Essays on executive compensation and firm performance
Abstract
This dissertation contains a number of essays on executive compensation and firm performance. The first essay empirically examines how CEO turnover is related to company performance and a number of other factors. The second essay examines why the type of compensation given to upper executives should vary across firms. We propose a model of optimal piece rate contracts, that incorporates incentives from tournaments. We then test the predictions of this model empirically. The third essay looks at how company performance is affected by the age of the CEO. This essay also includes a modification of the Gibbons and Murphy model. We also perform regression analysis on the affect CEO age has on company performance and on the allocation of resources to investments that improve future company performance. The last essay is a theoretical study of the factors that can cause organization inertia.
Degree
Ph.D.
Advisors
Barron, Purdue University.
Subject Area
Economic theory|Labor economics|Management
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