas Ristić, in common with most Serbian Liberals, was convinced Serbia must develop industry of its own, Mijatović was of almost the opposite opinion. Since Serbia’s economic strength was as an agricultural producer, Mijatović argued, its main task must be to assure itself of a market for such produce. This would enable the capital accumulation which alone could fund any native industry in the long run.

One of Mijatović’s first steps in office, therefore, was to inform the Austro-Hungarian government that Serbia recognized the validity of the 1862 treaty: the Monarchy was promised most favored nation treatment without being obliged to offer reciprocity to Serbia, an important element of the Austro-Ottoman arrangement. Negotiations were resumed in November 1880 and, after repeated urgings by Prince Milan, the trade treaty was finally signed on 6 May 1881.

As one historian has remarked, the agreement reached in 1881 “was no usual trade treaty.” And yet it has also been pointed out that Serbia derived unusual benefits from the treaty, so much so that politicians in both halves of the Monarchy, when the terms came up for ratification, were adamant that Austria-Hungary
had given away more than it got in return.\textsuperscript{51} In the circumstances of the time, and
given Serbia’s almost totally agrarian and undeveloped economy, it was natural
for a trade treaty concluded between it and the much more developed empire to
the north to reflect this.

It is also true that the Austro-Hungarian government, in driving its bargain
with Belgrade, was mindful not only of the need to dominate Serbia economi-
cally, but of its own trade problems as well. A few weeks after the Austro-Serbian
treaty was signed, the Monarchy concluded its own commercial deal with the
German Empire, one which constituted a heavy defeat for Austro-Hungarian
trade and indeed for the cause of free trade in central Europe. The Austro-
German treaty reflected the reality of protectionist Germany since 1879, and
forced Austria-Hungary to contemplate protection for its own produce, denied
access to German markets.\textsuperscript{52}

The Austro-Serbian treaty, which Haymerle and Kállay intended should
lead in the end to full customs union between the Monarchy and Serbia, was
based on the principle of granting each party trading advantages which no other
state could enjoy. In this way the Serbian economy could be fully integrated into
that of the Monarchy. The key to this arrangement lay in the definition of “border
traffic” (“trafic réciproque par la frontière commune”).\textsuperscript{53}

In most international trade instruments, this term was interpreted to mean a
zone of ten kilometres’ width, within which the general tariff of each contracting
country need not apply; it was generally accepted that the most favored nation
principle did not apply to border traffic. Annex B of the Austro-Serbian treaty, by
contrast, extended the definition of border traffic significantly: for the purposes
of trade in certain designated commodities, the exemptions applying to border
traffic were to include the entire country.\textsuperscript{54} For Serbia, the products thus exempted
included hogs, cattle, dried plums and plum products, hides, wine and honey. For
Austria-Hungary, the items which a Reichsrath report later described as belong-
ing to “a small but nevertheless important group of our export articles” included
paper, rough products in stone, pottery and glass, cast iron and iron agricultural
implements. In addition, no tariff at all was levied on Serbian grain, another im-
portant export from the Principality. The effect of these provisions was to assure
each party a market for those things each wanted most to export to the other. Ser-
bia’s most important produce could enter the Monarch virtually toll-free; in return,
manufacturers in the Monarchy had a market for goods likely to be in high demand
in Serbia in the near future, such as railway construction materials and farm tools.

Apart from the special exemptions for border traffic, the treaty gave Austria-
Hungary control over its own tariff for all other items of trade: it could raise
or lower import duties on goods coming from Serbia as it saw fit. The Serbian
tariffs, by contrast, were fixed at 6, 8 and 15 per cent \textit{ad valorem}, depending
on the goods imported, all of which rates constituted an increase over the 3 per
cent which manufactures from the Monarchy had enjoyed since 1862. In compensation for this increased duty, importers into Serbia from the Monarchy were promised exemption from the domestic taxes and tariffs by which, in the past, the Serbian government had sought to promote its fledgling native industry.

There was another, much shorter, instrument signed the same day as the trade treaty, which complemented it and was, in its way, almost as vital to the overall settlement. This was a veterinary convention, which empowered the Monarchy to close its frontiers to Serbian livestock on the slightest suspicion of disease.55 The “swine fever clause,” as it was frequently referred to, was a natural and understandable precaution, since Balkan livestock were in fact more liable to carry disease. Some such lock-out device was also necessary to protect the Monarchy against similar measures by the German Empire, on the grounds that a country which imported diseased animals was bound to pass on epidemics. There is no doubt, however, that the clause was also designed for use as a political weapon: the Monarchy thereby had the ability to bring the Serbian economy to a standstill, merely by threatening to close the frontier. By one calculation the frontier was actually closed nine times between 1881 and 1906.56

Writing in 1954, the American historian Vucinich remarked that, with the 1881 trade treaty and veterinary convention, “The obvious policy of Austria-Hungary was to prevent the development of light industry in Serbia, encouraging that country to develop an exclusively agrarian and raw materials economy.” 57 This is an interpretation echoed by successive general studies, all of whom cite subsequent trade statistics, and the record of Serbian economic development, to show Serbia’s economic dependency on the Monarchy.58

Yet a detailed study of the treaties, written two years before Vucinich reached his verdict, shows how much Austrian and Hungarian statesmen thought they were conceding to Serbia instead. First of all Serbia was allowed to raise its general tariffs, as opposed to the special rates on border traffic. Then, the treaty also abolished Austro-Hungarian consular jurisdiction in Serbia and other privileges derived from the capitulations. Even the promised relief from internal tariffs was not something the Serbian government was likely to achieve overnight, and in fact it was not long before such taxes were reappearing, in an attempt to raise new revenue.59 For all the advantages Austria-Hungary derived from the treaty, Hauptmann concluded, it was “more tailored to Serbian than to Austrian interests.”60 Or, as a deputy in the Austrian Reichsrath put it:

We have even to a certain extent blazed a trail for the Serbs, and outlined how they can levy a higher tariff from us, how to strengthen their state, how to give it a modern framework, and how they can set themselves on their own two feet. This constitutes therefore a renunciation of any thoughts of annexation or similar imputations, which have sometimes been made against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.61
The Monarchy, in the eyes of its own leaders, was showing praiseworthy restraint, in order to cultivate the best possible relations with its southern neighbor. To be sure, and unbeknownst to the deputies in the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments, the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry was already contemplating forcing a secret alliance on Serbia, which made the supposed moderation of the trade treaty a price worth paying; but that was another matter.

In any case, the fact remains that the trade settlement of 1881 did not do very much to further Serbia’s economic development. The country remained an economic backwater, importing the vast majority of its needs from the Monarchy, which in turn absorbed initially up to 90 per cent of Serbian agricultural produce, mostly in the form of livestock, cereals and fruit. Despite the good intentions and well-reasoned assumptions with which the economist Mijatović negotiated the terms of trade, the projected accumulation of capital and economic strength did not emerge. Even where Serbia specialized, as in livestock, it has been argued that the continuing backwardness of the country prevented selective breeding and the improvement of stock. As late as 1906, moreover, Serbia did not boast a single commercial slaughterhouse or meat-processing plant. Serbia’s development of a rationalized economic base was delayed and deformed by the peculiar nature of its connection with Austria-Hungary.

The very lopsidedness of Austro-Serbian trade relations, then, was likely to produce its own political reaction in time, given the right conditions in Serbia itself. In addition, it was not long before the Monarchy’s supposedly exclusive position in Serbia was threatened by outside competition. French and German banks, for instance, often working in unison, participated in loans to the Serbian government, and Austro-Hungarian banks were pressed more and more into the background. Even the Monarchy’s trade supremacy was not inviolate, for Germany at least was advancing steadily into Balkan markets. The Austro-German trade treaty of 1891, by which Germany lifted its ban on the import of Hungarian swine, stipulated in return that German goods in Serbia should enjoy whatever rates were accorded Austro-Hungarian goods.

To combat this, the Monarchy negotiated a new trade treaty with Serbia in 1892. This substituted, for the special border traffic rates of 1881, a general Serbian tariff which actually raised slightly the duties on Serbian imports: if this gave no preferential treatment to Austro-Hungarian industry beyond what it got already, neither did it benefit German manufacturers. At the same time Serbian produce retained its favorable rates of access to the Monarchy, with the significant exception of tariffs on grain, which were raised to placate agrarian producers in Hungary. These last, faced with the need to sell more of their own produce internally, as tariffs rose in Germany, were anxious to restrict imports of Serbian cattle and grain. Thus, while the desire to control Serbian policy remained as urgent as ever for the Monarchy, the inducements by which Serbia could be kept
within the fold were increasingly opposed by forces within the Dualist system. By the time of the “Pig War,” in 1906, this conflict of interests had assumed critical proportions.

The trade settlement imposed in 1881 therefore carried the seeds of its own destruction. By putting a positive brake on Serbia’s healthy, diversified economic development, and keeping it in the role of agricultural producer for the Monarchy, the trade treaty attracted bitter criticism within Serbia from the start. Eventually this resentment was to have serious political repercussions, which ultimately led to the breaking of Austro-Hungarian control. Nor was the task of formulating a response to this challenge, when it was made, facilitated by the clash of interests within the Monarchy itself.

If the trade treaty was thus fatally misconceived, the same was even truer of the capstone in Haymerle’s and Kállay’s edifice of control over Serbia. The secret political treaty, which Mijatović signed in Belgrade at Prince Milan’s behest on 28 June 1881, sought to complement politically what had already been achieved economically. Its clear intention, and effect, was to make Serbia a satellite of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Again, a major event in Austro-Serbian relations was preceded, in fact preconditioned, by one between the great powers. On 18 June Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia signed a renewed version of the Three Emperors’ League, reaffirming the essential identity of interests of the three northern courts. Of particular relevance in this context was the careful delineation of Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests in the Balkans. Article I of the separate protocol to the convention expressly reserved to Austria-Hungary, with regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina, “the right to annex these provinces at whatever moment she shall deem opportune.” In exchange, Austria-Hungary undertook to recognize the eventual union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, “if this question should come up by the force of circumstances.” While not specifically mentioning Serbia, the spirit of the treaty clearly implied that the Principality fell within the Monarchy’s area of concern, just as Bulgaria fell within Russia’s.

The existence of a new Three Emperors’ League provides the essential background to the secret treaty between the Monarchy and Serbia, since Haymerle and Kállay knew they could make whatever demands they wanted, confident that the Russians would be totally disinterested. Haymerle and Kállay were dealing, moreover, with Prince Milan himself who, at the end of May 1881, as the trade treaty neared ratification, signified to Vienna his wish to consolidate this settlement by a political alliance as well.

Ever since the early 1870s, Kállay and Andrássy had carefully followed Prince Milan’s development, and Haymerle too had ample opportunity to study Milan on the latter’s frequent sojourns in Vienna. The Monarchy’s leaders were familiar with the Prince’s lack of identification with Serbia and his countrymen,
his precocious cynicism and open preference for life in the West. “I am accus-
tomed to western culture and customs and find at home only untrustworthy, petty-
minded people,” he complained to Haymerle in September 1881. They also
knew that Milan had never forgiven Russia for turning its back on Serbia in 1878, and that a more naturally pro-Austrian ruler for Serbia could hardly be imagined. When Milan announced his intention of visiting Vienna in June, therefore, and dispatched foreign minister Mijatović ahead of him to clear the ground for a po-
tical alliance, Haymerle and Kállay were ready with specific proposals.

Mijatović, in his rather imprecise memoirs, claims that the Piroćanac min-
istry as a whole were in favor of some form of alliance, which seemed only
natural in view of the increasingly close economic ties with the Monarchy. They
were unhappy about, but resigned to, Austria-Hungary’s occupation of Bosnia,
but were most anxious to clear up the question of whether the Monarchy had
expansionist ambitions beyond the Sancak of Novi Pazar. In view of the antago-
nism which had sprung up with Bulgaria since 1878, moreover, the government
wanted to know precisely how far Vienna would back any future expansion into
the Balkans by Serbia.

In Vienna, Mijatović had extensive talks not only with Haymerle, but with
Kállay and another Hungarian diplomat, László Syögyény-Marich. He received
from Haymerle, in Kállay’s presence, assurances that the Monarchy had no inten-
tion of taking over more territory in the Balkans. According to Mijatović, Hay-
merle offered the following blunt advice:

> The Dual Monarchy has no objection to the existence of a truly independent
Serbia, cultivating good and neighborly relations with her. We have no objection
to the extension of her territories in a southern direction. But if Serbia should
turn out to be a ‘Russian satrapy’ and were herself to abandon her independence
and act on orders from Petersburg, then we could not tolerate such a Serbia on
our frontier, and we would, as a lesser evil, occupy it with our armies.

There was an uncanny echo here, not just of Kálnoky’s comment the previous
autumn, and of Consul Anger’s contemplation of sending in the troops, but of
Beust’s similar threats back in 1867. Serbia’s independence, by this reckoning,
might best be described as whatever independence the Monarchy was prepared
to allow. It was a definition, moreover, to which the two Hungarians involved in
these talks, Kállay and Szögyény, implicitly subscribed.

What Piroćanac and his colleagues would have made of this rather unprom-
ising start to the negotiations will never be known, since in the event Prince
Milan himself negotiated the treaty of alliance without their knowledge. Return-
ing to Vienna on 22 June after a visit to St. Petersburg, Milan entered directly
into talks with Haymerle and his team. The text Milan agreed to, and which
Mijatović signed on the 28th, was virtually the same as the draft submitted by
Kállay, who conducted the detailed negotiations. The whole transaction was a matter of the utmost secrecy; as Herbert assured Kállay on 12 July, his own legation staff knew nothing about it.\(^7\) Piroćanac and war minister Milutin Garašanin, the only other Serbian ministers to know anything about the treaty for years, were casually informed of the document’s existence a week after it was signed.\(^7\) When they did learn the details, both promptly resigned.

The minister president, with justice, claimed that “by such a convention Serbia would stand in the same relation to Austria-Hungary as Tunis to France.”\(^7\) Two articles of the treaty were particularly explosive, at least in the context of Serbian domestic politics. By Article II,

> Serbia will not tolerate political, religious, or other intrigues, which, taking her territory as a point of departure, might be directed against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, including therein Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak of Novibazar.\(^7\)

An understandable enough demand from the Monarchy’s point of view, this was nevertheless a potentially deadly undertaking for any Serbian government, and the attempt to honor it was to make first Milan, and then his ill-fated son Alexander, the object of widespread scorn and hatred within Serbia.\(^7\)

Even more unusual was Article IV. Here the Monarchy promised to support Serbian interests with other European powers. However,

> Without a previous understanding with Austria-Hungary, Serbia will neither negotiate nor conclude any political treaty with another Government, and will not admit to her territory a foreign armed force, regular or irregular, even as volunteers.\(^7\)

It was over this stipulation that Piroćanac and Garašanin resigned, since they quite correctly saw it as a surrender of Serbia’s ability to conduct its own foreign policy.

In return for these commitments, Prince Milan was promised Austro-Hungarian support if he proclaimed himself King of Serbia (Article III). Equally attractive was Article VII, which sanctioned Serbia’s expansion “in the direction of her southern frontiers (with the exception of the Sanjak of Novibazar).” The two parties promised benevolent neutrality in case either went to war with a third party, and would have the option of renewing the treaty after ten years.\(^8\)

The resignation of Piroćanac and Garašanin forced Milan to seek an immediate revision of Article IV. He could not accept the departure of two such prominent ministers without explaining why they had left, and the whole point of the treaty was that it must remain secret. Mijatović was accordingly sent back to Vienna to raise the issue, and in return the two ministers agreed to stay on. Prevailing on the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry to abandon what Haymerle termed “our biggest achievement,” however, was not so simple.\(^8\)

In Haymerle’s absence, Mijatović dealt with his old friend Kállay. In a lengthy memorandum submitted to Haymerle on 17 July, Kállay reported on his
discussions with the Serbian foreign minister. Kállay asserted that both Piroćanac and Garašanin, according to Mijatović, were entirely in accord with the basic content of the treaty; “Indeed it contains in binding form the ideas which, they are convinced, should serve as the basis of Serbian policy.” Article IV, however, was seen by both ministers as appearing to give up any right to conclude treaties, and with it Serbia’s independence; as a result, neither wanted to accept responsibility for the treaty. Kállay, in an attempt to meet the Serbian ministers halfway, suggested that Article IV was merely designed to prevent Serbia concluding treaties which had a specifically anti-Austrian purpose. There could be no objection to the conclusion of non-political treaties. Drawing, as he put it with some hubris to Haymerle, on his “years-long experiences in Serbia” and his “detailed understanding of Serbian affairs,” Kállay argued that the retention of Garašanin in particular was highly desirable, since he was in Kállay’s opinion very much the coming man of Serbian politics. Accordingly, Kállay took up Mijatović’s suggestion that the two governments exchange confidential notes, clarifying that Article IV was solely designed to prevent Serbia from concluding treaties with third parties which might have a specifically anti-Austrian purpose. As he pointed out, Haymerle had empowered him, in negotiating the treaty, to include if necessary just such a proviso safeguarding Serbia’s formal independence.

Kállay soon learned, however, that Haymerle was unwilling to abandon the control which the Monarchy had been seeking over Serbia for so many years. “Article IV,” Haymerle observed, “has the sole purpose of giving us a guarantee that a different ministry will not plan anything hostile against us.” Haymerle was willing to exchange confidential notes, clarifying that Article IV applied only to political treaties but, as he pointed out, the Article already included the word “political.” Haymerle also rejected the imputation that Serbia was the only party making any substantial concessions: “We are binding ourselves just as explicitly to conduct a policy friendly towards Serbia and to further its interests; we renounce completely any action against Serbia and are not demanding anything more from Serbia; we are giving positive promises to Serbia and Serbia is giving us only negative ones.” In any case, a deal was a deal. “Serbia,” Haymerle wrote in late July, “achieves with this treaty protection against all dangers; for us to safeguard ourselves against possible changes of minister is quite natural.”

The gap was only closed after another two months’ negotiations, and then only by sleight of hand. Prince Milan went up to Vienna for further discussions in September, by which time Piroćanac, to guard against future surprises, had decided to take over the foreign affairs portfolio himself. Piroćanac also announced his intention of seeing Haymerle about Article IV in October. In advance of this, however, Milan, Haymerle, and Kállay had come to an understanding which effectively obviated the Serbian government.
In a lengthy interview with Haymerle in mid-September, Milan made it clear how far he had traveled from the day in 1868 when he had stepped ashore in Belgrade, flanked by Blaznavac and Ristić. “Serbia has to decide between Austria and Russia,” he declared, nor was there any doubt where his personal preference lay. Ever since 1878, he told Haymerle, “Russia treats us like a child and a subordinate; but I don’t want to be Russia’s prefect.” The treaty with Austria-Hungary, in short, offered Milan the support he needed; rather than abandon it he would rather abandon Serbia itself, “ce foutre pays,” which caused him nothing but grief and annoyance.90

In the meantime Piroćanac was preparing to renegotiate, as he thought, Article IV. He was not satisfied with the formula suggested by Kállay in July, and wanted something more precise, a demand which Haymerle continued to resist. Mijatović, at the end of September, pleaded with Kállay somehow to accommodate the minister president’s reservations, on the ground that, if a well-disposed ministry like that of Piroćanac could not stomach Article IV, then the Monarchy would be hard put to find a more pliant replacement.91

Prince Milan, however, had already solved the problem to the satisfaction of Vienna. On 28 September, Baron Herbert reported from Belgrade that Milan had declared himself ready to give a secret undertaking to observe Article IV in its original form, whatever amendment to it might officially be negotiated by Piroćanac.92 Long before Piroćanac arrived in Vienna, therefore, Milan had spiked his guns. The Serbian government was about to achieve the bizarre position of accepting a treaty which meant one thing to the Prince’s ministers but, unbeknownst to them, another quite different thing to the Prince.

In the circumstances, it seems appropriate that it was Kállay with whom Piroćanac had to do business in Vienna, just as it was to Kállay that Prince Milan, on 24 October, addressed his secret declaration nullifying Piroćanac’s efforts. For Haymerle had died of a heart attack on 10 October; and in the interval, while the Emperor decided on Count Kálnoky as foreign minister and arranged for his recall from St. Petersburg, the forty-two year old Kállay was for several weeks the Monarchy’s acting foreign minister. The final instrument of Austro-Hungarian dominance over Serbia was thus signed by the man who had been most closely involved in the process ever since 1868.93

The Piroćanac-Kállay declaration of 25 October was a compromise with which both sides might reasonably have been satisfied. It stressed that Article IV could not “impair the right of Serbia to negotiate and to conclude treaties, even of a political nature, with another Government.” The essential implication of the Article, it was decided, was that Serbia would not enter into “any political treaty which would be contrary to the spirit and the tenor” of the secret treaty.94 With this wording, the absolute right of Serbia to conclude treaties, which was the sticking point for Piroćanac and Garašanin, was formally preserved. On the
other hand, it was clear that Serbian governments would be bound to consider
the Monarchy’s views in any such treaties. It was informal, rather than formal,
control; but it was control nevertheless.

Milan’s letter to Kállay of 24 October, by contrast, emphasized anew the
unequivocal nature of the commitment undertaken with the original treaty of 28
June. The Prince pledged on his honor “not to enter into any negotiation what-
soever relative to any kind of a political treaty between Serbia and a third state
without communication with and previous consent of Austria-Hungary.” As far
as Milan was concerned, this fresh declaration was to be considered “as having
an entirely official character.” In so far as the monarch of Serbia could ensure it,
therefore, Serbia was henceforth to be the Monarchy’s loyal ally.

The secret treaty of 1881 has to stand as one of the most extraordinary dip-
lomatic instruments ever confected. Concluded by the Prince of Serbia behind
the back of his own minister president, it represented the personal commitment
of the monarch and nothing else; and yet it was this personal commitment which
had been seen, by Andrásy, Haymerle, and Kállay in succession, as the linch-pin
of Austro-Hungarian control over Serbia since at least the early 1870s. By the
mid-1880s the inheritor of this strategy, Kálnoky, was convinced that it had all
been a mistake. After the disastrous Serbo-Bulgarian War of November 1885,
by which Milan had imperilled the already precarious Austro-Russian détente,
Kálnoky confessed that “he had always thought it a mistake, with regard to our
influence in Serbia, to place so much emphasis on the person of King Milan.”

By late 1888, with the King’s willful abdication looming, Kálnoky had come to
the conclusion that relying on Milan so exclusively had been a waste of time.

The treaty remained a deep secret throughout the 1880s, and only with
Milan’s abdication in 1889 did the select circle of those in the know about its
existence start widening. Precisely because the treaty was a secret, it rendered
the policy of Milan and his governments inexplicable to most Serbs, even if the
essentially Austrophile orientation of the monarch was a matter of public knowl-
edge. That the ruler of an independent state had so explicitly bound himself to a
foreign power, and in particular this foreign power, was for the majority of Mi-
lan’s subjects literally unthinkable.

It remains a puzzle as to why Haymerle and Kállay were so convinced that
this personal commitment from Milan was so worth having. Neither can have
been under any illusions as to Milan’s character and reliability; he was notorious-
lly capricious and unreliable. More importantly, the whole trend of Serbia’s
political development by 1881 was increasingly toward greater political partici-
pation and popular control of government policy, and a policy of relying on the
person of the ruler to control an entire society seemed a thing of the past. Milan’s
Austrophile stance put him on a collision course with the growing force of Ser-
bian populist nationalism, and Milan himself was a deeply imperfect and unpre-
dictable instrument. One can only conclude that, as servants of a monarch who, to the end of his reign, saw government and especially foreign policy in essentially dynastic terms, both Haymerle and Kállay were conditioned to assume that Milan Obrenović really could speak for Serbia. It was a fateful miscalculation.

Notes


5  In terms of territory, Serbia expanded by some two hundred square miles (518 square kilometres). See Michael Boro Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia 1804–1918* (New York & London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 2:399–400, who also offers the clearest map; and Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States 1804–1920* (Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 1977), 153, 156; the figure of 11,000 sq. km. in Gale Stokes, *Politics as Development: The Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth Century Serbia* (Durham, NC & London: Duke University Press, 1990), 136, seems to be a misprint. The new territory, roughly triangular, was part of what was loosely referred to as Old Serbia, and comprised the towns of Niš, Leskovac and Vranje along the Morava River valley, and Pirot in the east. Serbia was also finally ceded Mali Zvornik and Sakar, the two communities on the Bosnian frontier which had been in dispute since the 1830s; see Chapter 11, above.


7  Article XXXVII, ibid., 569: “Until the conclusion of fresh arrangements no change shall be made in Servia in the actual conditions of the commercial intercourse of the Principality with foreign countries.”


9  Petrovich, *History of Modern Serbia*, 2:405. Stokes, *Politics as Development*, 142–43, points out that there were ways around this for specific commodities, although it was still true that “until a commercial treaty was concluded, Serbia remained at Austria’s economic mercy” (143).

10  Petrovich, *History of Modern Serbia*, 2:412, gives figures for 1880–81. At that time, “77 percent of Serbia’s imports came from Austria-Hungary and 82 percent of its exports went to it... On the other hand, what Austria-Hungary got from Serbia amounted to only one and a half percent of its total imports.”

Herbert to Haymerle, 21 June 1880, quoted in Hauptmann, “Österreich-Ungarns Werben um Serbien,” 189, note 238.

The best summary of the complex issues behind the treaties of 1880–81 is still Hauptmann (*ibid*.), especially 146–51, 190–99, which takes account of the existing literature to the 1950s. Since then, the only comparable treatment is by Palotás, *Az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia balkáni politikája*, 83–104, who concludes (103–4) that no real progress was made while Andrásy remained foreign minister. This was partly because Andrásy’s insufficient understanding of, or interest in, economic matters lost the Monarchy time. Ristić also successfully played on the Hungarian government’s fear of an infringement of its rights under the Dualist settlement. See also idem, *Machtpolitik und Wirtschaftsinteressen: Der Balkan und Rußland in der österreichisch-ungarischen Außenpolitik 1878–1895* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1995), 81–92, 115–26.


Hauptmann, “Österreich-Ungarns Werben um Serbien,” 175–76; see also the trade figures given, *ibid.*, part 5, note 3 (222), which show the marked slump in Serbian exports to the Monarchy, between the signing of the Treaty of Berlin (1878) and the conclusion of the trade treaty (1881).


Anger to Kállay, 20 May 1880, HHSA, PA XL (Interná)/333–1 (Nachlaß Kállay I); quoted by Hauptmann, “Österreich-Ungarns Werben um Serbien,” 178.
22 Ibid., 172. For Kállay’s appointment, see Andrásy to Francis Joseph, 28 Sept. 1879, HHSA, AR F4/156. Kállay was not immediately appointed First Sektionschef, a post initially occupied by Baron Heinrich von Calice; officially Kállay was the “second political Sektionschef, fourth class.” Calice, however, was soon appointed to the Constantinople embassy, and Kállay was formally granted the title of First Sektionschef; Haymerle to Francis Joseph, 20 Nov. 1880, HHSA, AR F4/156.


24 See above, Chapter 11. On Kállay’s parliamentary career, see the introduction by Lajos Thallóczy to Benjamin von Kállay, *Die Geschichte des serbischen Aufstandes 1807–1810, aus den Handschriftennachlass herausgegeben von Ludwig von Thallóczy* (Vienna: Adolf Holzhau sen, 1910), xxii-xxvi; for a more critical assessment, see Imre Halász, *Egy letűnt nemzedék: Emlékezések a magyar állam kialakulásának újabb korszakából* (Budapest: Nyugat, 1911), 487–95. Halász’ memoirs, which also offer a detailed portrait of Kállay’s parliamentary leader, ‘Sennyey, are one of the more important sources on Kállay’s doings after 1875, since Halász was the de facto editor of *Kelet népe* and in daily contact with Kállay in the period 1875–76, and at frequent intervals thereafter.

25 Ibid., 484, 486, on the nominal nature of Kállay’s editorship; in the fourteen months he was associated with *Kelet népe*, Kállay by mutual agreement remained entirely preoccupied with foreign policy matters. On Kállay’s lone defense of Andrásy, which was the main reason for severing the connection with *Kelet népe*, see ibid., 489–92, 493–95. At least one of Kállay’s speeches in this vein in parliament, according to Halász, on 26 June 1877, “made a great sensation” (494); see also Thallóczy introduction to Kállay, *Geschichte des serbischen Aufstandes*, xiv-xx, who dates this speech 26 July, as does Jelena Milojković-Djurčić, “Benjamin von Kallay’s Reassessment of the Eastern Question: Concepts for a Solution,” in her *The Eastern Question and the Voices of Reason: Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Balkan States 1875–1908* (Boulder & New York: East European Monographs/Columbia University Press, 2002), 67.


27 Ibid., 487–88.

28 Mihailo D. Stojanović, *The Great Powers and the Balkans 1875–1878* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), 246. This was the more remarkable in view of the fact that, according to Imre Halász, Kállay by early 1878 regarded the Ottoman Empire’s collapse as likely in the near future; Halász, *Egy letűnt nemzedék*, 495.

29 Kállay to Andrásy, 9 Jan. 1879, quoted in István Díószegi, “Die österreichisch-ungarische Monarchie und die Organisierung Ostrumeliens 1878–1879,” *Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominata*, sectio historica 22 (1982): 92. The Ottoman government by this stage was markedly unhappy with Kállay’s presence in Eastern Rumelia since, as Díószegi puts it, “it could detect new anti-Turkish motives in his statements.”

30 Ibid., quoting Andrásy, to Kállay, 3 Feb. 1879: “Our first interest is, and remains, that the Russian army of occupation be withdrawn from first Eastern Roumelia and then Bulgaria.”
36 Ibid., 151.
37 Prince Milan to Ristić, 1/13 Aug. 1880, ibid., no. 7 (v), 152–155. See also Prince Milan to Ristić, 11/23 Aug. 1880, ibid., no. 7 (d), 158–59. The final phase of the struggle between Milan and the Monarchy, on the one hand, and Ristić on the other, is well summarized by Jovanović, *Vlada Milana Obrenović*, 2:269–70.
39 Haymerle to Francis Joseph, [Sept. 1880], quoted in Hauptmann, “Österreich-Ungarns Werben um Serbien,” 204.
40 Kálnoky to Haymerle, 7 Sept. 1880, quoted, ibid., 203.
41 Kállay to Kálnoky, 6 Oct. 1880, HHSA, PA XL (Interna)/333–1 (Nachlaß Kállay I), a reply to Kálnoky’s letter just quoted (note 39); also quoted by Hauptmann, “Österreich-Ungarns Werben um Serbien,” 203, who mistakenly dates the Kállay letter 6 September.
45 Ibid., 164.
46 Ibid. Also quoted in part in Stokes, *Politics as Development*, 175.
47 On the Progressives generally, see ibid., 176, 179–83, 189–90; on their economic thinking, especially that of Mijatović who was responsible for negotiating the trade treaty with Austria-Hungary, see 213–16.
48 As Mijatović put it to the *Skupština* called to debate the trade treaty, “We do not have the weapons to wage a tariff war”; quoted in Dimitrije Đorđević, *Carinski rat Austro-Ugarske i Srbije 1906–1911* [The Tariff War of Austria-Hungary and Serbia] (Belgrade: Istorijski Institut, 1962), 20. On Kállay’s friendship with Mijatović see, among many other references, Kállay Diary, 11 Sept. 1871 (Dnevnik, 403–4). Mijatović became one of Kállay’s chief sources of political information in the subsequent period 1871–75, and later claimed to have helped in the research for Kállay’s *History of the Serbs*; Mijatovich, *Memoirs*, 37, 230–31.
Chapter 12


51 Hauptmann, “Österreich-Ungarns Werben um Serbien,” 214–22, provides the most detailed summary of the practical implications for both countries; on domestic criticism of the treaty in Austria and Hungary, see 221–22. See also Palotás, *Az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia balkáni politikája*, 252–54; and Vucinich, *Serbia between East and West*, 170–72.


54 Ibid., 337–40; see also Hauptmann, “Österreich-Ungarns Werben um Serbien,” 219; Vucinich, *Serbia between East and West*, 170–71.

55 “Convention concernant les epizooties,” Vienna, 24 Apr./6 May 1881; text in *Nouveau Recueil Général des Traités*, 2nd series, vol. 8, no. 55, 352–55. Kállay was the sole signatory for this on the Austro-Hungarian side (355).

56 Hauptmann, “Österreich-Ungarns Werben um Serbien,” 216; Vucinich, *Serbia between East and West*, 208; and Đorđević, *Carinski rat*, 17, who lists the occasions.

57 Vucinich, *Serbia between East and West*, 171.


59 Vucinich, *Serbia between East and West*, 208 concludes that as early as 1884 “the Serbian government was responsible for the first serious infringement of the provisions of the trade treaty.” The Austro-Hungarian government, for its part, “realized that the violation of the treaty had been forced on Serbia by circumstances.”

60 Hauptmann, “Österreich-Ungarns Werben um Serbien,” 220.

61 *Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses*, 9th session, 27 Mar. 1882, quoted ibid., 221–22. Đorđević, *Carinski rat*, 20–21, also points out that, for all Serbia’s clearly subordinate position after 1881, it nevertheless did expand its trade and, especially from the 1890s, attracted an increasing amount of foreign capital, in the shape of state loans and investment in mining. This in turn laid the foundations for a later development, i.e. after 1906, of native industry. The number of indigenous industrial entreprises, however, founded with


Poidevin, “Les intérêts financiers,” 51–54; Đorđević, *Carinski rat*, 708, in his résumé, suggests that “Austria’s economic supremacy in Serbia did not have deep roots because it rested above all on commercial capital instead of using financial capital.”


Ibid., 176; Hauptmann, “Österreich-Ungarns Werben um Serbien,” 221.

Đorđević, *Carinski rat*, 22–23; also Horst M. Lorscheider, “The Commercial Treaty between Germany and Serbia of 1904,” *Central European History* 9, no. 2 (1976), 132, who points out that “the ability of the Austro-Hungarian government to make concessions to the Serbs depended . . . even more upon Austria’s opportunities for the export of agricultural products to Germany, her most important commercial partner.” Palairet, *The Balkan Economies*, 304, concludes that “As ever, Austria-Hungary sought to insulate itself against losses in the German market at the expense of its Balkan neighbours.”

Key Treaties of the Great Powers, 2:605.


Herbert to Haymerle, 29 May 1881, réservé; Herbert to Haymerle, 31 May 1881, #64A-B, both HHSA, PA XIX/15; Hauptmann, “Österreich-Ungarns Werben um Serbien,” 233.


Mijatovich, *Memoirs*, 35–38. Of principal concern here was the article in the Treaty of Berlin (Article XXV), which guaranteed Austria-Hungary the right to have garrisons and control of communications in the Sanjak, which was vaguely described as the territory “qui s’étend entre la Serbie et le Monténégro dans la direction Sud-Est jusqu’au délà de Mitrovitsa”; text in W.N. Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement 1878–1880*, 2nd edition (London: Frank Cass, 1963), Appendix 2, 413 (that in *Key Treaties of the Great Powers*, 2:563, is defective).


Haymerle to Francis Joseph, 23 June 1881, HHSA, PA I/456–1, Liasse V/2b, ff. 46–47.
Herbert to Kállay, 12 July 1881, HHSA, PA I/456–1, Liasse V/2a, ff. 44–45.


Repression of press criticism of the Monarchy, for instance, was particularly severe in the late 1890s. For one example, see the judgment of the Belgrade Court against the journal *Male novine*, 14 Dec. 1896, in *Progoni političkih protivniku u režimu Aleksandra Obrenovica 1893–1903* [The Persecution of Political Opponents under the Regime of Alexander Obrenović], ed. Andrija Radenić (Belgrade: Istorijški Arhiv Beograda, 1973), no. 40, 134–55. The newspaper was prosecuted specifically for making critical comments about Kállay’s administration of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Notes by Haymerle, on Kállay to Haymerle, 17 July 1881, HHSA, PA I/456–1; also quoted in Hauptmann, “Österreich-Ungarns Werben um Serbien,” 235.

Kállay to Haymerle, 17 July 1881, HHSA, PA I/456–1, V/3b, ff. 59–66. Haymerle was at this point taking the “cure” at Kreuznach in the Rhineland.


Mijatović to Kállay, 30 Sept. 1881, HHSA, PA I/456–1, V/13; cited in Hauptmann, “Österreich-Ungarns Werben um Serbien,” 238.


Kálnoky to Francis Joseph, 22 Nov. 1885, HHSA, PA I/456–1, V/45a; cited in Bridge, *Sadova to Sarajev*o, 159. Cf. the anodyne analysis of the treaty in Brown, *Haymerle*, who
concludes that, with the conclusion of the treaty, “Austro-Serbian relations had just been put on an even keel,” (192) and that in negotiating the treaty, Haymerle demonstrated “a degree of cautious vision.” (193).

97 Kálnoky to Hengelmüller (Belgrade), 23 Dec. 1888, HHSA, PA I/456–1, V/II.3.
Conclusion

The Habsburg Monarchy’s structure of control over Serbia was completed by the treaties of 1880–81. This system remained in place for a generation, by the end of which time the internal stresses it produced combined to shake it to the ground. Austro-Hungarian economic domination of Serbia was resented from the start, and in the end a Serbian government came to power which was determined to break the stranglehold. Even more futile, because more keenly felt, was the political domination of Serbia by the Monarchy. In an age of rampant and un-self-critical nationalism, the Monarchy already represented one of the principal bugbears of Serbs, whether in Serbia proper or within the Monarchy itself. Imposing a restraint like the secret political treaty on Serbia was bound, in the end, to provoke a reaction. The inability of Serbian governments to criticize the Monarchy, indeed their active persecution of those Serbian subjects who did so, made both government and dynasty unpopular. The result was increasing repression and the final explosion of 1903, when Alexander Obrenović paid with his life for his father’s commitment to the Monarchy. Revolution was followed by the return of political pluralism to Serbia, and popular politics meant confrontation with Austria-Hungary.¹

Briefly summarized, the railway convention of 9 April 1880 obliged the Serbian government to construct its contribution to the Vienna-Constantinople link, the section from Belgrade to Niš, within three years.² The trade treaty of 6 May 1881 gave Austria-Hungary much more than the customary most favored nation trading rights. By establishing special reduced tariff rates for goods or livestock classified as “border traffic,” the trade treaty made the Monarchy virtually the sole market for Serbian agricultural products. Tied to this, a veterinary convention, with its famous “swine fever clause,” enabled the Austro-Hungarian authorities to close the frontier to Serbian livestock whenever they saw fit.³ Finally, the secret political treaty of 28 June 1881 effectively associated Serbia with the Austro-German alliance, soon to become the Triple Alliance. In return for Milan’s promises to suppress nationalist intrigue against Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and to seek Vienna’s approval for any treaties with
other states, the Monarchy engaged to recognize Milan as King, and to abet Serbian
expansion to the southeast, at the expense of the remainder of the Ottoman
Empire in the Balkans.4

The period of greatest possible control, which this settlement ushered in,
lasted from 1881 to 1906, by which time a political revolution had been effected
in Serbia with the assassination, in June 1903, of Milan’s son and successor,
Alexander Obrenović. The accession to the throne of the rival Karadžorđević dy-
nasty did not, in itself, signify the adoption of a particularly anti-Habsburg policy
by Serbia; indeed, the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry initially welcomed the
change of dynasty, on the ground that King Peter was likely to be more pliable
than his late predecessor.5 However, the 1903 revolution did herald a return to
constitutional rule and genuine party politics, and in the circumstances this meant
the eventual entrenchment in power of the populist, ultra-nationalist Radical
Party, led by Nikola Pašić.6

It was the Pašić government which, in 1906, finally took the risk of letting
the trade treaty with Austria-Hungary lapse, refusing to accept foreign minister
Agenor Gołuchowski’s conditions for renewal. To the surprise of both parties
to the dispute, Serbia did not suffer economic devastation as a result, but in fact
found alternative markets for its produce.7 The economic emancipation which
followed 1906, therefore, set the stage for the rapid deterioration of diplomatic
relations between Serbia and the Monarchy thereafter. Only with the threat of
Austro-Hungarian economic sanctions removed could Serbian governments af-
ford to tolerate the extreme nationalist sentiments against Habsburg rule in Bos-
nia, which had been building up for a generation but which, by the terms of the
1881 treaty, Serbia’s rulers had been obliged to suppress.8

Seen in perspective, the overt Austro-Serbian antagonism of 1906–14 seems
almost inevitable, given the nationalist resentment which the preceding era of
economic and political vassalage had dammed up. And since the policy which
aimed at so explicit a domination of Serbia goes back to the early 1870s, we are
confronted once again with the contribution made by the two Hungarians, An-
drássy and Kállay, who were most involved in its formulation.

Gyula Andrássy was central to the establishment of a Hungarian voice in
foreign policy after 1867. While Hungarian minister president he could not of
course direct foreign affairs, which remained the preserve of the Emperor and
Beust. Nevertheless Andrássy availed himself to the full of his right to be con-
sulted over foreign policy issues, and nowhere more so than over policy affecting
the South Slav world and Serbia. As a result the Monarchy’s Serbian policy in
the first four years after the Ausgleich took on a literally dualist hue, with Beust
trying to maintain the traditional line of discouraging Serbian expansionism, and
Andrássy and Kállay trying to convince the Serbian Regents that, through the
good offices of the Hungarian government, many things were possible, not least
the acquisition of Bosnia. Only with Andrásy’s appointment as foreign minister in 1871 did this institutional schizophrenia end, by which point, ironically, Andrásy himself had swung to a more traditional viewpoint. Andrásy’s tenure as foreign minister saw the Monarchy revert to a policy of keeping Serbia firmly in its box, because of its potential as a cat’s paw for Russian influence in the Balkans, and despite the reasonable working relationship built up with Russia as a result of the Three Emperors’ League. Only when, at the end of three years of Near Eastern crisis in 1878, Serbia was cast adrift by Russia, was Andrásy able to impose on Serbia the deal done at the Congress of Berlin. After 1879 Haymerle and his Hungarian deputy, Kállay, continued Andrásy’s work by putting the treaty framework of 1880–81 in place.

Andrássy was also important in furthering the rise of the Hungarian factor in Austro-Hungarian foreign policy, both before and after his own appointment as foreign minister. To some extent the advancement of Hungarians within the foreign policy establishment was implicit in the Dualist settlement, in that from the start Francis Joseph and successive foreign ministers accepted the political logic of balancing diplomatic appointments in this way. Constitutionally, however, the Hungarian government was also assured the right to be consulted in foreign policy matters, and as we have seen Andrásy was quick to avail himself of this right. Not only did Andrásy make his views on foreign policy known, especially with regard to Russia and the Near East; he also secured key appointments in the persons of Béla Orczy in the foreign ministry itself, and Kállay in Belgrade. Andrásy also reorganized the foreign ministry after 1871 to include two section chiefs, one of whom should always be a Hungarian, and over the years the number of Hungarians in the diplomatic service rose significantly, although as William D. Godsey Jr. stresses, Hungarians “never dominated the corps.” It would be quite incorrect, as Godsey also reminds us, to speak of a “Hungarian mafia” in foreign policy. Nevertheless, on the specific issue of policy toward Serbia and the South Slav world, the Hungarian factor, I would argue, was decisive, at the very outset of the Dualist period, in giving relations a decidedly negative twist. And the damage, once done, was almost impossible to rectify. Non-Hungarian policy makers, like Kálnoky, might prefer a policy of straightforward domination of Serbia; but the Hungarian factor introduced, or at least exacerbated, an element of mistrust from which Austro-Serbian relations never recovered after 1871. The imposition of the unequal treaty framework of 1880–81 only entrenched this antagonism, by rubbing the Serbs’ noses in the subordinate nature of their position.

The role of Benjámin Kállay in this story remained an important one. Kállay’s finger prints were all over both the commercial treaty and the secret treaty of 1881, just as they were on the compromise declaration negotiated with Milan Piroćanac. Foreign minister Haymerle, as was to be expected, and subject of course to the Emperor Francis Joseph’s approval, had the final say; but it was Kállay
who hammered out the details, precisely because he was the acknowledged expert on South Slav affairs, whom Haymerle had inherited from Andrásy. Furthermore, Haymerle himself had been handpicked by Andrásy, and prior to his elevation had stood very much in Andrásy’s shadow; certainly there is no evidence that, with regard to Serbia, Haymerle did anything other than follow Andrásy’s lead. Consequently, on Haymerle’s death in October 1881, it was Kállay who steered the secret treaty safely into harbor.

Kállay’s influence on Austro-Serbian relations, moreover, persisted even after he left the foreign ministry. For over twenty years, from 1882 to his death in harness in July 1903, Kállay was the Monarchy’s joint finance minister and thus, under the peculiar ad hoc arrangement reached in 1878, effectively chief administrator of occupied Bosnia-Hercegovina. He consequently remained right at the center of the Monarchy’s South Slav policy, since governing Bosnia entailed constantly juggling Serbs, Croats and Muslims one against the other, while at the same time paying due attention to the repercussions in Croatia, in southern Hungary, and of course in Serbia itself. By the time of his death Kállay had a considerable reputation as a sort of natural administrator, a sage whose advice on how to handle fractious populations was repeatedly sought after, and who was allegedly seriously considered by the United States government as a possible governor of the Philippines, after their conquest in the Spanish-American War of 1898.

Despite the official eminence he attained, however, it is difficult to regard Kállay’s career as a success. A liberal nationalist, he spent much of his time in Belgrade, in the foreign ministry, and in charge of Bosnia manipulating, or seeking to manipulate, various elements of the South Slav world, first on behalf of the Hungarian political elite and then, his vision widening somewhat, on behalf of the Habsburg Monarchy. In Belgrade, he sought to tie Serbia to the Monarchy, especially its Hungarian half. At the Ballhaus, he was a principal architect of the tripartite structure imposed on Serbia in 1880–81. As joint finance minister, he aimed at making Bosnia a showcase for Habsburg rule, while keeping the nationalities there bitterly divided, not least through his vain attempt to promote a specifically “Bosnian” national identity.

There is a fitting irony that Kállay should have died within weeks of the ghastly events in Belgrade, which presaged the collapse of Austro-Hungarian control over Serbia. It was as if, with his passing, the whole pretence of keeping Serbian nationalism in leading-strings passed away too. Within three years the antagonism had boiled over, with the outbreak of trade war between the two countries. In little over a decade trade war had been succeeded by real war. During his long tenure as proconsul in Bosnia, Kállay finally identified Serbian nationalism as the greatest problem he faced. It was an insight he might have been more honest to have faced up to thirty years earlier, instead of striving so long and so hard to shackleso intractable a force.
Notes


8 Petrovich, *History of Modern Serbia*, 2:492–504, provides a more coherent account of Serbia's relations with the Monarchy in the late nineteenth century than Vucinich, *Serbia between East and West*, 31–32, 38–41, 172–78. The former, however, relies heavily on the standard work by Slobodan Jovanović, *Vlada Aleksandra Obrenović*, 2 vols. (Belgrade: Geze Kona, 1926–27), especially vol. 2. Documentary evidence of the degree to which Serbian governments, in the period 1881–1903, took their obligation to suppress criticism of the Monarchy's rule in Bosnia-Hercegovina is provided in *Progoni političkih protivnika u režimu Aleksandra Obrenovića 1893–1903*, ed. Andrija Radenić (Belgrade: Istorijiski Institut, 1973), which contains a mass of material from the Serbian, Austrian and Russian archives on this subject. There is not so much on the connection between economic emancipation and the worsening of political antagonism between the Monarchy and Serbia after 1903. Among older works, that of Gerhard Hiller, *Die Entwicklung des österreichisch-serbischen Gegensatzes 1908–1914* (Halle: Akademischer Verlag, 1934), 6, tends to take the view that Austro-Hungarian domination of Serbia was normal and profitable for both parties; Walter M. Markov, *Serbien zwischen Österreich und Rußland 1897–1908* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1934), especially 62–67, is based on a wider range of sources and is more critical, particularly of the Monarchy's handling of the trade dispute. See also Vucinich, *Serbia between East and West*, 209, 235–36, who, while making clear the economic
consequences of the “Pig War,” is muted on the inevitable political fallout; Petrovich, *History of Modern Serbia*, 2:548–54, 562–64, makes the connection more clearly. Petrovich’s interpretation, again, is undoubtedly heavily dependent on the detail provided in Đorđević, *Čarinski rat*, e.g. 568–72, which chronicles the effect the tariff war had on South Slav nationalist propaganda in Bosnia-Hercegovina. It is instructive to compare the conclusion reached by Đorđević (668), “The end of economic dependence led in the first place to Serbia’s political independence of Austria-Hungary” with that echoed by Petrovich (564): “Serbia’s economic liberation meant freedom from the Austro-Hungarian political domination of a quarter century.” Independent confirmation of the political importance of the breakdown in trade relations is also provided by Horst M. Lorscheider, “The Commercial Treaty between Germany and Serbia of 1904,” *Central European History* 9:2 (June 1976), 140–41, who not only shows how the concessions offered Serbia by the Monarchy’s principal ally, Germany, were crucial in helping Serbia to survive the tariff war, but concludes (142) that the resulting economic independence “enabled Serbia to pursue an increasingly aggressive policy vis-à-vis Austria-Hungary.”

9 Franz-Josef Kos, *Die Politik Österreich-Ungarns während der Orientkrise 1874/75–1879* (Cologne & Vienna: Böhlau, 1984), 57, following Radenić’s introduction to *Dnevnik* (xiii; 817), refers to the “national key of the Ausgleich.”


11 Ibid., 125–50, on the Hungarian presence in the foreign ministry and diplomatic corps generally.

12 See Kállay to Haymerle, 17 July 1881, HHSA, PA l/456–1, V/3b, ff. 59–66.


15 Introduction by Lajos Thallóczy to Benjamin von Kállay, *Die Geschichte des serbischen Aufstandes 1807–1810, aus den Handschriftennachlass herausgegeben von Ludwig von Thallóczy* (Vienna: Adolf Holzhausen, 1910), xxxvi. According to Thallóczy, Kállay’s abilities were especially prized in the States and by President Theodore Roosevelt. I have to date been unable to verify this independently.

Bibliography

A: Primary Sources

I: Archival

Austria

Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv [HHSA], Vienna

Politisches Archiv [PA]
- PA I (Allgemeines; Geheimakten)
- PA XII (Turkey)
- PA XXXVIII (Consular, including Belgrade)
- PA XL (Interna), Nachlässe, Schreiben der Minister und Sektionschefs, Varia: Nachlaß Kállay

Kabinettsarchiv
Administrative Registratur
Informationsbüro

Kriegsarchiv [KA], Vienna
Evidenzbüro

Britain

Public Record Office [PRO], Kew (now the National Archive)

Foreign Office Correspondence [FO]
- FO 7 (Austria)
- FO 78 (Turkey, including Serbia)
- Private Papers
- PRO 30 (Granville Papers)

British Library, London

Gladstone Papers
Add. MSS 44166–44168 (Correspondence with Granville)
Hungary

Magyar Országos Levéltár [Hungarian National Archive, or MOL], Budapest

Családi Íratok [Family Papers]
P4 (Andrássy Papers)
P344 (Kállay Papers, including the Kállay Diary)
Filmtár [Microfilm Archive] Miniszterelnöksági Levéltár: Minisztertanács
[Minister President’s Archive: Ministerial Council] 1867–1914

Országos Széchenyi Könyvtár Kézírattára [Archive of the National Széchenyi Library, or OSZK], Budapest

Kállay Papers

Fol. Hung. [FH] 1649, 1689, 1732 (Biographical material)
Fol. Hung. 1733 (Kállay-Andrássy correspondence)

II: Printed


Bibliography ♦ 319


**B: Secondary Sources**

**I. Memoirs & Literature before 1918**


**II. Literature since 1918**


Apple of Discord


Katus, László. “A magyar politikai vezetőréteg a délszláv kérdésről 1849 és 1867 között.” [The Hungarian Political Leadership on the Subject of the South Slav Question between 1849 and 1867] In *Szerbek és magyarok a Duna mentén*, 2: *Tanulmányok a szerb-magyar kapcsolatok köréből 1848–1867*. [Serbs and


Bibliography

Palai


Rumpler, Helmut. “Die Dalmatienreise Kaiser Franz Josephs 1875 im Kontext der politischen Richtungsentscheidungen der Habsburgermonarchie am Vora-


III. Unpublished Dissertations


This page intentionally left blank
Abdül Aziz (Sultan), deposition of, 270
Alexander II (Tsar of Russia), meeting with Prince Milan, 241
Aleksić-Pejković, Ljiljana, 6, 8–9
Andrássy, Gyula
- anticipation of war with Russia and, 178–79
  on Austro-Hungarian involvement in Serbian succession after Michael's murder, 82–83
  Beust's influence on, 83–84
  in Bosnian appropriation by Monarchy, 123
Bosnian scheme of
  after Karadordević debacle, 115
  conditions necessary for, 129
  Hungarian position on, 122
  impatience with Serbs on, in 1869, 141–42
  loss of interest in, 146, 147
  renewed interest of, in 1870, 177–78
  renewed push for, 191–92
  Serbia and, 3, 101
  slowing progress on, 130
  on corruption in Karadordević prosecution, 224
  despatch to Kállay on Serbian policy, 187–88
  distrust of Hungary after Karadordević acquittal and, 220
  efforts of, to oust Beust, 191
  fear of Russia and Pan-Slavism, 28–29
  as foreign minister
    appointment of, 245–246
    changing views on Eastern Question, 248
    Monarchy's new policy toward Serbia and, 260
  Hungarian factor and, 1, 313
  impatience of, with Serbian policy, 110
  influence of, on foreign policy issues, 22
  information on Border from Kállay to, 162
  Kállay appointment and, 55–56
  Kállay's explanation of Serbian policy shift to, 243
  Kállay's friendship with, 57–58
  on Karadordević deportation project, 228
  on Karadordević's involvement in Michael's murder, 80–81

Krstić, 37
- meeting of, with Prince Michael at Ivánka (1867), 41–48
- mentality of, in evolving Serbo-Hungarian relations, 3
- on Michael's successor
  Beust's acceptance of, 83–85
  disagreement with Beust over, 80, 82
  on need for Monarchy control over Bosnia-Hercegovina, 267
  on need for Serbian decision on allegiance, 227
  in negotiating deal between Monarchy and Serbia, 283–84
- Note of 30 December, 1875, on Balkan crisis, 269
- on Prince Milan's development and personality, 297–98
- promises on Serbian interests, 39–40
- reaction of, to Russia's repudiation of Black Sea clauses of Treaty of Paris, 189, 190
- responsibility of, for chill in Serbo-Hungarian relations, 115
Russia and
  in Balkan crisis, 268–69
  fear of, 28–29, 43, 67, 148
  on Serbia and Montenegro in Russo-Turkish War, 272
  on Serbian alliance with Austria-Hungary, 187–88
  Serbian satellite status and, 312–13
  on South Slav issue
    disagreement with Kállay on, 166–68
    short vs. long term analysis of, 168
    statement to Hungarian parliament 1871, 213–14
  talks with Orešković on Bosnian question, 66–69
  transformation of, from national politician to international statesman, 188–89
  on treaty with Serbia on Bosnian scheme, 205–6
Anger (Austro-Hungarian consul), on railway treaty with Serbia, 288–89
Apple of Discord

Ast, Nándor, in investigation of Miletić, 91, 92
Ausgleich of 1867, Serbian foreign policy and, 36
Austria. See also Francis Joseph (emperor of Austria) role in Bosnia question, misrepresented by Kállay, 125
Austria-Hungary. See also Habsburg Monarchy Bosnian annexation by, Kállay on, 70 dual monarchy of, after 1867, 20m foreign policy of duality of Beust and Andrásy in, 185–86 slowing negotiations on Treaty of Berlin details, 286 Hungarian factor in, Andrásy and, 313 involvement of, in Serbian succession after Michael's murder, 80, 81, 82 Prince Michael's assassination and, 89–90 Russia and, Reichstadt agreement between, 271 Russian overtures to, 182 reversal of, 183 in Russo-Turkish War, 272 San Stefano peace treaty and, 273 Serbia and after San Stefano treaty, 273–74 as satellite, evolution of, 283–310 Austrian Statute 146 of 21 December 1867, on foreign affairs, 21 Austro-German partnership, evolution of, 246 Austro-Serbian antagonism, 1906–14, inevitability of, 312 Austro-Serbian political treaty, 1881, 297, 298–301 Austro-Serbian relations, Kállay's influence on, 314 Austro-Serbian trade treaty 1881 advantages to Serbia from, 295 completion of, 294 negotiation of, 290–93 trade with Germany and, 296 1892, 296–97

Bach, Alexander von, on Bosnian annexation, 26
Balkans in 1815, 34m after Congress of Berlin, 284m Andrásy on, in 1870, 177 Beust's policy on, Kállay's knowledge of, 60 Christian population of, Ottoman administrative reforms and, 25 crisis in Monarchy's interests and, 268 Prince Milan and, 268, 269–70

Beck, Friedrich, Bosnian question and, 136–37
Beust, Friedrich Ferdinand von, 24f anticipation of war with Russia and, 178–79 approval of, as condition on Bosnian plan, 203 on Austro-Hungarian involvement in Serbian succession after Michael's murder, 81, 82 changing opinion on, 83–85 Balkan policy of, Kállay's knowledge of, 60 blame of, from Kállay for miscalculations in Karadžorđević affair, 114 in Border dissolution issue, 166 on Bosnian scheme, 26–28, 122 growing awareness of, 122, 123 Prokesch and, 133 resistance to, 137–40 skepticism of, 129 on British rejection of Bosnian plan, 185 in defense of circular, 212 distrust of Hungary after Karadžorđević acquittal and, 220 on Eastern Question in 1867, 24 in 1870, 140 foreign policy priorities of, in 1867, 24 on improved relations with Russia, 246 influence of, on foreign policy issues, 22 information on Border from Kállay to, 162 Ivánhka talks and, 44 Kállay's explanation of Serbian policy shift to, 242–43 loss of support for, 190–91 on Michael's successor, disagreement with Andrásy over, 80, 82 on Obrenović as hereditary rulers, 87 Ottoman Empire and, in 1870, 177, 178 reaction of, to Russia's repudiation of Black Sea clauses of Treaty of Paris, 189–90, 197 on Russian overtures to Monarchy, 182–83 on Serbian ambitions for Bosnia-Hercegovina control, 61–62 on Serbia's Balkan alliances, 61

Beust circular, 197–98
Regents' reaction to, Bosnian question and, 209–10 Serbian relations with Monarchy and, 211–13

Bismarck, Otto von on Andrásy's South Slav policy, 245 on division of Balkans into spheres of interest, 291 on Prince Milan's visit with Tsar, 245

Black Sea Crisis
Russia status after, Serbian policy shift and, 243 Russian support of Balkan status quo and, 202
Blaznavac, Milivoj
- on Border issue, 161
- on Bosnian question, 129, 143
  - Beust circular and, 211
discussions of, 201
disillusionment after, 238
death of, 263
as first Regent for Milan Obrenović, 78–79, 79f
election of, 86
on impossibility of Serbo-Hungarian understanding, 253
Karađorđević prosecution and
distrust of Hungary after acquittal in, 219, 220
as Milan's minister president, 263
on Miletic, 169
on Military Border, 164
pro-Hungarian position of, 102
response of, to Karađorđević verdict, 225
Russia and
accompanying Prince Milan to meet Tsar, 240, 241
opposition to, 102, 125
Montenegro rivalry and, 238
reaction of, to overture from, 239–40
on Serbia's dependence on Hungary, 165–66
on Serbo-Hungarian friendship, 85
Bloomfield, John, on Beust and Andrássy, 186
Bogisics, Chief Justice, in Karađorđević prosecution, 112
"border traffic," in Austro-Serbian trade treaty, 294, 311
Bosnia
- annexation of, by Austria-Hungary, Kállay on, 70
- anti-Habsburg nationalist sentiment in, Serbian tolerance of, after 1906, 312
- Francis Joseph's policy toward, 23–24
Bosnia-Hercegovina
Monarchy control over
- explaining rationale for, Kállay in, 289
- need for, Andrássy on, 267
occupied, Kállay as chief administrator of, 314
partition of, plan for, 205m
Serbian control over
- Beust on, 61–62
- offer of, at Ivánka talks, 42–43
- promise of, 3, 39–40
uprising in, threat of, Orešković outlining, 67–68
Bosnian question
- 1868–70, 121–54
- after Prince Michael's assassination, 94
- alienation of Croats from Serbs and, 70
- Austro-Hungarian diplomatic initiative on, 177–78
- crucial phase of, 133–141
- draft treaty with Serbia on, points in, 204–5
- Hungarian objective in, 121
- Hungarian revival of, 1870–71, 197–217
- Orešković's approach to Regents on, 199–200
- reactivation of, in 1870, 148
- Serbian hostility and, 230–31
- Serbo-Croatian cooperation and, 31
Bosnian scheme
Blaznavac and, 102
as blow to Russia, 127
British interest in, 179
Kállay's scepticism on, 115–16
reaction of Ottoman Empire to, 185
renewed push for, by Andrássy, 191–92
revival of, in 1870, 177–81
Regents' response to, 180–81
Ristić's distrust of, 102
Serbian Regents and, 128–29
Bridge, F. R., 8
Budapest Convention, 272
Bulgaria
- creation of, 273
- revolt in, 270
Buol, Karl Ferdinand von, on Bosnian annexation, 26
Congress of Berlin, 274
Balkans after, 284m
Croatia
- desire of, for Dalmatia and Military Border, 160
- Hungarian relations with, 156
- Military Border in, Serbo-Croatian cooperation and, 31
Serbia and
- alienation from, Bosnia question and, 70
- antagonism between, basis for, 31–32, 229
- cooperation between, National Party on, 32
- disharmony between, as goal of Hungary, 160
- suspicion between, 158–159
- Serbian relations with, Ivánka talks and, 47
Croatian National Party, Hungary and, 167
Crown council, Habsburg foreign policy and, 22
Cučković, Emil, 64
Čumić, Acim
- as Serbian minister president, 266, 267
wife of, relationship of Kállay with, 65
Dalmatia
  Croatia's desire for, 160
  revolt of (1869), 163–65
Danube question, Beust circular and, 212–13
Danubian confederation
  Andrásy and, 69
  Kállay on, 59
De Pont (Austrian foreign ministry), on Bosnian plan, 141
Déák, Ferenc, 28
Decsy, János, 6–7, 10
Diószegi, István, 6–7, 10
dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary after 1867, 20m

Eastern Question
  Andrásy on
    by 1871, 248
    in 1870, 177
  Beust on
    in 1867, 24
    in 1870, 140, 177
Eastern Roumelia, commission for creation of, 290
Eötvös, József, 28
  Kállay's acquaintance with, 57
  regional concerns of, 37
Europe, at end of Franco-Prussian War, 1871, 176m

fortresses, Ottoman-held, cession of
  Beust on, 38
  as Serbian goal, 27, 39
  Serbo-Hungarian cooperation and, 37

Francis Joseph (emperor of Austria)
  on Austro-Hungarian involvement in Serbian succession after Michael's murder, 82
  on Bosnian annexation, 26
  Bosnian scheme and
    approval of, 122, 198, 206
    military memoranda and, 137
  control of foreign affairs by, in 1867, 21–22
  dissolution of Border and, 161, 162
  foreign policy objectives of, in 1867, 22–24
  on improved relations with Russia, 246
  insurrection in Hercegovina and, 267–68
  introduction of Bosnian question to, 129
  need for Hungarian cooperation and, 19
Franco-Prussian War, 175–96
  Europe at end of, 1871, 176m

Galántai, József, on Ivánka talks, 10, 45, 46
Garašanin, Ilija
  injury to, in Obrenović assassination, 77–78
  on Ivánka talks, 42
  on Krstić's mission to Hungary, 38
Garašanin, Milutin, objection of, to secret treaty of alliance, 299–300
Gavrilović, Jovan
  as co-Regent, appointment of, 86
  presentation of Bosnian plan to, 202–3
Germany, Austria and, cooperation between, evolution of, 246
Gorchakov, Alexander, on Bosnia question, 124
Gorchakov circular, 190

Habsburg Monarchy. See also Austria-Hungary in 1867
  foreign policy of
    Austrian Statute 146 of 21 December 1867 and, 21
    Hungarian Law XII of 1867 and, 20
    nationalities of, 21m
  after 1867, constitutional structure of, 23f
  Bosnian appropriation by, 123
  conservative policy of, in 1867, 23
  distrust of Serbia by, after Livadia, 251
  economic control of Serbia by, negotiating, 283
  foreign policy of
    Austrian Statute 146 of 21 December 1867 on, 21
    in Balkans, dynastic tradition of
      acceptance of, by Andrásy, in 1872, 261
      rejection by, by Andrásy, 1867–71, 260
      duality of, 45–47
      toward Serbia
    Bosnian question and, 179
    failure of détente with Russia and, 184
    Hungarian factor in, 2–4
    Hungarian Law XII of 1867 on, 20
    need of, for proof of Serbian good will, 252, 253
    neutrality of, in Franco-Prussian War, 175, 176–77
    Ottoman Empire as ally of, 261
    relations with Russia, Austro-German cooperation and, 246
    Russian overtures to, 182
      reversal of, 183
    Serbia and, 30–31
    effect of Bosnian question on, 123
    as satellite, evolution of, 283–310
  Serbian relations with
    Beust circular and, 211–13
    problematical, 1871–78, 259–82
    tariff on swine imported from Serbia to, 251, 252
Haymerle, Heinrich von
  as Hungarian foreign minister, railway treaty and, 287–88
  on Monarchy's view of Serbian independence, 298
on Prince Milan's development and personality, 297–98
on Serbian relations with Monarchy, 290
Hercegovina. See also Bosnia-Hercegovina
Francis Joseph's policy toward, 23–24
insurrection in, in 1875, 267–68
Horvát, Boldizsár
in firing of Miletić, 91–92
Kállay's appeals to, during Karadžorđević prosecution, 109, 111, 112
in prosecution of assassination suspects, 105
Hristić, Filip
on Kállay's credibility as negotiator, 213
on meeting of Prince Milan with Tsar, 239, 240
Ristić's interest in Russia and, 238
Hübner, Joseph Alexander von, on Bosnian annexation, 26
Hungarian factor, in Habsburg Monarchy foreign policy, 2–4
Hungarian Law XII of 1867, on foreign affairs, 20
Hungary. See also Austria-Hungary
in Bosnian question revival, 1870–71, 197–217
Croatian relations with, 156
on dissolution of Border, 161–62
extradition of assassination suspects refused by, 103–6
Miletić as irritation to, 169
Serbia and cooperation between
Andrássy and, 37, 38–39, 43–44
Prince Michael and, 36, 37
deteriorating relations with, 228–31
secret treaty between, offer of, 69
Serbian and Croatian disharmony as goal of, 160
Serbia's dependence on, 165–66
Serbs in, persecution of, after Prince Michael's assassination, 90–91
Hunyadi, László, on Serbo-Hungarian relations, 37, 38
Ignatiev (General), 238
in arranging visit of Prince Milan to Tsar, 239–40
Italy, on Bosnia question, 124
Ivánka (Hungary), meeting between Andrássy and Prince Michael at (1867), 41–48
Ivanović, Mrs., relationship of Kállay with, intelligence value of, 65–66
Jaksčić, Grgur, on Ivánka talks, 45
Joannini, Count, on Bosnian question, 141
Jovanović, Slobodan, on duality of Habsburg Monarchy foreign policy, 45–46
Jovanović, Vladimir
arrest of, 92
Serbian liberalism and, 33
Kaljević, Ljubomir, as Serbian minister president, Balkan crisis and, 269, 270
Kállay, Benjámin, 56f
on alienating Croats and Serbs, 70
appointment of, to consul-general to Belgrade, as dual role, 60
as Austro-Hungarian consul-general in Belgrade, Bosnian scheme and, 46, 48
to Beust on Serbian dependence on Austria-Hungary, 202
Beust's circular and, 198
biography of, 56–57
on Blaznavac
Hungarian leanings of, 85
as Regent, 79, 84, 85
to Blaznavac on Serbian obstruction, 252
in Border issue, 161–62
in Bosnian scheme, 122
Andrássy as key to success of, 126
Beust and, 133, 135–36, 139–40
frustration of, with Andrássy, 135
handling of, criticism of, 147–48
Serbian self-interest and, 131–32
as chief administrator of occupied Bosnia Hercegovina, 314
as Consul Anger's correspondent, 288–89
despacht from Andrássy to, on Serbian policy, 187–88
"divide and rule" principle and, 148, 159
as editor/author, 289
education of, 57
efforts to revise secret treaty of alliance, 300, 301
on failing to mention Beust circular to Regents, 209–10
on importance of Hungarian assistance to Serbia, 94
journey of, through Bosnia in 1872, 262–63
on Karadžorđević deportation project, 225–26, 228
Karadžorđević prosecution and acquittal in, distrust of Hungary after, 220
efforts to influence judges in, 108–9, 111–12
Hunyadi, 107–114
loss of credibility as negotiator, 213
meeting with Regents on Hungarian-Serbian relations, 228–30
mentality of, in evolving Serbo-Hungarian relations, 3
Kállay, Benjámin (continued)
on nationality, 59
newspaper contacts of, in Belgrade, 65
Obrenović assassination and, 77–78
Belgrade conspirators in, trial of, 106–7
response of, 79
suspects in, extradition efforts of, 104–5
parliamentary career of, 289, 290
personal relations with women, intelligence value of, 65–66
personality of, 60
plea to Beust on cession of Bosnia, 133–34
in plot to assassinate Miletić, 169–70
political beginnings, 58–59
post-Livadia Serbian policy and, 248
press attacks on, 250
on Prince Milan's development and personality, 297–98
reaction of, to Prince Milan's visit to Tsar, 242–43
responsibility of, for chill in Serbo-Hungarian relations, 114–15
return to Austrian-Hungarian foreign ministry, 289, 290
role of, 1
between Serbian Regent and Hungary, dual nature of, 92–93
Serbian policy of, as disaster, 2
on Serbian route for railways, 63–64
Serbia's swing to Russia predicted by, 237
on South Slav issue
disagreement with Andrásy on, 166–68
limited view and, 168
in strengthening Serbia's ties with Hungary, 165–66
surveillance of Serbian–non-Serbian interactions by, 156
in trade and secret political treaties of 1881, 313–14
treaties of 1880–81 and, 2
use of Orešković by, for Bosnian plan, 199–200
Kálnoky, Gustav von
on importance of Serbian control, 292
as Serbian foreign minister, 301
Karadordević, Alexander, 103f
deportation of, from Austria-Hungary, Serbian efforts for, 225
involvement in Prince Michael's murder acquittal of, 113
by Supreme Court, 223–24
deteriorating Serbo-Hungarian relations and, 228, 229, 231–32
Serbian policy shift and, 243
appeal of King's Bench verdict by, 222
conviction and sentencing of
at Belgrade trial, 107
by King's Bench, 221
evidence of, 88, 106
extradition refused for, 104–5
prosecution for, 90, 101–19
Serbo-Hungarian relations and, 95
suspicions of corruption in, 224–25
suspicions of, 80
as possible Michael successor, 80
Karadordević dynasty, Serbian government of, after Alexander's assassination, 312
Karavelov, Ljuben, arrest of, 92
Kemény, Zsigmond, Near East policy and, 30
King's Bench, in Karadordević prosecution, 221
Klapka, György, 69
Kos, Franz-Josef, 9
Kossuth, Lajos, 29–30
Krestić, Vasilije, in Ivánka talks, 7–8, 44–45
Krstić, Nikola
Andrássy's promises to, on Serbian interests, 39
Serbo-Hungarian relations and, 37
Kujundžić, Milan, agitation in Monarchy encouraged by, 249
Kuzmanović, Dimitrije, testimony of, in Karadordević's King's Bench trial, 221, 224
Livadia, Prince Milan's visit with Tsar in, 241
Longworth, John Augustus
on corruption in Karadordević prosecution, 224, 225
on Kállay's handling of Bosnian issue, 147–48
mediation on Bosnian question and, 184
Lónyay, Menyhért, on Serbian swine imports, 252
Lutz, Heinrich, on Ivánka talks, 45
Marinović, Jovan, 78
as Serbian minister president, 265–66
Mayerffy, Gyula-Károly, in plot to assassinate Miletić, 169, 170
Menabrea (Italian Count), on Bosnia question, 124
Metternich principle, 26
Michael (Prince of Serbia). See Obrenović, Michael (Prince of Serbia)
Mihailović, Stevča, as Serbian minister president appointment of, 1875, 267
forced resignation of, 1875, 269
re-appointment of, 1876, 270
Mijatović, Čedomilj
political alliance with Monarchy and, 298, 299–300
trade treaty with Monarchy and, 293
Milan (Prince of Serbia). See Obrenović, Milan (Prince of Serbia)
Miletić, Svetozar, 144, 163
  on Bosnian plan, 180–81
  incarcerations of, 170
  involvement in Prince Michael's murder, lack of evidence for, 91–92
  on Military Border, 164
  Ottoman revolt and, 239
  plot to assassinate, Kállay in, 169–70
Serbian liberalism and, 33
Military Border
  Croatia's desire for, 160
  dissolution of
    as Hungarian goal, 160–62
    Orešković on, 163, 166, 167
Mill, John Stuart, 59, 69, 170
Mirković, Stevo, in plot to assassinate Miletić, 169, 170
Mita (Prince Michael's servant), injury to, in Obrenović assassination, 77, 78
Mrazović, Matija, 163
Murad V (Sultan), 163
National Party, Croatian, Yugoslavism and, 31–32
  nationalism
    Serbian
      Bosnian question and, 123
      Kállay and, 314
    South Slav, in Border, dissolution and, 161
  nationalities, of Habsburg Monarchy, in 1867, 21m
  foreign policy and, 19–21
Near East, policy on, of Beust and Francis Joseph, Russia in, 25
Nikola of Montenegro, 78
Obrenović, Alexander, assassination of, 312
Obrenović, Michael (Prince of Serbia), 63f
  assassination of, 77–99
    Belgrade trial and, 106–7
    as criminal vs. political crime, extradition and, 103–6
    domestic political advantages from, 93–94
    foreign involvement in, 89–90
    Karadordević and, 80, 88 (See also Karadordević, Alexander, involvement in Prince Michael's murder)
    Serbian Liberals and, 88–89
    imperial decree (berat) issued on, 86–87
    on Kállay's appointment, 60
    meeting of, with Andrásy at Ivánka, 41–48
    on Pan-Slavism, 64
    prospect of Bosnia-Hercegovina control and, 40
    Serbian liberalism and, 33–34
  on Serbian route for railways, 63–64
  on Serbo-Hungarian cooperation, 36, 37
  successor to
    conflict over, 80–86
    Prince Milan as, 78, 79f, 86
  Yugoslavism and, 32
Obrenović, Milan (Prince of Serbia)
  acclaimed as hereditary Prince, 86
  Balkan crisis and, 268, 269–70
  childhood of, personality problems from, 264–65
  clash of Ristić with, 264
  coming of age, Serbia's relation with Monarchy and, 262
  on importance of Serbian relations with Monarchy, 292
  introduction of, 78, 79f
  meeting with Tsar, 241
  negotiations for, 239–41
  personal commitment of, on secret treaty of alliance, 302–3
  San Stefano peace treaty and, 273
  secret treaty of alliance with Monarchy negotiated by, 298–301
  on Serbia's need for Austrian good will, 263
  unpopularity of, in Serbia, 264, 266
  war on Ottomans declared by, 270
Obrenović regime, liberal movement and, 33–34
Okey, Robin, 11
Orczy, Béla
  appointment to Hungarian foreign ministry, 56
  on Bosnian plan, 179
Orešković, Antonije
  in approach to Regents on Bosnian plan, 199–200
  on Border dissolution, 166, 167
    on Andrásy's view of Bosnian takeover by Serbia, 42–43
    on Blaznavac's misconception of justice system, 107
    meeting of
      with General Wagner, 163
      with Andrásy on Bosnian question, 66–69
    missions of, after Michael's assassination, 79
    on plan for South Slav unity, 159
Ottoman Empire
  Andrásy's view of, 46, 67
  Austria's Near East policy and, 24–25
  Bosnia scheme and, Prokesch on, 123–24
  integrity of, guaranteed by Russia, 202
  as Monarchy's ally, 261
  Prince Michael's assassination and, 90
  reaction of, to Bosnian plan, 185
  reform of, need for, Beust on, 38
  Serbian war against, 270–71
Ottoman Empire (continued)
support of, Andrásy in, 260
war with Russia, 272

Pajor, Titusz, in Karadordević prosecution, 108–9
Pan-Slavism, Prince Michael on, 64
Pašić, Nikola, Serbian government of, refusal to renew Austro-Hungarian trade treaty by, 312
peace. See also Quietism
in Beust's foreign policy, 24
in Francis Joseph's foreign policy, 23
Pelagić, Vaso, Ottoman revolt and, 239
Petrović, Nikola, 13
Piroćanac, Milan
as head of Serbian government, 1880, 293
objection of, to secret treaty of alliance, 299–300
political alliance with Monarchy favored by, 298
Popović, Miloš, 65
in plot to assassinate Miletić, 169
Popović, Vasilije, 5
Potthoff, Heinrich, 7
Progressives, Serbian, 293
Prokesch-Osten, Anton von
on Bosnian question, 26
on Bosnian scheme
Beust and, 138–39
growing awareness of, 122, 131–32
objections to, 132–33
Ottomans and, 123–24
on hereditary succession in Serbia, 87
on Michael's successor, 80
on Monarchy's diplomats in Belgrade, 55
on Prince Milan's visit with Tsar, 244
Prussia, Serbian policy shift and, 243
Pržić, Ilija, 5
quietism
in Austrian foreign policy, 23, 24
in Serbian foreign policy, inducements to, 39–40
Rabatinsky, Marie, 146
Rački, Franjo, Yugoslavism and, 31
Radenić, Andrija, 13
Radetzky von Radetz, Joseph, 26
Radovanović, Pavle, involvement in Prince Michael's murder, 88, 103
execution for, 106
railway(s)
Serbian route for, Prince Michael on, 63–64
Serbian spur of, Ristić's stall tactics on, 287
between Vienna and Constantinople, Beust on importance of, 138
railway convention, compromise on, 288
Rechberg, Johann Bernhard von, 26
Regents, Serbian. See also Blaznavac, Milivoj; Gavrilović, Jovan; Ristić, Jovan
Bosnian question and, 128–29
in 1870, restraints on, 180–81
appeal of Bosnian acquisition and, 123
Beust circular and, 209–10, 211
conditions of, 203
details of, 201
loss of interest in, 147
memorandum requested on, 127, 130, 131, 134–35, 140, 144, 145–46
Orešković's approach to, 199–200
pressure on, from Kállay, 200
skepticism on, 122
changing loyalties of, 112–13
on Dalmatian revolt, 164–65
distrust of Hungary, after Karadordević acquittal, 219–20
election/appointment of, 86
Kállay's report to Andrásy of, after Livadia, 250–51
Karadordević prosecution and, distrust of Hungary following, 225
meeting with Kállay on Hungarian-Serbian relations, 228–30
on Military Border, 164
post-Livadia relations with Kállay, 248–49
pro-Hungarian position of, disadvantage of, 228–29
prosecution of Belgrade conspirators and, 106–7
Russia and, renewed interest in, 231
Serbian Liberals and, 92
on Serbian relations with Monarchy, Beust circular and, 211–13
on Serbia's dependence on Hungary, 165–66
Reichstadt agreement, 271
Reiswitz, Johann Albrecht von, 6
Ress, Imre, on duality of Monarchy foreign policy, 46–47
Ristić, Jovan, 78, 79f
on Andrásy's appointment as foreign minister, 249–50
on Austro-Hungarian policy to Serbia in 1872, 262
Blaznavac's pro-Hungarian policy and, 103
on Bosnian question
alternative plan for, 146
concerns about, 208–9
discussions with Kállay on, 145
reservations of, 203
skepticism on, 124–25, 128, 130, 135, 208
Wagner affair and, 144
as candidate for Regent, 84
clash of Prince Milan with, 264
as co-Regent, appointment of, 86
on contradiction between Andrássy and Beust policies, 209–10
on contradictions in Andrássy's policy in 1867 and 1871, 207
distrust of Hungary, after Karadordević acquittal, 219–20
on Ivánka talks, 43
on Kállay's efforts on Bosnian scheme, 207–8
on Military Border, 164
mission of, to Bismarck, 62–63
national-liberal party and, 266
in negotiating details of Treaty of Berlin, 286, 287
in negotiation of Austro-Serbian trade treaty, 290–93
notes on draft treaty on Bosnia of, 204–5, 206–7
on post-Livadia relations with Monarchy, 248–49
press attacks on, 250
pro-Hungarian position of, disadvantages of, 228–29
Russia and
disillusionment with, after Russo-Turkish War, 273
leanings toward, 237–38
San Stefano peace treaty and, 273
seeking imperial decree (berat) on Obrenović as hereditary rulers, 87
as Serbian foreign minister
appointment of
1872, 263
1875, 267
dismissal of, by Prince Milan
1873, 265
1880, 293
forced resignation of, 1875, 269
re-appointment of, 1876, 270
on suspicion of Croatia, 158–59
Treaty of Berlin and, 283–85
Rosen, Georg
on Blaznavac after Karadordević acquittal, 219
on dual nature of Kállay's appointment, 60
on Kállay's appointment, 60
Rosen, Michael, 65
Russia
Andrássy's fear of, 28–29, 43, 67, 148
Austria-Hungary and, Reichstadt agreement between, 271
Balkan status quo supported by
Black Sea Crisis and, 202
as official position, 268
in Beust and Francis Joseph's Near Eastern policy, 25–26, 41
Black Sea clauses of Treaty of Paris repudiated by, 189
Andrássy's reaction to, 189, 190
Beust's reaction to, 189–90, 197
Blaznavac's opposition to, 102
on Bosnia question, 124
Bosnian scheme as blow to, 127
Habsburg Monarchy's relations with, Austro-German cooperation and, 246
Ottoman Empire integrity guaranteed by, 202
overtures to Austria-Hungary from, 182
reversal of, 183
Prince Michael's assassination and, 89
Serbian abandonment by, 274
on Serbian involvement in Balkan crisis, 268
Serbian relations with
hereditary succession issue and, 87
improving, 239–42
Ivánka talks and, 47
renewed Serbian interest in, 231, 237–58
threat from, Habsburg Monarchy's neutrality in Franco-Prussian War and, 176
war with, anticipation of, Beust's and Andrássy's preparations for, 178–79
war with Ottoman Empire, 272
Russo-Turkish War, 272–73
San Stefano peace treaty, 273
Schönbrunn Convention, 266
Schweinitz, Hans Lothar von, on Prince Milan's visit with Tsar, 244–45
'Sennyey, Pál, Kállay's friendship with, 58
Serbia/Serbs
Austro-Hungarian domination over, evolution of, 2–3
Balkan alliances of, Beust's concern over, 61
in Balkan crisis, 268, 269–70
Beust's Bosnian policy and, 26–28
Croatia and
alienation of, Bosnia question and, 70
antagonism between, basis for, 31–32, 229
cooperation between, National Party on, 32
disharmony between, as goal of Hungary, 160
suspicion between, 158–59
distrust of, by Monarchy after Livadia, 251
distrust of military by, Kállay's encouragement of, 162
domestic political scene in, unstable, in 1874–75, 266–67
economic stagnation in, after trade treaty, 296
Serbia/Serbs (continued)

foreign policy of

Andrássy's proposal at Ivánka and, 47
Ausgleich of 1867 and, 36

governmental structure of, in 1860s, 35–36

Habsburg Monarchy and, 30–31
Beust circular and, 211–13
deteriorating relationship between, after 1903, 2
effect of Bosnian question on, 123
railway convention between, 286–88, 311
relations between, problematical, 1871–78, 259–82
satellite status imposed on, 1878–81, 283–310
secret political treaty between, 298–301, 311–12
trade treaty between, 290–97, 311
veterinary convention between, 295, 311

Hungarian, liberal movement in, in 1860s, 33
Ivánka talks and, 47

Hungary and
assistance from, importance of, 94
coopration between
Andrássy and, 37, 38–39, 43–44
Prince Michael and, 36, 37
dependence on, 165–66
deteriorating relations with, 228–31
secret treaty between, offer of, 69
Prince Michael's assassination and, 77–99
railway route through, Michael and Kállay on, 63–64

Russia and (See also under Russia)
renewed interest in, 231, 237–58
Russian abandonment of, 274
in Russo-Turkish War, 272
San Stefano peace treaty and, 273
strategic importance of, 35
tariff on swine exported to Monarchy from, 251, 252
as threat to Balkan peace, validity of, 34–35
and Vojvodina, in 1860s, 35m

Serbian liberalism, in 1866, 33

Serbian Liberals
cooperation of, Regent's need for, 88–89
in government service, 93
Prince Michael's murder and, 88
Regents and, 92

Serbian nationalism
Bosnia question and, 123
Kállay and, 314

Serbo-Hungarian relations
Bosnian question and, 123
Karadordević prosecution and, 95

Seton-Watson, R. W., 5

South Slavs. See also Serbia/Serbs
Dalmatian revolt and, 164–65
disagreement of Andrássy and Kállay on, 166–68
ferment among, Serbian policy shift and, 243
managing, 155–74

Stanković, Filip, involvement in Prince Michael's murder, 103
acquittal of, by Supreme Court, 223–24
appeal of King's Bench verdict by, 222
conviction and sentencing of
at Belgrade trial, 107
by King's Bench, 221
extradition refused for, 104–5

Stefanović, Sanilo, as Serbian minister president, 267
Stratimirović, General, on Beust circular, 210

Strossmayer, Josip Juri
Belgrade visit of, 156, 157–59
on Bosnian scheme, 208
on distrust of Serbian Government, 159
National Party of, representatives of, in Sabor; 156
Yugoslavism and, 31–32

Subotić, Jovan
discussion with Blaznavac, 156–57
discussion with Kállay, 157

Syögyény-Marich, László, talks of Mijatović with, 298

Szabolcs, Miklós, in Karadordević prosecution, 221

Szilágyi, Dezső
on composition of King's Bench, 221
Kállay's appeal to, during Karadordević prosecution, 111

Sztrokay (Hungarian prosecutor), in Karadordević prosecution, 108, 109, 111, 112

tariff(s)
in Austro-Serbian trade treaty, 294–95, 311
on swine exported from Serbia to Monarchy, 251, 252, 286
in Treaty of Berlin, 285–86

Terebes meeting, between Andrássy and Kállay on Bosnian scheme, 126
territorial expansion
Francis Joseph and, 23–24
Habsburg Monarchy's interest in, Russia and, 25–26
Thallóczy, Lajos, on Kállay’s Bosnian journey, 263
Theodorovics, Svetozar, 64
Thoemmel, Gustav, Bosnian question and, 136, 137

Three Emperors' League
in Balkan crisis, 266, 268, 270, 271
renewed, in 1881, 297
revival of, in 1880, 291, 292
trade treaty, Austro-Serbian, negotiation of, 290–93
Treaty of Berlin, conditions of, 285–86
Treaty of Paris
  Black Sea clauses of
    renunciation of, 175, 181
    repudiation of, by Russia, 189 (See also
    Russia, Black Sea clauses of Treaty of
    Paris repudiated by)
  revision of, Beust on, 25
  Serbian aggressive inclinations and, 61
Tripković, Pavle, involvement in Prince Michael's
  murder, 88, 103
    acquittal of, by Supreme Court, 223–24
    appeal of King's Bench verdict by, 222
    conviction and sentencing of
      at Belgrade trial, 107
      by King's Bench, 221
    extradition refused for, 104–5
United Serbian Youth, 33

vetinary convention, Austro-Serbian, 295, 311
Vučković, Vojislav J., on Ivánka talks, 45

Wagner, Johann Ritter von
  Croatian National Party and, 144, 147
  meeting of Orešković with, 163
  replaced as governor of Dalmatia, 164
Wenckheim, Béla, attempt to prosecute Miletić
  and, 91–92
Wertheimer, Eduard von, 4–5, 8, 70
Wrede, on Serbian reaction to San Stefano treaty,
  273–74

Yugoslavism, 31–32

Zastava (The Standard), Serbian liberalism and, 33