The naturalness of naturalism: Essays in realism and meta-epistemology
Abstract
Rorty, Bernstein and others have argued that there is an acute lack of metaphilosophical reflection in contemporary analytic philosophy. These eight essays develop this concern in the context of issue-specific debates such as the realism dispute, the sceptic-nonsceptic dispute, and Rorty's polemic against epistemology. It is argued that a folk-theoretic and naturalistic conception of philosophy as what Devitt labels "protoscience" is necessary to legitimate the subject-matter of the analytic tradition, and clarify sundry issues such as the realism dispute, the thesis that knowledge requires certainty, causal theories of reference and knowledge, and many others. It is also argued that an independent 'deflationary' conception of philosophy can be used to defuse the attack on serious and systematic epistemologically-centered philosophy by Rorty. The project is divided into three parts. In the first, I address the issue of realism and the various disputes it has generated in specialized semantic theory. In the second part I reflect on the significance of philosophical scepticism as well as the allegedly impossible standard for knowledge that the thesis that knowledge requires certainty seems to yield. In the third part I develop metaphilosophical considerations in favor of a common-sense approach to philosophical issues, and use the same considerations to suggest the implausibility of Rorty's effort to deconstruct epistemology.
Degree
Ph.D.
Advisors
Bertolet, Purdue University.
Subject Area
Philosophy
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