The claim I've made is that there is an often overlooked ontological realism that is properly associated with the Deweyan pragmatic inquiry, the implication of which is that "what" might be discovered in inquiry, what might be known, is in an important sense set in advance, and is independent of the beliefs, hopes and preferences of the inquirer(s). The "production of knowledge," in virtue of this external limiting determination, is indeed the production of that which is stable, secure, general, and, in one very important sense, "transcendent" of the concrete particulars of its originating conditions.
This is a rather controversial thesis. In explicating it further here, I shall examine several crucial issues, developing what I take to be the best "Deweyan" interpretations, and set these in contrast to the contrary positions on a "Deweyan realism" advanced recently by Cunningham and by Garrison.
"Does "The Knowing" Alter "The Known"? On the Troublesome Relation of Facts and Ideas in a Deweyan Epistemology,"
Education and Culture: Vol. 13
, Article 4.
Available at: http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/eandc/vol13/iss1/art4